econ 522 economics of law dan quint fall 2012 lecture 2
TRANSCRIPT
Econ 522Economics of Law
Dan Quint
Fall 2012
Lecture 2
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TA sections begin this Friday
“Fake homework” for Wednesday on website
No class next Monday
Logistics
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defined law and economics
saw some brief history of the common law
and the civil law
and discussed ownership of dead whales
Last week, we…
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what is efficiency?
is efficiency a good goal for the law?
Today: efficiency
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What is“efficiency”?
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a Pareto improvement is any change to the economy which leaves… everyone at least as well off, and someone strictly better off
example of a Pareto improvement your car is worth $3,000 to you, $4,000 to me I buy it for $3,500
an outcome is Pareto superior to another, or Pareto dominates it, if the second is a Pareto improvement over the first
First concept: Pareto improvement
Vilfredo Pareto(1848-1923)
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Pareto improvements are “win-win” but most new laws create some winners and some losers so the Pareto criterion usually can’t tell us whether one policy is
“better” than another even the car example might not be a true Pareto-improvement
so we need another way to compare outcomes
Pareto superiority is not that useful a measure for evaluating a legal system
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a Kaldor-Hicks improvement is any change to the economy which could be turned into a Pareto improvement with monetary transfers also called potential Pareto improvement
car example again your car is worth $3,000 to you and $4,000 to me government seizes your car and gives it to me
I’m better off, you’re worse off combined with me giving you $3,500, it’s a Pareto improvement so me getting your car is a Kaldor-Hicks improvement
a Kaldor-Hicks improvement may create winners and losers, but gains outweigh the losses I’m $4,000 better off, you’re $3,000 worse off, $4,000 > $3,000
Next concept: Kaldor-Hicks improvement
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You and I are neighbors, you want to throw a party The party would make me $100 worse off… …and make you $50 better off… …and make each of your 30 guests $5 better off
Is the party a Pareto improvement? No – it makes you and your guests better off, makes me worse off
Is the party a Kaldor-Hicks improvement? Yes – because the party, combined with the appropriate money transfers,
would be a Pareto improvement (Example: you throw the party, you give me $40, each of your guests gives
me $3 – that’s a Pareto improvement)
Example
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To check if something is a Kaldor-Hicks improvement, we can…
look for transfers that turn it into a Pareto-improvement…
…or, just count up the gains of the winners and the losses of the losers, and see which is bigger
a change in the economy is a Kaldor-Hicks improvement if the winners’ gains outweigh the losers’ losses if you have the party… I’m $100 worse off You’re $50 better off 30 guests are each $5 better off – $100 + $50 + 30 X $5 = $100 > 0 Gains outweigh losses, so party is a Kaldor-Hicks improvement
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What we’ve really done here
In a sense, what we’ve done here is created a way to add up different peoples’ utility functions…
…by equating utility with willingness to pay We said the party made me $100 worse off We equated my disutility from you making noise with the amount
of money that would replace the inconvenience – if you threw the party and gave me $100, I’d be just as well off as before
Once we’ve done that, a Kaldor-Hicks improvement is an change to the economy that “creates value”
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we will call a change to the economy efficient if it is a Kaldor-Hicks improvement
we’ll say law A is more efficient than law B if moving from B to A is a Kaldor-Hicks improvement
and we’ll say a situation is efficient if there are no available Kaldor-Hicks improvements an efficient situation is when there’s no way to make some people
better off, without making some others worse off by more we’re already getting maximal value out of all available resources
Efficiency
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Example: is it efficient for me to drive to work instead of taking the bus?
Bus to campus from where I live is free
Driving is more convenient, but costs me $1 (gas)
Driving also imposes costs on other people: there’s more traffic, less parking, more pollution Suppose when I drive to work, it makes 1,000 other people worse off by
$0.01 each
By driving to work, I create $11 of total costs
It’s efficient for me to drive to work if the benefit I get is more than $11 If the benefit is less than $11, it’s inefficient for me to drive
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our definition of efficiency: actions are taken when total benefits outweigh total costs “goal” is to achieve all Kaldor-Hicks improvements
Ellickson: efficiency is “minimizing the objective sum of
(1) transaction costs, and
(2) deadweight losses arising from failures to exploit potential gains from trade”
Posner: “wealth maximization”
Polinsky: “Efficiency corresponds to ‘the size of the pie’”
Some other, similar measures
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What forces lead to inefficiency
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To see whether something’s efficient…
Compare gains to everyone in society (total social benefit)…
…to costs to everyone (total social costs)
Example we already saw (me driving to work): Total social cost = $1 (gas) + 1,000 X $0.01 = $11 Total social benefit = whatever I gain by driving to work So we just said: it’s efficient for me to drive to campus whenever
the value I get from driving is more than $11
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But what do people actually do?
When people decide how to act…
…they consider the cost and benefit to themselves, not to everyone private benefit and private cost
Driving only costs me $1 so I’ll drive whenever benefit to me is more than $1
On days when value I get from driving is more than $1 but less than $11, I drive to work even though that’s inefficient
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So externalities cause inefficiency
I’ll do something whenever private benefit > private cost
Efficiency depends on whether social benefit > social cost
If I was the only one affected by my choices, then social benefit = private benefit and social cost = private cost when I’m deciding which movie to watch on Netflix, nobody else is affected
by my choice, so my choice will be efficient
But when my choices affect other peoples’ payoffs… social benefit private benefit, or social cost private cost so actions I choose to take may not be efficient
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A classic example of this: the Tragedy of the Commons
Hardin (1968), “The Tragedy of the Commons”
Picture a small fishing village on a lake The more fish I catch, the fewer
fish are left in the lake… …and the harder it is for everyone
else in the village to catch fish So my fishing imposes an
externality on everyone else So everyone ends up fishing
more than the efficient amount
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Tragedy of the Commons – example
20 fishermen Cost of fishing is 8 fish per hour Notation
h = how many hours I fish H = combined hours everyone fishes H = hours everyone but me fishes
Fishermen catch 260 – H fish per hour
(a) What is the efficient level of fishing? How much utility does that give to each fisherman?
6.3 hours per day per fisherman; 793.8 fish/day
(b) Left to their own devices, how much will each person fish? How much utility will each person get?
12 hours per day per fisherman; 144 fish/day
Hours fishing, per day, per fisherman
Total fish caught
0 1263 9
“Maximum Sustainable Yield”
Efficient Level of Fishing
“Equilibrium” Level of Fishing
H (260 – H)
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What’s going on here?
Fishing imposes a negative externality on other fishermen Each one ignores this externality when deciding how much to fish… …so they all end up fishing more than the efficient amount
Same thing happens with other communal resources Cattle grazing, whaling, overhunting, oyster beds Aristotle: “That which is common to the greatest number has the least
care bestowed upon it” Elinor Ostrom, who shared the 2009 Nobel Prize in Economics, studies
how different societies solve this problem
Positive externalities work the opposite way Activities which create positive externalities are naturally done less than
the efficient amount
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Without some sort of regulation/intervention… Activities which impose a negative externality will be done more
than the efficient amount… …and activities which impose a positive externality will be done
less than the efficient amount
One idea we’ll see several times in this class:
if we want the law to lead to efficient outcomes,
we can try to design the law to eliminate externalities! “Internalization”
So externalities can lead to inefficiency
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Other forces which lead to inefficiency
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Cuban cigars Suppose I’d pay $15 each for Cohibas They cost $2 each to make, and another
$3 each to transport from Cuba to Madison Clearly, it’s efficient for me to smoke Cohibas But trade embargo on Cuba makes it illegal for me to buy them
Anything that prevents me from buying something I want can be a source of inefficiency One approach to property law: make it as easy as possible for
people to trade among themselves (This may seem like an obvious point; but then, there are lots of
things we’re not allowed to sell…)
Another thing that leads to inefficiency:barriers to trade
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I value my free time at $40/hour
Working in a factory, I can build things worth $50/hour
Clearly, it’s efficient for me to work Each hour I work creates $10 of new value Doesn’t matter who gets it – it’s efficient for me to work
But if income tax is 25%, then it won’t happen Factory owner can’t pay me more than $50/hour But $50/hour pre-tax is only $37.50 after-tax… …and I’d rather stay home than earn $37.50 an hour So I don’t get hired, which is inefficient
Another thing that leads to inefficiency: taxes
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This is a new BMW that’s been cut in half
Taxes distort behavior away from efficiency
Another example of taxes leading to inefficiency
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CS
Profit
Example Demand for some good
given by P = 100 – Q Monopolist can produce
good for $40/unit Monopoly price is 70,
demand is 30 Deadweight loss is
inefficiency Customers willing to pay
more than marginal cost but unable to trade
Another thing that leads to inefficiency: monopoly
P* = 70P = 100 – Q
Q* = 30
MC = 40DWL
(or private information)
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For example we just said taxes lead to inefficiency… …but without taxes, there’s be far too few public goods, which is also
inefficient we just said monopoly leads to inefficiency… …but we’ll study patents, which are legal monopolies used to get
companies to innovate
But also, we’ve defined “efficient”, but we haven’t claimed that “efficient = good”
Which brings us to…
But, saying these things lead to inefficiency doesn’t automatically mean they’re bad
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Is efficiency a good goal for the law?
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positive statements are statements of fact can be descriptive: “in 2007, U.S. GDP was $13.8 trillion” can be theoretical predictions: “if prices rise, demand will fall” “economics of what is”
normative statements contain value judgments for example, “less inequality is better” or, “government should encourage innovation” “economics of what ought to be”
Important distinction: positive versus normative economics
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Predicting behavior, and outcomes, that follow from a law or legal system is positive economics “Law X will lead to more car accidents than law Y” “Law X will lead to more efficient outcomes than law Y”
But in the background, we’d like some sense of what is the normative goal of the legal system “Law X is better than law Y”
One candidate for that normative goal is efficiency
Most of this class will be positive analysis
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“The central question [in this book]… is a simple one: what set of rules and institutions maximize the size of the pie? What legal rules are economically efficient?
There are at least three reasons why that is the question we ask.
The first is that while economic efficiency… is not the only thing that matters to human beings, it is something that matters quite a lot to most human beings.
The second reason is that there is evidence that considerable parts of the legal system we live in can be explained as tools to generate efficient outcomes… It is a lot easier to make sense out of a tool if you know what it is designed to do.
A final reason is that figuring out what rules lead to… efficient outcomes is one of the things economists know how to do –
and when you have a hammer, everything looks like a nail.”
- Friedman, Law’s Order, p. 312
Friedman gives a few arguments for studying efficiency
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This answers the question, “Why is it interesting to study efficiency?”
Not the question, “Should the law be designed with the goal of achieving efficiency?”
To answer this latter question…
But…
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Richard Posner (1980), The Ethical and Political Basis of Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication
Starts with the observation: if you buy a lottery ticket and don’t win anything, you can’t complain
Imagine before we all started driving, everyone in the world got together and negotiated a liability rule for traffic accidents
If one rule is more efficient than another, we’d all vote for that rule ex-ante – ex-ante consent
Posner gives us one argument why the law should aim to be efficient
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Suppose there are two candidate rules for accident liability One favors pedestrians, one favors drivers The one favoring car drivers is more efficient
Posner’s point: before we know who we’ll be, everyone would unanimously agree to the second rule
Ex-ante consent – simple example
-40-60-20Negligence rule
-500-100Strict liability rule
Expected payoff if you don’t know which one
you’ll be
Expected payoff,
pedestrians
Expected payoff, drivers
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People without cars would prefer a less efficient system if it meant drivers were responsible
Posner deals with heterogeneity with a different example
Landlord-friendly versus tenant-friendly laws Might think tenants would prefer pro-tenant laws But rents are determined competitively If laws become more tenant-friendly, rents might go up to compensate And if tenant-friendly law is less efficient, it could make both sides
worse off!
Things are a little more complicated…
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Suppose tenants get $1000 value from apartment, minus rent Landlords pay $100 for heat, $600 in other costs Without this law, tenants would pay for their own heat They’d heat apartment less, get $980 value and pay $60 for heat Might think tenants would prefer inefficient tenant-friendly law… But rents are set competitively, would go up to compensate… So both landlords and tenants do better under the old law!
Example: new law requiring landlords to pay for their tenants’ heat
760 – 600= 160
980 – 60 – 760= 160
rent – 600980 – 60 – rentTenant pays for heat
850 – 600 – 100= 150
1000 – 850= 150
rent – 600 – 1001000 – rentLandlord pays for heat
LandlordsTenantsLandlords’
payoffsTenants’ payoffs
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Posner’s basic argument: if we choose the most efficient legal system, everyone is “compensated ex-ante” for the choice, and should willingly accept the outcome they get
Of course, all this consent is hypothetical…
…and it does have certain limitations
Ex-ante consent, ex-ante compensation
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The “lottery ticket” analogy requires risk neutrality 50% chance at $1,000,000 is just as good as 50% chance at
$900,000 and 50% chance at $100,000 If $100,000 is “worth more to you” when you’re broke than when
you already have $900,000, this argument doesn’t work
Counterpoint to Posner: Hammond (1982) Efficiency is really a special case of utilitarianism, and subject to
the same limitations “Value” = “willingness to pay” $1 worth the same to everyone
Limitations to Posner’s argument
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efficiency is not equity efficiency is not fairness efficiency is not maximizing happiness
“Suppose that pituitary extract is in very short supply… and is therefore very expensive. A poor family has a child who will be a dwarf if he doesn’t get some of the extract, but the family cannot afford the price [or borrow the money].
A rich family has a child who will grow to normal height, but the extract will add a few inches more, and his parents decide to buy it for him.
In the sense of value used in this book, the pituitary extract is more valuable to the rich family… because value is measured by willingness to pay, but the extract would confer greater happiness in the hands of the poor family.”
- Posner, Economic Analysis of Law
This highlights some of the things efficiency is not
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Cooter and Ulen (textbook ch. 1)
Efficiency should not necessarily be the goal of society
But efficiency should be the goal of the legal system
If redistribution is desirable, it’s better to make the legal system efficient, and address distribution through taxes Cooter and Ulen offer four reasons why the tax system is a better
way to redistribute wealth than the legal system
A more pragmatic defense of efficiency as a goal for the law
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1. Taxes can target “rich” and “poor” more precisely than the legal system can
2. Distributional effects of legal changes are harder to predict
3. Lawyers are more expensive than accountants
4. More narrowly-targeted taxes cause greater distortion than broad-based taxes
Four reasons the tax system is a better way to redistribute wealth than the legal system
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We’ve seen two arguments in favor Posner: it’s what we all would have agreed on ex-ante C&U: if you want to redistribute, it’s better to do it through taxes
But there are definitely some problems with efficiency Distribution matters; not everything is monetizable; people might care
about procedural fairness
My take In this class, we’ll mostly focus on the positive questions But in the background, I think of efficiency as a “pretty good”, but
definitely imperfect, measure of “goodness”
So, summing up… is efficiency a good goal for the law?
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One argument from C&U for why law should focus on efficiency, redistribution should be done through taxes:
“narrow taxes cause more distortion than broad taxes” Wednesday, we’ll work through an example of this “Optional homework problem”
If you want to read ahead, look atRonald Coase, “The Problem of Social Cost”(although we probably won’t get to Coase till next week)
See you Wednesday!
For Wednesday…