easa automation policy_michel masson

Staying in Control - Loss of Control Prevention & Recovery

EASA Conference, 4-5 Oct 2011, Cologne

EASA Automation Policy

Dr Michel A. MassonSafety Action Coordinator, HF ExpertOctober 4th, 2011

EASA Conference Staying in Control, 4-5 Oct 2011, Cologne 2

Plan

Introduction

The approach

Most critical issues

Paths for improvement

Way forward


Quote

31 Aug 2011



The EASA Automation Policy adopts an innovative approach consisting of mapping crew-automation interaction issues, design and certification and training principles, and respective regulatory provisions to identify critical issues and paths for improvement

Being developed by the Internal Group on Personnel Training (IGPT)

Action mentioned in the EASp


The EASA Internal Group on Personnel Training (IGPT)

Set-up in 2010 to follow-up the EASA International Conference on Pilot Training of Nov 2009

Scope expanded to all types of personnel

Composed of experts from all operational Directorates of EASA


Plan

Introduction

The approach



Way forward


From a review of literature, 100+ entries were aggregated and grouped into 17 themes (not in ranked order):

Transformation of pilots’ role

Authority and control

Monitoring and intent recognition

Managing the automation versus flying the aircraft

Simplicity of operation

Aircraft types, variants, and (lack of) standardisation related issues

Special equipment

Flight crew co-ordination and communication

Situation Awareness, mode awareness, failure detection and management

1. Identify and group Crew-Automation Interaction issues


Complacency, over-reliance on automation, decision making

Workload management

Error Management

Information processing, integration and formatting

Diagnostic and troubleshooting

Alarm management

Programming and related issues (for example of FMS)

Database related issues

1. Identify and group Crew-Automation Interaction issues


2. Bridge Design and Training Perspectives

For each automation issue:

How can it be mitigated by Design?

How can it be mitigated by Training?


2. Bridging Design and Training Perspectives

Example:

Issue: The Flight Crew don’t select the level of automation appropriate for the task


2. Bridge Design and Training Perspectives


Based on expert judgment

Simple Risk Matrix:

3. Prioritisation of issues


Design & Certification:

CS and AMC 25.1302, Rulemaking Task CS Flight Crew

FCL

JAR-FCL 1.235, FCL 725.A et al., JAR-FCL 1.261 et al, Learning Objectives, Rulemaking task FCL.002, etc.

OPS

OPS 1.210, OPS 1.945, OPS 1.965, Appendix 1 to OPS 1.1045 B 2& B 3, OPS 1.978 (SOP), Appendix 1 to OPS 1.965, etc.

4. Identify and assess coverage in regulations (mitigations)


Plan

Introduction

The approach



Way forward


Basic manual and cognitive flying skills tend to decline because of lack of practice and feel for the aircraft can deteriorate.Difficulties to understand the situation and to gain/regain control when automation reaches the limit of its operation domain and disconnects or in case of automation failure.When automation fails or disconnects, the tasks allocated to the pilots may fall beyond their capabilities.Unexpected automation behaviour leading to adverse consequences due to engagement/disengagement of automatisms in inappropriate context.Diagnostic systems are limited with regard to dealing with multiple failures, with situations requiring deviations from SOPs, or with the unexpected (no SOPs)

Most critical issues (1/2)


AAE Conference 2011


Unanticipated situations requiring to manually override automation are difficult to understand and manage, create a surprise effect, and induce a workload peak.Pilots interacting with automation can be distracted from flying the aircraft. Selection of modes, annunciation of modes, FD commands may be given more importance than value of pitch, power, roll and yaw and so distract the flight/crew pilots from flying the aircraft.Flightcrews may spend too much time trying to understand the origin / conditions / causes of an alarm whereas it is not necessary for the situation at handData entry errors (either mistakes or typing errors) made when using Electronic Flight Bags (EFBs) may have critical consequences. Errors may be more difficult to prevent and to detect (no system check of the consistency of the computed or entered values) as EFBs are out of the scope of Type Certification and there is no guarantee that they are designed in accordance with Human Factors standards.

Most critical issues (2/2)


Plan

Introduction

The approach



Way forward



The European aviation system is globally well defended, providing all regulatory provisions and best practicesare well and uniformly implemented.Furthermore, regulatory developments already planned in the Ops, FCL and CS domains will provide additional mitigations.

Critical issues however deserve attention


Paths for improvement (1/3)

(Not an exhaustive list)

Revise requirements impacting basic airmanship and manual flying skills

Revise MPL/CBT requirements wrt Automation Management

Revise the Multi Crew Cooperation (MCC) concept and Instruction requirements wrt Automation Management



Revise recurrent training and testing requirements wrt Automation Mgt

Improve operator Automation Policies and develop Automation Policies specific to AC types and variants

Encourage manufacturers to publish Automation Policies and develop Automation Policies specific to AC types and variants


Wrt Operator Automation Policy


Manufacturer Automation Policy Examples



Transfer of Certification assumptions with regard to flight crew competences to training (as used presently in the OEB).

Consider getting the approval of safety critical functions of Electronic Flight Bags (EFBs) into the frame of Type Certification.

Close the loop by ensuring a consistent and complete validation process between Certification and Standardisation.

Continue involvement with Working Groups such as ICATEE, ICAO NGAP, etc.


European WP presented in ICAO A37


Plan

Quote


The IGPT and the EASp

Conceptual model and scope

The method step by step


Way forward


Way forward

Work in development:

Consolidation with stakeholders (manufacturers, operators, …)

Coordination with Authorities: FAA, TCCA, etc., and ICAO

Coordination with expert teams,such as ECAST, CAST, RASG, and EHFAG

Thank you for your attention

EASA Internal Group on Personnel Training (IGPT)

Coordinator:

[email protected]

Safety Analysis and Research Department


Annex - The European Aviation Safety Plan (EASp)

The European Aviation Safety Programme (EASP) complements the State Safety Programmes (SSPs)

Strategy (developed by the EC)

Policies and objectives

Programme: (developed by the EC)

Means for States to implement SSP (by the EC)

Plan: the EASp (developed by EASA)

European-wide priority actions (by EASA)

1st edition 2011-2114, now being revised


Published on the EASA SMS webpage


SAFETY PLAN FRAMEWORK

SYSTEMIC ISSUES OPERATIONAL ISSUES EMERGING ISSUES

Working with States to address SSPs

COMMERCIAL AIR TRANSPORT BY AEROPLANES

New products, systems, technologies and

operations

Working with States to foster the

implementation of SMS in the industry

Runway Excursions Environmental factors

Safety Management enablers

Mid-air collisionsRegulatory considerations

Complexity of the systemControlled Flight Into

TerrainNext Generation of Aviation Professionals

Loss of Control In Flight

Ground Collisions

OTHER TYPES OF OPERATION

Helicopters

General Aviation

HUMAN FACTORS AND PERFORMANCE

Training related Actions on the EASp


Action Develop an Automation Policy

easa automation policy_michel masson

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