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EC COMPETITION POLICY NEWSLETTER Editor: Stefan Rating Address: European Commission, C150, 00/158, Wetstraat 200, rue de la Loi Brussel B-1049 Bruxelles tel. +322 2957620 fax. +322 2955437 Electronic Mail: X400: C=be;A=rtt;P=cec; OU=dg4;S=info4 Internet: [email protected] World Wide Web http://europa.eu.int/en/ comm/dg04/dg4home.htm ISSN: 1025-2266 number 1 volume 3 spring 1997 c o m p e t i t i o n p o l i c y NEWSLETTER Published quarterly by the Competition Directorate-General of the European Commission Editorial Contents 1 Editorial, by Alexander SCHAUB Articles 2 La política de competencia en América Latina: una nueva área de interés para la Unión Europea, por Juan Antonio RIVIÈRE MARTÍ Opinions and Comments 6 L'accès au dossier dans les procédures de concurrence, par Kris DEKEYSER 8 Clauses suspectes dans un accord de règlement à l'amiable, par Philippe CHEVALIER 8 Die Kommission schlägt eine neue Bagatellbekanntmachung vor, von Stefan RATING Anti-Trust Rules 11 Most important recent developments 15 Press releases 15 Court Judgments Mergers 16 Summary of the most important recent developments, by Kristin SCHREIBER and Heiner BRUHN 21 Press releases 22 Court Judgments Liberalisation & State intervention 23 Most important recent developments 24 Press releases 24 Judgments State Aid 25 Summary of the most important recent developments, co-ordinated by Torben TOFT 30 Press Releases 31 Court Judgments INFORMATION SECTION 32 DG IV Staff List 34 Documentation 44 Coming up ... 44 DG IV on the World Wide Web 45 CASES COVERED IN THIS ISSUE by Alexander SCHAUB, Director-General for Competition You are holding in your hands (or visualising on your screen) the tenth issue of the EC Competition Policy Newsletter. This would in any event warrant a look back on three years during which DG IV has taken a new approach to information and transparency. And a successful one for that: 30,000 old-fashioned “hard” copies of each Newsletter issue are printed and rapidly exhausted. Moreover, all published issues are permanently available on the World Wide Web (http://europa.eu.int/en/ comm/dg04/newsle/index). Comments from all over the world confirm that the Newsletter is regarded as a valuable source of information. However, this issue also marks two changes to the team that has ensured the success of our publication, neither of which should go unnoticed. The first change is the departure of the Newsletter’s initiator and first editor, Christopher Wingfield Jones. After eleven years working in the EC competition policy field and notably in DG IV, of which three have been as the Assistant to the Director- General for Competition, Christopher has found a new challenge in an area where competition is developing quickly throughout the European Union, namely energy markets. It goes without saying that each issue of the EC Competition Policy Newsletter is always the product of a joint effort within DG IV - however, the Newsletter’s success owes much to Christopher’s commitment... and indeed energy. I should like to express my gratitude and wish him well in his future career. The second change concerns DG IV’s Information Officer, Panagiotis Alevantis. Since his arrival, Panagiotis has not only been instrumental in implementing a wholly new information policy, but also a driving force behind many a successful initiative in this field. He has anticipated at an early stage developments such as the success of the Internet, which we regard as normal today and which makes the EC Competition Policy Newsletter accessible to large numbers of interested readers whom we could not otherwise reach. This being the last issue he will co-ordinate before his imminent departure, I shall take the opportunity to acknowledge Panagiotis’ contribution to steering DG IV onto the information highway. As from this issue, the new editor of the Competition Policy Newsletter is Stefan Rating who will endeavour to maintain the high standard of the publication and continue the further development of the project. Starting in May 1997, Terence Whaley will be the new Information Officer, notably responsible for DG IV’s external information services. Issues relating to our presence on the World Wide Web will be the domain of our webmaster Gérald Messiaen. All three remain open to any suggestion or comment regarding DG IV’s information tools, and in particular the EC Competition Policy Newsletter.

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Page 1: EC COMPETITION POLICY NEWSLETTER OU=dg4;S=info4 …ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpn/cpnv3n01.pdf · EC COMPETITION POLICY NEWSLETTER Editor: Stefan Rating Address: European

EC COMPETITIONPOLICYNEWSLETTER

Editor:StefanRating

Address:European Commission,C150, 00/158,Wetstraat 200, rue de la LoiBrussel B-1049 Bruxellestel. +322 2957620fax. +322 2955437

Electronic Mail:X400: C=be;A=rtt;P=cec;OU=dg4;S=info4Internet: [email protected] Wide Webhttp://europa.eu.int/en/comm/dg04/dg4home.htm

ISSN:

1025-2266

number 1volume 3spring 1997

c o m p e t i t i o n p o l i c y

NEWSLETTERPublished quarterly by the Competition Directorate-General of the European Commission

EditorialContents

1 Editorial, by Alexander SCHAUB

Articles2 La política de competencia en América

Latina: una nueva área de interés parala Unión Europea, por Juan AntonioRIVIÈRE MARTÍ

Opinions and Comments6 L'accès au dossier dans les procédures

de concurrence, par Kris DEKEYSER8 Clauses suspectes dans un accord de

règlement à l'amiable, par PhilippeCHEVALIER

8 Die Kommission schlägt eine neueBagatellbekanntmachung vor, vonStefan RATING

Anti-Trust Rules11 Most important recent developments15 Press releases15 Court Judgments

Mergers16 Summary of the most important recent

developments, by Kristin SCHREIBERand Heiner BRUHN

21 Press releases22 Court Judgments

Liberalisation & State intervention23 Most important recent developments24 Press releases24 Judgments

State Aid25 Summary of the most important recent

developments, co-ordinated by TorbenTOFT

30 Press Releases31 Court Judgments

INFORMATION SECTION

32 DG IV Staff List34 Documentation44 Coming up ...44 DG IV on the World Wide Web

45 CASES COVERED IN THIS ISSUE

by Alexander SCHAUB, Director-General for Competition

You are holding in your hands (orvisualising on your screen) the tenth issueof the EC Competition Policy Newsletter.This would in any event warrant a lookback on three years during which DG IVhas taken a new approach to informationand transparency. And a successful one forthat: 30,000 old-fashioned “hard” copies ofeach Newsletter issue are printed andrapidly exhausted. Moreover, all publishedissues are permanently available on theWorld Wide Web (http://europa.eu.int/en/comm/dg04/newsle/index). Comments fromall over the world confirm that theNewsletter is regarded as a valuable sourceof information.

However, this issue also marks two changesto the team that has ensured the success ofour publication, neither of which should gounnoticed.

The first change is the departure of theNewsletter’s initiator and first editor,Christopher Wingfield Jones. After elevenyears working in the EC competition policyfield and notably in DG IV, of which threehave been as the Assistant to the Director-General for Competition, Christopher hasfound a new challenge in an area wherecompetition is developing quicklythroughout the European Union, namelyenergy markets. It goes without saying thateach issue of the EC Competition PolicyNewsletter is always the product of a jointeffort within DG IV - however, theNewsletter’s success owes much toChristopher’s commitment... and indeed

energy. I should like to express mygratitude and wish him well in his futurecareer.

The second change concerns DG IV’sInformation Officer, Panagiotis Alevantis.Since his arrival, Panagiotis has not onlybeen instrumental in implementing awholly new information policy, but also adriving force behind many a successfulinitiative in this field. He has anticipatedat an early stage developments such as thesuccess of the Internet, which we regardas normal today and which makes the ECCompetition Policy Newsletter accessibleto large numbers of interested readerswhom we could not otherwise reach. Thisbeing the last issue he will co-ordinatebefore his imminent departure, I shall takethe opportunity to acknowledgePanagiotis’ contribution to steering DG IVonto the information highway.

As from this issue, the new editor of theCompetition Policy Newsletter is StefanRating who will endeavour to maintain thehigh standard of the publication andcontinue the further development of theproject. Starting in May 1997, TerenceWhaley will be the new InformationOfficer, notably responsible for DG IV’sexternal information services. Issuesrelating to our presence on the WorldWide Web will be the domain of ourwebmaster Gérald Messiaen. All threeremain open to any suggestion orcomment regarding DG IV’s informationtools, and in particular the ECCompetition Policy Newsletter.

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La política de competencia enAmérica Latina: una nueva área deinterés para la Unión Europea*

por Juan Antonio RIVIÈRE MARTÍ, Consejero, DG IV-A

LA GRAN DÉCADA ECONÓMICA

América del Sur y Centroamérica son deuna gran actualidad desde el punto devista de la política de competencia.Desde principios de los años noventa seasiste en esa parte del mundo a unafianzamiento de los regímenesdemocráticos y a unas políticaseconómicas que incluyen la apertura delos mercados al comercio internacional.La conjunción de estos factores hallevado aparejado un crecimientoeconómico notable en esta área de másde 460 millones de habitantes.

Las políticas económicas desarrolladas,en diversos grados según el país, hansido políticas de ajuste económico,saneamiento financiero, estricto controlde sus divisas, desarme arancelario,favorecimiento de las inversionesextranjeras, privatizaciones de lasempresas públicas y desarrollo de laintegración económica regional. Despuésde unas décadas de intervencionismoestatal en la economía con los defectosdel dirigismo y de las estructurasmonopolísticas, se ha descubierto denuevo el dinamismo de la economía delibre mercado y se ha perseguido lacompetitividad de las empresas. Persistengrandes retos de creación de empleo y dereducción de la pobreza, que tambiéndeben ser tenidos en cuenta.

APOYO INTERNACIONAL

Esta evolución económica y política hafavorecido la creación y la puesta al día

de las legislaciones de competenciaexistentes en la región, realizándosemodificaciones y mejorándose los mediospara su aplicación. Este proceso harecibido sustento a nivel internacional.Por un lado, mediante iniciativas propiasde la región, como la creación delMercosur, el relanzamiento de laComunidad Andina, el Sistema deIntegración Centroamericano, el SistemaEconómico Latinoamericano y delCaribe, el Área de Librecomercio de lasAméricas, la Organización de los EstadosAmericanos y el definir Nafta. Por otrolado, entre las instituciones que hanapoyado esta evolución medianteiniciativas diversas de asesoramiento yconferencias figuran el Banco Mundial, laConferencia de las Naciones Unidas parael Comercio y Desarrollo (UNCTAD), laOrganización Mundial del Comercio(OMC) y la Organización Europea deCooperación y Desarrollo Económico(OECD).

TRADICIÓN Y MODERNIDAD ENLAS REGLAS DE COMPETENCIA

En el cuadro de la página siguiente, serecoge la lista de las legislaciones decompetencia vigentes. En la actualidadtienen reglamentación de competencia lospaíses siguientes: Argentina, Brasil,Chile, Perú, Colombia, Venezuela,México, Costa Rica, Panamá y Jamaica.Además existen normas regionales decompetencia para el Mercosur y el PactoAndino. Los países que actualmentetienen en proyecto su legislación sonBolivia, El Salvador, Guatemala,Nicaragua, y la República Dominicana.

La tradición legislativa antimonopolista esantigua en el Brasil, donde se remonta alsiglo pasado, y bastante larga en otros delos países de la región: en la Argentina seremonta a 1919, en México a 1934, enColombia a 1959 y en Chile a 1973. Elordenamiento jurídico de los paíseslatinoamericanos ha estado en gran parteinspirado, desde el logro de suindependencia, en el modelo jurídicolatino europeo. En cuanto a las reglas decompetencia, la prohibición de lasprácticas concertadas o acuerdosrestrictivos entre competidores, el abusode posición dominante y el control de lasoperaciones de concentración seencuentran reglamentados, en granmedida, por las legislacioneslatinoamericanas. Si bien se puede decirque ha existido en parte inspiración de lasreglas de competencia de las ComunidadesEuropeas en la redacción de lasreglamentaciones, también es verdad que,hoy en día, dichos conceptos jurídicostienen un reconocimiento universal comoguardianes de la organización de laeconomía de mercado.

UN CONCEPTO AMPLIO DECOMPETENCIA

Aunque las características económicaspropias difieren de un país a otro, laspolíticas de ajuste económicodesarrolladas han requerido medidas deorganización en muchas áreas próximas ala legislación en materia de competencia.Entre éstas destacan los derechos de losconsumidores, normalizaciones técnicas,reglas sobre inversiones, DerechoMercantil con especial mención delregistro de patentes y marcas, defensacomercial, privatizaciones y sectores deservicios regulados. Las reglas decompetencia se integran en este conjuntode mejoras de la organización económica.Hay quienes consideran aquéllasesenciales; en el fondo, sin embargo, malpodrían aplicarse si la organización de laeconomía no ofreciese un mínimo degarantías de funcionamiento estable.

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AUTORIDADES DEPAÍS/GRUPO LISTA DE LEGISLACIONES DE COMPETENCIA

ARGENTINA Ley N/ 22.262 de Defensa de la Competencia, de 01.08.1980.

BRASIL Lei N/ 8884, de 11.06.1994, alterada pela Lei N/ 9069 de29.06.1995,Prevenção e repressão as infrações contra ordem econômica Lei N/ 9021, de 30.03.95, Autarquia do CADEResolução n/ 5, de 28.8.96 do CADE. Disciplina as formalidadese os procedimentos, no CADE, relativos aos atos de que trata oart. 54 da Lei N/ 8884.Resolução n/ 6, de 2.10.96 do CADE

COLOMBIA Ley 155 de 24.12.1959, prácticas comerciales restrictivas. Decreto n/ 1302 de 01.06.1964, Decreto n/ 2153 de 30.12.1992, reestructura la Superintendencia

COSTA RICA Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva delConsumidor, de 20.12.1994.

CHILE Decreto Ley n/ 211, de 1973. Defensa de la libre competencia;previene y sanciona las prácticas monopólicas, modificada por el Decreto Ley n/ 2760 de 03.07.1979.

JAMAICA The Fair Competition Act. de 09.03.1993

MERCOSUR Decisión n/ 21/94-CMC Defensa de la Competencia. PautasGenerales de Armonización. Decisión n/ 18/96 Protocolo de Defensa de la Competencia delMercosur 17.12.1996

MÉXICO Ley Federal de Competencia Económica, de 24.12.1992.Reglamento interior de la Comisión Federal de Competencia, de12.10.1993.

PACTOANDINO

Decisión 285 de 21.03.1991. Normas para prevenir o corregir lasdistorsiones en la competencia generadas por prácticas restrictivasde la libre competencia.

PANAMÁ Ley N/ 29 de 1 de febrero de 1996, por la cual se dictan normassobre la Defensa de la Competencia y se adoptan otras medidas.

PERÚ Decreto n/ 701 de 05.11.1991. Prácticas monopólicas, controlistasy restrictivas de la libre competencia.Decreto Ley n/ 25868 de 06.11.1992, de organización delIndecopi. Decreto Legislativo N/ 807, de 16.04.96, Facultades, normas yorganización del Indecopi

VENEZUELA Ley de 13.12.1991, para promover y proteger el ejercicio de lalibre competencia.Reglamento N/ 1, de 21.01.93; Reglamento N/ 2, de 21.05.96Instructivo N/ 1, de 12.07.93; Instructivo N/ 2, de 23.05.94

COMPETENCIA MODERNAS

Todas las legislaciones mencionadasinstauran un ente, cuya denominaciónvaría (Autoridad, Comisión, Consejo,Fiscalía o Superintendencia), al queotorgan la responsabilidad de aplicar lasdisposiciones de competencia. Lalegislación de algunos países ha separadola instrucción del expediente de ladecisión final, que compete a un tribunalcreado al efecto. El cuadro de la últimapágina recoge la lista de autoridades decompetencia nacionales. Algunas de éstastienen capacidad interpretativa y puedenemitir también resoluciones o dictámenesque facilitan la aplicación de las normasde la competencia. En algunos países elámbito de aplicación de la partedispositiva de dichas normas es reducido.Las disposiciones administrativasrelativas a los poderes de la autoridad decompetencia y las disposicionesprocesales suelen ser más extensas.Algunas legislaciones nacionales dan fedel objetivo de reducir formalismos ytrámites burocráticos.

LA CULTURA DE LACOMPETENCIA

Por lo general, las autoridades decompetencia en América Latina tienenque hacer frente al desafío de aplicar lalegislación de competencia con mediosadministrativos y financieros limitados.Por añadidura, la economía consta desectores con un alto grado deconcentración y habituados alintervencionismo estatal o a laconcertación empresarial. De ahí que serequiera un esfuerzo para crear la"cultura" de la competencia. El fomentode la competencia empieza en la propiaAdministración del Estado, mediante laformación de sus funcionarios, y pasa porla adecuación de los planes de estudiosacadémicos de las universidades. A fin deconcienciar a la sociedad es precisoexplicar a las empresas y a losprofesionales liberales el objetivo de la

economía de libre mercado y la utilidadde legislar en defensa de la competencia.Resulta sin duda más arduo aplicar lasreglas de defensa de la competencia enAmérica Latina que en economías de altogrado de desarrollo industrial como lasexistentes en la Unión Europea.

LA GLOBALIZACIÓN DE LASOPERACIONES

Por otro lado, las autoridades decompetencia latinoamericanas, aun sindisponer de una larga experienciadoctrinal y jurisprudencial, tienen que

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enfrentarse con la necesidad de undesarrollo legislativo propio y conproblemas de competencia semejantes alos planteados en Europa o EstadosUnidos. Por ejemplo, en los sectores delas telecomunicaciones, de la televisióndigital, de las tarjetas de crédito, debienes de consumo producidos pormultinacionales, de la distribución en elsector del automóvil, etc., los desafíos ala libre competencia se han globalizado.Existe pues un fuerte interés tanto porconocer la doctrina aplicada en otrospaíses como por cooperar en lainstrucción y resolución de asuntos deactualidad.

PROYECCIÓN INTERNACIONALDE LA UNIÓN EUROPEA

De forma similar, en la Unión Europea lapolítica de competencia ha ido asimismocobrando una mayor proyeccióninternacional. La necesidad de unacooperación entre los Estados miembrosy la Comisión Europea se acrecienta. Laintensidad de las relaciones comercialesentre Estados Unidos y la Unión Europeaha llevado a la conclusión de un acuerdode cooperación mutua en materia decompetencia, que se verá completado enbreve por un acuerdo de comitología. Eldesarrollo de la economía de mercado enlos países de la Europa central y oriental(PECO), unido a su posible adhesión a laUnión Europea, han permitido a éstaexportar su modelo de libre competencia.Del mismo modo el objetivo de convertiren socios a los países mediterráneosmediante la firma de acuerdos de librecomercio ha proyectado el interés por laasunción de reglas de competencia enestos países terceros. Todas estasiniciativas en favor de los PECO, lasantiguas repúblicas soviéticas y los paísesdel entorno mediterráneo están apoyadaspor programas de cooperación técnicatales como Phare, Tacis o Meda, todosellos dotados de vastos recursosfinancieros. Además la presencia de laUnión Europea en los forosinternacionales tales como la OMC le hapermitido lanzar iniciativas multilaterales.

ACUERDOS MARCO DECOOPERACIÓN

La Unión Europea ha creado una red deacuerdos marco de cooperación con lospaíses de América Latina. Cabe destacarel Acuerdo marco interregional decooperación con el Mercosur, de 15 dediciembre de 1995 (DOCE 1996 nº L69), que en una segunda fase prevé laposibilidad de crear una área de librecomercio. La idea de apoyar el procesode integración económica del Mercosures de gran importancia.

Existen acuerdos marco de cooperaciónespecíficos con la Argentina, firmado el2 de abril de 1990 (DOCE 1990 nº L295, p. 66), con el Brasil, firmado el 29de junio de 1995 (DOCE 1995 nº L 262,p. 53), y con Chile, firmado el 21 dejunio de 1996 (DOCE 1996 nº L 209,p. 1). En la actualidad se está negociandoun acuerdo con México que tiene comoobjetivo constituir una área de librecomercio. Las relaciones comerciales dela Unión Europea se han desarrolladotambién mediante otros dos Acuerdosmarco de cooperación: uno, firmado el 26de junio de 1992, con el Acuerdo deCartagena y sus países miembros, elllamado Pacto Andino (DOCE 1993 nº C25, p. 32), el otro, concluido el 22 defebrero de 1993, con las Repúblicas deCosta Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala,Honduras, Nicaragua y Panamá, elllamado Istmo Centroamericano (DOCE1993 nº C 77, p. 30). La referencia a laimportancia de las reglas de competenciase considera incluida en el concepto denormas y disciplinas comerciales.

El artículo 5-3º del Acuerdo marcointerregional entre la Unión Europea y elMercosur prevé lo siguiente: "Lacooperación cubrirá principalmente lostemas siguientes: a) las disciplinascomerciales, las relativas a las prácticasrestrictivas de competencia (...)", a lo queel artículo 11-2º añade: "La cooperaciónestará dirigida en particular a:...c)identificar y eliminar los obstáculos a lacooperación industrial entre las Partesmediante medidas que favorezcan el

respeto de las leyes de la competencia ysu alineamiento a las necesidades delmercado (...)".

LAS ORIENTACIONES PARA LACOOPERACIÓN DE 1996-2000

La cooperación financiera y técnica conAmérica Latina alcanzá en 1995 unvolumen de 205 millones de ECU,invertidos en proyectos de desarrolloorientados a resolver problemasmacroeconómicos y sectoriales. A lacooperación económica correspondiera 56millones de ECU, destinados a mejora relcontexto económico, a formentar laintegración sectorial y a favorecer laexpansión de la economía. Para otrosámbitos de cooperación se dispuso de 80millones de ECU. La ayuda totalconcedida ascendió a 520 millones deECU. A finales de 1995 la Comisiónrecibió el apoyo del Consejo de Ministrosen sus orientaciones 1996-2000 para quela cooperación se hiciera extensiva alapoyo de las instituciones, la lucha contrala pobreza, las reformas económicas, lamejora de la competitividad, la formacióny la integración regional abierta. Última-mente el Informe Bertens del ParlamentoEuropeo ha considerado importante laelabotación una nueva propuesta y eldiseño de un programa de acción global ala altura de los cambios realizados.

GRAN DINAMISMO COMERCIAL

El dinamismo de América Latina no sóloha sido percibido por el ParlamentoEuropeo. Algunos Estados miembros de laUE desarrollan actividades a través de susagencias de cooperación, como es el casode Alemania y España. Los líderespolíticos europeos han subrayado confrecuencia la importancia de las relacionescon esa zona, siendo el más recienteejemplo el del Presidente de la RepúblicaFrancesa. Hace tiempo que las empresaseuropeas son conscientes del incrementode las relaciones comerciales. Los flujos decomercio exterior se situaron en 1995 entorno a los 40.000 millones de US$. Las

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tres cuartas partes de las inversioneseuropeas se centran, dada su extensióngeográfica y grado de desarrollo, enBrasil, México, Argentina y Chile. Sinembargo, el interés europeo abarcat a m b i é n a l o s d e m á s p a í s e slatinoamericanos. Hay un elemento delcomercio exterior que es revelador de estadinámica comercial: entre 1993 y 1995,América Latina ha contribuido enaproximadamente un 10,4% al incrementototal del comercio exterior de la UniónEuropea. Esta cifra es más del doble de laparte del comercio exterior totalcomunitario que corresponde al comerciocon América Latina.

País Lista de Autoridades de Competencia

ARGENTINA Comisión Nacional de Defensa de la CompetenciaMinisterio de Economía y Obras y Servicios Públicos

BRASIL Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica CADE, Secretaria de Direito Econômico. Ministério da Justiça Secretaria de Acompanhamento Económico, Ministério da Fazenda

COLOMBIA Superintendencia Delegada para la Promoción de la CompetenciaSuperintendencia de Industria y Comercio, Ministerio de Industria yComercio.

COSTA RICA Comisión para la Promoción de la Competencia.Unidad Técnica de Apoyo, Ministerio de Economía, Industria yComercio

CHILE Fiscalía Nacional EconómicaJAMAICA Fair Trading CommissionMÉXICO Comisión Federal de Competencia

Secretaria de Comercio y Fomento Industrial - SECOFIPANAMÁ Ministerio de Comercio e IndustriasPERÚ Comisión de Libre Competencia del Indecopi

Instituto Nacional de Defensa de la Competencia y de la Protecciónde Propiedad IntelectualTribunal de Defensa de la Competencia y de la PropiedadIntelectual

VENEZUELA Superintendencia Pro-Competencia

FACTOR DE FOMENTO DE LAINTEGRACIÓN ECONÓMICA

La aplicación de las reglas decompetencia en América Latina es unelemento importante del desarrolloeconómico y de la integración regional deaquellos mercados. Allí donde existeseguridad jurídica y certeza de suaplicación, los riesgos de conflictoscomerciales y políticas de defensacomercial se reducen considerablemente.Desde la Dirección General de la

Competencia de la Comisión Europea(DG IV) se ha seguido de cerca esteinteresante proceso durante el año 1996.Así se ha confeccionado un compendio delegislaciones de competencia de AméricaLatina y un repertorio de sus autoridadesnacionales respectivas a fin de fomentarsu conocimiento. Dicho compendio sehará llegar a quienes lo soliciten al n° defax +32-2-2969803 o a la dirección [email protected] (indicando sunombre y apellidos, empresa o institución,función en ésta, dirección, teléfono/fax y,en su caso, señas de correo electrónico).También se ha realizado un inventariopara evaluar las posibilidades decolaboración técnica tanto con paísesindividuales como con asociaciones ogrupos de países (Mercosur, PactoAndino, Istmo Centroamericano).

ÁREAS DE COOPERACIÓN

En la actualidad se están estudiando lasposibilidades y modalidades decooperación entre las autoridades decompetencia de la Unión Europea y deAmérica Latina. Las opciones a considerarse encuadran en tres grandes ámbitos:1.- Formación: En este apartado cabría

incluir periodos de intercambio o prácticasde funcionarios en las respectivasautoridades de competencia, conferencias,seminarios y cursos de formaciónuniversitaria. Esta experiencia deberíafavorecer los conocimientos prácticos de laaplicación de reglas y la doctrina decompetencia.

2.- Lazos institucionales: Se trataría deestrechar la cooperación entre autoridadesde competencia para favorecer unintercambio de informaciones sobre lagestión y la mejora procedimental de susactividades.

3.- Fomento de la integración económica:Ello requeriría un mayor arraigamiento dela cultura de competencia, incluyendo tantoa las empresas como a los profesionales, yel simultáneo desarrollo del ordenamientojurídico propio.

Se trata de objetivos ambiciosos aexaminar tanto por parte de lasinstituciones comunitarias como por lasautoridades nacionales de competencia delos Estados miembros y de AméricaLatina, respectivamente. En función de laevolución de las relaciones se decidirán lasmedidas específicas para poner en prácticaesta cooperación. Últimamente una misiónde prospectiva ha sido enviada a los paísesintegrantes del Mercosur para evaluar lasposibilidades de asistencia técnica porparte de la Unión Europea. Una nueva áreade cooperación con América Latina estánaciendo - compite a cada uno asumir susresponsabilidades para lograr llevar lasrelaciones en materia de política decompetencia a una nueva dimensión.

This article will shortly be available inEnglish, French, German and Portugueseon DG IV's internet site (under Speeches -see page 44 for details).

Cet article sera bientôt disponible enAnglais, Français, Allemand et Portuguaissir le site internet de la DG IV (sousSpeeches - pour plus de details voir à lapage 44)

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OPINIONS AND COMMENTSIn this section DG IV officials outline developments in Community competition procedures. It is important torecognise that the opinions put forward in this section are the personal views of the officials concerned. Theyhave not been adopted or in any way approved by the Commission and should not be relied upon as astatement of the Commission's or DG IV's views.

L'accès au dossier est une phase

L'accès au dossier dans lesprocédures de concurrence

par Kris DEKEYSER, IV-E-1

importante de la procédure dans toutes lesaffaires de concurrence contentieuses(interdictions avec ou sans amende,interdiction d'une opération deconcentration, rejet de plainte, etc.). Dansle cadre de cet accès, il s'agit pour laCommission de concilier deux obligationsopposées, à savoir l'obligation de respecterles droits de la défense et l'obligation deprotéger des informations confidentiellesdes entreprises.

A la lumière de la jurisprudence de laCour et du TPI et notamment de lajurisprudence dite "Carbonate de soude"[Arrêts du Tribunal de Première Instancedu 29 juin 1995 dans les affaires T-30/91Solvay / Commission, T-36/91 ICI /Commission et T-37/91 ICI / Commission,Recueil 1995, pp. II-1775, II-1847 et II-1901], et afin d'accroître la transparencevis-à-vis des entreprises, la Commission asouhaité systématiser et clarifier sapratique concernant l'accès au dossier, enadoptant une communication concernantles règles de procédure interne pour letraitement des demandes d'accès audossier dans les cas d'application desarticles 85 et 86 du traité CE, des articles65 et 66 du traité CECA et du règlementn° 4064/89 du Conseil [Règlement (CEE)n° 4064/89 du Conseil, du 21 décembre1989, relatif au contrôle des opérations deconcentration entre entreprises (JO L 395du 30.12.1989, p. 1)].

La communication, qui a été publiée auJournal Officiel C 23 du 23 janvier 1997,concerne l'étendue et les limites de l'accèsau dossier ainsi que les modalitésd'application pratique (Il convient depréciser toutefois que les règles deprocédure interne exposées dans lacommunication portent essentiellementsur les droits des entreprises mises encause dans l'instruction d'une infractionprésumée; elles ne portent pas sur lesdroits de parties tierces, et notamment desplaignants.).

L'objet de l'accès au dossier étant depermettre aux destinataires d'unecommunication des griefs de se prononcersur les conclusions auxquelles estparvenue la Commission, les entreprisesmises en cause doivent avoir accès à tousles documents qui constituent le "dossier"d'instruction de la Commission (DG IV),à l'exception des catégories de documentsidentifiées dans l'arrêt Hercules [Arrêt dutribunal de Première Instance du 17décembre 1991 dans l'affaire T-7/89Hercules, Recueil 1991, p. II-1711]: lessecrets d'affaires des autres entreprises, lesdocuments internes de la Commission etles autres informations confidentielles.

Toutes les pièces rassemblées dans lecadre de l'instruction d'un dossier ne sontdonc pas communicables et lacommunication donne des critèrespermettant de distinguer les documentscommunicables et ceux qui ne le sont pas.

Sur le plan administratif et pratique,certaines dispositions nouvelles sont misesen oeuvre dès le stade de l'instruction afinde faciliter l'accès ultérieur au dossier.

- Pour des raisons de simplification etd'efficacité administratives, les documentsinternes sont dorénavant classés dans lerecueil des documents internes relatifs aucas sous instruction, qui est par principenon accessible et qui contient tous lesdocuments internes en ordrechronologique. Ces documents concernentnotamment les instructions internes de lahiérarchie relatives au traitement del'affaire, les consultations des autresservices, la correspondance avec les autresautorités publiques, les projets ou autresdocuments de travail, etc.

- Certains documents qui ont été recueillispar la Commission au cours devérifications effectuées dans lesentreprises, sont normalement restituésaux entreprises concernées dans les plusbrefs délais si, après examen approfondi,ils s'avèrent sans intérêt pour l'affaire encause.

- Afin de faciliter la détermination ducaractère accessible ou non desdocuments, il sera dorénavant demandésystématiquement aux entreprises qui fontl'objet d'une mesure d'instruction de

(i) préciser quelles informations(documents ou parties de documents) ellesestiment être couvertes par le secret desaffaires, ainsi que les documentsconfidentiels dont la divulgation leurcauserait préjudice;

(ii) de fournir une justification écrite decette revendication; et

(iii) de donner à la Commission uneversion non confidentielle suffisammentsignificative des documents pour lesquelselles réclament la confidentialité (avecsuppression des passages confidentiels).

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OPINIONS AND COMMENTS

Les revendications de confidentialitémanifestement fondées, ou tout au moinsfondées à première vue sontprovisoirement acceptées (Il y a desdispositions spécifiques aux procédurespréparatoires dans les affaires deconcentration.).Les revendications de confidentialitémanifestement non fondées, par exemplecelles qui concerneraient des informationsdéjà publiques, ou la totalité de ladocumentation en cause de manièreglobale et indiscriminée, ne sont pasacceptées et la Commission en informel'entreprise.

L'appréciation définitive du caractèreconfidentiel d'un document ne pourra êtreformulée toutefois qu'à l'issue del'instruction d'une affaire, lors del'établissement de la communication desgriefs.

Si une divergence de vue persiste, laquestion est alors soumise au Conseiller-Auditeur qui peut mettre en oeuvre laprocédure de décision prévue à l'article 5,paragraphe 4 du mandat du Conseiller-Auditeur [Décision de la Commission du12 décembre 1994, relative au mandat desconseillers-auditeurs dans le cadre desprocédures de concurrence devant laCommission (JO L 330 du 21.12.1994, p.67)].

Il convient de rappeler le principe selonlequel un document qui constitue lapreuve d'une infraction ou , en senscontraire, un document manifestement àdécharge d'une entreprise ne peut êtreconsidéré comme confidentiel à l'égarddes entreprises en cause.

- Une dernière innovation dans la phasepréparatoire pour l'accès au dossierconcerne la liste énumérative des

documents, qui est établie désormaisselon les principes suivants :

a) Cette liste comprend la numérotationcontinue de toutes les pages du dossierd'instruction et l'indication (sur base d'uncode de classification) de la mesure danslaquelle le document est accessible et desentreprises auxquelles cet accès estautorisé.

b) Un code d'accès est attribué sur cetteliste à chaque document

- document accessible - document partiellement accessible - document non accessible

L'énumération des documents nonaccessibles comporte une indicationsuccincte permettant d'identifier leurcontenu et leur objet, de telle sorte quetoute entreprise ayant demandé l'accès audossier soit en mesure de déterminer, enconnaissance de cause, si ces documentssont susceptibles d'être pertinents pour sadéfense et d'évaluer l'opportunité derevendiquer l'accès à ceux-ci nonobstantcette classification.

Pour les documents accessibles etpartiellement accessibles, une telleindication du contenu de ces documentsest sans objet étant donné que lesentreprises ont un accès "physique" àceux-ci. Seuls les passages sensibles sontmasqués de telle sorte qu'il est possible,pour l'entreprise qui a accès, dedéterminer la nature de l'informationmasquée (e.g. chiffre d'affaires).

En ce qui concerne les modalitésd'application pratique de l'accès auxdossiers, qui, selon les circonstances,peuvent aller de quelques dizaines depages à plusieurs dizaines de milliers depages, la règle générale sera dorénavant

que les entreprises sont invitées àexaminer sur place, dans les locaux de laCommission, les documents accessibles.

Si l'entreprise estime, sur base de la listedes documents qui lui est donnée, quecertains documents non accessibles luisont nécessaires pour sa défense, elle peuten faire état dans une demande motivéeadressée au Conseiller-Auditeur.

Lorsqu'il s'agit d'un dossier peuvolumineux, la Commission pourraproposer à l'entreprise l'envoi par la postede la totalité des pièces accessibles.

Pour les affaires instruites sur la base desarticles 85 et 86, ne seront désormaisannexés à la communication des griefs ouà la lettre de rejet de plainte que lespreuves et les documents cités à l'appuides griefs ou du rejet de plainte.

Les modalités d'accès au dossier ainsiprévues devraient pouvoir s'appliquer sansdifficulté sauf pour les dossiers en cours,déjà constitués avant l'adoption de cesnouvelles dispositions; ces dossiersdevront, en conséquence, être traités aucas par cas.

L'accès au dossier constitue une étape-clefde la procédure administrative, permettantaux entreprises d'exercer de manièresatisfaisante les droits de la défense, touten conciliant la nécessité de la protectiondes informations sensibles et l'intérêtpublic à ce qu'il soit mis fin auxinfractions aux règles de concurrence.

La Commission est convaincue que lamise en oeuvre de ces nouvelles modalitéspermettra de résoudre de manièrepragmatique et efficace la plupart desproblèmes rencontrés à l'occasion d'unetelle procédure tout en satisfaisantpleinement le droit des entreprises d'êtreentendues par la Commission.

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OPINIONS AND COMMENTS

Clauses suspectes dans un accordde règlement à l’amiable

par Philippe CHEVALIER, IV-C-3

Le règlement à l’amiable d’une plaintedéposée en mai 1995 devant laCommission a amené les services de laDGIV à exprimer leur profondeinquiétude quant à l’existence et la naturede certaines stipulations contenues dansl’accord de règlement conclu entre uneentreprise plaignante et l’entreprise miseen cause.

L’accord prévoit que le plaignant retire saplainte, et que l’entreprise en causemodifie certaines de ses pratiques et paieau plaignant une somme de l’ordre de 4millions d’Ecus. Cependant, dans saversion originale, il imposait àl’entreprise plaignante l’obligation derembourser partiellement la sommepayée, si la Commission décidait, avantcertaines dates, d’adresser unecommunication des griefs à l’entrepriseen cause, attaquant certaines des

pratiques mentionnées dans la plainte. Laversion originale de l’accord stipulait enoutre que le plaignant ne devait pas,directement ou indirectement, encouragerles services de la Commission àpoursuivre ou à reprendre leursinvestigations, nonobstant le droit duplaignant de se soumettre à l’obligationde répondre à une demande derenseignements contraignante de laCommission, telle que prévue par l’article11 du règlement No 17.

Les services de la DGIV ont fortementcritiqué ces stipulations, qui pouvaiententraver le bon déroulement de l’enquêtemenée dans cette affaire, considérantqu’elles avaient pour effet de découragerune entreprise, qui jusqu’alors avait étéune source très utile de renseignements,de continuer à coopérer ouvertement avec

la Commission et à fournir desinformations.

Suite à ces critiques, la Commission futinformée que toute référence à desd e m a n d e s c o n t r a i g n a n t e s d erenseignements avait été effacée del’accord, que l’accord avait été modifiépour explicitement garantir au plaignant ledroit de discuter avec les services de laCommission des termes du règlement àl’amiable et de tout sujet s’y rapportant, etque l’entreprise en cause avait renoncéaux remboursements partiels tels queexpressément prévus dans la versionoriginale de l’accord.

Les services de la Commission ne se sontpas exprimés sur la compatibilité del’accord original avec le droitcommunautaire de la concurrence. Cetaccord, notamment par les clauses deremboursement qu’il contenait, semblaitnéanmoins contraire à l’ordre public etdonc nul de plein droit. Il est à noter queles services de la Commission n’ont pascritiqué le paiement de dommages etintérêts en tant que tel, mais le fait queleur montant dépendait de la suite que laCommission entendait donner à cetteaffaire.

Die Kommission schlägt eine neueBagatellbekanntmachung vor

von Stefan RATING

HINTERGRUND

Die Kommission legte am 22. Januar1997 einen Entwurf zur Änderungihrer Bekanntmachung über Ver-einbarungen von geringer Bedeutungvor (ABl. 1997 Nr. C 29, S. 3). Die

sog. “Bagatellbekanntmachung” er-läutert, welche Vereinbarungen nachAuffassung der Kommission grund-sätzlich nicht unter Artikel 85 Absatz1 des EG-Vertrages fallen. Der erstenBekanntmachung dieser Art aus demJahre 1970 (ABl. 1970 Nr. C 64, S.1) folgte nach sieben Jahren eine

zweite (ABl. 1977 Nr. C 313, S. 3)und schließlich im Jahre 1986 einedritte (ABl. 1986 Nr. C 231, S. 3), diein ihrer Ende 1994 geändertenFassung (ABl. 1994 Nr. C 368, S. 20)bis heute fortgilt.

Erklärtes Motiv der Kommission isteine Verringerung ihrer Belastung mitAnmeldungen solcher Vereinbarungen,deren Auswirkungen auf den Wett-bewerb im Gemeinsamen Markt nichtspürbar sind. Dies hat bereits diederzeitige geltende Bekanntmachungbewerkstelligt, allerdings um denPreis einer gewissen Rechtsunsicher-

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OPINIONS AND COMMENTS

heit für die Unternehmen. Darüberhinaus hat sie nach Auffassung derKommission den Spielraum für eineSenkung der Zahl unnötiger An-meldungen nicht ausgeschöpft undschließlich mit neueren Entwick-lungen, sowohl auf gemeinschafts-rechtlichem als auch auf wirtschaft-lichem Gebiet, nicht Schritt gehalten.

DERZEITIGER ANSATZ

Nach geltender Auffassung derKommission erfaßt Artikel 85 Absatz1 des EG-Vertrages im allgemeinennicht Vereinbarungen zwischenUnternehmen, deren gemeinsamerUmsatz bis zu 300 Millionen ECUbeträgt und deren Marktanteile fürdie relevanten Güter oder Dienstezusammen 5 Prozent nicht über-steigen. In diesen Fällen leitet dieKommission grundsätzlich weder aufAntrag noch von Amts wegenPrüfungsverfahren ein; im Ausnahme-falle der Anwendbarkeit des Artikels85 Absatz 1 sieht sie davon ab, einBußgeld zu verhängen.

Damit findet schon heute aufzahlreiche Vereinbarungen, ins-besondere solche zwischen kleinenund mittleren Unternehmen (KMU),das Kartellrecht der MitgliedstaatenAnwendung. Voraussetzung dafür ist,daß die aktuellen oder potentiellenAuswirkungen dieser Vereinbarungenauf den Handel entweder auf dasGebiet eines Mitgliedstaats be-schränkt bleiben oder in nur ge-r i n g e m Maße den inner-gemeinschaftlichen Wirtschafts-verkehr betreffen. Gleiches giltjedoch für Vereinbarungen, welchetrotz ihrer objektiven Eignung, denHandel zwischen Mitgliedstaaten zubeeinträchtigen, eine Wettbewerbs-beschränkung weder bezwecken noch

bewirken. In diesen Fällen ist nachständiger Rechtsprechung das Tat-bestandsmerkmal der Spürbarkeite iner Beschränkung inne r -gemeinschaftlichen Handels nichterfüllt.

NEUER VORSCHLAG

Die Kommission schlägt nunmehrvor, in einer neuen Bekanntmachungallein auf die Spürbarkeit derWettbewerbsbeschränkung abzu-stellen und dieses Merkmal nur nochanhand eines der beiden obengenannten quantitativen Kriterienbestimmen: Der Entwurf sieht keineGesamtumsatzschwelle mehr vor. Esentfällt damit die PrivilegierungKMU gegenüber größeren Unter-nehmen, da nach Überzeugung derKommission auch im Lichte dereinschlägigen Rechtsprechung nichtder Umsatz, sondern allein dieMarktstellung der Beteiligten für dieSpürbarkeit einer Wettbewerbs-beschränkung den Ausschlag gibt.

Die Kommission sieht keine Gefahreiner Wettbewerbsverfälschung inVereinbarungen zwischen Groß-unternehmen deren Marktanteilebestimmte Schwellen nicht über-schreiten. Diesbezüglich unterscheidetder Entwurf zwischen horizontalenund vertikalen Vereinbarungen undbezeichnet erstere als grundsätzlichstärker wettbewerbsbeschränkend.Vertikale Vereinbarungen beschrän-ken zwar ebenfalls den Wettbewerb,wenn sie den Zugang Dritter zuAbsatzmärkten oder Versorgungs-quellen erheblich beeinträchtigen undso eine Marktabschottung oder dieErstarrung bestehender Wettbewerbs-strukturen fördern, tragen andererseitsaber zur Entwicklung eines dyna-mischen Wettbewerbs im Binnen-markt bei.

Die Kommission schlägt daher vor,die Spürbarkeitsschwelle vertikalerWettbewerbsbeschränkungen auf einenkumulierten Marktanteil der be-teiligten Unternehmen von 10%anzuheben, ein Wert, der in demweiteren Zusammenhang des Grün-buches zur EG-Wettbewerbspolitikgegenüber vertikalen Wettbewerbs-beschränkungen (vgl. Beitrag von L.Peeperkorn in Competition PolicyNewsletter Bd. 2, Nr. 3, S. 10 ff.) vonInteresse ist. Für horizontaleVereinbarungen hingegen beabsichtigtdie Kommission, eine Schwelle inHöhe von 5% beizubehalten. In Er-mangelung einer Umsatzschwellewürde der Nutzen beider Schwellenund somit der Bekanntmachung zurFeststellung der Bedeutung einerVereinbarung weitgehend von derTransparenz der relevanten Märkteabhängen.

BEDEUTUNG DER NEUENSCHWELLEN

Die Kommission weist inÜbereinstimmung mit der ständigenRechtsprechung des EuGH darauf hin,daß auch die neuen Schwellenwertenur Hinweischarakter haben würden.Einerseits können Vereinbarungen, dieder Entwurf nicht erfaßt, von geringerB e d e u t u n g i m S i n n e d e sgemeinschaftsrechtlichen Kartell-verbotes sein, andererseits Ver-einbarungen unterhalb der Schwellendennoch in den Anwendungsbereichdes Artikels 85 Absatz 1 fallen. ZurVerdeutlichung letzterer Möglichkeitnennt der Entwurf bestimmtehorizontale und vertikale Kartelle, diebesonders schwere Wettbewerbs-beschränkungen im Sinne des Artikels85 Absatz 1 mit sich bringen,namentlich Absprachen zur Fest-setzung von Preisen oder vonProduktions- oder Absatzquoten sowie

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solche zur Aufteilung der Märkteoder der Versorgungsquellen. Behältsich die Kommission auch vor, gegenderartige Vereinbarungen ungeachtetder Marktanteilsschwellen einzu-schreiten, so erklärt sie doch, diesallein in Fällen eines deutlichenGemeinschaftsinteresses an derPrüfung tun zu wollen.

Umgekehrt könnten auch nachAnnahme des Bekanntmachungs-entwurfes Vereinbarungen vongemeinschaftsweiter Bedeutungweiterhin dem Kartellverbot ent-gehen, sofern sie sich günstig auf denWettbewerb auswirken. Insofernwürden die Bekanntmachungen derKommission von 1968 über diezwischenbetriebliche Zusammenarbeitund von 1993 über die Behandlungkooperativer Gemeinschaftsunter-nehmen unverändert fortgelten. DerEuGH hat die Anwendung diesesGrundsatzes u. a. auf Gebiets-beschränkungen in Alleinvertriebs-und Lizenzvereinbarungen, auf Wett-bewerbsverbote in Unternehmens-veräußerungsverträgen sowie aufAlleinbezugsverpflichtungen inVertriebsvereinbarungen gutgeheißen.

KMU

Trotz der vorgesehenen Aufhebungder Priviliegierung von KMU gegen-über großen Unternehmen entspringtder Reformvorschlag der Über-zeugung der Kommission, daßVereinbarungen zwischen KMUauchbei Überschreitung derMarktanteilsschwellen grundsätzlich

nicht Artikel 85 Absatz 1 verletzendürften. Dies begründet derVorschlag damit, daß solche Ver-einbarungen im allgemeinen wedergemeinschaftsweite Bedeutunge r l a n g e n n o c h s p ü r b a r eEinschränkungen des Wettbewerbsbewirken. Selbst wenn dies der Fallist soll in aller Regel kein hin-reichendes Interesse der Gemein-schaft daran bestehen, das Verfahrenzu betreiben. Die Kommissionschlägt daraufhin vor, künftigVereinbarungen zwischen KMUgrundsätzlich nicht zu prüfen. ZurBegriffsbestimmung greift sie aufihre Empfehlung vom 3. April 1996betreffend die Definition der Kleinenund mittleren Unternehmen (ABl.1996, Nr. L 107, S. 4) zurück, womitim Ergebnis ein sehr hoher Anteil derUnternehmen in sämtlichen Mitglied-staaten erfaßt würde.

Der Bekanntmachungsentwurf siehtjedoch zwei Ausnahmefälle vor, indenen die Kommission sich grund-sätzlich auch einer Vereinbarungzwischen KMU annehmen würde:Zum einen den Fall eines Kartells,das sich auf einen wesentlichen Teildes relevanten Marktes erstreckt unddarauf den Wettbewerb stark be-einträchtigt, zum anderen den einerVielzahl gleichartiger Verträge, dieeine Erstarrung der Wettbewerbs-strukturen auf dem relevanten Marktzu verursachen drohen (sog.“Netzwerkeffekt”). In beiden Fällenbliebe ein Einschreiten derKommission zur Aufrechterhaltungwirksamen Wettbewerbs erforderlich.

TECHNISCHE ÄNDERUNGEN

Die Kommission hält schließlicheinige Änderungen technischer Art fürnotwendig. So erwähnt der Entwurfaußer der Verordnung des Rates Nr.17 (ABl. 1962 Nr. 13, S. 204) auchjene Verordnungen des Rates, welchedie Anwendung der Wettbewerbs-regeln auf die drei Verkehrsbereicheim einzelnen regeln. Des weiterenenthält er einen ausdrücklichenHinweis auf den Umstand, daß ernicht die Anwendung des nationalenRechts der Mitgliedstaaten hindert.Schließlich entspricht die Definitiondes Begriffes des relevanten Marktesin dem Entwurf jener des FormblattsA/B Anmeldungen nach der Ver-ordnung Nr. 17 (Anhang zur Ver-ordnung (EG) Nr. 3385/95 derKommission, ABl. 1994 Nr. L 377, S.31).

NÄCHSTE SCHRITTE

Der Bekanntmachungsvorschlag ist inden elf Amtssprachen der Gemein-schaft auf dem World Wide Web(http://europa.eu.int/en/comm/dg04/dg4home.htm) zugänglich. DieKommission hat in den zwei auf dieVeröffentlichung folgenden Monatenzahlreiche Stellungnahmen erhalten,die sie nunmehr auswerten und beider Erarbeitung einer endgültigenFassung der neuen Bekanntmachungberücksichtigen wird.

This article will shortly be available inEnglish on DG IV's internet site (underSpeeches - see page 44 for details).

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ANTI-TRUST RULESApplication of Articles 85 & 86 EC and 65 ECSCMain developments between 1st January and 31st March 1997

Most important recentdevelopments

CSK ET GIST-BROCADESMETTENT FIN À UN ACCORDDE DISTRIBUTION DEPRÉSURE

CSK (Coöperatieve Stremsel- enKleurselfabriek), une coopérativenéerlandaise qui produit et qui vendde la présure animale, et Gist-brocades, qui produit également de lap r é s u r e , m a i s d ’ o r i g i n ebiotechnologique, avaient conclu unaccord réciproque de distributionexclusive qu'ils ont ensuite notifiéauprès de la Commission.

La présure animale et la présured’origine biotechnologique sont, ence qui concerne leurs caractéristiques,des produits substituables utiliséspour la fabrication du fromage.L’utilisation de la présure de naturebiotechnologique n’est pas encoreadmise dans tous les États membres.Aux Pays-Bas, l'utilisation de laprésure de nature biotechnologiquepour la fabrication du fromage n'estpas autorisée de manière généralemais néanmoins le ministre peuta c c o r d e r u n e a u t o r i s a t i o nindividuelle. La présure animale et laprésure d'origine biotechnologiquesont par conséquent des produitsconcurrents.

L’accord stipulait que CSK devenait,aux Pays-Bas, le distributeur exclusif

de la présure produite par Gist-brocades. Par contre, en dehors desPays-Bas, Gist-brocades étaitformellement désigné commedistributeur non-exclusif de la présureanimale produite par CSK. Toutefois,Gist-brocades était, de facto,considéré comme distributeurexclusif. L’accord prévoyaitnotamment que CSK pouvait vendre,mais uniquement après concertationavec Gist-brocades, à d’autresrevendeurs dans le territoire concédéà ce dernier, si CSK considérait queGist-brocades n’y réalisait pas assezde ventes. Cette disposition n’ajamais été appliquée. De plus, lesventes réalisées par CSK, maisdestinées à l’exportation, étaientconsidérées par ce dernier commeune “dérogation” à l’accord etn’étaient exécutées qu’aprèsconcertation avec Gist-brocades.

Les services de la Commission ontfait savoir à ces entreprises que cetaccord était à considérer comme unaccord réciproque de distributionexclusive entre fabricants de produitsconcurrents, ce qui revient en fait àun accord horizontal de partage demarché sur le plan géographique. Untel accord n’est pas exemptable. Deplus, CSK a été informée que, vu sapart de marché importante aux Pays-Bas, pareil accord pourrait constituerdans son chef un abus de positiondominante. En effet, l’accord en

question permettait à CSK decontrôler la distribution aux Pays-Basd’un produit concurrent et de protégerainsi sa position sur le marché.

CSK et Gist-brocades ontcommuniqué qu'ils n'étaient pasd'accord avec l'interprétation donnéedans cette lettre d'avertissement etqu'ils ont mis fin à leur accord dedistribution pour des raisonscommerciales.

COMMISSION SERVICESCLEAR THE GLOBALEUROPEAN NETWORKAGREEMENT TO CREATEHIGH QUALITY TRANS-EUROPEAN TELECOMMU-NICATIONS NETWORKS.

The European Commission’scompetition services have givenclearence to the Global EuropeanNetwork (GEN) agreement to providehigh quality digital links betweenMember States. This agreementamongst the major Europeantelecommunications operators willconsiderably improve the quality oftrans-European network telecommu-nications services. The EuropeanCommission’s competition serviceshave secured amendments to theagreement in order to preservecompetition between the companiesinvolved and ensure free and fairaccess for third parties.

The main amendments are :

(a) Each signatory will refrain fromentering into a collective concertedpricing arrangement and will negotiate

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on a bilateral basis the conditionsunder which it will give access to itsGEN capacity.

(b) Each signatory will offer in itspublic tariff access to GEN capacityon a non-discriminatory basis to thirdparties. These will thus be able toaccess GEN capacity on the samebasis as to the signatories.

The GEN agreement was signed byBritish Telecom, Deutsche Telekom,France Télécom, Telecom Italia,Telefónica de España. It will create a2 Mbit/s fibre optics tele-communications network between thesignatories' nodes using so-calledPDH (Plesiosynchronous DigitalHierarchy) technology. The networkwill improve the speed of circuitprovision, the network availabilityand quality and reliability of service.

Although they take a favourableapproach towards the improvementstrans-European telecommunicationsnetworks can bring, the EuropeanCommission’s competition serviceshave stated that at the same time theywill closely scrutinise suchagreements which involve dominantoperators in order to ensure thedevelopment of pro-competitivestructures.

In particular, the conditions underwhich third parties can accessEuropean leased lines remain a strongconcern for the EuropeanCommission. For that reason, theEuropean Commission services havewarned the parties that the negativeclearance of the agreement does notmean that signatories may abuse theirstrong if not dominant positions inthis market. At the same time, theEuropean Commission is, in thecontext of the ONP leased line

Directive, examining the applicationof the ONP principle in MemberStates.

Should a complaint be maderegarding access to European leasedline capacities, or should theEuropean Commission become awarethat the conditions under whichaccess is provided are discriminatoryor excessive, individual casespursuant Article 86 EC will beo p e n e d a g a i n s t t h e t e l e -communications operators inquestion. IP/97/242 [1997/03/20]

THE COMMISSION ADOPTS ASTATEMENT OF OBJECTIONSAGAINST UNILEVER CON-CERNING FREEZER CABINETEXCLUSIVITY IN THE IRISHICE CREAM MARKET

The European Commission hasdecided to adopt a new statement ofobjections against Unilever, whichoutlines its intention to find that thecompany’s distribution arrangementsfor so-called “impulse” ice cream inIreland infringe the Community’scompetition rules. Unilever providesfreezer cabinets “free on loan” toretailers, subject to the condition thatthe cabinets are to be usedexclusively for the storage of itsproducts. In the light of objectionsmade in July 1993 by theCommission to this practice, Unileverhad proposed a number ofmodifications to its distributionarrangements but the changes havenot been effective in achieving theirobjective of opening up the market.The Commission intends to find that,

in the circumstances of the Irishmarket, this provision of cabinets hasthe practical effect of precluding mostof the recipient outlets from sellingice cream other than Unilever’s,thereby contravening the competitionrules.

In September 1991 and July 1992respectively, the Commission receivedcomplaints from Masterfoods IrelandLtd (Mars) and Valley Ice Cream Ltdrelating to the distributionarrangements operated by HB IceCream Ltd (a subsidiary of theUnilever group, now trading as Vanden Bergh Foods Ltd) for its impulseice cream products in the Republic ofIreland. In July 1993, the Commissionprovisionally concluded that thearrangements infringe both Articles 85& 86 of the EC Treaty, and addresseda "Statement of Objections" againstVan den Bergh Foods to that effect.

In the light of these objections,Unilever, which is the leadingsupplier of ice cream in most EUcountries, proposed a number ofmodifications to its arrangements. Inparticular, an option allowing retailersto hire purchase freezer cabinets fromUnilever was proposed as analternative to the traditional free onloan offer. It was felt that theseproposals would be likely to renderUnilever’s distribution arrangementscompatible with the competition rulesby facilitating an evolution towardwider freezer cabinet ownership byretailers. This would enable retailoutlets to offer for sale the productsof any supplier, thereby contributingto a real opening up of the Irishimpulse ice cream market. Once thechanges were introduced, theCommission expressed its intention totake a favourable view of them (seeIP/95/229).

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However, while a new pricingscheme has been put in place, and anumber of Unilever’s older cabinetshave been sold to retailers in anattempt to encourage a move towardcabinet ownership, the option of hirepurchasing freezer cabinets hasproved unattractive. The changeshave thus not been effective inachieving their objective. TheCommission can therefore no longermaintain its favourable view of themodified distribution arrangements.

IP/97/147 [1997/02/21]

SETTLEMENT REACHEDWITH BELGACOM ON THEPUBLICATION OF TELE-PHONE DIRECTORIES - ITTWITHDRAWS COMPLAINT

Competition Commissioner Karel vanMiert’s services have reached asettlement with Belgacom, theBelgian national telecommunicationsoperator, on the conditions underwhich publishers of telephonedirectories in Belgium have access todata regarding subscribers ofBelgacom’s voice telephone services(access to listing services). Followingthe settlement, directory publishers inBelgium-will be charged a pricewhich is set in such a way thatBelgacom can recover the costs itincurs in the collection, treatment andprovision of the subscriber datarequired for publishing purposes, plusa reasonable profit margin. This cost-oriented approach will lead to a verysubstantial reduction of more than90% in the amount originally chargedto telephone directory publishers.

As a result of this settlement, ITTPromedia N.V., the Belgiandirectory-publishing subsidiary of theUS ITT World Directories company,has withdrawn its complaint lodgedwith the European Commission. Thecompany alleged inter alia that theconditions which Belgacom intendedto apply for access to its subscriberdata for publishing telephonedirectories were excessive anddiscriminatory and thus caught byArticle 86 of the EC Treaty. Theinitial price equal to 34% of theturnover of the directory publishersand 200BF per line of data wasalready in 1995 brought down to16% of turnover and 67 BF per line.At the end of 1995 the Commissionissued a formal statement ofobjections against Belgacom.

During the course of 1996, Belgacomendeavoured t o meet theCommission’s concerns andsubmitted a business proposalregarding access to its subscriber datafor publishers which has nowculminated in the present settlement.In assessing Belgacom’s proposal, theCommission’s services were assistedby an expert consulting firm to verifythe cost-oriented basis of theproposal. ITT was invited tocomment during the course of thesediscussions.

Belgacom has agreed to drop anyvariable component in relation to theturnover or profit of directorypublishers and instead to adopt acost-oriented approach, allowing it torecover its costs plus a reasonableprofit margin. Furthermore, as of1997, a distinction will be madebetween basic data, i.e. data andupdates which are essential forpublishing telephone directories andwhich directory publishers will thus

continue to acquire from Belgacom,and a range of optional supplementalinformation, which can be acquiredfrom Belgacom or from other marketsources.

For the years 1995 and 1996, the costallocation method applied in theparticular circumstances of this caseproduces total annual costs of 372million BF to be divided equallybetween the two current directorypublishers in Belgium, ITT andBelgacom’s subsidiary BelgacomDirectory Services (BDS). Atpresent, this translates into a price perline of data of 37 BF per line of basicdata and 10 BF for supplemental data(such data having already beenimbedded in the data provided overthe last two years).

Belgacom has undertaken to continueits pricing for basic data, with respectto which publishers are dependent onit, following the cost-oriented methodagreed for 1995/96. With respect tosupplemental data, prices will bedetermined on a market-oriented basis.Several factors could lead to a changein prices for basic data in the future:

- downward evolution: if, as could beexpected in the light of plannedsoftware changes or new technologies,the costs entailed in collecting,treating and providing basic data goesdown (this downward evolution couldpossibly be limited by an upwardevolution if the number of subscriberdata increases)

- changed allocation of the relevantcost base: if the number or scope ofpublishers using the data changes.

The principles established in this caseregarding access to data required fordirectory publishing on a cost-oriented

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basis are not only relevant from thepoint of view of competition policy,but are likewise in line with the EUpolicy orientation on directoriesreflected in the ONP voice telephonydirective and the Commission’scommunication on directories . Theprinciple of cost-orientation isapplicable throughout the EU.

Finally, the Commission willcontinue to closely survey futuredevelopments in this market, in closecooperation with the competentnational authorities.

IP/97/292 [1997/04/11]

THE COMMISSION APPROVESA REVISED COOPERATIONARRANGEMENT BETWEENSWEDISH MATCH SVERIGEAB AND SKANDINAVISKTOBAKSKOMPAGNI A/SCONCERNING THE PRINCEBRAND OF CIGARETTES INSWEDEN

The European Commission hasdecided to approve a revisedcooperation arrangement betweenSwedish Match Sverige AB andSkandinavisk Tobakskompagni A/Sconcerning the Prince brand ofcigarettes in Sweden. Followingserious doubts expressed by theCommission as to the compatibilitywith the competition rules of theirexclusive licensing arrangement, thetwo companies have come forward

with a radical re-definition of theircontinued cooperation. The changes,which meet the Commission’sconcerns, will involve an importantstructural overhaul of the Swedishcigarette market, and shouldcontribute to a real and immediateincrease in competition.

Swedish Match Sverige AB, formerlySvenska Tobaks AB, dominates theSwedish cigarette market. It is stillthe only manufacturer, and physicaldistributor, of cigarettes in Sweden.Skandinavisk Tobakskompagni is aDanish tobacco conglommerate activeprimarily in Denmark. SkandinaviskTobakskompagni’s Prince brand,which enjoys a strong position in theSwedish cigarette market, has since1961 been produced, distributed andsold in Sweden by Swedish Matchunder an exclusive licencingarrangement. This was notified to theCommission following Sweden’saccession to the EU. Under theagreement, prices were unilaterallyset by Swedish Match, and thecigarettes sold by Swedish Match’ssales force. The Commissioninformed the parties that, as a long-term exclusive manufacturing andsales license between two majorcigarette manufacturers, dominant onneighbouring geographic markets, theagreement gave rise to seriousconcern regarding its compatibilitywith Articles 85 and 86 of the EUTreaty.

The parties have now agreed toradically alter the terms of theirfuture relationship concerning thePrince brand. Their continuedcooperation will take the form of two

separate agreements for contractmanufacture and physical distributionby Swedish Match until the end of2001 : Swedish Match willmanufacture the currently licensedvariants of the Prince cigarette forsale by Skandinavisk Tobaks-kompagni in the Swedish market, andwill handle the physical distribution ofPrince cigarettes on a non-exclusivebasis. Skandinavisk Tobakskompagniis to become solely responsible for allsales, marketing and pricing of Princein Sweden with immediate effect. Theagreements will come into effectduring 1997.

These new arrangements should avoidany negative impact which might haveresulted for either company from amore abrupt change. In particular,Swedish Match had made substantialinvestments in relation to theproduction and distribution of thePrince brand, prior to Sweden’saccession to the Community and theapplicability of its competition rules.After 2001, the contract manufactureand distribution agreements will beterminable on one year's notice.

The amended agreements will havethe effect of placing essential controlof Prince in the hands of the brandowner, Skandinavisk Tobaks-kompagni, while at the same timeallowing it to continue benefitingfrom Swedish Match’s manufacturingand distribution infrastructure. Thiswill effectively introduce a newcompetitor of considerable strengthonto the Swedish cigarette market,thereby immediately increasingcompetition.

IP/97/80 [1997/01/31]

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Other pressreleasesThe full texts of Commission'sPress releases are available on-line from the RAPID database,on the day of their publication bythe Commission's Spokesman'sService. RAPID is available freeof charge through theCommission's EUROPA serveron the World Wide Web.

IP/97/243 [1997-03-20] The EuropeanCommission approves a joint venture inthe sector of polyurethane foams

IP/97/227 [1997-03-17] TheCommission imposes the dissolution ofUIP's Pay-TV distribution joint venture

IP/97/113 [1997-02-14] Car prices inthe European Union on 1 November1996 : lowest in the Netherlands,dearest in Germany

IP/97/85 [1997-02-05] Televisionwithout frontiers and major (sports)events : Commission Communication

IP/97/50 [1997-01-23] Competition andtransparency : the Commission adopts anotice on access to file (see page 6 ofthis issue)

IP/97/42 [1997-01-22] The Commissioninvites for comments on the envisagedrevision of the Notice on agreements ofminor importance (see page 8 of thisissue)

IP/97/12 [1997-01-15] Maritimetransport : the Commission gives greenlight to the North Sea Liner ConferenceAgreement

Judgments

Judgment of the Court of FirstInstance of 15 January 1997, CaseT-77/95: Syndicat français de l'expressinternational and Others vCommission of the EuropeanCommunities (Competition).

Judgment of the Court of 20 February1997, Case C-128/95: Fontaine SA andOthers v Aqueducs: AutomobilesSARL Preliminary ruling (Competition Vehicle distribution Parallel imports Regulation (EEC) No 123/85 Applicability as against third parties Independent reseller Definition of 'newvehicle‘ and second-hand vehicle‘)(Second Chamber)

Opinion of Advocate General P. Léger,20 February 1997, Case C-219/95 P :Ferriere Nord SpA v Commission ofthe European Communities ; Appealagainst the judgment of the Court ofFirst Instance (First Chamber) of 6April 1995 in Case T-143/89 FerriereNord v Commission Refusal to annulCommission Decision 89/515/EEC of 2August 1989 relating to a proceedingunder Article 85 of the EEC Treaty(IV/31.553 - Welded steel mesh)

Opinion of Advocate General F.G.Jacobs, of 27 February 1997, JoinedCases C-114/95 and C-115/95 : TexacoA/S v Middelfart Havn and Others;Olieselskabet Danmark a.m.b.a. vTrafikministeriet and Others:Preliminary ruling Østre Landsret Interpretation of Arts 9 to 13, 18 to 29,86, 90 and 96 of the EC Treaty Interpretation of Council Regulation(EEC) No 4055/86 of 22 December 1986applying the principle of freedom toprovide services to maritime transportbetween Member States and betweenMember States and third countries andCouncil Regulation (EEC) No 4056/86of 22 December 1986 laying downdetailed rules for the application ofArticles 85 and 86 of the Treaty tomaritime transport Interpretation ofthe EC-Sweden and EC-Norway freetrade agreements National legislation

on user charges for public and privatecommercial ports levied on domesticand imported products Surcharge of40% affecting imported goods only

Opinion of Advocate General G.Tesauro, 27 February 1997, CaseC-41/96 : V.A.G.Händlerbeirat e. V. vFirma SYD-Consult: Preliminary ruling Landgericht Hamburg Interpretation ofArt. 85 of the EC Treaty andCommission Regulation (EEC) No123/85 of 12 December 1984 on theapplication of Article 85(3) of the Treatyto certain categories of motor vehicledistribution and servicing agreements National legislation on unfaircompetition requiring that the systembe watertight for members to be able toobtain injunctions prohibiting thirdparties from distributing the productsconcerned Distinction betweendistribution systems which arewatertight in theory and systems whichare watertight both in theory and inpractice

Judgment of the Court of 11 March1997, Case C-264/95 P : Commission ofthe European Communities v Unioninternationale des chemins de fer (UIC)(Appeal Competition Transport by rail Legal basis for a decision RegulationNo 1017/68 Scope) (Full Court)

Judgment of the Court, of 18 March1997, Case C-282/95 : GuérinAutomobiles v Commission of theEuropean Communities (Appeal Competition Complaint Action forfailure to act Notification under Article6 of Regulation No 99/63/EEC Definition of a position terminating thefailure to act Cross-appeal limited tocosts) (Full Court)

Judgment of the Court, of 18 March1997, Case C-343/95 : Diego Calì & FigliSrl v Servizi ecologici porto di GenovaSpA (SEPG) Preliminary ruling(Harbour company Prevention ofpollution Legal monopoly Abuse of adominant position) (Full Court)

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MERGERSApplication of Council Regulation 4064/89Main developments between 1st January and 31st March 1997

Summary of the most importantrecent developments

Kristin SCHREIBER, Heiner BRUHN, DG IV-B-4

During the first quarter of 1997 (upto 2nd April) the Commission took36 decisions under the MergerRegulation relating to 30 cases.These include one clearance decisionunder Article 8(2) of the Regulationwithout undertakings (Coca ColaEnterprises/Amalgamated Beverages),one divestiture decision under Article8(4) of the Regulation (Kesko /Tuko), one clearance decision underArticle 6(1)(b) of the Regulation withundertakings (Bank Austria /Creditanstalt), as well as threedecisions under Article 6(1)(c) of theRegulation to begin in-depth “Phase2” investigations (British Telecom /MCI, Blokker / Toys R US andBoeing / Mc Donnell Douglas.

COCA-COLA ENTERPRISES /AMALGAMATED BEVERAGESGREAT BRITAIN

On 22 January 1997, the Commissiondecided to clear the acquisition byCoca-Cola Enterprises Inc (CCE) ofthe British bottling operation Coca-Cola & Schweppes Beverages Ltd(CCSB) Detailed “phase 2”investigations on this case had beenopened by the Commission on 19thSeptember 1996 (cf. CompetitionNewsletter of Autumn 1996).

CCSB bottles and sells a wide varietyof soft drinks including Coca-Cola,Schweppes Mixers, Fanta, Sprite andCanada Dry. CCE is the world´slargest bottler of Coca-Cola products.The Commission came to theconclusion that CCE, for thepurposes of the Merger Regulation, iscontrolled by The Coca-ColaCompany (TCCC).

CCE would acquire the whole of theshare capital of AmalgamatedBeverages Great Britain Ltd(AGBG), the parent company ofCCSB, from the present shareholders,Cadbury Schweppes plc (CS), whichhad a 51% equity shareholding, andTCCC, which held the remaining49% interest.

Virtually all CCSB´s production wasof brands owned by or licensed to itsparents. TCCC products, including itsstrongest brand, Coca-Cola, made upthe major part of the turnover ofCCSB. Following the operation, CSwould no longer produce and marketsoft drinks itself in Great Britain.However, CS brands would bebottled and marketed by the newentity under long term licensingarrangements concluded with CCE.These arrangements were, at the timeof the Commission´s decision, beingexamined under Article 85 and,following an agreement by the parties

to alter them, they were given thegreen light by the Commission on 24February 1997.

With regard to market definition, theCommission concluded that it waspossible to distinguish a distinctproduct market for cola-flavouredcarbonated soft drinks (colas) in GreatBritain. Colas are the single largestflavour of carbonated soft drinks inthe United Kingom, accounting forabout half the consumption of thiscategory. In reaching this conclusion,the Commission considered a numberof factors including the following:brand and image are key drivingfactors in the consumption of colas,whereas price and taste were moreimportant factors in the consumptionof other carbonated soft drinks(CSDs); a large majority of marketplayers (competitors and customers)considered colas to be a separatemarket and the parties themselves andtheir competitors defined theirmarketing and pricing policies on thebasis of a cola market. In addition, theadvertising and marketing initiativesof the major cola competitors inresponse to the recent (1994/95)introduction of premium own-labelcolas and Virgin Cola were directedalmost exclusively towards colasrather than other soft drinks.

The Commission’s investigationdetermined that CCSB was, at thetime of the decision, dominant in thecola market in Great Britain. Thisdominance stems from the very highmarket shares of Coca-Cola suppliedby CCSB in the overall cola market(about 60%) and in each of the threedistribution channels, multiplegroceries, impulse and on-premise. In

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addition, Coca-Cola is a “must stock”item in multiple grocers, wholesalersand cash & carries. Moreover,CCSB´s broad portfolio whichenables customers to obtain all or avery large part of their requirementsfrom a single source and theeconomies of scale in purchasing,production and distribution arisingfrom the combined potfolio are alsofactors contributing to the significantmarket strength of CCSB. In the colamarket, CCSB with its sales of Coca-Cola had a market share nearly threetimes that of its nearest competitor,Britvic, which bottles and marketsPepsi in Great Britain. Virgin Cola, arecent entrant into the market, onlyhad a very small share of the colamarket, almost all of which wasderived from sales to the multiplegrocers channel. Own label colasachieved a comparatively large shareof sales in multiple grocers, but theyhad only 10% of the overall colamarket in Great Britain. While themultiple grocers channel was thelargest of the three channels, itaccounted for less than half of thetotal sales of colas. In the otherchannels, neither Virgin Cola nor thepremium own label colas had anysignificant market share.

The Commission’s investigationconcluded that, through the operation,CCSB’s dominance on the colamarket in Great Britain would betransferred to CCE and thus toTCCC, the latter becoming a fullyvertically integrated company inGreat Britain combining the roles ofbrand owner and bottler. In addition,through the licensing arrangementsbetween CCE and CS, CS´s productswould continue to be produced,marketed and distributed by the newCCSB and would therefore fall underTCCC´s control.

The Commission examined bothvertical and horizontal/conglomerateaspects of the operation in thecontext of a possible strengthening ofCCSB´s position in the relevantmarket. With regard to verticalissues, the Commisison identifiedcertain advantages that could accrueto a fully integrated TCCC such asthe ability to coordinate moreeffectively promotions by the bottlerwith advertising by the brandowner.However, the Commisison alsorecognised that TCCC alreadyexercised substantial influence if notde facto control over the marketingof its own products and the overallcommercial strategy of CCSB.Similarly, with respect to horizontal/ conglomerate aspects, theCommission recognised that TCCC´sacquisition of control over the fullCCSB portfolio would not representa significant change in the market, asthe advantages arising from the broadportfolio were to a large extentalready available to CCSB.

While the operation would result in astructural change which could alsolead to a change in the marketbehaviour of CCSB, the Commissionconsidered that it was not possible todifferentiate sufficiently between theopportunities deriving directly fromthe operation and those which alreadyexisted. In the specific circumstancesof this case, there was no adequateevidence to conclude with a sufficientdegree of certainty that the operationwould lead to a reinforcement ofCCSB´s dominant position.

In any event, however, theCommission took note of the fact thatCCE undertook that CCSB shall notimpose (a) exclusivity obligations oncustomers with regard to colas; (b)target rebates for periods exceeding

three months; (c) combined targetrebates which apply to Coca-Cola andother products; nor (d) tyingprovisions. It was concluded thatthese undertakings addressed at leastsome of the concerns raised by thirdparties.

KESKO / TUKO

On 20 November 1996, following arequest from the Finnish Office ofFree Competition under Article 22 ofthe Merger Regulation, theCommission had decided that theacquisition of Tuko by Kesko, twoFinnish companies active in the saleof daily consumer goods in Finland,was incompatible with the commonmarket (cf. Competition Newsletter ofAutumn 1996). Since Kesko did not,in the course of the procedure whichled to the adoption of the prohibitiondecision of 20 November, offer anyundertaking capable of addressing thecompetitive concerns identified, it wasnecessary to eliminate the dominantposition created by the acquisition ofTuko. At the time when the Article8(3) prohibition decision was adopted,the concentration had, indeed, alreadybeen completed since Kesko acquiredcontrol over Tuko on 27 May 1996 byacquisition of shares. The Com-mission decided not to include in itsprohibition decision measures inapplication of Article 8(4) of theMerger Regulation and announcedthat a separate decision would beadopted.

Therefore, on 19 February 1997 theCommission adopted a decision underArticle 8(4) of the Merger Regulationsetting out measures in order torestore effective competition on the

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Finnish markets for retail and cashand carry sales of daily consumergoods.

The decision orders Kesko to divestthe daily consumer goods business ofTuko to a purchaser which must be aviable existing or prospectivecompetitor, independent of andunrelated to the Kesko group andpossessing the financial resources andproven expertise which enables it tomaintain and develop the divestedbusiness as an active competitor toKesko. The Commission’s decisionalso provides for the appointment ofan independent trustee who willensure that the order is fullycomplied with and notably that thepurchaser will meet the definedpurchaser standards in order toensure that the divested businessconstitutes an active competitiveforce on the Finnish daily consumergoods market.

In reaching the divestiture decision,the Commission took into account thenecessary degree of proportionalityand flexibility required to ensure thatthe divestment of Tuko can becarried out in an appropriate way andwithin a reasonable period of time.

BANK AUSTRIA /CREDITANSTALT

On 11 March 1997, the Commissionapproved the acqusition of solecontrol in Creditanstalt-Bankverein(Creditanstalt) by Bank AustriaAktiengesellschaft (Bank Austria)following undertakings which elimi-nated competition concerns identi-fied during the first phase of themerger procedure. Already in earliercases (notably Swissair/Sabena and

Répola/Kymmene), the Commissionhad accepted substantial undertakingsduring the first phase of investigationwhich eliminated the competitionconcerns identified and thus made theopening of proceedings redundant.

Bank Austria and Creditanstalt areuniversal banks, which are mainlyactive in Austria, and which have alarge number of participations incompanies in a variety of economicsectors. The biggest shareholder ofBank Austria is AnteilsverwaltungZentralsparkasse (AVZ). The city ofVienna provides an indirectguarantee, via AVZ, for BankA u s t r i a ´ s l i a b i l i t i e s . T h econcentration gave rise to a detailedcompetitive assessment of itsimplications in the banking sectorand in one of the industrialpa r t i c ipa t ions , namely t heconstruction sector.

The Commission considered that,following the concentration, the twoundertakings would not only be byfar the leading suppliers of bankingservices in Austria, but would also bethe only bank with significant marketshares active in all relevant productsegments. In addition, the partiesinvolved in the concentration wereactive on European foreign markets,while their major competitors inAustria were almost exclusivelyactive in that Member State.

Both in private and companycustomer banking services in Austriathe parties to the concentration,together with GiroCredit, which hadto be added to them, reachedsignificant market shares, which wereseveral times higher than those of thenext largest competitor, in a numberof product segments (e.g. creditbusiness, stocks and shares and

deposits). In addition, the Austrianbanking markets are characterized bymarket access barriers, so that therewas a risk of the creation orreinforcement of a dominant position.Further competition concerns stemmedfrom the addition of participationswhich Bank Austria and Creditanstalteach held in the specialized banksÖsterreichische Kontrollbank (OeKB)and Österreichische InvestitionskreditAG (Investkredit) which are active inthe public interest. OeKB is active inthe area of export insurance andfinancing, Investkredit in theunwinding and award of subsidizedcredits. There was a risk that theinfluence deriving from theseparticipations would further increasethe already strong joint marketposition of Creditanstalt und BankAustria.

However, Bank Austria had givenundertakings to the Commission,which eliminated the competitiveconcerns relating to the implicationsof the proposed concentration in thebanking sector. Bank Austria, orrather AVZ, committed itself vis à visthe Commission to sell its stake inGiroCredit. In addition, Bank Austriaentered into the commitment to reducethe calculated participation of BankAustria and Creditanstalt in OeKB tothe level of participation which BankAustria and GiroCredit currently holdtogether. Furthermore, Bank Austriawould not extend its influence inInvestkredit beyond the level ofinfluence which it had, together withGiroCredit, prior to the concentration.This way, a solution, which wasneutral from the point of view ofcompetition, could be found for thetwo specialized banks.

Competition problems in theconstruction sector arose from the fact

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that while Bank Austria already hadclose links with several largeAustrian construction companieswhich already had a strong positionon the Austrian construction markets(particularly in civil engineeringexcluding the construction ofbuildings), it would indirectlyacquire, through the acquisition ofCreditanstalt, a majority stake in thelarge Austrian construction companyUniversale.

For this reason, Bank Austria hadcommitted itself vis à vis theCommission to either sell its stake inUniversale or its participation inanother large Austrian constructioncompany, Stuag. Both alternativeswere considered by the Commissionto be equivalent from a competitionpoint of view and to be suitable forthe elimination of the competitiveconcerns stemming from theconcentration.

BT/MCI

The first case in 1997 in which theCommission decided (on 30 January)to launch an in-depth “Phase 2”investigation concerned the proposedm e r g e r b e t w e e n B r i t i s hTelecommunications plc (BT) andMCI Communications Corporation(MCI). The merger would take placeagainst a background of rapid changein the telecommunications sector, andin particular the granting of 44 newinternational facilities licences in theUK at the end of the year, theprospects of further liberalisation inthe U.S. market and the plannedliberalisation of the European marketin 1998.

BT is a UK-based supplier oftelecommunications services and

equipment. Its main services andproducts are local and long distancetelephone exchange lines to homesand businesses, internationaltelephone calls to and from theUnited Kingdom, and the supply oftelecommunications equipment forcustomers' premises. MCI is a US-based diversified communicationscompany, offering consumers andbusinesses a portfolio of integratedservices, including long distance,wireless, local, paging, messaging,Internet and information services aswell as outsourcing and advancedglobal communications. BT and MCIalso operate jointly a venture knownas Concert, which supplies value-added and enhanced services tomulti-national business customers.

The Commission’s detailedinvestigation, which will have to becompleted at the latest by Mid-June1997, will particularly focus on tworelevant markets : international voicetelephony services on the UK - USroute and the market for audio-conferencing services in the UK.

The Commission considers BT to bedominant on the UK market forinternational voice telephony since itoriginates and terminates more than70% of the traffic. There is a riskthat the proposed merger willstrengthen this dominant position onthe UK - US route. The followingissues will be particularly addressedin this respect. First, the mergedentity could henceforth self-correspond on the UK - US route forall its traffic, i.e. carry transatlantictraffic over end-to-end connectionsowned entirely by it. Other compe-titors on the route could do so aswell, but only over time and to alimited extent. In any case thiswould be possible only after

considerable investments. BT’ssignificant position in the local loopin the UK and hence in trafficorigination and termination implies animportant barrier in this respect.

Secondly, such self-correspondenceand the cost advantage, not easilyreplicated by other UK competitorscould result in an increased share ofMCI’s traffic being terminated by BTrather than by Mercury. Furthermore,the new entity BT - MCI could alsouse its advantageous cost position onthe US - UK route to hub traffic fromthe US to other EU countries via theUK. Profitable hubbing of suchtraffic could, under certaincircumstances and given the rule ofproportionate return, further reducethe market share and position of BT’sUK competitors.

Thirdly, the possibilities for thesecompetitors to react would depend ontheir ability to self-correspond or toestablish correspondent relations withother carriers on more favourableterms so as to constrain BT - MCI.Given, however, that the mergersignificantly enhances the mergedparties’ ownership of cable capacity atthe UK end, the effective competitionprovided by the 44 new internationalfacilities licence holders only own orlease a small proportion of cablecapacity.

The ability of incumbents tocompetitively constrain BT - MCI willdepend on their being able toreconfigure their existing cablecapacities which are to a large extentmatched with BT. Thisreconfiguration is consideredtechnically not difficult, but requiresthe consent of BT.

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The other area of serious concernwith regard to compatibility with thecommon market concerned the audio-conferencing market in the UK onwhich the proposed merger wouldcreate a dominant position giving theparties a combined market share ofover 80 %. On that market, theCommission considered that marketgrowth was to a major extentaccounted for by a more intensiveuse of established customers, ratherthan by the customers’ basebecoming larger. Therefore, despitethe fact that investment requirementsare relatively low, the reputation andproven record of incumbents mayprove difficult to challenge, as mightbe demonstrated by the fact that bothBT’s and MCI’s market shares havebeen increasing over the last years.

BLOKKER/TOYS “R” US

The second case on which theCommission decided to open an indepth “Phase 2” investigationconcerns the take-over of the Dutchoperations of Toys “R” Us byBlokker Holding B.V. Proceedingswere opened on 21 February 1997.Blokker is a major retail chain in theNetherlands whose principal activitiesare retail trade in household articles,toys and other products. It sells toysthrough its chains of specialised toyretail shops (Bart Smit and Intertoys)and through its household articlesretail shops. Toys “R” Us(Netherlands) B.V. is a whollyowned subsidiary of Toys “R” UsInc. (U.S.), which is one of theworld’s biggest toy retailers. Itbecame active on the Dutch marketin 1993 and is currently operating 9“mega”stores. Blokker will take over

6 out of the existing 9 shops bysubleasing the premises and throughthe purchase of inventory and stocks.It will also take over the personneland will obtain an exclusive franchiseto operate the Toys “R” Us formulain the Netherlands. The remaining 3stores shall be closed.

The Commission’s investigation ofthis case was initiated following arequest from the Dutch governmentto this effect, based on Article 22 ofthe Merger Regulation. Since therequired turnover thresholds set outin the Merger Regulation were notreached by the parties, theCommission would, in the absence ofthe Dutch request, have had nojurisdiction to deal with the case.This is the third time (afterRTL/Veronica/Endemol in 1995 andKesko/Tuko in 1996) that theCommission opens “Phase 2”investigations in a case referred to itby a Member State under Article 22of the Merger Regulation.

Blokker has by far the largest marketshare as a retailer in the Netherlandsand therefore holds a significantposition as a retailer and a purchaserof toys. The combined market shareon the relevant toy retail market willbe substantial, more than three timeslarger than that of the nearestc o m p e t i t o r . T h e p r o p o s e dconcentration could lead to thestrengthening of a dominant positionin the Netherlands and thus raisedserious doubts with regard to itscompatibility with the commonmarket. During the detailedinvestigation of the case, which willhave to be completed at the latest bythe beginning of July, particularemphasis will be put on theexamination of the likely increase of

Blokker’s market power in therelevant retail markets as well as onthe potential of Toys “R” Us as partof the Blokker group , in particularthe effects of the combination of thenew retail formula of Toys “R” Ussuburban “mega” stores and Blokker’sfamiliarity with the Dutch retailmarket.

BOEING/MC DONNELLDOUGLAS

On 19 March 1997, the Commissiondecided to proceed with an in-depth”Phase 2 “ investigation into a thirdcase: the proposed merger betweenthe Boeing Company and the McDonnell Douglas Corporation (MCD)The operation would lead to thecreation of the largest aerospacecompany in the world.

With a market share of more than60%, Boeing is by far the leadingplayer in the overall world market forcommercial jet aircraft of more than100 seats. Following the proposedmerger, there will be a furtherincrease in Boeing´s market share andonly one remaining competitor,Airbus. Furthermore, the mergerwould lead to a large increase inBoeing´s defence and space business.According to the Commission, whilstBoeing´s commercial aircraftoperations have usually accounted for70% to 80% of its total business,around 70% of MCD´s total businessis related to defence and spaceWithout taking into account therecently completed acqusition ofRockwell Defence and Aereospace,Boeing would, approximately triple itsdefence and space activities throughthe merger with MCD.

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During its in-depth investigation,which will have to be completed atthe latest by the end of July, theCommission will particularly focuson the impact of the proposed mergeron the market for large commercialaircrafts. In this respect, theCommission is going to evaluate towhat extent the additionalcompetitive potential of MCD incommercial aircraft could lead to astrengthening of Boeing´s alreadyexisting leading position as well as towhat extent the large increase inBoeing´s defence and space businesscould strengthen its market positionin commercial aircraft, for examplein terms of overall financialresources, greater access totechnology developed in the defenceand space sector, and increasedbargaining power vis-à-vis equipmentsuppliers.

Press releases

The full texts of Commission'sPress releases are availableon-line from the RAPIDdatabase, on the day of theirpublication by theCommission's Spokesman'sService. RAPID is availablefree of charge through theCommission's EUROPAserver on the World WideWeb.

IP/97/250 [1997-03-25] Commissionclears a merger concerningBirmingham International Airport

IP/97/236 [1997-03-19] Commissionbegins an in-depth investigation ofthe Boeing / McDonnell DouglasMerger.

IP/97/210 [1997-03-12] Commissionapproves the acquisition ofCreditanstalt by Bank Austria afterundertakings

IP/97/204 [1997-03-11] Commissionapproves merger in business travelservices.

IP/97/199 [1997-03-11] Transfer ofUndertakings: Commission adopts aMemorandum explaining theacquired rights of workers IP/97/170 [1997-03-03] Commissionauthorises the acquisition of AirLiberté by British Airways IP/97/169 [1997-02-28] Commissionauthorises the acquisition of thejoint control of the BBC's homeservice transmission by aninternational consortium

IP/97/168 [1997-02-27] Commissionclears joint venture of Bodensee-werk gerätetechnik gmbh and EHGElektroholding gmbh & co IP/97/167 [1997-02-27] MovingForward the Bank-SME Dialogue:The Final Report of the RoundTable of Bankers and SMEs IP/97/150 [1997-02-25] Commissionapproves the acquisition by UPM-Kymmene of Finnpap in the Finnishpaper industry IP/97/149 [1997-02-25] Commissioninitiates second phase proceedingson the take-over of the Dutchoperations of TOYS "R" US byBLOKKER

IP/97/146 [1997-02-21] Commissionapproves merger in the temporaryemployment services sector

IP/97/145 [1997-02-21] Commissionapproves joint-venture between Teliaand Ericsson

IP/97/144 [1997-02-21] Commissionclears acquisition by Archer-Daniels-Midland company of GraceCocoa Associates IP/97/142 [1997-02-20] Commissionauthorises the acquisition by theSidmar group of control ofFerrometalli Safem S.p.A

IP/97/135 [1997-02-19] Commissionorders KESKO OY to divest thedaily consumer goods business ofTUKO OY IP/97/128 [1997-02-18] Commissionclears TV joint venture of CLT-UFAand Universal in Poland IP/97/127 [1997-02-18] Commissionauthorizes joint venture ofDBV-Winterthur and GothaerVersicherungen IP/97/126 [1997-02-18] TheCommission gives the go-ahead tothe joint venture betweenHEWLETT-PACKARD andPHILIPS

IP/97/123 [1997-02-17] TheCommission approves the acquisitionby KNP group of two papermerchants in Germany and Italy

IP/97/121 [1997-02-14] TheCommission approves managementbuy-in of Finnish Chemicals Oy

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IP/97/104 [1997-02-10] Commissionauthorizes the acquisition of theItalian Unione Italia-na diRiassicuriazione S.P.A. bySchweizerische Rückver-sicherungs-Gesellschaft IP/97/101 [1997-02-07] Commissionclears the acquisition of Mees-pierson by Fortis

IP/97/100 [1997-02-07] Commissionapproves joint venture in theconstruction industry IP/97/76 [1997-01-31] Commissioninitiates second phase proceedingson BT-MCI merger IP/97/69 [1997-01-29] Commissionapproves the acquisition by TRW ofMagna Automotive Holding(Germany) gmbh IP/97/41 [1997-01-22] Commissionclears the acquisition of the Britishbottler Coca-Cola & SchweppesBeve-rages by Coca-ColaEnterprises, Inc. IP/97/11 [1997-01-14] TheCommission authorizes theacquisition by RheinbraunBrennstoff GmbH and SHV EnergyN.V. of joint control of the hardcoal trading activities of Stinnes AG

Judgments

Opinion of Advocate GeneralG. Tesauro, 6 February 1997,Case C-68/94 French Republicv Commission of the EuropeanCommunities; Annulment ofthe Commission decision of 14December 1993 taken in thecontext of the Communitycontrol of concentrationsbetween undertakingsestablished by CouncilRegulation (EEC) No 4064/89(Decision 94/449/EC of 14December 1993 relating to aproposed concentrationbetween the German under-takings Kali+Salz / MdK /Treuhand)

Opinion of Advocate GeneralG. Tesauro, 5 February 1997,Case C-30/95 Sociétécommerciale des potasses etde l'azote (SCPA) and Others vCommission of the EuropeanCommunities; Partial

annulment of CommissionDecision 94/449/EC of 14December 1993 relating to aproceeding pursuant toCouncil Regulation (EEC) No4064/89 of 21 December 1989on the control ofconcentrations betweenundertakings (Case NoIV/M.308 —Kali+Salz/MdK/Treuhand)

Opinion of Advocate GeneralC.O. Lenz, 6 February 1997,Case C-39/96 KoninklijkeVereeniging ter Bevorderingvan de Belangen desBoekhandels v Free RecordShop B.V. and Others:Preliminary ruling —Arrondissementsrecht-bank teAmsterdam — Interpretation ofArt. 85 of the EC Treaty andCouncil Regulation No 17 of 6February 1962: First Regulationimplementing Articles 85 and86 of the Treaty — Agreementor decision of an associationof undertakings on a pricesystem imposed for books —Conditions for the provisionalvalidity of an agreementnotified to the Commission in1962 and subsequentlyamended to a minor extent

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LIBERALISATION & STATE INTERVENTIONApplication of Article 90 ECMain developments between 1st January and 31st March 1997

Most important recentdevelopments

THE COMMISSION APPROVESTIMETABLE FOR FULLTELECOMMUNICATIONSLIBERALISATION INPORTUGAL

Upon request from the PortugueseGovernment , t he EuropeanCommission has today approved atimetable for the full liberalisation oftelecommunications in Portugal from1 January 2000. Voice telephony willbe completely liberalised from thatdate. In the meantime, directinternational connections for GSMmobile phone providers will beliberalised from 1 January 1999.As far as infrastructures areconcerned, the opportunity will begiven for competitors to enter thePortuguese market from the middleof this year. Alternative infrastructureproviders for already liberalisedservices will be permitted from 1July 1997 and Portugal mustliberalise without delay the marketfor GSM mobile phone alternativeinfrastructure. Under the liberalisationDirectives, Portugal was entitled torequest a derogation period up to2003.

Voice telephony

On request of the PortugueseGovernment, the voice telephony

deadline of 1 January 2000 wasgranted because Portugal Telecomneeded to rebalance tariffs andincrease telephone penetration furtherbefore the introduction of fullcompetition.

Alternative infrastructure foralready liberalised services

The Portuguese request for theliberalisation of alternativeinfrastructures for already liberalisedservices (such as telephone servicesfor Closed User Groups) was notgranted beyond the middle of 1997.The Commission believed that anypotential reduction in revenues on theprovision of leased circuits would becompensated by growth in the marketand that the development of thenetwork could be continued with theadditional implementation periodgranted for voice telephony. TheCommission stated that an extensionto July 1999 which the PortugueseGovernment had requested could notbe justified.

International GSM connection

The Commission has accepted therequest in full concerning the direct

international interconnection of GSMoperators. This was because therewas a realistic risk of substitutionbetween international GSM andinternational fixed telephony whichwould threaten the development of thetelecommunications network inPortugal.

Alternative infrastructure for GSMservices

The Commission rejected Portugal'srequest to postpone the lifting ofrestrictions on the provision ofalternative infrastructure for mobileand personal communications services.The Commission believed that theliberalisation of this section of themarket without delay did not pose athreat to Portugal Telecom's revenuesand hence to the necessary structuraladjustments and development of thenetwork.

The obligation and dates requestedand granted are summarised in thetable below.

Liberalisation of voice telephony andunderlying networks:- forseen in Directives: 1 January 1998- requested by Portugal: 1 January 2000- granted: 1 January 2000

Liberalisation of the use ofown/alternative networks for otheralready liberalised services:- forseen in Directives: 1 July 1996- Requested by Portugal: 1 July 1999- granted: 1 July 1997

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Direct international interconnectionof mobile networks with other mobileor fixed networks- forseen in Directives: February 1996- requested by Portugal: 1 January 1999- granted : 1 January 1999

Alternative infrastructure for mobilenetworks- forseen in Directives: February 1996- requested by Portugal: 1 January 1998- granted : none

Background

The Full Competition directive(Directive 96/19/EC) which providedfor the introduction of fullcompetition the telecommunicationssector on 1 January 1998 entitled fiveMember States (Ireland, Greece,Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain) tosubmit requests for derogations fromthat deadline to the Commission. TheDecision concerning Ireland wastaken on 27 November 1996 andprovided for a date of fullliberalisation by 1 January 2000.Greece and Luxembourg have alsosubmitted requests for derogations.Spain will not apply for a fullderogation and its request has beenrecently published (IP/96/1231).

This decision creates certainty for therapidly developing Portuguesemarket. It also provides a positiveenvironment for national and globalalliances which may be shaped inthat market.

World trade negotiations

The agreement of the Portuguesederogation is also relevant to thenegotiations on telecommunicationsat the World Trade Organisation

(WTO), in Geneva. Thanks to thisinternal liberalisation schedule, and toother changes concerning Spain andBelgium, it was possible inDecember for the EU to improve itsoffer to other trading partners. Thisshow of EU leadership, coordinatedwith an improvement in the US offer,was very positively received. Thisshould contribute to a better basictelecommunications agreement by theend of negotiations at the end of thisweek, and more generally toconstructive talks on outstandingagenda items of interest to the EU.

IP/97/118 [1997/02/12]

Other pressreleases

The full texts of Commission'sPress releases are available on-line from the RAPID database,on the day of their publication bythe Commission's Spokesman'sService. RAPID is available freeof charge through theCommission's EUROPA serveron the World Wide Web.

IP/97/183 [1997-03-05] Commissionadopts an Action Plan on Satellitecommunications in the InformationSociety

IP/97/45 [1997-01-23]Telecommunications Liberalisation:The impact on employment

Court Judgments

Judgment of the Court of 20February 1997, Case C-107/95P : Bundesverband derBilanzbuchhalter eV vCommission of the EuropeanCommunities Law governingthe institutions (Appeals —Action for annulment —Admissibility — Refusal by theCommission to commenceproceedings against a MemberState for failure to fulfilobligations — Refusal by theCommission to take measuresunder Article 90(3) of the ECTreaty) (Fifth Chamber)

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STATE AIDMain developments between 1st January and 31st March 1997

Summary of the most importantrecent developments

co-ordinated by Torben TOFT, DG IV-G-1

MARIBEL QUATER - NEWSCHEME APPROVED AS AGENERAL MEASURE

The Commission on 25 March 1997approved the new Belgian schemeknown as "Maribel quater", which isintended to promote the employmentof manual workers. The schemeprovides for a reduction in socialsecurity contributions for all firmsemploying manual workers. Thereduction is in the form of a flat rateamount plus an additional reductionin proportion to the extent to whichthe firm relies on manual labour.

The new scheme, which will enterinto force on 1 July 1997, replacesthe "Maribel bis/ter" scheme. Thatscheme granted an additionalreduction to firms whose mainactivity was in one of the sectorsmost exposed to internationalcompetition. On 4 December 1996the Commission decided (seeIP/96/1127) that the "Maribel bis/ter"scheme was unlawful aid that wasincompatible with the Communitycompetition rules. In the new scheme,the Belgian Government hasaccordingly reverted to the systemused in the "Maribel 1" scheme,which was a general measure that didnot differentiate between sectors.

The reduction in social securitycontributions under "Maribel" will becalculated as follows: annualreduction per manual worker ofapprox ECU 500 + (500 x X). The Xcoefficient represents the proportionof the firm's total work forceaccounted for by manual workers andmay vary from 0.01 to 0.66. In thecase of small businesses with nomore than five employees, thescheme provides for an annual flatrate reduction of approx. 840 ECUper employee.

The proposed scheme was deemed tobe a general measure and not aidbecause of its general nature,automatic application and the factthat it does not discriminate a prioribetween sectors. The fact that thereductions allowed differ from onefirm to another in line with theproportion of manual workers in thetotal work force does not detractfrom the general nature of themeasure. The Commission took theview that such differences werejustified by employment policyconsiderations, because of thediffering levels of social securitycontributions as a proportion of firms'total wage bills. Furthermore, therisks of manual workers being maderedundant as a result of automationare greater in firms employing a largeproportion of manual workers. Lastly,

the Commission found that theparameter used was transparent andobjective (case N 132/97).

COMMISSION PROPOSES TOTHE EU INDUSTRYMINISTERS TO CLEARRESTRUCTURING AID FORSHIPYARDS IN SPAIN,GERMANY AND GREECE

The Commission will propose to theIndustry Ministers at their meeting on24 April 1997 a series of aidmeasures to support restructuring ofshipyards in Spain, Germany andGreece. However formal Counciladoption will have to await theParliament's opinion. In all three casesthe aid now envisaged does notsignificantly alter the relativecompetitive situation on the market ofthe ship-yards concerned. In theGerman case the aid replaced bothformer aid lost in the cashconcentration system and theinvestments to be made by the privateinvestor. In the case of Greece andSpain, a large part of the aid is due tointerest that the enterprises had to payon loans taken out by them becauseeither for budgetary or legal reasonsthe Government concerned was not ina position to pay the aid concerned.

If the Council of Ministers accepts thederogation proposed to the existinglegislation, then the Commissionwould be in a position to formallypronounce itself on the three cases. Avital element for the Commission isthe undertaking by the governmentsconcerned to pay no more rescue aid,restructuring type aid or lossguarantees to these yards in thefuture. In addition the Commission is

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STATE AID

insisting on important reduction inproduction capacity in Germany andSpain. Strict monitoring of theconditions imposed will also be putin place.

The Commission has delayed untilnow its decisions regarding requestsfrom three Member States (Germany,Greece and Spain) to grant aids insupport of the restructuring of certainof their yards. However in view ofthe lack of any positive outcome tothe OECD meeting last week theCommission feels obliged to act ifthe future of the yards concerned isnot to be jeopardised. The three casesin question concern restructuring thatwere underway and were discussed inthe context of the OECD agreement.

Spain

In the case of Spain, aid is neededfor a further restructuring of thepublic yards in order for them toreturn to viability by the end of 1998.A large part of the proposed aid aremeasures (amounting to 180 billionpesetas or approx. 1.087 billion ECU)which were provided for in aderogation for Spain under theOECD agreement. In addition certainother measures are essential forviability, made up as follows: pastinterest payments (62 billion pesetasor approx. 374 million ECU); taxcredits(58 billion pesetas or approx.350 million ECU); and a capitalinjection (15 billion pesetas orapprox. 90,5 million ECU). The pastinterest payments related to loanstaken on in the period 1988 to 1994to cover delays in the payment ofpreviously approved aid. As suchthese payments are therefore unlikelyto have any significant distortingeffect on competition.

As a counterpart for the aid acapacity reduction of 30000 cgrt inthe public yards is proposed (from240000 cgrt to 210000 cgrt). Thiswould be supplemented by thecontinued closure to shipbuilding ofthe public yard at Astano (capacity135000 cgrt) and a capacity reductionin the private yards of 17500 cgrt.

The Commission proposes that strictmonitoring arrangements should beestablished to ensure that theresulting production limitations arerespected. Furthermore theCommission has stressed the finalityand exceptional nature of the aidpackage. The Commission acceptsthe Spanish Government's under-taking that, should any public yardnot achieve viability by the end ofnext year, no more restructuring aidwill be possible. The Commissionproposes that this should be acondition for the authorisation of thecurrent aid package.

Germany

In east Germany two shipyards underrestructuring, MTW-Schiffswerft andVolkswerft, were deprived from largeamounts of restructuring aid grantedto them through transactions withtheir former mother company BremerVulkan. The Commission opened aformal investigation procedure on thismisuse of aid. According to theresults of further investigations nowavailable from auditors it is evidentthat these questionable transactionswere beyond control of the yards.

After the collapse of the BremerVulkan Verbund the yards had to betaken over by the State again in viewof a re-privatisation which iscurrently at an early stage ofpreparation. For the continuation and

completion of the restructuringprograms new aid in the range of 1billion DM (approx. 533 millionECU) is needed. Basically the aid isneeded to replace the misused fundsand to replace the expected owncontributions from Bremer Vulkan.The vast part of the restructuringmeasures will be completed by end of1998.

The physical works under therestructuring programmes remainvirtually unchanged. The capacity ofthe shipyards will remain unchangedas well. The German governmentmade the commitment to ensure thatthe capacity limitations will be fullyrespected until end of the year 2000,and to extend this limitation until endof 2005 unless the Commissionauthorises an earlier termination of thelimitations.

In its assessment of the capacityaspects of the aid the Commissiontook into account that the BremerVulkan Werft in Bremen-Vegesack,one of the largest shipbuildingfacilities in Germany, will be closedfrom late summer 1997.

Comprehensive monitoring arrange-ments are foreseen to supervise theuse of the aid, compliance with therestructuring plans and enforcement ofthe capacity limitations.

Greece

In 1990 Greece obtained a derogationfrom the normal Community rules onoperating aid for shipbuilding and wasallowed to pay operating aid to itspublic yards, if linked to theirprivatisation until 31.12.1991. On thebasis of the undertakings given by theGreek Government that its publicyards would be privatised by 31

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March 1993, the Commissionaccepted, on 23 December 1992, thatthe write-off of the debts of the fouryards concerned by the derogation -in the amounts notified to it - wascommon market compatible.

The privatisation of the "Hellenicshipyard" was, however, onlyachieved in September 1995, whenthe State sold 49% of its shares to aco-operative of the yard's workers.Whilst the Commission had approvedin 1992 a maximum of GDR 44.0billion (approx. 144 million ECU) asaid for debts write-off linked to theprivatisation of the yard, this amounthas meanwhile increased due tointerests and penalties. The GreekGovernment has therefore requestedauthorisation from the Commission towrite-off GDR 54.525 billion(approx. 178,5 million ECU) indebts. Considering that the conditionsfor the yard to become viable havebeen met and in view of the socialand strategic importance of that yardfor the region and the whole country,the Commission takes the view that itis reasonable to provide a basis fordeclaring compatible aid for debts'write-off to cover the debts existingwhen the privatisation took place.

SOCIÉTÉ FRANÇAISE DEPRODUCTION - OPENING OFARTICLE 92(3) PROCEDURE

On 12 February 1997 theCommission decided to open aninquiry into aid amounting to almostFF 2.5 billion (approx. 379 millionECU) for the restructuring andprivatisation of Société française de

Production, a French company thatmakes TV programmes. It has alsoapproved emergency aid of FF 350million (approx. 53 million ECU)pending the implementation of theplan for restructuring of SFP whichhas finally been presented by theFrench authorities.

On 20 December 1996 the Frenchauthorities presented a plan forrestructuring SFP, which is related toan earlier offer to take over thebusiness made by Images TélévisionInternational et Générale d'Imagesand accepted by the FrenchGovernment in July 1996. New aidtotalling FF 1.192 million (ECU 182million) linked to the offer wasnotified to the Commission at the endof December 1996. The Frenchauthorities had announced that theywould provide an advance of FF 350million (approx. 53 million ECU)before the end of 1996 to meet SFP'scash flow requirements. Thecompany was virtually insolvent and,if the State had not stepped in, wouldhave had to be wound up.

The French authorities have alsonotified the Commission, within theframework of the restructuring andprivatisation plan, of aid for financialrestructuring amounting to FF 1.300million (approx. 197 million ECU) tocover the debt created when previousaid was repaid, as prescribed by theCommission in October 1996. TheCommission then took the view that,without a restructuring plan, SFP'soperations would continue to be lossmaking and the aid would thereforehave to be treated as equivalent tounauthorised operating aid. The totalcost of the operation to the State willthus be FF 2.492 million (approx.378 million ECU) (NN 12/97).

LA COMMISSION DÉCIDE DENE PAS SOULEVERD'OBJECTIONS À L'ÉGARD DEL'EXONÉRATION FISCALEDES BIOCARBURANTS

La Commission a décidé le 9 avril1997 de ne pas soulever d'objectionsà l'égard de l'exonération de la Taxeintérieure sur les produits pétroliers(TIPP) que la France entend accorderà certains biocarburants. Cettedéfiscalisation sera accordée à cesproduits indépendamment du mode deculture ou du type de matièrepremière végétale servant à lesproduire. L'objectif de ce dispositif estl'introduction d'une quantité limitée debiocarburants dans les carburants pourvéhicules à moteur et dans le fueldomestique.

Le bénéfice de cette exonération de laTIPP sera accordé aux unités (sites)de production de biocarburantsagréées par les autorités françaises àla suite d'une procédure d'appel àcandidatures publiée au JournalOf f ic ie l des CommunautésEuropéennes. Cet agrément autoriserales unités en question à mettre enmarché en France un volume défini debiocarburants qui bénéficiera del'exonération fiscale prévue par la loide finances annuelle.

Cet agrément pourra avoir une duréede trois ou neuf ans selon que lesentreprises aient récemment fait ounon d'importants investissementsspécifiques en matière de productionde biocarburants. L'attribution del'agrément pour l'une ou l'autre duréeest fonction des caractéristiquesprécises que les autorités françaisesmesureront sous forme de ratios etdont les valeurs critiques ont étécommuniquées à la Commission.

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La Commission constate que ceprojet s'inscrit dans la stratégie deréduction de la dépendanceénergétique du pétrole, dedéveloppement des sourcesénergétiques alternatives, d'unemeilleure utilisation des ressourcesagricoles et de la politiquecommunautaire de protection del'environnement.

La Commission s'est néanmoinsréservée le droit de vérifier que lamise en oeuvre effective duditdispositif se fait de façon objective etnon discriminatoire et qu'il n'a paspour effet ou pour résultat defavoriser l'écoulement prioritaire dela production nationale debiocarburants. A cet effet, la présentedécision demande que des rapportscontenant les résultats des appels àcandidature pour l'attribution desagréments soient communiqués à laCommission. (cas N 941/97).

AID SCHEME IN FAVOUR OFSME IN EAST GERMANY

The European Commission decidedon 26 February 1997 to approve anaid scheme in favour of SME indifficulties in East-Germany. Thescheme foresees aid given under theso-called ‘Vertragsmanagement’activity from the BvS or the BMGBin the form of extensions of loansand guarantees, waiver of loans and,exceptionally, granting of new loansor outright grants. Amounts up toDM 3 million (approx. 1.6 millionECU) per beneficiary may be madeavailable. The beneficiaries will beSME complying with the communitydefinition. Between 150 and 200companies are expected to benefitfrom this scheme each year until theend of the year 2000.

Even though “Vertragsmanagement”is not intended as an aid scheme,there are certain types of operationsthat boil down to aid in practice.Examples for transactions includingno aid are all corrections of materialor formal errors in the contract,specifications that were foreseen atthe start but failed the achieved aim,etc. Transactions implying aid arethose where the BvS fails to act as aprivate investor and accepts tomodify certain contract provisions inorder to support the company inquestion. The scheme appliesbasically in the following twosituations: - the BvS grants rescuemeasures for companies to avoidtheir bankruptcies or - it makesavailable financial resources tofacilitate a restructuring process. TheCommission has verified that thenotified scheme complies with theCommunity guidelines on aid forRescue and Restructuring of firms indifficulty (case NN 45/96).

COMMISSION INITIATESPROCEEDINGS IN RESPECTOF THE AID FOR THERESTRUCTURING OF GAN

On 12 March 1997 the Commissiondecided to initiate proceedings inrespect of the capital injection of FF11 billion (approx. 1.67 billion ECU)and the state guarantee estimated atFF 9 billion (approx. 1.37 billionECU) which the French Governmentplans to grant to GAN. Thedifficulties encountered by thisbanking and insurance group since1993, following losses in the propertyand insurance sectors, have alreadyled the French Government toprovide a capital injection of FF 2.86billion (approx. 434 million ECU).The Commission decided to approve

that aid on 18 September 1996 subjectto full implementation of therestructuring plan submitted to it (seeIP/96/842). However, those measureshave turned out to be insufficient. On3 March the French authoritiesnotified the Commission of newmeasures aimed at restructuring thegroup. The French Government nowhas one month to provide theCommission with all the informationit needs to examine the matter.

The additional measures notified bythe French authorities on 3 Marchbreak down as follows:

– a capital injection of FF 11 billion(approx. 1.67 billion ECU) designedto re-establish the capital base of UIC(a property development subsidiary ofGAN) following its 1996 losses andto give the insurance companies anappropriate financial structure. UIC isto receive FF 7.1 billion (approx. 1.08billion ECU) and the insurancecompanies FF 3.9 billion (approx. 592million ECU) ;

– a government commitment to coverthe estimated losses of FF 9 billion(approx. 1.37 billion ECU) whichGAN will incur in implementing theguarantees it will have to provide, aspart of the restructuring operation, forloans granted to the hived-off propertycompany Baticrédit Finance et Cie.

These measures are necessary forGAN's survival since the recoveryplan drawn up in 1996 seems to havefailed. Under that plan, the groupshould have recorded a profit of FF120 million (approx. 18 million ECU)in 1996 and one of FF 1,574 million(approx. 239 million ECU) in 1997.In fact, the losses for 1996 are likelyto amount to some FF 15 billion(approx. 2,28 billion ECU). The

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STATE AID

government support will enable GANto limit its 1996 losses toapproximately FF 5 billion (approx.759 million ECU). The Commissionwill have to re-examine whether theprevious FF 2.86 billion (approx. 434million ECU) capital injection wascompatible with the Treaty and alsoanalyse the reasons for the plan'sfailure, notably whether materialchanges in circumstances could haveaffected the Commission's earlierassessment or whether other factorswere involved. The French authoritieswill have to submit a realistic anddetailed restructuring plan setting outthe group's return to viability (caseN136/97).

COMMISSION OPENS THEPROCEDURE AGAINSTFINANCIAL MEASURES INRESPECT OF INFRALEUNAGMBH

The Commission decided on 12March 1997 to open proceedingspursuant to Article 93(2) EC Treatyfor financial measures amounting toECU 532.5 million notified in favourof Infraleuna GmbH in Sachsen-Anhalt, situated on one of the majorproduction sites which constitutes animportant part of the East German"chemical triangle".

Given the nature of the site, withinterconnected production plants andthe multitude of investors, an originalsolution had to be found to managethe installations. This has led to thecreation of “Infraleuna GmbH”. Themain tasks of the company are tooffer an operational site infra-structure, to supply services to thecompanies on the Leuna site and to

become a “low profit” servicesupplier enabling the site to beinterconnected and the inter-companysupplies to be settled. The case isspecial as the kind of services offeredby the Infraleuna GmbH are normallyprovided by the regional authoritiesand little is known on the possibleeconomic effect of subsidies in thisambit.

The Commission has decided to openproceedings pursuant to Article 93(2)EC Treaty as at the present stage ithas to assume that all financialmeasures constitute aid as it has notbeen sufficiently demonstrated thatthey will only finance infrastructurenecessary for the common good ofthe site. Furthermore, the effect ofthe measures has, at the presentstage, to be seen on the level of thetwo shareholders Linde AG andLeuna Caprolactam GmbH (25%each, 49% BvS until 2003) in theirquality as producers and other usersalready established on the Leuna site.Infraleuna GmbH is bound to “low-profit principles” and therefore willpass on all the benefits of the aidmeasures to its users. TheCommission sees the risk of a spill-over effect of the measures in viewof the fact that considerably loweredcosts for infrastructure services maylead to lower production costs.

The Commission has serious doubtswhether the derogations set out inArticle 92(3)(a) EC Treaty and inArticle 92(3)(c) EC Treaty apply asin its view it is not assured that theaid intensity will stay below thethreshold permitted for big companies(35%) and the presented companyconcept cannot be regarded asdetailed restructuring plan leading toviability. As the case is very complexit requires an in-depth assessment and

third parties shall be enabled to givetheir view on the case (cases N727/96 and NN 1/97).

COMMISSION GIVESCONDITIONALAUTHORISATION FOR THEEXTENSION TO WEST BERLINOF THE SPECIALDEPRECIATION ANDINVESTMENT ALLOWANCESCHEMES

The European Commission decided on12 February 1997 that the extensionof the German special depreciationand investment allowance schemes toinclude West Berlin is in principlecompatible with the common market,in so far as the schemes do not applyto the processing and marketing ofagricultural products.

The Commission's authorisation issubject to a number of conditions:

– Replacement investment is to beexcluded from both schemes; theschemes are to apply only to initialinvestment in equipment andconstruction goods which was begunafter 31 December 1995.

– Where the investment is outside anassisted area (in 1996 only part ofWest Berlin constituted an assistedarea), the investment allowance is tobe confined to "small" enterprises, asdefined in the guidelines on aid toSMEs, and there is to be no specialdepreciation.

– Aid under these schemes may becombined with other forms of publicassistance only up to the usualceilings: 15% gross for SMEs outsideassisted areas, and inside assisted

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areas 35% gross for large enterprisesand 45% gross (no more than 30%net) for SMEs (case C 34/96).

COMMISSION INITIATESPROCEEDINGS AGAINST TAXRELIEF MEASURES OPENINGTHE PROCEDURE IN ANEAST-GERMAN CASE OFFISCAL INCENTIVES

The European Commission decidedon 26 February 1997 to initiateproceedings against an amendment toSection 52.8 of the German IncomeTax Act. The new clause is a taxrelief measure, applicable from 1996to 1999, allowing a tax debt to bepostponed and in some cases evenwaived entirely; it is intended topromote the market in shares inenterprises located in the new Länderand West Berlin, and thus to increasetheir equity capital base. The firmneed not be operating in anyparticular industry, and severalthousand firms may qualify.

The Commission is not satisfied thatthe measure is compatible with thecommon market, for the followingreasons:

– The measure constitutes operatingaid, and the Commission hasconsistently held that operating aid isadmissible only by way of exceptionand on certain conditions in assistedareas. No such aid may be granted inWest Berlin.

– There is substantial danger ofabuse, because of the definition ofthe firms eligible, which makes noreference to economic independence.

– The special tax treatment isavailable only if the firm in whichthe holding is acquired has itsregistered office and head office inone of the new Länder or WestBerlin. The Commission has held thatsuch measures run counter to thefreedom of establishment (Article 52of the EC Treaty), because thebenefit of the measure would beconfined to firms satisfying theserequirements. (case NN 9/96).

Press releases

The full texts of Commission's Pressreleases are available on-line fromthe RAPID database, on the day oftheir publication by theCommission's Spokesman's Service.To obtain access to RAPID, pleasewrite to EUR-OP Information,Marketing and Public Relations(OP/4B) 2 rue Mercier L-2985Luxembourg tel. +352 2929 42455,fax +352 2929 42763

IP/97/251 [1997-03-26] State aid:Belgium: Commission gives green lightto Maribel scheme in support of manuallabour IP/97/235 [1997-03-19] Commissionproposes to the Industry Ministers ofthe EU to clear restructuring aid forshipyards in Spain, Germany andGreece IP/97/218 [1997-03-12] TheCommission opens a procedureconcerning the possible misuse of

shipbuilding development aid toIndonesia IP/97/217 [1997-03-12] The Commissionapproves aid to Vauxhall Motor Ltd insupport of an investment project inEllesmere Port, Cheshire (UK) IP/97/215 [1997-03-12] French textileplan: statement by Mr Van Miert IP/97/214 [1997-03-12] The Commissionauthorises DM 70 million aid measuresto Aircraft Services Lemwerder GmbH IP/97/213 [1997-03-12] The Commissionopens proceedings against financialmeasures in favour of Infraleuna GmbH,Sachsen-Anhalt IP/97/212 [1997-03-12] The Commissionopens investigation into aid to Cordex, aPortuguese rope and cord manufacturer IP/97/159 [1997-02-26] New Länder andBerlin: Commission initiates proceedingsagainst tax relief measures IP/97/158 [1997-02-26] The Commissionauthorises the prolongation of the Greekshipbuilding scheme until 31 December1997 IP/97/157 [1997-02-26] La Commissionautorise les aides en faveur del'entreprise MAO dans le cadre dudémantèlement du secteur IP/97/156 [1997-02-26] The Commissionapproves an aid scheme in favour ofSMEs in East Germany

IP/97/117 [1997-02-12] West Berlin:Commission gives conditionalauthorisation for the extension to WestBerlin of the special depreciation andinvestment allowance schemes

IP/97/116 [1997-02-12] Commissionopens investigations into aid of about FF2.5 billion to Société Française deProduction (SFP)

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IP/97/114 [1997-02-12] TheCommission investigates onrestructuring aid to Keller SpA andKeller Meccanica SpA in Italy IP/97/93 [1997-02-05] The Commissionhas initiated a procedure against an aidscheme for road haulage inFriuli-Venezia Giulia IP/97/92 [1997-02-05] Commissioninitiates proceedings with regard torestructuring aid for Stahl undHartgußwerke Bösdorf AG IP/97/91 [1997-02-05] Commissionapproves aid scheme for transport innorthern regions of Sweden IP/97/89 [1997-02-05] The Commissionapproves the prolongation of the DutchSubsidy Regulation for the newbuildingof sea-going ships until 31 December1996 IP/97/88 [1997-02-05] The Commissionapproves the prolongation of twoFinnish aid schemes for shipbuilding IP/97/87 [1997-02-05] State aid:Commission takes three positivedecisions concerning Germany IP/97/86 [1997-02-05] The Commissionrequires a Danish shipyard to repay theexcess aid granted in relation to fivevessels

SPEECH/97/17 [1997-01-23] State aidand codes of conduct - The road ahead(organised by Forum Europe) "Whatrules for Europe's transport

Revolution ?" Address by the Rthonourable Neil Kinnock Member ofthe European Commission responsiblefor Transport and TransEuropeanNetworks Concert Noble, Brussels 23January 1997

IP/97/43 [1997-01-22] The Commissionopens a procedure against a State aidscheme for combined transport in theNetherlands IP/97/40 [1997-01-22] Commissionseeks clarification concerning Frenchhorserace betting measures

IP/97/39 [1997-01-22] The Commissionapproves the release of a final trancheof restructuring aid for the Peene Werft

IP/97/38 [1997-01-22] Commissiondecides to initiate proceedings withregard to aid for Neptun IndustrieRostock and Dieselmotorenwerk Vulkan

IP/97/37 [1997-01-22] Commissionapproves new Danish regional aid mapfor 1997-99

IP/97/36 [1997-01-22] Commissioninitiates proceedings against extensionof aid scheme in Sicily IP/97/9 [1997-01-08] The Commissiondecides to widen its investigation onSpanish aids to publicly-ownedshipbuilding IP/97/8 [1997-01-08] The Commissiondecides to extend its procedure onGreek aid to the Hellenic shipyard

Court Judgments

Opinion of Advocate General C. O.Lenz, Case C-292/95 Spain vCommission of the EuropeanCommunities; Annulment of theCommission decision of 6 July1995 extending retroactively asfrom 1 January 1995 the decisionof 23 December 1992 concerningthe Community integration of Stateaids to the automobile industryJudgment of the Court of 14January 1997, Case C-169/95 :Kingdom of Spain v Commissionof the European Communities(State aids — Aid for theconstruction of a steel foundry inthe Province of Teruel, Spain) (FullCourt)

Judgment of the Court, of 27February 1997, Case T-106/95Fédération française des sociétésd'assurances (FFSA) and Others vCommission of the EuropeanCommunities (State aid — Publicundertaking — Combinedapplication of Article 92 andArticle 90(2) of the EC Treaty —Additional costs arising fromperformance of particular tasksassigned to the public undertaking— Competitive activities) (ThirdChamber, Extended Composition)

Judgment of the Court, of 20March 1997, Case C-24/95 : LandRheinland-Pfalz v AlcanDeutschland GmbH Preliminaryruling (State aid — Recovery —Application of national law —Limits) (Full Court)

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INFORMATION SECTION

DG IV staff listTélécopieur central : 295 01 28

Directeur général Alexander SCHAUB 2952387/2954576

Directeur général adjoint Jean-François PONS 2994423/2962284plus particulièrement chargé des Directions C et D

Directeur général adjoint Gianfranco ROCCA 2951152/2951139plus particulièrement chargé des Directions E et F

Conseiller auditeur Joseph GILCHRIST 2955673/2960246(chargé également de la sécurité des informations) télécopieur: 2969578

Assistant du Directeur général Stefan RATING 2994009

directement rattachés au Directeur général :1 Personnel, Budget, Administration, Information Irène SOUKA 2957206/29601892 Questions informatiques Guido VERVAET 2959224/2951305

DIRECTION APolitique de concurrence, Coordination, Affaires Internationaleset relations avec les autres Institutions Jonathan FAULL 2958658/2965201

Conseiller Juan RIVIÈRE MARTÍ 2951146/2960699Conseiller Georges ROUNIS 2953404

1 Politique générale de la concurrence et Coordination Emil PAULIS 2965033/2966207 Chef adjoint d'unité . . .

2 Affaires juridiques et législation Helmut SCHRÖTER 2951196/2955911Chef adjoint d'unité . . .

3 Affaires internationales Claude RAKOVSKY 2955389/2962368Chef adjoint d'unité . . .

DIRECTION BTask Force "Contrôle des opérations Götz DRAUZ 2958681/2952965de concentration entre entreprises"

Télécopieur du Greffe Concentrations 2964301/29672441 Unité opérationnelle I . . .2 Unité opérationnelle II . . .3 Unité opérationnelle III Roger DAOUT 2965383/29655744 Unité opérationnelle IV Kirtikumar MEHTA 2957389/2952871

DIRECTION CInformation, communication, multimédias John TEMPLE LANG 2955571/2954512

1 Télécommunications et Postes Herbert UNGERER 2968623/2968622Coordination Société d'information- Cas relevant de l'Article 85/86 Suzette SCHIFF 2957657/2954785

2 Médias, éditions musicales Anne-Margrete WACHTMEISTER 2953895/2960266 - Aspects de propriété intellectuelle Sebastiano GUTTUSO 2951102/2954363

3 Indu. de l'information, électronique de divertissement Fin LOMHOLT 2955619/2951150

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INFORMATION SECTION

DIRECTION D Services Humbert DRABBE 2950060/2952701

1 Services financiers (banques, assurances) Luc GYSELEN 2961523/2959987

2 Transports et infrastructures des transports Serge DURANDE 2957243/2954623

3 Commerce et autres services . . .

DIRECTION E Industries de base et énergie Rafael GARCÍA PALENCIA 2950253/2950900

1 Acier, métaux non ferreux, produits minéraux non Maurice GUERRIN 2951817/2951816métalliques, bâtiment, bois, papier, verre

2 Prod. chimiques de base & transformés, caoutchouc Wouter PIEKÉ 2959824/2956422

3 Energie et eau Paul MALRIC-SMITH 2959675/2964903

4 Cartels et Inspections Pierre DUPRAT 2953524/2954850Chef adjoint d'unité notamment chargé des Cartels Julian JOSHUA 2955519

DIRECTION F Industries des biens d'équipement etde consommation Sven NORBERG 2952178/2959031

1 Indu. mécaniques et électriques et industries diverses Franco GIUFFRIDA 2956084/2950663

2 Automobiles, autres moyens de transport Dieter SCHWARZ 2951880/2950479et construction mécanique connexe

3 Produits agricoles, alimentaires, pharmaceutiques,textiles et autres biens de consommation Jürgen MENSCHING 2952224/2961179

DIRECTION G Aides d'Etat Asger PETERSEN 2955569/2958566Conseiller Francisco ESTEVE REY 2951140Conseiller . . .

Task Force "Aides dans les nouveaux Länder Stefaan DEPYPERE 2990713/2952007

1 Politique des aides d'Etat Anne HOUTMAN 2959628/2969719Chef adjoint d'unité . . .

2 Aides horizontales Claude ROUAM 2957994/2954592

3 Aides à finalité régionale Loretta DORMAL-MARINO 2968603/2952521Chef adjoint d'unité Klaus-Otto JUNGINGER-DITTEL 2960376

4 Acier, métaux non ferreux, mines, construction navaleautomobiles et fibres synthétiques Martin POWER 2955436/2950991Chef adjoint d'unité Geert DANCET 2960993/2950068

5 Textiles, papier, industrie chimique, pharmaceutique, électronique, constructionmécanique & autres secteurs manufacturiers Cecilio MADERO VILLAREJO 2960949/2955900Chef adjoint d'unité . . .

6 Entreprises publiques et services Ronald FELTKAMP 2954283/2960450

7 Analyses,inventaires et rapports Reinhard WALTHER 2958434/2955410

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INFORMATION SECTION

Documentation ...This section contains details of recent speeches or articles given byCommunity officials that may be of interest. Copies of these areavailable from DGIV's home page on the World Wide Web. Futureissues of the newsletter will contain details of conferences oncompetition policy which have been brought to our attention.Organisers of conferences that wish to make use of this facilityshould refer to page 1 for the address of DGIV's Information Officer.

SPEECHES AND ARTICLES__________________________

Netzzugang aus Sicht der EuropäischenUnion - UNGERER - CeBIT/38. VDPIFachtagung - Hannover - 13/03/97

EU's regler om statsstøtte - PETERSEN- EU-ret & Mennesleret - 1/03/97

Maßnahmen der EU zur Öffnung desTelekommunikationsmarktes für neueWettbewerber - Van Miert - Online '97- Hamburg - 4/02/97

Banque - Concurrence - PIFFAUT -L'Observateur de Bruxelles - Bruxelles -1/02/97

Conference de presse - Van Miert -Bruxelles - 22/01/97

The European dimension inCompetition Policy - JONES - London- 21/01/97

The Future of State Aid Control -MEDERER - 20/01/97

Commission adopts Green Paper onvertical restraints in EU competitionpolicy - PEEPERKORN - 20/01/97

La politique de ConcurrenceEuropéenne La politique de concurrenceeuropéenne dans le domaine audiovisuel- PONS - 20/01/97

Naar een moderner mededingingsbeleidin de Europese Unie: hetstaatssteunbeleid - DANCET -Maandschrift Economie - 1/01/97

COMMUNITY PUBLICATIONSON COMPETITION__________________________

Unless otherwise indicated,these publications are availablethrough the Office for OfficialPublications of the EuropeanCommunities, 2 rue Mercier,L 2985 Luxembourg -Tel.4992821 - Fax 488573, or itssales offices (see last page).;use ISBN or Catalogue Numberto order.

Videos

Fair competition in Europe: Thisvideo - that lasts 16 minutes 45 seconds- is a layperson introduction to the mostimportant elements of european compe-tition policy. The video uses fictitiousexamples to briefly explain how theCommission combats cartels and how itprevents the creation of dominantpositions in the context of mergers andacquisitions at european and world

level. The video also describes thequestions raised by the adoption of Statesubsidies as well as the main objectivesof the liberalisation policy implementedactively by the Commission in thetelecommunications sector. This video isaddressed to an informed public thatwants to make a first contact witheuropean competition policy (students,professional associations, corporatelawyers, executives, SMEs etc.). It canbe ordered through the Office for officialPublications of the EuropeanCommunities (use catalogue numberCV-ZV-97002-xx-V with xx=languagecode i.e. EN, DE, FR, SV, PT, IT, NL,DA=15, FI, GR; available in alllanguages, price 20 ECU)

Legislation

Competition law in the EuropeanCommunities-Volume IIA-Rulesapplicable to State aid. Situation at 31December 1994; this publicationcontains the text of all legislative actsrelevant to Articles 42, 77, 90, 92 to 94. Catalogue No: CM-29-93-A02-xx-C(xx=language code: ES, DA, DE, GR,EN, FR, IT, NL, PT).

Competition law in the EuropeanCommunities-Volume IA-Rulesapplicable to undertakings. Situation at30 june 1994; this publication containsthe text of all legislative acts relevant toArticles 85, 86 and 90. Catalogue No:CM-29-93-A01-xx-C (xx=language code:ES, DA, DE, GR, EN, FR, IT, NL, PT).

Competition law in the EuropeanCommunities-Addendum to VolumeIA-Rules applicable to udertakings.Situation at 1 March 1995. CatalogueNo: CM-88-95-436-xx-C (xx=languagecode: ES, DA, DE, GR, EN, FR, IT,NL, PT).

Merger control in the European Union Catalogue No: CV-88-95-428-xx-C

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INFORMATION SECTION

(xx=language code: ES, DA, DE, GR,EN, FR, IT, NL, PT).

Brochure concerning the competitionrules applicable to undertakings ascontained in the EEA agreement andtheir implementation by the ECCommission and the EFTA surveillanceauthority. Catalogue No:CV-77-92-118-EN-C

Competition Law in the EuropeanCommunities - volume IIB -Explanation of rules applicable to stateaid. Catalogue No: CM-03-97296-xx-C(xx=language code)

Competition law in the EC- Vol III A --Rules in the international order.Situation at 31 December 1995. Catalogue No: CM-89-95-858-xx-C(xx=ES, DA, DE, GR, EN, FR, IT, NL,PT, FI, SV)

Official documents

Interim report of the multimodal group- Presented to Commissioner Van Miertby Sir Bryan Carsberg, Chairman of theGroup. Catalogue No:CM-95-96-350-EN-C

Green paper on vertical restraints in ECcompetition policy -COM (96) 721-(Ed. 1997) Catalogue No:CB-CO-96-742-xx-C (xx= ES DA DEGR EN FR IT NL PT SV FI)

Community Competition Policy in theTelecommunications Sector (Vol. I:July 1995; Vol. II: March 1997) acompedium prepared by DG IV-C-1; itcontains Directives under art 90,Decisions under Regulation 17 andunder the Merger Regulation as well asrelevant Judgements of the Court ofJustice. - Copies available through DGIV-C-1 (tel. +322-2968623, 2968622,fax +322-2969819).

Brochure explicative sur les modalitésd'application du Règlement (CE) N°

1475/95 de la Commission concernantcertaines catégories d' accords dedistribution et de service de vente etd'après vente de véhicules automobiles -Copies available through DG IV-F-2(tel. +322-2951880, 2950479, fax.+322-2969800)

The institutional framework for theregulation of telecommunications andthe application of EC competition rules Final Report (Forrester Norall &Sutton). Catalogue No:CM-94-96-590-EN-C

Competition aspects of accesspricing-Report to the EuropeanCommission December 1995 (M. Cave,P. Crowther, L. Hancher). CatalogueNo: CM-94-96-582-EN-C

Competition decisions

Recueil des décisions de la Commissionen matière d'aides d'Etat -Article 93,paragraphe 2 (Décisions finalesnégatives)- 1964-1995 Catalogue No:CM-96-96-465-xx-C [xx=FR, NL, DEet IT (1964-1995); EN et DA (73-95);GR (81-95); (ES et PT (86-95); SV etFI (95)]

Recueil des décisions de la Commissionen matière de concurrence - Articles 85,86 et 90 du traité CEE-64/72 Catalogue No: CM-76-92-996-xx-C(xx=DE, FR, IT, NL.)

Reports of Commission Decisionsrelating to competition -Articles 85, 86and 90 of the EC Treaty.-73/80 Catalogue No: CM-76-92-988-xx-C(xx=DA, DE, EN, FR, IT, NL.)

Reports of Commission Decisionsrelating to competition -Articles 85, 86and 90 of the EC Treaty.-81/85 Catalogue No: CM-79-93-792-xx-C(xx=DA, DE, GR, EN, FR, IT, NL.)

Reports of Commission Decisionsrelating to competition -Articles 85, 86

and 90 of the EC Treaty.-86/88 Catalogue No: CM-80-93-290-xx-C(xx=ES, DA, DE, GR, EN, FR, IT, NL,PT)

Reports of Commission Decisionsrelating to competition -Articles 85, 86and 90 of the EC Treaty.-89/90 Catalogue No: CV-73-92-772-xx-C(xx=ES, DA, DE, GR, EN, FR, IT, NL,PT)

Reports of Commission Decisionsrelating to competition -Articles 85, 86and 90 of the EC Treaty.-90/92 Catalogue No: CV-84-94-387-xx-C(xx=ES, DA, DE, GR, EN, FR, IT, NL,PT)

Reports of Commission Decisionsrelating to competition -Articles 85, 86and 90 of the EC Treaty.-93/94 Catalogue No: CV-90-95-946-xx-C(xx=ES, DA, DE, GR, EN, FR, IT, NL,PT)

Competition reports

European Community Competitionpolicy 1995 (xx=ES, DA, DE, GR, EN,FR, IT, NL, PT, SV, FI). Copiesavailable through the Cellule Information

XXV Report on Competition Policy1995 Catalogue No: 94-96-429-xx-C(xx=ES, DA, DE, GR, EN, FR, IT, NL,PT, SV, FI)

European Community competition policy1994 (xx=ES, DA, DE, GR, EN, FR, IT,NL, PT, SV, FI ). Copies availablethrough Cellule Information DG IV

XXIV Report on competition policy1994 Catalogue No:CM-90-95-283-xx-C (xx=ES, DA, DE,GR, EN, FR, IT, NL, PT, SV, FI)

XXIIIe Report on competition policy1993 Catalogue No:

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INFORMATION SECTION

CM-82-94-650-xx-C (xx=ES, DA, DE,GR, EN, FR, IT, NL, PT)

XXIIe Report on competition policy1992 Catalogue No:CM-76-93-689-xx-C (xx=ES, DA, DE,GR, EN, FR, IT, NL, PT

XXIe Report on competition policy1991 Catalogue No:CM-73-92-247-xx-C (xx= ES, DA, DE,GR, EN, FR, IT, NL, PT)

4ième rapport sur les aides d'Etat dansl'Union Européenne dans le secteur desproduits manufacturés et certains autressecteurs Catalogue No:CM-92-95-368-xx-C (xx=ES, DA, DE,GR, EN, FR, IT, NL, PT, SV, FI)

Other documents and studies

Proceedings of the EuropeanCompetition Forum (coedition with J.Wiley) Catalogue No:CV-88-95-985-EN-C

Study of exchange of confidentialinformation agreements and treatiesbetween the US and Member States ofEU in areas of securities, criminal, taxand customs (Ed. 1996) Catalogue No:CM-98-96-865-EN-C

Proceedings of the 2nd EU/JapanSeminar on competition (Ed. 1995) Catalogue No: CV-87-95-321- EN-C.

Competition Aspects of InterconnectionAgreements in the TelecommunicationsSector (Ed. 1995) Catalogue No:CM-90-95-801-EN-C

The effect of conglomerate mergers oncompetition (Ed. 1990) Catalogue No:CM-59-90-039-EN-C

Surveys of the Member States' powersto investigate and sanction violations ofnational competition laws (Ed. 1995) Catalogue No: CM-90- 95-089-EN-C

Information exchanges among firms andtheir impact on competition (Ed. 1995) Catalogue No: CV-89-95-026-EN-C

Meeting universal service obligations ina competitive telecommunications sector(Ed. 1994) Catalogue No:CV-83-94-757-EN-C

Competition and integration:Community merger control policy (Ed.1994) Catalogue No:CM-AR-94-057-EN-C

Growth, competitiveness, employment:The challenges and ways forward intothe 21st century: White paper (Ed.1994) Catalogue No: CM 82 94 529 xxC (xx=ES, DA, DE, GR, EN, FR, IT,NL, PT)

Growth, competitiveness, employment:The challenges and ways forward intothe 21st century: White paper (Ed.1993)-Volume 2 Part C Catalogue No:CM-NF-93-0629 A C

EG Wettbewerbsrecht undZulieferbeziehungen derAutomobilindustrie (Ed. 1992) Catalogue No: CV-73-92-788-DE-C

Competition policy in the new tradeorder: strengthening internationalcooperation and rules (Ed. 1995) Catalogue No: CM-91-95-124-EN-C

Forum consultatif de la comptabilité:subventions publiques (Ed. 1995) Catalogue No: C 184 94 735 FR C

Les investissements dans les industriesdu charbon et de l'acier de laCommunauté: Rapport sur l'enquête1993 (Ed. 1995) Catalogue No: CM 8394 2963 A C

Les investissements dans les industriesdu charbon et de l'acier de laCommunauté: Enquête 1992 (Ed. 1993) 9 languages Catalogue No: CM 76 936733 A C

The effect of different state aid measureson intra Community competition (Ed.1990) Cat. No: CM 59 90 702 EN C

Study on the impact of liberalization ofinward cross border mail on theprovision of the universal postal serviceand the options for progressiveliberalization (Ed. 1995) Final report, Catalogue No: CV-89-95-018-EN-C

Green Paper on the development of thesingle market for postal services, 9languages Catalogue No: CD-NA-14-858-EN-C

Competition and integration: Communitymerger control policy Catalogue No:CM-AR-94-057-EN-C

Survey of the Member State NationalLaws governing vertical distributionagreements (Ed. 1996) Catalogue No:CM-95-96-996-EN-C

Bierlieferungsvertäge in den neuenEU-Mitgeliedstaaten-ÖsterreichSchweden und Finland

PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIALJOURNAL

1st January to 31 March 1997__________________________

ARTICLES 85, 86(RESTRICTIONS ANDDISTORTIONS OF COMPETITIONBY UNDERTAKINGS)

13/03/97 C 80 Notice pursuant to Article12 (2) of Regulation (EEC) No 4056/86concerning Case IV/MAR/36.253 - P&O Stena Line

10/03/97 C 75 Opinion of the Economicand Social Committee on the 'XXVthreport on competition policy (1995)'

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6/03/97 C 70 Notification of a partner-ship agreement to set up and operate adigital pay-radio business for Europe(Case No IV/36.092 - Music ChoiceEurope)

1/03/97 C 65 Notification of a jointventure (Case No IV/36.308 - BT/NewsInternational - Springboard)

18/02/97 L 47 COMMISSION DECI-SION of 4 December 1996 relating to aproceeding pursuant to Article 85 of theTreaty establishing the EuropeanCommunity and Article 53 of the EEAAgreement (IV/35.679 - Novalliance /Systemform) (Only the German text isauthentic) (Text with EEA relevance)

18/02/97 C 48 Notice pursuant toArticle 19 (3) of Council Regulation No17 concerning a request for negativeclearance or an exemption pursuant toArticle 85 (3) of the EC Treaty CaseNo IV/34.415 - IFCO

15/02/97 C 47 Notice relating to CaseNos IV/35.337 - Atlas and IV/35.617 -Phoenix/Global One

15/02/97 C 47 Notification of a jointventure agreement for the marketing ofrights to world and regional referencemaps and atlases (Case No IV/35.962 -De Agostini - Rand McNally Limited)

15/02/97 C 47 Notice pursuant toArticle 19 (3) of Council Regulation No17 concerning Case No IV/E-3/35.841 -Hydro Texaco Holdings A/S - OKPetroleum AB (Preem)

12/02/97 C 44 Notification of a jointventure (Case No IV/36.365 - NEC +Packard Bell + Bull)

12/02/97 C 44 Notice pursuant toArticle 19 (3) of Council Regulation No17 and Article 3 of Protocol 21 of theEEA Agreement concerning a requestfor negative clearance or an exemptionpursuant to Article 85 (3) of the ECTreaty and Article 53 (3) of the EEA

Agreement (Case No IV/35.830 -Unisource - Telefónica)

12/02/97 C 44 Notice pursuant toArticle 19 (3) of Council Regulation No17 and Article 3 of Protocol 21 of theEEA Agreement concerning a requestfor negative clearance or an exemptionpursuant to Article 85 (3) of the ECTreaty and Article 53 (3) of the EEAAgreement (Case No IV/35.738 -Uniworld)

30/01/97 C 29 Notice of theCommission relating to the revision ofthe notice of 3 September 1986 onagreements of minor importance whichare not caught by the provisions ofArticle 85 (1) of the EC Treaty

29/01/97 L 26 Commission Decision of30 October 1996 relating to aproceeding under Article 85 of the ECTreaty (IV/34.503 - Ferry operators -Currency surcharges) (Only the English,French and Dutch texts are authentic)

28/01/97 C 27 Notification of acooperative joint venture agreement inthe aerospace sector (Case NoIV/36.254-F/2 - Snecma/P& WC)

23/01/97 C 23 Commission Notice onthe internal rules of procedure forprocessing requests for access to the filein cases pursuant to Articles 85 and 86of the EC Treaty, Articles 65 and 66 ofthe ECSC Treaty and CouncilRegulation (EEC) No 4064/89

21/01/97 C 21 Notification of a jointventure (Case No IV/36.351 - E 1 -Papierholz Austria)

21/01/97 C 21 Notification of standardform lease agreements and principlesfor change of use Case No IV/36.019 -SES

18/01/97 L 16 Commission Decision of18 December 1996 relating to aproceeding under Article 85 of the ECTreaty and Article 53 of the EEAAgreement (Case IV/35.518 - Iridium)

(Only the English text is authentic) (Textwith EEA relevance)

ARTICLE 90(LIBERALISATION)

18/03/97 L 76 COMMISSIONDECISION of 18 December 1996concerning the conditions imposed onthe second operator of GSM radio-telephony services in Spain (Only theSpanish text is authentic)

12/03/97 C 78 Proposal for a CouncilDirective amending Directive77/388/EEC as regards the value-addedtax arrangements applicable totelecommunications services

11/03/97 C 76 Communication from theCommission on the application of thecompetition rules to access agreementsin the telecommunications sector -framework, relevant markets andprinciples

5/03/97 C 68 Commission Noticepursuant to Article 4 (1) (a) of CouncilRegulation (EEC) No 2408/92 Imposi-tion of public service obligations inrespect of scheduled air services withinPortugal

5/03/97 C 68 Communication from theCommission under Article 4 (1) (a) ofCouncil Regulation (EEC) No 2408/92Imposition of public service obligationsin respect of scheduled air serviceswithin France

24/02/97 C 56 Opinion of the Economicand Social Committee on 'Public serviceobligations in the internal energy market'

14/02/97 L 43 Directive 97/5/EC of theEuropean Parliament and of the Councilof 27 January 1997 on cross-bordercredit transfers

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INFORMATION SECTION

12/02/97 L 41 COMMISSION DECI-SION of 27 November 1996 concerningthe additional implementation periodsrequested by Ireland for theimplementa-tion of CommissionDirectives 90/388/EEC and 96/2/EC asregards full competition in thetelecommunications markets (Only theEnglish text is authentic) (Text withEEA relevance)

30/01/97 L 27 Directive 96/92/EC ofthe European Parliament and of theCouncil of 19 December 1996concerning common rules for theinternal market in electricity

30/01/97 C 30 Opinion of the Economicand Social Committee on the 'Proposalfor a Council Decision regarding thedefinition and implementation ofCommunity policy in the field oftelecommunications and postal services'

30/01/97 C 30 Opinion of the Economicand Social Committee on the 'Universalservice for telecommunications in theperspective of a fully liberalizedenvironment'

30/01/97 C 30 Opinion of the Economicand Social Committee on the 'Proposalfor a Council Regulation (EC) on aid toshipbuilding'

8/01/97 C4 Request for implementationperiods Spain (Pursuant to CommissionDirective 90/388/EEC)

CONTROL OFCONCENTRATIONS/MERGERPROCEDURES

25/03/97 C 97 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.901 -Go-Ahead/Via/Thameslink)

21/03/97 C 92 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.886 -MRW/MHP

19/03/97 C 88 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.900 -BT/TELE DK/SBB/Migros/UBS)

15/03/97 C 84 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.905 -Schweizer Re/SAFR)

14/03/97 C 82 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.894 -Rheinmetall/British Aerospace/STNAtlas)

11/03/97 C 76 Non-opposition to anotified concentration (Case NoIV/M.859 - Generali/Prime)

5/03/97 C 68 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.904 -RSB/Tenex/Fuel Logistic)

4/03/97 C 67 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.786 -Birmingham International Airport)

26/02/97 C 59 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.835 -Recticel/Greiner)

26/02/97 C 59 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.877 -Boeing/McDonnell Douglas)

24/02/97 C 56 Opinion of the Economicand Social Committee on: - the'Communication from the Commissionto the Council and to the EuropeanParliament regarding the revision of themerger regulation', - the 'Proposal for aCouncil Regulation (EC) amendingCouncil Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89of 21 December 1989 on the control ofconcentrations between undertakings',and - the 'Proposal for a CouncilRegulation (EC) amending CouncilRegulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21December 1989 on the control ofconcentrations between undertakings -Articles 87 and 235'

22/02/97 C 53 Withdrawal ofnotification of a concentration (Case NoIV/M.888 - Metallgesellschaft/AGIV)

18/02/97 C 48 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.873 -Bank Austria/Creditanstalt)

15/02/97 C 47 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.888 -Metallgesellschaft/AGIV)

15/02/97 C 47 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.867 -Wagons-Lits/Carlson)

15/02/97 C 47 Non-opposition to anotified concentration (Case NoIV/M.760 - Klöckner/ARUS)

7/02/97 C 38 Non-opposition to anotified concentration (Case NoIV/M.862 - AXA/UAP)

5/02/97 C 36 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.869 -BGT/EHG-AIM)

4/02/97 C 35 Non-opposition to anotified concentration (Case NoIV/M.802 - Telecom Éireann)

4/02/97 C 35 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.857 -British Airways/Air Libert‚)

1/02/97 C 32 Request of examination ofa concentration (Case No IV/M.890 -Blokker/Toys "R" Us)

31/01/97 C 31 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.887 -Castle Tower/TDF/Candover/Berkshire -HSCo)

28/01/97 C 27 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.879 -Vendex (Vedior)/Bis)

28/01/97 C 27 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.882 -Archer-Daniels-Midland/Grace CocoaAssociates)

28/01/97 C 27 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.871 -UPM-Kymmene/Finnpap)

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28/01/97 C 27 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.846 -Philips/Hewlett-Packard)

24/01/97 C 24 Non-opposition to anotified concentration (Case NoIV/M.853 - Bell Cable Media/Cable &Wireless/Videotron)

24/01/97 C 24 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.878 -RTL 7)

24/01/97 C 24 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.876 -Telia/Ericsson)

24/01/97 C 24 Non-opposition to anotified concentration (Case NoIV/M.865 - Cable & Wireless / Nynex /Bell Canada)

23/01/97 C 23 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.883 -Prudential Nominees Ltd/HSBC EquityLtd/Finnish Chemicals Oy)

23/01/97 C 23 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.884 -KNP BT/Bunzl/Wilhelm Seiler)

22/01/97 C 22 Non-opposition to anotified concentration (Case NoIV/M.820 - British Aerospace/LagardèreSCA)

22/01/97 C 22 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.875 -DBV/Gothaer/GPM)

18/01/97 C 19 Non-opposition to anotified concentration (Case NoIV/M.843 - PTT Post/TNT/GD ExpressWorldwide)

17/01/97 C 18 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.880 -Schweizer Re/Uniorias)

17/01/97 C 18 Non-opposition to anotified concentration (Case NoIV/M.818 - Cardo/Thyssen)

17/01/97 C 18 Non-opposition to anotified concentration (Case NoIV/M.848 - Ahold/CSC)

16/01/97 C 16 Non-opposition to anotified concentration (Case NoIV/M.839 - Promodes/Garosci)

15/01/97 C 14 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.850 -Fortis/MeesPierson)

14/01/97 L 11 COMMISSIONDECISION of 24 April 1996 declaringa concentration to be incompatible withthe common market and the functioningof the EEA Agreement (Case NoIV/M.619 - Gencor/Lonrho) (Text withEEA relevance) (Only the English textis authentic)

14/01/97 L 11 COMMISSIONDECISION of 18 October 1995 relatingto a proceeding pursuant to CouncilRegulation (EEC) No 4064/89 (Case NoIV/M.580 - ABB/Daimler-Benz) (Onlythe German text is authentic) (Text withEEA relevance)

14/01/97 C 13 OPINION of theAdvisory Committee on Concentrations,delivered at its 33rd meeting on 4October 1995, concerning a preliminarydraft decision relating to Case NoIV/M.580 - ABB/Daimler-Benz

14/01/97 C 13 OPINION of theAdvisory Committee on Concentrationsgiven at the 37th meeting on 9 April1996 concerning a preliminary draftdecision relating to Case No IV/M.619 -Gencor/Lonrho

11/01/97 C 8 Non-opposition to anotified concentration (Case NoIV/M.811 - Creditanstalt-Bankverein /Treibacher)

11/01/97 C 8 Initiation of proceedings(Case No IV/M.754 - Anglo AmericanCorporation/Lonrho)

9/01/97 C 5 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.874 -

AMEC plc/Financière Spie BatignollesSCA/Spie Batignolles SA)

STATE AID

22/03/97 C 93 Authorization for Stateaid pursuant to Articles 92 and 93 of theEC Treaty Cases where the Commissionraises no objections

22/03/97 C 93 Authorization for Stateaid pursuant to Articles 92 and 93 of theEC Treaty Cases where the Commissionraises no objections

22/03/97 C 93 STATE AID C 2/97 (N854/95) Netherlands 22/03/97 C 93 STATE AID C 10/95 (exN 286/94) Italy

20/03/97 C 90 STATE AID C 62/96 (exN 829/96) France

19/03/97 C 88 Authorization for Stateaid pursuant to Articles 92 and 93 of theEC Treaty Cases where the Commissionraises no objections

19/03/97 C 88 STATE AID C 56/96 (exNN 174/95) Italy 19/03/97 C 88 STATE AID C 61/96 (exN 408/B/96) Italy

18/03/97 C 87 STATE AID C 51/96 (exNN 71/96) Italy (Sardinia)

14/03/97 C 82 STATE AID C 57/96 (exNN 65/96) Austria

14/03/97 C 82 STATE AID C 48/96(NN 51/96) Greece

13/03/97 L 72 COMMISSIONDECISION of 10 February 1997amending the boundaries of theless-favoured areas in the FederalRepublic of Germany within themeaning of Council Directive75/268/EEC (Only the German text isauthentic)

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13/03/97 C 80 STATE AID C 10/94(ex NN 104/93) Greece

6/03/97 C 70 Authorization for Stateaid pursuant to Articles 92 and 93 ofthe EC Treaty Cases where theCommission raises no objections

4/03/97 C 67 Authorization for Stateaid pursuant to Articles 92 and 93 ofthe EC Treaty Cases where theCommission raises no objections

1/03/97 C 65 STATE AID C 7/96 (exN 806/95 and NN 31/96) Germany

25/02/97 C 58 Authorization for Stateaid pursuant to Articles 92 and 93 ofthe EC Treaty Cases where theCommission raises no objections

25/02/97 C 58 STATE AID C 58/96(ex N 239/95) Spain

25/02/97 C 58 STATE AID C 59/96(ex N 123/96 and NN 127/96) TheNetherlands

22/02/97 C 53 STATE AID C 56/95 (N941/95) Spain

21/02/97 C 51 Authorization for Stateaid pursuant to Articles 92 and 93 ofthe EC Treaty Cases where theCommission raises no objections

21/02/97 C 51 Review of production aidceiling for shipbuilding

19/02/97 L 48 COMMISSIONDECISION of 30 July 1996 concerningState aid to Werkstoff-UnionGmbH,Lippendorf (Saxony) (Only theGerman text is authentic) -97/124/ECSC

19/02/97 C 49 STATE AID C 42/96(NN 194/95) France

14/02/97 C 46 STATE AID C 57/94(ex N 183/94) France

14/02/97 C 46 Authorization for Stateaid pursuant to Articles 92 and 93 of

the EC Treaty Cases where theCommission raises no objections

13/02/97 L 42 EFTA SurveillanceAuthority Decision No 112/96/COL of11 September 1996 on the 10th amend-ment of the procedural and substantiverules in the field of State aid

13/02/97 C 45 STATE AID (95-021Norway)

11/02/97 C 43 Authorization for Stateaid pursuant to Articles 92 and 93 ofthe EC Treaty Cases where theCommission raises no objections

8/02/97 C 39 Authorization for Stateaid pursuant to Articles 92 and 93 ofthe EC Treaty Cases where theCommission raises no objections

7/02/97 L 37 COMMISSIONDECISION of 17 July 1996 on aidmeasures provided for in SicilianRegional Law No 25/93 (Only theItalian version is authentic)

7/02/97 C 38 STATE AID C 17/91Italy

6/02/97 C 37 STATE AID C 55/96 (exN 687/96) Italy

5/02/97 C 36 STATE AIDS C 25/96Germany

4/02/97 C 35 STATE AID C 53/96 (exNN 10/96) Germany

4/02/97 C 35 STATE AID C 37/96 (exN 186/96) Germany

28/01/97 L 25 COMMISSIONDECISION of 30 July 1996 concerningaid granted by the Austrian Governmentto Head Tyrolia Mares in the form ofcapital injections (Only the German textis authentic) (Text with EEA relevance)

25/01/97 C 25 Authorization for Stateaid pursuant to Articles 92 and 93 ofthe EC Treaty Cases where theCommission raises no objections

18/01/97 C 19 Authorization for Stateaid pursuant to Articles 92 and 93 of theEC Treaty Cases where the Commissionraises no objections

17/01/97 C 18 STATE AID C 35/94 (exN 397/94) and N 728/94 FederalRepublic of Germany

14/01/97 L 10 COUNCIL Regulation(EC) No 40/97 of 20 December 1996concerning the export of certain ECSCand EC steel products from Slovakia tothe Community for the period 1 Januaryto 31 December 1997 (extension of thedouble-checking system)

11/01/97 L 8 COMMISSION Decisionof 30 July 1996 on State aid granted infavour of Compañ¡a Española de Tubospor Extrusión SA, located in Llodio,Álava (Only the Spanish text isauthentic) (Text with EEA relevance)

11/01/97 C-63/95: Federal Republic ofGermany and Others v. Commission ofthe European Communities (State aid -Guarantee given by the public authoritiesin favour indirectly of a shipbuildingundertaking for the acquisition of anundertaking in another sector -Diversification of the activities of therecipient undertaking - Recovery)

10/01/97 L 6 COMMISSION Decisionof 30 July 1996 concerning aid grantedto Santana Motor SA (Only the Spanishtext is authentic) (Text with EEArelevance)

9/01/97 L 5 COMMISSION DECISIONof 17 July 1996 on aid granted to theCompagnie Générale Maritime in thecontext of a restructuring plan (Only theFrench text is authentic) (Text with EEArelevance)

9/01/97 L 5 COMMISSION DECISIONof 26 June 1996 concerning German aidgranted to Mercedes-Benz inLudwigsfelde (Brandenburg) (Only theGerman text is authentic) (Text withEEA relevance)

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9/01/97 C 5 Authorization for State aidpursuant to Articles 92 and 93 of theEC Treaty. Cases where theCommission raises no objections

8/01/97 C4 Authorization for State aidpursuant to Articles 92 and 93 of theEC Treaty. Cases where theCommission raises no objections

7/01/97 C 3 ASSENT No 24/96 givenby the Council pursuant to Article 95 ofthe Treaty establishing the EuropeanCoal and Steel Community

7/01/97 C 3 ASSENT No 23/96 givenby the Council pursuant to Article 95 ofthe Treaty establishing the EuropeanCoal and Steel Community

3/01/97 C 1 Authorization for State aidpursuant to Articles 92 and 93 of theEC Treaty Cases where the Commissionraises no objections

3/01/97 C 1 Notice on monitoring ofState aid and reduction of labour costs

INTERNATIONAL

13/03/97 L 71 DECISION OF THEEEA JOINT COMMITTEE No 65/96of 27 November 1996 amending AnnexXIV (Competition) to the EEAAgreement

13/03/97 L 71 Corrigendum to CouncilRegulation (EC) No 7/97 of 20December 1996 concerning the exportof certain ECSC and EC steel productsfrom the Czech Republic to theCommunity for the period 1 January to31 December 1997 (extension of thedouble-checking system) (OfficialJournal of the European CommunitiesNo L 4 of 8 January 1997)

5/03/97 L 64 Information concerningthe entry into force of the InterimAgreement on trade and trade-relatedmeasures with Kazakhstan

5/03/97 L 64 DECISION No 4/96 OFthe Association Council, Associationbetween the European Communities andtheir Member states, of the one part,and the Czech Republic, of the otherpart, of 27 December 1996 concerningthe export of certain ECSC and ECsteel products from the Czech Republicto the Community for the period 1January to 31 December 1997(extension of the double-checkingsystem established by Decision No 2/96of the Association Council)

24/02/97 C 56 Opinion of the Economicand Social Committee on "The globalchallenge of international trade: Amarket access strategy for the EuropeanUnion"

15/02/97 L 45 COMMISSIONDECISION of 17 December 1996 onthe conclusion of an Agreement in theform of an Exchange of Letters betweenthe European Coal and SteelCommunity and the Russian Federationextending the Agreement between theEuropean Coal and Steel Communityand the Russian Federation on trade incertain steel products for the period 1January to 30 June 1997 AGREEMENTin the form of an Exchange of Lettersbetween the European Coal and SteelCommunity and the Russian Federationextending the Agreement between theEuropean Coal and Steel Communityand the Russian Federation on trade incertain steel products for the period 1January to 30 June 1997

29/01/97 L 26 DECISION No 1/96 OFthe Association Council, Associationbetween the European Communities andtheir Member states, of the one part,and the Republic of Bulgaria, of theother part of 17 December 1996concerning the export of certain ECSCsteel products from Bulgaria to theCommunity for the period 1 January to31 December 1997 (extension of thedouble-checking system established byDecision No 3/95 of the AssociationCouncil)

COURT OF JUSTICE/TRIBUNAL

Affaires introduites devant la Cour

Case C-395/96 P: Compagnie MartimeBelge Transports NV and CompagnieMaritime Belge NV v Commission,Appeal against the judgment of theCourt of First Instance of 8 October1996 in Joined Cases T-24/93, T-25/93,T-26/93 and T-28/93 Compagnie Mari-time Belge Transports and Others vCommission — Refusal to annulCommission Decision 93/82/EECconcerning a proceeding under Art. 85(IV/32.448 and IV/32.450: Cewal,Cowac and Ukwal) and Art. 86(IV/32.448 and IV/32.450: Cewal) of theEC Treaty

Case C-396/96 P Dafra-Lines AS vCommission, Identical with Case C-395/96 P

Case C-401/96, Somaco SARL vCommission: Appeal against thejudgment of the Court of First Instanceof 18 September 1996 in Case T-387/94Asia Motor France and Others vCommission — Partial setting aside ofthe judgment in Case T-387/94 AsiaMotor France III — Annulment of thecontested decision in so far as it findsthat there has not been any anti-competitive conduct in Martiniqueresulting from the application ofirresistible pressure by the localauthorities — Extra-contractual liabilityof the Commission resulting from itsrefusal to investigate a complaintconcerning competition.

Case C-415/96, Spain v Commission;Annulment of Commission DecisionC(96) 2936 of 18 September 1996,amending Decision 93/317/EECconcerning aids granted by Spain toHilaturas y Tejidos Andaluces SA, nowcalled Mediterráneo Técnica Textil SA,and its acquiring company.

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Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner GmbH &Co. KG v Mediaprint Zeitungs- undZeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. KGand Others; Preliminary ruling —Oberlandesgericht Wien —Interpretation of Art. 86 of the ECTreaty — Abuse of dominant position— Conduct of a media undertakingholding a dominant position and a defacto monopoly for the home deliveryof daily newspapers — Conductconsisting in a refusal to allow thathome delivery service to be used by acompeting daily newspaper on normalterms (particularly as to price)

Case C-23/97, Palmira Ieropoli andGiovanni Sgambellone v Cassa diRisparmio di Genova e Imperia SpA(Carige); Preliminary ruling —Tribunale di Genova —Interpretation ofArts 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty —Banking sector of a Member State,when dealing with clients holdingcurrent accounts, applying uniformconditions on the opening andguaranteeing of a line of credit -Determination of interest rates for credit

Case C-34/97, RWE Energie AG andStadt Nordhorn v Bundeskartellamt;Preliminary ruling — KammergerichtBerlin — Interpretation of Arts 5, 85,and 90(2) of the EC Treaty and validityof Art 9(3) of Regulation No 17: FirstRegulation implementing Articles 85and 86 of the Treaty — Powers of thenational competition authorities in asector for which a draft Council andEuropean Parliament directive (internalmarket in electricity) is in the course ofbeing drawn up — Agreement grantingexclusive use of a local authority'spublic road network for the supply ofelectricity — Notification of theagreement to the Commission notfollowed by a proceeding under Art.85(1) and (3) of the EC Treaty —Concept of undertaking (local authoritygranting use of its public road network)— Concept of undertaking entrustedwith the operation of services of generaleconomic interest (undertakingsupplying electricity under conditions

laid down by specific nationallegislation)

Case C-38/97, Autotrasporti Librandisnc di Librandi F. & C. v CutticaSpedizioni e Servizi Internazionali Srl :Preliminary ruling — Ufficio delGiudice di Pace di Genova — Compati-bility with Arts 3(f) and (g), 5, 85 and86 of the EC Treaty — National rulesproviding for compulsory tariffs for theroad transport of goods to be approvedand implemented by the publicauthority, on the basis of proposalsfrom a committee representing themajority of the operators concerned

Joined Cases C-52/97, C-53/97 et C-54/97 Epifanio Viscido and Others vEnte Poste Italiane; Preliminary ruling— Pretura Circondariale, Trento —Interpretation of Article 92(1) andArticle 93 of the EC Treaty — Conceptof aid granted by a Member State orthrough State resources — National lawunder which only one body acting inthe public interest is exempted fromobservation of a rule of generalapplication concerning fixed-termemployment contracts — Included.

Case C-55/97, AssociationInternationale des Utilisateurs de Fils deFilaments Artificiels et Synthétiques etde Soie Naturelle (Aiuffass) et Apparel,Knitting & Textiles Alliance (AKT) /Commission; Appeal against thejudgment of the Court of First Instance(Fifth Chamber, Extended Composition)of 12 December 1996 in Case T-380/94Auifass and Others v Commission —Judgment dismissing an action forannulment of the decision authorizing,under Article 92(3)(a) and (c), theUnited Kingdom Government to grantaid to Hualon Corporation for thepurpose of setting up a textilemanufacturing factory in NorthernIreland — Error in assessing the effectsof the disputed investment in the top-of-the-range products sub-sector —Misinterpretation of the contesteddecision — Insufficient reasons for thejudgment

Case C-61/97, Foreningen af danskeVideogramdistributører, agissant pourEgmont Film A/S and Others vLaserdisken and Others; Reference for apreliminary ruling - Aalborg Court -Interpretation of Articles 30, 31, 85 and86 of the EC Treaty and CouncilDirective 92/100/EEC of 19 November1992 on rental right and lending rightand on certain rights related to copyrightin the field of intellectual property (OJ1992 L 346, p. 61) - Prohibition againstrental and lending of media reproducingcinematographic works purchased(without any express restriction in thatconnection) in another Member State

Case C-66/97, Banco de Fomento eExterior SA v Confecções Têxteis deVouzela Ld. (CTV) and Others;Reference for a preliminary ruling —Tribunal de Comarca, Lisbon —Interpretation of Articles 59, 90 and 92of the EC Treaty — National provisionwhich grants exceptional privileges to apublic-sector bank

Case C-70/97, Kruidvat BVBA vCommission; Appeal against thejudgment of the Court of First Instance(Second Chamber, ExtendedComposition) of 12 December 1996 inCase T-87/92 Kruidvat v Commission —Application to have it set aside —Admissibility of an action for annulmentof Commission Decision 92/428/EECrelating to a proceeding under Article 85of the EEC Treaty (Case No IV/33.542 -Parfums Givenchy system of selectivedistribution) — Decision not ofindividual concern to an undertaking —Undertaking neither forming part of thedistribution network in question norinterested in joining it

Affaires introduites devant le Tribunal

Case T-164/96 Moccia Irme SpA vCommission; Annulment of CommissionDecision C(96) 2385 final of 30 July1996, declaring State aids intended to be

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granted by the Italian Government tocertain undertakings in connection withthe restructuring of the steel industry tobe incompatible with the commonmarket.

Case T-165/96 Prolafer Srl vCommission; Identical with Case T-164/96

Case T-166/96 Ferriera AcciaieriaCasilina SpA v Commission; Identicalwith Case T-164/96

Case T-167/96 Dora Ferriera AcciaieriaSrl v Commission; Identical with CaseT-164/96

Case T-185/96 Max Labat SA andRiviera Auto Service EtablissementsDalmasso SA v Commission;Annulment of the Commission decisionof 26 September 1996, rejecting thecomplaints lodged by the applicantsunder Art. 85 of the EC Treaty andCommission Regulation (EEC) No123/85 concerning the imposition byVAG France of an exclusive andselective distribution system forVolkswagen and Audi cars

Case T-187/96 Salini Costruttori SpA vCommission; Annulment of theCommission decision of 26 September1996 refusing to act on the applicant'srequest under Arts 93(2) and 101 of theEC Treaty concerning the decision ofthe Italian authorities to exclude theconstruction industry from the scope ofthe regional system for reducing socialcontributions in the 'Mezzogiorno‘

Case T-188/96 Salini Costruttori SpA vCommission; Identical with Case T-187/96

Case T-189/96 Garage des QuatreVallées SA and Pierre Joseph Tosi vCommission; Action for: (1) Annulmentof the Commission decision of 23September 1996, rejecting the complaintlodged by the applicants under Art. 85of the EC Treaty and CommissionRegulation (EEC) No 123/85

concerning the imposition by VAGFrance of an exclusive and selectivedistribution system for Volkswagen andAudi cars; and (2) compensation for theloss allegedly caused by the contestedmeasure

Case T-190/96 Christophe Palma andOthers v Commission; Identical withCase T-189/96

Case T-200/96 União Industrial Têxtil eQuímica SA (Uniteca) v Commission :Annulment of the Commission decisionof 29 May 1996 concerning the aidproposed to be granted by Germany toBuna GmbH, Sächsische OlefinwerkeGmbH, Leuna-Werke GmbH, Leuna-Polyolefine GmbH and BSLPolyolefinverbund GmbH in the contextof the restructuring and privatization ofthe chemical industry in the formerGerman Democratic Republic

Case T-201/96 Smanor SA and Othersv Commission: Action for compensationin respect of loss allegedly suffered bythe applicants as a result of the failureby the Commission to take measures tooblige the French State to comply withthe Court's preliminary ruling of 14 July1988 in Case 298/87, despite therepeated complaints of the applicants

Case T-211/96 Européenne automobileSARL v Commission: Annulment of theCommission decision of 9 October1996, rejecting the applicant's complaintof 27 July 1994 under Art. 85 of theEC Treaty and Art. 3, point 11 ofCommission Regulation (EEC) No123/85 concerning Peugeot's conduct inrelation to dealers of its foreignsubsidiaries aimed at preventing themfrom agreeing to sell vehicles to Frenchintermediaries — Claim forcompensation in respect of the lossallegedly suffered by the applicant as aresult of the Commission's conduct

Case T-2/97, Fédération Générale desTravailleurs de Belgique, CentraleProfessionnelle des Métallurgistes duBrabant (CMB) and Syndicat des

Employés Techniciens et Cadres duBrabant-Wallon (SETCA) vCommission: Annulment of theCommission Decision of 18 December1996, describing the restructuring of theForges de Clabecq company as State aidand requiring the Belgian Government tostop all financial intervention in favourof that company and to recover subsidiesalready granted

Case T-5/97, Industrie des PoudresSphériques (IPS) v Commission;Annulment of the Commission decisionof 7 November 1996, rejecting theapplicant's request under Art. 3(2) ofRegulation No 17/62 (Case NoIV/35.151 - IPS/Pechiney) that analleged infringement of Art. 86 of theTreaty by Pechiney Electrométallurgieon the calcium metal market be broughtto an end

Case T-8/97, Union Carbide Corporation(UCC) v Commission; Annulment ofCommission Decision 96/648/EC of 24April 1996 amending Decision94/811/EC declaring the compatibility ofa concentration with the common market(Case No IV/M. 269 -Shell/Montecatini)

Case T-9/97, Elf Atochem SA vCommission; Application for annulmentof the reports and annexes thereto drawnup by the Commission's agents on 18,19 and 20 November 1996 following aninvestigation carried out pursuant toArticle 14(2) of Regulation No 17 at theregistered office of Elf Atochem in thecontext of the olefins and polyolefinscase (No IV/E - 2/35.765).

Case T-18/97, Atlantic Container LineAB and Others v Commission;Annulment of the Commission decisionof 26 November 1996 concerning aproceeding under Art. 85 of the ECTreaty (Case No IV/35.134 - Trans-Atlantic Conference Agreement)

Case T-22/97, Kesko OY v Commission;Annulment of Commission Decision C(96) 3369 final of 20 November 1996

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declaring incompatible with thecommon market and the operation ofthe EEA Agreement the concentrationoperation relating to the acquisition ofcontrol over Tuko Oy by Kesko Oy(Case No IV/M.784 — Kesko/Turko)

Case T-23/97, AEVP - Associação dasEmpresas de Vinho do Porto vCommission; Action for failure to actseeking a declaration that theCommission unlawfully failed to adopta position on the complaint lodged bythe applicant pursuant to Articles 92and 93 of the Treaty relating to thesystem of financial compensationintroduced by the French authorities forFrench producers of 'liqueur wines‘

Case T-37/97, Forges de Clabecq SA vCommission; Annulment of theCommission decision of 18 December1996 categorizing as State aid therestructuring of the company Forges deClabecq and requiring the BelgianGovernment to stop all financialintervention in favour of that companyand to recover subsidies already granted

Coming up ...._________________________________

The following publications areunder preparation by DG IV

L'application des articles 85/86par les juridictions nationales

Fifth survey on State aid

Study on the examination ofcurrent and future excesscapacity in the europeanautomobile industry

DG IV on the WorldWide Web

___________________

DG IV has a home page on the Europaserver available on the World WideWeb. Our address ishttp://europa.eu.int/en/comm/dg04/dg4home.htm.

The homepage contains the followinginformation:

DG IV's Mission & Directory : A briefdescription of the main areas of DGIV's activity and DG IV's staff list.

What is New : Most recentdevelopments.

DG IV's areas of activity : for the mainDG IV's areas of activity we alreadyintroduce data for the following sub-headings:

Press releases issued during the pastmonth : Downloaded daily from theRAPID database; because of theupdating procedure data is introducedwith a delay of 2-3 working days.

Published in the Official Journal duringthe last 6 months : a full list of actspublished with publication references.

Legislation in force : Updated versionsof legislation published in Vol IA:Rules applicable to undertakings; VolIIA: Rules applicable to State aid; itwill also contain shortly Vol IIIA:International dimension.

Commission Decisions on individualcases : Already available full list byyear for the antitrust and mergerheadings. A list of the most importantdecisions by subject is also underpreparation.

Judgements of the European Court ofJustice and the Court of First instance :The schedule of the Court and the Courtof First Instance (on competition affairs);full list of Judgments of the Court andthe CFI by year; comments and analysesdrafted by DG IV officials.

Communications and importantdocuments : miscelaneous information ofsome importance (e.g. under the StateAid heading the reference rates used bythe Commission to measure the aidelement of state subsidies; under theMergers heading the monthly and annualequivalences between the ECU andnational currencies necessary for thecalculation of the yearly turnover inECUs)

Documentation, publications speechesand articles : Speeches of theCommissionner for Competition and ofDG IV officials since 1993; the News-letter, the Annual Competition Report,the list of Community publications onCompetition available to the public,what is coming up etc.

Special features : links to the mostimportant sites of national competitionauthorities; DG IV's publications areavailable in a portable document format(pdf) produced with the AdobeAcrobat® software. Interested users candownload the documents but they willalso need the Acrobat Reader® software(available free of charge) to read them.

Interested users should note that DGIV's pages are under construction.Members of DG IV's Cellule Informa-tion do their best - view the limitedresources available - to introduce datafor each heading. It goes without sayingthat your comments, ideas andcorrections - even your positive feedback- are always welcome, preferably by e-mail ([email protected]). The site wasset up since January 1996 by GéraldMessiaen, official at DG IV-01.

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Cases covered in this issue__________________________

Anti-trust Rules

Commission Decisions

11 CSK et Gist-Brocades11 Global European Network (GEN)

12 Unilever (Irish ice cream market)13 Belgacom-ITT Promedia

14 Match Sverige - Tobakskompagni

Mergers

Commission Decisions

16 Coca-Cola/Amalgamated Beverages GB17 KESKO/TUKO18 Bank Austria / Creditanstalt

19 BT/MCI20 Blokker?Toys "R" US20 Boing /McDonnell Douglas

Liberalisation

Commission Decisions

23 Telecommunications liberalisation in Portugal

STATE AID

Commission Decisions

25 Maribel Quater (BE)25 Restructuring aid for shipyards (ES, DE,

GR)27 Société Française de production (FR)27 Taxe intérieure sur les produits pétroliers

(FR)

28 Vertragsmanagement (DE)28 GAN (FR)29 Infraleuna (DE)29 Extension of special depreciation and

investment allowance for West Berlin (DE)30 Tax releif measures (DE)

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