Colin Harper

Head of Directed Energy Weapons Capability

QinetiQ

UK

The Potential for the “Triple Threat” to disrupt emerging electric vehicle

infrastructure

“ecoCity eMotion” 24-25th September 2014, Erlangen, Germany

European Conference on Nanoelectronics and Embedded Systems for Electric Mobility

Introduction

The emerging electric vehicle infrastructure is developing with a high

level of sophistication and flexibility. This operating model relies heavily

on embedded electronic systems to support safe vehicle operation and

appropriate driver information all underpinned by communication and

positioning systems to support the business models which enable

vehicle charging.

In this talk I will discuss the vulnerability of this technology rich

infrastructure environment to known and emerging electro magnetic

pulse (EMP) threats and consider the benefits of designing in mitigation

including detection, hardening and the development and application of

standards may minimise any potential negative impact..

Content

Directed Energy Weapons Capability within QinetiQ

The Triple Threat

EMP caused by space weather

EMP caused by a high altitude nuclear detonation

EMP caused by locally delivered, non nuclear effect

Potential Impact on Electric Vehicle Infrastructure

Vulnerability Issues

Components, Systems and Systems of Systems

Human Factors

Mitigation

Detection

Quantification of Vulnerability

Hardening Strategies

Standards Development

Summary

01 QinetiQ Capability

QinetiQ DEW & E3 Capability

Overlaps into other

established capability and

technology domains

EW & EA

NLW Cyber

Triple Threat

Spectrum

Management &

Interoperability

Electromagnetic

Environment Effects (E3)

EOCM

• Directed Energy Weapons

• Radio Frequency (Effects Optimisation and Assessment of Vulnerability)

• IEMI

• Laser

• Other Novel Effects

• Electromagnetic Environmental Effects (E3)

– RADAR, High Intensity Radiated Field (HIRF), High Intensity Radio Transmitting Area (HIRTA)

– Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP)

• Lightning, nuclear & High Altitude

• Geomagnetic disturbances

– TEMPEST (protection against covert extraction of secure data)

What is “The Triple Threat”?

Scope of the Triple Threat

Extreme Geomagnetic Storms

Geomagnetic storms are disturbances in the Earth’s normally quiescent geomagnetic field caused by intense solar activity

Coronal Mass Ejection (CME)

A rapidly changing geomagnetic field over large regions will induce Geomagnetically-Induced Currents (i.e. GIC, a quasi-DC current) to flow in the interconnected HV/EHV/UHV bulk transmission system

Over the past 22 years high levels of GIC have been noted on high-voltage power grids throughout the world

Measurements of large transformer neutral currents in the U.S., Japan, UK, Norway and Sweden

Sunspot Cycle and Large GMD Events

March 13,

1989

Feb 8,

1986

Cycle 19

Largest

Large Geomagnetic Storms can and do occur at anytime in the Sunspot Cycle and not just around the Sunspot peaks

High Altitude EMP (HEMP)

• Source: Exo-atmospheric nuclear detonation (>30km)

• Mechanism:

– Nuclear Radiation interacts with the atmosphere

• Gamma Rays produce Compton electrons

• Electrons are deflected by the earth's magnetic field

• Transverse electron currents produce transverse electric fields

• For exo-atmospheric burst, HEMP is the primary nuclear effect of concern at Ground Level (i.e. Blast, Thermal, Ionising radiation of much less importance)

UNCLASSIFIED

Atlanta

Chicago

Churchill

Dallas

Edmonton

Goosebay

Havana

Houston

Los Angeles

Mexico City

MiamiMonterrey

New YorkOmaha

Quebec

Seattle

St. John's

Washington DC

Winnipeg

United States

Bermuda

HOB= 170.00 at 39.5900, -83.0300, Tan=1455.7

[5.137E+03]

Complete HEMP Waveform

• Early time HEMP (E1)

– fast rise-time (few ns)

– high peak amplitude (tens of kV/m)

– pulse length approximately 100 ns

• Intermediate time HEMP (E2)

– fast rise-time (few ns)

– amplitude of 10’s V/m

– pulse length of ms

• Late time (E3) or Magnetohydrodynamic (MHD) HEMP

– slow rise-time (100’s ms)

– low peak amplitude (mV/m)

– long pulse length of over 100 s

Primarily an issue for equipment and

systems

Couples well to distributed conductors

and considered to be similar to the

Lightning transient threat

Couples well to distributed conductors

and considered to be similar to the

Geomagnetic storm transient threat

Intentional Electromagnetic Interference

• Definition of IEMI:

– ‘Intentional malicious generation of electromagnetic energy introducing noise or signals into electric and electronic systems, thus disrupting, confusing or damaging these systems for terrorist or criminal purposes’

• Related Terms:

– Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Weapons

– Radio Frequency Directed Energy Weapons (RFDEW)

– E-Bomb

– High Power Microwaves (HPM)

IEMI Sources

GND, HEMP & IEMI Footprint

GMD

HEMP

IEMI

Composite EM Environment

EW/Jammers

EMI

HEMP

Lightning

RFDEW/IEMI

HIRF/Radar

Mesoband (range dependent)

Hyperband (range dependent)

Hypoband (range dependent)

10kHz 10GHz 10MHz

Mag

nit

ud

e

[Arb

itra

ry u

nit

s]

Frequency

EV Infrastructure Potential Effects

Areas of Vulnerability

Areas of Vulnerability

Long power line coupling

(GMC and HEMP)

Areas of Vulnerability

IEMI threat to charging

cables acting as aerials

Areas of Vulnerability

Vehicle configured to

deliver bulk current

Injection (BCI)

Areas of Vulnerability

Other IEMI vulnerability

aspects

Other IEMI vulnerability

aspects

Other IEMI / Cyber

vulnerability aspects

Other IEMI / Cyber

vulnerability aspects

Other IEMI / Cyber

vulnerability aspects

Mitigation

Detection

Design in “hardness”

Shielding

Filtering

Thinking about physical security

Development & Application of Standards

Evidence based approach to hardening “retrofit”

Assessment of vulnerability

Quantification of vulnerability

The Vulnerability:Risk matrix

Appropriate investments

Hardening and Protection Engineering

Electromagnetic Compatibility

(EMC), EMI, HEMP and Lightning

protection measures are well

founded and well proven

For example - Shielding can provide

100dB (99.99%) reduction in

radiated threat environments

These measures are highly relevant

to the EM Security problem

Although some ‘adjustment’ is

necessary

The use of fibre-optical cable for

providing data interconnects can

provide a good degree of protection

As long as the cable is free from

metallic components

Source: IEC 61000-6-6: Mitigation of External EM influences

The Application of Standards (IEC 77C)

Protecting existing assets

Assessment of vulnerability

Quantification of vulnerability

The Vulnerability:Risk matrix

Appropriate investments

100.0E+6 1.0E+9 10.0E+9

Frequency [Hz]

Susc

eptib

ility T

hres

hold

Computer Effect

Network effect [DoS]

Hub damage

Questions

Colin Harper

cdharper@qinetiq.com