effective protection of intellectual property with drm ...€¦ · outsourcing increasing risks ......

19
Effective protection of intellectual property with DRM technology Dr. Gunter Bitz SAP Fraud Prevention Competence Center Teletrust Roundtable Feb, 5th 2007, San Francisco SAP AG 2007, SAP Fraud Prevention Competence Center / Dr. Gunter Bitz / 2 The Need for Enterprise RM The dissolving enterprise perimeter The data itself must be secured and controlled Outsourcing increasing risks External sharing of intellectual property Working with partners that work with your competitors Actions of employees Careless usage of e-mail & large distribution lists Intentional forwarding of information

Upload: others

Post on 20-Oct-2020

2 views

Category:

Documents


0 download

TRANSCRIPT

  • Effective protection of intellectual propertywith DRM technology

    Dr. Gunter BitzSAP Fraud Prevention Competence Center

    Teletrust Roundtable

    Feb, 5th 2007, San Francisco

    SAP AG 2007, SAP Fraud Prevention Competence Center / Dr. Gunter Bitz / 2

    The Need for Enterprise RM

    The dissolving enterprise perimeter

    The data itself must be secured and controlled

    Outsourcing increasing risksExternal sharing of intellectual propertyWorking with partners that work with your competitors

    Actions of employeesCareless usage of e-mail & large distribution listsIntentional forwarding of information

  • Collaboration with Externals

    Security & Trusted Computing

    Rights Management Technology overview

    Concept for Enterprise Rights Management

    Local Policy Enforcement: An Alternative

    Collaboration with Externals

    Security & Trusted Computing

    Rights Management Technology overview

    Concept for Enterprise Rights Management

    Local Policy Enforcement: An Alternative

  • SAP AG 2007, SAP Fraud Prevention Competence Center / Dr. Gunter Bitz / 5

    RM - How local Policy Enforcement works

    EncryptSet Policy

    AuthenticateRetrieve key

    Content policy and key stored

    Portal

    Repository

    E-mail

    Owner RecipientDataExchange

    Central control by Information owner

    Recipient cannot modify rights

    SAP AG 2007, SAP Fraud Prevention Competence Center / Dr. Gunter Bitz / 6

    DRM use cases / BC considerations

    Fulfill compliance requirements: SOX, HIPAA, Japan data & privacy act, …

    Data protection in outsourced business processes (e.g. 4R)

    Industrial espionage

    Disgruntled employees / Change of employment to competitors

    E-mails leaving company environment

    Cooperation with Externals (customer, partner)

    Board and Supervisory board meetings

    Insider information

    E-learning and documentation

    Admin password distribution

    Contract drafts, merger & acquisition

    IP and trade secrets

    Strategic development information

    HR data (salary, address)

    CRM data (opportunity pipeline)

    All data in content management systems

    Most use cases focus on small target groups

  • SAP AG 2007, SAP Fraud Prevention Competence Center / Dr. Gunter Bitz / 7

    Gartner’s Security Technology Hype Cycle

    Less than two years

    Two to five years

    Five to 10 years

    Key: Time to Plateau

    Technology Trigger

    Peak of Inflated

    Expectations

    Trough of Disillusionment

    Slope of Enlightenment

    Plateau of Productivity

    Maturity

    Visibility

    As of 15 February 2005

    Content Monitoringand Filtering

    Biometrics

    Security Compliance Tools

    Database Security

    Deep-Packet Inspection Firewalls

    EnterpriseDigital Rights Management

    Enterprise Federated Identity

    IAM

    Instant Messaging Security

    Managed Security Service Providers

    Patch Management

    EnterpriseReduced Sign-On

    NAC

    SSL VPNsSSL or Trusted-Link Security

    SEM andSIM

    SmartTokens

    Antispyware

    Trusted Computing Group

    Vulnerability Management

    Web Services Security Standards

    WPA Security

    Hardware Tokens

    Role Management

    Data-at-Rest Appliances

    Antiphishing

    Public Key Operations

    Business Continuity Software

    E-Signature

    Host IPS

    Network IPS

    Spam Filtering

    E-Mail Encryption

    Acronym KeyIAM = identity and access management SEM = security event management VPN = virtual private networkIPS = intrusion prevention system SIM = security incident management WPA = Wi-Fi Protected AccessNAC = network access contol SSL = Secure Sockets Layer

    Collaboration with Externals

    Security & Trusted Computing

    Rights Management Technology overview

    Concept for Enterprise Rights Management

    Local Policy Enforcement: An Alternative

  • SAP AG 2007, SAP Fraud Prevention Competence Center / Dr. Gunter Bitz / 9

    Enterprise RM: Integration ideas

    Editing RM Policies and assigning them to documents is time consuming!

    RM Policy depends on employee’s role & document type

    Identity Management System: Predefined roles for all document classification levels and

    document types

    Other Integration Points:Storage location of document in content management system

    Policy depends on initial storage location (data room concept)

    Dynamically generated contend (by ERP Systems)Keep existing authorization objects RM Policy

    SAP AG 2007, SAP Fraud Prevention Competence Center / Dr. Gunter Bitz / 10

    Integration: IAM with RM Policy Server

    Identity & AccessManagement

    • Business Intelligence• Data Warehouse

    RM Policy Server

    • ERP Applications• CRM• SCM

    • ContentManagement• Portals• File shares• Local Storage

    Client• strong Authentication required

  • SAP AG 2007, SAP Fraud Prevention Competence Center / Dr. Gunter Bitz / 11

    Identity Management Infrastructure with RM

    Email

    B2B Web

    ServiceDirectoryERPOffice

    DataAccess

    Pro-visioning

    Enterprise Network

    Directory Security

    Infrastructure Access

    End User Applications

    SAP AG 2007, SAP Fraud Prevention Competence Center / Dr. Gunter Bitz / 12

    Role based authorization model for RM

    Office-Applications

    Directory

    Service (IAM)

    Other

    Attributes

    Users

    Document

    Access-Rights

    RM Security Policy

    Documents

    Roles or

    Groups

    • Classification Level

    • Document Type

  • SAP AG 2007, SAP Fraud Prevention Competence Center / Dr. Gunter Bitz / 13

    Integration of Document Classification technologies

    Challenge: Automatic document classificationType of document and data

    Recipient / Target Group

    Classification level

    Employee’s role and position

    Possible Solution: Linguistic content scannersNo mature products available yet

    SAP AG 2007, SAP Fraud Prevention Competence Center / Dr. Gunter Bitz / 14

    Example: Integration with content management systems

    Content Management System

    1. check-in unprotected document

    2. authorization objects

    DRM policy server

    3. DRM policy

    Client(authorized)

    4. DRM protected document stored in

    system

    Client(authorized)

    5. client receives protected document

  • SAP AG 2007, SAP Fraud Prevention Competence Center / Dr. Gunter Bitz / 15

    A Typical Document lifecycle

    Archive /Destroy

    Publish

    EditCreate

    EachCycle:Triggerfor new

    DRMPolicy

    Set

    Point of Integration:

    Portal or ContentManage-

    mentSystem

    SAP AG 2007, SAP Fraud Prevention Competence Center / Dr. Gunter Bitz / 16

    Example: Integration with ERP Systems

    Application Serverwith DRM extension

    1. Data Export Request

    Client(authorized)

    2. Authorization Objects

    DRM Policy Server

    3. DRM Policy

    4. DRM protected data

    5. data forwarded to other clients (e.g. via email) Client

    (authorized)

    Client(not

    authorized)

    7. Read ok –Decryption Key issued

    8. Readnot ok

    6. read requests

  • Collaboration with Externals

    Security & Trusted Computing

    Rights Management Technology overview

    Concept for Enterprise Rights Management

    Local Policy Enforcement: An Alternative

    SAP AG 2007, SAP Fraud Prevention Competence Center / Dr. Gunter Bitz / 18

    Collaboration with Externals

    DocumentsAuthor: Company A

    • Company A is Author• Company B gets writeaccess• Company B gets no further rights

    Company A Company B

    • Company B can modifydocuments as defined in the collaboration• Company B cannot disclose information to 3rd party

  • SAP AG 2007, SAP Fraud Prevention Competence Center / Dr. Gunter Bitz / 19

    Challenges: 1. Interoperability

    2 PartnersMutual agreement vs.

    Law of the strongest

    Multiple Partners???

    SAP AG 2007, SAP Fraud Prevention Competence Center / Dr. Gunter Bitz / 20

    Smallsuppliercompany

    Interoperability between multiple customers

    Customer KRM Solution K

    Customer BRM Solution B

    Customer ERM Solution E

    Customer IRM Solution I

    Customer FRM Solution F

    Customer HRM Solution H

    Customer ARM Solution A

    Customer LRM Solution L

    Customer DRM Solution D

    Customer CRM Solution C

    Customer JRM Solution J

    Customer GRM Solution G

    HELP !!!!…we need aStandard!

  • SAP AG 2007, SAP Fraud Prevention Competence Center / Dr. Gunter Bitz / 21

    Interoperability: RM Standards

    XrML (eXtensible rights Markup Language),

    ODRL (Open Digital Rights Language) and

    XMCL (Extensible Media Commerce Language)

    BUT

    No interoperability between heterogeneous Policy Servers!

    No interoperability between Policy Server and non-native clientKey material (for document access) is stored on policy server of issuing entity

    Policy servers issue “read licenses” to their native clients only

    Collaboration with Externals

    Security & Trusted Computing

    Rights Management Technology overview

    Concept for Enterprise Rights Management

    Local Policy Enforcement: An Alternative

  • SAP AG 2007, SAP Fraud Prevention Competence Center / Dr. Gunter Bitz / 23

    Security: Attack Vectors 1

    Black Box Attack:Direct Attack to RM protected and encrypted document

    Direct Attack to RM Policy Server

    Both methods are Very difficult, require high skills

    If encryption is implemented flawlessly brute force onlyAES 128 is believed to be secure the next 50 – 60 years

    SAP AG 2007, SAP Fraud Prevention Competence Center / Dr. Gunter Bitz / 24

    Security: Attack Vectors 2

    Hardware & I/O

    Kernel

    Application / RM Client

    Drivers

    Prevent Policy Enforcement

    Grab output data

    Copy or modify memory

    All sort of bus attacks & “Analog Hole” problems

    Client AttacksClient Components

    Application / RM Client

  • SAP AG 2007, SAP Fraud Prevention Competence Center / Dr. Gunter Bitz / 25

    Microsoft: Protected Infrastructure for Multimedia

    SAP AG 2007, SAP Fraud Prevention Competence Center / Dr. Gunter Bitz / 26

    Trusted Computing: A possible solution

    Trusted Computing defines the secure and non-forgeable measurement of the state of a node.

    The node can change it’s status at will (from “secure” to “insecure”) but it can not deny of having done so.

    Attestation is performed for each part of code from start-up Integrity Measurement (of the node)

    This form of attestation can be performed remotely via network.

    Digital signatures proof correctness of measurement

    As of today: Available only for “secure startup”.

    Lack of a trusted operating system

  • SAP AG 2007, SAP Fraud Prevention Competence Center / Dr. Gunter Bitz / 27

    Rights Management with Trusted Computing

    TNC Specification of the Trusted Computing Group

    Collaboration with Externals

    Security & Trusted Computing

    Rights Management Technology overview

    Concept for Enterprise Rights Management

    Local Policy Enforcement: An Alternative

  • SAP AG 2007, SAP Fraud Prevention Competence Center / Dr. Gunter Bitz / 29

    Local Policy Enforcement

    DGServer

    DGComm (with IIS): Receives the activity data from Agents.The data are inserted into the DG Database.

    DGMC: DG Management Web interface.Database: Stores information for reporting, events, activities

    and other necessary functions of the DG system.

    DG Agent (Client PC)

    Administrator

    DGMC access1080/tcp to the server

    Communication requirement1080/tcp from the client to the server

    AD

    SAP AG 2007, SAP Fraud Prevention Competence Center / Dr. Gunter Bitz / 30

    Findings from Verdasys reports

    Activity – File Copy to Removable Media 1/2 Duration: 9/26-10/24

  • SAP AG 2007, SAP Fraud Prevention Competence Center / Dr. Gunter Bitz / 31

    Findings from Verdasys reports

    Application activity – file copy to removable media 2/2

    1. There were 8 activities detected by Verdasys on 10/15/2006

    2. Breakdown 7 explorer activities

    3. Break down the activity recordThe user seems backup D: and E: drive to external storage

    SAP AG 2007, SAP Fraud Prevention Competence Center / Dr. Gunter Bitz / 32

    Findings from Verdasys reports

    Activity – Network Upload of Files

    3. Break down the activity recordThe user seems to upload a completeweb page to a web server

    Duration: 9/26-10/24

    2. Breakdown ftpte activities

    1. There were 10,000 activities detected by Verdasys on 09/13/2006

  • SAP AG 2007, SAP Fraud Prevention Competence Center / Dr. Gunter Bitz / 33

    Pilot project: Process flow for file movement analysis

    Identification Monitoring Analysis Filtering Reporting

    Identification of

    confidential

    data sources

    (by folder level)

    by business

    owner

    (Mangers).

    A final report

    and a risk

    exposure

    estimation is

    produced

    Results (here:

    23,000 files)

    are (manually)

    filtered to

    identify critical

    files, which

    could endanger

    SAP’s business

    when disclosed

    Data is

    analyzed for

    files from

    confidential

    data sources

    which end up

    on insecure

    media (USB,

    CDR, Network)

    Digital

    Guardian tool

    records all file

    movement

    activity over a

    period of 2

    months for 500

    users

    SAP AG 2007, SAP Fraud Prevention Competence Center / Dr. Gunter Bitz / 34

    86%

    14%

    95%

    65%

    5%

    35%

    0%

    20%

    40%

    60%

    80%

    100%

    120%

    Files ending up on

    insecure devices

    compared to all file

    movements

    How many of the files

    ending up on insecure

    devices are

    confidential?

    Of all confidential files

    that are copied or

    moved, how many end

    up on insecure

    devices?

    All Files, secure Media

    All Files ending up on

    insecure media

    Confidential* files ending

    up on insecure media

    Confidential* Files,

    secure Media

    *Confidentiality is defined in terms of location, not content

    35% of accesses involving confidential shares lead to files ending up on insecure media

    File Movement Observed (qualitative)

  • SAP AG 2007, SAP Fraud Prevention Competence Center / Dr. Gunter Bitz / 35

    Conclusion & Outlook

    Trusted Computing will help to maintain control when sharing confidential information with partners / externals – but: not supported yet.

    Lack of Trusted Operating System weakens TC capabilities

    Interoperability of Rights Management Solutions required

    Integration of RM is key to success for mass usageIdentity & Access Management

    Content Management Systems

    ERP Systems

    Start with high risk areas today!

    Local Policy Enforcement as alternative for internal use

    SAP AG 2007, SAP Fraud Prevention Competence Center / Dr. Gunter Bitz / 36

    Effective Protection of IP (!?)

  • Thank you for your attention !Any questions ?

    Effective protection of intellectual propertywith DRM technology

    Dr. Gunter Bitz

    gunter “dot” bitz “at” sap “dot” com

    (E-Mails are welcome - SPAM is not)