economic voting and the national front: towards a subregional understanding of the extreme-right...

7/29/2019 Economic Voting and the National Front: Towards a Subregional Understanding of the Extreme-Right Vote in France

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EconomicVotingandtheNationalFront:

TowardsaSubregionalUnderstandingoftheExtreme-Right

VoteinFrance

SeniorPoliticsHonorsThesis

NewYorkUniversity

Fall2012andSpring2013,POL-UA950andPOL-UA951

ByJohnAmerlingAldrich

(203)948-6107

521East14thStreet,#12FNewYork,NY,10009

[email protected]

Acknowledgements

TheauthorwouldliketothankProfessorNathanielBeck,ProfessorOeindrilaDube,andOmarGarca-Ponce

intheNYUPoliticsDepartmentfortheirassistanceandguidancethroughouttheacademicyear,andAstrid

ParentyforhertirelesshelptranslatingfromtheFrench.


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ABSTRACT

Sinceitselectoralbreakthroughinthemid-1980s,theextreme-rightFrontnational

hasbeenacontroversialyetundeniablyinfluentialpoliticalandculturalforceinFrance.

Betweenthe2007and2012Frenchpresidentialelections,thepercentageofvoteshare

receivedbythepartyincreasedfrom10.44%to17.9%nationally,arecordhigh.Despite

thisandotherrecentextreme-rightvictoriesacrossEurope,theliteratureonextreme-right

votingisempiricallycontradictoryandsurprisinglylimitedinbothbreadthandscope.In

ordertoformamorecompleteunderstandingofextreme-rightvoting,thispaperexamines

thecontributionsofunemployment,immigration,andcrimetothechangeinvoteshare

receivedbytheFrontnationalbetweenthelasttwopresidentialelections.Iconductthe

analysisatthesubregionalleveloftheFrenchdpartement.Theanalysisshowsthatthe

changeinthedpartementalunemploymentratehasapositive,statisticallysignificant

effectonthechangeintheFrontnationalvote,andthatthiseffectisevenlargerinareas

thathavehighpercentagesofimmigrantsrelativetotherestofthecountry.


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I.INTRODUCTION

ThispaperseekstoexplaintheriseinelectoralsupportfortheFrenchextreme-

rightonthesubregionallevelofthedpartementbetweenthe2007and2012presidential

elections.Theaimofsuchaneffortistofurtheranddeepentheextantcorpusofacademic

literatureonextreme-rightvotinginrecognitionofa)theresurgenceoftheEuropean

extreme-rightinrecentdecadesandb)theabilityofextreme-rightpartiestoshapepolicy

andthenationalpoliticalagendaintheirfavorevenwhennotinpowerorcoalition.While

significantworkhasbeendoneexploringextreme-rightvotingoncross-nationallevels,

therehasbeenrelativelylittleworkdoneonintranational,subregionallevels,particularly

inFrancesincethe1986electoralbreakthroughofitspremierextreme-rightparty,the

Frontnational(henceforththeNationalFront,orFN).Itisinthisvacuumofliterature

thatthispaperstepsin,employingordinaryleastsquares(OLS)regressionanalysistothe

taskofassessingwhatchangingfactorsbetweenthe2007and2012presidentialelections

accountfortheincreaseofFNvoteshareexpressedbythe96dpartementsofMetropolitan

France(theFrenchmainlandplusCorsica).UsingthechangeinFNelectoralsupportas

measuredbythepercentageofvotesharereceivedineachFrenchdpartementasthe

dependentvariableandthechangeineachdpartementsunemploymentrateasthe

primaryindependentvariable,Iwilloperationalizethechangeindpartemental

unemploymentrateseffectonthedependentvariablefirstindependentlyandthenin

considerationofothercontrolvariablessuchasthechangeinthepercentageofimmigrants

ineachdpartementsrgion,thechangeinreportedcrimesineachdpartement,and

variousinteractionvariablesconstructedinconsiderationofhypothesespresentinthe

reviewedliterature.Reviewingandgroundingmyworkinthecontextofthisliterature,my


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paperisultimatelyvaluableinsofarasitcontributestoanacademiclandscaperifewith

debateandcontradiction,andadvancestheunderstandingofextreme-rightvotingon

intranational,subregionallevels.Ultimately,Iascertainthatthechangeinregional

unemploymenthasapositive,statisticallysignificanteffectonthechangeintheFNvote,

andthatthevariableseffectismagnifiedevenfurtherbyitsinteractionwithhighlevelsof

immigration.Suchaconclusionisconsistentwithotherscholarsfindingsandlends

qualifiedempiricalsupporttoMattGoldersmaterialisthypothesis,partofwhichasserts

thatunemploymentincreasesthevoteforextreme-rightpartieswhenimmigrationishigh.

Myanalysisaimstocontributemeaningfullytooneofthemostinterestingandincreasingly

topicalsubfieldsofpoliticalscience,thatofextreme-rightvoting.Iproceedwitha

backgroundontheNationalFront,aliteraturereview,andthefullpresentationofmydata,

researchdesign,andresults,followedbymyconclusion.

II.BACKGROUND

Sinceitsfoundingin1972bythepartysideologicalleaderandformerpresident

Jean-MarieLePen,theNationalFronthasgonefromreceiving0.75%ofthenationalvotein

theprimertour(firstround)ofitsfirstpresidentialelectionin1974toarecord17.9%in

thefirstroundoftheApril2012presidentialelection,thepartysmostrecent.11Nowunder

theleadershipofJean-MarieLePensdaughterMarineLePen,theNationalFronthas

establisheditselfasoneofEuropesflagshipextreme-rightpartiesandaforcenottobe

trifledwithintheFrenchelectoralarena.17Howhasitaccomplishedthis?Whatdoesthe

partystandfor?AndwhatdoestheelectoralsuccessoftheNationalFrontmeanfor


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France?Toanswerthesequestionsitbehoovesonetoexaminethepartybeforeandafter

1986,theculminatingyearofitselectoralbreakthrough.

Receivingsuchasmallpercentageofthevoteinitsfirstelectionandfailingto

qualifytoruninthefollowingpresidentialelectionof1981duetonotreceivingthe

recentlyincreasedminimumsofmayoralsupportneededbyanaspirantpoliticalparty,the

NationalFrontappearedpositionedtolanguishontheperipheryofFrenchpolitics.Yetby

leveragingpopulardiscontentwiththeeconomystillsufferingtheprotractedeffectsof

thepreviousdecadesglobaloilcrisisandeffectivelyshoringupsupportamongstits

mostlyblue-collarbase,theNationalFrontbrokeoutelectorallybetween1983and1986,

firstachieving10.95%ofthevoteand10seatsinthe1984electionstotheParliamentof

theEuropeanUnionandthen9.65%ofthevoteinthe1986Frenchlegislativeelections,

whichplaced35FNpartymembersintheFrenchNationalAssembly.8aActingintheFNs

favorwastherecentchangeintheFrenchelectoralsystemimposedbythenPresident

FranoisMitterrandfromasimpleplurality,orfirst-past-the-post(FPTP)systemtoone

ofparty-listproportionalrepresentation.PursuanttoDuvergerslaw,aprinciplein

politicalsciencethatpostulatestheestablishmentofatwo-partyregimeinasystemof

pluralityvotingandmultipartisminasystemofproportionalrepresentation,thechangeto

Franceselectoralsystemin1986removedbarrierstoentryforstartuppartieslikethe

NationalFrontandallowedmoredynamicismintheelectoralspace.7,30Whilethe

reinstatementofthemajoritarian,two-ballotsysteminthe1988legislativeelectionscost

theNationalFront34ofitsseatsintheNationalAssembly,thepartyexploiteditspast

success,burgeoningpopularity,andinfightingamongstFrancesmainstreamrightwing

partiestoachieve9.8%ofthefirstroundvoteinthe1988legislativeelections(and1seat


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inparliament)and14.4%ofthevoteinthefirstroundofthe1988presidentialelection.

Since1988ithassubsequentlyenjoyedelectoralsupportinthefirstroundofFrench

presidentialelectionsintherangeofanormalized10%-15%.30

Whileithasonlyoncepassedthroughtothesecond,finalroundofapresidential

election(in2002beforesufferingthelandslide82.2%victoryofJacquesChiracs

RassemblementpourlaRpublique[RallyfortheRepublic]party),theNationalFronthas

neverthelessbecomeadominantpresenceinFrenchpoliticsandsocietyand,asitsrise

between2007and2012foreshadows,lookspoisedtoevenfurtherentrenchitselftherein.

Throughtheprocessofpartisanrealignment,overthecourseofitshistorytheNational

Fronthasexpandedfromurbantoruralareas,embeddeditselfinlocalpolitics,acquired

votersfromotherright-wingfactions,andobligatedpartiesonboththerightandleftto

adjusttheirpoliciesinordertounderminetheFNsostensiblemonopolyonportraying

anddefiningcontentiousnationalissueslikethosepertainingtoimmigration,suchas

asylum,naturalization,therightsoffamilyunificationandmarriageforimmigrants,and

theissuanceoftouristvisas.30AsMartinSchain,ascholarofimmigrationandpoliticsin

WesternEurope,pointsout,theelectoralbreakthroughoftheNationalFrontensured

that,indecision-makingonimmigration,theelectoralcontextcouldnotbeignored[by

otherpoliticalparties].31Theresult,hecontinuestoexplain,hasbeentheemergenceof

morerestrictivepoliciesthroughoutFranceonanabundanceoftheseissues,including

manypassedbygovernmentsontheleft.Inthisway,thesheerpresenceoftheFNsinceits

breakoutinthemid-1980shasbeensufficienttocolortheideologicalagendaofthenation

andthetangiblepoliciesthroughwhichsuchanagendahasandcontinuestobe

expressed.Atvarioustimesinitshistory,theNationalFronthasbeenabletodothiswith


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littletonoofficialrepresentationingovernment;suchistheirpoliticalclout.Theprinciple

thatobtainsnotonlyinFrancebutthroughoutEuropeisthatfringeparties,evenwhen

theyremainelectorallyassuch,enjoyagravitationalpullinpublicandpoliticaldiscourse

disproportionatetotheiractuallegislativeagency.Asextremistpartiesemerge,

consolidate,andgrow,theyarecapableofleveragingmoremainstreampartiesfearof

losingvotersinordertoshiftnationalpolicyformationclosertotheirpreferentiallines.30

Butwhatarethesepolicies,exactly?WhatdoestheNationalFrontstandfor?

Broadly,theNationalFrontlikemanyotherextreme-rightpartiesinEuropeis

sociallyconservative,nationalist,eurosceptic,souverainist,economicprotectionist,and

anti-immigrant.23,13Thepartyadvocatesazerotoleranceplatformwithrespecttolaw

andorderissues,andhasbeenembroiledincontroversyformuchofitsexistencedueto

thepolemicalpoliciesitpromotesandtheprovocativestatementsthatcontinuetobe

issuedbypartyfigureheads.13aIndeed,theFNoftodayisregardedasamoremoderate

incarnationofthepartyonceknownforitsunabashedlyxenophobic,WorldWarII

revisionist,andanti-SemiticplatformJean-MarieLePenhasbeenfoundguiltytwiceof

denyingtheHolocaust,firstin1991andthenin2008.,9,16Despitedownplayingthemost

inflammatorycomponentsofitsrhetoricandengaginginaaself-consciousprocessof

ddiabolisation(decontamination)undertheaegisofMarineLePen,theFNnonetheless

staunchlydefendeditscorepositionsinthefirstroundofthe2012presidentialelection,

whereitplacedthirdaftertheultimatevictorFranoisHollandesPartisocialiste(Socialist

Party)andthen-incumbentpresidentNicolasSarkozysUnionpourunmouvement

InFebruary2012aPariscourtupheldits2008rulingthatJean-MarieLePenwasguiltyofthecontestationofcrimesagainsthumanity,havingsaidin2005thatinFrance,atleast,theGermanOccupationwasntparticularlyinhumane,evenifthereweresomeexcessesinevitableinacountryof550,000squarekilometers.Hewasfinedandgivenathreemonthsuspendedsentence. 16


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populaire(UnionforaPopularMovement).10Mediacoverageoftherun-uptotheelection

detailssupportbeingfoundintheFNsmantraaFrancefortheFrench,itsanti-immigrant

stanceinarepublicwheremanyarefearful[of]foreignersoverrunningthecountryand

strainingFrance'sgeneroussocialmodel,anditsanti-EuropeanUnionplatform,upon

whichitblamestheeconomicandpoliticalunionfortheunemployment,immigration,and

insecurityplaguingthecountry.20,26

ContextualizingtheNationalFrontsunprecedentedelectoralsuccesshasbeena

largerwaveofextreme-rightvictoriesbreakingupontheshoresoftheEuropeancontinent.

PropelledforthbytheEuropeanSovereign-DebtCrisisanditsattendanteconomicwoes,

EuropeanUnionPresidentHermanVanRompuyhasrecentlycriticizedwhathecallsthe

windsofpopulismblowingacrossEurope,fannedbyextremistmovements.20Indeed,

GeertWildersanti-immigrantandanti-IslamDutchFreedomParty,theAustrianFreedom

Party(FP)underJrgHaider,theupstartBritishFreedomPartyandtheassociated

EnglishDefenceLeague,theanti-immigrantandFlemish-secessionistBelgianVlaamsBlok,

theradicallynationalistHungarianJobbikparty,andGreecesostensiblyneo-NaziGolden

Dawnpartyareonlyahandfuloftheinfluentialextreme-rightpartiesthathave

commandedpublicandpoliticalattentioninEuropeinrecentyearsanddecades.27,32,33,30,

29,28AspoliticalscientistPiaKniggewrotein1998,Right-wingextremisminWestern

Europeis,ofcourse,notanewphenomenon.Forthemostpartofthepost-WorldWarII

erasupportforextremeright-wingpartieshasbeenmarginal.Theseparties,ifexistentat

all,remainedlargelyoutsidethepoliticalarena.Yet,startinginthe1980s,anewpatternor

trendappearedtomanifestitselfinthisregard.Newextremeright-wingpartiesemerged

rathersystematicallythroughoutthemajorWesternEuropeancountries.17Allvirulentin


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rhetoricyetelectorallyandlegislativelysuccessfultovaryingdegrees,theseparties

neverthelessrepresentacleartrendinEuropeanpoliticsandacauseforconcernamongst

mainstreampartiesforcedtorespondtotheircontributionstothenationalandcontinental

conversation.AsthereexistsomeinstitutionssuchastheguerrillaEnglishDefence

Leaguethatarenotactuallydesignedtobefunctioningpoliticalpartiesasmuchas

vehiclesofpoliticalagencyandactivism,itshouldbenotedthatincontrasttheFrench

NationalFrontisanestablishedandlegitimatepoliticalparty.Likemanyotherparties

acrossEurope,scholarssuchasMattGolderhavecategorizedtheFNasapopulistextreme-

rightparty.QuotingCanovan(1994),Golderassertsthatthesepartiesaredifferentiated

frompartiesofthemainstreamrightinsofarastheirpopularismmakesthemadvocatesof

directdemocracy[that]claimlegitimacyonthegroundsthattheyspeakforthepeople:

thatistosay,theyclaimtorepresentthedemocraticsovereign,notasectionalinterest

suchasaneconomicclass.12Othercharacteristicsagreeduponbyscholarsthatseparate

theextreme-rightfromthemainstreamrightincludedistinguishingfactorssuchas

embeddednotionsofinequalityandsocialhierarchy(oftenexpressedintermsofethnic

andculturalnationalism)andabaseofsupportdrawnmostlyfromthelower-,working-,

andmiddle-class.3,30QuotingChristopherHusbands,RobertW.JackmanandKarinVolpert

(1996)specifythatWhatunitesallofthesepartiesistheirparticularcommitmentto

somesortofethnicexclusionismahostilitytoforeigners,immigrants,ThirdWorld

asylum-seekers,andsimilarout-groupsaswellasaggressivenationalismorlocalism.14

Finally,andmostcruciallyforthispaper,extreme-rightpartieshaveandsharea

willingnesstoworkwithinextantpoliticalframeworksinordertoachievetheirgoals.30

PartiesliketheNationalFrontareneitherrevolutionarynoraretheyephemeral,flash


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parties,asMichaelS.Lewis-Beckdescribesshort-livedpartiesthataimtodisruptand

disband,ratherthanparticipateinthepoliticalprocessoverthelong-term.22Theselast

characteristicsareofparamountimportancebecauseitisonlywithintheconfinesofan

electoralinfrastructurebothutilizedandconsideredlegitimatethatwecanthoroughly

examinethefactorsthatcontributedtotheriseinFNvotesharebetweenthe2007and

2012presidentialelections,aswewilldoafterreviewingaselectionofrelevantliterature.

III.LITERATUREREVIEW

Aspreviouslymentioned,theliteratureonextreme-rightvotingisdiverseand

contradictory,aswellasincomplete.Diverseintermsofmethodology,regionalfocus,and

levelofanalysis,contradictorywithrespecttowhatitconcludesupontacklingsomeofthe

mostfundamentalquestionsofthefield,andincompleteinthesensethatthereisalways

moreworktobedoneinordertoclarifytheaforementioned.Beforeintroducingmyown

workandfindingsIwillreviewandcommentuponrelevantliteraturewithrespecttothe

following:

Methodology/regionalfocus/levelofanalysisoftheliterature:

Althoughtheparticularstrengthsandweaknessesofmyresearchdesignwillbe

describedinmoredetailinSectionV,itisworthstatingatthisjuncturethatnoscholarsin

thereviewedliteraturestructuredtheirworkasIstructuredmine:asafirstdifferences

regressiononanintranational,subregionallevel,whichistosayasamodeldesignedto

detectmeaningfulrelationshipsbetweenthechangesinthedependentandindependent

variablesovertime.Instead,utilizingavarietyofresearchdesignsoncross-national,


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subregional,andindividual(survey)levels,authorsexploredtheeffectsofeconomic

factorslikeunemploymentandinflationrates,socialfactorslikethepresenceof

immigrants,andpoliticalfactorslikeelectoraldistrictmagnitudeandpeoplessatisfaction

withthecurrentpoliticalregimeonsupportforextreme-rightparties.Allworkinthe

reviewedliteraturedealsexclusivelyacrossandwithinthecountriesofEurope,andall

resultsaretheproductsoftheeachauthorsuniqueanalyticalmodels,data,andsetof

assumptions.Therefore,whilealiteraturereviewisusefulincontextualizingtheworkof

thispaper,thereadershouldkeepinmindtheaforementionedqualificationsandrecognize

thattheliteratureonextreme-rightvotinginEuropeis,likeallacademicwork,neither

completenordefinitivelyconclusive.

Theoreticalbackgroundsandresultsoftheliterature:

Whenanalyzingtheeffectsofeconomicfactorsonextreme-rightvoting,most

scholarsworkingonanylevelofaggregatedatachooseatleasttheunemploymentrateas

anoperationalizablevariable.InTheecologicalcorrelatesofright-wingextremismin

WesternEurope(1998),PiaKniggeemploysapooledtime-seriescross-sectionalresearch

designacrosssixWesternEuropeancountriesbetween1984and1993inordertoexamine

therelativestrengthofthreepopularexplanationsofcontemporaryright-wing

extremism:theimpactofeconomicconditions(unemploymentandinflation),social

developments(immigration),andpoliticaltrends(publicsdissatisfactionwiththepolitical

regime).Usinglatentpublicsupportforpartiesoftheextreme-rightratherthanactual

electoraloutcomes(i.e.intentiontovoteforanextreme-rightparty)asherdependent

variable,Kniggefindsthatrisinglevelsofimmigrationandpublicdissatisfactionwiththe


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politicalregimesignificantlyfacilitateright-wingextremismandthat,contrarytothe

initialhypothesisresultssuggestthatadecliningnationaleconomy(unemploymentin

particular)diminishestheelectoralappealofextremeright-wingparties.Basingher

hypothesisthataseconomicconditionsworsen,WesternEuropeancitizensaremore

likelytolendtheirsupporttoextremeright-wingpartiesontheworkofLewis-Beck

(1988)andPowellandWhitten(1993),Kniggeassumesthatifconditionsofstableprices

andlowunemploymentaremet,theincumbentpartyorcandidateisrewarded.Iftheyare

not,votersinsteadsupporttheopposition,embodiedbyextreme-rightpartiesinWestern

Europe[that]havebeenexcludedfromparticipationingovernmentatleastforthetime

frameconsideredinthepresentcase(i.e.,19841993).17

ForKnigge,avotefortheextreme-right(or,specifically,theintentiontosupportthe

extreme-right)isanactofprotestagainstmainstreampartiesseentohavemismanaged

theeconomy.Aquestioncanberaisedhere,however:wouldanincumbentextreme-right

partyfacethesamethreatofgettingvotedoutwhentheeconomyisunderperforming?

Whilenotanswereddirectly,bothKniggeandMarcelLubbers,writinginExtreme-right

votinginWesternEurope(2002),suggestthatvoterstreatextreme-rightparties

differentlythanmainstreampartiesinsofarasextreme-rightpartiesareviewedas

representativeofaninstitutionalizedopposition,andnotjustanominalone.Goingonand

drawingupontheoriesofeconomicinterestscoveredinBlalock(1967)andOlzak(1992),

Lubberswritesthatincountrieswherecompetitionforscarceresourcesintensifiesdueto

worseningeconomicconditionsoranincreasingnumberofimmigrants,socialgroupsare

morelikelytoperceivestrongercompetitionoverthesescarceresources.Becausepeople

arenotverylikelytoblametheirowngroup(in-group)fortheseincreasinglycompetitive


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circumstancestheyblameothers(i.e.,out-groups).Itispreciselythisnotionofblaming

out-groupswhichimmigrantscomposeandareplacedintothatformsthebasisof

extreme-rightpartyplatforms,leadingLubberstoencapsulatesuchsentimentinthedual

hypothesisthatIncountrieswheretheunemploymentlevelishigherandthenumberof

immigrantsislarger,supportforextremeright-wingpartiesisgreater.24Lubbersexpands

uponthislogicinanother2002paper,FrenchFrontNationalvoting:amicroandmacro

perspective,wherehewritesthat,onthebasisofRealisticConflictTheory,manual

workersaremorelikelytovotefortheFrontNationalbecausemanualworkersmay

perceiveastrongercompetitivethreatfromethnicminoritiesthanotheroccupational

categories,asimmigrantsfirstandforemostoperateinthesamelabormarketsegmentas

manualworkersdo(Thave2000).Here,beingorsimplyperceivingtobethreatened

byan[ethnicallydistinct]otherisreasontosupporttheextreme-right,thepartythat

categoricallyblamesnationalout-groupsforacountryswoes,andthusLubbersonceagain

ultimatelyhypothesizesthatastheunemploymentlevelisanindicatoroftheeconomic

situationinaregion(Olzak1992),weexpectagainthatinregionswheretheunemployment

levelishigherorwhereunemploymentincreasesstronglypeoplearemorelikelytovotefor

theFrontNational.Goingontoanalyzebothindividuallevelandcontextual(i.e.regional

onthelevelofthedpartement)predictorsofNationalFrontvoting,Lubberssupports

Kniggeinfindingnodirecteffectofunemploymentontheregionallevel,althoughhedoes

findsmallindirecteffectssuchthathigherunemploymentlevelsevokeamore

unfavorableattitudetowardsethnicout-groups,astrongeridentificationwithFranceanda

strongerauthoritarianattitude,whichinturnincreasesthelikelihoodofavoteforthe

FrontNational.Whilealsofindingthatthenumberofethnicimmigrantsdoeshavea


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directeffect[onsupportfortheFN]insofarasthemoreimmigrants[that]liveinaregion,

thestrongerthesupportforLePen,heconcedesthatbreakingdowntheregionallevelof

analysishassometimesledtodifferentoutcomes,andthatwhenthereisnocontrolfor

compositionaleffects,[the]findingsarenotveryvalid.25

InEconomicsandtheFrenchVoter:AMicroanalysis(1983),MichaelS.Lewis-Beck

revealsthatanaggregatelevelregressionmodelexaminingtheeffectsofeconomic

conditionsonvotinginlegislativeelectionsinapreviouspaperofhis(Lewis-Beckand

Bellucci[1982])[indicated]thatincreasesintheunemploymentratesignificantly

[enhanced]thevoteshareoftheLeft.Insertingthesefindingsintoalargerdiscussion,he

assertsthatitisnotreallysurprisingthattheunemployedshouldvotefortheleft,

becausesuchavotemightbemadeonstrictpolicygroundsthatis,votersmaybelieve

thattheLeft,perhapsbecauseofitsworkingclassbase,ismorelikelytoinitiateprograms

thatwillreduceunemployment.Ultimately,his1983workconcludesthatonanindividual

level,themoreeconomicmalcontentsthereare,themoreLeftistvotesareexpected.This

isatodds,however,withthepreviouslydiscussedliteraturethatpredictsanincreasein

votesharefortherightspecificallytheextreme-rightinbadeconomictimes.Sucha

contradictionrevealsnotonlytheunderdevelopedcausalscenariowithinLewis-Becks

ownwork(whereinheadmitsthat,Ifonethinksaboutit,therearemanyreasonswhy

Frenchcitizensmightnottaketheirpersonaleconomicsituationintoaccountwhen

decidinghowtovote,suchasiftheyfailtoperceivetheirdeterioratingeconomic

circumstance,and,eveniftheydo,decidetoblameothersinsteadofelectedofficials),but

alsotheamountofcontradictionpresentthroughouttheliteratureonextreme-right

voting.21Whatarewetomakeofthesevaryingconclusions?AsMattGolderwrites,The


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problemisthateconomicvotingtheoriesfocusonhowincumbentpoliticalpartiesare

rewardedorpunishedfortheireconomicperformance.Theydonotexplainwhyvoters

whowishtopunishincumbentpartiesshouldvoteforextreme-rightpartiesoveranyother

oppositionparty.12Despitetheeducatedguessesofsomescholars,Golderiscorrectin

sayingthatwehavenounambiguous,theoreticalscenariothatpredictswhereonthe

ideologicalpartyspectrumweshouldexpectvoterstoturninrejectionofanincumbent

partyshandlingoftheeconomy.

Throughouttheliterature,andparticularlywithaneyetrainedonthepostulated

effectsoftheeconomy(throughtheavatarofunemployment)onextreme-rightvotingas

wehavehadsofar,onecanobservetheconflatingofeconomictensionswithsocialones

suchasthepresenceofimmigrants.Indeed,recallthatLubbersputthetwotogetherinone

hypothesiswhenheclaimedthatsupportforextreme-rightpartiesishigherincountries

withhighunemploymentandahighnumberofimmigrants.Manyauthorsconcur,and

overwhelminglytheliteraturesuggeststhathigherimmigrationisassociatedwithhigher

levelsofsupportforextreme-rightparties.Thisspeakstothefactthat,inthewordsofPaul

Hainsworth,immigrationistheextreme-rightsissueparexcellence,ortheissuethrough

whichallothermeasuresofsupportforextreme-rightpartiesarechanneled.14HildeCoff,

authorofFertilegroundsforextremeright-wingparties:ExplainingtheVlaamsBloks

electoralsuccess(2007),agrees,addingthatifanysingleissuedominatestodays

extremeright-wingplatforms,thenitiscertainlytheissueofimmigration.Coffsupports

suchastatementbyreviewingsomeofthesametheoreticaljustificationcoveredby

Lubbers,suchastheoriesofeconomicinterestandconflicttheory.Illustratingthe

inconclusivenessofallaspectsoftheliteratureonextreme-rightvoting,Coffultimately


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claimsonlythatthepresenceofimmigrantsmayfacilitate[extreme-rightparties]

electoralgrowth(italicsmine),citingopposingtheoriestothehigherimmigration,higher

extreme-rightvotescenariolikethosediscussedbyW.D.Chapin(1997)andPascal

Perrineau(1997),whichclaimthatpeoplewholiveinclosecontactwithimmigrantsmay

actuallydevelopmorepositivefeelingstowardsthemthanthosewhodonot.CitingP.

Martin(1998),Coffalsodescribesadissentingtheorywhereinanegativerelation

betweenthepresenceofimmigrantsandextremerightvotingmayalsooccurifpeoplewho

arehostiletowardsforeignersleaveplaceswheremanyimmigrantsliveandconcentratein

jurisdictionswithfewerforeigners.Shecouchesbothclaims,however,bysayingsuch

theorieshavelimitedempiricalsupport.4a

If,then,itismorewidelyacceptedthatimmigrantsdocontributetohigherlevelsof

supportforextreme-rightparties,whatisthenatureofsucharelationship?Thesituation,

accordingtoscholarslikeSchainandLubbers,isthatimmigrantsareseenasrepositories

theultimateout-groupsforthewoesofavotingcommunitywillingtoscapegoatthem

inlieuofblamingmembersoftheirownin-group.Extreme-rightpartiesplayintothisin

obviousways,asimmigrantissuesprovideaneasy,visiblefoundationuponwhichagreat

dealoftheirplatformiserected.Oneonlyneedstoreadmediacoverageofanextreme-

rightpartyscampaignorattendarallyinordertoseetheco-optionandpropagationof

suchanissueinaction.Lostintheimmigrationastheextreme-rightissueparexcellence

mix,however,arethemorenuanced,causalexplanationsofextreme-rightvoting,whichis

oneofthereasonswhypoliticalsciencethattriestobreakdownsuchaphenomenoninto

smaller,quantifiablepiecesissovaluable.Onarhetoricallevel,however,immigration

dominates,andletusnotbemistakenthatindeedimmigrationisasignificantcomponent


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ofextreme-rightvoting.Butwhatisreallygoingonhere?InExplainingVariationinthe

SuccessofExtremeRightPartiesinEurope(2003),MattGolderwrites,Althoughthe

successof[extreme-right]partiesiscommonlyassociatedwithhighlevelsof

unemploymentandimmigration,thecausalstoryremainsambiguous.Dovoterssupport

extreme-rightpartiesbecauseimmigrantsnegativelyaffecttheirmaterialwell-beingor

becauseimmigrantsposeathreattotheirnationalidentity,culture,andwayoflifemore

generally?12Furthermore,doesthereexistsomeimmigrantthresholdwherein

immigrantsizeturnsintoimmigrantrejection,asGallyaLahavquestionsinOpposition

toImmigration:Self-InterestorPublicInterest?(2003)?19Tothatpoint,isitalwaysthe

casethathigherlevelsofimmigrationproducehigherlevelsofsupportfortheextreme-

right,orcoulditbeasCoffandLahavwriteofsomesuggestingthatproximityto

immigrantsactuallydecreasesextreme-rightvotingbecauseimmigrantsarehumanized

andstereotypeseroded,pursuanttotheorieslikePerrineausaforementionedcontact

hypothesis?4a,19,15Whileitisoutsidethescopeofthispapersresearchtopursuethese

questionsindetail,theyneverthelessservetoinformandfilloutthecomplexitiesofissues

suchasimmigration,andcertainlymeritfurtherstudy.

Critiquingmanyoftheauthorshithertodiscussedinmethodologicaltermsand

recognizingtheinconsistenciesinmuchofthesameliteraturethatwehavereviewed(such

asthefactthatKnigge[1998]claimsthatunemploymentreducesthesupportforextreme-

rightparties,whereasJackmanandVolpert[1996]concludetheopposite),MattGolders

ExplainingVariationintheSuccessofExtremeRightPartiesinEurope(2003)examines

theeffectofelectoralinstitutions,unemployment,andimmigrationonthesuccessof

extreme-rightpartiesacross19countriesandover165elections.Amongtheauthors


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variousfindingsisthatimmigrationhasapositiveeffecton[extreme-right]parties

irrespectiveoftheunemploymentlevel,[and]unemploymentonlymatterswhen

immigrationhishigh.Procedurallyenablingthelatterfindingistheconstructionofan

interactionvariablebetweenimmigrationandunemploymentdesignedtoanalyzewhathe

callsthematerialisthypothesis,whichstatesthat,Unemploymentincreasesthevotefor

extreme-rightpartieswhenimmigrationishigh.Unemploymentdoesnotaffect(orlowers)

thevotesharereceivedbyextreme-rightpartieswhenimmigrationislow.Highly

emphasizingthisinteractionvariable,GoldercriticizesauthorslikeJackmanandVolpert

fornotincludingitintheirmodels,fortonotdosoistoassumethatunemployment

causesindividualstovoteforextreme-rightpartiesinanunconditionalway,whichhe

viewsasfallaciousduetothefactthattheeconomicvotingliteratureprovidesnoevidence

whyhigherlevelsofunemploymentwouldcausepeopletovoteforextreme-rightparties

overanyother.12Aswehavediscussedonlyvarioustheoreticalreasonsthatcouldordo

notcompelapersontovoteforeithertherightorleftunderconditionsofhigh

unemployment(withoutconcludinganythingsubstantive),itshouldbenotedherethat

Golderusesthewordevidence,whichheiscorrectinsayingispresentneitherherenor

intheliteraturereviewedinhiswork.

Inhispaper,Golderfindsempiricalsupportforthesynthesisofunemploymentand

immigration(intheformofaninteractiontermbasedonhismaterialisthypothesis)

increasingthevoteshareforextreme-rightparties,observingthat,Unemploymentonly

increasesthevoteshareofpopulist[extreme-right]partieswhentherearelargenumbers

offoreignersinthecountry.ItshouldbenotedherethatGolderiscarefultodistinguish

populistextreme-rightpartiesfromneo-fascistonesinhiswork,fortheinteractiontermis


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onlystatisticallysignificantwithrespecttotheformer.12AsGolderandothersdesignate

theNationalFrontapopulistextreme-rightparty,nofurtherdiscussiononthedistinction

suitsourpurposes.DiscussingGoldersmaterialisthypothesisaswellasitsinverseinthe

formofPerrineauscontacthypothesis(moreimmigrants,lesssupportfortheextreme-

right),DavidJesuitandVincentMahlerwriteinElectoralSupportforExtremeRight-Wing

Parties:ASubnationalAnalysisofWesternEuropeanElectionsinthe1990sthatmost

workpursuingeitherhypothesishasbeenbasedonnational-levelstudiesandnote,Of

therelativelyfewempiricalstudiesthathavebeenconductedattheregionallevel,none

hasfoundanunambiguouslinkbetweenimmigrationand[extreme-rightvoting].The

authorscitetheexampleofTerriGivensinTheRoleofSocio-EconomicFactorsinthe

SuccessofExtremeRightParties(2002)findingalinkbetweenahighnumberof

immigrantsandsupportfortheextreme-rightinAustrianandFrenchregionsbutnotin

GermanstatesbeforeadditionallycitingCassMuddesobservationthatthereisan

absenceofaclearcutrelationbetweenthenumberofimmigrantsandtheelectoral

successof[extreme-rightparties]incertainterritorialunits.Reviewingwell-worn

componentsofeconomicvotingliteraturesuchasthetheoryofincumbentpunishment

duringeconomicdownturnsandthequestionofwhyvoterswouldthenturntothe

extreme-rightovertheleft(whosesocialdemocraticparties,itispointedout,havealways

beenthepartiesoffullemployment),JesuitandMahlerdeemGoldersmaterialist

hypothesistheapproachthatismostconsistentwiththepoliticalrhetoricoftheextreme

right,whichoftenblamesnegativeeconomicconditiononforeignmigrants.15

TosingularlycreditGolderwiththisinsightwouldbetoerr,however,because

althoughhemayhavebeentheonetoformalizeandpopularizetheideasencapsulatedin


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hismaterialisthypothesisheisnotthefirsttohighlightanexusbetweenextreme-right

votingandtheconditionalpresenceofimmigrantsandhighunemployment.Citingthe

wellchosenwordsofNonnaMeyerwhosaidthatbehindtheveryrealcrispationover

immigrationishiddenthedramaofunemployment,itwasMichaelS.Lewis-Beckwho

continuedontostateinFrenchElectoralTheory(1993)thatunemploymentappearsto

dependforitseffectuponthelevelofimmigration.In[dpartements]withfewimmigrants,

[a]highunemploymentratedoesnotreallyincreaseFNsupport.However,asthenumber

ofimmigrantsincreases,theimpactfromunemploymentintensifies.Inotherwords,the

presenceofunemployment,byitself,doesnotyieldsignificantlymoreFNvotingItis

unemploymentcoupledwithimmigrationthatmotivatesNationalFrontsupport.Claiming

thatthepsychologicalmechanismforsuchaninteractioneffectseemsstraightforward,

Lewis-Beckassertsthatvotersinregionswithahighnumberofimmigrantsbelievethat

immigrantscauseunemployment,anattributionencouragedbyapopular[Jean-Marie]

LePenslogan,twomillionunemployed=twomillionimmigrants.Thus,forthese

voters,hecontinues,theunemploymentproblemissolvedbyaballotfortheNational

Front,whichproposesharshimmigrationcontrols.HefurthercreditsPerrineau(1988)

forsurveyevidencethatFNvotersdoindeedoverwhelminglymakethispsychological

attribution,strengtheninghisargument.InFrenchElectoralTheory(1993),Lewis-Beck

looksatthethreesocialcleavagesofclass,religion,andideology(basinghisfirstoftwo

researchdesignsonindividuallevelsurveydata)andthenseekstoevaluatetheissue-base

ofFNsupportbyanalyzingimmigration,crime,andunemploymenttheissueshesays

areconsistentlyjudgedtrsimportantbybothsurveysandjournalisticaccountsonthe

aggregateleveloftheFrenchdistrict(inhiscase,thedpartement).Measuringtheseissues


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upagainstthedependentvariableofFNvotesharereceivedinthe1986French

parliamentaryelectionsperdpartement,hesayshisaggregatelevelworkisdesignedto

avoidsurveydatasinherentproblemofonlyrevealingwhatvoterssaid,notwhatthey

did.Operationalizingtheeffectsofthenumberofimmigrants,crimesagainstpersonsper

1,000inhabitants,andtheunemploymentrate(allperdpartement)onthedependent

variableandincludinganinteractiontermunemploymentXimmigration,Lewis-Beckfinds

strong,positivecorrelationsforimmigrationandcrime,asurprisinglyweakbutstill

positivecorrelationforunemployment,andstrongsupportfortheinteractionof

unemploymentandimmigration,whosepositivecoefficientishighlystatistically

significant.Ultimately,hesayshismodelrevealsthat,Constituencieswithhighcrime

rates,andapronouncedimmigrantpresenceinthemidstofelevatedunemployment,are

fertilegroundforNationalFrontrecruiters.22

Whilecrimehasbeenlargelyabsentfromtheliteratureandresearchdesignswe

havereviewedthusfar,Lewis-Becksinclusionofthevariablespeakstoitsrelevancetothe

issueofextreme-rightvoting.InFertilegroundsforextremeright-wingparties:Explaining

theVlaamsBlokselectoralsuccess(2007),HildeCoffagreesthattherelationship

betweencrimeandextremerightperformancehasrarelybeenstudiedempirically,yet

callscrimeacentraltopicofextremeright-parties,particularlyforthepartyofherfocus,

theBelgianVlaamsBlok.Despiteitsrelativelackofscholarship,Coffhypothesizesthat

crimehasasignificanteffectonthesuccessoftheextremerightparties.Interestingly,

however,inherstudyshefindsthatcrimedoesnotdeterminetheelectoralsuccessofthe

VlaamsBlokonamunicipallevel.4aAlthoughthetwoaforementionedauthorsexamineit,

furtherstudyofcrimeseffectonelectoralsupportforextreme-rightpartiesmeritsthe


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considerationofallscholarsduetothevariablesrhetoricalcentralityamongstsuch

factions.

Mycontributiontotheliterature:

Clearly,therearesignificantgapstofillacrosstheentiretyofthescholarshipon

extreme-rightvoting.Inadditiontocompletingmoreresearchoncrimeseffectonsupport

fortheextreme-right,thereismoreworktobedoneontheunresolvedissueofwhyvoters

wouldchooseonepartyoveranothergivenapooreconomy,aswellasinformingamore

completeunderstandingofwhatwemeanwhenwediscusstheeconomyseffecton

extreme-rightvoting.JesuitandMahler,forexample,admitthattherehasbeenlittleeffort

todeterminewhethernegativeeconomicconditionsotherthanunemployment,either

aloneorinconjunctionwithhighimmigration,areassociatedwithsupportfor[extreme-

rightparties]suchashigherpovertyorincomeinequality.15Whilstincomplete,thesum

oftheextantliteratureisenoughtoaidandinformadditionalstudiesofextreme-right

votingacrossanylevelsandregionsofanalysis.Tothisend,althoughmyresearchdraws

theoreticallyonallofthereviewedliterature,itspecificallyreliesuponthesubregional

workofMichaelS.Lewis-BeckinFranceandthecross-nationalworkofMattGolder,both

ofwhomhaveparticularlycontributedtoourunderstandingoftheinteractiveeffectsof

unemploymentandimmigration.Unlikethetwoauthorscross-sectionalresearchdesigns,

however,myworkemploysafirstdifferencesdesigninordertocapturetheeffectsof

changingvariableswithinaspecificperiodoftime.Theadvantagesofthismodelwillbe

elucidatedinSectionV.Itiswithalloftheaforementionedinmindthatwemoveontoa

reviewoftheincorporateddata.


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IV.DATA

Dependentvariables:Mydependentvariableisthechangeinvotesharereceivedbythe

NationalFrontbetweenthe2007and2012presidentialelections(FNchange0712=%

voteshare2012%voteshare2007)perdpartement.Dataforbothyearswerecollected

fromtheNorwegianSocialScienceDataServicesEuropeanElectionandReferendum

Database,whichwereinturnsourcedfromtheCentrededonnessocio-politiquesatthe

Institutd'tudespolitiquesdeParis(SciencesPo).8TheFrenchdpartementisoneofthree

levelsofgovernmentbelowthenationallevel,betweenthergionandthecommune.

Rgionscontainsdpartementsanddpartementscontaincommunes.MainlandFrance

(which,asmentionedpreviously,includestheislandofCorsica)contains96dpartements,

allofwhichareincludedinmydata.ExcludedarethefiveoverseasdpartementsofFrench

Guiana,Guadeloupe,Martinique,Runion,andMayotte,whicharealsoknownasoverseas

rgionsandhavethesamelegalstatusasbothmetropolitanequivalents.

Independentvariables:Myprimaryindependentvariableofinterestisthechangeinthe

unemploymentrateperdpartementbetween2007and2012(Unempchange0712=%

unemploymentrate2012%unemploymentrate2007).Otherindependentcontrol

variablesinvolvetheregionalpresenceofimmigrants,incidentsofcrime,andvarious

interactionvariables.Duetotheunavailabilityofimmigrationdataonthedpartemental

level,thepercentageofimmigrants(trangers,ornon-Frenchnationals)perdpartement

wascodedasavariablerangingbetween1and5;1associatedwithaverylow

percentageofimmigrantsinthatdpartementsrgion(lessthan3%),2withalow

percentageofimmigrants(3%to4%),3withmediumpercentageofimmigrants(4%to


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5%),4withhighpercentageofimmigrants(5%to8%),and5withaveryhigh

percentageofimmigrants(morethan8%)fortheyears2007and2012.Theactual

variable,then,isthecategoricalchangeinthepercentageofimmigrantsrepresentedby

eachdpartementscodedrgionalvariable(Immchange0712=codedimmigration

variable2012codedimmigrationvariable2007).Thecrimevariableisthechangein

reportedassaultcrimes(atteintesvolontairesl'intgritphysique)perdpartement

between2007and2011,theyearsforwhichdatawereavailable(Crimechange0712=

crimeperdpartement2011crimeperdpartement2007).

Inadditiontothesevariables,threeinteractiontermswerecreatedalongwitha

dummyvariable.Thedummyvariable,Immdummy,representsdpartementswithahigh

percentageofimmigrantsrelativetoothersinthebaseyearof2007.Eachdpartementwas

codedeither0or1,theformerifthedpartements[rgional]immigrationlevelwas

previouslycategorizedas3orbelow(lowimmigration)andthelatteriftheimmigration

levelwas4or5(highimmigration).Asevidentinthesummarystatisticsbelow,36%of

Frenchdpartementsin2007wereclassifiedashavinghighimmigration.Thisdummy

variableistheonlymeasureofhighimmigrationinthedataset,forthesummarystatistics

showthatthergionalpresenceofimmigrantsonlywentdownbetween2007and2012,a

trendcorroboratedbyjournalisticaccountsofimmigrationinFrancethatreferencethe

timeperiodathand.5Withrespecttotheinteractions,thefirsttwoincludethe

aforementioneddummyvariable:ImmdummyXunempchangeoperationalizestheeffect

ofchangingunemploymentonthechangeinFNvoteshareindpartementswithhigh

immigration,andImmdummyXcrimechangeoperationalizestheeffectofchangingcrime

onthechangeinFNvoteshareindpartementswithhighimmigration.Thethird


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interactionterm,ImmXunemp,measurestheeffectofchangingunemploymentin

dpartementswithchanginglevelsofimmigration.Allimmigrationdata,toreiterate,are

measuredonthelevelofeachdpartementsrgion.

UnemploymentandimmigrationdatawerecollectedfromINSEE,theFrench

NationalInstituteofStatisticsandEconomicStudies(Institutnationaldelastatistiqueet

destudesconomiques),andcrimedatawerecollectedfromLaDocumentationfranaise,a

subsidiaryofDILA,theFrenchDirectorateofLegalandAdministrativeInformation

(Directiondel'informationlgaleetadministrative).1,2,4,6,18

Table1:SummaryandDescriptiveStatistics

Variable Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max.

VoteforFN2007 96 11.04792 3.144272 4.58 17.28VoteforFN2012 96 18.94292 4.441674 6.2 27.03Imm2007 96 2.885417 1.280377 1 5Imm2012 96 2.71875 1.335374 1 5Unemp2007 96 7.891667 1.600899 4.8 11.8

Unemp2012 96 9.722917 1.816154 6.2 14.4Crime07 96 4513.115 5999.926 237 33670Crime12 96 4875.115 6547.44 234 35750FNchange0712 96 7.895 1.572506 1.62 10.92Unempchange0712 96 1.83125 0.6207488 0.2999992 3.7Immchange0712 96 -0.1666667 0.3746343 -1 0Immdummy 96 0.3645833 0.4838397 0 1Crimechange0712 96 1.09207 0.0992172 0.9008572 1.371169ImmXunemp 96 -0.3302084 0.7695686 -2.900001 0ImmdummyXunempchange 96 0.5864583 0.8725787 0 3.2ImmdummyXcrimechange 96 0.3979343 0.5313959 0 1.3711569


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V.RESEARCHDESIGN

Asmentionedintheliteraturereview(SectionIII),myresearchisstructuredaround

aseriesoffirstdifferencesOLSregressionsdesignedtoassesstheeffectsofthechanges

inmyindependentvariablesonthechangeinmydependentvariable,thechangeinFN

voteshareperdpartementbetween2007and2012.Althoughprincipallyinterestedinthe

effectofthechangeinunemploymentonFNvoteshare,embodiedintheestimating

equation[FNvotesharedr=+1Unempdr+dr],Iwillcontrolfortheother

confoundingindependentvariablesmentionedaboveinSectionIV,embodiedand

emphasizedintheestimatingequation[FNvotesharedr=+1Unempdr+

2Immdummy07r+3UnempdrxImmdummy07r+4Crimedr+5Crimedrx

Immdummy07r+dr].Inadvanceofpresentingandanalyzingmyresults,itshouldbe

mentionedthattheyareconstrainedbythepowerandrefinementoftheirunderpinning

data.Duetoalackofavailabledataonthedpartementallevelorlower,myimmigration

dataareparticularlycoarse,measured(onceagain)asordinalvariablesontheaggregate

levelofthergion.Futureresearchwouldbenefitfromutilizingdatameasuredas

continuousvariablesonthelevelofthedpartement,forwhilesummarystatisticsshow

thatnorgionscoded1-5variableincreasedbetween2007and2012itcouldverywellbe

thatthepercentageofresidentimmigrantsincertaindpartementsdidincrease.An

additionallimitationtomyresearchdesignistheuseofassaultcrimeasaproxyforcrime

ingeneral,whichwasalsoduetoalackofotheravailabledata.Futureresearchcould

benefitfromdistinguishingtheeffectsofdifferenttypesofcrimesonelectoralsupportfor

theextreme-right.Concedingtheselimitations,myresearchdesignisnonetheless

strengthenedbyitsfirst-differencesconfiguration.Thisdesignmeasuresthechanges


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betweeneachvariable,thusnettingoutproblematiccompositionaleffects,orthe

characteristicsofeachdpartementthatdonotchange.Ihypothesizethefollowing:

H1:FNvoteshareandunemploymentarepositivelycorrelated,thusthechangeinFNvote

sharewillincreaseindpartementswithrisingunemployment.

H2:FNvoteshareandimmigrationarepositivelycorrelated,thusthechangeinFNvote

sharewillincreaseindpartementswithhigherpercentagesofimmigrants.

H3:FNvoteshareandcrimearepositivelycorrelated,thusthechangeinFNvotesharewill

increaseindpartementswithrisingcrime.

H4:TheeffectsofunemploymentandcrimeonFNvotesharearegreaterindpartements

withhighpercentagesofimmigrants,i.e.theinteractionofimmigrationwiththesevariables

leadstolargerFNvoteshare.


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VI.RESULTS

Table2:OrdinaryLeastSquares(OLS)Regressions

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

FNchange0712 FNchange0712 FNchange0712 FNchange0712 FNchange071VARIABLES

Unempchange0712 1.091*** 1.069*** 1.083*** 1.056*** 1.255*** (.310) (0.309) (0.319) (0.319) (0.301)Immchange0712 -0.336 -0.351 (0.270) (0.274) Crimechange0712 0.328 0.489 0.174 (1.411) 1.429 (1.272)Immdummy 0.791**

(0.288)Constant 5.897*** 5.881*** 5.554*** 5.369*** 5.119*** (0.644) (0.647) (1.514) (1.539) (1.394) N 96 96 96 96 96r 0.186 0.192 0.186 0.193 0.241 Standarderrorsinparentheses *p


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andpositiveeffectonFNvoteshare.Sincethechangeincrimeisnotsignificantlydifferent

than0itcannotbesaidtohaveaneffect.Controllingforboththechangeinimmigration

andthechangeincrimeincolumn4,thechangeinunemploymentstillexertsapositive,

statisticallysignificanteffectonthechangeinFNvoteshare.Thesignificance,however,has

fallenfromthe1%leveltothe5%level.Sincethechangeinimmigrationandthechangein

crimearenotsignificantlydifferentthan0,thevariablescannotbesaidtohaveaneffect.

Examiningthechangeinunemployment,thechangeincrime,andthedpartementswith

regionallyhighpercentagesofimmigrants(expressedbythedummyvariableImmdummy)

incolumn5,boththechangeinunemploymentandtheimmigrationleveldummyare

foundtobesignificant,thelatterresultwhichsuggeststhatitisalargepercentageof

immigrantsperrgionpersethatmeaningfullyinfluenceselectoralsupportforthe

extreme-right,asopposedtothefluctuationofimmigrantsfoundtobeinsignificantin

regressionmodels2and4.Thechangeinunemploymentisonceagainhighlystatistically

significantatthe1%level.Theimmigrationdummyvariableisassociatedwitha.791

(79%)increaseinFNvoteshareandissignificantatthe1%level.


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Table3:InteractionEffects

(1) (2) (3) (4) FNchange0712 FNchange0712 FNchange0712 FNchange0712

VARIABLES

Unempchange0712 1.091*** 0.688** 1.248*** 1.132** (0.310) (0.225) (0.293) (0.350)Immdummy -1.495 -5.089 (1.163) (2.933) ImmdummyXunempchange 1.297* (0.600) Crimechange0712 0.223 -1.729 0.584 (1.308) (1.338) (1.454)ImmdummyXcrimechange 5.383*

(2.628) Immchange0712 -1.777 (1.105)ImmXunemp 0.725 (1.105)Constant 5.897*** 6.1777*** 7.210*** 5.128*** (0.644) (1.373) (1.421) (1.612)N 96 96 96 96r 0.186 0.3 0.267 0.201

Standarderrorsinparentheses *p


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increasesinelectoralsupportfortheFNindpartementswithinhighimmigrantrgions,

comparedtothosewithinrelativelylowimmigrantrgions(reflectedin

Unempchange0712).ThissupportstheinteractioncomponentofMattGolder's"materialist

hypothesis"onasubregionallevel,andisthemainfindingofmyanalysis.Thecoefficientin

column2suggeststhat,givena1standarddeviationchangeinunemployment(.62),the

interactions(.68)(.62)+(1.3)(1)(.62)=1.23effectonFNvoteshareis81%largerin

magnitudethantheobservedeffectinareasoflowimmigration,(.68)(.62)=.42.Wecan

thinkofthecoefficientasstemmingfromtheequation:[FNvoteshare=6.2+.68

(Unempchange0712)1.4(Immdummy)+1.3(Immdummy)(Unempchange0712)],where

6.2istheconstantterm.Immdummy,capturingdpartementswithahighpercentageof

immigrantsnotexperiencingachangeinunemployment,failstoachievestatistical

significance,asdoesCrimechange0712.

Likecolumn2,themodelincolumn3oftable3includesUnempchange0712,

Immdummy,andCrimechange0712,butinsteadoftheinteractionbetweenhigh

immigrationandthechangeinunemploymentitcontainsaninteractionbetweenthe

dummyforhighimmigrationandthechangeincrime,ImmdummyXcrimechange.Boththis

interactionandUnempchange0712werefoundtohavepositivecoefficientsandbe

statisticallysignificant.Givena1standarddeviationchangeincrime(.099),the

interactions(-1.729)(.099)+(5.383)(1)(.099)=.361effectonFNvoteshareisabout

53.2%largerinmagnitudethantheobservedeffectinareasoflowimmigration

(representedbyCrimechange0712),(-1.729)(.099)=-.171.Theaboveispursuanttothe

followingequation:[FNvoteshare=7.21.729(Crimechange0712)5.089(Immdummy)+

5.383(Immdummy)(Crimechange0712)]where7.2istheconstantterm.Thecoefficientsof


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Immdummy(representingdpartementswithinhighimmigrantrgionsnotexperiencing

changingcrime)andCrimechange0712(representingdpartementswithchangingcrime

withinlowimmigrantrgions)arenotstatisticallysignificantandthuscannotbesaidtobe

differentthan0.

Aswehaveseenincolumns2and3oftable3,separateregressionsshowthatthe

interactionsbetweenchangingunemploymentandhighimmigration

(ImmdummyXunempchange)andchangingcrimeandhighimmigration

(ImmdummyXcrimechange)eachachievestatisticalsignificanceandcontributetorising

FNvoteshareindependentofoneanother.Thusanadditionalregressionmodel,notshown

above,wasdesignedtotestthesetwostatisticallysignificantinteractionstogether.

However,thedatadoesnothavesufficientvariationforbothinteractionstobeestimated.

Despitesuchinsufficientvariation,Inonethelessmaintainthatthechangein

unemployment(Unempchange0712)andthechangeincrime(Crimechange0712)

representtwodistincteffects,asthereexistsa-.22correlationcoefficientbetweenthetwo

variables.Giventheabove,wecanviewthestatisticalsignificanceoftheinteraction

betweenhighimmigrationandthechangeincrimeincolumn3oftable3asaninteresting,

yetnonethelesscomplementaryfindingwithrespecttoourprimaryresultofinterest,the

statisticallysignificantinteractionbetweenhighimmigrationandthechangein

unemploymentuncoveredincolumn2oftable3.

Incolumn4oftable3aregressionincludingUnempchange0712,Crimechange0712,

Immchange0712,andaconstructedinteractionvariablebetweenthechangein

immigrationandthechangeinunemployment(ImmXunemp)revealsthatonlythechange

inunemploymentattainedsignificance(atthe5%level).Thisfindingmayreflectthe


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coarsenatureoftheimmigrationvariable,whichdoesnotvarymuch.ThusagainIview

column2oftable3asthemainspecification.

Principally,andinsummation,thedatashowthattheinteractionbetweenchanging

unemploymentandhighregionallevelsofimmigrantsexertsthehighesteffectonFNvote

share,causingittorisebyavectorof1.23per1standarddeviationincreasein

unemployment.ThevariableImmdummyXunempchangecapturesthiseffect.Tolesser

degreesthechangeinunemploymentingeneral,theinteractionbetweenhighimmigration

andcrime,andhighimmigrationingeneralalsocontributedtotheriseinFNvoteshare.

ThevariablesUnempchange0712,ImmdummyXcrimechange,andImmdummycapture

theseeffects.AreviewofthestatedhypothesesinSectionVrevealsthatH1,H2,andH4

werecorrect.H3,whichpostulatedthatrisingcrimebyitselfwouldcontributetothe

Frenchextreme-rightvote,wasnotcorroboratedbythedata.Aspreviouslystated,

however,theinteractionofchangingcrimewithhighrgionalimmigrationdidhavea

positive,statisticallyeffectonelectoralsupportfortheNationalFront.

VII.CONCLUSION

Asthedatashow,interactionsmatter.Suchaconclusionbuildsupontheworkof

MichaelS.Lewis-BeckandMattGolder,andparticularlysupportsanamendedversionof

Golders2003materialisthypothesisonasubregionallevel.Theamendmentwemust

makereferstothefactthatwhileGolderconcludesthatimmigrationhasapositiveeffect

on[extreme-right]partiesirrespectiveoftheunemploymentlevel,[and]unemployment

onlymatterswhenimmigrationhishigh,ourdatashowthatunemploymentdoesnotonly

matterwhenimmigrationishigh,andinsteadexertsapositiveandstatisticallysignificant


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effectonFNvoteshareregardlessofthergionallevelofimmigration.12Itseffectissimply

enhancedbyaninteractionwithhighimmigration,byapproximately81%over

dpartementswithinlowimmigrantrgions.Interestingly,themostsalientinteractionterm

discoveredbyMichaelS.Lewis-BecktoaffectFNvotesharein1986,thatbetween

immigrationandcrime,wasnotours,andwhilestillpositivelycorrelatedhecalledthe

effectofourstrongestmotivatingforce,theinteractionbetweenimmigrationand

unemployment,surprisinglyweak.22

Consideringourresultsinthelightofthereviewedliterature,itappearsthat

subregionalmotivatorsofextreme-rightvotinglargelyconform,inmicrocosm,tothose

observedonthecross-nationalaggregatelevelinEurope.Thiswasatleastthecasein

Francebetween2007and2012.Whatcontinuestoeludescholars,however,isnotamore

variedpictureofextreme-rightvotingacrossdifferenttiersofanalysis;itisamore

universalconsensusastowhatdrivesthephenomenoninthefirstplace.Certainly,thereis

worktobedonetoimprovetheformer:asJesuitandMahlerobservedthatmostworkin

thefieldhasbeenbasedonnational-levelstudies,ithasbeenmygoaltoprogress

subregionalstudiesthroughtheanalysisofFrancebetweenitspasttwoelectioncycles.15

However,myfindingsultimatelycomeupagainstthemoreintractableandpermanent

problemsofthetheoreticalandempiricalcontradictionfoundrifethroughoutthe

literatureonextreme-rightvoting.WhileIcontributethefactthatunemployment,a

relativelyhighregionalpresenceofimmigrants,theinteractionbetweenhighimmigration

andunemployment,andtheinteractionbetweenhighimmigrationandcrimeincreasethe

extreme-rightvote,authorssuchasPiaKniggestillmaintainthatunemploymentdoesnot

matter,forexample,andothersmaintainthatevenifitdoes,thereisnoacceptable


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theoreticaljustificationforwhyvotersshouldturntotheextreme-rightoveranyother

partyintimesofeconomicdownturn.17

Itgoeswithoutsaying,then,thatfutureresearchandanalysisisnecessary.Mywork

wouldspecificallybenefitfrombeingredonewithmorerefinedimmigrationdata,soasto

moreaccuratelyrepresentthedpartementalelectoralreactiontochanginglevelsof

immigrants.Additionally,theeffectsofdifferentexpressionsofcrimeanddeclining

economicconditions(suchaspropertycrimeandlevelsofpoverty)couldbetestedsoasto

achieveamorenuancedunderstandingofthosetwophenomena.Overall,suchfuturework

wouldnotonlyservetoadvancethescholarlycommunityscomprehensionofextreme-

rightvoting,itwouldilluminateextreme-rightpartieschannelsofelectoralsupportforthe

edificationofallwhoareaffectedbytheirpolicies,bothdirectlyandindirectly.AsFrances

economicanddemographicgeographycontinuetoevolve,furtherscrutinyoftheregional

motivatorsoftheNationalFrontvoteandtheelectoralsuccessestheyportendwould

benefitpoliticians,policymakers,andprivatecitizensalike.

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economic voting and the national front: towards a subregional understanding of the extreme-right...

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