east german and berlin wall

East Germans and the Berlin Wall: Popular Opinion and Social Change before and after theBorder Closure of August 1961Author(s): Corey RossSource: Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 39, No. 1 (Jan., 2004), pp. 25-43Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3180668 .Accessed: 11/04/2014 20:14

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Sage Publications, Ltd. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Journal ofContemporary History.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 202.57.58.233 on Fri, 11 Apr 2014 20:14:37 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Journal of Contemporary History Copyright ? 2004 SAGE Publications, London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi, Vol 39(l), 25-43. ISSN 0022-0094. DOI: 10.1177/0022009404039882

Corey Ross East Germans and the Berlin Wall: Popular Opinion and Social Change before and after the Border Closure of August 1961

Only days before the barbed wire went up around West Berlin on the night of 12-13 August 1961, Walter Ulbricht, leader of the ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED) in East Germany, vigorously complained to Khruschev about the seem- ingly insurmountable obstacles that the porous sectoral boundaries around West Berlin posed to the entire socialist project in East Germany:

The entire situation, influenced by the open border, hindered us from implementing adequate measures to eliminate the disproportions in the wage structure and to create a proper relationship between wages and performance .... Simply put, the open border forced us to raise the living standard faster than our economic capabilities allowed. ... Of course we had similar difficulties with the transition to agricultural co-operatives as in other People's Democracies. But one should not overlook the fact that some things are much more compli- cated here. ... In all the other People's Democracies, in the context of their closed borders, such political-economic issues could be tackled differently than was possible under our political circumstances.'

This was merely one in a series of urgent letters during 1960-61. As Ulbricht had been warning the Kremlin, the mass population drain to the West was costing the German Democratic Republic (GDR) billions: production losses alone were estimated at around 2.5 to 3 billion DM. As a result, not only was the much-vaunted goal of surpassing West Germany's economic performance completely unachievable, but the aim had essentially become one of damage limitation, not least in order to curb the further population flow westwards. By summer 1961, Ulbricht was warning Moscow that the GDR was on the

I would like to thank the SSRC Berlin Program and German Academic Exchange Service for their generous financial support towards the research on which this article is based, and also Patrick Major for many enjoyable discussions that have shaped my thinking on the events presented here. This article is based in part on material first presented in C. Ross, Constructing Socialism at the Grass-Roots: The Transformation of East Germany 1945-1965 (Basingstoke 2000), with permis- sion of Palgrave Publishers.

1 Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der ehemaligen DDR im Bundesarchiv (hereafter SAPMO-BA) DY30/JIV2/202/30, Ulbricht to Khruschev, 4 August 1961, reprinted in Andr6 Steiner, 'Politische Vorstellungen und okonomische Probleme im Vorfeld der Errichtung der Berliner Mauer. Briefe Walter Ulbrichts an Nikita Chruschtschow' in H. Mehringer (ed.), Von der SBZ zur DDR (Munich 1995), 233-68, here 263-5.























Journal of Contemporary History Vol 39 No I Journal of Contemporary History Vol 39 No I Journal of Contemporary History Vol 39 No I Journal of Contemporary History Vol 39 No I

brink of collapse and could not survive the vicious circle of emigration and production loss for much longer.2

It is difficult to judge precisely how accurate or exaggerated such portrayals were. Ulbricht's dire prognoses were clearly intended to mobilize support among other Warsaw Pact states for the closure of the border to West Berlin, and it was very much in the interests of the SED leadership to paint the effects of the open border in the bleakest possible terms. Whatever judgments historians may eventually reach on the GDR's actual economic situation in summer 1961, it is generally agreed that, as Ulbricht himself pointed out to Khruschev, the open border hindered the realization of many of the SED's key socio-political aims. Insofar as the ability of ordinary East Germans to emi- grate westwards 'prevented the full rigour of Stalinism being applied', the sealing of the sectoral boundaries around West Berlin is widely viewed as a critical turning-point in the history of the GDR, indeed even as the 'secret founding of the GDR'.3

This article seeks to examine some of the limits of this thesis. In so doing, it by no means argues that the closure of the border to West Berlin was not a principal caesura in the political, economic and social history of the GDR. The Wall clearly marked the beginning of a period of greater domestic and international stability for the GDR, and crucially aided East German economic growth during the 1960s by ending the labour drain and enhancing the state's control over trade and currency. The concern here is rather with the effects of the Wall on state-society relations at the grass-roots level. The article focuses on the popular response to the border closure and the extent to which the Wall actually enhanced the SED's ability to realize some of its central socio-political aims on the ground. It starts by considering the domestic problems that the SED leadership sought to solve by sealing the border, and then proceeds to examine the immediate popular response and longer-term consequences for the regime's ability to exert its authority at the grass roots.

The building of the Berlin Wall was the culmination of one of the central Cold War crises of the late 1950s and early 1960s, whose international political background need not concern us here. For our purposes it is merely worth not- ing that, as research since the opening of the GDR's archives demonstrates, the stalemate following the failure of Khruschev's ultimatum to bring about a change in the political status of West Berlin was overcome above all by the

2 On the role of the SED in the 'second Berlin crisis', cf. esp. Michael Lemke, Die Berlinkrise 1958 bis 1963. Interessen und Handlungsspielraume der SED im Ost-West Konflikt (Berlin 1995); Hope Harrison, 'Ulbricht and the Concrete "Rose": New Archival Evidence on the Dynamics of Soviet-East German Relations and the Berlin Crisis 1958-1961', Cold War Inter- national History Project Working Paper, 5 (May 1993). 3 Quotes from Martin McCauley, The German Democratic Republic since 1945 (Basingstoke 1983), 103; Dietrich Staritz, Geschichte der DDR (Frankfurt a. M. 1996), 196.
















26 26 26 26


Ross: East Germans and the Berlin Wall Ross: East Germans and the Berlin Wall Ross: East Germans and the Berlin Wall Ross: East Germans and the Berlin Wall

actions of the East German leadership, which sought to force a solution to the crisis primarily because of a range of pressing domestic issues.4

Within the GDR, the years just prior to the construction of the Wall were characterized by a general sense of societal crisis. Arguably the most serious and widespread problem - at least in the eyes of the populace - was the growing shortage of consumer goods. Whereas the SED had boldly declared in summer 1958 that its 'principal task' was to overtake West Germany in the consumption of basic goods by the end of 1961, by the second half of 1959 the problems with guaranteeing an adequate supply of consumer goods were becoming increasingly acute. This was not only a matter of ordinary citizens making unfavourable comparisons with the increasingly wealthy West German republic next door (comparisons which the SED's 'principal task' ironically encouraged). Whether one sought spare parts, industrial goods, food or luxuries, almost everything was becoming more difficult to acquire. Reports streaming into the Central Committee vividly describe the angry mood of the populace and the near universal scepticism - even among some 'leading economic functionaries' - about the touted goal of overtaking the Federal Republic. The loud publicity for the concurrent successes of Soviet space technology only aggravated popular discontent by demonstrating the lavish sums spent on attempts to reach the moon while there were still shortages of basic commodities. A popular slogan contrasting the success in space with the fail- ures closer to home circulated throughout the GDR around the end of 1959: 'Ohne Butter, ohne Sahne, auf dem Mond die rote Fahne' ('There's no cream, there's no butter, but on the moon the red flag flutters'). The Politburo communique of 19 January 1960 on the availability of the 'thousand little things of daily use' did nothing to alleviate the shortages, and if anything backfired as a public relations stunt by drawing a more direct connection between the supply problems and the actions of political elites.5

Among the political actions that were blamed for consumer shortages, the policy of forced agricultural collectivization over the closing months of 1959 and spring 1960 was widely seen as the primary culprit. The immense difficulties of establishing 'agricultural production cooperatives' (Landwirtschaftliche Produktionsgenossenschaften, or LPGs) as the basis of East German agricul- ture had long been a thorn in the side of the party leadership. Collectivization first became a stated policy goal at the Second Party Conference of July 1952, as one of the central planks in the wider 'construction of socialism' in the GDR. The concerted drive to persuade East German farmers to found or join

4 Cf. Lemke, Die Berlinkrise, op. cit.; Harrison, 'Ulbricht and the Concrete "Rose"', op. cit. 5 See, for example, SAPMO-BA DY30/IV2/5/667, report of 12 September 1959, 14; report of 26 November 1959, 12; report of 14 November 1959, 10. SAPMO-BA DY30/IV2/5/983, report of 26 November 1959; report of 8 December 1959. SAPMO-BA DY34/22230, report of 7 November 1960, 3f. The full text of the Politburo communique, 'Uber die tausend kleinen Dinge des taglichen Bedarfs, Dienstleistungen und Reparaturen' is reprinted in Dokumente der SED, vol. VIII (Berlin 1962), 15-20.













27 27 27 27



LPGs after summer 1952 met with limited success, and was hindered not only by the determined opposition of independent farmers, but also by unreliable rural functionaries who frequently did not force the issue at village level. After pursuing a softer line following the regime-threatening demonstrations of 16-17 June 1953, the leadership stepped up its collectivization efforts once again in the latter 1950s. The all-out assault on independent farming launched during autumn 1959 and the so-called 'socialist spring' of 1960 met with stubborn resistance in the villages. Rather predictably, an increasing number of farmers simply left for the West.6 There were many other diffuse symptoms of protest such as threats or physical attacks against functionaries, the destruc- tion of propaganda posters, the disruption of LPG founding assemblies, as well as more serious forms of perceived opposition such as arson and alleged sabotage against collective farms.7

Such problems continued well after the government officially declared the completion of agricultural collectivization in April 1960. In many villages the newly-formed LPGs existed merely on paper, their new members showing little inclination to pursue the matter further. Indeed, many party members and rural functionaries were themselves decidedly unenthusiastic about the collectivization drive, and made little effort to ensure the development of collective farming practices after the agitation brigades had left the villages. For instance, in the village of Reitwein, near Seelow, the members of the newly-founded LPG 'Einigkeit', including the directors, were generally 'repelled by such methods' as were used to force them to collectivize; the vast majority had been under the distinct impression that they would be picked up by the police if they refused.8 It was therefore common for farmers to continue working as they had before the formal establishment of the LPGs. As late as summer 1961 many collective farms existed in little more than name. Indeed, the popular disaffection still led to threats to leave for the West when the topic of collective farming practices was broached. As a group of recalcitrant farmers near Beeskow declared only three weeks before the Wall was erected:

6 SAPMO-BA DY30/IV2/13/622, 'Analyse der Republikflucht in der Landwirtschaft', 12 May 1960, fo. 89. As a widely-circulated slogan put it: 'We're founding an LPG Type IV, the farmers over there and the land here' (the slogan rhymes in German: 'Wir griinden eine LPG Typ IV, die Bauern druben, der Boden hier'); SAPMO-BA DY30/7/376, 'Die Entwicklung der genossen- schaftlichen Arbeit in der Landwirtschaft', undated, summer 1960, 2. 7 SAPMO-BA DY30/IV2/2023/9, 'Analyse der Kriminalitat in der Landwirtschaft', 28 July 1960, 1. Cf. generally, Arnd Bauerkamper, Liindliche Gesellschaft in der kommunistischen Dik- tatur. Zwangsmodernisierung und Traditionen in Brandenburg von 1945 bis zu den friihen secbziger Jahren (Cologne 2002); also J. Osmond, 'Kontinuitat und Konflikt in der Landwirt- schaft der SBZ/DDR' in R. Bessel and R. Jessen (eds), Die Grenzen der Diktatur. Staat und Gesellschaft in der DDR (Gottingen 1996), 137-69; C. Ross, Constructing Socialism at the Grass- Roots: The Transformation of East Germany, 1945-65 (Basingstoke 2000), chap. 9. 8 SAPMO-BA DY30/IV2/2023/61, 'Abschlugbericht', 22 April 1960, 4. See also SAPMO-BA DY30/IV2/7/405, fo. 85; SAPMO-BA DY30/IV2/2023/61, 'Bericht fiber die Brigadetatigkeit im Kreis Haldensleben vom 22.3 bis 14.4.60', 2; SAPMO-BA DY30/IV2/7/408, 'Information', 23 March 1960, 54.










28 28 28 28


Ross: East Germans and the Berlin Wall Ross: East Germans and the Berlin Wall Ross: East Germans and the Berlin Wall Ross: East Germans and the Berlin Wall

'We don't want to hear the word socialism any more, leave us alone. Enough people have already cleared out (for the West), and there's still room for us.'9

Meanwhile, the SED's perennial attempts to raise productivity in the factories were faring little better. Despite continually trying to improve productivity via various wage reforms and 'socialist competitions', the underlying lack of a clear wage incentive and the constant shortage of skilled labour meant that the regime continually had to wrestle with the problem of poor industrial disci- pline and wage inflation. The SED leadership had learned its lesson from its previous attempt to confront this problem head on; the spectre of June 1953 discouraged any attempts to force the productivity issue, especially as long as the borders were open. The more covert attempts to raise productivity throughout the 1950s showed little effect, not least because many factory managers were anxious to keep shopfloor discontent beneath the threshold of conflict in order to retain an adequate labour supply. Both workers and managers were well aware of the acute labour shortage from the mid-1950s onwards, and acted accordingly in their informal negotiations over remunera- tion. At the Schwarze Pumpe coal and energy site, for example, disaffected workers frequently used the threat of leaving to force enterprise directors to improve pay and conditions. Managers widely regarded such issues as a 'hot potato', and shopfloor disputes over such matters as 'hard' work norms, piece- rate wages or bonuses were often settled on the spot via informal mechanisms of conflict regulation.10 The ability of the party leadership to control these processes on the shopfloor was therefore rather limited. Indeed, the periodic attempts to augment the regime's authority in the factories could backfire. A prime example was the introduction of 'socialist brigades' in the late 1950s (modelled on the Soviet 'shock brigades' of the 1920s and 1930s), which were intended to raise productivity but in the event were widely instrumentalized by workers as a new forum for collective bargaining with factory management. Despite the SED crackdown on these brigades in 1960, the continuing shortage of skilled labour - greatly exacerbated by the constant drain to the West

9 SAPMO-BA DY30/IV2/5/672, 'Informationsbericht', 24 July 1961. Brandenburgisches Landeshauptarchiv (hereafter BLHA) Bez. Pdm. Rep. 404/15, Nr. 27, 'Analyse uiber die Lage in den LPG - Typ I - des Bezirkes Potsdam', 27 September 1960, fo. 220. BLHA Bez. Ctb. Rep. 930, Nr. 772, 'Sekretariatsvorlage', 5 June 1961, unpag; SAPMO-BA DY30/IV2/7/376, 'Einschatzung der Lage und Stimmung der Bauern zu den politischen Grundfragen', undated, ca. July 1961, 4. 10 Cf. esp. Peter Hiibner, Konsens, Konflikt, Kompromif/. Soziale Arbeiterinteressen und Sozialpolitik in der SBZ/DDR 1945-1970 (Berlin 1995); idem, 'Balance des Ungleichgewichtes. Zum Verhaltnis von Arbeiterinteressen und SED-Herrschaft', Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 19 (1993), 15-28; idem, 'Arbeitskonflikte in Industriebetrieben der DDR nach 1953. Annaherungen an eine Struktur- und Prozefganalyse' in U. Poppe et al. (eds), Zwischen Selbstbehauptung und Anpassung (Berlin 1995), 178-91; Jeffrey Kopstein, The Politics of Economic Decline in East Germany, 1945-1989 (Chapel Hill, NC 1997); Ruidiger Soldt, 'Zum Beispiel Schwarze Pumpe: Arbeiterbrigaden in der DDR', Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 24 (1998), 88-109, here 93; on workers' protest generally, Andrew Port, 'The "Grumble Gesellschaft": Industrial Defiance and Worker Protest in Early East Germany' in P. Hiibner and K. Tenfelde (eds), Arbeiter in der SBZ- DDR (Essen 1999), 787-810.










29 29 29 29



meant that the problems of wage drift, insufficient productivity gains, and informal negotiation at the factory level remained unsolved for the time being."I

In all of these areas, the overarching problem of 'Republikflucht' ('fleeing the republic') greatly added to the SED's woes. It is estimated that between 1949 and 1961, some 2.7 million people left the GDR. Although both the East and West German governments tended to present the causes of the mass emigration in political terms - either as a vote for freedom or a betrayal of socialism - material factors were undoubtedly paramount. The West German 'economic miracle' of the 1950s exerted a powerful 'pull' on many East Germans, especially the young and relatively mobile, and in particular skilled workers, engineers and technicians who were in great demand. The West German Lastenausgleichgesetz (Law for the Equalization of Burdens) also attracted many East Germans who had previously been expelled from the eastern territories of the Reich. In the northern areas of the GDR where they tended to be concentrated, reports remarked that many were using the GDR as a 'springboard' for moving on to the West.i2 At the same time, there was a whole range of economic 'push' factors within the GDR, foremost among them the aggravating shortage of consumer goods and housing we have already encountered. In addition, career prospects for individuals in the GDR were to a considerable degree tied to their social background; the threat this posed to young people from professional or middle-class households provided additional incentive for their parents to move the family westwards. Apart from material concerns, personal and situational factors such as marital break- down, escape from debts, career motives, etc., also played a significant role. The reuniting of families also remained an important factor until the release of the last German POWs from the Soviet Union in 1955.l3

11 On the brigades, see esp. Jorg Roesler, 'Die Produktionsbrigaden in der Industrie der DDR. Zentrum der Arbeitswelt?' in H. Kaelble et al. (eds), Sozialgeschichte der DDR (Stuttgart 1994), 144-70; idem, 'Probleme des Brigadealltags: Arbeitsverhaltnisse und Arbeitsklima in volkseigenen Betrieben', Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 47/38 (1997), 3-17; idem, 'Zur Rolle der Arbeits- brigaden in der betrieblichen Hierarchie der VEB: eine politik- und sozialgeschichtliche Betrach- tung', Deutschland Archiv, 30 (1997), 737-50. See also P. Hiibner, "'Sozialistischer Fordismus?" oder: Unerwartete Ergebnisse eines Kopiervorganges. Eine Geschichte der Produktionsbrigaden in der DDR' in Alf Liidtke et al. (eds), Amerikanisierung (Stuttgart 1996), 96-115; idem, 'Syndi- kalistische Versundigungen? Versuche unabhangiger Interessenvertretung fur die Industriearbeiter der DDR um 1960', Jahrbuch fur historische Kommunismusforschung (JHK) (Berlin 1995), 100-17; Riidiger Soldt, 'Zum Beispiel Schwarze Pumpe'. On the long-term political effects of the productivity problems in the factories, see esp. Kopstein, The Politics of Economic Decline, op. cit. 12 Bundesarchiv Berlin (hereafter BAB) DO1/11/964, 'Republikfluchten: Auswertung des Berichtsmonats September', 2 November 1957, fo. 193-201. 13 SAPMO-BA DY30/13/397, 'Wie ist die gegenwartige Lage in der Abwanderung nach Westdeutschland?', undated, ca. February 1956, 5. See generally, SAPMO-BA DY30/9.04/668- 9; also DY30/9.04/62, 'Probleme, die in der Arbeit mit der wissenschaftlichen Intelligenz eine Rolle spielen', 2 December 1960, 1-2. On the causes of Republikflucht, cf. esp. Patrick Major, 'Going West: The Open Border and the Problem of Republikflucht' in P. Major and J. Osmond










30 30 30 30


Ross: East Germans and the Berin Wall Ross: East Germans and the Berin Wall Ross: East Germans and the Berin Wall Ross: East Germans and the Berin Wall

The problems presented by the open border were not, however, limited to those who left permanently. The so-called 'Grenzgdnger' - the approximately 60,000 people who lived in East Berlin or the GDR but worked in West Berlin - not only represented a loss of labour from the East German economy, but also were seen to take unfair advantage of state subsidies and feed the black currency market, since they could exchange their Western wages at very favourable unofficial rates yet still enjoy the subsidized rents and food prices in East Germany. The lure of earning Western wages and paying Eastern prices rendered the SED's periodic attempts to discourage East Germans from working in West Berlin through police sanctions or naming-and-shaming campaigns almost completely ineffective.14 Much the same could be said of the lure of Western consumer and industrial goods, which drew shoppers and arti- sans from all over East Berlin and Brandenburg in search of scarce household items or spare parts. Perhaps more importantly, the porous sectoral boundaries in Berlin were seen to undermine national security by hindering the regime's ability to recruit adequate numbers of young men into the armed forces. The recruitment drives of the 1950s had triggered emigration waves among the affected age cohorts, and there were even reports of youths temporarily leaving for the West simply in order to be considered politically unfit for NVA (Nationale Volksarmee) service upon their return.15 Yet another concern for the SED was the constant cross-border traffic of East German youths drawn by Western clothing styles, music and film. The '30-Pfennig' novels from the West - mostly romances, 'Wild West' adventures and spy stories - were exceedingly popular in spite of the fact that customs officers regularly confiscated such 'trash and dirt literature' at border crossings. Even more popular were the predominantly American films in the so-called 'border cinemas' near East-West checkpoints. Along with the supposedly nefarious influence of 'beat-music', which was transmitted across most of the GDR from stations in West Germany and West Berlin, these various forms of Western youth culture were not only derided as prime examples of American 'Unkultur', but were regarded as nothing less than a form of 'psychological

(eds), The Workers' and Peasants' State: Communism and Society in East Germany, 1945-71 (Manchester 2002), 190-208; also C. Ross, 'Before the Wall: East Germans, Communist Authority and the Mass Exodus to the West', Historical Journal, 45, 2 (2002), 459-80; Henrik Eberle, 'Weder Gegenerschaft noch Abwerbung. Zu den Motiven republikfluichtiger SED- Mitglieder aus dem Bezirk Halle imJahr 1961' in H. Timmermann (ed.), Diktaturen in Europa im 20. Jahrhundert (Berlin 1996), 449-60. 14 On Grenzganger generally, see Jorn Schuitrumpf, 'Zu einigen Aspekten des Grenzganger- problems im Berliner Raum von 1948/49 bis 1961', Jahrbuch fur Geschichte, 31 (1984), 333-58. On attempts to discourage working in West Berlin via police sanctions and propaganda, see SAPMO-BA DY30/IV2/12/104 and 107, passim; SAPMO-BA DY34/22230, 22231 and 22677, passim. 15 Cf. C. Ross, '"'What about peace and bread?" East Germans and the (Re)Militarization of the GDR, 1952-1962', Militdrgeschichtliche Mitteilungen, 58, 1 (1999), 111-35; idem, "'Protect- ing the Accomplishments of Socialism?": The Militarization of the GDR' in Major and Osmond (eds), The Workers' and Peasants' State, op. cit., 78-93.

The problems presented by the open border were not, however, limited to those who left permanently. The so-called 'Grenzgdnger' - the approximately 60,000 people who lived in East Berlin or the GDR but worked in West Berlin - not only represented a loss of labour from the East German economy, but also were seen to take unfair advantage of state subsidies and feed the black currency market, since they could exchange their Western wages at very favourable unofficial rates yet still enjoy the subsidized rents and food prices in East Germany. The lure of earning Western wages and paying Eastern prices rendered the SED's periodic attempts to discourage East Germans from working in West Berlin through police sanctions or naming-and-shaming campaigns almost completely ineffective.14 Much the same could be said of the lure of Western consumer and industrial goods, which drew shoppers and arti- san

east german and berlin wall

Documents