eclipsecon eu 2016 iot security in action! · iot security in action! julien vermillard, ... device...

IoT Security in Action!

Julien Vermillard, Sierra Wireless

@vrmvrm - [email protected]

EclipseCON EU 2016

https://twitter.com/vrmvrm

mailto:[email protected]


Introduction

Managing connected devices

Why it is simple to exploit non-secured systems

How simple to have the minimum security

Network security

Deep dive: demo setup

IoT Device(MangOH)

Attacker

Internet Gateway(Linux PC)

Local network

Internet

Man-in-the-Middle?

IoT Device(MangOH)

Attacker PCLinuxEttercap


Local network

Internet

Before attack

IoT Device(RaspberryPI)



Local network

Internet

Traffic to Internet

ARP poisoning

IoT Device(MangOH)



Local network

Internet

I’m the gateway!

Route everything to the gateway

Traffic to Internet

DNS spoofing

IoT Device(MangOH)



Local network

Internet

Fake DNS response

DNS queryiot.eclipse.org

LWM2M connection

With TLS/DTLS?




Local network

Internet

Fake DNS response

DNS queryiot.eclipse.org

DTLS handshakefailure

Security with gateways

Sensor network(ex: Zigbee)

Gateway:collect data and push to cloud

cable, 4G, etc..

Secure transportLow or no security

public network

Security with gateways

public network

Sensor network(ex: Zigbee)

cable, 4G, etc..

Attack gatewayget access to all the network

Local wireless sniffing

End-to-end security

public network

Low power nodes:security starts here

Sensor network(ex: Thread)

Router

cable, 4G, etc..

See only encrypted communicationNot your Achilles’ heel

Other benefits of IP to the edge device

Simplicity: only IP networks

Topology flexibility compared to gateway

Scaling IP routing is something well known

Can we trust wireless network?

Wifi password?

GPRS encryption?

3G/4G femtocell?

Zigbee?

Bluetooth?

Not talking of plain text wireless network :)

Example: GPRS

https://discourse.criticalengineering.org/t/howto-gsm-base-station-with-the-beaglebone-black-debian-gnu-linux-and-a-usrp/56

Example: 3G/4G femtocell

http://www.ioactive.com/pdfs/IOActive_Remote_Car_Hacking.pdf










Key Management

Key management

You will have a fleet of device

They needs secrets (key, password, etc..)

Unique across devices

You need to be able to change those secrets

You will probably don’t trust your factory

Lightweight M2M Bootstrap

Flash bootstrap credentials

I only have bootstrap credentials or I can’t reach final server



Give me key and my server(s)

Bootstrap Server


New keys and server(s) URLsand ACL

Bootstrap Server


Registration

Bootstrap Server

Registration

Home AutomationServer

Device Manag.Server

Secret key rotation using bootstrap?

Renew or upgrade your secret:

1 - Device authenticate with the bootstrap server2 - Bootstrap server rewrite the bootstrap secret

Next bootstrap the device use the new bootstrap secrets

Public Key Infrastructure?

Root CA

Intermediate CA

End entity 1 End entity 2 End entity3

How to verify a certificate

Root trustIdentity to verify Intermediate

Issuer Signature

Expiration ~3 y

Public Key

Issuer Identity

Issuer Signature

Expiration ~5 y

Public Key

Issuer Identity

Root Signature

Root CA Identity

Root Public Key

Find

Verify Find

Verify

Identity

Identity

Enrollment with PKI

Generate

Private Public

Enrollment with PKI

Private Public

Certification Authority

Certificate Request

Enrollment with PKI

Generate

Private Public

Certification Authority

Certificate

CA Private

Sign using CA private key a X.509 certificate

Enrollment with PKI

Generate

Private Public

Service

CA Public

Sign using certificate for authentication

Still not IoT friendly

A lot of enterprise protocols:

IKE: Internet Key Exchange RFC2409

CMP: Certificate Management Protocol RFC4210

SCEP: Simple Certificate Enrollment Protocol draft-gutmann-scep-02

EST: Enrollment Over Secure Transport RFC7030

IEEE 802.1AR: Secure Device Identity 802.1AR

But still nothing ready to use for constrained networks & devices

Firmware download

Firmware download




Local network

Internet

Send firmware with backdoor

HTTP GET

CMS (Cryptograpic Message Syntax)

See RFC5652 (replaces PKCS #7)

Used to digitally sign, digest, authenticate, or encrypt arbitrary message content.

Supported by OpenSSL (CLI: openssl cms)

https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5652

Secure boot

Hardware (ROM) enforces booting only correctly signed code

Often based on ECDSA signature

Hardware based ⇒ no algorithm agility

Open-source solutions are there

Eclipse IoT:

Leshan, Wakaama, TinyDTLS, Scandium, Paho,

Mosquitto, Hono

OpenSSL, Mbed TLS

CFSSL

GnuPG

U-Boot

Thanks!Twitter: @vrmvrmMail: [email protected]


mailto:[email protected]

Credits

Tom Medley - The Noun ProjectGuilhem - The Noun ProjectGiuditta Valentina Gentile - The Noun ProjectSergey Krivoy - The Noun ProjectJon Anderson - The Noun ProjectRyan Beck - The Noun ProjectEdward Boatman - The Noun Project

eclipsecon eu 2016 iot security in action! · iot security in action! julien vermillard, ... device...

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