educating international security practitioners preparing to face the demands of the 21st century...

8/7/2019 Educating International Security Practitioners Preparing to Face the Demands of the 21st Century International Secu

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EDUCATING I NTERNATI ONAL SECURI TY PRACTI TI ONERS:PREPARI NG TO FACE TH E DEM ANDS OF THE 21st CENTURY

I NTERNATI ONAL SECURI TY ENVI RONM ENT

J ames M . Smi t h

Dan iel J . Kauf man

Rober t H . Dor f f

L in da P. Br ady

J ul y 2001


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ISBN 1-58487-056-7

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CONTENTS

Foreword. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

Chapter 1.

Educating I nternational Secur it y Practi t ioners:Preparing to Face the Demands of the 21st Centur yInternational Secur it y Envi ronment

James M. Smith. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Chapter 2.Mi li tary Undergraduate Secur it y Educat ionfor t he New Mil lennium

Daniel J. Kaufman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Chapter 3.

Professional Mil it ary Secur it y Education:The View from a Senior Service Col lege

Robert H . Robin Dorff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Chapter 4.Professional Schools of International Affairs:Preparing National Security Practitionersfor the 21st Century

Li nda P. Brady . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Chapter 5.Educating I nternational Secur it y Practi ti oners:The Role of Research Cent ers and Pr ofessionalOutreach Programs

James M. Smith. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

About the Authors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

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FOREWORD

The end of the Cold War brought chal lenges not only for pr act i t ioners of nat ional secur i typolicy and strategy but for those involved in the education and development of futurestrategic leaders and secur it y poli cy pract it ioners. One of t he primary cont r ibut ors to thi s

book, Professor James M. Smith of the U.S. Air Force Academy, launched this project ininitial conversations in 1996-97 with Brigadier General Daniel J. Kaufman of the U.S.Military Academy, Dr. Robert L. Wendzel of the Air War College, and Colonel Jeffrey D.McCausland of the U.S. Army War College. All four shared a concern about the future ofsecurity studies generally, but especially about the education and development of militaryoffi cers as fut ur e st rategic leaders.

The contributors to this book who were teaching and conducting research at militaryinst it ut ions saw a requir ement for more and bet ter secur it y and str ategy educat ion for seniorleaders following the end of the Cold War. They also saw a general national decline inemphasis and resources outside DoD, and a new operational focus within DoD that

threatened the delivery of that improved strategic focus. And they shared a vision of howtheir various levels and programs could come together to advance the continuingdevelopment of strategic leaders for the Army and the Air Force. They added a civilianperspect ive to expand t he focus to str ategic pract it ioners general ly.

This book contains the results of their reflection and analysis. The authors examine,albeit generally, the challenges of the 21st century international security environment towhich future strategic leaders and policy practitioners will need to respond. Morespecif ically, they offer t he reader insight s in to secur i ty studies and leadership developmentat their respective levels (military undergraduate, civilian undergraduate, traditional andnontraditional graduate, and senior military officer) and institutions (including researchcent ers and professional out reach programs). The goal is to inform a broader audience aboutwhat is cur rent ly being done to educate st rategic pract it ioners at these vari ous insti tut ions,and what might need to be done differently or better. The Strategic Studies Institute ispleased to offer this publication in the hope that i t wi ll st imulate others to think about howwe can work t oward t he cont inual improvement of our educati onal ini t iat ives to prepare thestudents of t oday (at al l levels) to assume the strategic leadership r oles of t omorr ow.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.Di rector

Strategic Studies Insti t ute

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CHAPTER 1

EDUCATI NG I NTERNAT I ONAL SECURIT Y PRACTITI ONERS:PREPARIN G TO FACE TH E DEM ANDS OF TH E 21st CENTURY

I NTERNATIONAL SECURI TY ENVIRONMENT

J ames M . Smi t h

In 1984 Theodore J. Crackel wrote, in an insightful article in the journal, The PublicInterest,

American mi l i tary educati on has at i ts heart two crucial processesthe mak ing of l ieutenantsand the making of colonels. How we prepare young men to lead others int o batt le, and how we en-sure that t hose who assume the highest commands are well -quali fied, are issues that must beaddressed with utmost ser iousness, because fai lure here can have the gravest consequences.

1

Crackels point was made for t he Cold War-era mi l i tary, and i ts focus was couched in t erms ofpreparat ion for operat ional command. But the art icles broadened essence r ings tr ue today:educating junior officers to assume their central roles in international security policyimplementation and educating senior officers for their international security policyformulation and oversight roles are the bookends of the cross-career development ofCommanders, Chiefs, Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs), and Chairmen. Making lieutenantsincludes establishing a solid foundation of knowledge and skills in international securityupon whi ch t he offi cer can bui ld across a career . And making colonels involves synthesizingtheir accumulated experiences and preparing them to take the next step up to active roleswi thin t he internati onal secur it y poli cy process.

General (Retired) John R. Galvin both underscored and expanded on that theme in hiscall for the creat ion of str ategists wit hin the U.S. mil it ary.

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We need str ategists. In the Army and throughout the services. At all levels. We need senior gen-erals and admi rals who can provide soli d mil itary advice to our poli t ical leadership, and we needyoung offi cers who can provide soli d mi l i tary adviceopt ions, detail s, the result s of analy sistothe generals and admi rals. We need mi l i tary strategists, offi cers, all up and down t he line, be-cause it takes a junior strategist to implement what the senior strategist wants done, and it(usually) takes the input of juniors to help a senior strategist arrive at his conclusions.

3

Lieutenant General Richard Chilcoat further defined the competencies required of

Crackels colonel, Galvins senior strategist, by defining the requirements to become amaster of t he st rategic art . He defined strategic art as:

The ski llful formulati on, coordinati on, and appl icati on of ends (objectives), ways (courses of ac-ti on), and means (supporting resour ces) to pr omote and defend the national i nterests.

4[emphasis

added]

Mastery of t hat st rategic art , then, requir es the complete int egrati on and combination of thethr ee roles per formed by the complete str ategist: str ategic leader, str ategic practi ti oner, and

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strategic theorist.5

The strategic leader coordinates ends, ways, and means; the strategicpractitioner applies ends, ways, and means; while the strategic theorist formulates ways,ends and means, all to ful fi ll the requir ements of U .S. nati onal secur it y.

And Galvin reaffirms the requirement to begin the preparation of strategists from the

very beginning of an officers military career. He states:

We need to agree that str ategy is not an elect ive of the lat er years of an offi cer s careerthatwork in th is fi eld needs to begin ear ly. The li eutenant does not have to be a strat egist , but hemust be aware that what he is absorbing wi ll contr ibute to a knowledge of tact ics and opera-t ional art consti tut ing milestones on the way to abil it y in the field of strategy.

6

So i t is clear t hat we need to bui ld deep and broad pol i t ical-mi l it ary competencies towardthe development of str ategists. This was t rue to a greater degree than at any ear li er t ime inhistory at the height of the Cold War when every military action had profound politicalimplications and potentially catastrophic consequences. It was even truer in the late 1980swhen the provisions of Goldwater-Nichols placed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

and to only a slight ly lesser degree the regional CINCs, in dir ect poli t ical-mi li tary advisoryroles to the National Command Authority. And it is most true today in the face of thedynamic ambiguit ies of t he post-Cold War in ternati onal secur it y envir onment, where somehave seen the key to success as having commanders who are thinkers over doers. Thisanalysis might take that a step further to claim that the requirement is for thinkingdoersofficers who are at once operationally expert and politically competentfor truemasters of str ategy.

The foll owing four chapters present a range of pr oposals, each addr essing a specifi c levelor dimension of preparing strategists. The monographs were chartered to address thecoincidence of increasing requirements for international security practitioner competencies

particularly within the U.S. military officer corpsand a decline in both participation andemphasis in the civilian academic and research security studies sector. The monographswere presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association inWashington, DC, in 1999. Together t hey address the formal pr ofessional mi li tary educationof l ieut enant s and colonels, and they also address the cont r ibut ions to st rategist pr eparat ionfound in civilian security education programs and in security research and outreacheducation.

Br igadier General Daniel J . Kaufman, Professor and Head of West Point s Department ofSocial Sciences when he wrote this paper and now West Points Dean, begins by addressingthe strategist preparation of lieutenants and other junior to mid-ranking officers. Heoverviews foundat ional educati on in in ternat ional secur it y studies as providi ng the base for

a li fet ime of service ranging from li eutenant to li eutenant general. To buil d that foundati on,West Point provides secur i ty education and exper ience to thr ee target audiences: the ent ir egraduat ing class of cadets each year who receive a broad grounding in secur i ty studies; thesubset of cadets who choose to major in, or t ake electi ve cour ses in, subjects such as poli t icalscience, regional studies, and economicscour ses that all relate in depth to secur i ty studies;and, signi ficant ly, the group of mid-ranking facul ty who return to the Army each year aft ercompleting a graduate degree in and gaining several years of advanced immersion insecurity affairs. This final group is ready to move into command or specialist positions

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directly advising senior leadership. West Point, then, provides foundational securityeducat ion very closely consistent wi th t he Galvi n model of str ategist development .

Professor Robert Robin Dorff, U.S. Ar my War College Department of Nat ional Secur i tyand Strategy, addresses taki ng t he experienced colonels the last few steps toward effect ivepract ice of str ategy i n t he evolvi ng in ternati onal secur it y envir onment. The senior servicecol lege provides specifi c preparat ion for senior leadership and staff secur it y policy posit ions.Its primary focus is on transitioning these colonels from operational-level thinking toembrace the strategic perspect ive. I t also adapts them to the new face of st rategic secur i typractice by exposing them in detail to joint and senior civilian practitioners. The focus ofeducat ion here is direct ly modeled on t he Chi lcoat concept of str ategic mastery, wi th specifi ccour ses on strategic leadership, str ategy, and pract ice.

It is critical to prepare both lieutenants and colonels, but strategist preparation alsorequires less formal mentorship (Chilcoats strategic theorists required competenciesinclude teaching and mentoring the strategic art), as well as self-study across an officersent ir e mil it ary career. As Galvin put it , A look at history wil l show that highly motivated

self-development is the keyto producing the best strategists. We need to foster and nurturethis.

7One fundamental requirement to such support and nurturing is the provision of

oppor tuni t ies and materials.

Professor Linda Brady, Director of The Sam Nunn School of International Affairs,Georgia Institute of Technology, outlines both the contributions that civilian educationprograms can make to helping prepare international security practitioners and thecontributions the civilian academic sector can make to defining and developing the field ofstudy. Programs such as hers are adapting their curriculum content to changes in theinternat ional secur it y envir onment, adding emphasis on emerging int ernati onal actors suchas int ernat ional organizat ions, emerging secur i ty i ssues such as economics and technology,

and adding emphasis to nonmilitary instruments of strategy as these continue to gainprominence in post-Cold War practice. They are also adapting to new students, nowincreasingly from nontraditional sectors such as international business, from technicalmajors such as computers, and reaching both down into the undergraduat e communi ty andup i nto the professional seeking cont inuing and enr ichment educati on i n secur it y studies.Such programs offer the military advanced graduate education for security specialists,access to continuing education in security studiesthis study increasingly available indistance education presentationand detailed instruct ional materials and applicat ions innew areas of emphasis such as the nexus of security policy and technology, as well as theincreasing place of economics wi thin secur i ty str ategy. These advances arise fr om cont inuingresearch into the changing nature of int ernat ional secur it y.

Finall y, Professor James M. Smith, Di rector of t he U.S. Air Force (USAF) Insti tute forNational Security Studies, located at the USAF Academy where he also teaches militarystrategic studies and national security studies, addresses the contributions of internationalsecurity research and outreach education to preparing practitioners to meet the challengesof today and tomorrow. Research and outreach programs must face three often distinctworlds. They must i dent ify and pull forward sti ll -relevant lessons from the relat ively morepredictable Cold War past; they must address and seek to clarify the ambiguity of thetransit ion we cur rent ly face; and they must seek t o shed li ght on alternati ve paths int o the

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dark ness of uncertainty the futur e holds before us. Together t hese worlds present a dynamicand steep agenda for research and education. Research contributes to security studies byclarifying ambiguity, updating definitions and conceptions of the components of security,creating and extending knowledge in both old and new arenas, and testing and refiningtheory as a guide int o the unknown, all to cont inuall y inform secur it y poli cy as it evolves.

Outreach programs then disseminate the results of the research by educating directpart icipants, informing and energizing the secur it y debate among the knowledgeable publ ic.This disseminat ion can serve to shape broader support and consensus for secur i ty st rategy,foster an active security policy community to keep key issues on the agenda, and identifyareas for fut ur e research and educati on. The emphasis here is both on productimmediatelyuseful research products and educational outcomesand on processfostering andmentoring the continuing development of strategists and strategic knowledge.

All the authors were asked to address, at their level and for their category of program,issues such as the need for international security education, their intended audience, thecompetencies requir ed of t hose pract it ioners todaypart icular ly as these are changed fr omtradit ional programs at their levelany new methodologies part icular ly sui ted to deli very oftheir product to their audience, and where their program fit s in to the larger field of st rategistdevelopment . Both t he cont inui ty and the var iety of the points raised in the different essaysunderscore the dynamic nature and importance of this effort.

I t is clear t hat the full range of educat ional pr ograms designed to prepare internati onalsecur it y pr act it ioners must adapt t heir programs to the changing demands of t he emerginginternat ional secur i ty envi ronment . Formal r eviews such as the 1989 House Ar med ServicesCommittees Skelton Panel and the 1997 Center for Strategic and International StudiesCheney Study have begun to address broad directions for future military education. Thesereviews have identif ied issues such as matching education pr ograms to the demands of t henew international security environment; preparing for the technological demands of 2010;

adapting education to the Revolution in Military Affairs and emerging informationalrequirements; and adjusting to the increased emphasis on joint and coalition militaryoperations and to mi li tary operati ons other than war . Civi li an programs must address manyof these same concerns as they seek to prepare their students for policy formulation andassessment roles in t his futur e envi ronment.

Those studies and the chapters presented here only begin to address these issues at thepract i t ioner/program di rector level across the range of nat ional secur i ty educat ion programs.They are int ended as a foundat ion for fur ther i nvest igation and analysis, to anchor debatetoward cont inuing update and review of the preparat ion of st rategic professionals for theU.S. mi li tary and government. To borrow a thought from Chi lcoat, they are not intended to

provide a[n] . . . ideal pr ocess for formulating or master ing st rategic art . Their purposerather i s to emphasize that the search i tself is important , permanent, and wort h our best effortsand attenti on at a ti me when fami l iar landmarks have vanished and no new strategic vi sion hasattr acted a nat ional consensus.

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END NOTES - CHAPTER 1

1. Theodore J. Crackel, On the Making of L ieutenants and Colonels, The Publ ic Interest, No. 76, Summer1984, p. 18.

2. General John R. Galvin , Whats the Mat ter wit h Being a Str ategist? Parameters, Vol. XI X, No. 1, March

1989, pp. 2-10; reprinted in t he Summer 1995 edit ion, Vol. XXV, No. 2, pp. 161-168. Page cites here are to the1989 publication.

3. Galvin , p. 2.

4. Major General Richard A. Chil coat, Strategic Art: The New Discipline for 21st Century Leaders, Carl isleBarracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, October 10, 1995, p. 3.

5. Chil coat, p. 6.

6.Galv in , p. 10.

7. Ibid., pp. 9-10.

8. Chil coat, p. 1.

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CHAPTER 2

MI L IT ARY UNDERGRADUATE SECURI TY EDUCATI ONFOR THE NEW MI L L ENNIUM

Daniel J. Kaufman

I n t r oduct ion.

Whatever one might think about the nature of the post-Cold War internationalenvironment, one conclusion seems certain: the demands placed on the leaders of thenat ions mil i tary services have grown in scope and complexi ty. These demands extend wel lbeyond the traditional service responsibilities for fielding well-trained and equipped forcesto carry out combat or other types of operations. Today, service members are engaged in ahost of act ivi t ies that range from t eaching mil it ary offi cers in t he nations of t he former Soviet

Union the role of t he mil it ary in a democracy t o enforcing sanct ions against I raq.

The br ief history of the post-Cold War period has reinforced the need for mi l i tary offi cerswho are not only techni cally and tact ically proficient , but well -versed in st rategy, cul tur e,information systems, and decisionmaking as well. How will the military services acquiresuch leaders? What should newly-commissioned officers know about national securityaffairs? The purpose of this chapter is to examine the role and desired nature of nationalsecurity undergraduate education, focusing on the programs of the three major serviceacademies.

The mi l i tary services of the Uni ted States acquire their newly-commi ssioned offi cers fromone of three sources: Officer Candidate School (OCS), the Reserve Officer Training Corps

(ROTC), or the service academies. (A very small number of offi cersusuall y speciali sts suchas doctorsreceive a direct commission.) Officer Candidate Schools are 13- to 14-weekprograms designed primarily to fill shortfalls in the officer corps, particularly duringmobil izations in response to a nat ional emergency. ROTC consists of 2- t o 4-year programs inmilitary instruction designed to supplement the undergraduate curriculum in civiliancol leges and universit ies. The major i ty of new officers that enter the services each year arecommi ssioned thr ough ROTC. The service academiesthe U.S. Mi l i tary Academy at WestPoint , New York; t he U.S. Naval Academy at Annapoli s, Maryland; and the U.S. Air ForceAcademy at Colorado Springs, Coloradoare 4-year undergraduate degree grantingprograms that also include an intense program of military training and professionaldevelopment i n addit ion to the academic cur r iculum. Each academy provides approximately

900-1000 commissioned off icers to it s respecti ve service each year. The focus of thi s chapt eris on the national security education programs at the service academies. Every ROTCprogram requir es study of mi li tary science; however , cur r icular requir ements and content , toinclude those in security studies, are determined by the individual school.

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Nati onal Secu r i t y Educat i on at t he Under graduate Level:Pur pose, Focus, and Scope.

I t seems clear that a nati onal secur it y education pr ogram at the undergraduate level isnecessary for al l thr ee services. In fact , one could make a compell ing argument that such aprogram is one of the reasons why West Point and its sister academies should continue toexist . I f any undergraduates, anywhere, should study national secur it y, it is surely cadetsand midshipman at the federall y-funded service academies.

The Uni ted States retains interests thr oughout the wor ld, and threats to those in terestshave not disappeared with the collapse of the Soviet Union. In some measure, traditionalthreats remain. There are still states that oppose U.S. national interests in importantregions of the wor ld. The proli ferat ion of modern mi li tary weaponr y and the possible spreadof weapons of mass destr uction (WM D) have raised t he potent ial costs of r egional confl ict . Onanother l evel, threats have become more dif fuse, harder to define, and much more dif fi cul t toprotect the cit izenry against than t hey were during the Cold War . The spectrum of confl ict i sbroader today, the r isks more immediate, if less dest ruct ive. Chances that the wor ld wi ll be

destroyed because of a superpower nuclear exchange have diminished dramatically, butchances that a cit y in t he Uni ted States may face att ack by a nuclear, biological, or chemicalweapon at the hands of a rogue stat e or a substate actor , domest ic or foreign, have increasedeven more dramatically. Concern for the protection of human rights has led the UnitedStates in to areas of admit tedly l ess than vit al nat ional in terest , and this moral imperati ve,as well as the responsibilities of leadership, promise no early reprieve from suchengagements.

The purpose of an undergraduate education in national security studies should then beclear: to prepare graduates of the service academies for posit ions of responsibi l it y in bothoperational and policymaking assignments. Service academy graduates will oversee the

implementation of U.S. national security policy, develop the future capabilities that thedefense of t he Uni ted States and it s all ies wi ll requir e, and cont r ibut e to the formulation ofnational security policy. Consequently, it is imperative that newly-commissioned officersunderstand current U.S. national interests and those of our allies, the threats to thoseinterests, and the constr aints on our abi l it y to meet those thr eats. Given all of those factors,offi cers must be able to cont r ibute to the development of nat ional secur i ty str ategy, now andfor t he future.

Any security education program should ensure that young officers understand thehistory of U.S. national security policy and the principles that have driven U.S. strategicchoices in t he past. They should be able to der ive the theor ies and pr incipl es that wi l l formthe foundat ion for t he future nat ional secur it y poli cy of the Uni ted States. The scope of t his

education should, in the words of West Points Olin Professor of National Security StudiesGeneral (Retired) George Joulwan, prepare them for challenges facing officers from therank of Lieutenant to Lieutenant General. Those are the responsibilities that they willconfr ont , from graduation day t o the day some few of them ret ire as senior members of t heDepartment of Defense, other Executive Branch agencies, and even the United StatesCongress.

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Educati ng Futu r e Leader s.

Foundati ons for a L i feti me of Service. An officer i s an expert with speciali zed knowledgeand ski ll in the dir ect ion, operati on, and cont rol of an organizat ion whose pr imary function i sthe application of violence. However, officer expertise is much broader and morecompr ehensive than t he act of fi ght ing it self, and it is fostered thr ough a cont inuous processof development. Just as law at i ts border merges into history, poli t ics, economics, sociology,and psychology, so also does mil i tary expert ise. Beyond t hese borders, mil i tary knowledgehas frontiers on the natural sciences of chemistry, physics, and biology. An officer mustunderstand t he professions relat ionship to these many other fields. Therefore, professionalmilitary education must begin with a broad, liberal, cultural background, which for theAmerican offi cer t radit ional ly has been t he baccalaur eate degree.

Undergraduate education is necessarily foundational in many respects. The academicprograms at the three service academies provide not only a broad li beral educati on, they alsoprepare graduates for the professional envir onments in which al l of t hem wil l serve. They doso by combini ng an extensive core cur r iculum wit h a majors program t hat supports study i n

depth of a chosen discipline. While the details of the core curricula at the three academiesdif fer slight ly, the pur pose is the same: to provide the in tel lectual foundati on needed to carryout the responsibilities of a commissioned officer in the decades ahead. Curricular designmust answer two cr i t ical quest ions: Fir st, what do we need our offi cers to be able to do in t hefut ur e? Second, how does our cur r iculum cont r ibute to the development of offi cers who reflectthose attributes we deem important? What follows is a discussion of the specifics of theacademic program at the U.S. Mi l i tary Academy at West Point . The object ives and programsat the Air Force and Naval academies are essentially similar in design and scope. Theintel lectual and professional development programs at al l t hr ee academies are der ived fromthe two focal questions noted above.

The Mili tary Academy descr ibes it s academic program not by specifi c cour ses but by theeducat ional object ives that ident i fy competencies essent ial for successful development andservice as a professional officer . What does West Point expect of i ts academic program? Whatare the key outcome goals of i ts intel lectual development program? The general educationalgoal of the U.S. Mil it ary Academy i s clear ly stated:

To enable it s graduates to ant icipate and respond effecti vely t o the uncer taint ies of a changingtechnological, social, poli t ical, and economic wor ld.

1

From t his concept for in tell ectual development , the Mi li tary Academy derives a set of ninespecifi c Academic Program Goals that address specifi c Army needs and r eflect the att r ibutesthe Academy seeks to develop in its graduates. These goals are listed in Table 1.

2

Nati onal Secu r i t y Educat i on: Thr ee Classes Each Year .

The teaching of national security at West Point encompasses more than just a specificcour se in nat ional secur i ty affai rs. Each year the Mi l it ary Academy graduates thr ee classesof national security students. The first class is the obvious one, that is, every graduatingcadet, regardless of academic major. The second class is a subset of the first. These are thegraduates who chose to major in a specific field with a clear link to some aspect of what is

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commonly thought t o be the study of nat ional secur i ty. The thir d and oft en over looked classis comprised of those officers assigned to the West Point faculty following graduate studywho complete their assignments as instructors and return t o service in the field Army.

3

Every Cadet A National Security Studies Student. The contemporary debate over thestudy of national security is based on how broadly or how narrowly to define the term. Forsome, secur i ty studi es are focused on t he use of force to secure, defend, and advance nationalinterests. Others broaden t he term t o incorporate the range of t hreats to nat ional survival ,stability, and sovereignty to include environmental hazards, domestic crime, economicgrowth, and quest ions of social justice.

West Point s cur r iculum r eflects an understanding of t he need for a broad undergraduateeducation that i nst il ls the att r ibutes listed in Table 1 wit hout rejecti ng or subordinating thetradit ional elements of nat ional secur it y studies. The Mi li tary Academys aim i s to provide abaccalaur eate degree that fi rst and foremost prepares i ts graduates for the unique demandsof their chosen profession. The same is obviously t rue for the other servi ce academies as well .

As it has been throughout its history, the West Point academic program is based on anextensive core cur r iculum. At one level, the core cur r iculum is the common major for every

10

Think and act creatively.

Understand and apply the mathematical, physical, andcomputer sciences to reason scientifically, solve

quantitative problems, and use technology.

Use the engineering thought process by whichmathematical and scientific facts and principles areapplied to serve the needs of society.

Draw on an appreciation of culture to understand in a

global context human behavior, achievement, and ideas.

Draw on an appreciation of history to understand in aglobal context human behavior, achievement, and ideas.

Understand patterns of human behavior, particularlyhow individuals, organizations, and societies pursue

social, political, and economic goals.

Communicate, especially in writing, in preciselanguage, correct sentences, and concise, coherentparagraphs---each communication evincing clear, critical

thinking.

Recognize moral issues and apply ethicalconsiderations in decisionmaking.

Demonstrate the capability for and willingness topursue progressive and continued educational development.

Tabl e 1. Academi c Pr ogram Goals.


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graduate. Taken together, the 31 courses in the core constitute the means by which theMil it ary Academy seeks to inst il l i n every graduate the at t r ibut es contained in the AcademicProgram Goals. The specific structure of the core curriculum is detailed in Figure 1. As thedata in the figure indicate, every cadet, regardless of academic major, must take foursemesters of mathemati cs, two of physics, two of chemistry, one of terrain analysis, one of

computer science, and five from one of seven engineering sequences (civil, mechanical,elect r ical, nuclear, comput er science, envi ronment al, systems). In t he humani t ies and publ icaffairs, every cadet must take 4 semesters of history, 3 of social sciences, 3 of English, 2 ofbehavioral sciences, 1 of phi losophy, 2 of a foreign l anguage, and 1 of consti tut ional law. Thethree required social sciences courses consist of 1 semester of American Politics, 1 ofeconomics, and 1 of i nt ernat ional relat ions. In addit ion t o the 31 academic cour ses in the corecur r iculum, cadets must take four cour ses in mil i tary science and four year-long cour ses inphysical educati on.

The core curriculum is bound by belief in the importance of a truly common educationalexperience. Therefore, there are no special classes in physics for philosophy majors.Aeronautical engineers take the same core literature class as English majors. There is nomath for poets and lovers at West Point. Cadets must master a range of commondiscipl ines, all of which cont r ibute to the goal of producing an educated ci t izen and a ski ll edpublic servant .

11

9 to 13 Electives for Major / Field of Study9 to 13 Electives for Major / Field of Study (FOS)(FOS)

4 Military Science 4 Physical Education

9 to 13 Electives for Major / Field of Study9 to 13 Electives for Major / Field of Study (FOS)(FOS)

4 Military Science 4 Physical Education

West Point Academic ProgramWest Point Academic ProgramArmy OfficerArmy Officer

Bachelor of Science DegreeBachelor of Science Degree

1 Philosophy/Ethics

2 Foreign Language

3 Social Sciences

2 Leadership

3 English

4 History

1 Law

5 Engineering Science/Design

1 Computer Science

1 Terrain Analysis

2 Chemistry

2 Physics

4 Math

16 Sem Crs

Humanities and Social Science

15 Sem Crs

Math, Science, Engineering

Fi gur e 1.


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7. Understand the role that political decision-making structures and processes play inaffect ing the development and implementation of national secur it y policy.

8. Understand the capabilities and limitations of economic, diplomatic, and militaryinstr uments that cont r ibute to nat ional secur it y.

9. Understand the role of force in the achievement of national political ends.10. Understand how to integrate the instruments of U.S. power to most effectively

address shor t - and long-term t hreats to U.S. nati onal secur it y.

11. Understand the impl icat ions of str ategic alternat ives to cur rent force structure anddoctrine.

15

Fi gur e 2. Fr amewor k f or Analyzin g Nati onal Secur i t y Pol i cy.


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Producing graduates able to meet the practical demands of national securitypoli cymaking and implementation wi ll requir e a soli d emphasis on al l of t hese skil l sets, butwi th a prior it y on the courses that r equir e both oral and wr it ten analysis of cur rent eventsthrough theoretical prisms and frameworks. Armed with these lenses with which tounderstand the world around them, those who focus on national security studies will be

bet ter prepared to cont r ibut e to the formulation of nat ional secur it y strategy.Graduating Faculty. A third and often overlooked class that leaves the service

academies each year is compr ised of t he juni or mi li tary facul ty members who are returningto their respect ive services after graduate school and a tour on the facul ty. Normall y, a junioroff icer selected to teach at a servi ce academy spends 2 years at a top-fl ight graduat e school (afew spend 3 years). Following graduate school in an appropriate discipline, they spend 3years teaching, mentor ing, counseli ng, and pur suing their own research agendas. Many usethe tour t o complete their doctoral di sser tations, having achieved ABD status during theirgraduate school assignment. In addition to supporting cadet military instruction, facultymembers have the opportunity to pursue their own professional development during thesummer working in service headquarters in Washington or other relevant agenciesthr oughout the count ry, or in some cases involving Foreign Ar ea Officers, thr oughout theworld. Junior faculty members also provide valuable research to service agencies oneverything from weapons modernization to regional culture. The Institute for NationalSecur i ty Studies at t he Air Force Academy sponsors research by facult y members at all thr eeservice academies. Research cel ls at West Point that include junior facul ty members provideanalysis and recommendations to the Army leadership on issues as varied as the use ofart if icial in tell igence, resource all ocation, and manpower recrui t ing and retention.

The combination of graduate school, teaching, and professional development activitiesensures the continued and enhanced utility of junior faculty members for their services.Histori cal data support the conclusion that facul ty members not only cont inue to cont r ibut e,

but also that they enjoy a greater degree of professional success than do their peers. Many ofthe services senior leadership served as academy faculty members, and selection rates forpromotion and key command assignments reflect the degree to which t he services value theexpert ise that jun ior facul ty members develop and nur tur e dur ing and after an assignmentto a service academy.

4

Designing the Ideal Program in Nati onal Secur i ty Educati on Something Old, SomethingNew. . .What would compr ise an ideal program in nat ional secur it y educat ion? How would itdiffer from the cur ri cula of today? What part of t hat curr iculum i s tr adit ional but r etainsrelevance? What should we add that is new, and why is it needed?

An ideal program would build upon the foundation of the core curriculum to produce

graduates who fully understand both their own country and the world in which it takes aleadership r ole. Thus, core cour ses in world and mil it ary hi story, poli t ical science, economics,international relations, English, foreign languages, and mathematics, science, andengineer ing retain great relevance for the futur e educati on of mi li tary offi cers. To thi s broad,li beral foundat ion, the ideal program would add r equir ed courses in:

Comparat ive Poli ti cs

Research M ethodology

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International Relat ions Theor ies

Terr ori sm*

The Mil itary in Polit ics

U.S. Foreign Poli cy

The Economics of U .S. Nat ional Secur it y

The Pol i t ics of Defense Pol icy

International Organizati ons*

U.S. National Secur it y Studies

Secur it y in the Developing Wor ld

Counterpr oli ferat ion and Arms Cont rol*

Senior Thesis/Independent Research Project

*New Courses

Much of the list above is t radit ional, and cour ses in these subjects have been taught at t heservice academies for some t ime. As long as the pr imary mission of the U.S. Armed Forcesremains to fight and win our nati ons wars, and as long as interstate warfare remains a realthreat in the international system, it is essential that the academic and professionaldevelopment programs at the service academies prepare cadets and midshipmen for thosepossibi li t ies. However, changes in t he int ernat ional secur it y environment in the wake of t heCold Warmost notably the increased U.S. involvement in mul t inational coali t ions underthe auspices of international organizations, the increased threat of terrorism against

American citizens from both domestic and international actors, and the greatly increasedthreat of proliferation of weapons of mass destructionwould seem to necessitate theintellectual consideration of some new subject matter at the undergraduate level and theint roduction of several new cour ses.

In light of the nature, variety, and location of the operations that the U.S. militaryservices seem destined to conduct more or less routinely in the post-Cold War world, one ofthe most pressing needs of the armed services is for officers wi th an in-depth understandingof another region of the world. During the Cold War, the armed forces knew where theprimary t hreat was and how t o prepare; the disorder of t he post-Cold War wor ld means thatthe military services must be prepared to conduct operations ranging from humanitarianrelief to theater-level war at any time, anywhere in the world. Thus, in addition to thecourses listed above, cadets should take courses in both the language and politics of one ofthe following regions:

Africa

East Asia

Russia and the Former Soviet Union

Latin America

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Europe

Jointness. One of the areas that may well deserve increased emphasis in theprecommissioning education of officers is that of joint operations. What shouldnewly-commissioned officers know about joint operations? What are the most effectivemeans by which to inculcate into young officers an appreciation for the fact that all U.S.military operations are likely to be joint and an understanding of the capabilities of theirsister services?

The report of the Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) Study Group onProfessional Military Education (known as the Cheney Report, after the chair, formerSecretary of Defense and now Vice President Dick Cheney) recommended that allprecommissioning programs ROTC, OCS, and the service academiesoffer mandatorycourses that introduce students to the operations and cultures of sister services.

5Some

suggest that every cadet or midshipman spend at least one semester at another serviceacademy. In fact, the service academies do have such an exchange program, although thenumber of participants is limited to about 20 in each class. The Air Force Academy has

introduced a mandatory course in Joint Operations, and t he subject is an int egral par t of t hemilitary science instruction at West Point and Annapolis. Summer military trainingprograms also emphasize the joint nature of U.S. military operations, and includeparticipation by representatives of other services where feasible.

6To date, there are no

common standards for precommissioning educat ion i n j oint operati ons. The adopt ion of suchstandards will require appropriate adjustments in the military science programs at theservice academies and in ROTC.

Teachi ng Meth odologi es.

How can teachers best serve their audience and achieve the ends of our ideal cur r icula?West Point has long relied upon the Thayer Method of instruction: small classes, taught

primarily by company-grade or junior field-grade officers who serve both as traditionalcollege professors but also, and perhaps even more important, as role models for the youngcadets they instruct . This approach should remain the foundat ion of i nstruct ion in nati onalsecur i ty studies. Small classrooms allow for one-on-one int eract ion between instructor andstudent, and among the students themselves. This opportunity for dialogue is especiallyimportant when debating quest ions for which there are no r ight answers; it encourages thedevelopment of t he reasoning ski ll s, analyt ic abili t ies, and proficiency i n pr esentati on t hatcadets will need when they are responsible for the formulation of policy in years to come.Cadets should continue to be held responsible for mastering the material in high-levelseminars before class attendance; that time can then be put to use debating nuances andimpli cations wit h peers and i nstructors. The educati onal value of r equir ing cadets to make

presentat ions cannot be overemphasized; the sooner they learn to craft cogent presentat ions,the more effect ive they wil l be as staff offi cers and as poli cymakers and advisors.

Small seminars should be supplemented by lectures from experts in the field, invited toshare their perspect ives and experiences with cadets. These speakers serve as role models ina different way than do officer instructors; they can present a firsthand view of policyformulation at the highest levels, enlightening and encouraging those who will beresponsible for carr ying it out on t he ground, at l east earl y in t heir careers.

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The proliferation of information technology raises interesting new possibilities in theclassroom. Experience to date indicates that, while internet access is essential to nationalsecur i ty education, i t is possible to overuse technology in t he classroom; the medium mustnot become the message. Only a few years ago, the advanced technology classroom of thefuture was perceived to be one where every student was wired to a computer and the

internet, madly searching for and ret r ieving informat ion fr om an endless variety of sour ces.Experience has taught that just the opposite is true; the information revolution hasreinforced the critical role of the instructor in the classroom. Information searches can andmust be done outside of class, but the classroom must be the site of critical thinking andanalysis. Web si tes, videos, and PowerPoint presentat ions that can be projected ont o a screenallow for the rapid transfer of information and serve to maintain student interest.Nonetheless, human interaction is the core of the undergraduate learning experience.Debating pol icy issues in small groups is not only t he best way to sharpen young minds, i t i salso the best possible preparation for their future roles as policy and decisionmakers.Simulations and role-playing, especially when supported by film clips of present or pastnati onal secur it y issues, simil arl y help to develop the skil ls and the mindset that the service

academies seek to inculcate in t heir graduat es.

The L ocus of Secur it y St ud ies.

Where does the study of national and international security fit into current educationprograms at the undergraduate level? Should security studies be a separateinterdiscipl inary f ield, or is it more proper ly a subset of i nternati onal relat ions, or a ser ies ofsemi-connected cour ses under i nt ernat ional r elat ions, IPE (int ernat ional poli t ical economy),etc.?

International Relations was created as a discipline to answer the question of whatcauses war and how can we minimize the chances of war occur r ing and i ts destr ucti veness

when it does? Security studies, which answer if not those first-order questions thensecond-order questions derived from them, is clearly a subfield of international relations,and arguably t he most important subfield of int ernati onal r elat ions. Alt hough IPE has someimportant insights into both the causes of war and peace and proper and possible choicesabout nat ional secur it y poli cy, it is not fundamentally about power and war, the subjects ofinternational relationsand of national security policy. While a complete discussion of theviews on what proper ly consti tut es secur it y studies in the post-Cold War wor ld is beyond t hescope of t hi s chapter , Richard Bet ts insight ful essay on t he importance of str ategic studiessupports the notion that security studies is appropriately thought of a sub-field ofinternational relations.

7On the issue of the content of security studies, Betts posits a

subfield of three concentric circles. At the core is military science, which is concerned with

how technology, organization, and tactics combine to win battles. In the middle ring liesstrategic studies, which focuses on how political ends and military means interact undersocial, economic, and other constraints. The outer, most inclusive ring is security studies,which considers everything that bears on the safety of a polity.

8In practice, of course, the

dividing li nes between t he circles wil l never be clear, alt hough the typology does impose somediscipline on the considerations of what properly constitutes security studies, a field thatcould potent iall y be boundless.

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In the end, commissioned officers who lead the nations military services in the 21stcentur y wi ll need to be facil e with t echnology and comfortable wi th uncertaint y and change.They will need to be attuned to the role culture plays in determining the structure anddynamics of the international system. Finally, they will need to be accomplished players inthe fragmented decisionmaking environment that defines American pluralism. The

educational programs at t he servi ce academies are designed to produce just such leaders forthe nati on, now and in t he fut ure.

ENDNOTES - CHA PTER 2

1. Educati ng Army L eaders for the 21st Century, Office of the Dean, Uni ted States Mil it ary Academy, WestPoin t , NY, 1998, p. 9.

2. Ibid.

3. For a more complete discussion of these issues, see Daniel J. Kaufman and Jay M. Parker, TeachingNat ional Secur it y at West Point : More than Just One Course, National Security Studies Quarterly, Vol. III,Issue 4, Autumn 1997, pp. 25-38.

4. Former members of the West Point faculty include General Eric Shinseki, Chief of Staff of the Army;Lieutenant General Thomas Burnette, Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Joint Forces Command; LieutenantGeneral David Ohle, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army for Personnel; Li eutenant General Paul K ern, Director ofArmy Research and Development; Lieutenant General (retired) Richard Chilcoat, former President, NationalDefense Uni versity; General (reti red) Barry M cCaffrey, Director of t he Offi ce of National Drug Cont rol Policy;General (retired) Jack Galvin, former Commander-in-Chief, Southern Command and then Supreme AlliedCommander, Europe; General (retired) George Joulwan, former Commander-in-Chief, Southern Command,and then Supreme Al l ied Commander, Europe; and General (ret i red) Wesley Clark, formerCommander-in-Chief, Southern Command, and then Supreme All ied Commander, Europe; to name but a few.

5. Center for St rategic and In ternational Studi es, Professional M i l i tar y Education: An Asset for Peace andProgress, March 1997, p. 37.

6. For instance, the author part icipated in an air mobil e operat ion last summer i n whi ch West Point cadetswere tr anspor ted by U.S. Mari ne Corps heli copters. U.S. Navy ships dock at West Poin t rout inely, where theyare visit ed by cadets, who receive instr uction on their operati ons and capabil it ies. The Nat ional Securi ty Studi escourse visit s the Navy base at New L ondon, where cadets visi t submari nes and other naval vessels. There are 13Ai r Force offi cers assigned to the staff and facul ty at West Point , and a lik e number of Ar my officers are assignedto the Air Force Academy.

7. Richard K. Betts, Should Strategic Studies Survive? Worl d Pol it ics, Vol. 50, October 1997, p. 10.

8. Ibid., p. 9.

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CHAPTER 3

PROFESSI ONAL M I L I TARY SECURITY EDUCATI ON:TH E VI EW FROM A SENI OR SERVICE COL L EGE

Rober t H. Robin Dorf f

There is li tt le doubt that the internati onal secur it y environment of t he 21st century i ssignificantly different from the Cold War environment that preceded it. Analysts andpundi ts alike have struggled mighti ly t o identi fy the cr it ical dimensions of that envir onmentand their implications for U.S. national security policy. But this changing securityenvironment has equally important implications for how we teach international security,especial ly when our student s are pri mari ly pract it ioners. For the tools and techniques weteach and study t oday may have a great deal of in fluence on how well those pract i t ioners areable to deal with the challenges and opportunities of this still-emerging securityenvi ronment. The fact that we do not yet have a convenient label for this new era highlightsour inabil it y to come to grips fundamentally wit h it s defining character ist ics. Simply call ingit the post-Cold War era tells us only that it came after something, and begs theimportant quest ions of how it is both simi lar to and different fr om the era that pr eceded it .

But the purpose of this chapter is not to answer those important, and indeedfundamental, questions. Although I wish I had enduring answers to them, I do not.Consequentl y, I shall concent rate instead on r aising and discussing some general questionsabout international security education. In the process, I will also point to what I think aresome of t he cr it ical dimensions of t he new secur it y environment that reflect both cont inui tyand change when compared to the era immediately preceding thi s one. But I shall do so only

in the context of t rying to highli ght what i t is that secur it y studies need to focus on in order toprepare the practitioners of today for wrestling with the policy problems they are likely toface tomorr ow. Moreover, I shall do so by focusing on t he inst i tut ion I know best because it iswhere I teachthe Senior Service College (SSC) generally and the United States ArmyWar Coll ege (USAWC) specifi call y.

Th e Seni or Serv i ce Coll ege.

The SSC represent s the culminati ng point of t he professional mil it ary education pr ogramfor most mi li tary offi cers. Alt hough courses offered at other inst it ut ions cont inue to provideopportunities for additional learning beyond the SSC level, very few military officers willhave the opportunity to attend. For example, those selected for General Officer will attend

CAPSTONE and some that go to the Joint Staff wi ll att end the Program for Joint Educati on(JPE) Phase 2 cour se at Norfolk .

1Consequently, for most students the SSC affords one last

opportuni ty t o pursue a broad and general education i n nati onal secur it y affai rs, leadership,and strategic-level theater operations prior to tackling their post-battalion commandcareers. Whi le some of t hose students may in fact go on t o command brigades, and some mayeven go to combat commands, most of the graduat ing offi cers fi nish out their mi l it ary careersin high-level staff positions. The SSC experience is designed primarily to prepare them forthose future assignments, not so much by training them for their next assignment as by

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preparing them to learn and adapt along the way. In short, it is a curriculum designed todevelop their ski ll s in how t o th ink , not what to thi nk. In addit ion to the USAWC where Iteach, the other SSCs are the Naval War College, the Air War College, the National WarCollege, the Marine War College, and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

2The

remainder of my comments will focus on the USAWC, and, while many of the observations

would hold true across all of the SSCs, I will not try to generalize beyond the immediateconfines of the insti tu ti on wi th whi ch I am most famili ar.

Another way of i ll ustrati ng just where the SSC generall y and the USAWC specif icall y fi tin the overall education of the student draws on the familiar conceptual framework of thelevels of war (Figure 3). The three levels of war are the tactical, the operational, and thestrategic. One can view t hem as par t ial ly over lapping cir cles arr anged ver t icall y fr om t helowest level (tact ical) to the highest level (st rategic). Figur e 3 shows these overlapping levelson t he left , the pri mary foci associated wi th each level in the middle, and t he relati onshipamong the Army teaching institutions on the right. The primary responsibility for thetact ical level l ies wi th t he basic and advanced cour ses. The focus is primar i ly on di visionthrough platoon engagements. At the high end of t he tact ical level and over lapping wit h t heoperat ional level is the Combined Arms Services Staff School where Corps Batt les are theprimary focus (ill ustrating something of t he over lap between the tact ical and the operationallevels, as well as the overlap between the institutional teaching responsibilities). TheCommand and General Staff Coll ege carr ies the primary responsibil it y for t he mid- to highoperational and low-strategic levels. Here the focus is primarily on subordinate campaignplans and joint, services and combined operations. The USAWC covers some of the highoperational levels, but it is the primary institution for the strategic level. Here the focusshifts to the high operational (theater strategy and campaign plans) and the strategic(nature of war, national security and national military strategies) levels. The overallprogression of professional educat ion i s therefore designed to take the student from t he basic

tactical level through the high strategic level by the time they finish the program at theUSAWC.

Let us now t urn our att ent ion more specif icall y t o the USAWC. Fi rst , we should considerthe mission statement because i t provides a succinct overview of how we see our role in t heoveral l education of the professional pract it ioners who are our students. The mission of theUSAWC is:

To prepare selected mi l i tar y, civi l ian, and internat ional leaders to assume str a te gic respon sibil -i ti es in mil i tary and nat ional securi ty organi zat ions; to educate students about the employmentof landpower as part of a uni fied, joint , or mul t inat ional force in suppor t of t he nati onal mil i tarystrategy; to research operati onal and str ategic issues; and to conduct outreach programs thatbenefi t t he USAWC, the U.S. Army, and the Nation.

Al though t he research and out reach functions are closely in ter twined wi th t he educati onfunctions, they are somewhat more peripheral to the focus of this chapter. So I willconcent rate on education, and begin by looking at the students.

There are two primary groups of students who study at the USAWC. The ResidentProgram consists of those students selected to complete a roughly 10-month program ofstudy while physically residing in Carlisle and attending seminars, classes, andsupplemental pr ograms at the Col lege. There is also a Distance Educati on Program, which

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individual cur r icula were geared more to the specifi c services.4

Today the students reflect theway in which most senior military leaders will have to work jointly with the other servicesand combined wit h our al li es around t he wor ld. The fact that offi cers from other services andother nat ions att end t he USAWC mirrors thi s important change. Moreover, an increasingnumber of our curriculum requirements come not from the Army per se, but from the

Program for Joint Educat ion (PJE). I t no longer suffi ces to understand how t he Army runs(a tradit ional service theme at t he SSC); one must understand how the Army runs in the

joint and combined wor ld. I n addit ion, the post -Cold War downsizing of t he mil it ary and t hechanging nature of military operations (to include many more interfaces with civilian-runoperati ons) vir tuall y ensure that our mi li tary l eaders must necessari ly in teract more oftenand across a wider spectrum of issues wi th their civi l ian counterpart s. The demographics ofthe Resident class better reflect these realities of that changing security environment.

Many of our mi li tary students wil l soon hold leadership posit ions (command and/or staff)that require analysis, policy options, prescriptive recommendations, and programimplementation for complex problems in a joint (service), combined (allies and partners),interagency (political-military), global environment. And most of our civilian students willsoon hold leadership posit ions that wi ll requir e regular and frequent contact wi th, and theabil it y to work effecti vely wit h, their mil it ary counterpart s. We design our cur r iculum wi ththese kinds of practitioners in mind. One personal experience serves perfectly to illustratethis point . On a recent visit to a foreign count ry, I was hosted by a former student who wasthen serving as the U.S. Consul General . He returned home one evening anxious to descr ibea specif ic event fr om t hat especiall y busy day. He had been called on by a German Br igadierGeneral who was to head up NATO civil operations in Bosnia. The discussion notsurpri singly had ranged over a wide var iety of issues, including the mi li tary operati onal sideas well as the humanitarian dimensions. From issues dealing with deployment to rules ofengagement, and, of course, including the political-diplomatic dimensions of those issues,

this former student had felt completely at home in his one-on-one discussion with theGeneral. He observed that his year at USAWC had helped prepare him for just that ki nd ofencounter.

Ear li er we used the levels of war t o il lustrate the relat ionship among the var ious mi li taryeducational inst it ut ions. Another contemporary example draws on t his same framework andhelps demonstrate yet another way in which the international security environment haschanged, and the role that professional education plays in preparing practitioners to dealwith it. Consider the young soldier guarding a bridge in Bosnia during the post-Daytonimplementation phase. On the one hand, this is a purely tact ical assignmentguardingthe br idgeand this soldier k nows his responsibi l i t ies and the procedur es very well . Yet nowconsider t hat he must carry out this assignment wit h television li ghts glar ing and the CNN

cameras roll ing. What at one t ime might have been a purely tact ical operation now has thevery real potential to influence not only the operational but also the strategic level. Amishandled checkpoint engagement, suddenly made visible to the ent ire world, might easi lyescalate tensions in another area of operat ions or even lead to fai lur es in ongoing high-levelnegotiations. So in todays complex security environment, we see an increasing blurring ofthe distinctions across these levels and dimensions. Combined with the significantlycondensed time frames within which events take place and responses are required, thisblurring has tremendous significance for how we educate our international security

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understand the role of values and ethi cs in complex organizations, an endur ing theme in theUSAWC curriculum for which DCLM assumes the primary (though not exclusive)responsibility. DCLM also takes the lead role in teaching how the Army runs in the jointworld, including the PPBS system. DNSS (the Department in which I teach) exposesstudents to strategy, international security studies, and the contemporary policy and

policymaking environment. Finally, DMSPO provides the essential focus on strategic-leveltheater operat ions, wit h a st rong emphasis on joint ness. Time and space constraints do notall ow for a detail ed discussion of the ent ire cur r iculum, so I wi l l concent rate instead on someof t he signifi cant changes in t hat curr iculum t hat in turn reflect impor tant changes in t henational and international security environment. The challenges we face in adapting ourcur r iculum to a changing envi ronment can be il lustrated by the foll owing quest ions:

1) What is traditional course content but nonetheless retains relevance for thecontemporary pract it ioner?

2) What is t radit ional course content that is no longer relevant and why?

3) What is new about the contemporary environment and why is it needed as coursecontent?

The DCLM component of the curriculum has changed to reflect the changing nature ofthe command, leadership, and management envi ronment noted earl ier . Thi s shows up mostprominently in the attention given to the joint world and the increasing interaction withcivilians. Because this is inherently a peer leadership world, one sees much more use ofcontemporary management and leadership techniques drawn from the civilian corporateworld. Students at the USAWC today will study everything from creative and criticalthinking techniques to personality-based, small group decisionmaking models. Studyinghow t o provide effect ive leadership in t odays diverse and mul t icult ural policy world is onearea in which significant change in the curriculum has occurred. Similarly, the attention

paid t o join tness has increased substant ial ly, j ust as the mi li tary wor ld has become morejoint. However, it is a mistake to think that jointness is simply presented as a given, withsimple models for explaining how i t works. Joint ness at t he USAWC is also raised for cri t icalanalysis, and ser ious quest ions ar ise as to how the promotion of jointness affects readiness,effect iveness, and the abili ty of the Unit ed States generally to apply it s mi li tary i nstr umentsof power. A r ecur r ing theme in t his regard i s the issue of i nt erservice r ivalr y, and it s effectson budgets, procur ement, and r oles and missions (among other things). Obviously, t he role ofthe Reserve and Guard component s of our mil i tary services plays heavily in thi s discussion,too. Among the traditional course content that has remained largely the same is thecontinued emphasis on the historical study of strategic leaders, and the attempt to gleanfrom that study the endur ing principles of success and fail ur e in that wor ld.

The part of t he cur r iculum I know bestthe one that addresses U.S. nati onal secur it ystrategyis the one that has perhaps changed the most i n r esponse to the changing secur i tyenvironment brought about by the end of the Cold War. At the same time, because of itsconcent rat ion on endur ing issues and lessons drawn from the histor ical study of str ategy andwar, much of this piece of t he cur r iculum r eflects cont inui ty wi th past approaches. So, theopening block of the DNSS core cour se may at fi rst blush appear t o have changed very l i t t lein the past several years. Students examine fundamental character isti cs of in ternati onal

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relations and the behavior of nation-states and other actors in the international system.They look at what causes war, and why those causes may be more or less enduring. Anexaminati on of how one formulates st rategy, and the applicat ion of a var iety of i nstr umentsof nat ional power to the pursuit of nat ional object ives, rounds out this fir st block of study. Forthe most par t , these issues and t he lessons might be the same today as they were more than

15 years ago when the Uni ted States and the Soviet Union sti l l confr ont ed one another in alargely bipolar world. Yet subtle and important changes have occurred. Many of thosechanges derive from the fact that strategic art at the national level today requires thecoordinated use of all the elements of nat ional power, and perhaps somewhat less rel iance ona single element such as the mi li tary. So, for example, we spend more t ime today examiningthe relat ive ut il it y of mi li tary power as compared to economic power than we might have inthe 1980s. We certainly have increased the attention paid to political economics, bothdomest ic and internat ional. We have also increased our focus on in ternat ional i nsti tut ionsand non-state actors to reflect a signif icant enhancement of t he roles played by these actorsin t he in ternati onal secur it y envi ronment of the 21st century.

One obvious change is the signi fi cant ly reduced t ime we spend studyi ng str ategic nucleardeterrence and U.S.-Soviet r elat ions generally. Whil e students st il l must wrest le wit h t helogic (or illogic) of deterrence theory, we spend much less time focusing on the strategicbalance between the two superpowers. Obviously, t here are no longer two superpowers andmuch less interest in the balance per se. This is not to say that deterrence and nuclearweapons receive no attent ion; clearl y t hey do. But what we emphasize is different . Today weare likely to examine the relevance of strategic deterrence for achieving conventionalstabili ty or for managing rogue nations and even terror ists, rather t han viewing it as a wayof simpl y keeping the Cold War cold. Proli ferat ion and the possible terr or ist use of nuclearweapons receive significantly more attention today than do issues of the strategic nuclearbalance.

Our attention to the domestic policymaking environment also retains elements of thetradit ional as well as the new. Surely one cannot understand U.S. nati onal secur it y poli cywi thout understanding the consti tut ional context , including the rules and the actors. Thatmeans studying the presidency and the Congress, and the constitutional invitation tostruggle between those two preeminent branches of our federal government. But today italso means spending even more time trying to understand the vagaries of the interagencyprocess, and the role and influence of the mass media on military matters specifically andnati onal secur it y poli cy generally.

One area that has on the surface changed very little is the amount of time in ourcur r iculum devoted to the historical study of st rategy. However, I would argue that in fact

this sur face-level view masks a greatl y enhanced use and study of history i n our cur r iculum.First, history is used much more throughout the year and across the curriculum than itmight appear i f one only adds up t he indi vidual lessons devoted specifi call y to history per se.Second, hi story has become even more relevant (if i t were ever correct to say that it was lessrelevant ) now that some of t he unique qual i t ies of t he U.S.-Soviet confr ontat ion have recededand the future starts to look more and more like the past (to paraphrase a popular butprobably inaccurate contemporary shorthand). But it is certainly the case that we spendmore time today exploring the classical wr it ings on str ategy, and examining the historical

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cases of war (its causes, prosecution, and termination), than we did a relatively short timeago. The reasons lie largely in the way we try to place the current strategic period in anappropri ate context , that i s by point ing to the contemporary per iod as yet another example ofa strategic pause. Arguably, we are in the midst of the third such major strategict ransformati on of the 20th century, wit h t he per iods foll owing the end of the two wor ld wars

providing the fir st two. Given the uncertaint ies and profound impli cati ons for the fut ure ofsuch periods of change, it is hardly sur pri sing that we spend more time today t rying to pushstudents to examine the past wi th even greater att ent ion than in the recent past . Identi fyingand understanding cr i t ical elements of cont inuity and change are always the cornerstones ofcoming to gri ps wit h t hese per iods of str ategic pause, and the study of hi story helps us to do

just that. Our military leaders are frequently (if not altogether accurately) accused ofprepar ing to fight t he past war again. Only t hrough a careful examinat ion of the past , wit han emphasis on ident i fying endur ing pr inciples and themes, coupled wi th a ser ious study ofthe present, can we hope to avoid this pitfall.

Finally, it goes without saying that in the block devoted to the contemporary securityenvi ronment we find the most change. But this is also a bit misleading on the sur face. Fi rst ,this block always changed the most because it focused on current issues and events. So inthat sense, it really hasnt changed all that much. If change is t ruly the only constant in ourli ves today, then thi s block has in fact remained qui te constant . Second, the cont inui ty existsin the fact that we look at the current national security strategy and national militarystrategy, and the relat ionship between t he two. Alt hough the two have changed considerablyover t he years, and especially so since the Cold War ended, the quest ions we rai se endure. Dowe have the proper object ives? Ar e the appropr iate resour ces organized and appl ied in t hemost effi cient ways to ensure success in t he pursuit of t hose object ives? I f not , why not? Whatis the appropriate role for the Uni ted States in the int ernat ional system, and how should ournati onal secur it y st rategy best reflect that r ole? I t is no sur pri se that at t his broadly str ategic

level the approach t o educating our pract it ioners should remain quit e cont inuous wi th pastapproaches.

I am much less quali fied to address the element s of cont inui ty and change in the way weteach t he last cour se in our core cur r iculum except to reinforce the point made in more thanone place earl ier in t hi s essaythe enhanced attent ion paid to jointness. The DMSPO cour secontains perhaps the most l earn ing object ives and lesson r equirements from the Program forJoint Educat ion than any of t he other three courses. From uni ty of effort and joint planni ngto joint support to the CINCs, this is a course that reflects significant adaptation to thatimportant change in the secur it y envi ronment. Campaign planning also increasingly r eflectsthe use of al l iances and coali t ions, and t he requi rements that come along wi th t hem. And ofcourse, the burgeoning li terature that i s Joint Doct r ine plays an important r ole in this part

of t he students core cur r iculum education. And yet perhaps the greatest change of al l comesfrom t he changing nature of mi li tary operati ons themselves, wit h an i ncreasing number ofmi li tary operati ons other than war now the rule rather t han the excepti on. Student s mustunderstand the requir ements for major t heater war (MTW) as well as a variety of smallscale contingencies (SSC).

And here we encount er what is increasingly a curr iculum problem for all of us at the SSClevel of professional education for the international security practitioner: the tension

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between education and t raining. Most of us know the difference between t he two, althoughwe might not be able to offer neat and tidy little definitions that clearly lay out thosedifferences. But education focuses on learning the enduring general principles that willinform good decisionmaking in a variety of contexts over long periods of time. It involvesdialogue, analysis, and synthesis. Training, on the other hand, involves much more

task-specifi c instr ucti on on how t o t ypes of i ssues. Both are import ant , and each occupiesan ext remely valuable place in the wor ld of the pract it ioner . But in a rapidl y changing wor ldsuch as the one in which we live today, the half -li fe of t raini ng is almost assuredly shr inking.To the extent that t raini ng competes wit h educati ng for scarce learning t ime, the tensiongrows and the potent ial opportunity costs increase. Finding the proper balance between t hetwo is one of t he greatest chall enges we face at the SSC level. Whi le senior mi li tary leadersst il l requir e t raining in the use of specif ic systems and organizat ional r equir ements, makingroom for that in the curriculum competes with the expanding coverage required in otherareas. It is doubt ful that t he near future wi ll see any easing in t he tension inherent in thisrelationship.

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Methods.The pr imary teaching method we use at t he USAWC is based on the adul t l earning model.

In short , we learn from each other . We organize students int o core seminar groups of 17. Twoof those 17 students are officers from foreign countries. At least one of the students is acivilian. Each seminar has at least one air and sea component officer, and at least oneReserve or Guard officer. The remaining students are U.S. Army officers drawn fromdif ferent branches in such a way as to create as much diversit y as possible (combat arms,combat support , combat service support ). Each seminar is diverse in other ways too, wi th atleast one female and one minority student. The intent is clear: diversity in seminarcomposition enhances individual and group exposure to diverse views, opinions, andperspectives. The faculty members primarily serve as coordinators and facilitators of the

learning process, not as sources of knowledge and wisdom per se. Active learning throughdiscussion, dialogue, and debate characterize the approach, as opposed to more passivelearning techniques such as lectures. While a considerable amount of attention is paid totheory and general pr inciples, emphasis is almost always placed on t he applicat ion of thosetheor ies and pr inciples to practice (ei ther historical or contemporary). Shared experience is avalued commodit y in t he typical seminar.

Of course, this kind of approach to education is not equally possible at all levels oflearning. It is particularly well suited to our institution where the students on average areroughly 44 years of age, wi th 20 years of service behind t hem. Al l of t hem come here alreadyhaving earned an undergraduate degree, and about 75 percent of them already have

graduate degrees.

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Their age and years in service mean t hat they have a great deal to shareand a wide range of experiences to draw on for applying lessons learned. They requiresignificantly less structure and formality than many younger, less experienced studentsmight . At the same time, many of t hem need to see the pol icy or job-related relevance of t hesubject matt er before they wi ll ful ly engage that subject matt er . But a very hi gh percentageof all the students are highly motivated self-starters, and hard chargers. Educating theinternational security practitioner at this stage of his or her career certainly has itschall enges, but they are generally vast ly outweighed by the enthusiasm and matur it y t hat

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the students bring to the seminar envir onment. In that sense, it is a t ruly uni que teachingand learning environment, and general lessons and principles are hard to draw from ourexperiences to be applied at other levels of the educational process.

Conclusions.

Rather than summarizing what I have alr eady covered in t his chapter, let me concludewi th some general remarks about where I think the SSC piece of the pract it ioner educat ionprocess is headed. I begin wi th an observat ion: The quali ty of an i ndividual s response in acr isis sit uat ion wil l be a funct ion of the quali ty of the think ing conducted by that individualbefore the crisis ever arose. Training can help most in situations where specific steps andactions are replicated over and over again, and in that sense it can help our senior-levelpract it ioners most in terms of processes (designing and implement ing them). But t raining isof much less value when it comes to the thinking that must occur in the strategic-levelpract it ioner s envi ronment for which we are trying to prepare these individuals. Thi nk ing isa funct ion of exper iencethat whi ch you have done before, or that which you have studiedbefore. The broader the experient ial base (direct and indir ect), the greater t he l ikel ihood that

good, sound analysis, planning, and act ion wi l l occur . One does not necessari ly get the ri ghtanswers from having been there and done that or been there and studied that, but one ismuch more likely to ask the right questions. And it is much easier to get to the rightanswers when one asks the right quest ions than when one fail s in t hat fi rst , all-importanttask.

Our role in educating int ernat ional secur it y pract it ioners at the SSC level is increasinglygeared toward the asking the right questions approach to education. In effect, we aremoving closer to what I would characterize as an applied liberal arts graduate educationmodel. In doing that , we are moving (and in my opinion should be moving) fur ther awayfrom a professional t raini ng model. Our graduates wi ll only infr equent ly, i f at all , be called

upon to recite doctrine, procedures, and routines. Rather, they will be wrestling with issuesand seeking answers for questions for which there are no clear solutions or answers, andindeed multiple and contending approaches and options. Moreover, the very process withwhich they wi ll have to work wil l be simil arl y ambiguous in many ways (non-hierarchical,highly political, pluralistic, etc). What the curriculum needs to do is not prepare them fortheir next assignment , or even the assignment-after-next . Instead i t needs to prepare themto adapt, t hink on t heir feet , be flexible, and most of all , to think deeply and dr aw on a widerange of experience in order to sort out the best approaches, options, and processes for anygiven situation. In sum, we must prepare them to be strategic thinkers, leaders, andpractitioners.

What does this imply in terms of internati onal secur it y as a field of study, at l east from

the SSC perspective? In my opinion international security is not and should not be aseparate, interdisciplinary field of study. Rather, we should view it as the application ofdisciplinary thinking across disciplines to multidisciplinary challenges, problems, andissues. This is an important distinction. A separate interdisciplinary field of study wouldhave its own literature, its own methods, and its own jargon. The successful practitioner ofthe st rategic ar t who can simul taneously play t he thr ee roles we identi fied earl ier wi ll havegrasped the fundamentals of the various disciplines that come into play (history, politicalscience, military science, economics, and so on). Moreover, that successful practitioner will

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have soli d inst incts about which dimensions are most important in a par t icular problem at agiven point in t ime. I doubt that any two individuals so equipped would necessari ly come atthe same problem in t he same way independently of each other . But I have every confi dencethat both would be able to work their way through the problem and have a high l ik eli hood ofsucceeding because of the combinat ion of education and exper ience they would br ing t o the

process. In my vi ew, that is the kind of product we should seek i n our efforts to educate theinternational security practitioner of the 21st century.

Two leading scholars at Yale University made the following observation about therelati onship between educat ion and strategy today, and i t serves to highli ght t he educat ionalfocus of t he SSC cur r iculum:

The dominant tr end within universiti es and the think tanks is toward ever-nar rower specializa-t ion: a higher premium i s placed on functioning deeply wi th in a single field than broadly acrossseveral. And yet wi thout some awar

educating international security practitioners preparing to face the demands of the 21st century...

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