effects based operations: applying network centric warfare in

Front Cover Graphic

About the CCRPThe Command and Control Research Program(CCRP) has the mission of improving DoD’sunderstanding of the national security implications ofthe Information Age. Focusing upon improving boththe state of the art and the state of the practice ofcommand and control, the CCRP helps DoD take fulladvantage of the opportunities afforded by emergingtechnologies. The CCRP pursues a broad programof research and analysis in information superiority,information operations, command and controltheory, and associated operational concepts thatenable us to leverage shared awareness to improvethe effectiveness and efficiency of assignedmissions. An important aspect of the CCRP programis its ability to serve as a bridge between theoperational, technical, analytical, and educationalcommunities. The CCRP provides leadership for thecommand and control research community by:

• articulating critical research issues;• working to strengthen command and control

research infrastructure;• sponsoring a series of workshops and

symposia;• serving as a clearing house for command and

control related research funding; and• disseminating outreach initiatives that include

the CCRP Publication Series.

This is a continuation in the series of publicationsproduced by the Center for Advanced Conceptsand Technology (ACT), which was created as a“skunk works” with funding provided by the CCRPunder the auspices of the Assistant Secretary ofDefense (C3I). This program has demonstrated theimportance of having a research program focusedon the national security implications of theInformation Age. It develops the theoreticalfoundations to provide DoD with informationsuperiority and highlights the importance of activeoutreach and dissemination initiatives designed toacquaint senior military personnel and civilians withthese emerging issues. The CCRP PublicationSeries is a key element of this effort.

Check our Web site for the latest CCRP activities and publications.

www.dodccrp.org

DoD Command and Control ResearchProgram

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (NII)&

CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER

Dr. Linton Wells, II (Acting)

PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (NII)Dr. Linton Wells, II

SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE ASD(NII)&

DIRECTOR OF RESEARCH

Dr. David S. Alberts

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied withinare solely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent theviews of the Department of Defense, or any other U.S. Governmentagency. Cleared for public release; distribution unlimited.

Portions of this publication may be quoted or reprinted withoutfurther permission, with credit to the DoD Command and ControlResearch Program, Washington, D.C. Courtesy copies of reviewswould be appreciated.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Smith, Edward Allen, 1946-Effects Based Operations: Applying Network Centric Warfare in Peace,

Crisis, and War / Edward A. Smith, Jr.p. cm.

ISBN 1-893723-08-9 (pbk.) -- ISBN 1-893723-08-9 (pbk.)1. United States--Military policy. 2. United States--Armed Forces. 3. Military art and science. 4. World politics--21st century. I. Title.UA23 .S5238 2002355'.033573--dc21

2002012910

1st Printing 20022nd Printing 20033rd Printing 2005

Effects Based Operations

Applying Network Centric Warfare in Peace, Crisis, and War

Edward A. Smith

I n f o r m a t i o n A g e T r a n s f o r m a t i o n S e r i e s

Table of ContentsAcknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .vii

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ix

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xiii

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xxi

Chapter 1. Why Effects-Based Operations? Military Operations in a New Security Environment . . .1

Chapter 2. Network-Centric Operations:The Starting Point . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .59

Chapter 3. What Are Effects-Based Operations? . . .103

Chapter 4. Shaping Behavior: Operations in theCognitive Domain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .157

Chapter 5. The Rules of the Game: Putting Effects-Based Operations into a Real-World Context . . . . . .193

Chapter 6. The Challenge of Complexity . . . . . . . . . .231

Chapter 7. From Dealing with Complexity ToExploiting It . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .295

Chapter 8. Dynamic Effects-Based Operations: TheChallenge of Effects Assessment and Feedback . . .353

Chapter 9. Effects Beyond Combat: Deterrence and Reassurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .409

Chapter 10. Putting the Pieces Together:An Operational Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .445

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Chapter 11. Network-Centric Contributions to Effects-Based Operations: Options, Agility,Coordination, and Knowledge Mobilization . . . . . . . .501

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .547

About the Author . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .557

Catalog of CCRP Publications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .CAT-1

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List of FiguresFigure 1. Forward Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8Figure 2. Symmetry of Means and Will =Symmetric Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30Figure 3. Asymmetry of Means and Will . . . . . . . . . . .33Figure 4. Asymmetric Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .34Figure 5. Probability Equation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .39Figure 6. Comparing the Two Approaches . . . . . . . . .43Figure 7. Self-Synchronization andSpeed of Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .78Figure 8. The OODA Cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .80Figure 9. Speed of Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .82Figure 10. Synchronizing OODA Cycles toMass Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .86Figure 11. Coordinated Attack…Then What? . . . . . . .88Figure 12. Coalition Operations: International Self-Synchronization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .89Figure 13. OODA Cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .118Figure 14. Interaction Between OODA Cycles . . . . .119Figure 15. Battle of Midway (June 1942) . . . . . . . . .121Figure 16. How? Out of Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .125Figure 17. Compression of Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .128Figure 18. Multiple Overlapping Cycles . . . . . . . . . . .129Figure 19. How? Time Compression +Multiplying Cycles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .131Figure 20. Result: Lock Out . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .132Figure 21. Defining the Edge of Chaos . . . . . . . . . . .136Figure 22. Defining the Edge of Chaos . . . . . . . . . . .138

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Figure 23. Operations on the Edge of Chaos . . . . . .140Figure 24. Battle of Trafalgar (1805) . . . . . . . . . . . . .142Figure 25. Intersecting Edges of Chaos . . . . . . . . . .147Figure 26. Edge of Chaos – Three Axes . . . . . . . . . .149Figure 27. Three Domains of Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . .161Figure 28. Operations in the Physical Domain . . . . .162Figure 29. Operations in the Information Domain . . .165Figure 30. Operations in the Information Domain . . .168Figure 31. Operations in the Cognitive Domain . . . .175Figure 32. Sensemaking and Decisionmaking . . . . .178Figure 33. Reactions in the Physical Domain . . . . . .180Figure 34. Action-Reaction Cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .183Figure 35. The Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .197Figure 36. Basic Building Block:Action-Reaction Cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .207Figure 37. Action-Reaction Cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .224Figure 38. From Action to Observer . . . . . . . . . . . . .235Figure 39. Observable Attributes of Physical Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .236Figure 40. Kinds of Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .257Figure 41. Combining Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .268Figure 42. Tactical Level Balance of Effects . . . . . . .269Figure 43. Operational Level Balance of Effects . . . .270Figure 44. Military-Strategic Level Balance of Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .271Figure 45. Geo-Strategic Level Balance of Effects . .273Figure 46. From Actions to Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . .276Figure 47. Unity of Effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .283Figure 48. Relative Weight of Effort . . . . . . . . . . . . .285Figure 49. Different Actions, Different Timelines . . . .286

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Figure 50. Coordination Requirements: Planned vs. Self-Synchronization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .288Figure 51. Creation of Overall Effect . . . . . . . . . . . . .299Figure 52. Effects Cascades: Physical Action to Direct Physical Effect . . . . . . . . . .313Figure 53. Effects Cascades: First Cascade of Indirect Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .313Figure 54. Effects Cascades: Second Cascade of Indirect Physical Effects . . . . . .313Figure 55. Effects Cascades: Cascade of Indirect Psychological Effects . . . . . . . . .315Figure 56. Effects Cascades: Derivative Cascades of Indirect Psychological Effects . . . . . . . .317Figure 57. Effects Cascades: Bounding Complexity by Pruning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .325Figure 58. Effects Cascades: Pruning Psychological Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .329Figure 59. Effects Nesting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .333Figure 60. Effects Nesting: Multiple Overlapping Nests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .335Figure 61. Coalition Nesting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .339Figure 62. The Cognitive Cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .387Figure 63. What is Observable? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .389Figure 64. How Do We Observe? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .394Figure 65. Deterrence, Reassurance, and theCognitive Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .417Figure 66. Libyan Crisis (1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .449Figure 67. Nesting: Tactical Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .456Figure 68. Attain Document I and II (Libya 1986) . . .459Figure 69. Nesting: Operational Level . . . . . . . . . . . .461Figure 70. Nesting: Military-Strategic Level . . . . . . . .471

Figure 71. Different Actions, Different Timelines . . . .477Figure 72. Effects Nesting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .479Figure 73. Freedom of Navigation Operations(Libya 1987) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .507Figure 74. Shared Situational Awareness . . . . . . . .510Figure 75. Communities of Expertise:Libya (1986-7) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .518Figure 76. “Context” in the Cognitive Domain . . . . . .523

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AcknowledgmentsIn writing this book, I was privileged to be able todraw upon the work of the Information SuperiorityWorking Group (ISWG) sponsored by the Office ofthe Secretary of Defense, upon the “SensemakingWorkshop” sponsored by the ISWG and theAmerican Institute for Aeronautics and Astronautics,and the “Effects-Based Operations Workshop” ofJanuary 2002, in all of which I participated. Theideas presented also draw upon my own lessonslearned from directing an extended series ofRevolution in Military Affairs (RMA) Wargamesconducted under the auspices of the Chief of NavalOperations and the Office of Net Assessmentbetween 1995 and 1998. Similarly, these ideas drawupon lessons learned from participating in theeffects-based operations play in the Navy’s GlobalWargames of 1999, 2000, and 2001.

I wish to express my special gratitude to Dr. DavidAlberts of the Office of the Secretary Defense (C3I)who suggested the book and then providedcontinued encouragement during its writing, and toVice Admiral (ret) Arthur Cebrowski, U.S. Navy,who both instigated my initial effects-based studiesduring his tenure as President of the U.S. NavalWar College and then encouraged me to proceedwith the book when he assumed duties as Directorof Force Transformation. I am and will always begrateful to Mr. John Garstka, Director of Conceptsin the Office of Force Transformation, to Dr. DavidSignori of Rand Corporation, to Dr. Mark Mandeles,

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President of the de Bloch Group, and Mr. JohnRobusto, Director of Network Centric Warfare atthe Naval Air Warfare Command who volunteeredto read this work and who provided valuableinsights and suggestions.

Similarly, thanks are due to Dr. Richard Hayes,editor Joseph Lewis, graphic artist Bernard Pineau,and researchers Eric Cochrane and Brian Davis ofEvidence Based Research, who lent discipline tomy meanderings and put the work in a readableform. Special thanks are also due to Dr. GordonSmith and my colleagues at Boeing’s WashingtonStudies and Analysis office, who not onlyencouraged me to proceed with the writing but alsoassumed part of my workload to enable me to doso. Finally, I owe a particular thanks to my wife,Marie-France, who endured my “middle-of-the-night-inspirations-that-simply-have-to-be-written-down-right-now” and a home office that was formany months littered with books and papers.

However, all views expressed herein are theauthor’s own and do not reflect either upon thesesources or upon the Boeing Company.

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PrefaceIt is fitting that this, the third book in our Information

Age Transformation Series, be about effects-basedoperations (EBO). The first book in the series,Information Age Transformation, takes the view thatDoD transformation is, in essence, about becomingan Information Age organization. The second bookin the series deals with experimentation and arguesthat we need to modify, if not replace our somewhatlinear requirements, doctrine development, and testand evaluation processes. This third book speaksdirectly to what we are trying to accomplish on the"fields of battle" and argues for changes in the waywe decide what effects we want to achieve and whatmeans we will use to achieve them.

Adaptation to the Information Age will requirechanges in the following four dimensions: missionspace (what the military will be called upon to do),environment (the conditions, constraints, and valuesthat govern military operations), concepts (themilitary business model or the way we do what wedo), and the business side of the DoD (the way theorganization supports value creation). EBO is aboutthe first two of these four dimensions while NetworkCentric Warfare (NCW) addresses the last two.Hence, EBO and NCW form a synergistic treatmentof military transformation. They deal with the why,what, how, and support of military operations.

Both EBO and NCW are, at their core, very simpleideas. Yet EBO, like NCW, often seems to be

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mischaracterized and misunderstood, much to thechagrin of its proponents. One theory that seeks toexplain this notes that in the Cold War era, views ofnational security and the role of the military becamenarrowly focused. A military was to deter aggressionand, if necessary, fight and win our nation's wars.Wars were implicitly defined as conflicts amongcoalitions of professional militaries. In many ways,Industrial Age warfare was very symmetric: air to air,tank to tank, submarine to submarine. Warfare andanti-warfare. Loss exchange ratios and FEBAmovement made sense in this context. In otherwords, measures of attrition and territory, bothdirectly related to military actions, made sense. Putanother way, the means had merged with the effects.

Fast forward to now. The mission space and theenvironment in which we operate have changedsignificantly. No longer are the missions we arecalled upon to participate in purely or evenpredominantly military. The effects sought in manymissions require a balance of military and non-military means to achieve. Thus, the tight couplingthat once existed between means and effects existsno longer. But despite this reality, the former tightcoupling between means and effects continues topermeate mindsets, processes, and measures. EBOserves to remind us that means and effects need tobe explicitly linked, that traditional means may not beappropriate, and that we need to once againbroaden our view of military operations.

EBO enables us to apply the power of NCW not justto traditional combat, as many are inclined to do, butto go beyond kinetic means to consider means in the

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information and cognitive domains to create effectsin the cognitive domain across the full missionspectrum in peacetime and crisis responseoperations as well as in combat. EBO shifts ourfocus from targets and damage to behavior and thestimuli that alter behavior. As Dr. Smith argues, thisbroad multilevel interaction will form the basis of anew strategic deterrence.

Dr. Smith's blend of theory and practice explains andillustrates the why and how of EBO and its naturallinks to NCW. Upon completing the first three booksin our Information Age Transformation Series,readers will have a comprehensive overview of whatDoD transformation is all about and an idea abouthow to go about the business of transformation.Future books in this series will take a look at specificaspects of an Information Age transformation,including a look at a reconceptualization of C2.

David S. Alberts

Director, Research OASD(C3I)

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ExecutiveSummary

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001fundamentally changed our security

environment. The system of strategic deterrence inplace since the beginning of the Cold War visiblycollapsed. In place of mutually assured retaliationcame the threat of terrorists armed with weaponsof mass effect whom we may not be able to identifyand who have no homeland at risk. The existing“balance of terror” became, with September 11th,unbalanced. Now we are trying to fashion a newstrategic deterrence that relies not so much onretaliation as on prevention, either stopping theterrorists outright, deterring the sponsors, orconvincing them that terror cannot succeed.Where strategic nuclear deterrence was the sinequa non of the Cold War, this new prevention-based deterrence demands a balanced applicationof both civil and military power to shape behavior.This shaping of behavior is the essence of effects-based operations.

To help us deal with the pressing problems of thepost-September 11th world, we have three ongoingtechnological revolutions in sensors, informationtechnology, and weapons. We can use thetechnologies simply to achieve incrementalimprovements in force effectiveness. But to do onlythis would miss their real potential. These

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technologies can enable us to think differentlyabout how we organize and fight. Indeed, this iswhat network-centric operations are about. But thisis not enough. Network-centric operations are ameans to an end. Their true impact derives fromhow they are applied. Narrowly applied, they wouldproduce more efficient attrition, yet they clearly cando much more. The concept of effects-basedoperations is the key to this broader role. It enablesus to apply the power of the network-centricoperations to the human dimension of war and tomilitary operations across the spectrum of conflictfrom peace, to crisis, to war, which a new strategicdeterrence demands.

Defining Effects-Based OperationsThe broad utility of effects-based operations growsfrom the fact that they are focused on actions andtheir links to behavior, on stimulus and response,rather than on targets and damage infliction. Theyare applicable not only to traditional warfare, butalso to military operations short of combat. Effects-based operations are not new. Good generals andstatesmen have always focused on outcomes andon the human dimension of war (e.g. will andshock). Indeed, we can trace how the principles ofeffects-based operations have functioned inhundreds of crises and conflicts to distill astraightforward definition:

Effects-based operations are coordinated setsof actions directed at shaping the behavior offriends, foes, and neutrals in peace, crisis,and war.1

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The concept of effects-based operations focuses“coordinated sets of actions” on objectives definedin terms of human behavior in multiple dimensionsand on multiple levels, and measures their successin terms of the behavior produced. The “actions”include all facets of military and other nationalpower that might shape the decisions of “friends,foes, and neutrals.” Military actions, for example,might include air strikes, but also include a host ofother military actions such as the role of maneuver,a major aspect of almost all crisis operations.Actions encompass operations “in peace, crisis, andwar,” not just combat.

If we look closely at real world crisis and combatoperations, some rules of thumb for effects-basedoperations quickly emerge. Actions create effectsnot just on the foe but also on anyone who canobserve them. Effects can occur simultaneously onthe tactical, operational, military-strategic, andgeo-strategic levels of military operations, indomestic and international political arenas, and inthe economic arena as well. Effects cannot beisolated. All effects, at each level and in eacharena, are interrelated and are cumulative overtime. And lastly, effects are both physical andpsychological in nature.

Operations in the Cognitive DomainEffects-based operations can be described asoperations in the cognitive domain because that iswhere human beings react to stimuli, come to anunderstanding of a situation, and decide on aresponse. To create an effect, an action first must be

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seen by an observer who will then interpret it andunderstand it against the backdrop of his or her priorexperience, mental models, culture, and institutionalties, and translate this perception into a “sense” ofthe situation. Finally, this sense will be balancedagainst the options perceived to be available toproduce a set of decisions and the reactions thatconstitute a response or “behavior.” This cycle ofactions and reactions will be repeated many times atmultiple levels during the course of a crisis, a war, oreven a peacetime interaction.

The cognitive cycle suggests three levels ofcomplexity in effects-based operations.

First, we must somehow orchestrate our actions topresent a particular picture to the observer.However, the observer will see not only what we dobut also how we do it (e.g. the scale of our action, itsgeographic and operational scope, its timing, speed,duration and synchronicity). But, he will see onlythose facets of the action that his data andinformation collection capabilities permit.

Second, we must be able to identify a link betweena particular action or set of actions and the effect weseek to create. But cognitive processes contain somany variables that we cannot reliably trace a causeand effect chain from a specific action to a specificreaction. Therefore, we need to think in terms of thekinds of potential physical and psychological effects(e.g. destruction, physical attrition, chaos,foreclosure, shock, and psychological attrition).These categories are not mutually exclusive but areelements in an overall effect that will vary from one

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situation to the next, from one level to the next, fromone observer to the next, and over time.

Third, since effects are interrelated, the directeffects we create will tend to cascade intosuccessions of indirect physical and psychologicaleffects in ways that are different and not entirelypredictable. Physical effects will tend to cascade inthe manner of falling dominoes while psychologicaleffects will tend to cascade almost explosively,limited only by the speed and scope ofcommunications. Our operations may exploit thesecascades to amplify the impact of our actions, orwe may have to control them so as to preventunwanted collateral effects.

To plan and execute effects-based operations, weneed not know exactly how an observer will think orpredict exact outcomes. Our object is to identify aseries of the most likely outcomes that are sufficientfor planning. For this, we need to know the nature ofthe stimulus we are creating and the decisionmakingproblem it will present to observers, friend and foealike. And, we need to know something of theobservers’ decisionmaking processes in order tounderstand the influences upon their decisions, suchas institutional biases and prevailing mental models.Given this knowledge, we can estimate how thevarious aspects of our actions might be perceivedand what options might be considered in response.

We must also be able to adapt agilely to changingsituations. For this, we will require feedback as towhether our actions had the direct effect intended,and as to any change in behavior created. But how

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do we get this feedback? Clearly, there are manyparts of the cognitive process we will not be able toobserve. Nonetheless, there are observables wecan exploit. If an action involves destruction,damage assessment is an index of whether thedirect effect sought was achieved. Similarly, asystem’s physical performance can provide an indexof direct effect. Likewise, assessment of anorganization’s performance can provide an index ofits reaction to the stimulus. Finally, we might take acue from indications and warning intelligence andaggregate large numbers of small indicators, anyone of which might be meaningless by itself, butwhich can provide feedback on behavior whencombined in the proper algorithm.

Network-Centric Operations:Options, Agility, Coordination,Knowledge MobilizationDespite its complexity, the above is not animpossible task. We have been dealing with thesechallenges on an ad hoc basis throughout history.The good news is that we now can tap thetechnologies and thinking of network-centricoperations to provide the four key ingredients ofsuccessful effects-based operations: options, agility,coordination, and knowledge mobilization.

OptionsThe ability to link diverse and geographicallyseparated capabilities offers decisionmakers a widerange of options to tailor our actions precisely to a

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situation and set of observers so as to increase theirimpact. In a sense, networking permits the attrition-based metric of probability of kill (Pk) to be replacedby an effects-based metric “Po,” in which the “o” isthe probability of a given capability producing auseful option to deal with a given situation.

AgilityThe responsiveness of networked forces withshared awareness and speed of command providesthe agility to adapt to an intelligent adversary’sactions by enabling us to shape and reshape ouroptions and actions amid the give-and-take of battleand crisis operations.

CoordinationShared situational awareness and understandingof command intent, coupled with the capacity forsynchronization and self-synchronization, enableus to coordinate complex actions and effects thatwill produce a unity of effect across levels andarenas in which diverse actions build on eachother synergistically.

Knowledge MobilizationFinally and most importantly, success in effects-based operations will hinge on how well we mobilizeknowledge and expertise to bear so as to providetimely, relevant support to decisionmakers at alllevels. Flexible, responsive networking can bring thisbreadth of knowledge to bear.

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In brief, network-centric operations are indeed ameans to an end, and effects-based operations arethat end.

1Effects-based operations are not defined in terms of aprocess because we logically cannot describe a procedure forplanning and executing effects-based operations until wehave first defined what those operations are.

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IntroductionCome the Revolution…

As Chief of Naval Operations, the late AdmiralMike Boorda was pressed time and again to

support a seemingly endless succession of newsystems and platforms, each usually promoted byadvocates attempting to portray their system interms of some fashionable but only half-understoodconceptual buzzword. Boorda’s frustrated responseto these “opportunities” was the pointed observationthat “it sure would be nice if we had some clear ideawhat it was we were trying to do first.”

Over the past several years, we have seen asuccession of new civilian and military technologiesand a series of new concepts. We have beenoffered the prospects of “force transformation” anda Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) in various andsometimes competing forms. We have beenconfronted with the technologies of the informationrevolution and their application to something calledNetwork Centric Warfare or network-centricoperations. We have been asked to understandsome apparently new concepts variously termedeffects-based warfare, effects-based targeting, andeffects-based operations. Quite understandably,this onslaught can leave us puzzling over how thesepieces might fit together. Like Admiral Boorda, weare left trying to separate the worthwhile andnecessary elements of the proffered transformationfrom those that would serve little purpose.

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The key to dealing with this dilemma, as Boordaobserved, is having some clear idea of what it iswe are trying to do. Given the sweep and profoundnature of the changes we face both in technologyand in our security environment, especially afterSeptember 11, 2001, if we are to obtain that “clearidea,” then we must proceed from the widestpossible perspective and work our way down tothe specifics. This approach is needed becausethe big picture encompassed by this wideperspective provides the context within which wecan begin to understand and evaluate the changesbeing proposed. It provides a way of identifyingwhere the pieces of the puzzle might fit, includingthose otherwise apparently irrelevant pieces thatmay prove critical to new ways of doing things.Also, it can give us a way of figuring out whatpieces are missing and thus, what we need toinvent and build if we are to succeed. In short, itcan give us some sense of the direction and a setof priorities for getting where we want to go, whichis the first step in any meaningful transformation ofour military capabilities.

The purpose of this book is to begin to define oneaspect of this big picture: how network centric-operations and effects-based operations fittogether, and how they complement one another inmeeting the needs of the new securityenvironment. The starting point for this definition isthe hypothesis that Network Centric Warfare andnetwork-centric operations are not ends inthemselves, but means to an end. They are tools tobe applied to military operations. Their valuederives as much from how we use them as it does

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from what they are. The concept of effects-basedoperations, of using military operations to shapethe behavior of friends, foes, and neutrals in peace,crisis, and war, provides such an application.

Unlike network-centric operations, which haveemerged from the technologies and thinking of theInformation Age, effects-based operations are notnew. Their roots can be traced back for centuriesand are what good generals and statesmen havealways attempted to do. When combined withnetwork-centric thinking and technologies, however,such an operational approach offers a way ofapplying the power of the network to the humandimension of war and to military operations in peaceand crisis, as well as combat. In essence, effects-based operations represent an opportunity to usenetworked forces to achieve nonlinear impacts andto expand the scope of action across the entirespectrum of conflict.

The focus in this book will be on defining the effects-based side of this equation. This focus reflects howthe emerging literature on Network Centric Warfarehas already done much to define the network-centricequation, but that there is no equal grasp of whateffects-based operations are or how the two mightbe related. This book attempts to explain effects-based operations by constructing what might betermed an extended working hypothesis. It is not adefinitive answer. We are too early in the process ofdefining network-centric operations, effects-basedoperations, and the requirements for a 21st-centurymilitary to generate one. Instead, the workinghypothesis offers one logical way of assembling the

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pieces. Because any hypothesis is by natureimperfect and tentative, it must be broad enough toevolve as the technologies and the concepts of bothnetwork-centric and effects-based operationsevolve. Indeed, a hypothesis with a broad reach inthought is likely to serve as a sound guide for whatwe are trying to do.

To support this working hypothesis, this book will relyheavily on common sense examples drawn frommilitary history. These are calculated to convey afundamental understanding of the enduring militaryprinciples and ideas behind both network-centricand effects-based operations.1 They are intended asa jumping-off point for the more detailed operationsresearch that must still be done, and not as definitivestudies in themselves. However, the use of historicalexamples has another important use. It highlightsthe point that many of the ideas and principlesinherent in both network-centric and effects-basedoperations are not new, but represent freshapplications and refinements of accepted, tried andtrue military thinking.

Transformation There has been much discussion about the need fora transformation of American military forces to takeadvantage of the new technologies of theInformation Age and to better enable those forces tohandle the challenges of the post-September 11thepoch. But what is transformation? In his bookInformation Age Transformation: Getting to a 21stCentury Military, Dr. David Alberts describestransformation as “a process of renewal, an

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adaptation to environment”2 and points to both thechanges in technology and the post-September 11thsecurity environment as the driving forces behindtransformation. He then goes on to lay out howNetwork Centric Warfare is the key to thetransformation of a still largely Cold War military intoan effective force for the 21st century. Where doeffects-based operations fit in this transformation?

In creating a working hypothesis for effects-basedoperations, we will start with a form of transformationwhich has received much attention, the Revolution inMilitary Affairs. We will postulate that transformationconstitutes a sharp break with the accepted way ofwaging war that enables one force to conclusivelydefeat another.3 Such a framework is useful notbecause Network Centric Warfare and effects-basedoperations purport to be a true RMA (it is still tooearly to tell and, in any event, the transformation ofa large military force is anything but rapid). Rather,the two concepts may be “revolutionary” becausethey propose a new form of warfare that mightenable us to “conclusively defeat” an enemy. Thelessons and caveats attached to the RMA thereforebecome factors to be considered in determining howwe approach and implement network-centric andeffects-based operations. They likewise provide anindex of just how “transformational” the concepts ofboth Network Centric Warfare and effects-basedoperations really are (or aren’t).

The most widely used example of a Revolution inMilitary Affairs is the 1940 blitzkrieg in which theGerman Army defeated the French and BritishArmies in northern France. The new “military”

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technologies4 embodied in the radios, tanks, andclose air support of the blitzkrieg were available toboth sides in the struggle (actually, the British andFrench had more and better equipment than theGermans). But the Germans combined these newmilitary technologies with a new, highly mobileconcept of warfare, trained and organized theirforces accordingly, and then devastated theiropponents on the battlefield.

The example of the French and British debacle in1940 provides two warnings that apply to any would-be revolution or transformation and to network-centric and effects-based operations:

• First, new military technologies, no matter howsophisticated, are not by themselves sufficienteither to create an RMA or to deal with one.Unless the technologies can be translated into arevolution in warfare concepts, doctrine, andorganization they will fall short of (or even fallprey to) a genuine RMA poised against it.Moreover, to the extent that new technologiesgive us an unfounded confidence that the old“tried and true” doctrine and concepts of warfarestill work, they may conspire against us.

• Second, any successful RMA must function atmore than the tactical level. At a purely tacticallevel, France’s Maginot Line worked quite well.German forces did not come through itsdefenses. The fortifications remained intact andmanned until France itself surrendered. TheGerman blitzkrieg, on the other hand, workedbecause it generated sufficient shock to cause

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a collapse of resistance within the Frenchpolitical and military leadership, who thensurrendered even though the means forconducting a continued resistance from NorthAfrica were at hand.5 Similarly, American forcesin Vietnam were able to inflict defeat afterdefeat upon the Viet Cong and NorthVietnamese military forces, but were unable totranslate those defeats into a victory over NorthVietnam. As long as it remains possible to winall the battles and still lose the war, an RMAmust clearly have a strategic and operationaldimension as well as a tactical application if itis to succeed.

However, there is also a third warning to be drawnfrom both the French Revolution and Vietnam: theRevolution that overturns the existing way of warmay not involve “new” technologies at all. The lévéeen masse that yielded the victories of the Frenchrevolutionary armies and Napoleon was not basedon new technologies, but upon the application ofstandard 18th-century military technologies on apreviously inconceivable scale. The need to sustain,move, and control such a large mass of forcesnecessitated changes in concepts of operations,doctrine, and certainly in the organization andcommand of the forces. Those changes andNapoleon’s reorganization of the French state tosupport such an extensive military effort were thecore of the Napoleonic RMA, and did not rely uponany new technologies possessed by the French.

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Similarly, a military revolution might also center on areturn to an older form of warfare, where that olderform takes advantage of an opponent’s relativeinability to undertake a particular form of combat.General Giap’s adaptation and application of Maoistprinciples of guerrilla warfare to defeating the UnitedStates in Vietnam might be classed in this category.Such guerrilla warfare required little application ofnew technology and deliberately avoided engagingU.S. Industrial Age forces in massed battles.Instead, North Vietnam’s strategy centered on usinga protracted, low level war to wear down Americanresistance at home.6 Notice that in both theNapoleonic and North Vietnamese examples, thefocus was not a different application of technologiesas in the blitzkrieg, but something even more basic,an asymmetric concept of warfare. The approach towarfare used was revolutionary because it was ableto meet and negate the impact of the strongest andmost sophisticated armed forces of the day. It wasnot the nature of the means that was revolutionary;it was the result.

These warnings are clearly applicable both tonetwork-centric, effects-based operations, and to thesituation in which we have found ourselves as anation since September 11, 2001. They tell us thatthe new thinking involved in the concepts is asimportant or more important than new technologies,and that a tactical-level revolution, however good itmay appear, is not enough to win wars or to keep thepeace. Similarly, any transformation that does notextend beyond new technology and systems totactics, doctrine, organization, and concepts seemslikely to fall short of revolutionary change. Moreover,

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if either or both the technology and the thinking failto address the real uses to which the forces are to beput in a strategic environment, they are doomed toultimate failure.

However, there is another dimension to thedistinction between technologies and conceptsthat is essential to understanding both the natureof transformation and the nature of NetworkCentric Warfare and effects-based operations. Inthe 1940 blitzkrieg debacle, we can distinguishbetween two different revolutions.

On the one hand is what might be termed a MilitaryTechnical Revolution (MTR), that is, the impact ofnew technologies and systems on existing conceptsof warfare.7 On the other hand is a Revolution inMilitary Affairs, that is, the application of thosetechnologies to new tactics, doctrine, andorganization and to a new concept of warfare. Thisdistinction between new technology and newthinking is particularly pertinent to our own situationin exploring the potential of Network Centric Warfareand effects-based operations. Consider that the newtechnologies of the Information Age are not anAmerican or Western monopoly, just as the radio,the tank, and aircraft were not a German monopolyin 1940. In actuality, the technologies that supportNetwork Centric Warfare and, indeed, the entiretransformation we seek to create either are availableon an open worldwide arms market or, even moreimportantly, are military adaptations of widelyavailable civilian technologies. Indeed, in a macabresense, this is what the airliner hijackings ofSeptember 11th represent.

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As this suggests, we have no monopoly on change.The strategic environment that we face is onemarked by a single internationally available Military-Technical Revolution that nations and even non-state actors will try to adapt to their particular needswith new concepts, doctrine, and organization. Eachwill try to create their own unique form of a RMA,often with us as the focus.

Furthermore, given the declining prices of thetechnologies of the information revolution, thethreshold for access to this international MTR is nolonger the possession of a world-class research andproduction capability. It is simply the availability ofenough money to purchase the makings of a localcapability and the ingenuity to operate the pieces asa system. As the terrorist attacks of September 11,2001 indicate, that amount of money may be sominimal (the price of pilot lessons, airline tickets, andbox-cutter knives) as to put the operation within thereach of even small groups and can be especiallydeadly whenever the will of those groups is greatenough to generate people willing to commit suicideto further its ends. Even more ominously, if theterrorists have access to weapons of mass effecteither independently or through state-sponsors, thethreat may assume strategic proportions.

The keys to understanding and anticipating thesewould-be revolutions are likely to be assessingwhich technologies are likely to be chosen from thisinternational grab bag and how they might be puttogether. In this context, the crucial determinant ofthe success or the failure of a future would-benetwork-centric or effects-based revolution is likely

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to lie in understanding the limits of both theconcepts and technologies in meeting differentstrategic needs.

A Reality CheckThese factors point to six common sense caveatsthat we will need to bear in mind as we attempt tounderstand the implications of Network CentricWarfare and to trace a theory and concept of effects-based operations.

1. Network-centric and effects-based operationsmay change the character of warfare; they cannotchange the nature of war.

Coercion and manipulation will still be fundamentalaspects of warfare and of military operations short ofcombat. Likewise, new concepts and technologieswill not change the strategic imperatives that drivenations and non-state players in war and peace.Thus, the military solutions postulated in network-centric and effects-based operations will only besuccessful to the degree that they enable us to dealwith these imperatives in peace and in war.

2. Network-centric and effects-based operations arenot a substitute for military force.

Network-centric warfare and effects-basedoperations are about enhancing the impact andeffectiveness of military force in a given tactical,operational, or strategic context. Success will bejudged on the basis of results achieved rather thanthe novelty of the means used. A display of long-range precision bombing skills may be

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technologically impressive, but it will be of little usein coercion unless the targets that are struck hold asufficient importance for the enemy eitherindividually or in their aggregate to create thedesired coercive effect. Similarly, however quicklywe may move, and however successfully we remaininside an adversary’s decision loop, the advantageof speed of command will avail nothing unless itenables us to do something to the enemy as a result.

3. Others will react.

Our network-centric and effects-based operationsconcepts and technologies will not and cannot bedeveloped in splendid isolation and then sprung onan unsuspecting enemy. The technologies involvedare too widely available and the discussions of theirpotential uses are too widespread for this to be arealistic possibility. The real question is not whetherwould-be challengers will react to our efforts topursue network-centric and effects-basedoperations, but when, where, and how.

No prospective challenger can be expected toremain static and unchanging in the face of theefforts we are making. Therefore, if we use the newconcepts to “fight the last war,” if we study them inthe context of past victories rather than pastdefeats, or if we measure them against anopponent who thinks and fights as we do (or evenworse, as we would have him fight), we will yieldany advantage to would-be foes who will nothesitate to exploit any vulnerabilities we havedemonstrated. Indeed, others are already lookingintently at the technologies that we are examiningand adapting them to their own needs.

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This implies that the development of network-centricand effects-based operations in the United Statesand the West will come as part of a protractedinteractive process in which both we and ourpotential challengers are players. In this give andtake, each side may be expected to adapt itstechnologies and thinking to evolving developmentson the other side.8

4. Network-centric and effects-based operations arenot a universal answer.

Network-centric and effects-based operations willnot simply replace all other older forces and formsof warfare. They will open some new warfareniches even as they close others. And, the verynature of military competition should make it clearthat would-be foes will attempt to exploit anywarfare niche in which they believe the UnitedStates and its allies cannot successfully engage.Logically, these would-be foes will see exploitableniches wherever network-centric and effects-based operations are least applicable. Urban andguerrilla warfare, counter-terrorism operations,peacekeeping efforts, and hostage rescues arejust a few examples. Even if aided by newtechnologies, such operations will remainmanpower intensive and casualty prone and thus,attractive niches to be exploited by would-be foes.

To deal with these ever-changing challenges, wewill still require a balance of military capabilitieseven as some of those capabilities becomemarkedly better. The challenge will be to figure outhow our concepts of Network Centric Warfare andeffects-based operations apply to these challenges

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and enhance our ability to deal with them. The moreapplicable network-centric and effects-basedoperations are across the spectrum of conflict, thegreater will be their impact.

5. Numbers still count.

New technologies, Network Centric Warfare, andeffects-based operations do not remove “mass” fromthe military equation, but may reduce the mass ofthe military power needed to produce a given result.The desired outcome is still a decisive result, andsome finite quantity of actions will be needed toachieve it. Sensor and information technologies, forexample, can multiply the effect of each weaponfired by ensuring that each hits the right target at theright time, but some number of targets must still bestruck to have the desired effect.9 Similarly, aneffects-based approach to warfare may enable us toachieve a nonlinear impact on the enemy, but somenumber of actions will still have to be undertaken toachieve that impact.

6. What if network-centric and effects-basedoperations don’t work as planned?

Too many discussions of new technologies andconcepts seem to assume that some form of aclose-ended, one-time, limited objective strike orseries of strikes will be decisive, and that asustained campaign and/or the occupation ofenemy territory will not be necessary (clearly nottrue in the U.S. operations in Afghanistan). Yet inour quest for some new blitzkrieg, we must alwaysask, what if the conflict turns out to be more like1914 than like 1940?

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The lessons of 1914 pose a very different set of“what ifs”:

• What if we must deal with an enemy so vast thateven the most effective targeting effort mustnecessarily assume a very considerablescale?10

• What if intelligence is so poor that it cannotidentify which targets might be decisive?

• What if there are no such targets?

• What if the enemy is so determined that hecontinues to fight in spite of the damageinflicted?

Even with all the new technologies of a militarytechnical revolution, and even with a matureconcept of a new kind of swift, precise war, we maystill become embroiled in a long, large-scaleconflict, or conversely in a protracted low-intensityconflict.11 How would network-centric and effects-based operations function under these conditionsand how would they contribute?

Since September 11, 2001, there is a new urgencyin all of this. Transformation is no longer anacademic exercise or another buzzword in defenseacquisition. Rather, it is something toward which weare impelled by a basic change in our securityenvironment that is every bit as profound and far-reaching as that of the beginning of the Cold War in1947-1949. That change pitted the West against aninternational communist adversary armed withnuclear weapons in a balance of terror that enduredfor 40 years. Now, we face a security environment in

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which there is no such balance upon which to build.Terrorist opponents armed with weapons of masseffect can place our largest cities at risk, but there islittle that we can place at risk in response. This timewe must somehow fight a very asymmetric conflictwhose focus from beginning to end will be in themind of man.

It is already clear that the tools of the Cold War willnot suffice to wage this war. We must, therefore,transform. But we must equally take care as to howwe transform. As in the case of France in 1940, thereis no second chance. Even the promise of network-centric operations will avail us little if they are appliedto sharpening the tools of past wars or tools topursue the wrong objectives.

This is where the concept of effects-basedoperations comes in. Effects-based operations focuson the mind of man. They are not a replacement fornetwork-centric operations; rather they are thegateway to applying the tools of network-centricoperations to the threat we now face, an asymmetricconflict that must be won in the mind of man.

The note of urgency behind the transformationshould tell us something else as well. Thetransformation embodied in network-centric andeffects-based operations cannot await the arrival ofsome new technology 20 years hence. Instead,network-centric and effects-based operations mustbe an application of both those technologies that wenow possess and those new technologies we cancreate. In this sense, for all of the urgency, thisprocess will remain more of an evolution in militaryaffairs than a sudden revolution.

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Getting ThereIt is worth noting that the Revolution in Military Affairsembodied in the blitzkrieg did not simply occur on itsown. It was created. It required careful thought,considerable debate, and extensive effort totransform the German military of 1918 into that of1940. Because of the internal soul-searchinginvolved in such an effort, it is far easier to winsupport for radical change when the externalpressures leave little room for anything else. Thiswas certainly the case for Weimar Germany.However, such radical thinking and action areespecially hard for a dominant power to undertake.12

The very successes that produced its rise workagainst it. Admonitions such as “don’t mess withsuccess,” and “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” becomethe rule of the day. This is far more than simply aconservative reaction. It is a recognition of themagnitude of the gamble that is involved in changingfrom a military structure and strategy that hasworked and yielded the current dominance, to anapproach that is new, untested, and may not work.

Here again is a reason for examining NetworkCentric Warfare and effects-based operations from alarger perspective. If we are to make an intelligentgamble on the future, we must understand not onlyhow these concepts apply at the tactical level, butalso how they enhance the nation’s military power asa whole and enable it to better meet its strategicneeds. However, here we have an advantage. Ifeffects-based operations are not new but arestatement of hallowed military principles used bysuccessful commanders and statesmen from time

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immemorial, then there is a large historical databasethat we can examine for clues as to how to proceed.This database also makes it plain that thesecommanders succeeded because they were able toapply the tools they had available to the problem ofshaping a foe’s behavior, much as we will be doingin the immediate future. One objective of this bookwill be to better define a broad unified concept andtheory of effects-based operations so that we canbetter understand where and how the current toolsof network-centric operations can be applied todoing just this.

Organization of This BookThis book starts by considering the asymmetricchallenges posed by the new security environmentof the post-September 11th world and the limitationsof traditional attrition-based approaches to warfarein meeting them. It lays out a rough paradigm forlooking at how Information Age technologies, theconcept of Network Centric Warfare, and effects-based operations relate to one another. It thenproposes a basic theory for behavior-based effects-based operations and derives a rule set fromhistorical real world operations. The examples arethen used to explore the three levels of complexityinherent in effects-based operations and therequirements for effects-based feedback tocommanders. The concept is then extended to thepeacetime missions of forward deterrence andreassurance. All of the pieces of the effects-basedpuzzle are in turn put together to look at an extendedoperational-level example. Finally, this book reviews

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the implications that effects-based operations holdfor the further development of Network CentricWarfare and how the resulting network-centric andeffects-based operations might contribute to thecreation of a more effective homeland defense in theemerging security environment.

1Many (but by no means all) of these examples are drawnfrom naval history. This should not be surprising given theauthor’s extensive background in the United States Navy andthe tendency of all authors to focus on what they know best.However, the examples used are chosen to demonstrate aset of problems and solutions that extend far beyond theNavy or the Naval Service and that reflect the problems theUnited States military forces in general face in planning andexecuting effects-based operations 2Alberts, David S. Information Age Transformation: Getting toa 21st Century Military. Washington, DC; CCRP. 2002. 3As originally defined by Andrew Krepinevich, a Revolution inMilitary Affairs is a sharply discontinuous change in theefficacy of certain forms of military power stemming from theintroduction of new technologies, concepts, doctrine andmodes of organization. Krepinevich, Andrew F. “Cavalry to Computers: The Patternsof Military Revolutions.” The National Interest. Fall 1994.P.30ff. 4The evolution of two of these 1940 technologies (the radioand the airplane) depended about as much on innovationswrought by civilian industry as they did on improvementsundertaken by government. 5The alternative advocated by de Gaulle and others was tomove the entire French Government and as much of theFrench armed forces as possible to North Africa. This wasstaunchly opposed by the Vice Premier Marshal Pétain and acorps of defeatists in the National Assembly who voted to stayin France and later voted Pétain into power. 6It might be argued that guerrilla warfare was the RMA of thelatter half of the 20th century as it brought down first the greatcolonial empires, then fought the United States to a standstill,and finally laid the seeds for Soviet collapse. 7If we consider terrorism as a form of warfare, then the useof airliners as large guided missiles would fall into this

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MTR category.8How long might the advantages that accrue from network-centric and effects based operations last before a reactionnullified much of its impact? In general, the bigger thechallenge the RMA poses, the greater will be the efforts tocounteract it, and the shorter the time it will retain a dominantadvantage on the battlefield. Conversely, the more radicaland overwhelming the RMA and the more difficult anyattendant MTR is to replicate, the greater will be the impactand the longer the advantage is likely to last. While the impactof the blitzkrieg and the levee en masse lasted for twodecades or less, the Western projection of military power bysea and the follow-on creation of Industrial Age militarycapabilities so overwhelmed the non-European world that theadvantage endured for several centuries. The long-termsuccess accrued less from the military technologies than fromthe fact that they evolved from a European societal andeconomic structure that was difficult to replicate. Hence, theyand the colonial and mercantile empires they supportedlasted until Japan, a nation that had successfully adapted theessential elements of European culture that gave them rise,finally challenged them.9The contribution of information and knowledge superiority isthat the more open to question the targeting is, the more it willbecome necessary to increase the number of strikes to havea reasonable chance of damaging those targets that will yieldsuch a decisive impact. Conversely, if the quantity ofweapons used fell to zero, the impact of that superiority,however fast or omniscient it may be, will still fall to nothing.However, there is still more to the equation. The impact of numbers is not restricted to tactical exchanges.The more our RMA depends on a very limited number ofprecisely targeted weapons or actions, the more tempting itwill be for an enemy either to calculate the damage he mightincur and dismiss it, or to deal with the precision by presentingan overwhelming number of targets. Even more disturbingly,the fewer weapons we have available, the greater will be thepressure for us to gamble on targeting a very limited numberof elusive and, perhaps, illusionary “golden” nodes (singlepoints of failure calculated to bring enemy resistance to a halt)simply because there are not enough weapons for anythingelse. The danger of course is that, if we have guessedincorrectly, there are no further options. A highly focused attack may work whenever the enemy isweak or his will is not great, and the destruction necessary tobe decisive is relatively small. But the reality is that the biggerand more dangerous the opponent, the riskier it will become to

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base our strategy on assumptions about the fragility of enemywill. Such assumptions are themselves notoriously fragile and,if faulty, are more likely to lead to defeat than victory.10The German invasion of Russia in June 1941 is a case inpoint. The force of the blitzkrieg that overwhelmed Poland in1939 and France in 1940 was simply absorbed in thevastness of Russia, the same problem which had confrontedNapoleon’s RMA in 1812. The defeat of those enemy forcesthat could be engaged and the destruction of theinfrastructure that could be reached in both cases was notdecisive. The Russians refused to succumb, were able togenerate more forces, and retained sufficient additionalinfrastructure beyond the reach of the invaders to continue tosustain armies in the field. A similar problem might confrontthe United States in the case of a war with China.11Desert Storm succeeded as a new style conflict onlybecause it ended when it did. Had allied forces been requiredto move from the open spaces of the desert into the heavilypopulated areas of Iraq, or had they been compelled toconduct house-to-house fighting in Kuwait City, much less inBasra or Baghdad, the resulting warfare would not have beenswift and decisive, even if the final outcome remained thesame. The cases of Vietnam or of World War II Russia areonly marginally different in this regard.12This is very much evident in the countervailing casepresented by Great Britain in the interwar years. AlthoughBritain entered the 1920s with superiority in all of thetechnologies that combined to sustain the blitzkrieg, andalthough Britain had initiated many of the concepts involved,it ultimately failed to transform its military in anyrevolutionary way.

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CHAPTER 1

Why Effects-BasedOperations?

Military Operationsin a New Security

EnvironmentNetwork Centric Warfare and network-centric

operations1 are not ends in themselves. Theyare the means to an end. For them to have value,they must be applied to military operations, and theymust improve the capacity of those operations toaccomplish some strategic, operational, or tacticalobjective. Our working hypothesis is that effects-based operations (military operations directed atshaping the behavior of foes, friends, and neutrals inpeace, crisis, and war) constitute the conceptualframework for this two-step process of turning ournetwork-centric capability into a national advantage.2

In essence, effects-based operations provide the“end” for our network-centric “means.”

Effects-based operations are not new. Goodgenerals, admirals, and statesmen have focused on

1

using military forces to shape the behavior of friendsand foes for centuries. What is new is the potentialapplication of network-centric thinking andcapabilities to such operations. As suggested above,we must address two aspects of this marriage ofnetwork-centric and effects-based operations: whatare the strategic, operational, and tactical objectivesto be attained; and how might network-centric andeffects-based military operations help us to realizethose objectives? It is appropriate, therefore, tobegin to answer the question “why effects-basedoperations?” by looking at our emerging securityenvironment and the requirements that network-centric and effects-based operations must meetbefore beginning to discuss the nature of thoseoperations in the following chapters.

The New Security Environment:September 11 and BeyondThe terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001fundamentally changed our security environment.The system of strategic deterrence3 that hadfended off any serious attack on our homelandsince the onset of the Cold War, and that hadprovided stability in a changing world, visiblycollapsed. The Cold War face-off between powerfulnation-states was replaced by a threat from non-state terrorists, potentially armed with weapons ofmass effect, and dedicated to overturning whatthey perceive as an unacceptable status quo. The“balance of terror” tipped in favor of the terrorists.We now face the challenge of fashioning a newbalance that relies less on the threat of retaliation

Effects-Based Operations2

and depends more on some form of prevention:stopping the terrorists outright; deterring their state-sponsors; and convincing all who would exploitterror that it cannot succeed.

These tasks demand changes in how we create andapply military power. The paradigms of the Cold Warmilitary order are no longer adequate. Whereasstrategic nuclear deterrence had been the sine quanon of Cold War strategic deterrence, the newsecurity environment calls for a more nuancedapproach depending heavily on a forward,prevention-based, conventional deterrence and thebalanced application of civil and military power.Where Cold War military effectiveness tended to bemeasured in terms of the destruction of forces andinfrastructure, Information Age effectiveness is likelyto focus on force agility and the ability to provide awide range of options in peace, crisis, and war.

The ThreatThe most pressing threats of the new securityenvironment are violent reactions to the world’smovement toward a single international systemmarked by the free movement of people, investment,goods, and ideas. The attacks of September 11thand the overt hostility toward what is perceived to bea heavily American globalization make it plain thatthis evolution will be neither easy nor withoutsignificant peril. Yet, this movement is not so much afunction of American efforts to promote any ideologyas it is due to the attraction that many aspects of theWestern economic model hold. Notwithstandingrecessions and inequities, the complex adaptive

Chapter 1 3

economic system that we call free enterprise hasproven to be a much more efficient producer ofgoods and services than command economies ormore traditional economies, an efficiency thatmanifests itself in the increased quantity of goodsand services available. It is the promise not of massconsumption but of consumption by the masses, theidea that everyone can aspire to material goods anda better life, that is attracting support for change. Inaddition, the introduction of new informationtechnologies stands to further enhance thisproductivity and attraction. America may aspire toinfluence the direction and timing of this change, butit cannot control it.

Democratic government, the complex adaptivepolitical system, is the necessary complement to thiscomplex adaptive economic system. Again, thereason is practical rather than ideological.Responsive government is needed to cope with theaccelerating pace of political and social change thataccompanies the free market and information-drivenglobalization, both to curb the potential abuses of thefree market system and to enforce the competitionthat drives increased efficiency. In essence, it is the“feedback loop” that focuses the economic effort andensures that efficient free enterprise does not sinkinto inefficient monopolies or corrupt oligarchies.

The movement toward a new international systemhas also been marked by an expanding informationrevolution and the spread of the free, mass culture ofthe West, abetted by a pervasive global mediawhose reach has been further expanded by therevolution in information technology (embodied in


the Internet). This media revolution has not onlyheightened demand for the goods that a moreefficient free market economy can bring, but alsoincreased demand for more open and flexiblegovernment. Again, the information revolution is notthe result of any American effort to createdemocratic bastions, support the free press, orpromote information technology. Rather, it resultsfrom the spread of the information itself and theresulting increased awareness around the world ofhow life might be different and how governmentsmight be better. This awareness lends force to theentire movement for change, political and economic,as well as social.

The course of this internationalization has not andwill not be smooth. Expectations raised by theexpanding media will exceed the ability ofgovernments and economies to deliver.4 There willbe violent reactions and often destabilizing changesin established cultures and institutions. And, thosewho oppose change will see conflict as a way todisrupt the movement toward globalization. The anti-Western violence of al-Qaida is only onemanifestation of a problem that is likely to continueas long as the process of globalization continues.5

Herein lies the threat to American security. TheUnited States can control neither the movementtoward a new international system nor the violentreactions to it, yet the United States, its citizens, andits interests will clearly be a principal target. To makematters worse, the free trade and travel that are partof globalization make the United States and theWest vulnerable in ways that they have never beenbefore. Ocean barriers are no longer protection

Chapter 1 5

against terrorism in an era of mass air travel and stillmore massive trade.

Amidst this turmoil, a strategy of “forward defense”takes on a new meaning, and the traditional militarymissions of deterrence, presence, and crisisresponse take on a new significance. Over the past50 years, the United States’ forward defensestrategy has rested on three pillars: the economy,politics and culture, and the military. SinceSeptember 11, 2001, this strategy has taken on anew urgency. The pace of the transition in which weare engaged is likely to be at least in part a functionof the internal and regional stability surrounding it.The greater the instability and conflict, the slower thepace is likely to be and the more prolonged thethreat to the United States. By aiding the transition toa successful and speedy conclusion, we thereforelessen the danger to ourselves at home and abroad.The forward strategy thus rests on a paradox. It mustseek both stability and highly-disruptive change.How then do military forces contribute?

The Military RoleThe lasting solutions to the unrest wrought byglobalization are political, social, and economic innature, not military. This is because the root causesof the instability are themselves political, social, andeconomic in nature.6 Thus, the United States and theWest can influence global evolution only to thedegree that their businessmen, teachers, diplomats,and journalists are free to play a role. But, thesevaried roles, like the change as a whole, demand abasic local stability in order to succeed. While our


Chapter 1 7

forward military forces certainly may have a role ininfluencing local militaries, their crucial role is not asan agent of change. Their real role is to createand/or reinforce the stability that political, social, andeconomic change requires. The role of militaryforces is not to solve all of the social, political, andeconomic dilemmas; it is to buy time.

Military forces buy time in a very immediate sense bydealing with the symptoms of unrest: meetingthreats to American and Western nationals;containing crises; supporting local efforts to handleunrest; and countering opportunistic threats fromother local states. However, perhaps the mostsignificant military contribution is not dealing with thesymptoms of instability, but acting as the forwarddeterrent that underpins long-term stability, a forcewhose presence and capabilities support anenduring peace within which change can occur.

We can conceive of the economic, socio-political,and military roles in forward defense as a series ofoverlapping circles, depicted in Figure 1. Eachelement has a distinctively different function in thestrategy. Each overlaps and supports the otherelements. These overlaps are instructive. Forexample, by opening new markets, businessmenalso engage in people-to-people contacts that helpto expand the cultural and political frontiers. Yet,despite the overlap, the role of the businessmanclearly remains economic. Similarly, a diplomatmight aid business in opening new markets orexpanding investments while continuing to executeU.S. policy. This overlap of functions is also apparentin the military domain. One role of military forces in

forward defense, for example, may be to keep theseas safe for commerce. Another may be to engagepeople-to-people contacts, e.g. exercises with localmilitaries. However, while each of the latter rolesmay be important, they describe only those areas inwhich the military role overlaps and directly supportsthe economic and political elements. In this sense,they are missions that are peripheral to the actualand most critical military role of creating andmaintaining the basic local stability. It is this role ofdeterrence and crisis response that is the truecontribution of the military pillar.

In describing this role and the context of effects-based operations, our problem is complicated by


Figure 1. Forward Defense

the fact that we tend to look at military efforts interms of reactive operations such as theevacuation of American nationals threatened bylocal terrorism, or crisis responses to block localaggression. Such operations deal with thesymptoms of the instability and the incipient failuresof local deterrence.7 As such, they are but one partof the real contribution of constructing and actingas the guarantor of local stability.

Strategic Deterrence and the NewSecurity EnvironmentPost-September 11th strategic deterrence has twodimensions: homeland defense and forwarddefense, deterrence and containment. During theCold War, strategic deterrence tended to bedefined predominantly in terms of strategicnuclear deterrence. This is certainlyunderstandable given the stakes involved in anuclear conflagration, however this strategicnuclear deterrence was paralleled by a broaderdimension that might be termed conventional ornon-strategic nuclear deterrence.8 Both remain afundamental part of our security, but the latterdimension in particular lies at the heart of ourpost-September 11th problem and the need foreffects-based operations.

Strategic Nuclear Deterrence The nuclear deterrence of the Cold War rested onthe threat of retaliation. It worked because eachnuclear-armed power could threaten opponents

Chapter 1 9

with a set of consequences so catastrophic thatneither side stood to gain. This “balance of terror”was the basis for mutual deterrence. As secure,second-strike capabilities emerged, and with themthe perceived ability to retaliate even if the otherside managed to deliver the first blow, this threat ofassured retaliation became the “security” of amutually assured destruction (MAD) which ColdWar arms control agreements even codified intotightly written rules, replete with inspections toavoid technological surprises that might upset thedeterrence system. Despite a number of tenseCold War military confrontations, theconsequences of a nuclear exchange combinedwith the acknowledged difficulty of controlling theescalation of even a tactical nuclear exchangemade nuclear conflict unlikely.

However, the very scale of the consequencesinvolved in MAD set a credibility threshold. Anuclear war that would result in the annihilation oflarge portions of the population on both sides couldonly be credibly threatened to the degree that theissue at hand threatened the nuclear power’sexistence as a nation.9 In essence, decisionmakersapplied a “rational man” approach to MAD andconcluded that no rational decisionmaker wouldaccept the risk of such destruction for any but a life-or-death, vital national interest. Hence, if thethreatened national interest was less important, thethreat of nuclear war would become less credible.Beneath this sliding and somewhat uncertainthreshold, there remained considerable room forconflicts in which vital interests were not engagedand, thus, in which strategic nuclear capabilities


were largely inapplicable.10 The strategic nucleardeterrents tended to cancel each other out beneaththe credibility threshold and, within this sub-threshold region, each side was relatively free topursue conventional conflicts with peripheralpowers in Vietnam and Afghanistan, the Czech andHungarian Revolutions, and the Grenada operation.

What then has changed? The stability of Cold Warstrategic nuclear deterrence rested in part on twofacts: that an attacker could be immediatelyidentified; and that the attacker had roughlyequivalent forces or population at risk.11 These factsassured the nuclear response and gave the regimeof strategic deterrence much of its stability. Sincethe end of the Cold War, the problem has shifted tothat of deterring a non-state adversary armed withweapons of mass effect and acting either alone oras the surrogate for some hidden state sponsor.Such an adversary has little at risk in such anattack. Indeed, the attack may be difficult to trace toa specific actor, state or non-state. Thus, thestability of assured retaliation has become aprecarious balance between one side’s ability toinflict an attack using a weapon of mass effect andthe other side’s ability to prevent it.

Conventional Deterrence12

This new strategic deterrence quandary poses achallenge to how we think about military powerbecause it suggests that we must somehow deter astrategic attack with conventional military forces. Inessence, it reverses the Cold War primacy of militaryforces in which strategic nuclear forces were the

Chapter 1 11

sine qua non of homeland security and bothconventional deterrence and the forces to support itwere considered a “lesser included case.” In the faceof the new threat to homeland security, it is nucleardeterrence that becomes almost a “lesser includedcase” of conventional deterrence. Forwarddeterrence, the maintenance of regional stability,and the containment of local crises that spawn bothterrorists and their state support have become thekey to assuring homeland defense to a degree neverbefore seen.

However, we must be careful. Conventionaldeterrence is not simply a miniature version of itsnuclear cousin with conventional weaponsdestroying pre-planned lists of targets. Rather, itdiffers significantly from nuclear deterrence in itscomplexity, its logic, and its execution.13 At the heartof all deterrence is the question of who and what areto be deterred. In the case of Cold War strategicnuclear deterrence, this who and what tended to berelatively straightforward. By contrast, conventionaldeterrence encompasses a seemingly infinite andconstantly changing variety of whos and whats, butfew theories as to how to deter. Where the primarychallenge in Cold War strategic nuclear deterrencewas a symmetric opponent in the context of a majorconflict, the what of conventional deterrence can beeither asymmetric or symmetric, and thus can rangefrom a terrorist cell to a large-scale conventional war,such as Desert Storm. Similarly, the who can rangefrom a peer nation to urban terrorists and otherideological, ethnic, or religious non-state actors.


The logic of conventional deterrence revolvesabout two factors: the threat of unacceptableretaliation; and the ability to prevent a would-befoe’s success.14

Retaliation

Like its strategic nuclear counterpart, conventionaldeterrence can rely on the threats of retaliation.We may threaten something a would-be enemyholds dear, using the same logic as strategicnuclear deterrence. However, where nuclear armshold whole societies at risk, conventional weaponsare limited to more finite targets or actions thatonly in some vast aggregate might purport to holda whole society at risk. The key question in anythreat of retaliation with conventional weapons istherefore: what precisely does the opponent holddear? In some cases, that question may beanswered with lists of targets. But, in the case ofnon-state actors or even states that simply do nothave vulnerable forces, populations, orinfrastructure, the problem again devolves to aquestion of understanding what factors play in thecognitive process of the leadership (e.g., thesurvival of the organization), and then threateningthose vulnerabilities in some way.

Retaliation may also take the form of escalation,threatening to expand the conflict beyond theconfines of a foe’s desired battlespace. However,where the threat of nuclear escalation involves thecrossing of a catastrophic threshold, in conventionaldeterrence this is more likely to be a process ofprobing and testing the limits of response. As this

Chapter 1 13

implies, the more flexible the capabilities of thedeterrent force are, the more likely it is that thechallenger’s probe will be unsuccessful, and histhreat will become less credible.

Over the years, the potential for conventionaldeterrence has been multiplied by a succession ofdevelopments. The development of precisionweapons made it possible to destroy very specifictargets reliably without a large-scale effort. Then,nodal targeting of the weapons bolstered the impactof precision weapons by enabling warfighters tofocus destruction where it would create the greatestimpact. Finally, the introduction of cruise missilesmeant that these precision strikes could beaccomplished without risking personnel, whichmade the political credibility of a threat far greater.Each of these elements has made retaliation withprecision weapons appear to be increasinglyattractive as a staple of conventional deterrence.However, a closer examination is warranted.

In fact, retaliation-based conventional deterrenceruns into some of the same problems encounteredin nuclear deterrence. It has a credibility threshold.The less direct the challenge is to the interests ofthe state threatening to retaliate,15 the less credibleany threat of a large-scale retaliation is likely to be,just as in the case of the doctrine of massiveresponse.16 But, there is a Catch-22 aspect to this.As the magnitude of the damage that can becredibly threatened decreases, the consequencesand risks attached to the enemy action alsodecrease. And, the lower the risks, the more likelythe deterrence is to be tested, as long as the


adversary perceives the risks to be manageable.This suggests that as long as the challenger cancontrol the level of conflict to avoid a large-scalereprisal, he would have considerable freedom ofaction. By contrast, if a challenger’s probes were tobe met with a tailored, graduated responseincluding the possibility of vertical or lateralescalation, his risks would rise substantially.

To make retaliation still more difficult, all these risks-versus-gains calculations are likely to be heavilycolored by what the adversary decisionmaker wantsto see and by a consequent tendency to rationalizeaway the possibility of retaliation entirely or tominimize its impact. The more intellectually isolatedthe adversary decisionmakers are, the more likelysuch rationalization is likely to occur.17 By extension,the greater the degree of rationalization is, the morelikely a challenge will be to occur.

As the above strongly suggests, threats ofretaliation at the conventional level are likely to beeither difficult or ineffective as deterrents, especiallyin confrontations with asymmetric opponents.

Prevention

The more successful approaches to conventionaldeterrence appear to revolve around prevention:the foreclosure of any reasonable prospect of aquick or sure success.18 Prevention thereforeinvolves closing any military, political, temporal, orgeographic niches19 an adversary might seek toexploit. Logically, if would-be foes perceive that theycannot succeed in a course of action, then they will

Chapter 1 15

probably consider it pointless to proceed. Suchforeclosure applies both to their dealings with otherlocal powers and to dealings with a global powerable to intervene in their area.

At the heart of foreclosure are the questions of whatconduct we are trying to deter, and how anadversary might use the capabilities at his disposalto create and/or exploit a military, political, temporal,or geographic niche. That is, successful preventionhinges on our ability to identify the nature anddimensions of potential niches and demonstratingthe capabilities to prevent the niche competitor fromsucceeding. Moreover, this construct is asapplicable to confrontations with non-state terroristorganizations as it is to states.20 Notice that thisconstruct is open-ended on several levels. It doesnot necessarily imply a military-on-militaryconfrontation or a formal campaign of any sort,although both may be part of an effort to foreclose. Itdoes not necessarily imply a violent use of militaryforce, though the actions of military forces are verylikely to be part of any response. It will likely involvesome mixture of political, military, and perhapseconomic action to deal with a prospective niche thatmay itself contain such elements. And finally, theclosure of the niche may depend either on an activeforeclosure in which specific moves are counteredby specific counter-moves, or on a passiveforeclosure in which the continuing local securitycalculus itself discourages challenges.

The above discussion outlines a general frameworkfor the complex and multi-faceted strategicdeterrence we will need to pursue in the post-


September 11th security environment. It is astatement of the problem to which network-centricconcepts and effects-based operations will beapplied. In this sense, it is one part of the “end”toward which our network-centric “means” will bedirected to produce a result. We still have todetermine how the “means” will be applied to thetasks involved. This leaves us once again with thequestion: why effects-based operations? In essence,what would an effects-based application of network-centric concepts and capabilities contribute tosolving the problems of the new securityenvironment that our current approaches to warfarelack? To answer these questions, we need tounderstand what our current approach to warfare is,and just as importantly, how it has shaped ourthinking about military power.

Attrition-Based Warfare,Asymmetric Conflict…and the NewSecurity EnvironmentFor better or for worse, our current approach towarfare, and thus to implementing a forward defensestrategy and creating a post-September 11thstrategic deterrence, remains largely focused on thedestruction of an opponent’s physical capacity towage war.21 That is, it remains attrition-based. Suchattrition is neither wrong nor necessarilyinappropriate. However, it is essential to ourcomprehension of the potential synergies ofnetwork-centric and effects-based operations thatwe understand why we have come to rely onattrition. Such understanding is inhibited by the fact

Chapter 1 17

that the term “attrition warfare” has a distinctlypejorative ring to it. Attrition warfare or attrition-based warfare is usually presented as thetechnological and conceptual antithesis of“revolutionary” military thinking or, indeed, as theform of warfare that network-centric and effects-based operations seek to replace. Or, it is still morenarrowly used to describe a particularly bloody styleof warfare epitomized by the World War I battlesaround Verdun.22 Such easy dismissal yields littlereal understanding of what attrition warfare is, why itwas adopted, or how effects-based operations mightprovide an alternative. Was attrition warfare simply ahorrifically bad strategic choice? Or, was it dictatedby some strategic imperative that made it a lastresort? And, if the latter, how might network-centricand/or effects-based operations provide us withbetter choices?23

The first step in the process of understandingattrition is to recognize that attrition warfare, even inits bloodiest form, is neither a product of theIndustrial Age nor of the modern nation-state. It hasbeen found throughout history. Indeed, the ThirdPunic War between Rome and Carthage (198 B.C.)can be said to be the archetype of a total war,attrition warfare carried to its logical but extremeend. In that war, Rome defeated the Carthaginianarmy, destroyed the city of Carthage, andslaughtered its citizenry or sold them into slavery.By so doing, the Romans removed all of thephysical means by which Carthage might wage war:men, arms, and agricultural infrastructure. Nomatter how much the surviving Carthaginians mayhave wanted to continue their struggle with Rome,


they were rendered physically incapable of doingso. The driving force behind the totality of thisdestruction was a mutual hatred between Romeand Carthage that was pursued so implacably bythe citizen soldiers of both states through asuccession of wars that, as the Roman SenatorCato kept insisting, there was no alternative but thatCarthage be destroyed.24

The evolution of the modern model of attritionwarfare that has so shaped our thinking followed asimilar logical trajectory. Although the modernconcept of the citizen soldier arguably dates from theEnglish Civil War and the early colonial and Frenchand Indian Wars in North America,25 it finds itsclearest expression in the French Revolution’s lévéeen masse. The impact of mass conscription uponEuropean warfare was profound. Whereas most18th-century wars had been fought with relativelysmall, highly trained, professional “precision” armies,the lévée produced very large citizen armies drivenby patriotism. Napoleon harnessed the militarypower of the lévée both by altering French militaryorganization and doctrine to permit mass maneuverwarfare and by reorganizing the French state andeconomy so as to be able to sustain enormousarmies in the field.26 The nationalistic underpinning ofthe lévée posed a problem for Napoleon’sopponents because, to defeat Napoleon, they had todefeat not just Napoleon or his army, but the Frenchnation as a whole, much as Rome found it necessaryto destroy Carthage to defeat it.27

This same dilemma was at the root of the U.S. CivilWar, and of the two World Wars. To the mass

Chapter 1 19

conscription and nationalism of Napoleonic masswarfare, these three wars added the resources ofIndustrial Age economies. The greater wealth,technology, and manufacturing capacity provided away of regenerating and re-equipping defeatedarmies even as the growth of mass democraciesreinforced the nationalism supporting large-scaleconscription. However, the combination ofnationalism and mass democracy also had anotherconsequence. With large numbers of citizen soldiersdying in battle and entire populations involved in thewar effort, it became increasingly difficult to accept18th-century style negotiated settlements, such asthe Congress of Vienna that ended the Napoleonicwars. Instead, wars were propelled to the infinitelymore difficult goal of unconditional surrender. Inessence, if government is truly to be “of the people,by the people, for the people,”28 then it is no longersufficient to defeat the opposing army in the field, for“the people” will simply generate a new army, asboth France and Carthage had repeatedly done.Rather, to defeat a government of the people, youmust wear down the people’s resistance, or destroytheir ability to put new forces in the field.29 30 Duringthe Civil War, General Grant dealt with thisunpalatable strategic necessity by trying to weardown the South’s physical capacity to make war bykilling or capturing its soldiers and destroying theirsupport and re-supply infrastructure.31 By placingunrelenting military pressure on the Confederatecapital, he forced the South to commit its meagermanpower to a grinding battle in which they could bedestroyed. By using Sherman to cut the South in twoand Sheridan to cut off supplies from the


Shenandoah Valley, and by using Union naval powerto blockade or hold Southern ports, he eliminatedthe Confederates’ ability to sustain any but a limitedguerrilla war. Grant’s was not an arbitrary choice, buta response to a harsh imperative. No negotiatedsettlement was possible because the one thing thatthe South and its electorate wanted, independence,was the one thing that the North could not grantwithout invalidating the entire cause for which it wasfighting. There simply was no other way to defeat theSouth, nor, as the South itself discovered during thefirst half of the war, was there any other way todefeat the North.32

The World War I trenches bear an eerieresemblance to those of Richmond andPetersburg. Just as in the American Civil War, noneof the warring powers in World War I deliberatelyset out to fight a war of attrition. In August 1914,both sides hoped to break their opponent’s will in aswift campaign. Yet by October 1914, they foundthemselves entrenched on a static battlefield thatstretched from the North Sea to Switzerland andfrom the Baltic to Romania, with their strategyreduced to grinding down their foes’ militaryforces.33 They too had no choice. The scale of theforces and resources committed was so vast andthe foes so determined that no single battle orcampaign could break their opponent’s ability tocontinue the fight. Like the North and the Southduring the Civil War, both sides were able tosustain horrendous losses through 4 years of war,specifically because they all had some semblanceof popular government and nationalistic fervor.34

However, unlike the Civil War, neither side in the

Chapter 1 21

Great War was able to destroy their opponent’seconomic and industrial capacity to sustain thearmies in the field. Thus, in the absence of somesignal success in either the Allied blockade or theGerman U-boat war, both sides were limited to onemajor course of action: grinding down the opposingarmy on the battlefield.

In the years after World War I, air power appearedto offer a logical way out of this dilemma. Bomberscould strike directly into the enemy heartland anddestroy the means of sustaining a conflict withoutthe need for ground forces to break through enemylines. Giulio Douhet, the Italian air power prophet,even hoped that such bombing would overcomenationalistic fervor and break the will of the civilianpopulace.35 Yet, in the end, the strategic bombing ofGermany and Japan during World War II was morereminiscent of the Civil War campaigns of Shermanand Sheridan. It destroyed centers of warproduction and cut the lines of communications bywhich production reached forces in the field,36 butair strikes alone did not bring victory.37 Similarly, thecoordinated armor and air tactics of the World WarII blitzkrieg appeared to replace trench warfare witha swift maneuver war. But, in the final analysis,despite the military successes against Poland,France, and initially against the Soviet Union,Germany was unable to translate military successinto a strategic victory over all of the Allies. Nor werethe Allies later able to translate their own blitzkriegimitation into a collapse of German will. Rather, oncloser inspection, the ultimate strategic andoperational impact of the maneuver warfare inwhich both sides engaged was to gradually destroy


enemy forces in much the same fashion that Granthad done in the campaign leading to the siege ofRichmond and Petersburg during the Civil War. Likethe South, German and Japanese will to resistendured until both countries were all but overrun oroccupied.38 As a result of this will to resist, despiteits tactical and operational innovations, World War IIremained fundamentally a war of attrition.39

Means and WillWhat can we deduce from these examples? Andwhat implications do they hold for Network CentricWarfare and the application of the network-centricrevolution to effects-based operations? Four thingsare evident in the above history:

• First, attrition warfare was not an arbitrarychoice. It was a last resort. No participant in anyof the wars cited set out to fight a war ofattrition.40 On the contrary, all tried to fight aswift, decisive maneuver war, but foundthemselves confronted by a foe too big or tooresilient for that to succeed. They were driven toattrition warfare when confronted by a hostilepeer who would not yield as they had hoped.This strategic imperative was twofold. Theresources available to a large industrializedstate provided the physical means to engage inconflicts of a scale, scope, and duration thatpreviously would have been unthinkable andenabled these states to redress battlefielddefeats that, by Napoleonic standards, wouldhave been decisive.41 Equally important, thenationalism at the root of the nation-state’s

Chapter 1 23

existence provided a cohesive popular will. Thatnot only permitted them to endure battlefielddefeats and terrible loss of life, but alsocompelled them to demand “unconditionalsurrender” of their foes rather than settling for anegotiated compromise in the manner of 18th-century diplomacy.

• Second, one cannot assume that an opponentwill fight the kind of war planned. Opponentsadapt to challenges in unexpected ways. Theform these wars took was dictated by theinteractions between the two competitors, notby any pre-war plans. The longer the conflictlasted, the more opportunity there was foradaptation. By extension, any new approach towarfare (network-centric operations andeffects-based operations included) must beflexible and dynamic enough to deal withintelligent opponents.

• Third, the three great attrition conflictsexamined, the American Civil War and the twoWorld Wars, could be considered wars ofattrition because the overall strategy of theparticipants depended on the cumulativedestruction of their opponents’ physical capacityto wage war in order to achieve victory. It wasnot because the combat operations needed torealize this strategy were limited to attrition forattrition’s sake. In actuality, each side usedmaneuver, surprise, shock, attrition, and anyother form of warfare that offered someprospect of success in meeting their attrition-based strategic objective.


Chapter 1 25

• Finally and somewhat paradoxically, in all ofthese wars, the ultimate determinant of victorywas not physical destruction, but theparticipants’ will to continue the struggle. Ineach case, the underlying rationale for theattrition strategy was not to inflict the PunicWar-style destruction of a total war (an extremeand almost impossible task in the case of avery large nation-state). It was to induce acollapse of the enemy’s will. In each case, thewarring parties resorted to attrition of forcesand capabilities because they came to seesuch attrition as the only option available tothem to provoke such a collapse of will. Allparties to these conflicts almost doggedlysought to fight a swift decisive war ofmaneuver, often despite widely availableevidence to the contrary.42 Similarly, theparticipants almost invariably43 sought their foes’surrender rather than a total Carthage-likedestruction, even if only to avoid the horriblecost they themselves would incur in inflictingsuch a level of destruction, despite repeatedinsistence on “unconditional surrender.”

This duality of these physical and psychologicaldimensions in the midst of attrition warfare points tothe degree of complexity that is involved inunderstanding how we really wage war and why wesucceed or fail. To win in each of the three conflictsexamined, the victor had to overcome both someportion of the opponents’ physical means ofcontinuing the conflict and the opponent’spsychological will to do so. Thus, with fewexceptions (notably Verdun), what each side sought

to accomplish by attrition was not simply destruction,but rather the reduction of the opponents’ physicalcapabilities to some ill-defined or, perhaps,indefinable level at which that opponents’ will toresist would collapse and they would surrender. Thisis significant because the reliance upon such acomplex interaction of means and will suggests thatsuccess, even in attrition warfare, cannot beascribed to some predictable function of force sizeand kill rate. Instead, it is the product of a complex,nonlinear relationship between physical destructionof some kind and degree, and a series ofpsychological processes taking place in the minds ofhuman actors at each level of conflict over someperiod of time. This complex interrelationship ofmeans and will appears greatest at the geo-strategicand military-strategic levels of conflict, but iscertainly evident at the tactical and operational levelsas well.

A Clash of Complex Adaptive Systems The nonlinearity of the relationship betweenmeans and will also points to the utility ofconsidering all conflict as clashes betweencomplex adaptive systems. As described incomplexity theory, such complex adaptive systemsare entities that evolve and adapt to theirenvironments.44 As a result of this ability to learnand adapt, the behavior of complex adaptivesystems can never entirely be predicted. Thisphenomenon is certainly evident in the history ofwarfare and specifically in the difficulty in predictingexactly when, why, and how a warring party’s will


Chapter 1 27

might collapse under the stress of mounting losses.In the conflicts examined, the level at which the willof each losing country (and each military unit)broke varied greatly.

Three distinct examples of this variation areobvious in the conflicts surveyed. First, in theblitzkrieg of 1940, the French will to fight was weakat all levels from the onset and organized Frenchmilitary resistance ended early and abruptly, eventhough a substantial physical capacity to continuethe struggle remained.45 46 47 Second, during WorldWar I, the will of the Central Powers was sufficientto withstand 4 years of heavy wartime losses, butby the summer of 1918, it was so worn down,especially in Austria-Hungary and Turkey, thatresistance ended before the respective German,Austrian, or Turkish homelands were invaded,even though each had substantial organizedmilitary forces still in the field. But third, in theSouth in 1865 and in Germany and Japan in 1945,the will to resist was so great that, even after morethan 4 years of war, and even after the destructionof most of each state’s physical capacity to wagewar, the will to resist remained strong.48

These examples are discrete cases on a continuumthat, over the three wars, runs from Denmark’sacceptance of German occupation withoutresistance in 1940 to the suicidal resistance of theJapanese on Okinawa in 1945. Moreover, a deeperprobe of the French example indicates that therelationship between the blitzkrieg and the Frenchcollapse is by no means clear-cut. In fact, theblitzkrieg succeeded at least in part because it

successfully exploited an underlying Frenchpsychological weakness that derived in part fromdeep fissures in French society and the leadership ofthe Third Republic.49 Even then, as the subsequentactivities of the Free French and Résistanceunderlined, the French popular will was not entirelybroken so long as there remained a hope ofoverturning the German victory. By contrast, at theother end of the continuum, although the Alliesanticipated analogous lingering resistancemovements in Germany and Japan after theirrespective surrenders, none occurred, perhapsbecause there was no corresponding hope ofultimately overturning the Allied victory. The aboveexamples point to a complex relationship betweenthe attrition of physical means of waging war and thehoped-for collapse of will.

If we take this model of complex behaviorcombining physical and psychological dimensionsand apply it, not just to the great wars, but also tothe numerous smaller conflicts that have markedthe past 50 years and the emerging post-September 11th world, another facet of the problememerges: the impact of symmetry on the nature ofthe interactions.

Symmetric Versus Asymmetric ConflictFor all of the post-September 11th discussion ofasymmetric conflict, it is curious both that there hasbeen little agreement as to what constitutes anasymmetric conflict and that there has been little orno discussion as to an obvious first question: what issymmetric conflict? This question of symmetry


draws together the threads of the issues of meansand will, the roots of attrition warfare, and the natureof effects-based operations. The precedingdiscussion underlines the need to understand justhow a conflict might be expected to evolve andtherefore, how we might be called upon to adapt. Inpart, the direction of a conflict’s evolution will bedriven by culture and hence, will vary widely fromone opponent to the next. However, it will also reflectwhat might be termed the mechanics of wars orcrises in general. The relative symmetry orasymmetry of the will and capabilities of theopponents in a conflict or crisis is one significantfactor in such mechanics.

Symmetric Conflict

The Civil War and the two World Wars weresymmetric contests in the classic sense. Nation-states fought other nation-states or coalitions ofnation-states.50 War was formally declared orsanctioned in some manner and, atrocitiesnotwithstanding, the warring parties observed abasic law of war, with violators prosecuted by thevictors after the war. Navies fought navies. Armiesfought armies. Because of these symmetries, theresults of individual engagements and of protractedcampaigns could be measured in classicLanchestrian terms of forces and capabilitiesdestroyed. Yet, there was an additional and muchmore significant symmetry to these wars. Both sidesin each of these conflicts had both great means andgreat will (see Figure 2). In fact, it was thecombination of the great means and the great will

Chapter 1 29

that could be brought to bear by competing nation-states that gave these struggles their character asprotracted wars of attrition.

Consider the plight of General Robert E. Lee, theConfederacy’s leading commander during the U.S.Civil War. Lee managed to defeat the Union Army ofthe Potomac about once every 4 to 6 months formost of the war.51 Most of these defeats probablywould have been considered decisive by thestandards of the previous Napoleonic wars.However, in the Civil War, about 4 to 6 months aftereach of these “decisive” battles, Lee found himselfconfronting a larger, better-equipped Army of thePotomac. The North had the means needed togenerate and equip new forces after each defeat,and it had the will to do so time and again. It is thatsymmetry of great means and great will on bothsides that gave the war the character of a protractedattrition war. The same is true of the First and


Figure 2. Symmetry of Means and Will = Symmetric Warfare

Second World Wars, and may be extended to theCold War as well. After 150 years of suchsymmetric, attrition-based warfare, this model ofsymmetric conflict has shaped our nation’sconscious and unconscious perception of what waris or ought to be.

In these symmetric attrition conflicts, it may beargued, the bigger and more determined the twocontestants were, the less likely it was that one ofthem would break quickly and the more likely theconflict would be both protracted and attrition-based. However, what if the opponents were notsymmetric, but asymmetric?

Asymmetric Conflict

There has been much discussion of asymmetricconflict, but little agreement as to what constitutesan asymmetry. In some interpretations, asymmetriesare considered to be any difference in militaryforces, equipment, training, or organization thatmight be exploited. While this is consistent with themaxim that warfare is about finding and exploitingasymmetries, it is equally applicable to thesymmetric conflicts just discussed, each of whichfeatured such asymmetries (U-boat warfare versusantisubmarine warfare for example), and does littleto define the nature of the asymmetric conflictchallenge we now face. In another vein, it isincreasingly accepted that defining asymmetry in anasymmetric conflict involves a reversal of some or allof the symmetries we could observe in the threegreat “wars of attrition.” Thus, nation-states may notfight other nation-states, but may be pitted against

Chapter 1 31


guerrillas, ethnic liberation movements, or eventerrorists. Navies may not fight other navies, butinstead be required to enforce embargoes or projectpower ashore against a variety of decidedly non-naval targets. Armies may not fight other armies, buthave to contend with urban terrorists, guerrillawarfare, peacemaking, or peacekeeping operations,or, especially after September 11th, homelanddefense against a terrorist threat.52 However, if wefollow the line of reasoning generated by examiningthe role of means and will in symmetric conflicts,another possibility emerges. The truly criticalasymmetry may lie in the differences of will andmeans between the opponents because thesedifferences shape the very mechanics of the conflict.This suggests that the real definition of anasymmetric conflict is one in which there is nosymmetry of will and means.

What might an asymmetry of means and will looklike? If a symmetric contest may be said to pit oneadversary with great means and great will againstanother that also has both great means and greatwill, then an asymmetric contest might be expectedto involve different combinations. The possibilitiescan be outlined in terms of a simple quadraticdiagram (see Figure 3). The terms “great” and“limited,” of course, are relative and simply denotethe direction of the disparity of means or willbetween the two opponents. Still, they do serve todefine some key elements in the asymmetry.

In a contest between an entity that has both greatmeans and great will and an entity that lacks one orboth, the side with both great will and means is

bound to prevail. The outcome is likely to be swiftwhere the challenger’s will is weak and his meanslacking. It may be less swift, but it will be just as sure,where the means are available but the will lacking, orwhere the will is strong but the means lacking.

A similar result is likely to emerge when one sidehas either great means or great will and the otherhas neither.

However, when the contest is between one powerthat has great means and limited will and anotherthat has limited means but great will, the result islikely to be far from being either certain or swift. Infact, such a war is likely to involve protractedoperations that are reminiscent of symmetric wars ofattrition, even if the operations themselves may bevery different in character. This would indicate adifferent paradigm for asymmetric conflict and adifferent set of mechanics at work.

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Figure 3. Asymmetry of Means and Will

In such a conflict, each side has an advantage overits opponent, but the advantages are very differentin nature. Both the opponents and the strategiesthat they use may be fundamentally asymmetric. Ifwe return to the basic warfighting maxim thatsuccess lies in attacking your opponent’sweaknesses and not his strengths and byextension, that warfare revolves about the creationand exploitation of asymmetries, then we wouldexpect each side to exploit its greatest strength andattack the other’s greatest weakness. However, asillustrated in Figure 4, in this lopsided contest, thereare really two different asymmetries that might beexploited. One side has an advantage in means.Logically, we would expect that side to exploit itsadvantage by attacking and destroying the other’smore limited physical means, e.g. by pressing anessentially attrition-based approach.

The other side has an advantage in will. Therefore,we would expect that side to exploit its advantage


Figure 4. Asymmetric Conflict

by attacking its opponent’s will to continue thestruggle, e.g. an essentially effects-basedapproach focused on shaping the opponent’sbehavior. If we think about this type of asymmetriccontest between a power of great means butlimited will and another entity with great will butlimited means, it is immediately obvious thatnumerous Cold War and post-Cold War conflicts fitthe description. This is especially true if we acceptthat the entity with limited means may not be astate at all but a guerrilla group, an ethnic orreligious liberation movement, or an internationalterrorist organization such as al-Qaida.

However, we must add a caveat here. Even in theheart of a massive war of attrition such as World WarII, resistance movements in occupied Europe andthe Philippines continued even after theconventional armies were defeated. Thesemovements signal an important fact: An adversaryneed not be both powerful and determined in orderto win. He need only be determined enough toovercome any disparity of resources betweenhimself and his opponent. Stated differently, themore determined (or fanatical or desperate) theadversary is, the less reliant upon “means” he willlikely be.

Moreover, as the last line suggests, such anasymmetric conflict need not be limited to war. Themodel applies equally or better to operations otherthan war across a spectrum from peacekeepingoperations to crisis responses to terrorism. Indeed, itis the asymmetric rather than the symmetric modelof conflict that appears prevalent since the end of

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World War II.53 Vietnam and the Soviet experience inAfghanistan offer good examples of asymmetries ofwill and means in war. Both were regional conflicts inwhich a small state or non-state liberation movementconfronted a great power. Neither challengerpossessed a size or resource base sufficient tosupport an extensive, highly mechanized war effort.Neither had the physical means to confront, muchless to wear down, the physical war-making capacityof the United States or the Soviet Union in asymmetric attrition war. To have any hope ofsuccess, the challengers in both cases had to shiftthe focus from a contest of means in which theasymmetry worked against them, to one of will inwhich they held (or at least believed themselves tohold) an asymmetric advantage. In so doing, theyaccepted a continuing asymmetry of means thatthey could not in any event alter and concentratedtheir efforts on the parallel but opposite asymmetryof will. Their strategy, like that of a traditionalsymmetrical war of attrition, was cumulative. Theyunderstood that continued support by theiropponent’s public was the core requirement for alengthy war. They concluded that the cumulativeeffect of protracted guerrilla operations could be toerode that support, even though the more powerfulopponent retained military superiority in the field andcontinued to win battles and destroy elements oftheir own forces and capabilities.54

By zeroing in on the attrition of their opponent’spolitical will as their strategic objective, they alsodefined a much more manageable military task. Inthis effects-based context, it was no longernecessary to launch large concerted attacks to

destroy their foe’s military capability and attainvictory. Rather, the foe’s will might be attacked bysustaining a rate and scope of relatively smallattacks that was sufficient to inflict a level ofcasualties and damage that might be consideredintolerable at home, regardless of whether they weremilitarily significant in the field. At the tactical andoperational levels, this asymmetric use of limitedmilitary power left the American and Soviet militaries,designed for symmetric warfare with each other, withlittle in the way of military capabilities or supportinfrastructure that their large mechanized forcescould attack. Enemy formations were kept too small,lines of communications too rudimentary, and theinfrastructure too sparse for classic attrition-basedwarfare to work well. What is more, the dispersal hada second, derivative effect because it enormouslyincreased the amount of effort required for the largerpowers and their local allies to achieve militaryobjectives based on attrition of physical means. Thescale of their efforts often became sodisproportionate to those of the guerrillas that it wasquestionable who was wearing whom down.

This asymmetric approach to warfare has beenremarkably successful. Not only did it thwartsuperpower efforts in Vietnam and Afghanistan, butit also helped bring about the collapse of theWestern colonial empires in the years after WorldWar II.55 This same asymmetric approach also hasbeen manifest in a score of lesser encounters,crises, and Operations Other Than War fromSomalia to Kosovo. It is also apparent in thereasoning of terrorist organizations from the IrishRepublican Army to a long train of Middle Eastern

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terrorists. In each case, the challengers (states, non-states, gangs, terrorists, or warlords) believed thatthey simply had to be able to inflict sufficient painover a long enough period of time to wear down alarger power’s will and thus wring from it theconcessions they sought.

In approaching such asymmetric conflict, it is easy tofocus on the perceived lack of will on the part of agreat power operating forward to protect what areoften extended or unclear national interests.However, we need to carry this analysis an importantadditional step and focus on the will of thechallenger. Is this will infinite? And if not, at whatpoint might it break? We observed earlier that in thecase of the World War II resistance movements, itwas not necessary to be both big and determined tostand up to a big and determined foe. It was onlynecessary to be so determined as to overcome anydisparity in resources. That is, the will required tosucceed is relative. This suggests a relationshipbetween means and will that is something along thefollowing lines (See Figure 5).

The impact of means upon the outcome tends tovary arithmetically, while that of will variesgeometrically. The more determined the foe, theless means he will require in order to succeed in thecontest. The more constrained the task is, thegreater the probability is of success with the meansavailable. However, obviously if the means fall tozero, no amount of determination will suffice tomake up the difference. This was the core reasonfor the Roman resort to a total war solution to theconflict with Carthage.56


In the case of the World War II Résistants, thedetermination that balanced their lack of meansderived from their firm belief that the Allies stillfighting would eventually return with sufficient meansto redress an imbalance.57 In the case of the guerrillamovements, their determination did not necessarilystem from any realistic hope of outside interventionto redress the imbalance, but from a convictionrooted in a historical, national, or religious destiny.There was and is a sense of ultimate inevitability thatfortifies the will sufficiently to sustain the long-termnature of a struggle and to endure the sacrifice oflives entailed. When this will is put into the context ofa strategy that seeks to inflict damage and weardown public support rather than to gain a militaryvictory, it can be sufficient to win.

If we apply the same logic to a different form ofguerrilla operation represented by internationalterrorism, something similar emerges. There too, thewill of the terrorists need only be great enough to

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Figure 5. Probability Equation

balance the greater means available to theiropponents. The terrorists may not be able to hope tomatch the means of a great, industrialized state, butassuredly believe that they have superior will. Theroots of that will may be in nationalism or ethnicidentity, as in the case of most of the guerrillaoperations cited. But, those roots may also lie in thefact that the terrorists see themselves as part of aninevitable historical process or as divine agentswhose deaths lead to martyrdom, as in the case ofal-Qaida terrorists. Such a religious context can alsoyield the patience and endurance that comes fromoperating on a divine rather than human time line.

If we follow this logic to its conclusion, givensufficient will on the part of the terrorists, the meansrequired for initiating and sustaining a long-termconflict may be very minor indeed. The World TradeCenter bombing in 1993, for example, was theamalgamation of religious fanaticism andcommercially available materials. The attacks of2001 used commercial airliners as gigantic missiles.In each case, the willingness of the terrorists toaccept their own deaths and of the terroristleadership to trust to God and to ignore the follow-on consequences multiplied the impact of theminimal physical means available to them.

The New Security Environment:Asymmetric and Symmetric ConflictsDoes this mean that asymmetric forms of conflicthave replaced the old attrition-based warfare drivenby a symmetry of means and will? In fact, thedefinition of symmetric warfare in terms of will and


means argues otherwise. If symmetric attritionwarfare arose when circumstances pitted states andcoalitions with great means and great will againstone another, then it stands to reason that similarcontests will tend to move in the same direction. Thisis borne out by recent history. Since World War II,classic, symmetric attrition wars have continuedaround the world. Desert Storm, for all of theapparent disparity of means involved, falls into thiscategory, as do multiple wars between Third Worldstates58 including the Iran-Iraq War and a successionof Arab-Israeli Wars. This persistence of symmetricattrition warfare indicates that the conditions thatgave rise to symmetric, attrition-based warscontinue to exist. Asymmetric conflict has notreplaced symmetric conflict; it has come in additionto it. In this same vein, we might expect that anyeventual conflict with a proverbial “peer competitor”would, because of the symmetry that the word “peer”implies, resemble the symmetric attrition-based warsof the past more than any asymmetric conflict alongthe lines of those just discussed.59

The model for fashioning military power or forevaluating the applicability of network-centric andeffects-based operations suggested here is not atidy “either/or” of either a symmetric, attrition-basedconflict, or an asymmetric, effects-based conflict.Rather, it is more along the lines of a continuum witha total focus on means at one extreme and a totalfocus on will at the other. This continuum wouldextend from pure attrition-based approaches towarfare (the total destruction of the Third Punic War)at one end to a pure effects-based approach(peacekeeping operations) at the other. Along this

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continuum, the mode of warfare toward whichopponents will be drawn is a function of the degreeof difference in their respective sizes, militarycapabilities, and determination.60 The moresymmetric the means and will of the adversaries are,the more likely they are to be drawn into afundamentally attrition-based conflict that continuesuntil one or the other contestant’s means and/or willare exhausted. The more asymmetric the meansand will of the opponents are, the more likely theyare to take a more effects-based approach (forexample, centered on a damage infliction strategy ina protracted low-intensity conflict) of which terrorismmust be considered a form.61

The above continuum becomes a bit clearer if wecompare the attrition-based and the behavior/effects-based approaches to conflict and begin tosee where they differ and where they overlap (SeeFigure 6). In this comparison, the focus on meansthat is typical of a symmetric conflict produces whatis essentially an attrition-based approach to warfarecentered on attacking physical targets, usually tomeet military objectives and usually to producequantifiable results. This does not mean that theresult is a pure attrition approach in which the onlything that matters is the destruction of forces andcapabilities. Such attacks certainly may havepsychological impacts in the manner of effects-based operations. The distinction is that in attrition-based operations, these impacts are usually a by-product of the attack, rather than its purpose.However, there is another important consideration.Because attrition-based approaches to dealing withconflict do involve physical damage to an opponent,


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such operations are restricted to wartime or tocombat operations short of war. In other words,some form of a state of hostilities is a prerequisite totheir application. If opponents can deny us groundsfor such a state of hostilities, they can invalidate anymilitary strategy based on attrition.62

This same restriction applies in a different way toattrition-based deterrence. If one’s only recourse isto destroy targets, then the deterrent value ofmilitary forces hinges on either their ability toretaliate by destroying forces and capabilities, or theability to pre-empt an opponent’s action with similardestruction. Both actions are credible only inextreme situations, at or near the onset ofhostilities. Both have substantial political costs andrisks including the possibility of reciprocalannihilation. Obviously, such threats are veryunlikely to deter an opponent who sees the conflictin political terms in which such destruction mightcreate opportunities in the world media, or whotreats the destruction both as martyrdom and aconfirmation of the attackers’ intrinsic evil.

The above stands in sharp contrast to theelements of a warfare approach dictated by afocus on will and behavior. The military capabilitiesneeded to attack the physical means of anopponent may be absolutely necessary to fight asymmetric war of attrition, but they may also bequite insufficient to deal with an asymmetric foewhose focus is necessarily on our political will ordecisionmaking behavior. For such a foe, the focusis not on targets but on actions that are directedtoward political objectives and that revolve about


the opponent’s will and decisionmaking structure,both political and military. In short, the approach towarfare is very fundamentally effects-based,directed at shaping behavior.

Unlike the attrition-based approach, the effects-based strategy is conceived and executed as adirect assault on an opponent’s will and not a by-product of destroying his capability to wage war. Forthis reason, the role of the media and information isno longer that of an ancillary support for morale as inattrition-based campaigns, but as a central part ofthe effort to assault the public will. Because thetarget is human behavior, the results are notincremental, but nonlinear in the manner of theproverbial “straw that broke the camel’s back.” Painis inflicted until the victim can stand no more.Further, because the actions undertaken and thepain inflicted need not involve destruction, they neednot be confined to combat operations, but can spanthe spectrum from peace to crisis to war.63 Finally,they can deter not simply on the basis of what canbe destroyed either in retaliation or pre-emptiveaction, but rather by threatening a cumulativepsychological attrition inflicted relentlessly over time.

While this latter model is drawn from observation ofasymmetric conflicts, its use need not be restrictedto those who would challenge a great power. Indeed,the cardinal advantage of the great power may proveto be that it has the option of following either anattrition-based or an effects-based approach, orsome combination of the two that best meets itsneeds at any particular time.

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The New Security Environment andEffects-Based Operations What becomes clear in the foregoing discussion isthat attrition-based operations, no matter howefficient we may make them, do not work very wellagainst an asymmetric adversary who hasminimized his dependence on conventional physicalmeans of waging war. Still more importantly, theconcept of attrition, because it does rely ondestruction and thus on the existence of somerecognized state of hostilities, does not apply wherethere is no state of hostilities, or if such hostilities areprecisely what the military force is attempting tothwart. Because these operations short of combatcomprise both the core of our national efforts to dealwith the post-September 11th security environmentand the vast majority of all military operations, weclearly need something other than an attrition-basedmetric for military operations and for our acquisitionof effective military power. In brief, new informationtechnologies and network-centric thinking must beput into a context within which they can address thecomplex interaction between nations, would-benations, and other challengers in which the attritionof an opponent’s physical means of waging war isnot a central factor of strategy. The effects-basedapproach to military operations provides thegateway into doing just this.

But that is not all. Even in symmetric combatoperations against a peer adversary in whichattrition is a key factor, the focus on will and behaviorpromises to give our military forces the nonlinearimpact they will need to succeed. Such capabilities


could achieve our military objectives without theprotracted conflict and massive casualties that havemarked the great attrition wars of the past 150 years.In essence, although the warfare decisions thatemerge from an effects-based thought process maystill be denominated in terms of targets or forces andcapabilities to be destroyed, the core of theapproach is not the destruction of targets, but anaction-reaction cycle in which success is defined bythe behavior produced.

Finally, effects-based operations are not simply amode of warfare. They encompass the full range ofactions that a nation may undertake in order toinduce a particular reaction on the part of anopponent, ally, or neutral. They represent a unifiedapproach to national strategy that is as much atthe root of peacetime operations as it is of wartimeoperations. Thus, the concept of effects-basedoperations becomes the key to applying network-centric capabilities and concepts on multiple levelsto deal with a security environment that combinesboth old and new threats and that will require bothcombat operations and a broad range ofoperations short of combat, including thosedirected at establishing a stable deterrence regimeon a global scale.

All of the above begs the real question: just what areeffects-based operations? To proceed any further,much less to make the tantalizing marriage betweennetwork-centric and effects-based ideas a reality, wemust first flesh out our definition and theory ofeffects-based operations, then describe itsapplication to military operations, and finally assess

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how the efficiencies of network-centric thinking andcapabilities might best be applied. This is the task ofthe following chapters.

1Network Centric Warfare can be concisely defined as theconcept of linking all aspects of warfighting into a sharedsituation awareness and understanding of command intent soas to achieve a unity and synchronicity of effects thatmultiplies the combat power of military forces. Network-centric operations are then military operations across thespectrum of conflict from peace, to crisis, to war to which theconcepts and capabilities of Network Centric Warfare havebeen applied.2Logically, it is not enough to figure out how network-centriccapabilities might apply to a given generic military operation.If that generic military operation serves little purpose inmeeting our strategic, operational, and tactical objectives,then no matter how well we accomplish it, the capabilities willhave little value. 3As a working definition, we can consider “strategicdeterrence” to be the neutralization or foreclosure of directthreats to the peace, prosperity, and continued survival of thenation.4Majid Khadduri, for example, traces the polarization of Arabsociety that resulted from expanding contacts with the Westas the Arab leadership attempted to adapt an establishedsystem to new ideas without surrendering its Islamic identity. Khadduri, Majid. Political Trends in the Arab World.Baltimore; Johns Hopkins. 1972. pp. 2-7. 5Albert Hourani describes the economic, religious, andcultural reactions of the Arab world to spreading contacts withan intruding Western culture. He notes that one such reactionwas the Islamist movement surrounding the MuslimBrotherhood and points to the work of Sayyid Qutb who, asearly as 1964, was calling for a jihad “not for defense only, butto destroy all worship of false gods and remove all obstaclespreventing men from accepting Islam.” Hourani, Albert. A History of the Arab Peoples. Cambridge;Belknap/Harvard Press. 1991. pp. 445-6.6The idea of a broader integrated involvement in change isnot new and was noted very pointedly in the Iklé-Wohlstetterreport in 1988.


Iklé, Fred C and Albert Wohlstetter, Chairmen. DiscriminateDeterrence, The Report of the Commission in IntegratedLong-Term Strategy. Washington. 1988. p. 15.7A frequent criticism of military crisis responses is thatultimately they produce no discernible change in the localsituation. However, if we consider the military role not as oneof solving the problem but of buying time for an economic-socio-political solution, then the response takes on a newperspective. It may not at all be that the military interventionthat failed, but that the political and economic tools availablewere not able to fashion a lasting solution in the period of timethe military intervention bought. 8See Edward Rhodes, “Conventional Deterrence: Review ofthe Empirical Literature,” Second Navy RMA Round Table,SAIC, Tysons Corner, Virginia, 4 June 1997.9This was the essence of the French argument for anindependent “force de frappe” which was deemed a credibleresponse to any threat to France, whereas a U.S. responsethat endangered American cities might not be believable orbelieved. 10Iklé and Wohlstetter, p. 35. In actuality, through the courseof the Cold War, each nuclear power recognized the dangersof an uncontrolled escalation that might grow from anymilitary incident between them and was careful to avoid sucharmed confrontation. 11As part of the stabilizing mental model, each of the Cold Warnuclear adversaries had a fairly detailed idea of whatstrategic weapons the other side had available and how theywould be used. Thus, retaliation tended to be seen as alargely mechanical, “sensor-to-shooter” endeavor initiated bya national decision to respond.12For purposes of this book, the term “conventionaldeterrence” is used to encompass everything but strategicdeterrence, i.e. weapons of mass destruction or of masseffects.13See the work of Prof. Edward Rhodes of Rutgers Center forGlobal Security and Democracy, “Conventional Deterrence:Review of Empirical Literature,” Second Navy RMA RoundTable, June 1998. “Conventional Deterrence,” ComparativeStrategy, Fall 2000. “Review Of Empirical Studies ofConventional Deterence,” Working Paper, ColumbiaInternational Affairs Online (CIAO), Columbia University. July1999.14The latter is of course present in strategic nucleardeterrence in facets such as the secure second strikecapability that denies an opponent the possibility of anincapacitating first strike.

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15Under the United Nations Charter, states are given the rightto self-defense but not to retaliation, thus many nations havetended to treat operations that would otherwise be consideredto be retaliatory in nature as acts of self-defense in thecontext of this limited or conventional deterrence. Waters, Maurice. The United Nations. New York; MacMillanCompany. 1967. pp. 553-579.16In the case of conventional deterrence, the unacceptableresult most probably will not be the annihilation of society, butrather a political fall-out that could be counterproductive andthat would, hence, negate the effect that the power hadsought. Obviously, this sets up a sliding scale. The moreimportant the interest to be defended is, the more acceptableany negative fall-out will be. The less important the interest is,the more likely it is that possible negative repercussions willoutweigh any gains to be made from successful deterrence. 17Although it can be postulated that such a rational process ofcalculation would have little to do with the reaction of anirrational decisionmaker, it is probably closer to the truth tosay that any senior level decisionmaker is, by virtue of havingattained that position, rational. This does not mean that therationality would match Western notions of a rationaldecisionmaker, but simply that some form of rationalcalculation will almost inevitably be involved in perceiving andreacting to the threat of retaliation. It is upon that calculation,in whatever form it takes, that deterrence relies. 18Rhodes, “Conventional Deterrence,” p. 243.19In fact, conventional deterrence centers on the “nichecompetitor,” a foe that is constantly probing for niches withinwhich he believes can compete successfully. Such nichesmay be defined in political terms as a challenge that thedeterring power is unable to meet for political reasons or atacceptable cost, or with the temporal terms, such as theability to engineer a military or a political fait accompli in sucha short time as to preclude an effective response. The nichemay be geographic, such as confining operations to an areato which the adversary cannot obtain ready access or inwhich his full capabilities cannot be brought to bear. Or it maybe a warfare niche, a military challenge for which thedeterring power has only a limited local or deployablecapability. In general, the smaller the disparity in capabilitiesbetween the niche competitor and his opponent the larger thenumber and variety of the niches that are likely to be availableto exploit, and the more frequent the challenges probably willbe. Obviously, for the challenger, the key to success in suchan endeavor is the ability to contain the conflict within thechosen niche. This imposes two constraints on his niche


strategy. First, he must be able to do something to achievethe desired effect within his chosen niche. It does no good todefine a niche within which any action he undertakes will notproduce a worthwhile result. And second, he must be able todiscourage either vertical or lateral escalation that mightmove the confrontation out of the niche to arenas in which hecannot compete successfully. For example, the victim of theniche challenger might increase the level of the militaryconfrontation by unexpectedly heavy reinforcement of forcesin the confrontation, or might attempt to move theconfrontation to other areas of competition geographic orotherwise. The success of a conventional deterrent under theseconditions hinges the ability either to counter any action thechallenger might take within any given political, temporal,geographic, or warfare niche and/or to escalate a conflictbeyond the confines of that niche. 20We can look at the threat from al-Qaida in this vein. Thecompetitor seeks to avoid American retaliation by remaininganonymous or by so decentralizing his action that the militarypower of the United States cannot be brought to bear.Similarly, the terrorist cells seek to operate in a boundaryniche between states, between external and internal security,and between peace and war21The introduction of more efficient ways of applying militarypower to this end, whether by increasing the number ofsorties and targets each day, or by nodal targeting to reducethe number of targets we need to destroy to incapacitate anopponent, do not change the fact that the fundamentalobjective remains the attrition of enemy capability to wagewar. 22In 1916, the Chief of the German General Staff, General vonFalkenhayn set out to exploit the German advantage inmanpower by creating a situation in which would producesuch a large number of French casualties as to graduallygrind down the physical ability of the French Army to resist. Keegan, John. The First World War. New York. 2000, p 278.23The dangers associated with a shift from attrition warfare tothe unknown of Network Centric Warfare or a still evolvingconcept of effects-based operations are particularlysignificant for the United States, a country that wasparticularly well suited to fight and win such wars of attrition.From the epoch of the Civil War onwards, the American“nation in arms” had an economy and demography sufficientto support massive armies and an industrial production thatenabled it to overwhelm its enemies war production. It alsohad the ability to mobilize national opinion and, hence, the

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political capacity to outlast its opponents. Finally, because ofits nearly insular geography, the United States (like Britain)could use the sea and its naval power to create a homelandsanctuary even as it projected its own massive militaryoverseas to fight in the enemy’s backyard.24It might be argued that the Second Punic War, whichdecisively defeated Carthage, was the result of a successfulattrition strategy and that the Third Punic War was a different“total war,” though it remained a clear logical descendent ofCato’s “Carthage must be destroyed” injunction. Goldsworthy, Adrian. The Punic Wars. New York. 1998. pp.198ff.25For a frontier settlement in North America, defense was notsomething to be provided by a distant army, however welltrained. It was something to which every man and womancontributed because the penalty for failure was death. Theresult was the same militia system that so bedeviled theconventional British armies during the American Revolution.Burgoyne’s defeats at Bennington and Saratoga, for example,were largely at the hands of a militia army that had not existed2 weeks before the battles and did not exist 2 weeks later.The idea of the citizen soldier appears to have crossed theAtlantic with Lafayette who formed French citizen soldiersinto what is now the Garde Républicaine. This idea was lateradapted by Carnot into the lévée en masse. Galvin, John R. The Minute Men. Washington; Brassey’s.1989.26Revolutionary France, like the late 20th-century UnitedStates, had the advantage of numbers. In 1800, France wasby far the most populous country in Western Europe. It had alarge and robust economy and an extensive civilinfrastructure, particularly of roads. As a result, even as lateas the 100 days in 1815, France was able to generate largearmies on short notice. It was this size and capacity thatsustained Napoleon through a quarter century of almostincessant wars. Durant, Will and Ariel. The Age of Napoleon. New York;Simon and Schuster. 1975. pp. 3-6 and 179ff. 27The Napoleonic wars introduced many elements of modernattrition warfare: massive forces, the nation in arms, and thedestruction of the military means of a nation to resist.However, as a rule, these conflicts only indirectly touched onthe civil means of creating military power, chiefly in theContinental System and the British Orders in Council. Thus,while Napoleon inflicted a draconian peace on Prussia afterJena, for example, he only sought to destroy the PrussianArmy and not the means for Prussia to create military power.


28The Gettysburg Address. President Abraham Lincoln. 1863.29Lincoln probably would have been horrified to see his wordsextrapolated in this way. But Lincoln appears to haveunderstood their implications and the need for attritionwarfare in defeating the South, supporting Grant’s plan towage such a war while at the same time repeatedly sayingthat he did not want to know what those plans were. Sandburg, Carl. Lincoln, The Prairie Years and the WarYears. Easton; Norwalk. 1984. pp. 464-5. 30Grant, U.S. The Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant. Easton;Norwalk. 1989. p. 469.31Grant writes that, although he had started the campaign inthe West insisting that property rights be respected, he cameto conclude that such an approach prolonged the war andthat it was ultimately more “humane” to destroy all means bywhich the rebellion could be sustained. Grant. Memoirs. pp. 191-2.32This plan was outlined in April 1864 just after Grant tookcommand of the Union armies and was elaboratedsuccessively over the course of the next 4 months. Foote, Shelby. The Civil War: A Narrative. Time-Life, Vol. 10.Alexandria, Virginia. 2000. pp. 26ff. 33Hayes, Carlton J. A Brief History of the Great War. NewYork: MacMillan Company. 1925. pp. 41-55.34Although sometimes ignored amid a lingering residue ofWorld War I propaganda, 1914 Russia, Germany, andAustria-Hungary were all constitutional monarchies withfunctioning, democratically elected parliaments that voted togo to war and thereafter sustained the war effort by approvinga succession of war budgets. It was not until the OctoberRevolution of 1917 in Russia that this ceased to be the case.Similarly, it is noteworthy that Austria-Hungary’s collapse anddisintegration in October 1918 occurred in the context of itsparliamentary system and without any effort by the monarchyor military to reverse that decision by force. Keegan, pp. 415-416. 35Douhet, Giulio. The Command of the Air. Washington DC;Office of Air Force History. 1983.36In the case of Japan’s island empire, this interdiction was ingreat part the fruit of a submarine campaign that sank most ofthe irreplaceable Japanese merchant marine.37Williamson Murray writes, “We now know that these massiveassaults on Germany’s cities did in fact impair Germanmorale substantially. What British air theorists failed to takeinto account, however, was the reality that modern states(democratic as well as totalitarian) possess enormous powers

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of compulsion. As a result, there was no outlet for the drasticeffects that the bombing had on German morale – theconcentration camp and the Gestapo were more than enoughto keep the population in line.” Murray, Williamson et al. An Historical Perspective on Effects-based Operations. Institute for Defense Analyses, JointAdvanced Warfighting Project; Alexandra, Virginia. October2001. p. 29. 38In the case of Japan, only outlying islands, e.g. Okinawa andIwo Jima, were taken by storm and the government appearsto have yielded in the face of the total destruction intimated bythe atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. However,even in the face of these bombs and the Emperor’sintervention, hardline military resistance to surrendercontinued. It is instructive that the Allies feared continuedresistance by diehard elements of the civilian population andrecalcitrant military even after a formal surrender. 39This look at attrition warfare can be taken a step further. TheSoviet defeat in the Cold War may be laid to the SovietUnion’s being overwhelmed by America’s superior ability tomaintain a large and rapidly modernizing military force whileat the same time increasing its economic base. The Sovietswere astute enough to recognize that their own inability to doboth meant there would be an ever widening gap incapabilities and no Soviet hope of ever catching up. In effect,the United States and its allies won the Cold War by forcingthe Soviet economic system into bankruptcy, that is, bydestroying the Soviet means of continuing the competitionwithout having to defeat Soviet forces in battle.40The duel between Generals Pétain and von Falkenhayn atVerdun excepted. (Keegan, pp 278ff.) One can also make acase that Stalin realized from the start that he would have tofight a war of attrition against the Germans when theyinvaded and, indeed, such attrition warfare had historicantecedents in Kutuzov’s winter campaign against Napoleon.Nevertheless, in the early stages of the German invasion in1941, the Red Army defended forward and adopted ascorched earth policy only when the front collapsed. 41Grant, for example, says, “Up to the Battle of Shiloh, I …believed that the rebellion against the Government wouldcollapse suddenly and soon if a decisive victory could begained over any of its armies.” Grant. pp. 191ff. 42This is most evident in the lead up to World War I whenEuropean military planners, with the model of the U.S. CivilWar before them, nonetheless based their assumptions onthe models of the 1866 Austro-Prussian War and the 1870-1


Franco-Prussian War. Those wars were swift and decisiveand seemed to point to a military revolution based on massmobilization and railroads, factors that caught the greatpowers up in the “Gun of August” entanglement of alliancesand inflexible time lines. Keegan, pp. 212-3. 43Notable exceptions were in World War II when the Nazis andJapanese sought to enslave the conquered peoples ofEastern Europe and China respectively, or the parallel butsoon abandoned Morgenthau Plan by which the Allies were tohave reduced post-war Germany to an agricultural state.44Murray Gell-Mann, “The Simple and the Complex,” in DavidS. Alberts and Thomas J, Czerwinski. Complexity, GlobalPolitics, and National Security. Washington, DC. 1997, pp. 10-11.45At the time the French government capitulated, plans werebeing implemented to shift the center of French resistance,together with the French Navy and as much of the Army ascould be transported, to North Africa which itself contained asizeable French army. Churchill. Their Finest Hour. p. 201.46William Shirer traces the divisions between right and left inFrench society back to the beginning of the Third Republic in1872. Shirer, William L. The Collapse of the Third Republic, AnInquiry into the Fall of France in 1940. New York: Simon andSchuster. 1969. 47These differences came to a head during the socialistgovernment of Léon Blum in the 1930s. 48Ready, J. Lee. World War Two: Nation by Nation. London;Arms and Armour. 1995. p180ff, p. 116ff.Colton, Joel. Léon Blum, Humanist in Politics. New York;Knopf. 1966. 49As a result, in the aftermath of June 1940, French at alllevels and of both right and left tended to see the 1940 defeatas the inevitable result of the policies and weaknesses of theThird Republic itself. Smith, Allen. The Road to Vichy, The Writings and Journals ofConstant Caulry, 1938-1945. Unpublished thesis, College ofWilliam and Mary; Williamsburg, Va. 2002. pp.3-7. 50The Confederacy is included as a nation-state. 51Johnson, Robert and Clarence Clough Buel eds. North toAntietam: Battles and Leaders of the Civil War. New York:Castle Books. 1956. pp. 449-695.52Gray, Colin. “Thinking Asymmetrically in Times of Terror.”

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Parameters. Spring 2002, p. 5ff.53It is certainly tempting to imagine that a confrontation withanother large industrial power on the order of Germany or theSoviet Union is unlikely for well into the present century. It isalso tempting to imagine that any future confrontation with alesser adversary will proceed in the manner of a DesertStorm. However, the World War I example carries a warning.The great power strategists and planners before that war hadthe clear example of the American Civil War before them. Yet,they chose to study different examples, those of the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 and the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1, wars that seemed to confirm the validity of their preferredapproach to war and left them unprepared for the conflict of1914-1918.54There is an assumption here that the challenger can be surethat his own public support will outlast that of the largerpower. This is not a foregone conclusion. For one, therobustness of the larger power’s public support is likely to bea function of how directly the challenger threatens what thatpublic perceives to be its vital national interests, such as thesafety of its citizens. Too much of a challenge, thus, canprovoke the larger power’s public and create an equality ofwill between the two sides yielding the victory to the biggerside. Similarly, the challenger must pay attention to his ownsupport, much as Mao enjoined guerrillas always to be ableto swim in the sea of the local peasantry.55Consider that, in the 20 years after the end of World War II,the great colonial empires of the British, French, and Dutchcollapsed in disarray even though parts of those empires hadbeen held securely with minimal military forces for two tothree centuries beforehand. The colonial powers fought tomaintain or restore a local hegemony, but this goal was notstrongly shared by electorates at home with the result that thetolerance for physical attrition of any kind was extremely low,a distinct contrast with the situation in World Wars I and II.The indigenous rebels, on the other hand, fought to oust aforeign power and establish a national entity. In so doing,indigenous leaders often built on an extensive knowledge oftheir imperial enemy. Many had been educated in the “mothercountry” and perceived that there was no stomach for thecommitment of blood and treasure that would be required tohold the empires by force. While not all of the colonies werethe scene of guerrilla warfare, the British experience inMalaya and Kenya, the French in Indo-China, Madagascar,and later Algeria, and the Dutch in the East Indies, all pointedto the difficulty of attempting to halt opposing guerrillas ifindependence were not granted.


56Goldsworthy, pp. 353-6.57One might also speculate that the failure to generate anequivalent resistance movement in Germany in 1945stemmed from the basic lack of any such hope. 58“Third World” is used here in Nehru’s original context, that is,states that were not formally members of either the NATO orWarsaw Pact. 59However, we must add an additional important caveat here.In the final analysis of each of these wars and conflicts,symmetric and asymmetric, the choice of what kind of war tofight was not for one side’s planners and strategists to make.Their enemies chose. They chose by not “breaking” as thestrategists had planned. They chose by how they decided tofight, by their stalwart reactions to defeats and losses of menand materiel, by the resources they committed, and by the willto resist that they were able to generate and maintain. 60If we take this observation a step further, the moresuccessful we are in implementing an American militaryrevolution, the more asymmetric our opponents must becomeif they are to have any chance of challenging us successfully.61Strausz-Hupé, Robert. “The New Protracted Conflict.” Orbis.April 2002.62One might argue here, for example, that treating a largescale terrorist action as a criminal matter rather than as an actof war also has the effect of ruling out the attrition-basedresponses for which American and Western militaries ingeneral are best equipped.63In fact, the almost Manichean dichotomy of militaryoperations into war versus “operations other than war”reflects a holdover from Cold War thinking in an age whosemilitary challenges are more properly described by acontinuum that runs from peace through crises of every sort,to wars that are equally varied in size and scope.

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CHAPTER 2

Network-CentricOperations: The

Starting Point1

Given the radical change in the existing worldorder that we have experienced since the end of

the Cold War and particularly since September 11th,it is hardly surprising that we should begin to thinknot only of “transforming” our military forces, but alsoin terms of some form of “revolution” in militaryaffairs (RMA). While transformation2 offers theprospect of multiplying the power of our own militaryforces, perhaps the more compelling argument in itsfavor is the specter of a successful RMA in thehands of an opponent producing a devastatingdefeat. Indeed from a semantic standpoint, the realmilitary revolution in our modern world would be onethat overthrew the existing world order and not onethat somehow sustained it.

In this regard, perhaps the most poignant messagecarried by the story of the French collapse in the1940 blitzkrieg is not so much the desirability offinding an American RMA as it is the absolutenecessity to avoid being surprised and defeated bysomeone else’s RMA. In the final analysis, our

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interest in Network Centric Warfare may not be somuch a question of figuring out how to be theGermans of 1940. More than anything else, it maybe determining how to avoid being the French. Thisunstated fear of being on the losing end of an RMAis the underlying motivation of much of the RMAdebate. That same fear is also at the root of much ofthe growing interest in effects-based operations.

The blitzkrieg example underlines something elseas well. In many respects, a military developmentmay be revolutionary not because of the speedwith which it takes place, or because of the noveltyof the means used, but because of the result itachieves. A revolution in military affairs isrevolutionary because it constitutes a sharp breakwith the accepted way of doing things, a changethat enables the RMA military force to defeat anopponent conclusively.3 The problem is thatpeacetime tests of such a prospective militaryrevolution can never fully replicate either combatconditions or the uncertainties of war. Howeverclosely an opponent’s activities have beenmonitored, and however frequently the elements ofa would-be RMA have been practiced, theoutcome and success of the prospective revolutionwill never be known until it’s too late4 and the battleis won or lost.

It is in this context that both Network Centric Warfareand effects-based operations must be considered.Either separately or together, both Network CentricWarfare and effects-based operations may be saidto constitute an embryonic, would-be militaryrevolution. Neither is entirely new in the sense that


both can be traced to fundamental military principleslong antedating the Cold War. However, both take ona significant new dimension in the Information Age.Both are also evolving significantly in response tothe changing missions and threats of the post-September 11th world. Both display a renewed focuson more traditional military operations rather than aCold War-style strategic nuclear standoff. Bothreflect attempts to think differently and to harnessnew technologies. Finally, like other would-bemilitary revolutions of the past, both may ultimatelybe confronted with a challenge that their advocateshad not anticipated and they may fail. Herein lies thecore challenge. How do we best adapt the newtechnologies and the new thinking to the missionsour military forces are likely to face in our newsecurity environment while recognizing that others inthat world will be attempting to create their ownrevolutions with us as the target?

Network Centric Warfare,Technological Revolutions andCombat EfficiencyIt seems appropriate that any discussion oftransformation should start with Network CentricWarfare, the concept of linking all aspects ofwarfighting into a shared situation awareness andshared understanding of command intent so as toachieve a unity and synchronicity of effects thatmultiplies the power of military forces. TheDepartment of Defense Report to Congress onNetwork Centric Warfare of July 2001 notes thatNetwork Centric Warfare involves networking in

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three domains of warfare (the physical, information,and cognitive domains) so as to “generateincreased combat power by: better synchronizingeffects in the battlespace; achieving greater speedof command; (and) increasing lethality, survivability,and responsiveness.”5 In their seminal book,Network Centric Warfare, Developing andLeveraging Information Superiority, Alberts,Garstka, and Stein describe “Network CentricWarfare” in this manner:

NCW is about human and organizationalbehavior. NCW is based on a new way ofthinking, network-centric thinking, andapplying it to military operations. NCWfocuses on the combat power that can begenerated from the effective linking ornetworking of the warfighting enterprise. It ischaracterized by the ability of geographicallydispersed forces to create a high level ofshared battle space awareness that can beexploited via self-synchronization and othernetwork-centric operations to achievecommander’s intent. NCW supports speed ofcommand, the conversion of a superiorinformation position to action. NCW istransparent to mission, force size, andgeography. Furthermore, NCW has thepotential to contribute to the coalescence ofthe tactical, operational, and strategic levelsof war. In brief, NCW is not narrowly abouttechnology, but broadly about an emergingmilitary response to the Information Age.6

Network-centric operations, then, are the applicationof the concepts and principles of Network Centric


Warfare to military operations across the spectrumof conflict from peace, to crisis, to war.

As this description suggests, Network CentricWarfare and network-centric operations are closelyaligned with the emerging new technologies of theso-called Information Age. But, the descriptiondoes more than that. It implies that the newtechnologies by themselves are not enough andthat the real potential of network-centric operationsstems from some innovative thinking as to how touse these technologies. Thus, in the manner of Dr.Krepinevich’s definition of a revolution in militaryaffairs, the new technologies must be accompaniedby changes in organization, doctrine, and tactics,just as the inter-war years’ new technologies,radios, aircraft, and armor needed to be used as adifferent combined arms force to create a blitzkriegRMA. There is still another dimension to thiscombination of new technologies and new thinking.Network Centric Warfare may also provide themeans for executing an old concept, effects-basedoperations, in a new way that is both precise anddynamic. It is this prospect that will be explored inthis book.

The common thread that runs through the definitionof Network Centric Warfare, the introduction of newtechnologies, and the exploration of a concept ofeffects-based warfare is the search for greatercombat efficiency. That is, the purpose of eachtechnology and concept is a reduction in the relativeamount of military or other power needed toundertake a given mission, to fulfill a given task, orto create a specific outcome. The attraction of

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Network Centric Warfare and effects-based warfareis the prospect that they can yield improved combatefficiency. The challenge is to understand how theymight do this and what combination of technologiesused in support of which concepts would yield thegreatest combat efficiency.

We need to be careful in how we proceed. TheAlberts et al. description of Network Centric Warfareimplies a distinction between a military technicalrevolution (MTR) and a RMA similar to that drawn inthe Introduction to this book. Whereas the MTRapplies new technology to existing ways of war, theRMA combines new technology with new tactics,doctrine, and/or organization, e.g. the blitzkrieg, orcombines new or existing technologies in a newconcept of warfare, e.g. the levée en masse and theNapoleonic revolution.

If we apply this construct to Network CentricWarfare and effects-based operations, threedistinct levels of potential improvement in combatefficiency begin to emerge. The first level ofimprovement would derive from the application ofnew technologies to existing forces, doctrine,tactics, and organization and the existing conceptsof warfare. The second level of improvement wouldderive from the adaptation of doctrine, tactics, andorganization to optimize the impact of the newtechnologies. Finally, the third level of improvementin combat efficiency would then derive from theapplication of the new technology and thinking to adifferent style of warfare, an avenue we will explorein effects-based operations.


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The idea of combat efficiency and the three levelsof potential improvement in efficiency, each tied todifferent aspects of the RMA debate, offer aframework for more detailed consideration of howboth Network Centric Warfare and effects-basedoperations fit into the larger picture of the newsecurity environment, what military forces do in it,and how they are organized.

First Level Improvement in CombatEfficiency: New TechnologiesThe most straightforward and understandablepotential improvement in combat efficiency is to bederived from applying the emerging military anddual-use technologies for forces, doctrine,organization, and tactics to existing concepts ofwarfare. The use of new technology to multiply theimpact of military forces seems almost axiomaticand, indeed, is the staple of the current acquisitionprocess. The only challenge would appear to lie indetermining which technologies in whichcombinations hold the most potential. Still, this isnot as simple as it sounds.

Three Technological RevolutionsThe driving force behind the discussion of NetworkCentric Warfare has been a revolution in informationtechnology that has been building over the lastdecade and more. Still, this information is only partof the picture. In reality, we must think in terms of aninterlocking set of three different technological

revolutions: one in sensors, one in informationtechnology, and one in weapons technology.7

• Sensor Technology. The revolution in sensortechnology is twofold: one element is the movetoward sensors that are able to achieve acomprehensive, near-real-time surveillance overvast areas, and the other is a move towardsmaller, cheaper, more numerous sensors thatcan be netted to detect, locate, identify, andtrack targets.8 The latter is of particularsignificance. Not only will the sensors producedby the revolution be smaller, cheaper, andtherefore, much more numerous, but they willalso be of an almost bewildering variety. Eachwill test some specific set or range ofphenomena, e.g. acoustic, seismic, andinfrared, with each stream of informationintegrated both with that of different sensors andover time. Together, these trends can providethe quantity and quality of data to create a“situational awareness” that is “global in scopeand precise in detail.”9 Already, this trend isbeing reflected in the expanding efforts of theU.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps to exploitfields of unattended ground sensors, includingsome insect-like mobile sensors. It is alsoreflected in the U.S. Navy’s exploration of aconcept of an “Expeditionary Sensor Grid” ofthousands, if not tens of thousands, of sensorsthat might be deployed by an operationalcommander in tiers of overhead, unmannedaerial and surface sensors spread across aforward battlespace on and under the sea,ashore and in the air.


• Information Technology. The true utility of thenew sensors described above can only beappreciated if we think of them in the context ofsensor fields or entire surveillance systems.The military success of the sensor revolution iscontingent upon an equal and parallel successin networking them into a system of systems.New information technology provides thisnetwork backbone. It lends the sensorrevolution a real military significance. Thereason is twofold. First, the networking allowsus to expand the capability of the sensors bothby better integrating the data collected, and byallowing the sensors to interactively build onone another’s efforts. This latter networking canin turn permit a dumbing down of the sensorsinvolved so as to make them still cheaper andpotentially more numerous. Second, the scopeand scale of the data provided by the sensorrevolution is likely to be of such a quantity thatit would be unmanageable save for aninformation revolution that will bring thegeometric increase in computing powernecessary to process, collate, and analyze theresulting quantity of sensor data. In short,without networking, the sensors could achieveonly a very limited part of their impact and theirnumbers and diverse data streams might evenbecome counterproductive.

What is more, the revolution will also providethe means of distributing information to anydesignee or “shooter” anywhere in the world atnear-real-time speeds. Unless the “commandand control”10 of the forces receiving the sensor

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information were equal to the task, the influx ofinformation would likely overwhelmcommanders and become dysfunctional. Thus,the information revolution must also contributethe means of ensuring both that the rightinformation reaches the right decisionmaker atthe right time in the right form, and that thedecisionmaker can make the best use possibleof it in executing command intent, however itmay be expressed. If we take this latter thoughta step further, we can also look for informationtechnology to provide better information anddisplays to help decisionmakers appreciate therapid successions of complicated tactical andoperational data that make up a modernengagement. Still more importantly, we mightuse the new technology to address the stillmore complex, subjective, and usuallyambiguous information inherent in exploitingthe human dimension of war.

• Weapons Technology. If the network-centricrevolution was limited to the first twotechnologies alone, a battlefield commandermight find himself inundated with a quantity oftargets that would completely outstrip hissupply of weapons. The third component of thetriple revolution provides the means ofexploiting these sensor and informationrevolutions. The focus of this weaponsrevolution is not toward increasingly preciseweapons but toward smaller, cheaper, andmore numerous weapons that are preciseenough to exploit the data provided by sensorsand information systems. Like the information


and sensor revolutions, the revolution inweapons is twofold. Better streams of targetingdata can permit a “dumbing down” ofexpensive guidance packages and thus reducecosts. And, new designs, better electronics,“lean manufacturing,” and mass production ofmuch larger numbers of weapons candecrease the cost for a given level of accuracyand capability.11 Indeed, the sensor andinformation revolutions enable us to think notonly in terms of cheaper missiles, but also interms of unmanned combat air vehicles thatcan be far cheaper than manned platforms asthe delivery means for this new generation ofcheap precise weapons.

…and Combat EfficiencyIf we accept that the first level of improvement incombat efficiency stems from applying these newtechnologies to the existing ways of war, then themajor challenge in attaining the first level ofimprovement in combat efficiency is figuring outwhich technologies in which combinations mightbest enable us to meet our strategic objectives andprovide the best return on our investment. Thequestion of which combinations work best isparticularly important. As our outline of the threerevolutions indicates, the real impact of thetechnologies upon warfare derives from thesynergies of combining different technologies drawnfrom different revolutions.12 Improved sensors canhelp us to find more targets more quickly andaccurately and to detect enemy actions and

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reactions sooner. But, the amount of data thesesensors can provide would overwhelm us withoutbetter information systems to process and handlethe data stream. Better information technologiessimilarly might enable us to move data andinformation faster and to disseminate both combatinformation and directives more rapidly and with lesserror. But, the combinations of sensors andinformation systems we create could simply leave uswith massive amounts of targeting information if wedid not have the larger numbers of weapons neededto exploit that information, and so on.

The idea of combining a variety of differenttechnologies to achieve new synergies seemsaxiomatic. The difficulty is in determining whichsynergies are likely to result and how these willevolve over time. In this vein, the tripletechnological revolution poses five challenges withwhich we must deal:

• First, the three technological revolutions arelargely independent of each other and, thus, willalmost inevitably be out of synch. This isespecially true since the sensor and informationrevolutions are largely being developed bycivilian industry and follow a timetable thatbears little relationship either to developments inthe other revolutions or to military need.

• Second, there will be a continual interactionamong the new technologies. Innovations in onearea may be expected to have a direct impacton the utility of technologies in other areas. Forexample, the new information technologies that


permit sensors to be more autonomous mightenable an expansion in the size and scope ofthe sensor fields that can be managed within anexisting surveillance system. Furthermore,developments in one area may spark changesin others. Improved guidance on weapons orthe introduction of improved unmanned combatair vehicles, for example, could change thenature and function of sensor fields.

• Third, the synergies that emerge from theinteraction of the new technologicaldevelopments can be both positive andnegative.13 Although we are accustomed tothinking of one technology building on another,in fact, some of the synergies may actually benegative. A slower pace of development in onetechnology revolution could inhibit progress inanother, such as bandwidth restrictions limitingthe size of sensor fields that can be monitored.Additionally, a new technology in the hands of awould-be opponent could potentially defeat thepurpose of an entire development effort. Aseries of developments in informationtechnology that permit us to centralizecommand and control, for example, may createa vulnerability that a precise weapon canexploit. Still more likely, if new informationtechnology were used to drive a centralizationof command instead of a de-centralization, itcould reduce our agility just when it is mostneeded to deal with adversaries who have usednew sensors and information technologies tode-centralize their operations.

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• Fourth, as the last point suggests, becausemuch of the triple revolution either is in civilian,“dual use” technologies or is readily available onthe international market, there is no American orWestern monopoly on the systems emerging orhow they are adapted to military use. To thecontrary, other states and non-state actors maypick and choose from a global technological“grab bag” to create their own would-berevolution, a revolution that may well be focusedon defeating the United States and the West. Asthe cost of the new technologies declines overtime, furthermore, the number of actors whocould potentially afford the technologies neededto pose an asymmetric threat will expand,multiplying the number and variety of potentialapplications of the technologies we mustconfront. Moreover, because smaller actors andnon-state actors must rely on commercial-off-the-shelf technology, they can largely avoidcumbersome acquisition procedures that afflictthe asymmetric foes. This can give them anadvantage in speed and surprise. In essence,as soon as they can identify a technologysynergy and buy it, they can exploit it.

• Fifth, none of the three revolutions is close tobeing finished. Each of the technologicalrevolutions is likely to continue to expand andaccelerate in the decades to come. Each newdevelopment can spawn new potentialsynergies like a succession of ripplesspreading out over a lake. Thus, our problemis not simply that of finding a one-timerevolutionary synergy for our own use, but


rather that of managing a stream of potentialsynergies, many of which might be usedagainst us.

In brief, the three technological revolutions present anearly infinite and constantly changing plethora ofpotential military synergies that will change even aswe attempt to apply them to existing concepts,doctrine, tactics, and organization. Given the fluidityand complexity of the three technologicalrevolutions, how do we identify those technologiesand those combinations that offer the most potential,both for ourselves and for our would-be opponents?

To some degree, by applying the principles of“system of systems” engineering, we can identifysome of the potential synergies, test them, andincorporate them into our deliberate planningprocess. Better sensors and information clearlycould create better situational awareness and thusreduce fratricide and enable us to detect enemymoves as they occur. Better targeting data wouldmean that fewer weapons would be required for agiven mission, and so on. Although this multiplyingweb of potential synergies may sound complex, theimpact of the new technologies can be readilyquantified. By comparing the results of a givenmission or tactic using older systems and forces withthe results of the same mission or tactic using newsystems or forces, we can obtain very exact results.

However, this ability to quantify is seductive.Because comparisons of limited changes in existingsystems can yield very exact results, we can findourselves in the position of the man looking for his

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lost keys by the light post because that is where hecan see best. Similarly, if we focus only on that whichwe can quantify, we stand a good chance of makingonly incremental changes in current capabilitiessince that is what we can best quantify, a fault forwhich the current acquisition system has beenfrequently chastised. The result would be to end upimproving our capacity to fight the last war, likeFrance in the face of the blitzkrieg.14

It is worth noting in this regard that, during the inter-war period, the most impressive militarytechnological advances and investments were madeby France, not by Germany. These technologies,embodied in the Maginot Line, were tested andevaluated, and “proven” to be an order of magnitudemore effective than the fortifications of World War I.15

Nor were the French unaware of the emergingtechnologies of their epoch. In 1940, French tankswere often better than their German counterpartsand their aircraft were more numerous.16 However,what shaped the blitzkrieg was how the Germansused the technologies they had available and theirorganization, strategy, and tactics.17

The key question raised by the technologicalrevolutions outlined above is the same one thatdistinguishes a MTR from a RMA. That question isnot: how do we use the new technologies to executeour current tactics and doctrine better? It is instead:how might the new technologies enable us to dothings differently? This, indeed, is the essence oftransformation. The challenge posed by thisquestion is to create doctrine, organizations, andtactics that optimize emerging technologies or thatincorporate them into new concepts of warfare that

better adapt our capabilities to the changing securityenvironment. In the final analysis, without the newthinking, the new technologies are likely to increaseefficiency in a way that is largely arithmetic andincremental in nature. They enable us to executetoday’s tactics and operations in a quantifiably betterway, but they still leave us with traditional, tightlycontrolled, and synchronized operations that arehierarchically planned and executed.18

We can palpably sense that there is somethingmissing in this technology-focused, first level ofimprovement in combat efficiency. Not only does theapplication of new technologies to existing concepts,organization, doctrine, and tactics beg the questionof what those same technologies might have done ina different context, but it largely ignores an evengreater issue. The post-September 11th missionsour military forces now face are not and will not bethe same as those for which our Cold War platforms,organization, and tactics were designed. Theevolving synergies of the triple technologicalrevolution draw us to look at a second level ofcombat efficiency in which changes in technologiesare coupled with change in how we think about war.This next level of combat efficiency has come to beembodied in the idea of Network Centric Warfare.

Second Level Improvement inCombat Efficiency: Network CentricWarfareFittingly, the concept of Network Centric Warfarebuilds on some key warfare changes that can growfrom the three technological revolutions. One such

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change is the use of sensors and networking toimprove situational awareness, precision, and self-synchronization to carry out more operations duringa given period of time and to focus those actions onthe right target at the right time to optimize impact.The speed and precision brought by networking canlikewise provide the potential to exploit very specificbattlefield opportunities and to operate at a pacecalculated to overwhelm an enemy’s capacity torespond. Also, network-centric capabilities portenda highly agile force able to change from one rapid,precise operation to another at will, and able tocompress complex targeting processes to fit thenearly real-time dimensions of the battlefield.Finally, networking also has the potential toincrease the amount and quality of the informationand knowledge available to commanders at everylevel both on and off the battlefield. For ourunderstanding of Network Centric Warfare and itsrole in improving combat efficiency, the critical pointis not that these capabilities may exist, but ratherhow the capabilities come together in NetworkCentric Warfare and how the resulting network-centric operations are more efficient.

The concept of Network Centric Warfare nowevolving applies the new technologies to two ends:to explore new ways to do existing missions better;19

and to find ways to undertake missions that we mightnever before have attempted. The latter is a criticalpart of dealing with a fast changing securityenvironment and especially the threats ofasymmetric threats. The Navy Warfare DevelopmentCommand’s draft “Capstone Concept for NavalOperations in the Information Age” begins to define

a working concept for the application of theseNetwork Centric Warfare concepts to militaryoperations. The Capstone Concept refers tonetwork-centric operations “as the art of derivingmaximum force power through the rapid and robustnetworking of diverse, well-informed, andgeographically separated warfighters” so as to“enable a precise, agile style of maneuver warfare.”20

What does that mean, and how does it increasecombat efficiency?

Proponents of network-centric operations explainthe impact on combat efficiency in this manner. Intraditional military operations, a mission is assignedand planned, forces are generated, and operationsare executed to concentrate power on an objective.This is a highly coordinated, “stepped” cycle (seeFigure 7): periods of relative inaction, during whichforces are generated and actions coordinated (theflat part of the step) alternate with periods of action,when combat power is applied (the vertical part).However, if forces were networked to create a near-real-time situational awareness, then we could actcontinuously along a relatively smooth “combatpower curve.” We would no longer need to pausebefore deciding on further action; the informationand coordination needed would already be there.

The shared situation awareness promised bynetwork-centric operations would also permit aflattened decentralized command structure inwhich decisions could and would be made at thelowest practicable level of command. Combinedwith self-synchronization, it would permit us toreclaim the “lost combat power” between the

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optimal combat power curve and the steps of theplanned synchronization as illustrated in thediagram. Finally, as we train and organize to workwith these capabilities and perfect ourdecisionmaking, the pace of these semi-independent operations might accelerate further topermit a steeper combat power curve and with it anew, more rapid speed of command.

Speed of Command

Although equating accelerated self-synchronizedoperations to increase combat efficiency makesintuitive sense, it needs further explanation. Oneway of doing this is to look at the diagram’s “steps”in the context of the Observe, Orient, Decide, andAct (OODA) loop concept proposed by ColonelJohn R. Boyd, USAF. However, instead of treatingthe OODA loops21 as circles, we can look at themas a succession of linear cycles overlaid on thesteps described. Col. Boyd’s Observe, Orient andDecide phases then would equate to the flat part ofthe step while the Act phase would be the verticalor action part of the step (see Figure 8). Plotted onaxes of time (x) versus cumulative application ofmilitary force (y), the “steps” then become OODAcycles with each Act adding to the total of themilitary force applied.

If we were somehow able to compress the length oftime required to complete an observation of theopponent’s actions sufficient to make a decision,and/or if we were similarly able to shorten the timeneeded to re-orient our activities and then to decide


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on a course of action, then the impact on thecombat power curve would be to greatly increaseits slope (see Figure 9).

The result would be the increase in the speed ofcommand theorized in Figure 7, our original diagram.

While this may be sufficient to explain the diagram inFigure 9, it falls into a trap. We seem to equate thelength of the OODA loop or decision cycle with thepace of operations. Yet, we know that much more isinvolved in conducting military operations.22 Weknow that to act, we must do a great deal more thansimply observe, orient, and decide. Actions arephysical in nature and require physical preparationsas well as decisionmaking. Accordingly, we mustlook beyond the OODA decision cycles to a largerdimension that might be termed a “combat powergeneration cycle.” That cycle encompasses not onlythe act of observing, orienting, and deciding, but alsothe whole range of parallel physical acts necessaryto actually generate combat power, or act.

Self-Synchronization

This broader conception of the combat powergeneration cycle introduces new dimensions to eachphase of Boyd’s OODA loop. For example, the“observe” process includes both the decision toobserve certain activities and the physical actionsneeded to acquire the intelligence, surveillance, andtargeting data and to transmit it to the right people orsystems. New sensor and information technologiescan compress this process significantly, but there isa limit to how much.


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Moreover, to optimize the impact of precision, weneed more than sensor-based awareness; we needto identify specific vulnerabilities. To do that, weneed to know the enemy better. Although this“knowing” draws on sensor information and as aresult, will be subject to some time compression, theknowledge also depends on regional expertise andon intelligence databases developed long before thebattle begins. Thus, the new sensors andinformation technology can only shorten the cycle tothe degree that the physical actions needed for long-term collection and analysis have already beencompleted and that knowledge is already availableon the network.

A similar limit emerges in the “orient/decide”phase.23 Better awareness helps us avoid mistakesand use assets more efficiently, but we must stillcomplete a set of physical actions to generatemilitary power. We may have to move the carrierwithin range of the objective, plan and brief themission, fuel and arm the aircraft, and launchthem.24 We may also have to deliver follow-on airstrikes to achieve an objective. The pace of theseactions is determined by the physical capabilities ofsystems and people. An aircraft carrier can moveonly so fast and its flight deck operations can behurried along only so much. Efficiency is as much afunction of how we organize, train, and equip ourforces as it is of how the information flows. Thesame is true of the “act” phase. Once in the air,aircraft must proceed to the target and then, at atime dependent on a series of physical constraints(the speed of the aircraft, range of its weapons, andthe distance to be traveled), launch their ordinance.

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To increase the impact of network-centric-derivedspeed of command and thus combat efficiency, wemust accelerate both parts of the combat cycle, theOODA cycle and the process of generating combatpower. A strike sortie generation demonstrationconducted by the U.S.S. Nimitz (CVN 68) in 199725

provides a good example of how these two elementscome together. The Nimitz demonstration used arudimentary network to aid targeting anddecisionmaking, but then focused on optimizing thebattle group, the carrier, and the airwing to makebetter use of the increased information that thenetwork made available. Among other things, itadded pilots to its embarked airwing,26 introducednew high-speed cyclical operations,27 and relied onaccompanying missile ships for air defense of thebattle group. The result was a fourfold increase insorties over a 4-day period. Arming each aircraft withmultiple precision weapons, each of which couldreliably destroy an aimpoint, further multiplied theeffect. The battle group thus established a faster,more efficient power generation cycle, one that(when combined with network’s ability to identify the“targets that count” in commensurate numbers)produced an order of magnitude increase in thegroup’s combat efficiency.28

This achievement is significant for several reasons.First, the Nimitz operation shows that using betterequipment, organization, training, and informationcan shorten the combat power generation cycle,and thus take advantage of network-centric speedand awareness. However, it also indicatessomething else; the time required for combat powergeneration will vary with equipment, training, and


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organization, just as it did on the Nimitz before andafter new measures were implemented. Thatsuggests that dissimilar military forces have powergeneration cycles of radically different lengths. Forexample, the length of the Nimitz’s cycle woulddiffer from that of a squad of SEALs (U.S. Navyspecial operations forces) inserted from asubmarine, or of a cruiser firing Tomahawk landattack missiles, or of a squad of Marines in afirefight, or of bombers operating from bases in thecontinental United States (see Figure 10).

The Nimitz demonstration also points to anotherdifferential in the impact of training andorganization. Thus, not only are different kinds ofunits differently equipped and therefore subject todifferent physical limits in how fast they can react,but different units of the same type will havereceived different levels of training and displaydifferent proficiencies that will also have an impacton the speed of their performance.

In a traditional battle, the commander manages thecomplex interaction among these different combatcycles by coordinating subordinate units so thattheir respective “act” phases strike the enemy atthe same time or in some prescribed sequence.Indeed, one can hardly imagine the D-Day landingsin the absence of such coordination to mass thefires and effects of the massive Allied forces. Andas the complexity of the Allied landings underlined,the more diverse the forces involved, the greaterthe coordination problem is likely to be. Thedifficulty is that by coordinating to this degree, theentire effort is held hostage to the speed of the


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slowest combat cycle, with all other unitsdeliberately kept from achieving their optimumtempo of operations so as to mass the effectsneeded or to be mutually supportive. Therefore, thecommander deliberately foregoes additional cyclesof applied power that might have been generatedby quicker paced forces, and so less power isapplied overall (see Figure 11). In short, “byoptimizing mass, we minimize efficiency.”29

As if this were not enough of a challenge, most ofour wartime operations do not involve uniquely U.S.forces. The norm is a coalition operation of someform. Thus, the problem is not only the differencesbetween unit types and levels of proficiency on theU.S. side, but an even greater variance betweenU.S. units and the analogous Allied units. Each Alliedunit almost inevitably will have different equipmentand different training as well as in all likelihooddifferent rules of engagement. These will in greatdegree govern the varying lengths of the coalition’scombat power generation cycle (see Figure 12).

In fact, the pace of coalition operations are verymuch governed by these factors to the point thatthe overall combat power generation cycle of thecoalition as a whole may bear little resemblanceto those of the individual players. While theseproblems can in some respects be ameliorated byintegrated alliance working arrangements such asin NATO, in general, the problem encountered bythe commander in coordinating the “act” phases ofmultiple forces and multiple allies increasesalmost exponentially as the number of coalitionpartners increases.


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Shared Situation Awareness, SharedUnderstanding of Command Intent

How does Network Centric Warfare better enablethe commander to deal with this complex challengeand optimize the pace of his operations?

Increases in an individual unit’s speed of command,or decisionmaking, can certainly enable us to reduceOODA cycle lengths and thereby increase the paceof operations, to a point. Similarly, better equipment,organization, and training of that unit can alsoincrease its pace of operations. But, the keyquestion that emerges from the discussion above isnot about individual units, but about how disparateunits of all descriptions can be coordinated toincrease the overall pace of operations andfirepower of the force as a whole, whether it isentirely American or a coalition. The implied solutionis to somehow permit each unit to operate at itsoptimal pace, thus reclaiming the “lost combatpower.” But, how do we do this without making theoverall force dysfunctional and, perhaps, fratricidal?

Here is where the agility derived from NetworkCentric Warfare becomes important. This agility andthe speed and precision it exploits all derive from theamalgam of information tools, sensors, andcommunications that constitutes the informationback plane of network-centric operations. Thenetwork permits us to undertake more actions in agiven time, to focus those actions better, to act andreact faster, and to do so with more certainty. That isto say that networking permits our military forces tobecome more efficient.


The contribution of Network Centric Warfarecenters on creating a shared situationalawareness and a shared understanding of“command” intent.30 The assumption here is that, ifunit commands down to the tactical level have ageneral awareness of the overall situation and aspecific awareness of their position in it, then theywill be able to operate freely and coordinateamong themselves so as to optimize thecapabilities of each unit. The ability to use theshared situational awareness in this manner isclearly much more than linking sensors andcommanders. Like the Nimitz demonstration, itderives from adopting different organization,training, and doctrine to build on the awareness. Italso involves looking at the shared situationawareness beyond the tactical level. For theconcept to work, operational level commands andabove must be confident enough in the quality ofthe sharing to be able to decentralizedecisionmaking for maximum effectiveness wherefeasible, and retain control where it is needed. Thisalso implies different senior echelon training,organization, and doctrine, a change that needs tostretch all the way up to the national leadership.Finally, if we are ever to put to rest the oxymoronof rapid coalition operations, the sharedawareness and the changes in organization,training, and doctrine must likewise extend topotential partners.

As the latter two prospects highlight, sharedsituation awareness by itself is insufficient. Thecommands sharing the awareness must likewise be

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linked by a shared understanding of the commandintent without which their actions are likely tobecome dysfunctional. In fact, the decentralizationof command that breeds the greater combatefficiency hinges on such shared understanding.Again, such shared understanding depends asmuch on organization, training, and doctrine as itdoes on the information links among thecommands. Furthermore, even more than withshared situation awareness, such sharedunderstanding of command intent requires lookingbeyond the tactical level of military operations.

This does not mean that a detailed understandingof the national leadership’s objectives and policyintent need be inflicted on the harried tactical levelcommander. It does mean that the commandintent at each level must reliably reflect the intentof the next higher echelon of command. Thatdescending chain of command intents is likewisethe fruit of training. However, it is something more.The understanding we seek is not so much theresult of shared information as it is of sharedknowledge, both of the situation and theobjectives. It is this latter sharing that is at theheart of most of the coordination problemsassociated with coalition operations.

In the final analysis, the driving force behind both theshared situation awareness and the sharedunderstanding of command intent is less a questionof simply increasing combat efficiency than the needto avoid defeat. To deal with changes in the enemythreat or to take advantage of emerging battlefieldopportunities, we must be able both to conduct


rapid, semi-independent operations and to massforces and effects as required. We must be able tochange the mode, direction, and objectives of ouractions just as much as we need to bring speed andprecision to targeting.

Identifying Synergies of Thinking andThingsIf we must choose the best technologies in the bestcombinations to optimize combat efficiency, and ifwe are to combine them with the right organization,training, and doctrine to exploit shared situationalawareness and understanding of command intent,how are we to determine which are the bestsolutions? How do we measure the value of thealternatives? How much is the proverbial “pound ofinformation” really worth?

The problem of assessing multiple different impactsencountered in dealing with myriad interacting newtechnologies is multiplied here by the need tomonitor how each contributes or fails to contribute tothe new tactics, doctrine, and organization we areexploring. The result is a complex problem with aseemingly infinite number of variables. Even thoughany precise quantification of the value of informationmay not be possible in the sense of assessing newtechnology alone, there clearly are new ways ofassessing and measuring outcomes that are nowemerging. These approaches focus upon measuringoutcomes with and without key network-centriccapabilities such as shared situation awareness andself-synchronization.

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In fact, this is what the Navy’s Fleet BattleExperiments (FBEs) and the Joint ForcesCommand’s experimentation program in particularhave been attempting to do, both with respect to theconcepts themselves and with respect to theincorporation of new technologies into thoseconcepts. Nor are those the only such experiments.The Department of Defense Report to Congress onNetwork Centric Warfare points to “a growing bodyof evidence that provides an existence proof” of thecentral ideas of Network Centric Warfare.31 Thereport goes on to note:

The most compelling evidence identified to dateexists at the tactical level in a broad range ofmission areas. This evidence has beenassembled from a variety of service andcombined experimentation and operationaldemonstrations, as well as high intensity, tacticalconflict situations. Examples were identified thatsupported the relationship between:

• Improved networking capabilities and increasedinformation sharing

• Increased information sharing and increasedshared situational awareness

• Increased shared situational awareness andimproved collaboration and synchronization

• Increased mission effectiveness as a result ofthe presence of one or more of these factors.

Although these results are certainly not quantifiablein the same sense that the acquisition process hascome to expect of weapons and platforms, the


experimentation to date32 provides clear indication ofthe synergies between the new technologies nowavailable and some new thinking as to how to bestwage war. These synergies are the basis for thesecond, higher level of combat efficiency that isattainable with network-centric operations. Indeed,they are already sufficient to indicate that thesecond, network-centric level of improvement incombat efficiency is clearly well beyond thatachievable with the new technology alone.Furthermore, the simple fact that we are stillreferring to “experimentation” has another importantimplication: that we have not yet fully explored justhow great an increase in combat efficiency mightultimately come from combining the newtechnologies with network-centric thinking.

Third Level of Improvement inCombat Efficiency: Effects-BasedOperations… Efficiency to doWhat?Although the results of the experimentation withnetwork-centric operations are certainly promising,they are not the end of the story. What we havedescribed is the nature of the network-centric“means” we seek to create. What we have yet toaddress is how we might use that tool’s enhancedoperational efficiency. Now we must ask: efficiencyto do what?

If we say nothing further at this point, that applicationwill, by default, reflect the tried and true concepts ofsome form of attrition-based warfare. It is easy for us

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to look at the applications of speed of command andself-synchronization and the uses of shared situationawareness and shared understanding of commandintent considered so far and to think only in terms ofimprovements to our ability to destroy enemy forcesand infrastructure. That is, just as in the case of thefirst or MTR level of combat efficiency, network-centric operations by themselves and in combinationwith new first level technologies can amount to littlemore than “better, faster, more” attrition.

At first glance, this statement appears dissonant.Surely, the changes wrought by new technologiesand Network Centric Warfare must enable us tosomething more than just improve the efficiency ofour attrition? The discussions of Network CentricWarfare certainly give us a hint of something more.We are told that network-centric operations mayenable us to “get inside the enemy’s OODA loop,” orthat we can use the increased pace of ouroperations to overwhelm the enemy and lock him outof an effective response. Still, even these hints ofsomething more almost inevitably seem to devolveinto metrics that are still defined in terms of targetsdestroyed, in terms of attrition of enemy forces andcapabilities: (1) because we were able to operateinside the enemy OODA loop, we were able todestroy the opposing force; (2) because the enemywas unable to respond effectively, we were able todestroy his infrastructure with relative impunity, andso on.

Yet, the real efficiency that we seek with our newtechnologies and network-centric thinking issomething very different from such destruction. It is


to foreshorten the combat itself by breaking ourenemies’ will to resist, even though they may retainthe forces and capabilities to do so. How then do wemake the leap to a level of efficiency that wouldpermit us to break our enemies’ wills rather thangrind down their means of waging war? How will thenew technologies and concepts of network-centricoperations apply to the use of military power short ofdestroying the opposing forces and capabilities (theoperations short of combat that make up the vastmajority of what a military does)?

To answer these questions, we must first answer adifferent question: what are effects-based operations?

1Parts of this chapter were originally published as “NetworkCentric Warfare: What’s the Point?” United States Naval WarCollege Review. Winter 2001.2The Department of Defense Report to Congress on NetworkCentric Warfare defines transformation as “the evolution anddeployment of combat capabilities that provide revolutionaryor asymmetric advantages to our forces.” Report toCongress, p. 2-2.3See also Norman Friedman, Thomas C. Hone, Mark DMandeles. The Introduction of Carrier Aviation into the U.S.Navy and the Royal Navy: Military-Technical revolutions,Organizations, and the Problem of Decision. Office of NetAssessment, 1994.4Andrew W. Marshall, “Opening Remarks,” Navy RMARoundtable, June 4, 1997, SAIC: 1997.5Department of Defense. Network Centric Warfare,Department of Defense Report to Congress, 27 July 2001.Washington, D.C. 2001. p. 3-10.6David Alberts, John Garstka, and Frederick Stein. NetworkCentric Warfare, Developing and Leveraging InformationSuperiority. Washington; CCRP. 2000, p. 88. 7Morrow, Walter. “Technology for a Naval Revolution inMilitary Affairs,” Second Navy RMA Round Table, 4 June1997.

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8By extension, this revolution would then include all of theelements of the global locating capability, e.g. the GlobalPositioning System (GPS), that enable us to locate objectsprecisely either for surveillance or for targeting weapons. 9Morrow. “Technology.” 10There is some question as to whether the term “commandand control” might itself be archaic in an era of complex, high-speed interactions. Indeed, the prospect of some newarrangement for the direction of forces and actions seems tobe a necessary ingredient for the implementation of bothNetwork Centric Warfare and effects-based operations. 11This trend is already evident in the falling unit price of theNavy Tomahawk cruise missile from $1.2 million 10 yearsago, to less than $700 thousand in 1998, to the prospect of$300 thousand or less before the next decade is out - aroughly 50% drop every 10 years. Murphy, RADM Daniel.“Surface warfare.” Navy RMA Round Table. June 4, 1997. Asimilar case might be made for the JDAM munitions.12In the U.S. operations in Afghanistan, for example, thePredator unmanned aerial surveillance vehicles were armedwith Hellfire missiles, thus combining sensors and weaponssystems into one package with the package supported byincreasingly accurate and comprehensive informationsystems. The combination of technologies and at least thelimited introduction of Network Centric Warfare lent newmeaning to an old concept of “armed reconnaissance” andprovided a new paradigm for technology synergy. 13The situation is analogous to the triple revolution in guns,armor, and propulsion that marked warship design in the 50years between 1862 and 1912. That three-fold revolutionintroduced a period of trial and error experimentation andforced such rapid change in warship design that new unitswere obsolete within a few years of fleet entry. It also broughtforth Mahan and a fundamental rethinking of what naviescould do. 14In a period of very rapid, multi-faceted technological change,this tendency is aggravated by the fact that it is very likely thatmany, if not most, of the technological synergies we areencountering will only be fully understood over time. To makematters still more difficult, the interactions of diverse newtechnologies can only be fully understood as they are appliedto defense problems in the field. To make matters worse, thenature of those defense problems themselves will beconstantly evolving. This means that, for all of our efforts totest and plan, we will not be able to predict entirely or quantifyin advance all the potential results of the technologies weintroduce.


15Probably the most innovative military technologies of the1920s and 1930s were those incorporated into the vast arrayof defensive works on France’s frontier with Germany knownas the Maginot Line. The French problem was not a lack ofinnovative military thinking as to other alternatives. CharlesDe Gaulle’s Fils d’épée (1934) clearly laid out many of theprinciples adopted by German panzer commanders in theblitzkrieg. Similarly, the problem was not a lack ofexperimentation. The French Army Staff conducted numerouswargames throughout the period, most of which validatedtheir thinking. Their problem was rather that they applied theirmilitary technical revolution to the wrong concept. 16May, Ernest R. Strange Victory, Hitler’s Conquest of France.Hill and Wang. 2000. p. 209.17What the French lacked was the organization, doctrine, andtactics of the blitzkrieg and, as Williamson Murray points out,the French staff was unable to deal with the pace ofoperations that these innovations generated. Murray, p. 21.18To some degree, this same quandary is also evident todayin the debate over Network Centric Warfare. All too manyattempts to describe Network Centric Warfare and itsimpact on military operations have centered on the networkand on the new information technologies that can be usedto create more efficient sensor-to-shooter sensors andcommunications architecture. In this “if you build it, they willcome” approach, the architectures and informationtechnologies (the technological revolutions) are seen to bethe core of the problem, and that the RMA will be borndirectly out of its successes. While the link between newinformation systems and improved combat efficiency iscertainly true, the “if you build it, they will come” approachruns into many of the same problems and limitations of theMTR. The performance of a sensor-to-shooter architecture,for example, may be very testable and quantifiable, but itcould still leave us endlessly refining the “SCUD hunting”problem of the last war, rather than dealing with emergingasymmetric challenges. And, the farther the approachstrays from existing paradigms, the more difficult itbecomes to quantify. More importantly, the MTR approachlargely fails to answer how and why the new architecturesand technologies translate into new capabilities like“shared awareness” and “speed of command,” or how theseenable us to “get inside the enemy’s OODA loop,” muchless to what avail.19The Navy’s old Ocean Surveillance Information System(OSIS) combined with the Joint On-line Tactical System

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(JOTS) in the context of the Combined Warfare Commander(CWC) concept certainly represent at least an embryonicform of what we now know as network-centric operations,which dates back more than 15 years. However, the efforts ofthe ongoing series of Navy Fleet Battle Experiments clearlymove toward a level of interaction these earlier systems couldnot foresee.20Navy Warfare Development Command. Draft NetworkCentric Operations: A Capstone Concept for NavalOperations in the Information Age. p. i.21The OODA cycle was originally used by Col. Boyd tocharacterize a fighter engagement but it has been come to beapplied to the decisionmaking process in general. Whilecertainly an oversimplification of a much more complexinteraction, it does offer a shorthand version of the processand is used here in that sense.Colonel John A. Boyd, USAF. “A Discourse on Winning andLosing.” Air University Lecture. August 1987. 22At this point, in fact, we begin to see the limitations of theoverly simple, tactical level OODA loop model. 23In Boyd’s tactical engagement loop, “orient” and “decide” areseparated into two phases, however, this separation becomesdifficult to distinguish in more complex operations, especiallyat the operational and strategic levels of war. As used in thispaper, the orient and decide phases are combined and usedto define the period of time necessary to generate the rightforce to achieve the right effects. 24In the 2001-2 Afghan operations, we are already seeing animpact network-centric situational awareness on this process.Aircraft were often launched and targets provided en route or,especially in the case of long-range bombers, were changedseveral times en route. Yet, despite the increased efficiencywrought be the changes in command, control,communications and information, the aircraft in question stillhad to go through the same physical processes to launch orto be “turned around” between cycles. 25The results of this demonstration are detailed in a two-volume study by the Center for Naval Analyses. See AngelaJewell et al. “USS Nimitz and Carrier Airwing Nine SurgeDemonstration.” Alexandria, Virginia; Center for NavalAnalyses, 1998.26In the Nimitz case, the airwing composed of lowmaintenance, quick turnaround F/A-18s that could readilyundertake five or more sorties per day. 27The carrier airwing started with intense “flex-deck”operations, but soon discovered that the flight deck became


unworkable. They therefore switched to an aggressiveconcept of cyclical operations that enabled them to launchmore aircraft while maintaining better order on the flight deck. Interview with RADM John Nathman, USN. February 11,1999. 28This was echoed in the 2002 report of Commander CarrierGroup Eight on operations in Afghanistan. The report notedthat naval air strike operations had moved from a paradigm oftwo aircraft per aimpoint to one of two aimpoints per aircraft,in essence a fourfold increase in striking power. 29Comment by Colonel John D. Sullivan, USAF ret., BoeingWashington Studies and Analysis. 30That is, the mission and objectives toward which thecommand’s actions are to be directed and the manner inwhich that mission is to be accomplished. Depending on theorganization and doctrine of the forces involved, this intentmay be highly specific and directive in nature or, in thecontext of Network Centric Warfare, it may be general enoughto permit individual units to adapt to the changing battle andto take initiative to exploit fleeting battlefield or otheroperational opportunities. Alberts et al. Understanding Information Age Warfare. pp. 167ff. 31Network Centric Warfare, Department of Defense Report toCongress. 27 July 2001, Washington, DC. 2001. pp. 8-8ff. 32In Understanding Information Age Warfare, Alberts et al. citeexamples of the Navy’s Fleet Battle Experiment Delta and theAir Force’s F-15 link 16 experiments. In the former, theaddition of some rudimentary shared awareness and agreater degree of self-synchronization to a routine defensiveproblem resulted in a tenfold decrease in the number of“leakers” at the same time as it permitted a 10 percentdecrease in the number of air sorties. In the latter, theintroduction of link 16-derived situational awareness, even ononly a limited proportion of the F-15s engaging, resulted in atwofold increase in the number of kills.

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CHAPTER 3

What AreEffects-Based

Operations?What are effects-based operations? Are they

simply another name for a more sophisticatedversion of nodal targeting, or perhaps, another twiston the connection between attrition and “will” thatoperations research analysts have been puzzlingover for decades? Or are they something more, abroader and more integrated approach to militaryoperations as a whole that, when combined withnew technologies and network-centric thinking,might enable us to deal differently with thechallenges we face and help us to exploit ourmilitary power operations short of combat?

In one guise or another, effects-based operationshave always been with us. They are what goodgenerals, admirals, and statesmen have alwaystried to do: to focus on shaping the adversary’sthinking and behavior rather than on simplydefeating his forces. They are at the heart of thewritings of Sun Tzu and of Clausewitz on militaryoperations. Moreover, as the allusion to bothmilitary and political leaders indicates, effects-

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based operations are neither simply a mode oftactical level warfare nor peculiarly military innature. They also encompass the full range ofpolitical, economic, and military actions that anation might undertake to shape the behavior of anenemy, of a would-be opponent, and even of alliesand neutrals. These actions may includedestruction of an enemy’s forces and capabilities,that is, attrition-based operations. However, theobjective of an effects-based strategy and of thoseactions that advance it is not simply to destroyphysical capabilities, but to induce an opponent,neutral, or ally to pursue a course of action inkeeping with our interests.

The concept of effects-based operations is a broadframework which includes ideas like “nodaltargeting” and “attrition-based operations,” but whichoffers the scope and flexibility to do much more: tolook at military operations in peace, crisis, and war,and to do so in the context of a cohesive overallnational political, economic and military effort.

This sweeping postulate poses a set of significantquestions to be addressed in this book. How wouldwe define a working concept of effects-basedoperations? How might such a concept change theway in which we operate our military forces andapply our military power? How might we actuallyoperationalize that concept both in combat and inday-to-day military operations? And finally, howshould it shape our understanding of NetworkCentric Warfare?


Toward a Concept of Effects-BasedOperationsThe preceding chapters’ discussions of levels ofimprovement in combat efficiency, attrition, meansand will, and symmetry in conflict indicate thateffects-based operations increase combat efficiency(1) by concentrating efforts on enemy will so as toforeshorten combat, and (2) by applying network-centric operations not just to combat but across thespectrum of conflict. In fact, these two ideas alsoprovide significant clues as to how effects-basedoperations work and as to the nature of therelationship between Network Centric Warfare andeffects-based operations.

Will and BehaviorContained in the discussion of attrition-basedwarfare is the idea that attrition, however efficient itmight be made, e.g. by nodal targeting, remains atbest an indirect assault on the true determinant of aconflict’s outcome: the will of the enemy to continuethe struggle. This question of will is fundamental toboth the symmetric and asymmetric models ofconflict, but in very different ways. In the symmetric,attrition-based contests, the destruction of thephysical capacity to wage war gradually deprives afoe of the physical means for continuing a strugglethat he is otherwise determined to pursue. In theasymmetric contests, the destruction is aimed atcreating a psychological or cognitive effect.1 That is,in the asymmetric, essentially effects-based contest,the objective is to break the will or otherwise shape

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the behavior of the foe so that he no longer wishesto continue the struggle, or to disorient him so thathe can no longer fight or react coherently.

While physical destruction remains a factor ineffects-based operations, it is the creation of sucha psychological or cognitive effect that is the truefocus of the effects-based approach. It is also thereal context for assessing the combat efficiency ofnetwork-centric and effects-based operations. Forexample, the increased precision, speed, andagility promised by the networking of sensors,forces, and commanders certainly portends anability to undertake very rapid and very preciseactions on the battlefield. The potential availabilityof an increased knowledge and understanding ofthe foe through the network points to a new abilityfor commanders to configure their battlefieldactions so as to achieve a highly specific “effect”defined in terms of enemy behavior. In essence,the combination of network-centric capabilities withan effects-based approach appears to present uswith a new potential for attacking the elements ofenemy will directly and thus, circumventing or, at aminimum, diminishing our reliance on sheerphysical destruction.

Operations in Peace, Crisis, and WarThe discussions of attrition-based warfare alsopoint to an obvious fact. Although our efforts toimprove the combat efficiency of our forces and toapply the concept of Network Centric Warfare arefocused on combat operations, the vast majority ofour military operations do not involve either combat


or destruction. To be certain, a military force thatcannot fight the nation’s wars is worth little, but it isequally true that one capable only of warfighting willbe of small help in preventing wars, containingconflict, or building a stable deterrence, which arethe key missions in dealing with the post-September11th security environment.

We must also take this logic an important stepfurther. We need to recognize that the behavior weseek to shape is not simply that of our enemies. Ourmilitary actions are and must be equally directed atshaping the behavior of friends and neutrals.2 Nosuccessful alliance or coalition operation has everbeen conducted without taking into account theimpact of its actions on each of the partners.Likewise, no crisis reaction or peacekeepingoperation can remain focused solely upon anaggressor without considering how other regionalstates will react. The political reality is that althoughwe may focus upon defeating an enemy, our militaryoperations almost always must also seek to supportour allies and to reassure neutrals, as well assimultaneously deterring other would-be adversarieswho might potentially join the foe in opposing us.

This aspect of effects-based thinking lies at thecenter of coalition operations of all stripes andcharacters.3 In fact, thinking in terms of effects-based operations can provide a basis for looking athow military operations might best be orchestratedto shape the behavior of friends and would-be foesalike so as to prevent war and preserve peace.The effects-based approach can also provide uswith a framework for considering not just how to

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apply network-centric operations to battle, but alsohow they might be used in a variety of roles acrossthe entire spectrum of conflict from peace to crisis,to war.

The above presents a possibility for applying thenew technologies and thinking of Network CentricWarfare to something more than combat and morethan the destruction of an opponent’s physicalmeans of waging war. By combining the concepts ofeffects-based operations and Network CentricWarfare, we can address the complex interactionbetween nations, would-be nations, and otherchallengers, particularly asymmetric opponents inwhich destruction is either not the central factor ofstrategy or is to be avoided.

Defining Effects-Based OperationsThe shift in focus from “weapons on target” to“focused actions” to shape the behavior of enemiesand allies suggests a broad definition of effects-based operations along the following lines:

Effects-based operations are coordinatedsets of actions directed at shaping thebehavior of friends, neutrals, and foes inpeace, crisis, and war.

Notice that this is a definition of effects-basedoperations. Effects-based warfare would be thesubset of these operations pertaining to combat orwartime operations,4 while effects-based targeting(at least of the kinetic variety5) would be in turn asubset of effects-based warfare. Notice, too, that weare defining the operations themselves and not a


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“process.” Logically, unless we first define whateffects-based operations are, we cannot begin toaddress a process for how we might plan andexecute them. Accordingly, we will start by definingthe key terms in our effects-based concept and a setof rules derived from observed uses before trying toidentify a process for carrying the concept out.

The definition of effects-based operations aboveemphasizes a broad understanding of actions orsets of actions and their links to behavior. The termactions is deliberately broad so that it can subsumenot only military actions, but also political,economic, or other actions by a government, as wellas those of non-governmental and internationalagencies and non-state actors.

The term behavior is also left broad so as toencompass not only that of foes, but also that offriends and neutrals. The latter reflects not onlythe links and considerations that must remain acritical facet of successful coalition operations,but also leaves the term foes loose enough toencompass both an adversary in combatoperations and an opponent in a confrontationthat does not result in combat.

These distinctions reflect the reality of today’s broad-spectrum military operations and, indeed, the highlyvaried use of military power throughout history. Theactions military forces may be called upon toundertake certainly can and must include combatand specifically strike operations, but military forcesclearly do a great deal more. Indeed, the mostfrequent and persistent military mission has been

that of preventing war, usually by deterring conflict orcontaining any crises that might escalate into war. Inthese endeavors, military forces are routinely usedin conjunction with political and diplomatic action toshape the behavior of observers (friends, foes, andneutrals) either by their actions or by their verypresence in a particular area. And historically,national command authorities have used theseactions very deliberately to create particular effects.In brief, past actions of military forces have clearlyconstituted effects-based operations even thoughthey did not involve combat.

Defining “Effect”If we are to pursue this definition of what might betermed “full spectrum effects-based operations” intoa more detailed concept, we must first be clear as towhat we mean by the word effect. The term effecthas been routinely used in military writings to implyeverything from outcomes or results, to operationalobjectives, to the blast radius of a weapon’swarhead. To make matters worse, much of thediscussion of effects-based operations to date hastended to focus on kinetic effects, that is, the impactof blowing something up (a use that, in many ways,is scarcely distinguishable from the attrition-basedmodel examined in the previous chapter).

Most frequently, the term effect is used in a target-planning connotation to denote the impact of aparticular target’s destruction upon some largeroperational or strategic dimension, notably inColonel John Warden’s concept of the concentriccircles of vulnerabilities in an enemy system.6 In


this context, the effect is not only that of the directimpact, that is, the destruction of the target, butalso that of the chain of successive events orindirect impacts that arise from that direct impact.The process of identifying the potential nodes inthis chain or cascade of subsequent consequentindirect effects and then exploiting them is thebasis for most of the current nodal targeting efforts.However, in each case the focus of such effects-based nodal analysis is on using some form oftarget destruction7 as the agent for generating thesubsequent cascade of effects.8

For the purposes of this work, we will take adifferent tack and explore the more generaloperational connotation that is suggested both bythe broad requirements of our security environmentand by Sun Tzu’s injunction that “to subdue theenemy without fighting is the acme of skill.”9 We willpostulate simply that:

An effect is a result or impact created by theapplication of military or other power.

Such power of course may be applied at thetactical, operational, military-strategic, and/orgeo-strategic level of conflict.10

The breadth of this definition implies that effects maybe either kinetic or non-kinetic, and may equally beeither physical or psychological/cognitive in nature.Thus, one effect may still be the destruction ofopposing forces and capabilities. However, thisbroad definition of effect, like that for effects-basedoperations, also leaves room for many morepossibilities that can stretch well beyond our still

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fundamentally attrition-based framework. It includes,for example, the use of maneuver to create effectsand the application of military power to the creationof conventional deterrence.

Notice, too, the use of the phrase “application ofmilitary or other power.” The phrase is deliberatelybroad so as to encompass those effects that canderive from uses of military power that do not involvedestruction, or that come from the use of other formsof power, or that arise from a conjunction of differentforms of power. This reflects the reality of a world inwhich military power is not applied in isolation but isinvariably part of an overall national package.

Notice as well that the words other power are notfurther defined. This implies that we may look notonly at the effects that might be wrought by otherelements of national power, but also that effectsmay derive from applications of power by actorsthat are not nations, including non-state actorssuch as terrorists, guerrillas, and ethnic orreligious liberation movements.

With these broad definitions, we have the latitude toexplore both how network-centric operations mightmore directly shape behavior whether in combat orin situations short of combat, and how militaryactions complement political and economic power increating effects.


A Stimulus and Response Model ofEffects-Based OperationsThese definitions of effects-based operations andeffects lead to another critical question: just how dothe actions we take, military and otherwise, influencethe behavior of adversaries and other observers?

A psychologist looking at our efforts to define effectsand effects-based operations would swiftly concludethat what we were talking about was nothing morethan a series of stimulus and response interactions.That is, the behavior we seek to shape is nothingmore than a response to a stimulus or set of stimuli.By threatening or administering some form ofpunishment or by offering some inducement, thestimuli motivate the recipient toward a particularcourse of action or behavior. In fact, this idea ofstimulus and response is a good shorthanddescription of what we are attempting to do witheffects-based operations. The challenge we confrontin planning an effects-based operation is figuring outwhat the right stimulus is to produce the response oreffect that we seek.

One way of shaping an opponent’s behavior in aparticular direction is fairly obvious. Killing a foecertainly and definitively shapes his futurebehavior. Similarly, the physical destruction of afoe’s forces, capabilities, and infrastructure willalso shape that foe’s future behavior. Simply put,the removal of particular capabilities forecloses tothe enemy any courses of action that might havedepended on their use and thus, options that theopponent might otherwise have pursued. In other

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words, by destroying the capabilities, we create aphysical effect that in some way delimits theenemy’s physical behavior.

To take a much considered example, the destructionof Iraqi SCUD missiles and their launchers duringDesert Storm would have foreclosed their use asterror weapons, a kind of behavior that the Iraqiregime might otherwise have chosen to adopt. Thistrain of logic is at the root of much of attrition-basedwarfare11 and of most nodal targeting efforts. It isalso the basis for much of the current concern with“time critical strike” and “time critical targeting.”

However, the 50-year history of crisis responseoperations signals that there is much more to theconcept of effects-based operations than this rathernarrow and still largely attrition-basedunderstanding. By looking at actions in terms ofstimulus and response, we open a different door.Actions become stimuli. They are no longerrestricted to moves that destroy physical capabilities,but include all moves that a military force makes thatmight influence a decisionmaking process.

This broader concept opens the way to address notonly the links between physical actions and physicaleffects, but also those between physical effects andeffects that are psychological in nature. And, it alsopermits us to consider the impact of the very sameactions upon friends and neutrals. Thus, while theproximate physical effect sought in hunting IraqiSCUDs during Desert Storm was to forestall Iraqiuse of those weapons, the real underlying reasonwas the need to prevent the Iraqi regime from


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undertaking a series of physical actions (attackingIsrael) that would have led to a potential Israeliretaliatory strike, which could have undermined thecohesion of the coalition. From the perspective ofthe United States, this larger political-militarydimension of SCUD hunting was a critical factor thatwould determine whether the American-led coalitioncould be held together and thus, whether the desertwar itself could be conducted. In short, theimportance of the political-military and psychologicaleffects of the SCUD hunting tended to far outweighthe significance of any immediate physical effectsgenerated by the SCUD hunting or of any militaryobjectives that might have been met by using theassigned air sorties against other military targets.How then do we address this larger dimension of thestimulus and response model?

The Navy Warfare Development Command’s draftCapstone Document takes a step in this directionby proposing that we can combine a superiorknowledge of the enemy and of a given situationwith the increased speed, precision, and agility toattack enemy decisionmaking. The Documentsuggests that we might use the newfound network-centric attributes to induce chaos, to shock theenemy into submission, or to “lock out” anycoherent response as an alternative to attrition-based modes of warfare.12

What is significant here is the Document’sacceptance of the fact that the objective ofnetwork-centric operations may no longer be inthe physical domain, that is, destroying enemyforces and capabilities. Instead, the Document

treats destruction as but one means of attainingthe objective of setting in motion a psychologicalprocess of perceptions and decisionmaking. Asthe Document makes clear, network-centricoperations can involve the use of military power toaffect the psychological or reason and beliefdomains of warfare.

If we follow the logic of the Document a bit further,network-centric, effects-based operations would beabout focusing knowledge, precision, speed, andagility not on more efficient destruction, but uponthe enemy decisionmakers and their ability to takecoherent action. The knowledge, precision, speed,and agility created by network-centric operationsbecome the tools of a realm of effects-basedoperations centered squarely in the humandimension of war. At a general level of abstraction,this prospect is enticing, but the proponents ofNetwork Centric Warfare are less clear as toexactly how the increased speed, agility, andknowledge wrought by the network translate intothe needed effect. Nonetheless, there are hintsthroughout the literature on Network CentricWarfare and in the experimentation conducted byeach of the Services as to how this might be done.For example, “getting inside the enemy’s OODAloop,” “lock out,” and creating an “overwhelmingpace” of operations are effects-based applicationsof network-centric capabilities. These ideas providea jumping-off point for exploring the concept ofeffects-based operations.


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Stimulus and Response in MilitaryOperationsInstinctively, we can appreciate that the ability topenetrate the “enemy’s OODA loop,” to anticipateenemy actions and to foreclose them before theyeven begin would be a powerful capability. However,just how does this process take place and what havenetwork-centric capabilities to do with it?

To answer this question, we need to return to theOODA cycle diagram outlined in Chapter 1 (seeFigure 13). However, this time we will look at thecycle from a different perspective. In the diagramabove, the “act” phase or the application of combatpower can be seen in two ways. From theperspective of straightforward physical attrition, the“act” attacks, destroys, or in some way degrades theenemy capability to wage or sustain a war. Indeed,this is our almost instinctive reaction to the diagram.Yet, from the cognitive perspective, the same “act”can be seen as a stimulus, that is, something thatenemies “observe” and must factor into theirdecisionmaking processes and which may have animpact on their choice of action (see Figure 14).

Notice that the action involved may be the same inboth cases: blowing something up. Only now weare considering what the impact of that target’sdestruction will have on enemy will and psychologyand not just on his physical capabilities. Logically,the more significant the action, the greater impactthe stimulus will have on the enemy decisions andultimate behavior.


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If the stimulus is significant enough, the effect maybe to force enemies to reconsider their courses ofaction and, perhaps, to begin their OODAdecisionmaking cycles all over again, re-observing,re-orienting, and re-deciding before acting. That is tosay, we would not so much “get inside” their OODAloops as we would disrupt them.

We can also extend this logic. A succession of suchsignificant stimuli might not only disrupt a foe’sdecisionmaking cycle but could even create analmost catatonic condition of “lock out” in which theenemy is continually re-observing, re-orienting, andre-deciding to the point that he either cannot reactcoherently or cannot act at all.

MidwayOne historical example of a decisive stimulus andresponse interaction occurred during the Battle ofMidway in June 1942 (see Figure 15). In that battle,intelligence derived from coded Japanesemessages enabled the United States Navy toanticipate the Japanese attack, to detect enemycarriers before their own were found, and to launchan air attack first.

However, the real story here lies in thedecisionmaking process in the Japanese command.When the Japanese commander, Vice AdmiralNagumo, received a reconnaissance report of anAmerican carrier in the area (the first dotted line inFigure 15), he reconsidered the attack on Midwaythat was about to be launched, re-oriented his effort,and ordered his aircraft rearmed for fleet action.13

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Then, as the planes were being rearmed, Nagumo’sfleet was attacked by carrier-based Americantorpedo planes. Finally, as his protective combat airpatrol was intercepting the American torpedo planes,the American bombers struck (in Figure 15, thesecond dotted arrow), catching the Japanesecarriers with decks full of planes and bombs.

Consider what happened at Midway from thestandpoint of our stimulus and response model.The Americans had planned a tightly synchronizedair operation. The American dive-bombers andtorpedo planes were to have attackedsimultaneously so as to overwhelm and dilute theability of the Japanese combat air patrol to defendtheir fleet, a standard and logical military course ofaction. When the different elements in theAmerican attack became separated, this traditional,attrition-based American plan failed, but in theprocess of failing, it produced an entirelyunplanned but fortuitous serendipity of effects-based interactions: two stimuli and then adevastating attack.

The first stimulus to impact upon Vice AdmiralNagumo’s very professional military decisionmakingprocess was a sighting of an American carrier, theU.S.S. Yorktown, by a Japanese reconnaissanceaircraft. The Japanese observation, which theAmericans were naturally trying to avoid, presentedNagumo with the prospect of an American navalthreat to his force and an opportunity for a decisivenaval battle. In essence, it compelled a re-orientation of the Japanese effort. The fact thatNagumo’s fleet was preparing to do something quite


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different (attack ground targets on Midway) meantthat the aircraft for the Midway strike had to berearmed for a fleet engagement. Nagumo, unawareof the presence of the two additional Americancarriers in the area, decided to risk an immediaterearming of his strike aircraft for a fleet engagement.

With the rearming underway, the second stimuluscame, in the form of the attack on the Japanese fleetby unescorted American torpedo planes.14 Despiteheroic efforts by the American aviators, this costlyact did not succeed in inflicting any physical damageon the Japanese fleet. However, it again intrudedupon the Japanese decisionmaking cycle, this timeat the level of Nagumo’s subordinates, bynecessitating two defensive tactical actions thatproved to have serious consequences. First, theJapanese carriers were forced to maneuver radicallyto avoid the American torpedo attacks and in sodoing had to curtail the rearming of strike aircraft andhalt any aircraft launches. Second, the Japanesecombat air patrol defending the fleet descendedfrom their stations high over the fleet to chase thetorpedo planes. Those decisions paved the way fora largely unopposed attack by the American dive-bombers that appeared over the Japanese fleet wellafter they had planned to do so, but at just the righttactical moment to take advantage of the Japaneseconfusion. Their attack dealt deathblows to fourJapanese carriers in the ensuing 11 minutes,devastated the carrier air arm of the ImperialJapanese Navy, and proved to be the turning point inthe Pacific War.


In this example, two stimuli, the sighting of theU.S.S. Yorktown and a tactically ineffective torpedoplane attack together had a decisive impact on theJapanese decisionmaking cycle. They occurred atjust the right time to force the Japanese to re-orienttheir efforts and to re-decide their existing course ofaction, first at the operational level and then at thetactical level. The responses to the stimuli togetherproved fatal to Japanese ambitions in the Pacific.

Notice that in the Midway example, Americansuccess was not the result of ingenious planning orany application of a concept of effects-basedoperations. It grew from a series of serendipitousblunders. Yet the message is the same. A series ofstimuli (that need not involve any physicaldestruction at all) can produce a response that willdetermine the outcome of a battle and perhaps awar. The stimuli unwittingly applied by the Americanshad focused on the human dimension of the battleand secured a very nonlinear outcome. Thechallenge for network-centric and effects-basedoperations is to repeat such an effect reliably,predictably, and at will. How might the newtechnologies and network-centric thinking of our firsttwo levels of combat efficiency help us to do this?

The question suggests a series of “what ifs.” Forexample, if we compare the Japanese andAmerican combat cycles at the time of the torpedoattack, it becomes evident that the cycles were outof phase (see Figure 16). Had they been in phase,both sides would have observed each other at thesame time, oriented their efforts accordingly, anddecided and acted similarly.15 In that case, the

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American and Japanese strikes would have passedeach other in the air and struck empty decks onboth sides, without the disastrous consequences forthe Japanese, but possibly with dire results for thesmaller force of American carriers. But thanks totheir intelligence coup, the American sidecompleted their decisionmaking process in time forthe torpedo bomber action to hit the Japanese whenthey were still re-orienting their efforts to attack theAmerican fleet. The American success restedpartially on careful preparation (the intelligence,reconnaissance, and early launch of aircraft) and inpart on the good fortune of the Yorktown sightingand the disjointed arrival of the torpedo and dive-bomber strike elements over target.

To emulate the stimulus and response sequence ofthe Midway example, we would have both to time theenemy decisionmaking cycle precisely and correctly,and to coordinate our own stimuli/actions to occur atexactly the right time. This would require not only thesituational awareness that in 1942 enabled theAmerican fleet to launch its strikes first, but also theknowledge of the enemy needed to identify andexploit the critical junctures.16 Also, we would have tobe able to coordinate our actions so as to controlthem with an exactitude sufficient to exploit thetiming of enemy decisionmaking. There is afundamental problem here: intelligence simply willnot yield such knowledge of the enemy reliably,consistently, or at all levels, nor will it be able topredict the impact of a random stimulus like theYorktown sighting.17

How else then might the new technologies andnetwork-centric operations enable us to create the

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same effect upon an enemy decisionmaking cycleas at Midway?

One solution is simply to multiply the number ofopportunities to repeat the Midway incident. Themore frequent the stimuli, the greater the chancethat they will occur at the right time to obtain thedesired effect on the enemy decisionmakingprocess. Shortening the length of our own overallcombat power generation cycle would multiply thenumber of impacts on adversary decisionmakingover a given period and, thus, increase thelikelihood of striking at the “right time” to disrupt theadversary’s cycle (see Figure 17). But, as we haveseen, the power generation side of the combatcycle can only be compressed so much. Usingexisting organization and doctrine, there are onlyso many large strike waves that can be launched ina given time and thus, only so many stimuli that canbe applied.

Still another approach would be to organize and plandifferently. We could, for example, build on theconcepts of self-synchronization and sharedsituation awareness enabled by networking tolaunch smaller, more numerous operations, each ofwhich might generate a stimulus sufficient to affectthe adversary’s decisionmaking cycles.18 The lengthof the combat cycles of individual units might remainthe same, but the actions of each might bestaggered and overlapped so as to produce andsustain a rapid succession of stimuli being applied toenemy decisionmaking (see Figure 18).19 Thisapproach has an obvious limitation: the more wediminish the size of our actions, the more vulnerable


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the individual units will be to being defeated in detail.However, if we were to exploit a synergy with newsensors and communications, the resultingimprovements in situation awareness andcommanders’ knowledge of the enemy might enableus to anticipate enemy actions and optimize forceseither for disruptive effect or for mutual support.

Finally, we could both multiply the number of cyclesand compress the time needed to execute eachcycle (see Figure 19). In essence, we would use ournetwork-centric capability to liberate individualforces to operate at their optimum combat cycle andby so doing increase the number of combat powergeneration cycles we execute. Ideally, these stimulicould be made numerous and varied enough tooverwhelm enemies with new developments, forcingthem continually to revisit decisions, pause forfurther observations and perhaps, redirect effortseven to the point that they never actually take action.Indeed, this approach seems to come closest tocombining the elements of self-synchronization andspeed of command contained in the “Cebrowskicurve” outlined in Chapter 2.

The latter two approaches in particular suggest avery different effects-based analogy from that ofMidway (see Figure 20). Instead of a rapier thrustinto the enemy decisionmaking process at preciselythe critical time, we would unleash something akin toa swarm of bees. Even though no single unit in theattacking swarm would have a decisive impact, theoverall effect would be to leave the victim swinginghelplessly at attackers coming from all directions,and unable to mount any coherent defense save

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retreat.20 In essence, we provide so many stimuli thatadversaries can no longer act coherently, but wouldbe constantly forced to recycle their decisionmaking.Repeated often enough, the stimuli applied to theenemy decisionmakers could result in an almostcatatonic inability to act: a lock out.

This swarm approach poses new challenges. Howdo we coordinate the swarm so as to achieve militaryobjectives other than interfering in enemydecisionmaking? How do we know when to massforces or effects so as to avoid being defeated indetail? How do we assess the effectiveness of ourefforts and then feed the results of theseassessments into the next round of orient, decide,and act phases? Will enemies know they have beendefeated and cease to resist? Or, will they simplycontinue to swat at the attacks until they can nolonger do so, and continue a blind attrition war?

To be effective, the swarm will need to work towarda unified set of military objectives under the samecommand intent. But to achieve the brief cycle times,the elements of the swarm must be self-containedand self-coordinated. In short, our forces would needto become self-synchronized and self-adaptive.21

These are key capacities that we hope to draw fromnetwork-centric operations, but they find theirnonlinear payoff in an effects-based operationdirected at the human dimension of war, in this caseenemy decisionmaking.

Shock and Chaos As a ResponseThe Midway example and the above “what ifs” pointto a theoretical relationship between the

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technological and network-centric levels ofimproved combat efficiency and a third effects-based level of improvement on at least the tacticallevel. However, we need to take the reasoninganother step to look at a more general applicationon the operational and strategic level.

The connection between the swarms of stimuliand lock out indicates the possibility of the stimulicreating at least one classic psychological effectencountered in military operations, the creation ofchaos on the battlefield. The principle of chaos inwarfare is not new.22 Clausewitz talks in terms ofexploiting the fog and friction of war to drive theenemy into a rout, that is, into a state of chaos.23

By examining how technology-based andnetwork-centric-based efficiency coupled witheffects-based operations might stimulate andexploit battlefield chaos, we can establish at leastone such general application of our stimulus andresponse model of effects-based operations tomilitary operations as a whole.

Recent writings on chaos theory24 have drawn acomparison between the concept of chaos inphysical systems and its application to warfare. Inexploring chaos in physical systems, the boundaryregion between chaos and order is particularlysignificant because small inputs or changes insystem parameters there can have very largeimpacts, even causing the entire system to collapse.

If we extend this thinking to effects-basedoperations, this phenomenon would equate tocreating a situation in which relatively small


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applications of military or national power at the righttime might have disproportionate and potentiallydecisive impacts. This was certainly reflected in theMidway example, but bears a fuller explanation.

Defining the Edge of Chaos

How do we define this “edge of chaos” boundaryregion in terms of effects-based operations? Asimple approach is to define the edge of chaos interms of the intensity of the military operations,specifically the pace versus the scale/scope ofoperations. These can be plotted along the x and yaxes of a graph (see Figure 21).

We can understand intuitively that the more weincrease the pace of our operations (x), the moredifficult they will be to manage. Similarly, the greaterthe scope and scale of our operations (y), the moredifficult they will be to control. By extension, we cansurmise that at some point along the x-axis, thereare operations so rapid that we would not be able tocoordinate them, and that somewhere along the y-axis are of such a size or scope that we would losecontrol of our forces. In brief, we can identify twotransition points from order into chaos. Figurativelythen, the edge of chaos would be a line drawnbetween these two points that touches all thecombinations of scale/scope and pace of operationsthat define the limit of our control. Beyond the linelies the zone of chaos where operations are solarge and/or so rapid that we cannot hope toexecute them and remain a coherent viable force.Within the line lie all of the operations we cancontrol, the zone of order.


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In this context, chaos encompasses all those militaryoperations that are uncontrollable, and are thereforeunfocused, incoherent or chaotic, such as in an“every man for himself” battlefield rout.25 Theopposite of this battlefield chaos is order wheremilitary operations are of a scale, scope, and pacewhich can be controlled, coordinated, and focusedon a given objective.

Exploiting the Edge of Chaos

How can we identify and exploit this operationalboundary? The starting point is the realization thatthe edge of chaos is not fixed (see Figure 22). Itchanges constantly. As the U.S.S. Nimitz flight sortiein Chapter 2 demonstrated, the use of betterorganization, training, and equipment can enable aunit to operate safely at a much higher pace andscale of operations. That is significant because itimplies that the edge of chaos for any unit ismutable. A highly trained and organized force usingsophisticated equipment will be able to operatesafely at a pace and scale of operations that wouldpush a less well-trained and equipped force intochaos.26 Better equipment, training, and organizationenable us to drive our transition points further outalong the x- and y-axes and define a new edge ofchaos. This kind of improvement is what the newtechnologies and network centric thinking in the firsttwo levels of combat efficiency are all about.

The mutability of the edge of chaos is significant inanother respect. If we consider that the manning,training, organization, and equipment of no twounits is ever likely to be identical, it implies that no


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two units will ever have exactly the same edge ofchaos. By extension, the edge of chaos will alsovary from one force to the next as each forcecomprises different units, differently equipped,manned, trained, and organized.

Opposing forces in any battle, therefore, are likely tohave their own very different edges of chaos. Thiswould suggest a situation more along the lines ofFigure 23 in which the two very different edges ofchaos of the opponents define three distinct zones.

Zone 1 is the zone of chaos. It encompasses allthe combinations of scale/scope and pace ofoperations in which neither side will be able tocontrol or direct its actions in any coherent way.

Zone 2 defines a complex, asymmetric region inwhich the better-equipped and trained force and/orthe force with the better tactical, operational, andstrategic concept of operations can coordinate itsoperations while the less-well-trained and equippedor the less-well-adapted side cannot.

Zone 3 is the zone of order. It encompasses all thecombinations of scale/scope and pace ofoperations that both sides will be able to managemore or less comfortably.

By definition, neither side can operate successfullyin Zone 1. Conversely, neither side would derive anyparticular advantage from operating in a way thatpermits its enemy an orderly and focused responsein Zone 3.27 By contrast, the boundary region, Zone2, offers the possibility for the kinds ofdisproportionate impact foreseen in chaos theory. It


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is a regime of inherent asymmetry in which the lesscapable side can be confronted with a dilemma. If itattempts to respond in kind, it risks losing controland lapsing into chaos, but if it fails to respond, it willlikely be pummeled into submission by its opponent.At best, the asymmetry condemns the less capableactor to pre-planned, time-late responses.28

In essence, the diagram describes what we hope toobtain by adopting new technologies and integratingthem into a network-centric concept of operations.The goal is to create an information and speedadvantage sufficient to comfortably handle a scale,scope, and pace of operations that is manifestlybeyond that of any prospective opponent, and thento exploit that superiority by operating in thatadvanced zone of complexity. What has this got todo with chaos, effects-based operations, and theexploitation of the human or psychologicaldimension of warfare?

Chaos and Behavior

If we look at this three-zone model from theperspective of effects-based operations, this logiccan be carried another step. Our exploitation of thezone of complexity need not be limited todestruction and more efficient attrition. It can alsoserve to exploit the human dimension of warfare.For example, if we were consistently able tooperate beyond the other’s edge of chaos, we maybe able to induce a state of despair in which furtherresistance either is, or appears to be, futile.Focusing efforts on precisely those psychologicalvulnerabilities most likely to drive the enemy intochaos can accelerate this process.

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One good historical example is the 1805 Battle ofTrafalgar in which Admiral Horatio Nelson destroyedthe combined French and Spanish fleets. The crux ofthe action was Nelson’s bold movement to breakthrough the French-Spanish battle line in two placesand then concentrate his forces on bite-sizedportions of it (see Figure 24). Although the idea ofdefeating the enemy in detail is certainlyunderstandable in the context of attrition-basedwarfare, the real key to Nelson’s success was theeffect that his bold maneuver had on the French andSpanish ability to control their forces and the chaosit created.

The basis for Nelson’s confidence that his ownforces could undertake such a risky operation and


Figure 24. Battle of Trafalgar (1805)

be successful was what could be described as a“cerebral networking” among Nelson and his seniorcaptains. That network had been formed by years ofcombat operations together. Nelson was confidentthat all of his subordinates would perceive thedeveloping situation in the same way, that theywould have a shared situational awareness.29 Hewas equally sure that his commanders not onlyunderstood his intent, but that they wouldaggressively exploit any opening in the enemy lineand carry out mutually supportive actions withoutfurther direction. For that reason, Nelson could limithis final directive before the battle to a single,inspiring, if not otherwise very helpful, “Englandexpects every man to do his duty.” Nothing morewas needed. The commanders knew what to do.

This contrasts sharply with the situation of theopposing commander, Admiral Pierre de Villeneuve.His force was larger and in many waystechnologically superior, but it lacked anysemblance of the cerebral networking Nelson hadforged. The French commanders had largely spentthe war years blockaded in port. They distrustedAdmiral Villeneuve even as Villeneuve distrustedhis own judgment. Added to this was the problem ofcoordinating the French fleet’s operations withthose of a Spanish fleet, with which the French hadnever before operated.

Under these circumstances, the best Villeneuvecould do was to form his combined fleet into aconventional 18th-century line of battle, in whichtwo ordered, parallel battle lines would pound eachother until one or the other struck their colors, blew

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up, or sank. When Nelson refused battle on theseterms and instead broke through the French-Spanish line, the pace of operation that he forced onthe French-Spanish immediately exceeded theirability to cope and invalidated their numericalsuperiority. Villeneuve largely lost control of hisforces. In such conditions, his ships only becamepart of general chaos, and in fact, a substantialproportion never entered the battle.

If Trafalgar had been simply a classic symmetric,attrition-based contest, the outcome might havebeen determined by the fact that the French andSpanish had more ships, more guns, and a muchheavier broadside throw weight.30 Instead, it hingedon the ability of each side to respond not simply tothe stimulus of an attacking fleet, but with the paceof those stimuli. When that pace proved to be morethan the less well-trained and less confident Frenchand Spanish fleets could handle, they lost.

If we compare this to the Japanese reactions in theMidway example, it becomes evident that we aredealing with two different kinds of psychologicalimpacts.31 In the Japanese case, the fleet was well-trained and equipped and had operated extensivelytogether and was operating against a numericallyinferior opponent. The stimuli presented by theAmericans did not result in chaos but neverthelessforced the Japanese commanders into a series ofbad decisions. In the case of Trafalgar where theFrench and Spanish force was well-equipped butnot well-trained and had not operated extensivelytogether, the stimuli presented by Nelson’s attackso overwhelmed the force that once combat was


joined, the French commander was unable to directthe battle in any coherent way. In both cases, thenumerically inferior force won the day. In bothcases, it was the impact on decisionmaking thatappears to have been decisive.

Chaos, Stimulus and Response, andAsymmetric WarfareIn the Battle of Trafalgar, the range of combinationsof scale/scope and pace of operations that theFrench and Spanish could handle, their edge ofchaos, clearly lay entirely inside that of the BritishFleet. This gave the British the decisive advantagein what was otherwise a symmetric contest. Thisleads us to another question. Both Trafalgar andMidway were essentially symmetric confrontationsin which two very similar forces fought each otherto a conclusion. Indeed, the edge of chaos diagramthat we have used seems to assume a situation inwhich the two opponents have similar objectivesand forces, but in which one or the other hassuperiority in information and speed of command.What if the opponents had been asymmetric?

In an asymmetric contest, there are likely to be twomajor differences from this state of affairs. Theforces are not likely to be similar in character andthe strategies and courses of actions followed byeach side are likely to be very different. If we wereto depict this in terms of two edges of chaos, it isunlikely that one side’s edge would fall entirelyinside that of the other (see Figure 25). Instead,there would be some kinds of operations in whichone side could engage but in which the other could

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not or would not engage, e.g. terrorism. It is alsolikely that one side might be able to generate a paceand scope of operations that exceeded that of theother in a particular area. For example, a largeconventional military might be able to mount andcontrol a scale of operations that a guerrilla forcecould not, but the guerilla force in turn might be ableto generate a pace of small-scale operations thatthe larger force could not. This suggests that in anasymmetric contest the two edges of chaos mightwell cross each other to produce not just a singlezone in which one side was able to dominate, but asecond asymmetric zone, in which the advantagewas reversed.

This reversal underlines a factor evident in both theTrafalgar and Midway examples. The side that isbigger and better equipped does not necessarily winthe battle. Faster, better, and technologicallysuperior capabilities may still leave room forsuccessful competition. One side in the conflictmight choose to fight asymmetrically. For example,they might choose to trade centralized control forspeed and scope of operations, that is, to define aniche within which they can compete.

In so doing, that side might voluntarily forego someof its ability to mass effects on a specific objective. Ifthe desired effect derived from the pace and scopeof the attacks rather than from the amount ofdestruction, or from cumulative impacts rather thanfrom specific, then this trade-off may be veryacceptable. In other words, the challenger couldconfront a technologically superior enemy bycreating a new asymmetric zone in which small,


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decentralized units could operate successfully, but inwhich an opponent using large formations undercentralized control could not respond coherently.

The importance of this fourth asymmetric zone iseven more evident if we plot the respective edges ofchaos on a graph with three axes: one for pace, onefor scale, and a separate orthogonal axis for scope(see Figure 26).

This depiction highlights two aspects ofdecentralization: forces can be broken into smallerself-synchronized units; and, they can bedispersed over a wide area to make a coordinatedand timely response by the other side moredifficult. This corresponds rather closely to Maoisttheory of guerrilla warfare. Guerrillas usedispersed formations so small that they can nolonger be targeted effectively by heaviergovernment forces. These bands then conductmany small raids so rapidly that the raiders aregone before opposing forces can be brought tobear. Since the desired psychological effect, theattrition of an opponent’s will, depends more onpace and scope than on damage to specifictargets, control can remain highly decentralizedand still succeed. This was the essential problemthe United States confronted in Vietnam.

To this example, we must add another, for the modelcorresponds rather closely to what might beexpected of terrorist operations below even the levelof military operations represented by guerrillawarfare. In a terrorist operation, the emphasis is onan even more widely dispersed force with whatevercontrol and support needed provided via a loose


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nodal network in which each node functions in amanner that is largely separate from the others.

This latter decentralization can be expected to varywith the amount of support and direction needed.For example, to the extent that local materials andpersonnel can carry out assigned operations on theirown, or to which the timing of the operations neednot be very precise, the individual nodes canfunction at a minimum scale and with little direction.The more precise the timing required, the greater thescale, and greater the necessity for nonlocalmateriel such as weapons of mass effect (WME), theless able the terrorist organization will be todecentralize and the more vulnerable it will be to ourown coordinated operations.

These examples imply a new understanding ofchaos as not necessarily a loss of control overone’s forces. It could also mean a situation in whichthe size of the forces involved and the length of thedelays associated with generating and using themconsistently prevent one side from accomplishingits objectives.

…and Network-Centric Operations?

How do network-centric operations address this low-tech asymmetry? One answer is based on theknowledge and situation awareness brought to bearby the network. If the guerrillas’ actions or theterrorists’ actions can be anticipated or instantlydetected and responded to, then much of whatguerrillas and terrorists gain by dispersing anddecentralizing can be negated. In effect, networking


permits the high-tech side to move its edge of chaosfurther out along the x- and z-axes of the diagramuntil decentralization no longer confers anyadvantage on the guerrillas or terrorists. Also, wherethe guerrillas, urban fighters, or terrorists might optfor increasing the number and decreasing the size oftheir operations by decentralization, a network-centric force might do the same (for example, byresorting to a ground war of small units aided bysuperior situation awareness).

Alternatively, the network-centric force couldincrease its pace, using the network to manage high-speed complex operations. For example, given therelatively slow pace of operations that might beexpected of a decentralized terrorist organization,the network-centric force could act and react faster.In each case, network-derived situation awarenesscombined with self-synchronization would enablethe network-centric forces to operate as a self-adjusting, military version of the “complex adaptivesystem” while at the same time retaining the abilityto mass superior effects at will.

Fleshing Out the ConceptWhat we have done in the preceding pages is tolayout a rough framework for a working concept ofeffects-based operations and to show how thatconcept links the first two levels of improvement incombat efficiency to a third and larger effects-based efficiency. The historical examples ofMidway and Trafalgar further demonstrate how theconcept is in fact reflected in real-world operations.We can see in the responses of Admirals Nagumo

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and de Villenueve to the stimuli presented by theactions of Admirals Spruance and Nelson and theirforces. Yet there is a great deal missing here. Wedo not know what went on in the minds of the fouradmirals, of their staffs, or of their subordinatecommanders that may have influenced or decidedthe responses chosen. This is to say that we havenot yet traced our working concept through thecognitive domain, the area in which the nonlinearpsychological effects that we seek to create andexploit actually reside.

1As used here, the psychological effect denotes all of the non-physical impacts resulting in behavior, while the cognitiveeffect refers to the impact on a decisionmaking process.2In this “shaping” of friends and neutrals, military actions fallinto much the same role as diplomatic actions, not compellingor forcing a certain behavior, but of reassuring or supportingso as to induce it. 3This factor, sometimes dubbed the CNN factor after the roleplayed by the media in Desert Storm, has been anincreasingly critical part of military operations and is likely togrow as Information Age technology links a global public. Thisis a key element of the “globalization” process addressed inChapter 1.4Alberts et al. make a similar distinction between network-centric operations, the application of network-centrictechnologies and thinking to all military operations, andNetwork Centric Warfare, their applications to the subset ofthose operations involving combat. Alberts et al. Understanding Information Age Warfare. p. 58.5Targeting is used here in its most frequent context ofattacking and inflicting damage on physical entities. However,it should be noted that the term may also be applied in thesense of information operations that cause no physicaldamage. 6Col. John A. Warden III, USAF. “The Enemy as a System.”Airpower Journal. Spring, 1995. pp. 41ff.7This includes the use of offensive information operations to


destroy or corrupt an adversary’s computer or other electronicsystems, even though no visible physical destruction may beentailed. 8The question of direct and indirect effects and the problemsof planning cascades of effects in the context of an effect-based operation will be explored in some detail in Chapter 7.9Samuel B. Griffith. Sun Tzu, The Art of War. Oxford, 1963. p. 77.10The word conflict is used here in its international relationssense of a contravening interaction between opposing actorsthat may or may not involve military action and may or maynot include inflicting damage. 11In the Third Punic War (199 B.C.), for example, the Romansforeclosed any further hostile behavior on the part of theCarthaginians by destroying the entire power base, tearingdown the city, and selling the population into slavery. 12Ullman, Harlan and James Wade, Jr. Shock & Awe:Acheiving Rapid Dominance. Washington, DC: NDU. 1996.13Nagumo’s force had already been under attack from U.S.land-based aircraft, but considered the real threat andopportunity to be the American carriers.Prange, Gordon W. et al. Miracle at Midway. New York, 1982.pp. 231ff.14The torpedo planes attacked in three uncoordinated wavesthe effect of which was to keep the defending Japanesefighters at sea-level for a protracted period of time. Prange, p. 257. 15This is to say, the technologies that might have permittedone or the other side to act faster or with more power (levelone efficiency) or to comprehend the situation and decidefaster (level two efficiency) would have been the decisivefactors. 16In the Midway example, because the forces were verysimilar in character, the length of the U.S. and JapaneseOODA cycles would have been roughly similar. In a conflictbetween two dissimilar forces, that would not be the casemaking the OODA cycle that much more difficult to predict. 17Despite the best surveillance picture or situationalawareness we can generate, the ultimate determinate of thespeed and direction of the enemy decisionmaking cycle willbe the enemy himself. Such knowledge of the enemy is notthe result of sensor data but of analysis based in large part onsporadic human intelligence reporting. We cannot, therefore,depend on having the intelligence when we need it or, indeed,on collecting the needed data at all.18Note that in each case the total amount of force applied

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remains constant and what varies is the way in which thatforce is used.19Indeed, this begins to approximate the optimum combatpower performance curve used by VADM Cebrowski in thegraphic used to demonstrate the impact of self-synchronization that we saw in Chapter 2.20In fact the desperate actions of the American escort carrierforce attempting to block the advance of a powerful Japanesebattleship force toward Leyte Gulf in October 1944 providejust such an example. In that engagement, the threatenedescort carriers launched any aircraft that could fly, includingthose that were unarmed or armed with munitions that couldhave no possible physical effect on the heavily armoredJapanese force. The American pilots attacked the armoredbridges of the Japanese ships with ineffectual machine gunfire, and when their meager ammunition was spent, resortedto “buzzing” the Japanese ships without firing. The effect wasto so confuse and bewilder the Japanese commander, VADMKurita, that he ordered the withdrawal of the force, even as itwas on the verge of victory.Friedman, Kenneth I. The Afternoon of the Rising Sun, TheBattle of Leyte Gulf. Novato, California. 2001. pp. 283ff. 21Both of these factors were key aspects to the success of theAmerican air attacks during the Leyte Gulf Battle. Pilots, whovery well appreciated the nature of the danger the Japaneseforce posed, were merely told to attack the enemy withwhatever they had. The perpetual buzzing of the Japanesebridges was the result. Friedman, p. 285.22It should be noted that the idea of inducing chaos will hardlybe a new concept to ground forces for whom the primordialchallenge is to control very large numbers of actors in battle.In the ground context, “breaking the enemy will to resist”equates to causing the enemy to lose control and disintegrateinto a chaotic “every man for himself” rout. While thisunderstanding remains operative to be sure, the focus of thechaos sought here lies at the operational and even thestrategic level even more than of the battlefield. 23Watts, Barry. Clausewitzian Friction and Future War.Washington, DC; National Defense University. 1996. pp.105ff.24Maj. Glenn James, USAF, uses the example of a waterfaucet that will drip with an annoying regularity. As the flow ofwater is increased, the frequency of the drip increases but theregularity remains. However, when the flow is increased evenminutely beyond some definable rate, the drops no longerhave time to form and the drip changes abruptly to a sporadic(chaotic) flow. The very minor increase in flow has caused the


physical system to become chaotic. James, Maj. Glenn, USAF. Chaos Theory, The Essentials forMilitary Applications. Newport Paper 10, Naval War College,Newport, R.I. 1997. p. 15-16. 25It is worth making a distinction here between a tactical levelchaos that induces the enemy to take flight and a strategiclevel chaos that may induce irrational behavior by a powerwith nuclear weapons. Between these two extremes lies azone in which inducing “shock and awe” is a tool that can beused to achieve specific effects calculated to support ourpolitical and military objectives. However, implicit in the ideaof effects is a risks-versus-gains analysis that applies tochaos as to all other effects. 26In the Nimitz demonstration, the air wing set out to conduct“flex-deck” operations which were thought to offer the fastestturnaround and sortie generation. What they soon discoveredwas that this “clobbered” the deck making it difficult to moveeven as many aircraft as they routinely did. In effect, they hadreached the edge of chaos for flex-deck operations. Then,they adapted to the new requirement, and instituted a newform of accelerated cyclic operations that not only avoidedthe previous bottlenecks but enabled them to operatecomfortably at the new higher pace. Nathman, Op. Cit. 27In a strategic nuclear confrontation such as those during theCold War, it was necessary to operate in this zone of order soas to avoid the risk of an irrational act or uncontrolledescalation.28One example of this is the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War.The Egyptian Army’s “edge of chaos” could not hope to matchthat of the Israelis. Therefore, the Egyptians were forced toresort to a highly planned pre-emptive operation in whichvirtually all actions were pre-scripted. That gave them aninitial success in crossing the Suez Canal, but left themlargely incapable of responding to Israeli counter-action. 29The two fleets took more than three hours to close. Thiswould have allowed ample time for the commanders toobserve the enemy line and any potential gaps in that line thatthey might exploit. The cerebral networking provided acommon understanding of how such gaps might be exploitedand how each might provide mutual support and exploit anyfurther opportunities that might be observed during the battle. Marcus, G.J. The Age of Nelson, The Royal Navy 1793-1815.New York. 1971. pp. 276ff.30The British advantage also stemmed from how they usedthe capabilities at hand. This was not only at the operational

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level, e.g. the cerebral networking of commanders, but also atthe tactical level in gun handling. Intense training enabledBritish ships to get off almost twice as many rounds perminute as their French and Spanish counterparts, essentiallynullifying the French-Spanish armament advantage. Thisamounts to a 19th-century equivalent of the Nimitz strikesortie generation demonstration and reflects the degree towhich training can change the edge of chaos of a given unit.Ibid.31It is significant to note that, in our Midway example, thereactions of Japanese commanders remained veryprofessional throughout the engagement. There was nopanic. Japanese forces remained under control and withdrewin good order. Their defeat in the battle stemmed from aseries of responses that were impelled by the timing of theAmerican stimuli. Each decision/response was perfectlyrational in its own right, but foreclosed options that, had theybeen pursued, might have changed the course of the battle.For example, Nagumo’s decision to rearm the aircraft on deckforeclosed an immediate launch of the aircraft, which mighthave made the carriers less vulnerable. The combat air patrolcommander’s decision to descend to attack the incomingAmerican torpedo planes decimated that threat, but itprevented an effective defense against the American dive-bombers. Pranger, pp. 257ff.


CHAPTER 4

ShapingBehavior:

Operations in theCognitive DomainThe key to our working concept of effects-based

operations as well as to the non-linear payoffthat we hope to obtain from Network CentricWarfare is a process that takes place in the mind ofman. Our definition of effects-based operationsproposed that there are actions that shape “thebehavior of friends, neutrals and foes.” This causeand effect link was certainly apparent in theexamples of Midway and Trafalgar, but to make theconcept a useful tool, we must understand notsimply that a response occurred, but also why itproduced the effect that it did. Without thisconnection, we cannot replicate the actionsrequired to change behavior successfully or makeany reliable use of the concept. To address the“why” of the stimulus and response, we mustunderstand something of the cognitive processesinvolved in observing and responding to a stimulus.

157

Beyond the OODA LoopColonel John Boyd’s OODA loop reduces thecognitive process to a tactical short hand ofObserve, Orient, Decide, and Act. In this OODA loopcontext, we can intuitively understand, for example,that operating faster than our opponent confers anadvantage. Indeed, in the context of the one-versus-one, air-to-air engagement from which Colonel Boydoriginally derived the OODA loop, the mentalprocesses involved seem fairly clear andstraightforward.1 The fighter pilot first observes hisopponent’s presence or action, orients himself todeal with it, decides upon a course of action, andthen acts to execute it. The opposing pilot similarlyobserves that action or reaction, orients himself todeal with it, decides on a course of action, and acts.Victory then goes to the pilot who can act and reactfaster. Similar tactical level OODA loops can bedivined for everything from a submarineengagement to a firefight on the ground. However,the OODA loop construct also leaves some criticalquestions unanswered. For example, at what paceof operations might we expect to overwhelm thatopponent and why would this be so? How might weshock that opponent, induce despair, or break hiswill? It should be apparent that there are very reallimits to how far can we take this somewhatsimplistic tactical level example.2

The general concept of an OODA loop ordecisionmaking cycle certainly has value whenapplied to operational level interactions and higher,as in the Battle of Midway. Yet, it is also evident inboth the Midway and Trafalgar examples that these


operational level interactions are vastly morecomplex than the one-to-one, air-to-air engagement,and that the complexity increases still more at higherlevels. Moreover, however decisive Midway andTrafalgar may have been at the operational level ofwar, neither ended the war. It took another 3 yearsafter Midway to defeat Japan, and the Napoleonicwars dragged on for another 10 years afterTrafalgar.3 Both battles were but one factor in acomplex series of factors that determined the natureof the decisionmaking at the military-strategic andgeo-strategic levels.4

The military-strategic and geo-strategic dimensionsof the two examples point to the need to consideractions in terms of a multi-level, multi-arena impactthat spans friends and neutrals as well as enemies.After all, this larger framework is the context intowhich each of the battles ultimately had to fit, butthis necessary contextualization also presents avery different set of problems from the tacticalmilitary action we are accustomed to considering.Not only do these different dimensions of upperlevel interaction operate on an entirely differenttimeline from that of tactical OODA loopengagements, but they force us to consider that thenature and timing of actions and reactions are atleast as important as their speed. They also force usto think not just in terms of the personal behavior ofthe other pilot in a fighter engagement, but also interms of institutional or organizational behavior ofincreasing complexity.5 In fact, the farther we moveaway from the tactical level OODA loop, the morewe are obliged to look to what might be termed“operations in the cognitive domain.”

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Operations in the Cognitive DomainThe cognitive process by which humans perceiveand decide is clearly at the center of the humandimension of war. It is the ultimate locus of thenonlinear effects we hope to obtain from bothnetwork-centric operations and effects-basedoperations. Our ability to understand this process isthe basis both for any hope of foreshortening combatby convincing an adversary to yield and fordetermining how we might create effects withoutfighting. Finally and perhaps most significantly forour current strategic environment, it is thebattleground for asymmetric conflict in peace, crisis,and war.

Three Domains of ConflictThe 1999-2000 work of the Information SuperiorityWorking Group sponsored by the office of theSecretary of Defense (C3I) and the March 2001workshop on “sensemaking” conducted by theDepartment of Defense’s Command and ControlResearch Program (CCRP) and the Command,Control, Communications, and Intelligence TechnicalSub-Committee of the American Institute forAeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA)6 took theOODA loop several steps further. They described theprocess of decisionmaking involved in the OODAloop in terms of three different domains: a physicaldomain, an information domain, and a cognitivedomain (see Figure 27).

All military operations were considered to occur inthe context of these three domains. Physical military

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actions took place (the physical domain), the actionswere detected and reported to higher authority (theinformation domain), and decisions as to how torespond were made by commanders at variouslevels (the cognitive domain). However, there wasalso recognition in the working groups that thedomains extended well beyond just militaryoperations to all of the actions that a state,government, or a non-state actor such as a terroristorganization might take. By extension, the domainsmight be considered to subsume all of the processesinvolved in any effects-based operation and, byfurther extension, all of those processes thatnetwork-centric operations must serve if they are tohave any value.

The three domains provide a general framework fortracing what actually goes on in the stimulus andresponse process inside human minds and human

Figure 27. Three Domains of Conflict

organizations, and how physical actions in onedomain get translated into psychological effects andthen into a set of decisions in another domain.Understanding this process is important becausewith it, we can begin to comprehend how people andorganizations perceive a stimulus or action and whythey respond or react in the way they do and thus,how we might shape behavior.

The Physical DomainAs the name suggests, the physical domainencompasses all the physical actions or stimuli thatbecome the agents for the physical andpsychological effects we seek to create7 (seeFigure 28).

These physical actions can include a military forcethat is simply in the right place at the right time to


Figure 28. Operations in the Physical Domain

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have an impact. Such a force becomes an object tobe observed and reported, as in the case of theJapanese reconnaissance reports of the Americancarrier Yorktown during the Battle of Midway. It mayalso take the form of a military operation, such as thefollow-on American torpedo plane attack on theJapanese fleet, an event that is observed and affectssubsequent decisions.

However, we must not restrict our consideration tomilitary forces and military operations. If we look atthe military-strategic and geo-strategic dimensionsof the battles of Midway and Trafalgar, it becomesclear not only that these naval actions were onlypart of a much larger military effort, but also thatthe entire military effort was part of an overallnational effort. Thus, the physical actions we mustconsider are not only those of military forces, butalso those that occur in other arenas of nationalpower and may be political and economic innature, as well as military.

If we carry this into the context of the three domains,then the actions in the physical domain may bepolitical, economic, and/or military in nature, and allmust be equally considered to be objects or eventsin the manner of the diagram in Figure 28. All cancertainly affect the opponent’s decisionmakingprocess or, in the context of the workshop’sdeliberations, can change the way in which anopponent or other observer understands or makessense of a developing situation.

At the other end of the action-reaction cycle, thephysical domain also encompasses those physicaleffects created by our actions. These are of two

types: the direct effect or actual physical impact ofan action; and the indirect or derivative physicaleffects that flow from and are caused by the directeffect. All of these successive effects are physical innature and lie in the physical domain.8

To understand how these objects, events, andphysical effects shape decisions, however, we mustmove beyond the physical domain to the informationand cognitive domains.

The Information DomainThe information domain includes all of the meansby which we become aware of the objects andevents or of a situation as a whole. In tacticalterms, this domain encompasses the essentialelements first of monitoring the battlespace andthen of managing our actions so as to achieve ourmilitary objectives. The information domainincludes all sensors that monitor physical actionsand collect data. It also includes all the means ofcollating or contextualizing that data to create aninformation stream, and all the means ofconveying, displaying, and disseminating thatinformation. In essence, the information domain isthe means by which a stimulus is recognized andconveyed to a human or to a human organization9

(see Figure 29).

Although this process of collecting and reporting tocreate a shared situation awareness tends to be thefocus of most of our attention in network-centricoperations, it is just half of what transpires in theinformation domain. This domain also


encompasses all of the means of conveying thedecisions, plans, and orders that translate acognitive response into physical actions. Thisdomain is the focal point of efforts to apply newinformation technologies to tie the disparateelements of the information domain together andthereby permit faster, more flexible, and moreprecise network-centric military operations.10

A Surveillance System of Systems

There is a critical caveat to this process ofcollecting and conveying data and information andthe “awareness” that it produces. In order toillustrate that we are all prisoners of our ownsenses, Plato uses the example of a man confinedin a cave since birth who cannot see the “real”world but only the shadows that the “real” worldmakes on the wall of his cave.11 Similarly, in

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Figure 29. Operations in the Information Domain


observing the physical actions that will drivedecisions, we are all prisoners of not only oursenses, but also of the sensors and sources ofinformation that we employ, and of the decisionswe make to employ these resources. We can thinkof these resources and decisions as defining thenature of a surveillance system or system ofsystems of sensors.12 Each sensor, like our ownsenses, sees only part of what may be transpiringat any given time. Any individual sensor may belimited to a specific geographic area or physicalenvironment, just as a surveillance satellite canonly see the particular area of the earth that is in itsfield of view, or only what is in line of sight. Equally,the sensor may monitor only a specific set ofphysical phenomena such as a particular part ofthe overall frequency spectrum.

The success or failure of the surveillance systemdoes not hinge on any single all-encompassingsensor, but on how each sensor in a networkinteracts with the others to provide the informationneeded, much as vision, hearing, touch, taste, andsmell conspire to present a picture to the humanmind. Indeed, this balancing and networking ofsensors is one of the core principles of network-centric operations, with each sensor contributingsome part to an integrated whole. This is to say thatthe capability of the surveillance system as a wholeis a function of the capabilities of the sensors wechose to include in that system of systems. Thus, theprobability of detecting a particular object or event atany given time would depend on the decisions maderegarding what the surveillance system needs to

detect, which sensors are needed to assure suchdetection, where they are deployed, and how theyreport and to whom.

This is where we begin to straddle the line betweenthe information domain (in which actions areobserved and reported) and the cognitive domain (inwhich decisions are made).

The Nature of Awareness

At the center of the cognitive domain decisionsregarding the nature and organization of thesurveillance system are three questions: What arewe trying to do? What kind and level of awarenessdo we need to do it? And, what information do weneed in order to create that awareness? Theanswers to these questions determine how webalance the various sensors and sources in oursurveillance system of systems so as to achieve anadequate level of awareness.

Our awareness requirements will probably revolvearound acquiring a defined level of data andinformation on our security environment. In a tacticalcombat environment, this data and informationwould likely include the location, activities, andcapabilities of our own forces and those of our alliesand coalition partners (Blue), opponents or potentialopponents (Red), and any other significant player(White) (see Figure 30). We would further seek tosituate these observers in an environment that mightextend to include factors such as terrain or sea-state, weather, lighting, and what we know of theintentions of each actor.13

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Even for a country as wealthy as the United States,the resources to be applied to the task of observingwill never be unlimited. Thus, the decisions we makeregarding the situation awareness to be created willalways involve balancing the data gathering andinformation resources available on the one handwith the degree of uncertainty (or perhapsignorance) that we are willing to accept on the other.

The impact of such decisions is far-reaching. Themissions we can undertake, the tactics and strategywe can support, and the threat environment withinwhich we can operate will be constrained by thesituational awareness we create. The fighter pilot inour OODA loop will be able to observe only to thedegree that his sensors or some external inputenable him to do so.14 These sensor-basedconstraints will also be carried over into planning. Aguerrilla band or a terrorist organization, to take anexample, might not be able to plan on the availabilityof timely, comprehensive satellite data. But, theymight deal with this constraint by redefining theirstrategy and mode of operations to take into accountthe degree of shared awareness possible with thedata and information that they could obtain.

This shared situation awareness also has temporaland spatial dimensions. In creating a surveillancesystem of systems, we would also need to strike abalance between the extent of the physical andgeographic space that requires monitoring and thetimeliness of the reporting possible. With a finitenumber of sensors, as the geographic area to besearched increases, the more the sensors willhave to be dispersed, the more frequent will be the

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holes in coverage, and the lower will be theprobability of detection.

Notice that in each of the above cases, theawareness produced by the sensors is shaped bythe way in which the risks and opportunities of agiven strategy or operation are weighed. That is, thecharacter of the information domain and the natureof what can or cannot be observed are irrevocablytied to the processes of decisionmaking in thecognitive domain.

Human Information

In the discussion of the information domain thus far,we have focused on the problems of sampling thephysical phenomena of the battlespace environmentusing sensors that are mechanical and electronic innature. However good these sensors are or maybecome, they have two major limitations:

• First, they focus in large part on an immediateand distinctly military battlespace consisting ofthe tactical picture needed for the operationallevel of war. But this means that the systemonly monitors and reports a relatively smallproportion of the total data that might beavailable on objects, and then in only one sectorof the physical domain.

• Second, they largely ignore what might betermed human information,15 the panoply of dataon objects and events derived from humansources.

This broader definition of human informationextends to the full range of data and information


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from human sources in much the same way as adistinction is drawn between raw sensor data that iscollated to create information and analyzed tocreate intelligence. However, it presents a newproblem and challenge for the information andcognitive domains. Human-derived information isby nature uncertain and, to some degree,ambiguous. Not only are human senses andrecollection more fallible than mechanical andelectronic sensors, but the reporting maydeliberately set out to deceive (disinformation) or itmay be clouded by what the reporter wishes to see,or by the degree to which he understands what heobserves (misinformation).

At the tactical level of operations, the human datainput might take the form of a local resident telling apeacekeeping patrol about some past or potentialguerrilla activity in an area. At the operational andmilitary-strategic levels of conflict, this humaninformation may take the form of more conventionalhuman intelligence, intelligence exchanges,contacts with nongovernmental organizations, oropen source information. At the geo-strategic level itwould likely be part of a broad input of informationnot only from military or intelligence sources, butalso from the data gathering and informationsources of the government as a whole. For example,data would be drawn from other governmentagencies, international organizations, allies,neutrals, private individuals, and the media, all ofwhich have acquired increased importance in thepost-September 11th security environment.

As the above suggests, human-derived informationis far more difficult to handle than sensor data. It

does not lend itself well to automation16 and offersno prospect of a sensor-to-shooter link that, after all,attains its high rate of speed by “getting the man outof the loop.” On the contrary, the ability of human-derived data to translate into information andexpand awareness depends on the ability to put theman back into the loop.17 Just as the creation andorganization of a system of systems of sensorsrequires considerable decisionmaking, so too doesthe handling and analysis of human-derived dataand information. Creating human information that isuseful to the commanders and warfighters involvesa cognitive process on the part of some analyst.That analyst may be the stereotypical intelligenceanalyst, or an expert brought into the problem on anad hoc basis. But, it also may be the soldier onpatrol in a peacekeeping operation who is and mustbe the expert on the area he is patrolling. In thiscapacity, he must evaluate and deal with all sorts ofhuman information on an immediate and continuingbasis. This implies a different dimension of thecognitive domain than the essentially sensor-basedtactical decisionmaking, one that turns on theassessment of what information to believe and whatnot to believe. In short, it hinges on humanjudgment. This cognitive context may potentially beas simple as a peacekeeper’s day-to-dayknowledge of the neighborhood he is patrolling or itmay be as complex as trying in June 1942 toestimate all of the eventual repercussions of thevictory at Midway.


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The Cognitive DomainThe cognitive domain is the locus of the functions ofperceiving, making sense of a situation, assessingalternatives, and deciding on a course of action.This process relies partially on consciousreasoning, the domain of reason, and partially uponsub-conscious mental models, the domain of belief.Both reason and belief are pre-conditioned byculture, education, and experience. From thestandpoint of a stimulus and response model ofeffects-based operations, the cognitive domain iswhere the stimulus actually produces someresponse and shapes behavior. As such, it is thereal focus of any effects-based operation.

We have just seen the amount of decisionmakingbehind the creation and orchestration of datagathering in the information domain. Obviously, thehuman decisionmakers and the humanorganizations that directed the surveillance effortarrived at some way of balancing their assignedmissions with the materiel and other constraintsimposed, and of balancing time and space, andopportunities and risks. But this overview leaves aquestion: How did they arrive at a notion of what thecorrect balance was?

The same question confronts us when we look at theinformation domain from the perspective of howdecisionmakers deal with the information that thesurveillance system produces. One element of theanswer revolves about the mantra of conveying “theright information to the right person at the right placein the right form.” Too much information presented


too quickly overwhelms decisionmakers, while toolittle leaves them making decisions in a vacuum. Thewrong displays can confuse and disorient. The rightones can permit them to handle more informationand make better decisions.

All of these considerations are important, but theyare all fairly clear human engineering problems andare relatively easy to solve. The real challenge at thecenter of effects-based operations is how humandecisionmakers perceive the actions in the physicaldomain as reported to them, and then how theymake decisions. Yet all of these questions in both ofthese areas drive us back to the same fundamentalquestions: How do human beings perceive adeveloping situation, make sense of it, assess thechoices available and come to a decision as to acourse of action?

Knowledge and Understanding

The sensemaking conference and successivesessions of the Information Superiority WorkingGroup observed that the decision processes inquestion and the ability to deal with informationhinged on what the human decisionmakersthemselves brought to the situation (see Figure 31).In part, this human dimension reflects the conditionof the individual decisionmaker and factors such asemotions, physiology (especially fatigue), andbeliefs. But it also reflects a deeper and morefundamental question of how human beings ingeneral perceive and understand a given situation.

As a general rule, human beings approachproblems with a particular frame of reference that

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grows out of an individual’s prior knowledge,education, and training, all within the context of aparticular culture.18 The decisionmakers andhumans in general tend to reason largely byanalogy. A given set of circumstances is consciouslyor unconsciously compared with similar incidents inthe past or with a generalized mental model of what“ought to be.” The deep and largely subconsciousunderstanding of the situation then emerges fromnoting the nuances of the information, with themissing pieces of the puzzle provided by mentalmodels or prior experience. Human organizations19

might be expected to approach problems in thesame manner, although potentially with a greaterdiversity of knowledge and experience.20

Prior knowledge and mental models, both heavilyinfluenced by national and decisionmaking culture,have a significant impact on cognitive awareness intwo dimensions: the sensors or sources deployed tocollect data and process information; and how theinformation created is treated and translated into asense of the situation. In the case of the latter, theresult can clearly be dangerous if there aremisperceptions of either the information or the entiresituation, regardless of the quality of the information.

As the above suggests, the tendency towardcrucial misperceptions will be most pronounced ifthe decisionmakers have little or no knowledge ofthe outside world, or who have a fixed,ideologically-based mental model that flatly rejectsany other model or actively seeks to eliminate anyother point of view.21


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The issues of prior knowledge of culture, training,education, and mental models are crucial becausethey affect how a situation is perceived and thus,the rest of the cognitive process. They willdetermine how decisionmakers are likely to pursuethe cause and effect logic, the way in which theyview time, and the kinds of alternative futures theycan foresee, which are all elements at the root ofour concept of effects-based operations. Forexample, decisionmakers with an otherworldlymental model might pursue what they see as adivinely-inspired cause and effect logic with aneschatological understanding of time in which theevents of this world simply work toward an infinitedivine plan. Unless we can understand this contextin some manner, we will be unable to comprehendthe potential outcomes of a given situation, muchless calculate what actions on our part mightproduce a given psychological effect and thebehavior we are striving to shape.

Sensemaking and Decisionmaking

Together, the prior knowledge, mental models, andresulting understanding of a situation provide thebasis for sensemaking. The process ofsensemaking has been referred to as fittingtogether the pieces of the puzzle (information,constructs drawn from prior knowledge and mentalmodels, ambitions, emotions) into a story thatconveys an intuitive appreciation of the situation.This story embodies cultural values, and it containssome idea of a dynamic future, and it also maycontain an intimation of alternative paths todifferent futures (see Figure 32).


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This process of sensemaking provides the basis fordefining the choices of courses of action availablefor a potential response. Such a choice, of course,might be to undertake no action at all, eitherbecause no action is deemed necessary oradvisable, or because it is decided to await furtherdevelopments. Inaction may result from a decisionto seek further information, for example, bychanging the data gathering focus of thesurveillance system or by applying different modelsand tools to the collection and assessment. Thedecision might also be to avoid immediate reactionin favor of consultations.

The decision might equally be to take action. Inthis case, an additional decisionmaking processwould determine which of several potentialactions would best meet the contingency at hand.The decisionmakers would go through their ownassessment of the physical and psychologicaleffects to be sought and the pros and cons of thevarious physical actions that might lead tocreating those effects. In any individual effects-based operation, each of these options (to act, towait, or to probe further) then would be testedagainst the understanding developed during thesensemaking process.

Acting

Once a course of action is decided, that decisionmust somehow be translated into physical action.This process would again cut across the informationdomain to undertake something in the physicaldomain (see Figure 33).

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The planning process, like situational awareness,straddles the divide between the cognitive andinformation domains. The process encompassesdefining and deconflicting the actions andcommunicating a full understanding of thecommander’s intent to the units executing thedirectives. This is no small challenge. Planning musttake into account a host of factors that stretch wellbeyond the immediate battlespace or other area ofconflict. To make matters worse, this effort toorchestrate the entire task runs into the samePlatonic problem we encountered in observing andreporting data. No action will ever be executed inexactly the way the commander intended. No matterhow well the commander’s intent may becommunicated, the understanding of that intent willvary across multiple levels and multiple arenas, aswell as across coalition members. Just as eachindividual’s training, experience, mental models, andidiosyncrasies are different, so too will theirunderstanding be different. If the backgrounds of theindividuals in question differ greatly, the chances ofa miscommunication will be high.

The more complex the action and the greater thenumber of arenas and levels of command that weattempt to coordinate, the greater will be thelikelihood of distortion and misunderstanding.Improving command and control communicationscan help, but the real problem lies in the interfacebetween the cognitive domain and the informationdomain. It is the problem of communicatingunderstanding, both to planners who mustunderstand what is possible with the assets at hand,and to warfighters and other actors as to thecommander’s true intent.

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The more uniform the experience or priorknowledge base of planners and actors, the lessthe problem is likely to be. The more diverse theexperience base is, the greater the likelihood of amisunderstanding.

Action-Reaction Cycle

Finally (and ideally), this process will produce a setof synchronized and coordinated physical actionsaimed at creating some physical and/orpsychological effect on the opponent and thus,affect that opponent’s behavior in an acceptabledirection. This is to say that the entire processdescribed from the physical actions to the collectionof data to the sensemaking, and the execution of aresponse is but one half of a cycle in which eachside in succession observes and responds to theactions of the other. The physical action producedby the planning and execution process thenbecomes a stimulus that the opponent will observe,consider, and react to (see Figure 34).

This description of a complex process fraught withuncertainties, although necessary to anunderstanding of what we are attempting in effects-based operations, is by no means restricted toeffects-based operations. On the contrary, we cansee in it a description of military operations ingeneral. It is an OODA loop written large and insome significant detail. It is not new. It is in manysenses a timeless description of the challengesinvolved in any military operation. It can be tracedthrough the 1805 Battle of Trafalgar and through the1942 Battle of Midway.


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From Cognitive Cycles to Effects-Based OperationsWhat does this cognitive cycle tell us about how tochoose the right actions to create the right physicaland psychological effects to shape behavior? Thecognitive cycle provides the conceptual base forunderstanding three essential aspects of actions orstimuli that we are trying to use to shape behavior.

The Nature of Actions

If we follow the logic of the cognitive cycle, thepsychological effects we seek to create so as toshape behavior are the result of observations andthe perceptions that these observations evoke in theobserver. This implies that the effects we seek willbe reliant upon those aspects of our actions that areobservable. That means that we must look at eachaction from the standpoint of what an observer islikely to see. Seen from this perspective, what theobserver sees is not merely what is done, but alsohow it is done.

The Cumulative Impact of Actions

In the entire cognitive cycle we have just described,there are only two points at which any physicalactions we may take can create effects that willinfluence behavior.

The first point of entry is obviously that the physicalactions either create the physical effects (e.g.destruction of forces and capabilities) that mayforeclose certain behavior, or that they constitute


the object or event that is being observed,reported, and perceived, and to which the observerultimately reacts.

The second, less obvious point of entry is the historyof previous physical actions that may have beenseen by the same observers, such as the responsesto earlier crises and other contingencies in the samearea or in similar situations. These previous actionsform a large part of the prior knowledge described inthe cognitive cycle. They are the reference pointsagainst which the observers and decisionmakersmeasure the current physical action and thus, thebasis for their perceptions.

Perhaps as important, these previous actions shapethe observers’ unconscious mental models of whatcourse a given set of actions is likely to follow andtherefore will be the basis for how the observerassesses a variety of dynamic futures. The historyof previous actions provides a ready gauge of likelycause and effect relationships and time-delayexpectations. In a still broader context, the history ofprevious political, economic, and military action insimilar situations are an essential part of shapingthe deep understanding that goes into the sensethat the observer makes of a given situation.Phrased differently, the aggregate of our previousactions precondition observers as to what theyshould expect to see. The above underscores acardinal principal of effects-based operations. Theeffects-based operation does not begin with thephysical action we may decide to execute. It beginswith all those actions we have taken in the samearea well before the current action was ever

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considered at all. If the history of our previousactions supports the immediate physical action weare undertaking and the psychological effect we aretrying to create, then we may build upon theobservers’ expectations. If that history wouldcontradict that immediate action and the effect weseek to create, then we may have to overcome theearlier impressions to achieve the effect we desire.

The Nature of the Observer

The cognitive cycle underlines how differentobservers with different levels and kinds ofexperience, mental models, national ororganizational cultures, and understandings of thesituation will make sense of the same action indifferent ways and reach different decisions as tohow to respond to the stimulus.

Although this variable has obvious implications forhow information is perceived and handled within agiven state, it has even more of an impact when weremember that any action we take will be seen bymore than just one human observer. Indeed, ourdefinition of effects-based operations specified thatthey shaped the behavior “of friends, foes, andneutrals,” each of whom will see the same actionfrom a different perspective and in a different light.Moreover, although the process outlined in thecognitive cycle may be understood in terms of astate or government reacting to a stimulus, thesame process would apply to a non-state actor suchas a terrorist organization. Their reactions would bea function of what they were able to see, how it was


reported and understood, how it was correlated andcontextualized, and how it was balanced against theoptions open.

…and Effects-Based Operations?How applicable is this entire construct to effects-based operations? There are two potentialcriticisms that must be taken into account. First, itmay be argued that underlying the entireconstruct is a presumption of rationality on thepart of the observers and decisionmakersinvolved and that without such rationality theentire construct becomes questionable. Second, itmay similarly be argued that there are so manyvariables at play in the cognitive process that itcannot be universally applied.

The first question was, in fact, addressed by theOffice of Net Assessment of the U.S. DefenseDepartment in a summer seminar.22 The seminar’sconclusion was that the decisionmakers in aconfrontation would be rational. The working groupsobserved that attaining a leadership role, whether ina government or an organization, can beunderstood to demand a substantial degree ofrational thinking and calculation, even though thisrationality may not be the same rationality that aWestern mind would pursue.

If we accept that the decisionmakers in aconfrontation are likely to be rational, then we canpostulate that the process described above willremain roughly the same, even though the filters(culture, education, and experience) may be vastly

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different and produce vastly different outcomes. Verysimply, what we are describing is the process bywhich the human mind functions and despite culturaldifferences, the same general process remains validacross such boundaries.

However, perhaps the most pointed response tosuch a critique is simply to apply the construct to aseries of real-world operations and to look at howthese mechanics operate in the context of thoseoperations. To the degree that the mechanics areconstant across multiple operations, then we canbegin to deduce the parameters of the operations ineffects-based operations in the cognitive domain.

1Boyd, p. 42.2In Understanding Information Age Warfare, Alberts et al. referto the OODA loop as a “traditional view of command andcontrol processes” but also make the argument that itoversimplifies even a “traditional” hierarchical joint commandstructure.Alberts et al. Understanding Information Age Warfare. pp.131-133.3Muir, Rory. Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon, 1807-1815.New Haven; Yale University. 1996. 4A distinction needs to be drawn between the military-strategic level of decisionmaking by Theater Commandersand the Joint Staff focused on higher-level militarydecisionmaking, and the geo-strategic level ofdecisionmaking by the national leadership focused on theaspects of national power, including political and diplomaticrisk assessment. 5We can think of these successively more complex systems inthe context of James Grier Miller’s “Living Systems” (p.755)theory of seven levels of complexity operating from the levelof cells all the way through that of supranational or


international systems. In effects-based operations, we aredealing with at least four levels of the system: groups(individual military units), organizations (Joint Task Force),communities (the military), societies (nation-states), andpossibly, supra-national groupings such as the internationalcommunity. Each of these levels shares certaincharacteristics and certain mechanical processes with theothers. Thus, the theory offers the prospect of some internalrational order amid the complexity of the maze of humanorganizations. That structure offers some hope that we canplan and execute effects-based operations focused onbehavior and can provide a key to figuring out how to handlethe complexity involved. Miller, James Grier. Living Systems. Denver. 1995. pp. 9ff. 6”Report of the Workshop on Sensemaking, 6-8 March 2001.”DODCCRP/Evidence Based Research; Tysons Corner. 2001.The comments included here also reflect the notes of theauthor, who was a participant in the workshop.7The assumption here is that all actions must have somephysical dimension to them in order to be either objects orevents that can be observed and reported. The physicalcomponent of such an action may be as great as a large scaleamphibious assault or as little as the keystrokes required toinsert a computer virus into the internet.8At the same time, all of the above objects, events, and chainsof physical effects clearly can be seen to have an impact thatlies beyond the physical domain, a second and distinctlydifferent chain of derivative effects. Clearly, Vice AdmiralNagumo, the Japanese commander at Midway, madedecisions based on a report of a sighting of a U.S. carrier, andhis subordinate commanders made tactical decisionsbecause of the American torpedo plane attack. Thus, anaction in the physical domain resulted in a stimulus in thecognitive domain that in turn resulted in a series of commanddecisions at various levels that altered Japanese behaviorduring the battle. It is equally true that the chain of physicaleffects deriving from the destruction of a railroad bridge mightbe expected to set off a series of decisions at succeedinglevels of command. These cascades of direct and indirectphysical effects will be discussed in detail in Chapter 7. 9As noted in Understanding Information Age Warfare, a directobservation by human senses (the Mark 1 Mod 0 eyeball)does not pass through the information domain in theconnotation of electronic sensors and information systems.Nevertheless, the processes and limitations of the humansenses are very closely analogous to those of the electronicsensors and information systems. Because they perform an

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analogous function, it is useful to consider them in the sameinformation domain for purposes of effects-based planningand execution.Alberts et al. Understanding Information Age Warfare. p. 12.10Alberts et al. note that “information is the result of puttingindividual observations (sensor returns or data items) intosome meaningful context. Data is a representation ofindividual facts, concepts, or instructions in a manner suitablefor communication, interpretation, or processing by humansor by automatic means.”Alberts et al. Understanding Information Age Warfare. pp. 16-17. 11Jowett, J.B. trans. Plato’s Republic. New York; ModernLibrary. 1982.12We will follow here the distinction made by Alberts et al. thatdirect sensing is the application of human senses tosurveillance in a way that unites the sensing and the cognitivefunction of perception in an individual. Indirect sensingdenotes a situation in which mechanical or electronic sensorsdetect and forward data or information to a human observerwho perceives a situation as a result and thus becomes theentry point into the cognitive domain. 13In an asymmetric conflict environment (guerrilla warfare,urban terrorism), this information requirement would extendacross the full range of what might otherwise be consideredpolice data or even financial data. 14In fact, one of the major attributes of network-centricoperations is that it would enable such external inputs from anetwork to increase the scope of the area that the pilot couldobserve.15This human information is distinguished from humanintelligence (HUMINT) sources, a term that usually connotesdata derived from the reporting of open and undercoveragents of some sort and that has been assessed in some wayfor its reliability or credibility. The term human information, asapplied here, encompasses all of the unevaluated informationthat derives from both traditional open sources and fromincidental observations and reporting by human beings. 16There are rich possibilities for the use of new informationtechnologies such as data mining in extracting relevant datafrom large amounts of text and the creation of analyticalmodels to search for new ways to contextualize that data.However, like the creation of a system of surveillancesensors, even the data mining and the tools require extensivehuman judgments as to what should or should not be thefocus of the data mining and what should or should not go into


the models used. 17The analysis process that transforms such humaninformation into HUMINT deals with these problems byaggregating the reporting to look for consistencies over timeor by comparing such information with other reporting on thesubject area that has proven reliable.18Alberts et al. point to four different ways in which knowledgecan be loaded into the cognitive domain:The education, training, and experience of an individual;Direct experience with the physical domain;Interaction with other human beings; andInteractions with the information domain.Alberts et al. Understanding Information Age Warfare. p.18.19Because commanders act and react in the context of someorganization and are influenced by the differing perceptions ofmultiple players in that organization, if we are to understandwhat goes on in the cognitive domain, we need to think interms of command intent rather than commander’s intent,even though the ultimate decision continues to rest with thecommander. 20This will vary with the decisionmaking culture. A culture thatdiscourages anyone but the chief or a limited number ofdecisionmakers to speak will be limited to their experiencebase alone. One that encourages the expression of divergentviewpoints will benefit from a wider base, but may be subjectto an information overload. Practically, decisionmakers tendto gravitate to a limited number of counselors whosejudgment is trusted and who put information into anexperiential framework shared by the decisionmaker. RobertF. Kennedy’s description of the American decisionmakingprocess during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis is a case inpoint. Kennedy, Robert F. Thirteen Days, A Memoir of the CubanMissile Crisis. New York; Norton, W. W. & Company, Inc.1969.21In this sense, Osama bin Laden and his admirers can bedescribed as Islamist fascists.22Office of the Secretary of Defense, Office of NetAssessment. 1995 Summer Study, Author’s notes.

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CHAPTER 5

The Rules of theGame: PuttingEffects-Based

Operations into aReal-World

ContextIn the cognitive cycle, as in the definitions of

effects-based operations, effects, and the stimulusand response model, we can begin to see theoutlines of a fundamental general theory of effects-based operations. We must now take this theoreticalunderstanding another step and see how it appliesto real-world operations. There are two ways inwhich this might be done. If we assume that bothnetwork-centric operations and effects-basedoperations are entirely new concepts for which thereis no precedent, then we would be obliged toexamine the theory in the context of controlled battleexperiments in the hope that those experimentscould be made to resemble the real world. However,

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if we accept that the basic principles of network-centric operations are not new, and that effects-based operations in one form or another havealways been with us, then we can also test thetheory directly by looking at how it is reflected in real-world conflicts.

In this chapter, we will approach the effects-basedproblem from this latter direction. With thetheoretical underpinnings of the precedingchapters in mind, we will examine a series of real-world operations, both to test the theories and todeduce a set of effects-based operating principles,or “rules of the game.” In choosing which set ofmilitary operations to examine, we will move ourfocus away from warfighting. Whereas the previousexamples (Midway, Trafalgar, the great attritionwars, and Vietnam) were all wartime combatmodels, this time we will turn to examples ofmilitary operations short of combat. After all, if weare to assess the full range of military actions thatmight provoke responses and change behavior, wemust look beyond combat operations. In eachcase, we will seek to understand why, how, andwhich actions produce effects: the set of operatingprinciples or rules of the game. By looking at avariety of cases over time, we will try to assess thegeneral applicability both of these operatingprinciples and of our emerging theory of effects-based operations. Finally, by concentrating ourattention on crises short of hostilities, we will alsobegin to address how effects-based operationsapply to the peacetime and crisis responseoperations that have constituted the vast majority


of our military operations for the past half-centuryand more.

To support such assessment, there is a substantialdatabase of operations short of combat to drawupon. If we use the generally accepted method ofcounting U.S. crisis responses developed by BarryBlechman and Stephen Kaplan in the late 1970s, wecan identify approximately 400 crisis responseoperations of varying sizes and descriptions thathave been conducted by U.S. military forces sincethe end of the Second World War.1 2 3 4 5 Very few ofthese 400 crisis responses by military forces, whichincluded some of the largest scale militaryoperations of the Cold War, actually involvedcombat. However, almost all did involve the use ofsome form of maneuver, as opposed to strikeoperations, to create effects and to changebehavior.6 And, almost all paid nearly as muchattention to shaping the behavior of friends andneutrals as they did to shaping the behavior ofprospective foes. Thus, the crisis response conflictsprovide ample grounds for both testing the theoryand ascertaining how it operates in the real world.

As a more manageable number of examples thanthe 400 or more responses cataloged, we willexamine a set of three major crisis reactions by theSoviet Union and the United States that occurred inthe Middle East between 1967 and 1973:

• The June 1967 Arab Israeli War;

• The September 1970 Jordanian Crisis; and

• The October 1973 “Yom Kippur” Arab-Israeli War.

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From the standpoint of our ex post factoexperimentation, this set of examples has a numberof advantages. Each took place in the same basicgeographic area and security environment: the ColdWar Middle East (see Figure 35). The three crisesalso involved many of the same players anddemonstrated a significant scale and scope ofinteraction over a period of time that is short enoughto make changes in technology and weapons amongthe principles a negligible factor. And, the actions ofthe players are fairly well documented in accessible,unclassified sources. These factors indicate that weshould be able both to pick out consistencies inbehavior from which to draw our rules, and to tracea learning quotient from one crisis to the next.

There is also an additional significant point to beconsidered. In each of these crisis reactions, as inthe earlier 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, any resort tohostilities by either the Soviet Union or the UnitedStates against the other would have marked adangerous and perhaps catastrophic failure ofmilitary power. This is to say that they represent theantithesis of an attrition-based approach to militaryoperations. For the two superpowers in theirinteraction with each other, the destruction of forcesand capabilities was not an option to be consideredin order to create effects. Thus, the results or effectsof their operations cannot be assessed in terms ofattrition models. But, they are explicable in thecontext of a stimulus and response, effects-basedoperation model in which sets of military actionscoupled with actions by other elements of nationalpower produced the desired changes in behavior.That is to say, the crises are good mirrors of exactlythe kind of issues raised in the preceding chapters.7


The Crises

The Arab-Israeli War, June 1967

The June 1967 crisis is significant for two reasons.It is the first incident in this series of Soviet-American confrontations in the Middle East, andtherefore provides a baseline case for assessinghow the two powers adapted and learned over the

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Figure 35. The Middle East

course of the three crises. Also, it is the only one ofthe three crises that involved an attempt to puttogether a coalition military operation.

The roots of the crisis lie in escalating terroristoperations into Israel that took place throughout1966 and early 1967. On May 12, 1967, amid thethreats and counter-threats surrounding theseattacks and a new Egyptian-Syrian defense pact,Israel threatened to take unspecified retaliatoryaction in the event of continued terrorism across itsborder.8 Syria immediately accused Israel ofmobilizing its armed forces for an attack on Syriaand invoked the defense pact. In response, Egyptmobilized its armed forces on May 14, ordered itsforces into the previously demilitarized SinaiPeninsula area on May 18,9 and finally declared ablockade of the Strait of Tiran on May 22.10

Britain and the United States initially reacted to thecrisis by trying to create an international naval forceto transit the strait and break the blockade andpromptly started to mass naval forces in the RedSea for such a demonstration of power.11 On May 30,Israel gave the superpowers a deadline of 1 to 2weeks for this effort to succeed.12 But, the effort soonran into problems. The principal superpower navalforce east of Suez was a British carrier battle groupin the Red Sea.13 Not surprisingly, Britainimmediately became subject to Arab threats toBritish oil supplies and financial stability. As aconsequence, Britain announced that it wouldwithdraw from the effort on May 31,14 and with theBritish withdrawal, the attempt to use coalitionmilitary power to avoid the conflict failed.


On June 5, in the face of mounting warpreparations by its Arab neighbors, Israel attackedfirst Egypt, then Syria and Jordan. The UnitedStates and the Soviet Union initially attempted toavoid any direct involvement in this developingconflict and kept their respective naval forces in theMediterranean Sea at a distance from the warzone.15 But, as the Arab-Israeli war intensified, boththe Soviet and American military forces throughoutthe region were put on alert and moved closer tothe conflagration. Soviet warships equipped withanti-ship missiles took up tattletale stations in closeproximity to major American units, while armedU.S. carrier aircraft closely monitored the majorSoviet units in the area. Both sides likewise beganto reinforce their naval forces in the area. Thetense naval standoff quickly came to involve 47American ships and 25 Soviet ships.16

The face-off continued until June 10 when, in theface of an increasingly successful Israeli invasion ofSyria, the Soviets threatened to intervene directly inthe struggle to stop the Israeli advance toward theSyrian capital of Damascus. In response, the UnitedStates sent its Sixth Fleet, then stationed south ofthe central Mediterranean island of Crete, toward theconflict area at high speed.17 At the same time, theWhite House communicated to the Soviets that anysuch direct Soviet intervention in the war would beunacceptable, that the United States wanted tocontrol the situation and that, in any event, theIsraelis were not going to force their offensive as faras Damascus. When the Israeli drive indeed haltedshort of Damascus, the confrontation ended, but leftIsrael in control of parts of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan

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including the Sinai Peninsula up to the Suez Canal,the West Bank territories of Jordan, and the SyrianGolan Heights.

The Jordanian War, September 1970

In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11,2001 and the subsequent U.S. operations inAfghanistan, the Jordanian crisis of 1970 isparticularly interesting. It involved both state-to-stateconflict and interactions, and interactions with anumber of non-state players, a group of Palestinianterrorist organizations loosely sponsored by Syria.The operations therefore involved not only the clientstates of the Soviet Union and the United States asin the 1967 war, but also included terroristoperations carried out by various Palestinianfactions to threaten the United States and Israel, andto induce a collapse of the Jordanian government.

The Jordanian crisis grew out of a series ofconfrontations in the spring and early summer of1970 between the Jordanian Army that remainedloyal to King Hussein and groups of Palestinianguerrillas and terrorists supported by Syria and(indirectly) by the Soviet Union.18 The tense situationwas aggravated by additional Palestinian terroristactions in Jordan, including an attemptedassassination of King Hussein on June 9,19 theassassination of the American Defense Attaché toJordan on June 12, the seizure of 60 Westernhostages at an Amman hotel, and by an ongoingseries of hostile encounters between the Israelis andboth Egypt and Syria.20


As the situation in Jordan worsened, the UnitedStates tried to use its political and economicinfluence both to broker a Jordanian-Palestiniansettlement and to engineer a cease-fire in theongoing fighting between Israel and its neighbors.21

The diplomatic effort failed in all respects. BySeptember, the situation in Jordan wasdeteriorating rapidly. On September 1, Palestinianterrorists attempted yet another assassination ofKing Hussein. Then on September 6, thePalestinians began a series of airliner hijackings,including American aircraft and United Statescitizens, dispatching the aircraft to airfields in Cairoand Jordan.

This action was accompanied by reneweddemands on the Jordanian Government both bythe terrorists and by other Palestinian factions.22

These events in turn were followed by openconflict between Palestinian guerrillas and theJordanian Army and by a Syrian invasion of Jordanin support of the Palestinians. To everyone’ssurprise, the Jordanian Army defeated the Syrianinvasion and asserted control over the Palestinianterrorist camps.23

In response to the deteriorating situation in Jordan,the United States began to concentrate naval forcesin the eastern Mediterranean and dispatched anadditional carrier battle group from the Puerto Ricoarea, in case some form of intervention becamenecessary. Then, in the face of the Syrian invasion,the United States warned the Soviets and theSyrians that if the invasion continued, the U.S.would not stop any Israeli action and might indeed

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intervene directly itself, and began to put airborneforces on alert.24 In the following days, as the Syrian(and Iraqi) invasion continued, American forces inthe European Theater were put on alert and theU.S. Sixth Fleet was reinforced with an additionalcarrier battle group.25 In response, the Sovietscontinued their own reinforcements to theirMediterranean fleet.

During the ensuing Soviet-American militaryconfrontation, both sides maneuvered naval forcesin the area but deliberately kept their most powerfulunits outside the eastern Mediterranean area of theconflict. Although the confrontation ended when theJordanian Army defeated the Syrian and Iraqiinvaders and surrounded the principal Palestinianterrorist bases, both the Soviet and American navalforces continued to reinforce and to maneuver warilyin the Mediterranean for several additional weeks.

The Yom Kippur War, October 1973

The 1973 Arab-Israeli War was occasioned by thecontinued Israeli occupation of Egyptian, Syrian,and Jordanian territories that had been captured inthe 1967 war and by the failure of the United Statesor any other actor to find a negotiated settlement toreturn these territories.26 In some ways, the 1973war resembled that of 1967. It too was principally aconventional military conflict between states, ratherthan a combination of state-sponsored terroristactions and conventional operations. However,unlike the 1967 “Six Day War,” the 1973 war waslong and more closely fought with the localantagonists, rapidly exhausting their supplies ofweapons and munitions.


The war started on October 6, 1973 (on the Jewishholy day of Yom Kippur and in the midst of theMuslim holy month Ramadan) and began with botha surprise Egyptian assault across the Suez Canalaccompanied by a Syrian thrust into the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights.27 The Egyptians quicklyestablished a bridgehead on the Israeli-occupiedside of the canal and expanded it over the next 8days. The Syrians, after an initial success on theGolan Heights, bore the brunt of the Israeli responseand by October 10, they were falling back. ByOctober 14, the two sides were deadlocked, but overthe following week, the tide began to turn heavily inIsrael’s favor. A cease-fire was attempted onOctober 22, but it failed. A second cease-fire wentinto effect on October 24. After a tense U.S.-Sovietconfrontation, the cease-fire finally took hold onOctober 25, ending the war.28

Given the initial Arab successes in the war, theSoviet Union promised “full support.”29 However,when the Syrian situation began to deterioratesharply on October 9-10, the Soviets began a large-scale airlift to Syria. The United States initially playeddown any resupply effort and sought Sovietcooperation in finding a diplomatic solution to thecrisis. However, the U.S. began resupplying Israelon October 7 and then, as Israel began to run out ofarms, began a large-scale resupply effort onOctober 13.30

The Soviet and American military approaches to thecrisis mirrored this evolution. Initially, both sought tomaintain a “low key, even handed approach towardthe hostilities”31 and kept their respective fleetsoperating in an area south of Crete. This changed on

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October 9-10 as the Soviets placed units with anti-ship missiles as tattletales near the major U.S. units,and then began a rapid, large-scale reinforcement oftheir Mediterranean fleet.32

When the first cease-fire failed to end all hostilitieson October 22, the Soviets threatened Israel with“grave consequences,” alerted its airbornedivisions, began to reconfigure its airlift so as to beable to send the airborne divisions into Damascus,and increased the pace of its navalreinforcements.33 On October 24, in a brusque noteto President Nixon, the Soviets threatened to sendtheir military forces into the Middle East to enforcea peace, a potentially dangerous move consideredunacceptable by the United States. This wasfollowed by a threatening “anti-carrier” exercise bySoviet ships in the Mediterranean directed againstU.S. forces in the area.34

In response to the Soviet actions, the Americans firstsent to the crisis area an additional carrier thatpreviously had been held in the westernMediterranean as a demonstration of the U.S. desireto keep the crisis low key. Finally, in response to theSoviet threats of October 22 and 24, the UnitedStates went to a general alert, increased theDefense Condition, alerted the 82nd AirborneDivision, and reinforced the Sixth Fleet with anadditional carrier group that had been held outsidethe Mediterranean. The resulting tense Soviet-American naval confrontation continued through thefirst week of November until it was apparent that thecease-fire was holding and both sides began to drawdown the forces in the area.


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ObservationsWhile the above recounting of three verysignificant crises and the Soviet and Americanreactions is necessarily very cursory, there areseveral aspects of our broad definition of effects-based operations that are immediately evident ineven this loose account of the military interactionsof the three crises.

• First, although the numbers of Soviet andAmerican forces involved were very large andthe interactions between their naval forces inparticular were often very intense, none of theoperations involved actual combat. Indeed, oneof the principal objectives of both the Sovietsand the Americans in each case was to avoidsuch hostilities, the result of which could be arapid and uncontrolled escalation into a nuclearconflict. Thus, despite the significance of themajor naval and other military interactionsinvolved, none of those critical interactions hadmuch at all to do with any semblance of anattrition-based model of warfare.

• Second, in each case, it was actions, especiallythe maneuvers of the Soviet and Americanfleets, and not weapons that were carefullytargeted by operational commanders andnational leaders alike to shape the opponent’sbehavior35 and that of local clients, allies andneutrals. The critical question was not what wasdestroyed, but how certain military actionswould be perceived and by whom.36

• Third, all of the military operations in each ofthe crises, however large they may have been,were but one part of a still larger, longer, andmore complex diplomatic, political, andeconomic effort involving all the regionalactors. Neither the military actions of theseactors nor the effects they created could beseparated from their political-diplomaticcontext. Rather they had to be coordinatedwith other actions to achieve an overall effect.

• Finally, the interactions of both fleets duringthe operations were dynamic. The fleets’actions did not at all resemble the execution ofa preplanned target list followed by bombdamage assessment and planning for asecond strike. Instead, the maneuveringinteractions of both the Soviet and Americanforces were as dynamic as those of a tacticalOODA loop, but were as interrelated, complex,and multi-faceted as those suggested by thecognitive process outlined in Chapter 4.Moreover, the cognitive cycles observed at thetactical and operational levels were very muchconnected to equivalent cycles at the military-strategic and national levels of interaction.Indeed, the fleets and their actions became aprimary way of one superpower signaling itsintentions to the other,37 and thus of shapingnational behavior.

The above certainly indicates a dynamic in the useof military forces that is very different from attrition-based models and cannot be readily explained insuch terms. What additional lessons can we draw


from these three crisis response operations, andwhat do they tell us about the nature of effects-based operations and the prospective role ofnetwork-centric thinking in them?

Effects-Based Operations: Rules ofthe Game If we look more closely at what was going on in eachof the above three crisis response operations and atthose aspects of each side’s behavior that carriedover from one crisis to the next, we can begin todiscern some general operating principles or rules ofthe game for effects-based operations. At the root ofthese parameters is a very fundamental observation:that the military responses in each of the three crisesconsisted of a succession of what might be termedaction-reaction cycles (see Figure 36). That is, theycan be described in terms of a series of two-sidedinteractions in which each side tried to persuade its

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Figure 36. Basic Building Block: Action-Reaction Cycle

opponent to adopt a particular course of action whiledissuading it from alternate, unacceptable coursesof action.38 These behavior-driven action-reactioncycles between intelligent adversaries were thebasic building blocks of the crisis operationsobserved. They are equally the basic element ineffects-based operations.

These action-reaction cycles could be observedrepeatedly at multiple levels throughout each of thethree crises:

• At the tactical level, the cycles were mostevident in the maneuvers and counter-maneuvers of the Soviet and American warshipsin the Mediterranean. This was especiallyapparent in the repeated movements of the airor surface tattletales used to monitor and (ifneed be) to attack the opposing units, and thesubsequent efforts of their targets to evade orguard against a sudden missile strike.

• The cycles were also evident at the operationallevel in the interaction between the SovietMediterranean Eskadra39 as a whole and theU.S. Sixth Fleet, especially in what has beentermed a strategy of “inter-position” in whicheach fleet sought to interpose itself between theopposing force and its clients.40

• The cycle was also seen at the military-strategiclevel in confrontations between U.S. and Sovietmilitary power that stretched well beyond theMediterranean battlespace. In all three cases,the superpowers’ military efforts involveddiverting forces from other theaters or from the


homeland to reinforce the forces in theMediterranean area. In the 1970 case, theseefforts even included Soviet preparations to flyairborne divisions into Syria, and in the 1973case, it included both a similar Soviet action anda U.S. general alert that included strategicnuclear forces.

• Finally, the cycle was perhaps extremely evidentat the national level as the drama of the crisiswas played out among the American and Sovietgovernments, their clients, their allies, andneutrals in a drama that spanned both politicsand economics, and both the national andinternational arenas. In this latter contest, theU.S. sought to block any direct intervention bySoviet military forces and to discourage Sovietsupport to Arab clients, while the Soviets soughtto do the same to the United States, and bothsought to posture for a wider Arab audience.

In each of the three crises, the success of the overallnational level effect sought depended at least in partupon the tactical and operational level signalingeffects created by military forces on-scene.

If we can discern these building blocks at each levelof interaction, what more can we deduce as to thenature of effects-based operations?

Rules of the Game Actually, the three crisis response operationssurveyed and, indeed, the entire history of ColdWar crisis responses by the United States, point tosix basic rules of the game that describe and

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define an effects-based operation. The first threeof these rules are roughly analogous to those in agame of chess, while the last three step beyondthe chess game to a far greater degree ofcomplexity, specifically because they center onthe human (cognitive and behavioral) dimensionof the interaction.

1. Actions create effects.

In a game of chess, it is not necessary to take apiece to have an effect on the game. Many or evenmost of the moves we make during the chess gameprobably will not involve taking an opponent’spieces. We might simply put an opponent into check,for example. Or our moves might be directed atforeclosing a future move by the opponent, or atpositioning a piece for a future move we might wishto make. Each contributes to the course of the game;each creates an effect.

Throughout all three of the Soviet-American navalconfrontations in the Mediterranean between 1967and 1973, the focus was similarly on moves oractions rather than on targets and destruction. Theactions of the Soviet and American military forcesdid not need to include the destruction of opposingforces and capabilities in order to have an impact orto create a desired effect. Quite the contrary, thedestruction of forces in the crisis area, whether thoseof the opposing superpower or those of its localclient states, would have meant an unacceptableincrease in the scale and scope of the local conflict,an eventuality that both the Soviets and Americanssought to avoid. Indeed, it was just such a possibility


that brought the most intense moments of bothentire confrontations. Both sides appreciated thedangers that any hostile military action betweenthem, even an accidental one, could pose, includingan uncontrolled escalation to nuclear conflict.41

Additionally, especially during the 1973 war, therewas also a perception by the two superpowers thatthe clients might also be attempting to provoke justsuch an exchange, as a way of solidifying theirprotector’s involvement in what was becoming anincreasingly desperate situation for both clients.42 Infact, however tense they became, most of themilitary operations stopped at a level of actions wellshort of the violent use of military force. Yet, this didnot mean that either the actions or effects of themilitary forces involved were inconsequential, asthe dispatch of the entire Battle Force of the U.S.Sixth Fleet toward the coast of Syria in the closingdays of the 1967 War bears out. It meant rather thatto produce the right effect, the military action usedcould not depend on destruction for its effect.

During the vast majority of these encounters, eachside maneuvered for tactical advantage, oftenaggressively as in the case of the Soviet anti-carrier exercise in the closing days of the 1973crisis, while at the same time deliberately andcarefully avoiding combat. The focus of the actionsundertaken was to use maneuver itself as theagent for creating the desired effects. Indeed, thecoordination of both the Soviet and American ships,aircraft, and submarines participating in thesecycles throughout the three operations bore all ofthe marks of maneuver warfare in their agility,

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flexibility, and responsiveness. The encounterswere maneuver warfare without the warfare. Theywere engagements in which maneuver by itselfcreated the desired effect.43

Moreover, this paradigm of “maneuver warfarewithout the warfare” is not peculiar to these threecrisis reactions. It has been a recurring facet ofalmost all of the 400 or so crisis responses that havetaken place over the last 50 years.44 In manyrespects, the maneuvers of the fleets engaged inresponding to the three Middle East wars resemblednothing so much as a modern version of 18th-century positional warfare. They were militaryoperations in which the object was not to destroy theopposing army but to so out-maneuver it as toforeclose any possibility of success and thus, forceits cession. These maneuver responses resemblemany elements of what was termed “gunboatdiplomacy” in the 19th century, a form of positionalwarfare at sea.45 This idea of an effects-basedmaneuver warfare without the warfare not onlyappears to be the paradigm for the majority of themilitary reactions to crises over the past half century,but also that for the world of asymmetric challengesthat we are likely to have to face in the 21st century.

Given these examples, we can hypothesize that ineffects-based operations, it is not necessary todestroy an opponent’s capabilities in order to havean impact or in order to create an effect. This is notto say that effects-based operations exclude thedestruction of capabilities and targets. They do not.It says rather that there was much more to creatinga desired overall effect than striking a target ordestroying opposing forces, and that the


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destruction of forces and capabilities may be butone way to accomplish an effect, and notnecessarily the best one.

2. Effects are cumulative.

A chess game is comprised of a series of movesthat continue until a capitulation, a checkmate, or adraw. The moves in the game do not occur inisolation. In each move, pieces may be lost,formations dispersed, and intended movesforeclosed with the effect of that move cumulativelysetting the parameters for succeeding moves. Theeffect of a move may be felt either directly andimmediately because it forces an opponent to reactin the next move, such as by putting a king intocheck. Alternatively, it may be felt indirectly or notuntil later in the game, such as in the impact of theloss of a powerful piece. As the latter implies, theultimate effect of a given move may not be entirelyknown at the time and may well be represented inserendipitous or unintended consequences insubsequent moves.

In the Soviet and American responses to the threeMiddle East crises, the action-reaction cyclesclearly followed a similar pattern. At the tacticallevel of these operations, there were longsuccessions of air operations46 and of tattletale andcounter-tattletale operations on a given day, andfrom one phase of the crisis to the next as eachside maneuvered for tactical advantage. In thesesuccessive cycles, the lessons learned from oneinteraction immediately affected the actions andreactions of the succeeding cycles.

At the operational level in particular, each sidebegan to develop a knowledge base of what toexpect of the other and of how to adapt to thesituation in the Mediterranean. This experienceand knowledge base changed how each side’smilitary forces reacted as any individual crisisprogressed, but also transferred from one crisis tothe next. For example, in the 1967 crisis, theSoviet ability to reinforce its Mediterranean fleetpromptly was constrained by the provisions of theMontreux Convention requiring 4 days advancenotice for all warship transits of the Bosporus andDardenelles, but by 1970, the Soviet Navy Staffhad hit upon the idea of making “contingencydeclarations” of intent to transit. In normaloperations, these declarations could be leftunfilled, but in time of crisis, all the contingencydeclarations made could be met, thus enablingSoviet warships to exit the Black Sea in greaternumbers. This permitted the Soviets to augmenttheir forces in the Mediterranean Sea by largernumbers of ships in 1970 and 1973 than in 1967.

It can be surmised that military and otherinteractions in peace, crisis, and war will follow asimilar general rule. In effects-based operations,therefore, actions and their effects are not andcannot be isolated. They are interrelated. The effectcreated by one interaction carries over into the nextcycles to create a cumulative overall effect. Oneaction or effect thus paves the way for the next in asuccession of interactions. Forces lost andcapabilities destroyed cannot be applied to the nextaction. Similarly, troops whose confidence has been


crushed in one interaction cannot be expected torespond aggressively in the next confrontation.

The same is true of the cumulative effect from onecrisis or conflict to the next. In this succession ofactions and effects, the effect of an interactionmay be direct and immediate, an impact thateither independently or when added to what hasgone before causes a change in current behavior.Or it may be long-term, a part of a continuinghistory of actions and effects that will ultimatelyshape perceptions or otherwise produce anaggregate impact.

3. Any action-reaction cycle will have bothactive and passive participants.

The idea of cumulative effect can be taken a stepfurther. Consider that in a chess tournament, theimpact of a move is not confined to a singleinteraction during a game. Instead, it will influencehow the opponent plays in succeeding moves oreven in succeeding games. Moreover, each move orseries of moves, like those of a chess master, maybe studied for the novel way in which they deal witha given situation on the board or for what they sayabout an individual player’s thinking. These lessonscan then be carried over into other encounters.Furthermore, this learning process is not confined tothe two active protagonists. It applies to all thosewho can observe the game or who can study it insome fashion. In this manner, the impact of a movemay extend not only to re-matches with the sameplayers, but to all who can put the knowledge to use

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for their own ends, either against one of the playersbeing observed or someone else.

In each of the three Middle East crises, we canobserve a similar pattern. The interactions betweenthe Soviet tattletales and their American prey ineach crisis were essentially action-reaction cyclesinvolving two active players in a tactical levelengagement. But, surrounding these active playersin each case were successive layers of interestedparties. These passive players might not be directlyinvolved in this tactical engagement, but would beimmediately and directly affected by its outcome.

In the event that the interaction were to take awrong turn (i.e., an American ship ramming aSoviet tattletale or a Soviet tattletale firing amissile), these passive actors would have quicklybecome active participants in any resulting conflict.The aircraft in combat air patrol stations might havebeen ordered to attack any Soviet unit that openedfire, and Soviet tattletales trailing other majorAmerican combatants might similarly have openedfire on their charges as the conflict spread.47 In fact,this spread of action from the active players to awidening circle of observing players (potentially toa nuclear exchange) was exactly what theoperational commanders, the national militarystaffs, and the national commanders on both sidesfeared in all three crises.

On another level, the client states of bothsuperpowers were also passive players in each ofthe three superpower confrontations. They werenot directly involved in the Soviet-Americanmilitary interaction centered on the tattletales, but


they were close observers who were veryconcerned with the outcome of any suchengagement. Indeed, particularly in the 1967 and1973 crises, they tended to see any engagementas a gauge of each superpower’s commitment toits clients and thus, of the latitude they had inpursuing their own war aims.48

The set of passive actor-observers also includedNATO and the Warsaw Pact Alliance partners of theAmericans and Soviets respectively. These powers,apart from the abortive role of Britain in 1967, andHungary permitting Soviet aircraft in their airspace in1967 and 1973, took no part in the crisis, but likewisewould have seen Soviet and American interactionsas a gauge of their commitment as allies. Finally,there were all of the regional states that were notinvolved in the Arab-Israeli or Jordanian conflicts,but whose future behavior would at least in part beshaped by those outcomes. These states (e.g. Libyaand Saudi Arabia) were also closely following thecourse of Soviet-American military confrontations.

In short, the actions of the superpower protagonistsfrom the tactical level upward were being observedin one fashion or another by the whole world. At aminimum, these observations would have translatedinto revised military assessments as to thecapabilities of each superpower to carry out a role inthe region and into political assessments as to thereliability and worth of each of the protagonists as anally. Thus, in each case, the effect of an actionassumed many different dimensions that stretchedwell beyond the initial tactical battlespace and theoriginal active players.

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Whereas the above three rules have clear analogiesto a chess game, they also hint at a more complexinteraction that transcends the kind of competitionreflected in a game of chess. And, the 1967, 1970,and 1973 crises used to illustrate the first three rulesdemonstrate some more complex interactions thanany reflected in the chess game. This more complexdimension emerges in the remaining three rules,which focus on the human dimension of theinteractions and the way in which each action-reaction cycle is seen and understood by observers.

4. Action-reaction cycles occur simultaneouslyin multiple dimensions.In each of the three crises, the action-reaction cyclescould be seen to occur on four different levels:

• At the tactical level, there were tattletale andcounter-tattletale operations and close airsurveillance operations.

• At the operational level, there were maneuversto interpose the forces of one or the other fleetbetween the opponent and that opponent’s localclients in the war.

• At the military-strategic level, there was a raceto substantially reinforce the naval units in thecrisis area and in the 1973 crisis, to resupplyclients on both sides by air. Other forces wereput on alert. Nuclear forces were held pendinga close monitoring of the opponent’s forces forany sign of change.

• Finally, at the geo-strategic level, there was aconsiderable political, diplomatic, and

sometimes economic effort undertaken by boththe Soviets and the Americans in each of thethree crisis reactions.

In each of the three crises, interactions at each leveland in each arena took place simultaneously. Whathappened or failed to happen on one level in onearena influenced what happened in all. In anexample of inaction, the failure to counter Arabfinancial pressures on Britain in 1967 nullified theonly military force in the region capable of averting aconflict, Britain’s “East of Suez” carrier battle group. Thus, in place of a single chess game, we havemultiple complex interactions on four levels and inthree or more arenas. This only stands to reasonsince the actors and behaviors we wish to influencein effects-based operations also reside on fourdifferent levels of the military arena and at multiplelevels of the political and economic arenas.

5. All actions and effects at each level and ineach arena are interrelated.

It is clear, especially at the geo-strategic level, thatthe military actions in the three Middle East crisestook place in the context of complex diplomatic,political, and economic maneuvering. The crisesalso amply demonstrate that the actions and effectson all of these levels and in all these arenas wereinterrelated. This was certainly very evident in theconcerns of both Soviet and American operationalcommanders that some unintended action mightset off an uncontrollable succession of events.Although this was apparent in each crisis, it wasmost pronounced as in the 1970 crisis when the

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U.S. Sixth Fleet commander ordered his flagshipalongside that of the Soviet Fleet’s flagship so thatboth ships would be subject to any attack that mightgrow out of an incident.49 The commanders’concern was military in nature, but bothcommanders clearly appreciated that any suchencounter would quickly spread outside the militaryarena to the political and economic.

In the crises, the diplomatic activity obviouslyincluded explanation of Soviet or American positionsand actions to allies, neutrals, and/or potentialadversaries. This was an essential element indefining the military actions required to support thecreation of a unified national level effect. In the daysbefore the 1967 War for example, much of thediplomatic activity centered on putting together aninternational naval force that could break theEgyptian blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba before theIsraelis undertook any action.

In a different vein, the Arabs (and particularly SaudiArabia) applied significant economic pressure onGreat Britain to foreclose a potential British militaryaction. Similarly, during the 1973 crisis, the Arabstates led by Saudi Arabia attempted to forecloseAmerican military support for Israel by cutting offAmerican oil supplies with an oil embargo.

However, there was also another dimension of thisinterrelationship in view. As Rule Two indicated, theactions of the players were also cumulative overtime. After its abortive involvement in the 1967 war,for example, Britain never again played a leadingrole in a Middle East crisis. In 1970, British forces


kept well clear of the developing crisis, and by 1973,they had been entirely withdrawn from both theMediterranean Sea and the area “East of Suez.”Similarly, the U.S. and Soviet reactions to the crisiswere mutually studied and figured in the actions thateach took in subsequent crises.

If we accept, as outlined in Rule Two, that actionsand effects cannot be isolated and that they producecumulative effects, then as another general rule, itfollows that all of the above interactions: at all levelsand arenas must also be treated as interrelated andcumulative over time. Thus, it is not only what we donow that might create an effect on another level or inanother arena, but also how that action appears inthe context of what we have done in the past. Theeffect of any individual action, thus, stands to beenhanced or diminished by the cumulative contextwithin which they were undertaken.

6. Effects are both physical and psychological.

The chain from physical actions to psychologicaleffects can be observed in each of the three MiddleEast crisis responses. It is perhaps most evident inthe dispatch of the U.S. Sixth Fleet toward the Syriancoast in 1967 in response to the Soviet threat tointervene on behalf of a hard-pressed Syria.However, it is more uniformly present in the largescale, visible reinforcement of naval forces in theMediterranean that both sides undertook in all threeof the Middle East confrontations. Although neitherthe abrupt dispatch of the Sixth Fleet nor thesubstantial reinforcement of forward forces resultedin any semblance of attrition-based damage to forces

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and capabilities, we can nonetheless seeconnections between the physical and psychologicaleffects. In each case, a physical action (shipmovements) had a direct physical effect. The eventwas observed and reported. That direct physicaleffect gave rise to a series of subsequent actions anddecisions, which manifested as changed behavior.The reinforcement of forward forces typically set offsimilar movements of opposing forces to counter ormonitor them, and in decisions by policy makers tofurther reinforce their own forces in the area. In thecase of the Soviets in 1967 and again in 1973, thepsychological effect was evident in the decision not toenter the struggle on behalf of Syria.

However, if we look more closely still at the crises,we can also discern that these reactions to a singletactical or operational level action evoke a chain ofreactions that span all the levels of command andacross multiple arenas.

It should be readily apparent in the discussion ofeach of the rules that effects have both physical andpsychological dimensions. The relationship betweenphysical actions and physical effects is alreadyfamiliar. A bomb is dropped and physical destructionensues. But the central thesis of effects-basedoperations is that physical actions, destructive ornondestructive, kinetic or nonkinetic, can producephysical and psychological effects.

The psychological effects in the decisionmakingprocesses of allies, neutrals, and enemies becomemanifest in their behavior. That is, we can detectthe psychological effect of our actions upon


observers by noting how they react or alter theirbehavior in response.

Actions and EffectsThe rule set and examples outlined above supply ageneral framework for pursuing an effects-basedoperation that is consistent with the model of thecognitive cycle outlined in the preceding chapter(see Figure 37). Yet, they still leave us far from anysort of cause and effect chain.

What were the criteria for choosing a particularaction at any given time during the crises? Thatquestion actually implies two different questions:

• First, what was it in the nature of a specificaction that induced decisionmakers to believethat it would have the desired impact on theother side or upon other observers? How didthey decide, for example, what (to use AdmiralZumwalt’s words) was a low-key response?Such a decision presupposes that we canidentify which aspects of any action observersmight see as low-key and which they would not.If we are to operationalize effects-basedoperations, we must have an idea of whatattributes of our actions will have desirableeffects and then be able to control them so asto obtain those effects.

• Second, how do we choose what effects tocreate? It is clear in the examples that theeffects sought existed at multiple different levelsand in multiple arenas. The basic rule set

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likewise tells us that all of these are interrelatedwith the effects in one arena or leveldetermining the success or failure of those inanother arena or level. Yet, the effectsdemonstrated in the examples were almostuniversally of a general nature and primarily atthe geo-strategic or military-strategic levels.How then do we identify the effects we need tocreate and then link them to the actions neededto create them?

The above suggests the need for a more nuancedunderstanding of both the nature of actions andeffects, especially as the terms apply in the contextboth of the rules sets and of the real-world examplesabove. This is the function of the next chapter.

1The vast majority of these responses were small-scale andlargely utilized those military forces already on-scene or in theregion of the crisis. According to the Blechman and Kaplanstudy, Force without War, this figure stood at 331 as of 1978.As later updated by Siegel and the Center for Naval Analysesusing the same methodology, the figure amounted to morethan 400 crisis responses by U.S. military forces by the endof 1996. Blechman, Barry M. and Stephen S Kaplan. Force withoutWar. Washington, DC; Brookings. 1978. 2Zelikow, Philip D. “Force without War, 1975-1982.” TheJournal of Strategic Studies. March 1984. 3Siegel, Adam. The Use of Naval Forces in the Post War Era:U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps Crisis Response Activity,1946-1990. Alexandria, Virginia; Center for Naval Analyses.1991. 4U.S. Air Force, Air Staff. The United States Air Force and U.S.National Security: A Historical Perspective. Washington, DC;USAF Historical Office. 1991. 5U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency. “Crisis Response.”unpublished paper. 1992.

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6Obviously, if we follow the logic of the cognitive domain, onemust maneuver something that observers can see and musttake into their decisionmaking. Thus, the maneuver to whichwe shall refer is a maneuver of capabilities that achieves itseffect in part from what those capabilities are and in part fromwhere they are and when. Barnett, Roger. Naval War College Review. Spring 2002. 7The author was assigned to the U.S. Sixth Fleet during the1967 and 1970 crises and monitored the Soviet response tothe 1973 crisis from the Navy Field Operational IntelligenceOffice, authoring a series of classified articles on the latter.8Israel had launched an earlier anti-terrorist operation againstthe Jordanian town of Es Sammu in November 1966. 9The Sinai had been de-militarized in 1956 as the requisite forIsraeli withdrawal from territories it occupied in the 1956 war.10Abu-Lughod, Ibraham. The Arab-Israeli Confrontation ofJune 1967: An Arab Perspective. Evanston; NorthwesternUniversity. 1970. pp. 49-51.11Johnson, Lyndon Baines. The Vantage Point: Perspectivesof the Presidency, 1963-1969. New York. 1971. pp. 290-291.12Johnson, p. 294.13The sole subscribers to the force in addition to Britain werethe United States, which had two over-aged destroyers in thePersian Gulf, Australia, which was to send two cruisers, andthe Netherlands, which volunteered to send an officer tocommand the force.Finney, John W. “Backing Reported for Plan to Test AqabaBlockade.” New York Times. June 1, 1967. Page 1, Col 8.14Wilson, Harold. A Personal Record. Boston. 1971. p. 396.15President Johnson first set the American limit at 200 milesfrom the conflict area, then later reduced it to 100 miles. Thesole exception to this limit was the USS Liberty, anintelligence collection ship that was monitoring events fromwaters off the Gaza strip until the Israelis attacked it(ostensibly accidentally) on June 10. Neither side had air orground forces in the area, although the threatened Sovietairlift into Syria would have involved both. Johnson, pp. 298 ff.16New York Times. June 11, 1967.17President Johnson wanted to maneuver the U.S. Sixth Fleetso as to signal the Soviets that the United States wouldrespond, but with a measured military action. Aware thatSoviet intelligence collection ships were monitoring the fleet,he had it reverse course and head toward the Syrian coast,but to avoid alarming the Soviets, he apparently wanted the


ships to proceed at a “normal” cruising speed. However, hemade the mistake of asking his Secretary of Defense RobertMcNamara what a “normal” cruising speed for the fleet wouldbe, and received a reply of 25 knots (about double the normalcruising speed). Johnson, pp. 302-303. 18Nixon, Richard M. RN. The Memoirs of Richard Nixon.Norwalk. 1978. p. 485.19Kissinger, Henry A. White House Years. Boston. 1979. p. 595.20New York Times. June 12, 1967 and June 28, 1967.21Nixon, pp. 483 ff.22New York Times. September 13, 1967.23Kissinger, p. 628.24Kissinger, pp. 629. 25This build up continued on September 23 even as theJordanians began to drive the Syrian forces back across theborder so as to maintain pressure on both the Soviets andtheir Syrian clients. Kissinger, p. 630.26This situation was particularly troublesome to the Egyptians.The cease-fire line of 1967 ran along the course of the SuezCanal, which consequently could not be used. This deprivedEgypt of a substantial source of revenue and foreignexchange and made them dependent on annualcompensation payments from their Arab neighbors, asituation unacceptable to Sadat. Sadat, Anwar As. In Search of Identity, An Autobiography.New York; Harper. 1978. pp. 188 and 215. 27Jordan, in no position to fight, studiously avoided anyinvolvement in these assaults despite heavy pressure fromother Arab states to do so. Kissinger, Henry A. Years of Upheaval. Boston; Little Brown.1980. pp. 490 and 494.28Sobel, Lester A. Israel and the Arabs: The October 1973War. New York: Facts on File, Inc. 1974. pp. 90-111.29The Soviets had had some advance notice of the operationand on October 5, scrambled visiting ships from Egyptianports and evacuated civilian personnel from the country. Kissinger. Upheaval. p. 466.30Nixon, p. 514.31Zumwalt, Elmo. On Watch. Washington, DC; Zumwalt. 1980.p. 435.32Zumwalt, p. 442ff.

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33This included a helicopter carrier battle group and a seriesof additional submarines increasing the total to more than 80,a total that ultimately included some 96 units.Zumwalt, p. 442.34Israelyan, Victor. Inside the Kremlin During the Yom KippurWar. University Park; PSU Press. 1995. pp. 169-170.35This was certainly underlined in the 1967 Arab-Israeli Warby President Johnson’s use of the movements of the SixthFleet to signal U.S. resolve to oppose any direct Sovietintervention in Syria. But, it was equally apparent in the WhiteHouse order to send an aircraft from the Sixth Fleet into Israelto suggest combined Israeli-American planning during the1970 crisis, and in the movements of the Sixth Fleet, the alertof the 82nd Airborne Division, and the increase in the overallDefense Condition (DEFCON) during the 1973 crisis.Kissinger. Upheaval. pp. 469ff. 36Kissinger. White House Years. p. 614.37Since the major units of each fleet in all cases were underclose and continuous scrutiny by the other, any change inactivity, size, or location were promptly reported to higherlevels of command if not directly to the respective nationalcommand authorities. 38Edward Luttwak uses the term suasion to encompass theidea that a single action can be either persuasive ordissuasive, depending on who is observing the action. Luttwak, Edward. Strategic Power, Military Capabilities, andPolitical Utility. Georgetown. 1976. p. 26. 39The designation Eskadra signified an operationalorganization that was theoretically more than a squadron andless than a fleet, but which might be expanded as much asnecessary to cope with an evolving situation, in the manner ofa U.S. task force. http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/agency/mf-med.htm.John Pike. September 16, 2002. 40One variant of this strategy was the placement of the U.S.Sixth Fleet in an operations area south of the island of Cretein both the 1967 and 1973 crises. That position, althoughaway from the immediate conflict area, was also astride theflight path of the Soviet aircraft resupplying Egypt and Syria. Howe, Jonathan. Multicrises: Sea Power and Global Politicsin the Missile Age. Cambridge. 1971. pp. 57ff. 41Then Vice Admiral Isaac Kidd, U.S. Navy, commented thathe was so concerned with this possibility that, during theheight of 1970 crisis, he put his flagship alongside the Sovietflagship. In this position, missiles or bombs aimed at onewould be sure to strike both as a demonstration that he had


no intention of initiating hostilities. Kidd, Isaac C. ADM. “View from the Bridge of the Sixth FleetFlagship.” Proceedings, February 1972. Interview with theauthor. November 10, 1972. p. 31.42From the Egyptian and Syrian standpoint, the desperationstemmed from their apparent inability to halt the Israeliadvance on their respective capitals. From the Israelistandpoint, it was desperation born of logistics and theinability to replace the arms and munitions expended withouta massive American airlift. These factors became keyingredients in the superpowers’ ability to force both sides tothe negotiating table. Sobel. Israel. p. 97.43We have to be careful to add a caveat that the impact of themaneuver derived in part from the fact that the forces usedcould have opened fire and inflicted destruction. 44Blechman and Kaplan, p. 271.45Cable, Sir James. Gunboat Diplomacy, The Sea in ModernStrategy. London. 1971. p. 76.46These were primarily carrier air operations on the side of theAmericans in all three crises, but included air resupplyoperations by the Soviets in 1967 and air resupply by bothAmericans and Soviets in 1973. These interactions wereusually dissimilar in that the Soviet reaction to a carrierlaunch cycle was usually to report the launch and track theaircraft, and the American reaction to resupply flights wassimilarly to track and report them. Both actions, however,carried an implication of an ability to attack or otherwise haltthe air action if need be.47This was especially true since these tattletales were notjudged to have a combat life of more than a few minutes afterhostilities began. This tended to make the entire engagementa precipitous “battle of the first salvo.” Kidd, p. 32.48Kissinger. Upheaval. pp. 579ff. 49Then VADM Isaac Kidd. Interview with the author. November10, 1972.

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CHAPTER 6

The Challenge ofComplexity

Perhaps the most striking aspect of both thecognitive cycle and the foregoing rule sets is the

sheer complexity of what we are trying to do inplanning and executing effects-based operations.Indeed, we can delineate three distinct areas ofcomplexity: orchestrating the right actions to createthe behavioral effects we want to produce;determining which cascades of direct and indirecteffects are likely to stem from our actions; anddetermining which effects we have actually created.The challenge, moreover, is not only to deal withthese complexities, but also to exploit them to ouradvantage in the manner of the “edge of chaos”discussed in Chapter 3.

The historical examples of combat and crisisoperations demonstrate that this challenge,however daunting it may appear, can be met. Greatleaders have always been able to manage this featto some degree. That is one reason why they areconsidered “great.” Our challenge is to figure outhow to apply new technology and the network-centric thinking of the Information Age to this task.To this end, we must dissect the complexities

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involved and study how leaders have dealt withthose complexities in the past.

Complexity One: From Actions toEffectsAt the heart of the concept of effects-basedoperations is the idea that our actions can affect theoutcomes of an interaction. At least in a generalsense, we can certainly see this to be the case in thethree crises reviewed as well as in earlier examplesfrom Trafalgar and Midway. Yet, implicit in the idea ofplanning and executing an effects-based operationis the notion that the link between the actions weexecute and the effects they create is more than ageneral loose relationship, and that with specific,well-chosen actions we can drive specific effects totake place.

The problem with this supposition is the complexityof the task involved. The rule set in the previouschapter makes it clear that we are treating a processin which the actions and effects in question areinterrelated across four levels (tactical, operational,military-strategic, and geo-strategic) and across atleast three arenas (political-diplomatic, military, andeconomic) and are cumulative over time.

If we consider this process in the context of theMiddle East crises, it also becomes apparent thatthe actions we use to create effects can be of nearlyinfinite variety.1 Similarly, the review of the cognitivecycle indicates that the way in which these actions,past and present, will be perceived varies from oneobserver to the next. Finally, the rule set cautions


that any action will be perceived by and have someeffect on multiple and often competing observers.The task of translating actions into effects clearly isnot impossible. After all, this is exactly what theparticipants in each of the three Middle East criseswere doing.2 How did they do it?

If we think about what went on in the crises, thedecisionmakers routinely accepted a degree ofuncertainty in their calculations. This is very differentfrom the certitude we normally think of in a precisionstrike whose outcome is denominated solely interms of bomb damage and levels of physicaldestruction. They accepted the complexitiesinvolved in inducing the desired behavior and, in asense, heeded the Aristotelian injunction to be“satisfied with the degree of precision that the natureof the subject permits, and not to seek exactnesswhen only approximation is possible.”3 In essence,they bounded the complexity by looking at andchoosing certain kinds of actions that were likely toproduce certain kinds of effects so as to find aworkable answer.

It seems clear that the starting point for answeringthese most fundamental of effects-based questionsis to understand better what we mean by the termsactions and effects, and how they apply in the real-world operational context that we have laid out in theprinciples of effects-based operations. The cognitivecycle gives us a hint of how to proceed: that theimpact of actions and the nature of effects both arethe result of how observers perceive, understand,make sense, judge, and decide. It is this humandimension of interactions, whether in peace of in

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war, that we must address if we are to understandeither the nature of actions or the effects that wemight create.

The Nature of ActionsIn discussing the cognitive cycle, we noted that theimpact of a physical action on an observer stemmednot only from what was done, but also from everyobservable aspect of how it was done. It seems clearthen that our concept of the nature of actions mustproceed from one basic question: what aspects of anaction are observable?

As we saw in the crisis reactions, the number ofpermutations in actions that an observer mighttheoretically see could be nearly infinite. However,such an open-ended approach is of little value indefining a working concept. What we must do is tobound this infinity by thinking of an action in terms ofa particular set of variables, the sum of which will beobserved, interpreted, and understood by anobserver in their cognitive processes.

To plan an action, we must consider all thosevariables that might describe that object or eventand then determine what part of that descriptionmight reach one or another observer through theinformation domain of sensors and informationsystems that each has created (see Figure 38).Notice that we have not said that this multi-faceteddescription of an action equates to the observer’sperception. The perception is the initial impact thata particular set of action variables will have on aspecific individual with a specific background in a


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specific set of circumstances or situation. Ourconcern for the moment is more limited. It is todetermine what the variables associated with thewhat and how of an action might be.

If we think about the physical actions that took placeduring the battles of Midway and Trafalgar and in thethree Middle East crises, we can trace at least sixdifferent major observables that describe both whatwas done and how it was done (see Figure 39).

1. What

The starting point is obviously the question of “whatis done,” the nature of the physical actionundertaken. In other words, what is the object orevent to be observed? This physical action may bethe destruction of forces and capabilities as in a


What is Done How it is DoneWhat Scale

• Force Used• Impact

With What

Scope• Geographic• Operational

Timing• Speed• Duration• Synchronicity

Visibility

Figure 39. Observable Attributes of Physical Actions

traditional warfare model. It may equally be aterrorist bombing. However, as we have seen in thecase of the Battle of Midway, the action need notinvolve destruction. It may be as simple as being ata particular place at the right time, as the aircraftcarrier Yorktown was at Midway. Or it may be amovement toward a place as in the case ofmaneuver, a recurring feature of each of the MiddleEast crises. Or, it may be what is not done andwhere a unit is not present, as demonstrated by thedeliberate efforts by the United States to keepforces out of the crisis area that characterized allthree Middle East crises.

For the opponent observer/decisionmaker, this“what” is the aspect of the stimulus that might beexpected to provoke one series of shapingquestions: What did my adversary do? What actionwas taken or what capability was destroyed? Howwill it affect me or how might I have to alter mycurrent course of action to deal with it? The “what”encompasses most of the reactions upon whichnodal targeting or a carefully crafted target list mightfocus. But the “what” also extends to militarymaneuvers or simple presence that might induceobservers to ask questions such as: Where did theforce interpose itself? What action did it take andhow might that action inhibit my current and futureoperations? Moreover, these kinds of observationsare not restricted to the states and governmentsdoing the observing, but would apply equally to non-state actors, such as terrorist organizations. This isespecially true if the physical means of such groupsare limited to the point of offering few targets subjectto physical destruction.

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Because the observers in question will not belimited to adversaries and would-be opponents, theactions will also be seen by and affect thedecisions of friends and neutrals, both passive andactive players, as well as our own public. Thesequestions might take a somewhat differentdirection, but focus on a similar end: How does theaction affect me and the course of action I amcurrently pursuing with regard to the United States,or the region, or my neighbors?

All of the above considerations were reflected in theresponses to the Middle East crises, but there wassomething more as well. In the 1967 War, PresidentJohnson was concerned not only with what the SixthFleet was doing (heading toward Syria), but alsohow it was doing it (its transit speed). This interest isunderstandable in the context of the crisis becauseof the signal that the Fleet’s speed would carry to theSoviets. However, it would also have been importantto the White House because the length of time it tookfor the transit determined the timing for the nextdiplomatic and political actions the United Statesmight have to take.

This distinction between what an action is and how itis executed is the basis for the five remainingelements of an action.

2. How

The first and perhaps most visible element of this“how” is the nature of the power used to undertakethe action. The choice of power will tell observers agreat deal both about the action itself and the


direction of any continuing chain of interactions, bothessential parts of the sensemaking anddecisionmaking processes. Obviously, it makes agreat deal of difference whether an action orstimulus is solely or primarily political, economic, ormilitary. And, it also matters what kind of militaryforce is used or threatened.

The choice of military force, for example “boots onthe ground,” might presage a willingness to take risksor to undertake an extended commitment, while arelatively low cost threat, such as a missile strike,might signal a lack of commitment. The messagesent by this choice can be either positive or negativedepending upon the situation and opponent. “Bootson the ground” in one circumstance may indicate anissue so important as to be worth risking substantialcasualties. In another situation, reliance on groundforces could signal an opportunity for the opponent toadopt a damage infliction strategy as part of anasymmetric attack on our will. Similarly, a resort tostandoff precision missiles may signal a lack ofwillingness to take casualties, or by denying anyexploitable vulnerability, it may indicate a ready abilityto act again because the operation can be sustainedwithout appreciable political fallout.

In the Middle East crises, the forces of choice werenaval units, airborne divisions, and transport aircraft.The naval forces in particular were applicable to alocal face-off. They offered credible, forcible optionssuch as putting Marines ashore and air strikes, butthey could also be maneuvered to support political-diplomatic efforts. In all three cases, one key to thisuse in crisis resolution was that each action taken

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would be immediately reported to the opposing sideby the tattletales observing both sides. Similarly, theactivity of the 82nd Airborne Division and its Sovietcounterparts were closely monitored and reported,as was the overall alert status of military forces, andparticularly strategic nuclear forces, on both sides.

We can equally turn this around and look at thequestion from the perspective of the types ofoperations or weapons (kinds of force) used byterrorists. The hijacking of airliners with the eventualrelease of the passengers and crew, as in the 1970crisis, might be expected to create one reaction. Thehijacking of similar airliners and their use withpassengers and crew as gigantic missiles in theWorld Trade Towers attack conveys a differentmagnitude and character threat, while their use todeliver a weapon of mass effect against a large citywould convey yet another level and character threat.

3. Scale

The scale of the action has two dimensions: thescale of the effort involved in the action and thescale of the impact. Together they set thequantitative size of the problem the enemy observeror decisionmaker must deal with.

Obviously, a single missile might destroy a singletarget and create an effect, but it seems evident that adifferent scale of effort, using 100 missiles on thetarget, will create a very different impression upon theobserver, for good or bad. Similarly, using 100 missilesagainst a single target has a very different significancefrom their use against 100 different targets.


Moreover, the effect created by the same scale ofeffort will vary from one observer to the next andfrom one situation to the next. Was a 100-missilestrike a disproportionate response? Was it sufficientto induce shock and to deter future actions or is agreater scale of effort and impact required? Would astrike by a single missile against a single targetconvey an impression of weakness or of confidencein an ability to detect and strike exactly the righttarget at exactly the right time?

From the standpoint of friendly or neutral observers,these same questions would contribute to definingthe credibility of both a threat and a response. Theirobservations might reassure them as to the viabilityof U.S. commitments, or define the extent of theproblem they would face in trying to challenge us.While these questions underline how separate thequestion of scale is from that of focus, they alsopoint to the need to tailor the scale to a particular setof observers and a particular situation.

The impact of scale on the Middle East interactionswas very evident. In all three of the crises, militaryforces, and the naval forces in particular, offeredpotential variations along at least three differentcontinua: the scale or numbers of units added orsubtracted; the distance from the crisis area; and thelevel and type of activity undertaken. All threevariables figured prominently in each of the crises,but the choices as to which to emphasize hinged ona risk analysis. Moving a force closer to the crisisarea or increasing the aggressiveness of its actionsappear to have been considered riskier alternativesthan increasing numbers, with the former used only

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where the very short time-span of interactions left noother military alternative. In fact, the navalconfrontations in the 1970 and 1973 crises weresome of the most massive uses of Soviet andAmerican military power during the 40 years of theCold War.

However, there was a second reflection of thisconcern regarding the scale over the span of thethree crises. Not only was there concern with thereinforcement and counter-reinforcement of navalunits during the crises, but also as planning carriedover from one crisis to the next. Thus, the number ofships involved in the confrontations grewsubstantially from the 1967 crisis, to the 1970 crisis,to the 1973 crisis. Indeed, the scale and pace ofsuch a build-up was deemed so critical by theSoviets that they set up a system of contingencydeclarations for transiting the Bosporus andDardenelles, which endured for more than a decadeafter the crises.

4. Scope

Scope encompasses two dimensions, onegeographic and the other operational.

• Geographic scope defines the physicalbattlespace within which the foe may beobliged to act or within which he may bevulnerable. The broader the area is, the greaterhis problem is likely to be. For example, abarrage of 100 missiles aimed at a single targetwill be observed to present a differentchallenge from a similar scale strike directed at


100 separate targets spread across the breadthof a country. The former would permit the foe toconcentrate his defenses around one or morekey targets. The latter would put him in thequandary of either having to dilute the defenseso as to try to defend all potential targets, orconcentrating it around the wrong target andleaving the others without any defense at all.

However, there is another aspect to geographicscope: where can forces be brought to bear?The impact of this aspect of geographic scopeof operations was most apparent in the abortiveAnglo-American attempt to break the Egyptianblockade of the Strait of Tiran in 1967. Whenthe use of British naval forces was foreclosedby Arab economic pressure on Britain, theUnited States and its would-be coalition partnerswere unable to get sufficient forces to the scenein time to meet an Israeli deadline, and theeffort failed. In essence, the Arabs managed toconstruct a challenge, the geographic scope ofwhich exceeded the abilities of the Americanand Australian forces.

A variant of this challenge occurred in the airresupply efforts of both the Soviets andAmericans during the 1973 crisis. In the Sovietcase, warships armed with surface-to-airmissiles stationed at the Hamamet anchorageoff Tunisia could readily attack the Americanaircraft resupplying Israel as they passedthrough the air corridor in the Strait of Sicily, aroute dictated by the refusal of America’sEuropean allies to grant overflight permission.

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Similarly on the American side, theconcentration of the Sixth Fleet carriers offCrete and Cyprus put them athwart the routesthat Soviet transports needed to take to reachEgypt and Syria.

• Operational scope defines the nature of thebattlespace or the warfare environments (air,sea, undersea, ground, space) where the foemight be challenged. However, it simultaneouslydefines those warfare areas where the foe is notlikely to be challenged and that, therefore, mightprovide opportunities to counter or balance thethreats that can be posed. For example, aninability to deal with land or sea mines mightsignal a way of slowing or stopping a “boots onthe ground” challenge. In general, the greaterthe number of warfare environments subject toa credible challenge, the more stressing thethreat is likely to be seen to be by the would-beadversary. A complex, multi-dimensional threatwill simply tax an adversary’s assets andcommand and control to a greater degree, andit is more likely to keep him guessing as towhere the full weight of any attack or maneuverwill be placed.

The influence of operational scope wasdemonstrated in the Soviet-American face-offs in allthree crises. Both sides were largely limited to navalforces for the confrontation because neither had afrontier with the parties involved, nor air bases ortroops in the area.4 However, the operational scopeof what the respective forces were able to do differedgreatly. The American force with its carrier air power


and amphibious capability had a far wideroperational scope, one that encompassed a fullrange of air operations from surveillance to strike atsea and ashore. The Soviets had the advantage ofanti-ship missiles mounted on its heaviercombatants as well as missile-firing submarines. Inthe aggregate, these different advantages tended tocancel each other out, which is perhaps one reasonthat the contest became primarily one of numbers.

5. Timing

Timing encompasses three different dimensions:speed; duration; and what might be called“synchronicity.”

• Speed is the ability to execute an action orreaction rapidly enough to create a desiredeffect. This may mean creating an operationaltempo that is so overwhelmingly fast as to allowno coherent response or as to induce shock orchaos. Or it may mean being able to reactquickly enough to changes in either the warfareenvironment or the political arena to foreclosecourses of action that the foe might wish totake. Both these ideas are reflected in theconcept of “speed of command.” Thus, for thefoe, speed defines one set of problems withtiming actions for maximum effect and anotherin coping with the pace of operations. Theformer portends foreclosure of desired coursesof action and the latter holds the potential forshock and chaos. The closing hours of both the 1967 and 1973crises present a clear example of this

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requirement for speed in creating an effect. Ineach case, the effect created by an overallnational action hinged on the ability of the SixthFleet to demonstrate American resolve by itsmaneuvers, and the ability of the Sovietintelligence collectors to immediately detectthose maneuvers and report them directly toMoscow. A similar but less pressing exampleoccurred in the 1970 crisis when U.S. airborneunits in Germany were put on alert at least inpart because such an alert would be speedilyreported to Soviet Intelligence.5

• Duration, or the period of time over which anoperation is or can be sustained, defines howlong a foe might have to endure an action, andby extension, whether he or she can hope tooutlast it. An action that can only be initiatedonce or that cannot be repeated very ofteninvites the foe to “ride it out” before returning toprevious behavior, whereas one that has nosuch limitation invites a conclusion that thepressure is not going to end without a changein behavior. The build-up of Soviet and American navalforces in the Mediterranean in each of theMiddle East crises was at least partially directedat convincing the opponent and its clients of awillingness to “stick it out.” Despite any efforts tolimit access, the ships could be maintained onstation virtually indefinitely and if necessary,resupplied from home waters.6 In a largerdimension, for at least the Sixth Fleet, there wasalso the history of continuous operations in thearea since 1948. There was no expectation on


the part of either the Soviets or their clients thatthe American force might be withdrawn, only aquestion as to where it would operate, in whatnumbers, and with what capability.

• Synchronicity, or the ability to cause actions tooccur at exactly the right time or in exactly theright sequence to achieve a disproportionateimpact, defines the level of difficulty of themilitary problem a would-be foe faces. Thewider the diversity of closely timed operationsthe foe might face, the more difficult it will be forhim to counter them and the more likely it isthey will result in a cascade of problems for theobserver that he will be unable to control.

The Soviet anti-carrier exercise that took placein the closing days of the 1973 crisis (ademonstration of the Soviet Fleet’s capacity tolaunch a sudden and coordinated missile strikethat could incapacitate or sink all the U.S.carriers in the Mediterranean) is certainly onedemonstration of synchronicity, and oneobviously calculated to have more than justtactical significance. However, suchsynchronicity is also apparent in the timing ofSixth Fleet actions to coincide with notesexchanged between Moscow and Washington,as well as in the alerts to airborne forces onboth sides.

6. Visibility

As the diagram of the cognitive process suggests,any action that is observed, whether it is intended tobe or not, and whether it is part of a particular

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effects-based plan or not, will create some effect.Conversely, any action that is not observed, nomatter how carefully planned and orchestrated itmay be, will create no psychological effect.

The visibility of actions, whether directly or throughsensors and information systems including themedia, is key. If the foe or local audience cannotsee the scale, scope, and timing of our actions(including “virtual” actions) or cannot even get areport of the actions in a manner that is timelyenough to enter his decisionmaking process, thenthey will have no impact beyond their attritionvalue, if any. For example, a virtual action thatcannot be seen or evaluated by the observer islikely either not to enter into his calculations at allor, perhaps, to be dismissed as a hoax. But that isnot all. If the dimensions of our actions aremisreported and misperceived, the observer mayreact in a way that is very different from what wasintended. Or he may overreact, a particularlydangerous prospect when confronting a foe armedwith weapons of mass destruction. Knowing whatthe foe or other observers and, by extension theirindividual surveillance or other collection systems,are likely to see becomes a critical factor in effects-based planning.

While there is clearly a need to appreciate whatobservers are likely to see and react to, there is alsoan opportunity in considering the visibility of ouractions because it provides one more variable thatcan be manipulated and controlled to create thedesired effect. If our knowledge of the observer’ssensor system and how it operates is sufficient, for


example, we may be able to orchestrate our actionsso as to control what is observed and when.

These factors were evident in the use of navalforces to signal intentions to the Soviets.Presidents Johnson and Nixon were very muchaware not only that U.S. maneuvers were beingclosely monitored by the Soviets, but also of whatwould be reported and how fast it would reach theSoviet decisionmakers in Moscow. Thus, eachpresident was able to use the maneuvers of thefleet with considerable finesse. However, the samevisibility was conferred on the reinforcementsentering the Mediterranean. Soviet movementsthrough the Bosporus were to some degreesignaled several days in advance by thecontingency declarations for warship transits, butthen were confirmed when the ships making thetransit were directly observed. Similarly, U.S.forces held in the Atlantic became visible, andtherefore became elements in the confrontationwhen they transited the Strait of Gibraltar into theMediterranean, where they were equally monitoredby the Soviet intelligence collectors.

We need to expand this focus further. Both theUnited States and the Soviets had large andsophisticated surveillance and intelligence collectionsystems to detect changes and relay information todecisionmakers. This was not the case for the localnations nor was it necessarily true for the allies ofthe two superpowers. Typically, the surveillancesystems of the local states did not extend very far offtheir coasts and their intelligence collection waslargely limited to human intelligence that was often

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late. Thus, news of movements or other actionscould not be locally ascertained. While this mighthave permitted the concealment of military effortsalmost at will, it had a down side. In each of the threecrises, false reporting of U.S. military action insupport of Israel, e.g. reports of U.S. carrier aircraftparticipating in the initial air strikes of the 1967 war,could not be confirmed or denied by trusted localsources and, thus, spread wildly.

Together, these six attributes constitute a list of thevariables inherent in any military action. Stateddifferently, they constitute the aspects of our physicalactions that may be orchestrated so as to create adesired physical or psychological effect and producea particular behavior.7 In essence, they provide ayardstick against which we can begin to measure theactions that we might want to execute in order tocreate a particular effect.

Effects: To Do What?We earlier defined effect as “a result or impactcreated by the application of military or other power.”Most discussions of effects-based operations seemto focus on very specific actions being orchestratedto create very specific effects. On the surface,pursuing this correlation would seem like a logicalway to proceed. After all, effects-based operationsrevolve about the assumption of a causal linkbetween a given action and a given outcome or,stated differently, between a stimulus and aresponse. Indeed, this same assumption is at theroot of our expectations for a higher order, thirdeffects-based level of combat efficiency. Nor is this


all. The sheer complexity of the interactionsdescribed in the previous rule set highlight theimpossible scale of the challenge we would face intrying to predict an exact link between actions andreactions at any but a purely tactical attrition-basedlevel at any one level of conflict. And it seems nearlyimpossible to do so across the whole multi-level,multi-arena, multi-actor interaction described muchless in a manner dynamic enough to be able to dealwith a changing battlefield situation.

Unfortunately, this relationship between an action,however carefully crafted, and an effect can neverbe reduced to a simple cause and effect logic chain.As we could see in the cognitive cycle, there are toomany variables involved in the process of movingfrom perception, to decision, to discernible behaviorand the process is, thus, too complex to be renderedinto such a neat chain.

At the root of all of this complexity lies afundamental reality. Effects-based operations areabout the human dimension of conflict. Theyrevolve around the interactions between two ormore of the most quintessential of complexadaptive systems: human decisionmakers andhuman organizations. The behavior of complexadaptive systems is, by definition, nonlinear.Indeed, it is exactly this human-based nonlinearitythat we are trying to exploit in our effects-basedoperations. However, the nonlinearity implies thatany link between an action and the subsequentbehavior of human decisionmakers cannot beentirely predicted.8 Thus, the cause and effectlinkages between a particular stimulus and a

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particular response on any but an immediatetactical level are (and are likely to remain) neitherclear nor quantifiable. At Midway, for example,despite the United States’ ability to break Japanesecodes, no one on the American side could havepredicted either VADM Nagumo’s exact reaction tothe sighting of the U.S.S. Yorktown or thesubsequent chain of events. This is true eventhough in retrospect we can discern a clearstimulus and response chain.

If we cannot expect to trace or predict a clear, onefor one, cause and effect relationship betweenactions and human behavior, and if effects-basedoperations are by their very nature about exactly thishuman dimension of conflict, then how are we toplan and execute effects-based operations?

One way of dealing with this nonlinear challenge iswhat might be termed the behavioralist approach.The hope here is essentially that we might use theincreasing computer power of the informationrevolution to profile the opposing decisionmakers soprecisely as to be able to predict their reactions tothe stimuli posed by any particular action.9 But thereis a drawback. A profile of sufficient depth to predictreactions would require such a depth of knowledge,not only about the decisionmakers themselves butalso of all the factors impacting on their decisions, asto render it highly unlikely that the knowledge wouldbe available when needed. Developing andmaintaining such a database, or even simplyobtaining the depth and quality of inputs neededwould be a Herculean task, even with modern datamining technologies. Understanding how to put the

data together in a model that took into account all oftheir implications in the context of an alien culturewould be still more difficult. Moreover, the resultingprofiles, whether computer assisted or not, wouldonly be as good as the data and informationprogrammed into them. Finally, if this task weremultiplied across all the levels of potentialdecisionmakers in all the nations and non-stateactors we might encounter, the scope simply of thecollection effort required would rapidly reach animpossible scale.

A variant of this behavioral approach is the idea ofusing game playing theory.10 That is, if we couldreplicate the conditions of the interactionsthemselves and, with computer assistance in theform of perhaps hundreds or thousands of virtualruns, and if we could reduce these interactions tosome predictive model, we would be able to produceat least a set of probabilities for certain actionsproducing certain effects. This approach, of course,assumes that the game play from player to player isconstant enough to model reliably.

Both of the above approaches certainly cancontribute to an understanding of the observersand the processes involved in moving from actionto effect to reaction. And, both offer realpossibilities as analytical and decisionmaking tools.Yet, the real message seems to be that anyapproach that focuses on tracing an exact linkbetween a given action and a very specific effect isdoomed to failure. Herein lies a paradox. Thenonlinearity of human reactions that makes theassessment of the cause and effect link so difficult

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is precisely what gives effects-based operationstheir disproportionate impact. How then are we toexploit the very nonlinearity that plagues us?

We can begin by accepting that the interactions weseek to trace are fundamentally nonlinear. Theconflict we seek to portray is very much a clashbetween complex adaptive systems and there arereal limits to what we can predict in such clashes.Professor Alan Beyerchen has noted that much ofthe enduring value in Clausewitz’s writings stemsfrom the fact that “he understands that seeking exactanalytical solutions does not fit the nonlinear realityof the problems posed by war, and hence that ourability to predict the course and outcome of anygiven conflict is severely limited.”11 How do we applythese injunctions to looking at effects?

Let us return to the Midway example. We have saidthat we could not predict the exact nature and timingof Vice Admiral Nagumo’s response to the sightingof the Yorktown. But, we can try to bound theproblem. For example, the American operationalcommander, Vice Admiral Spruance, and his staffcould understand very well both that the Japanesewould be looking for his ships, and that Nagumo’smost likely reaction to a sighting would be to launchaircraft for a naval battle. This is to say, he had agood general understanding of the most likely impactof an American stimulus and of the most likelyJapanese response. He might also have surmisedthat the arrival of the torpedo planes would causethe Japanese carriers to maneuver so radically as tobe unable to launch or recover aircraft. And, hemight have predicted as well that, if that arrival


occurred before that of the dive-bombers, theJapanese Combat Air Patrol (CAP) would probablydescend to intercept the torpedo planes and leavetheir protective CAP stations uncovered.

Thus, even though the exact chain of eventsremained unknown and unknowable, Spruancecould have used his understanding both of theoperational situation and of the fundamental militarychoices his counterpart would face to deduce aseries of most likely actions and reactions. That is,he could roughly predict at least a limited cause andeffect chain. If he had also had adequate and timelyinformation on the location and movements ofJapanese forces, both air and sea, and of the timingand sequencing of Japanese air operations, hemight have been able to exploit this generalunderstanding to create intentionally the effects thatthe sighting and the disjointed American attackactually created by pure chance.

The Midway example suggests that we should nottry to think of effects-based operations in terms offinding and exploiting very specific actions-to-effects linkages, but to look instead at a moregeneral relationship between the potential actionsdescribed by the variables and various kinds ofeffects. That is, we should bound the problem of apotentially infinite number of effects in the sameway as we did the potentially infinite number ofactions. To do this, we might parse the infinite rangeof possibilities into a finite set of categories that cangive us some idea of what kinds of effects that wemight seek or that we might produce in a given setof circumstances. Then, from the categories, we

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might proceed to an understanding of how thedifferent influences that each represents togetheradd up to an overall effect able to alter or shape thebehavior of foes, friends, and neutrals.

Kinds of Effects

In the Middle East crises, as in earlier historicalexamples, we have seen recognizable evidence ofcertain kinds of effects. The destruction of forces andcapabilities at the center of attrition-basedoperations was certainly one such effect either in theform of destroying a specific force or target, or in thatof the gradual wearing down of an opponent’s forcesand capabilities. Similarly, the chaos manifest in theFrench and Spanish fleets at Trafalgar would appearto be another kind of effect, and the shock thatrippled through France in May 1940 yet another.Finally, the maneuvers of naval forces in the threeMiddle East crises from 1967 to 1973 illustrate whatmight be termed “foreclosure” as yet another kind ofeffect. We can begin to discern the outlines of sixdifferent categories (see Figure 40).

Although the effects in these categories areproduced by some physical action, the effectsthemselves fall into two general areas: those effectsthat are predominantly physical in nature, and thosethat are primarily psychological. The physical effectsalter behavior by dealing with the physical means ofan observer to wage a war or to carry out a courseof action. The psychological effects alter behavior byaffecting the cognitive processes of the observers soas to shape will. The physical effects are focused ondestruction and the incapacitation of forces and


capabilities, including by rendering an observerincapable of mounting a coherent action (chaos).The psychological effects span the domain ofreason, the rational decisionmaking process, andthe domain of belief, the emotional impacts ondecisionmaking. They lap over into the physicaldomain where they induce chaos, but focus onforeclosure, shock, and psychological attrition.

1. Destruction

Destroying an opponent’s physical capability to dosomething is clearly an effect. In fact, thedestruction of an opponent’s forces and capabilitiesis the cardinal physical effect specifically because itmay be successful regardless of whether itproduces a psychological effect. If we kill the foe ordestroy his physical means of resisting, his optionsfor responding will be reduced to nearly nothing, nomatter how great his will to resist. This, as we have

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Physical Psychological

(Reason/Belief)Destruction Chaos / Entropy

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• Passive

• Active

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Figure 40. Kinds of Effects

seen, was the underlying desperate logic ofsymmetric attrition warfare.

While this logic has been challenged by theasymmetric warfare focused on will, destruction hasa real and continuing validity. This is especially trueat the tactical level where there is no time to considerwhether an opponent’s behavior has changed andevery reason to suppose that a behavior that haschanged once can just as rapidly change back againso long as the means to attack continue to exist. Insuch a kill or be killed combat situation, the physicalelimination of an opposing unit or force is definitive.Once destroyed, the opposing unit or force can nolonger pose a threat.

Yet, we also pointed to another understanding ofdestruction. Destruction of capabilities may be ameans to an end, or a way of enabling other kindsof effects to be created. It may force a re-evaluation of a course of action. It may shock. Itmay wear down resistance. It may lead to othereffects or be the agent for other effects bothphysical and psychological.

2. Physical Attrition

Although on the tactical level of conflict, thedestruction of an opponent’s force or capabilitiesmay be carried out in a single operation, suchdestruction on the operational or military strategiclevel is likely to involve a campaign or series ofcampaigns.12 The focus would shift from physicallykilling the enemy in a tactical engagement togradually wearing down enemy capabilities in


repeated operations.13 Although the physical result ofattrition may be the same as that of destruction (theelimination of all or part of a foe’s capability to wagewar), the character of the effect is very differentbecause of the longer time that it takes to produce aresult. Among other things, this slower, longer timeline permits the foe to assess what is going on andperhaps to adapt to the challenge and deal with it,thus extending the timeline of the interaction.

This longer timeline also provides more opportunityfor psychological factors to operate and means thatany psychological impact is likely to revolve aboutweariness or a calculation of the futility of furtheraction rather than a sudden collapse. Likedestruction, physical attrition of an opponent’s forcesand means of waging war can be an agent forgenerating other psychological kinds of effects.

The role of physical attrition in the three Middle Eastcrises is most apparent in the 1973 war. Instead ofa 4-year long grinding down of an opponent’scapacity to wage war as in the World Wars, in the1973 war, it only took 1 week for the belligerents toexhaust nearly their entire supply of ammunition,tanks, aircraft, and missiles, and to then turn to theUnited States and the Soviet Union to compensatefor the shortfall. President Sadat, in particular,appears to have realized that Israel, even withAmerican arms, could not support a long warbecause of its manpower limitations, and used thisto push Israel into negotiations, a different form ofbehavior modification.14

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3. Chaos

Where destruction and physical attrition veryobviously fall under the heading of a physical effect,chaos is both physical and psychological in nature.Chaos works from the premise that rendering a foeunable to react coherently or to control the forces hehas available, or throwing those forces into disarray,is tantamount to destroying capabilities. Suchconfusion created in the minds of decisionmakersconveys that they are unable to command or fighttheir forces effectively. This idea is reflected in theconcept of entropy-based warfare. The greater thedegree of confusion and disorganization that can beinduced into an enemy’s decisionmaking process,the less able the foe will be to use the capabilities hehas effectively and efficiently. This was clearlydemonstrated in the Trafalgar example.

In this respect, the effect of chaos embodies someelements of both physical and psychological effects.Psychological factors (disorientation, confusion,fear) yield a physical result, the inability to useotherwise applicable forces and capabilities,however the cause of this effect is inherently rootedin behavior, the inability of commanders andsubordinates to handle the pace and scope ofoperations required to deal with the challenge.

The drawback here is that, unlike the effects ofdestruction and attrition, such induced chaos is not apermanent state. Thus, the effect is not definitiveand the capabilities can be brought to bear again ifever and whenever the foe is able restore order.


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4. Foreclosure

A recurring facet of all three of the Middle East crisisreactions at all levels was the idea of somehowcurtailing an opponent’s options or foreclosingpotential courses of action. Such foreclosure,indeed, is a fundamental tenet of positional ormaneuver warfare. It can derive from the destructionof the capabilities that might be needed to pursue acertain course of action, or from their being renderedsomehow inapplicable. But as numerous crisisreactions over the past 50 years have pointed out, itmay also derive from maneuvering forces so as toput a particular capability at risk and thus invalidatethe would-be enemy’s risk assumptions underlying aparticular course of action.

In the crisis histories that we have reviewed, we candistinguish two different types of foreclosure:

• Active Foreclosure. Most of the examples offoreclosure encountered in the discussionfocused on what might be termed activeforeclosure, the use of military forces to block acourse of action that a foe has already initiated.This may take the form of a modern version ofpositional warfare in which a military force isinterposed between the would-be enemy andhis objective. This approach was very muchevident in all three of the Middle East crises of1967-1973, but has also been present at alllevels of peace enforcement operations in the1990s most demonstrably in Bosnia andKosovo. Foreclosure may take the form of athreat of a response so massive or dire as toinvalidate all previous risk assessments.


• Passive Foreclosure. Another less obviousaspect of foreclosure is the ongoing balance ofmilitary power that brings stability to a givenarea. This passive foreclosure is analogous toMahan’s concept of a “Fleet-in-Being.”15 Theforeclosure revolves around the fact that asufficient array of capabilities exists or can bebrought to bear in a given region to prevent adestabilizing course of action from beingcarried out. Such foreclosure hinges not onlyon the relative capabilities of both sides overtime, but also on convincing the challenger thatthose capabilities are likely to be used in theevent of aggression. Successful passiveforeclosure is likely to produce one of two kindsof behavior. Either the would-be challenger willnot apply the resources necessary to creatingthe capabilities to pursue the course of actionin the first place, or if the capabilities do exist,the challenger will risk them on an endeavorthat is doomed to failure.

In the three Middle East crises, the resort to activeforeclosure in each case indicated some failure ofthe regime of passive foreclosure in the area. This,indeed, was one of the historical roles of the U.S.Sixth Fleet presence in the area. In each of the threecrises, therefore, the immediate reaction of theguarantor powers was to attempt to restore passiveforeclosure. In 1967, the United States and GreatBritain attempted to break the Egyptian blockade ofthe Strait of Tiran and restore the balance in theSinai, but failed. In the 1970 crisis, the foreclosurewas restored by Jordan’s military success againstthe Syrians, Iraqis, and Palestinians, a success that

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precluded the United States’ having to intervene. Inthe 1973 crisis, both the United States and theSoviet Union initially attempted to restore order viapassive foreclosure, but again failed and soon foundthemselves at loggerheads with each other pendingthe creation of some new balance of power.16

Like chaos, the effect of foreclosure is notpermanent. Foreclosure will remain operative aslong as the challenger continues to assess that therisks of pursuing an aggressive course of actionoutweigh prospective gains. In practical terms, theeffect will remain only as long as the imbalance offorces that deterred action persists. If the balancebetween opposing forces shifts toward thechallenger during active foreclosure, as was thecase during the Soviet and American reactions to the1973 war, then the foreclosure effect can diminish,disappear, or be reversed. Over a longer term, thesame is true of passive foreclosure. The localbalance of power can similarly shift, or over a farshorter time, the willingness of one side to actuallyuse the forces can lapse, provoking a challenger toreassess the risks involved in aggressive conduct.

As the above chains of reasoning intimate,foreclosure is prominently within the domain of thereason and ultimately hinges on the ability to createa situation in which the proverbial “reasonableman” would conclude that a desired course ofaction simply cannot succeed and adjusts hisbehavior accordingly.

5. Shock

Where foreclosure is in the domain of the reason,shock is clearly in that of the emotion. Shock centersabout a sudden collapse of the foe’s belief in hisability to produce an acceptable outcome in a givensituation. It may be paralleled by a sense of despairand resignation to a fate that can no longer beavoided. It can be induced by the constant surprisecreated by an overwhelming tempo of theopponent’s operations, or by the unexpected failuresof one’s own forces and plans. This, indeed, was thecase in France when confronted by the Germanblitzkrieg of 1940.

At the strategic and operational level, the shockeffect may be manifest in a semi-catatonic inability tomake coherent decisions or in ceding the initiative tothe adversary. On the battlefield, it may be seen inthe collapse of unit cohesion and the panic of a rout,certainly evident in the Syrian Army’s actions on theGolan Heights in the 1967 and 1973 wars.

However, we need to add a caveat. Shock is in theeye of the beholder. Shock and panic are much lesslikely in an experienced leader or among well-trainedand battle-hardened troops than among newlytrained conscripts. As noted earlier, in the AmericanCivil War, whereas the battle of Bull Run in 1861resulted in a panicked rout of Union troops, theBattle of the Wilderness in 1864 resulted in no suchreaction, even though the casualties were fargreater.17 Shock, in short, is as much a function ofthe target’s experience, perceptions, andpsychological state as it is of the actions taken toinduce it.


6. Psychological Attrition

Whereas shock is a sudden collapse of belief,psychological attrition is the product of gradualerosion of the will. The victim of this psychologicalattrition gradually becomes convinced that nothinghe can do will yield a satisfactory outcome to asituation and, at length, the victim agrees to changehis behavior in a direction that previously could nothave been tolerated. This effect is typified by thereaction of the United States public over the periodfrom 1968 to 1975 during the Vietnam War. Thefocus in this effect was not on capabilities that mightretrieve or alter the underlying situation, but on amounting belief that those capabilities wouldultimately be to no avail. Thus, the course of actionwas deemed fruitless and ripe for change. This, ofcourse, is the primary effect sought by the physicallyweaker adversary in an asymmetric conflict.

The kinds of effects outlined above are not mutuallyexclusive. Any unified overall effect, especially at themilitary-strategic or geo-strategic levels, is likely toreflect a number of different kinds of effects and thebalance of these different kinds of effects will changeover time.14 Moreover, a single action may createdifferent kinds of effects at each level. For example,the destruction of an opposing aircraft may be aneffect in its own right at the tactical level. However, itmight also be seen as part of an operational levelcampaign to attrite enemy forces and wear downenemy will to fight. Or it may serve to forecloseoptions that the enemy might otherwise haveattempted using that aircraft. Or the shoot-downmight be part of a larger strategic level effort to

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shock the enemy military and political leadership intoreconsidering their behavior. These connectionsmay be accidental and purely serendipitous, but thecentral notion in effects-based operations is that allthese effects and actions can and should becarefully orchestrated to produce a decisive effecton the enemy at one or more levels and in one ormore arenas. As this implies, the effects of aparticular action will probably not be uniform acrossall levels and all arenas. The fighter pilot operating atthe tactical level is focused on destroying theopposing aircraft. Not only might that be hisassigned role, but he may also be forced into thataction to save his own life.

At the operational level, the joint commandermay have more latitude in this regard and mightfocus on creating chaos in the enemydecisionmaking process.

At the military-strategic level, the regionalCombatant Commander or the Joint Staff mightfocus on foreclosing certain tactical and operationalmoves the foe might take.

And, at the geo-strategic level, the nationalcommand authorities might look to foreclose certaininternational actions or to shock the foe intoreconsidering his past choices. Yet the action that isdirected by each of these levels of decisionmakers inorder to create all these diverse effects might be thesame: one air-to-air engagement at the tactical level.

We can depict these varying configurations of effectsto be sought in a series of vector diagrams. Each ofthe kinds of effects discussed above can be

rendered as one vector (see Figure 41). Then thechanging configuration from one level of conflict tothe next could be shown by indicating how far alongeach vector the concern with that kind of effect wasat this level or for this unit or command.

Thus, at the tactical level, the configuration of effectssought to create the impact on the opponent mightreflect an emphasis on destruction as a reflection ofthe “kill or be killed” nature of the interaction, but itmight also reflect the value of shocking, blocking, orconfusing the opponent in such an engagement (seeFigure 42).

At the level of the operational commander, thisdiagram might look very different. Instead offocusing on destruction of an opposing force per se,the commander may be more concerned withforeclosing a particular course of action or with hisability to attrite the opponent physically andpsychologically. Yet, he is likely to have a similarinterest in shocking and confusing his opponent.This would yield a very different shape from thatabove (see Figure 43).

At the military-strategic level of the theater or thenational military staff, the configuration might beexpected to change yet again. Even more than theoperational commander, their concern wouldprobably be on the longer term overall effects of anengagement or campaign. Thus, the focus would beon physical and psychological attrition and onforeclosure, both active and passive (see Figure 44).In contrast to the tactical level, the interest of anational level command may be less in destruction

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than in the avoidance of destruction. Similarly, in aninteraction with a power armed with weapons ofmass destruction, the interest may not be in inducingshock and chaos but in avoiding those effects.

Finally, at the level of the national commandauthority, the focus would probably be on still longer-term issues. Thus, psychological attrition wouldfigure prominently in the effects sought, as would therestoration of some form of passive foreclosure (seeFigure 45). At the same time, the nationalcommander would probably continue to beconcerned with physical attrition and with creatingan active foreclosure of unacceptable actions on thepart of the foe. As a significant difference, however,the national commander would be looking at each ofthese effects not from the perspective of just militaryactions to create these effects, but also the use ofpolitical and economic actions to those ends. Thus,active foreclosure, as demonstrated in the threeMiddle East crises, would combine military actionwith diplomatic action and domestic political actionto achieve the effect sought.

Obviously, each of these effects diagrams will varywith the particular situation and over time. Thepriorities in the first phase of a crisis are not likely toresemble those of succeeding phases. Thisevolution through a crisis was demonstrated in eachof the three Middle East crises. Typically at theoperational level and higher, this evolution wentfrom an emphasis on foreclosure and the astuteavoidance of anything that might shock the partiesor induce chaos during the initial crisis containmentphase, then to active foreclosure with elements of

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surprise or shock and psychological attrition duringthe conflict containment stage, and then to passiveforeclosure and the avoidance of shock and chaosin the crisis resolution phase.

The Observer

There is an additional aspect to the complexity to beconsidered here. Not only can a single action createa variety of different effects, but those effects alsocan vary radically from one observer to the next andfrom one situation to the next.

While we tend to think of diplomatic and economicactions as efforts to convince, cajole or otherwiseinduce acceptable behavior and of military actionsas efforts to compel or coerce, in actuality, whetherthe actions in question are seen as positive ornegative depends on whether the observer is afriend, foe, or neutral. The same military actionseen as a coercive intervention by a would-beaggressor will be seen as reassurance by a localfriend who is the object of the intended aggressionor by a local neutral who seeks to avoid theregional instability that the aggression mightprovoke. Thus, a peacekeeping operation would beseen as threatening or coercive by those who standto gain by disrupting the peace (e.g. the Serbs inBosnia or Kosovo), and as stabilizing andreassuring by those who wish to maintain thepeace (Bosnian and Albanian villagers).19

In essence, the action itself is neutral. It acquires itspositive or negative dimension as coercion orreassurance in the eyes of the observer and in the

context of the situation. From the standpoint ofplanning and executing effects-based operations,however, this adds to the complexity. Since no actiontakes place in a vacuum and the observers of anyaction will be many and varied, we must considermultiple and conflicting cognitive impacts whenplanning any action.

From Actions to EffectsThe above leaves a major question unanswered.How do we orchestrate our actions so as to producethe kinds of effects we seek? By thinking of actionsin terms of a set of observable attributes, we havebegun to define the nature of the potential militaryactions we might use and have begun to reduce thevariables we must consider to a manageable set.Similarly, by delineating the kinds of effects we mightwant to create, we have both begun to define thenature of the potential effects and reduced them to aworkable set of variables. The real question we mustanswer, therefore, is how might a certaincombination of attributes in our actions lead to aparticular kind of effect?

We can instinctively understand that certain kinds ofactions are likely to produce certain kinds of effectsin a maze of links like that displayed in Figure 46.For example, we could surmise from what we knowof attrition-based operations that, in order to producea certain level of destruction, we would require aparticular focus for our efforts, particular kinds offorces, on a particular scale with these operationsbeing sustained at some rate for some specificduration. We might also deduce that the geographic

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and operational scope of the operation in question,or its synchronicity and visibility might be lessrelevant to achieving our objective. In other words,we would assess that the destruction meted out willvary as we concentrate our efforts (focus), use morepowerful forces (type of force) in greater numbers(scale) at a faster rate (speed) over a longer periodof time (duration). However imprecise it may be, theexistence of a working link between kinds of actionsand the kinds and levels of physical effects is hardlyany surprise. And, it suggests that the same kinds oflinks are at the root of producing psychological orcognitive effects.

Although the cognitive process by which actionsbecome perceptions, understanding, and a senseof the situation and then in turn result in the choiceof certain courses of action may be too complex toidentify or to permit us to track a cause and effectchain with any reliability, we can arrive at anintuitive sense of the relationship between actionsand effects in the same manner as we understandthe links in an attrition-based model withoutnecessarily computing them. We can understand,for example, that chaos on the battlefield hassomething to do not only with the level ofdestruction inflicted but also of how thatdestruction was inflicted, factors such as speedand synchronicity or the ability to focus on criticalvulnerabilities. In our 1805 Trafalgar example, theFrench commander knew he was going to bedefeated before the first shot was fired. Theinsurmountable problem he faced was not somuch the destructive power of Nelson’s fleet,which was inferior to his own. It was the fact that

Nelson’s commanders could synchronize theiractions independently and thereby sustain a speedof operations that allowed the British fleet to focusits power at will so as to defeat a superioropponent in detail.

The foreclosure effect, in essence the use of militaryforces to ensure either that the opponent cannotfight as he had intended or that he does not fight atall, is slightly different in character. Yet, we can stilldiscern the links between the nature of the actionsand the foreclosure effect. In the three Middle Eastcrises of 1967-1973, the resort to destruction orphysical attrition was not a viable option for eitherthe Soviet Union or the United States. Thus, successhinged on how forces were used to createpsychological or cognitive effects.

Here we can see the attributes at work.

• The focus or specific nature of the action thatthe other side would observe was of criticalimportance either as a negative reinforcement,e.g. undertaking routine port visits todemonstrate a refusal to become involved, or asa positive reinforcement, e.g. conductingpotentially threatening exercises to demonstratea willingness to become involved.

• The type of force used also became a keyvariable. For example, the Soviets replacedintelligence-collection ship tattletales withmissile-firing combatants to underline a tacticalchallenge that would have made any Americanstrike on Soviet units very costly and thusforeclose it.


• The scale or numbers of forces involved andespecially the repeated reinforcement of theopposing Mediterranean fleets similarlybecame a dominant way in which each sideendeavored to foreclose certain courses ofaction to the other.

• The scope of military operations bothgeographic and operational also became acentral part of the attempts to shape opponentbehavior, and that of clients and allies. Forceswere alternately held back from the crisis areato show a desire to avoid confrontation, orrushed toward it to block an impendingopposition move.

• The role of the speed of actions and reactionsby both sides and the need for synchronicitywas most evident in the attempts to coordinatespecific military maneuvers with diplomaticactions, a coordination requirement thatsometimes necessitated visible military action ofa particular kind within an hour or less.

In each of these crises, thus, the attributes of themilitary actions undertaken were consciouslymanipulated so as to produce active foreclosure of aparticular course of action to the opponent or,conversely, to encourage a particular course ofaction, with the specific course of action to beforeclosed varying over time.

The case for shock is more straightforward. We canreadily understand that a combination of numbers,particular types of forces focused on particularobjectives, and speed and synchronicity produced

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the success of the German blitzkrieg in May 1940and the subsequent collapse of French military andpolitical will. In short, it was the nature of the Germanactions and not just the destruction they inflicted thatcollapsed any French hope for finding a way out ofthe dilemma posed, and thus produced shock.

Finally, there is the case of psychological attrition,arguably the root cause of the American defeat inVietnam. Actions calculated to induce psychologicalattrition would clearly seem to revolve about someaspect of duration, the ability to sustain some finitelevel of operations over a protracted period of time,as in Vietnam. Yet, at the same time, in the contextof asymmetric terrorist operations, we can also seefactors such as geographic scope entering theequation. The attack on the World Trade Center, forexample, derived its impact from the fact that it wasan attack upon a major symbol in the Americanheartland.

As the above indicates, by varying the nature of ouractions, we can vary the kinds of effects we arelikely to create. This link between actions andeffects both reflects and is consistent with ourearlier observations on the cognitive process eventhough it makes no attempt to trace a specific actionthrough all of the steps in that process. In essence,we accept a certain level of ambiguity anduncertainty (or ignorance) and plan and execute ouractions within the constraints imposed by boundingthe factors involved, actions on the one hand andeffects on the other.


Unity of Effect and SynchronizationThere is an additional complication here. The effectswe create can be positive (driving observers towardthe behavior we want), negative (drive them awayfrom that behavior), or neutral, (having no impact onbehavior). Observers will view our actions in theiraggregate and not as isolated events. Since theyhave no way of knowing for certain whatmisunderstandings may have arisen in our executionof actions, they cannot afford not to treat them as awhole, considered, intentional response on ourpart.20 Indeed, this process of aggregation is acentral part of sensemaking.

Our objective in executing effects-based operationsis somehow to create a unity of effect that focuses allactions and thereby masses their effects toward aparticular behavioral objective. However, to do thiswe need to address yet another aspect of thecomplexity of effects-based operations: how do weorchestrate our actions so as to, at a minimum,deconflict them or, ideally, to achieve the synergy weneed? The problem once again centers on whatobservers see and how they interpret what they see.

Logically, the scope of an observer’s aggregation ofthe effects of our actions will grow geometricallyfrom one level of conflict to the next and with it thescope of the actions we must coordinate to achieveunity of effect. Therefore, where the tacticalcommander might coordinate the actions of asquadron or company, the Joint Task ForceCommander must coordinate the actions of multipleforces over a wider geographic scope and in several

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warfare environments. The Joint Staff must similarlycoordinate military actions on a global basisincluding those of strategic deterrent forces whoseactivities might send a particularly strong messageone way or the other. However, the greatestchallenge lies at the geo-strategic level. Thenational leadership must coordinate all the diverseelements of national power so as to create a singleoverall effect at the geo-strategic level of operationsin which each action by each element, military,political and economic, reinforces the actions of theother elements in driving observers toward adesired behavior.

We can think of this as outlined in Figure 47. Theeffects we create may be either positive or negative,causing or preventing some behavior. If we fail tocoordinate our actions, then we risk presenting theobserver with conflicted actions whose effects wouldtend to cancel each other out and provide noimpetus to shape the desired behavior. If wedeconflict the actions so that they do not canceleach other out, then the effects can becomeadditive, but if we can somehow choose the rightactions and synchronize them, then we can achievea synergy in which the effect of one action buildsupon the other to multiply the impact. Conversely, ifwe choose the all the wrong actions and deconflictthem, then the negative impact would becomeadditive, and if we do all the wrong things at all thewrong times, that impact too can become synergisticin a negative direction.

Our problem, then, is not only to choose the rightactions to drive behavior in the direction we want at


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each level and in each arena, but also to avoid thoseactions that might drive behavior in the wrongdirection or that might leave the observer confusedand uncertain. Our opportunity is to use the power ofnetworking to coordinate and synchronize all actionsto build synergistically upon each other.

There is an additional complication here. Actionswill likely be taken in multiple arenas simultaneouslyand involve a changing weight of military, political-diplomatic, and economic actions in creating aunified national effect. As shown in Figure 48, therelative balance of the national effort changes asthe interaction moves from peace, to crisis, toconfrontation, to war.21 Generally, political,diplomatic, and economic actions tend topredominate in the early phases of a crisis, but asthe crisis worsens, there is an increasing relianceon military action and a diminishing reliance oneconomic action at least in part due to the time suchactions require to have an impact either as aninducement or a means of coercion. And, in theperiods of highest tension, as noted during thesuccessive Middle East crises, there is a tendencyto rely on rapid political interchange backed up bywhatever military actions can be brought to bearand seen by the right observers.

This tradeoff underlines that we must synchronizenot only military actions, but also all of the actions ofall the different forms of national power that might beobserved. Each of these forms will have its owntimeline22 much as different forms of military powerhave different combat power generation cycles (seeFigure 49). Thus, when senior decisionmakers


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attempt to coordinate political, diplomatic, economic,and military actions to achieve a unity of effect, theyare subject to the same problem that we observed inthe efforts of military commanders to coordinatedifferent kinds of military forces, and to the samelosses in efficiency as commanders pursuing aplanned synchronization.23 This leaves the nationalleadership in the same position as the militaryoperational commander who must coordinate theactions of his forces so as to optimize their physicaleffect upon the enemy. A nation-state’s leadership orits equivalent in a non-state organization must adjustthe actions of all players in each arena, political,military, and economic, in order to put together acoherent overall effect that drives observer behaviorin the desired direction.

Synchronization: The “Fedora Curve”

All of the above bespeaks a need forsynchronization in effects-based operations thatappears to contradict the aspiration of network-centric operations to be “self-synchronized.” Whatthen is the role of self-synchronization in an effects-based operation? If we look more closely at thecrises surveyed, it becomes apparent that therequirement for synchronization is not a constant.Rather, it varies across the duration of a crisis orwar (see Figure 50). The requirement for tightsynchronization of actions and effects will likely beleast in routine peacetime interactions, but willbegin to rise sharply in times of crisis as the nationalor organizational leadership attempts to coordinateand synchronize actions to achieve a synergy of


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effects. That need for tight control will peak during aperiod of intense confrontation immediately beforehostilities when the risks attached to any individualaction being misperceived are at their greatest.24

However, the requirement lessens as hostilitiescommence and any attempt to assert closecentralized control of a fast-paced tactical or evenoperational level combat situation would meanceding the initiative to the enemy. Then, as thecombat transitions into an end-state solution, therequirement for control returns as the national andmilitary leadership attempts to reduce the risk of anyaction undoing the solution being discussed. Finally,once a solution is reached, the requirement forcontrol remains high during the initial stages of abuild-down of force levels before gradually returningto a peacetime self-synchronization, giving thecurve the shape of a fedora hat.

Bounding ComplexityThe picture of effects-based operations thatemerges from these examples is above all one ofcomplex coordination requirements. The corechallenge in planning and executing effects-basedoperations is to ensure that all of the actions takenacross this diverse spectrum reinforce the effect weare trying to create and to avoid a situation in whichthose actions negate each other and either confusefriends, foes, and neutrals as to our intentions, orworse still, create an effect that is the opposite ofwhat we seek. It seems obvious that, by thinking interms not of an infinite variety of possible actions butin terms of the particular combination of attributes of

an action that can be observed or felt and thus affectperceptions and behavior, we can bound one aspectof the effects-based planning problem. It also shouldbe evident that, by thinking in terms of the kinds ofeffects we wish to create rather than in terms of ahighly specific outcome for which we cannot traceany semblance of a cause and effect chain, we canbound another aspect of the complexity to the pointthat we can conduct rational effects-based planning.

Yet, in the last section of this chapter, we havesuggested something more: that this planning andbounding of complexity is not to be done just onceand then executed. Rather, the planning processmust be dynamic and respond to the give and takeof an evolving situation. The effects sought and theactions required, as well as the degree ofcoordination needed to carry out the multi-facetedaspects of a national action, will change over thecourse of a crisis or conflict.

1This variety was great enough that, as the history of thecrises amply illustrates, the national level decisionmakerswere normally unaware of all the actions being taken at thetactical level and the local commanders were almostinvariably unaware of the exact role they were to play in thelarger, national level scheme of things.2In the sense of creating specific physical effects, it is alsowhat was taking place in the wars reviewed. 3Aristotle. Nichomacian Ethics.4The United States did have Wheelus Air Force Base in Libyaduring the 1967 crisis, but was largely unable to use it due tothe situation that such use would have placed the Kingdom ofLibya with its Arab neighbors, particularly Egypt. Similarly,although the Soviets had large numbers of advisors in Egyptprior to the 1973 crisis, they were ordered out of Egypt a fewmonths before the Egyptian attack on Israel. 5Kissinger, White, p. 631.


6In fact, though manageable, the withdrawal of access canpose problems for resupply as the United States found out in1973 while trying to refuel two carriers operating east of Suezin the face of an Arab oil embargo.Zumwalt, p. 455.7In a somewhat different guise, they are also applicable toother nonmilitary actions that a government may take. Theeffect of a diplomatic note, for example, derives not only fromwhat language was used in the note but also from how thatnote was presented, to whom, by whom, when, and with whatdegree of publicity. If we were further to combine a militaryoperation with the presentation of the diplomatic note, thenthe variables to be controlled or manipulated would include allthose attached to the note and all those attached to themilitary action.8Czerwinski,Thomas. Coping with the Bounds, Speculationson Non-linearity in Military Affairs. Washington, DC; NationalDefense University Press. 1999. p. 9. 9This concept was the centerpiece of the decisionmakerschool of international relations theory. It was hypothesizedthat if we can know the decisionmaker and the influencesupon him or her well enough, we can begin to predict thedecision that will be made. To that end, social-psychologicallaboratory studies in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s soughtto profile subjects, insert them into a controlled problem set,and analyze the results. However, a criticism of the approachwas that the results, even with a relatively homogeneoussubject population, were not conclusive and even lesscredible when postulated for very different cultures andbackgrounds. Singer, J. David, ed. Human Behavior and InternationalPolitics, Contributions from the Social-PsychologicalSciences. Chicago; Rand McNally. 1965. pp.153ff. 10Lieber. Theory and World Politics. Cambridge; Winthrop.1972. pp. 18ff.11Beyerchen, Alan D. “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity and theUnpredictability of War” International Security. Winter, 1992.p. 60.12Although there remains the possibility of discovering some“golden node” that would bring about the collapse of an entiresystem or war effort and, thus, for a single destructionoperation to win the war rather than merely the engagement,it is questionable whether such a node would exist and stillmore questionable whether we would be wise to rely uponcreating such a far-reaching effect. 13Carried to its logical extreme, the total physical elimination

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of the adversary, as in Rome’s destruction of Carthage, mightso totally remove a threat as to make the question of creatingpsychological effects on the foe entirely moot. 14Sadat, pp. 215ff.15Mahan, Alfred. Mahan on Naval Warfare: Selected Writingson Rear Admiral Alfred T. Mahan. Boston: Little Brown. 1918.p. 243.16Laqueur, W. The Road to War: The Origin and Aftermath ofthe Arab-Israeli Conflict 1967-8. London: Penguin. 1968.p. 109. 17Steere, Edward. The Wilderness Campaign. Harrisburg:Stackpole Company. 1960. p. 457. Johnson. North to Antietam. p. 494.18The collapse of France in 1940, for example, involved acomplex variety of effects acting together. The destruction ofFrench and British forces in the field and the attrition of theFrench Air Force accompanied by the chaotic inability of theFrench General Staff to salvage the military situationproduced shock at all levels of the French Government. Thisin turn built upon a certain level of defeatism and warweariness that lingered from the First World War to produceFrance’s defeat. In this process, the German Army and theblitzkrieg served as the agents of this complicated series ofeffects and the subsequent change in French behavior. Shirer. pp. 805ff. 19On a different level, this positive/negative perception of thesame action is true of strategic nuclear deterrence as well. Areinforcement of the nuclear deterrent that might be judgedthreatening by an opponent might be seen as reassuring toan ally whom that reinforcement might protect. 20The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis presents a good example ofboth dimensions of this problem. On the one hand, the U.S.military often failed to understand that their actions werebeing used by President Kennedy as a means of signalingAmerican intent and that, under such circumstances, normalmilitary precautions such as raising the DEFCON level mighteither confuse the Soviets or create an effect contradictory towhat the NCA sought. On the other hand, the starkdiscrepancies between the communications from GeneralSecretary Khrushchev and the later official Soviet positionboth confused and alarmed the American NCA, quite theopposite of what Khrushchev intended.Kennedy. Thirteen Days. p. 98ff. 21Observed in newspaper analyses during four crises, the1967, 1971, and 1973 Middle East crises and the CubanMissile Crisis of 1962.


Smith, Edward A. Jr. Naval Confrontation, The Inter-superpower Use of Naval Suasion in Times of Crisis.Unpublished dissertation, The American University. 1979.22Military, diplomatic, political, and economic actions arephysical in nature and can move only so fast. Arranging for acall on the head of a foreign government or for a meeting ofthe United Nations Security Council takes time and proceedsaccording to a schedule over which the United States and/orits coalition partners may have little or no control. Economicactions, for example, might require approval from Congressor actions by industry and financial centers at home andabroad. 23The physical actions necessary for the State Department tomake a public announcement can be condensed into hours oreven minutes, while moving a military force into a positionwhere it can sustain and lend credence to the announcementmay take days. One reason for the repeated resort to the useof forward naval forces for signaling was that they werealready forward and being monitored and thus, couldreinforce rapid-fire diplomatic actions within minutes. 24As that demonstrated in the confrontation stages of the1962, 1967, 1971, and 1973 crises, the balancing of militaryand political-diplomatic actions can become so tightlycontrolled and dynamic that the action-reaction cycles arereduced to less than an hour.

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CHAPTER 7

From Dealingwith Complexity

to Exploiting It If effects-based operations are to be anything more

than an interesting theory, we must figure out aprocess by which we can reliably translate the multi-faceted actions we have been describing into thekinds of effects that we need to shape the behaviorof friends, foes, and neutrals. In brief, we must beable to plan and execute real-world effects-basedoperations that apply this theory.

Orchestrating our actions so as to have thegreatest probability of producing a desired effect isa task that is easier said than done. The sets ofvariables described in the preceding chapter, evenwhen bounded by defining the elements of militaryactions or by delineating the kinds of effects,remain complex. And, there are at least twoadditional levels of complexity in the problem thatwe still have to address before we can hope toundertake the planning and execution of effects-based operations.

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One aspect of this additional complexity has alreadybeen intimated. The orchestration we need toundertake involves not only choosing the rightcombinations of actions to influence observers’behavior in the desired direction, but also identifyingand avoiding those actions that might drive thebehavior in the wrong direction. In essence, if wefail to orchestrate our efforts correctly, the variableswe seek to manipulate can become a cacophony ofsignals in which the different aspects of our actionswill tend either to cancel each other out, or to soconfuse observers as to have no impact at all. Evenworse, the actions may produce effects andbehavior that are quite the opposite of what weintended. In planning effects-based operations,therefore, we must be able not only to focus ouractions but also to deconflict them across fourlevels of command and three or more arenas ofeffects-based operations. What is more, we must beable to deconflict our actions not only with respectto a single observer, but also with respect to themultiple and very different perspectives suggestedby the “friends, foes, and, neutrals” in our definitionof effects-based operations.

Influencing this behavior means dealing with theperceptions of human beings, each of whosereactions will be different and none of whosereactions will be either linear or entirely predictable.Yet, to plan effects-based operations, we mustsomehow anticipate how each complex adaptivesystem observing our action, whether an individualor an organization, might adapt and respond to thestimulus it presents. On the surface, this task soundslike a contradiction in terms. How do we predict the


reactions of a complex adaptive system whosereactions are, by definition, not entirely predictable?And, how do we make the same action appeardifferently to different observers? Are we setting animpossible standard for effects-based operations?

The task of coordinating all of these elements soas to create a unity of effect certainly seemsdaunting. However, we can take some solace fromtwo facts.

First, a failure to address these levels ofcomplexity does not remove them. Indeed, we canlogically surmise that, in the absence of any efforton our part to orchestrate our efforts, thelikelihood of cacophony of actions and effects willbe even greater.

And second, the fact that the examples usedthroughout this work are drawn from history shouldsend a message. Successful coordination of effectsis neither impossible nor new. We have done all ofthis before. Indeed, the great military and politicalleaders in history have been “great” at least in partbecause they have been able to put these piecestogether in their heads. The question for us is ratherhow the new technological revolutions and network-centric concepts let us do these tasks better, morequickly, and more precisely.

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Dealing with the Additional Levelsof Complexity: Elements of theProblemThe first step in dealing with these new dimensionsof complexity is to fit together the pieces of theeffects-based puzzle that we have explored so far. Inour discussion of a general evolving concept ofeffects-based operations, there are three majorpieces of the puzzle that stand out.

• First, in looking at the cognitive cycle, we beganto describe the human dimension of thedecisionmaking process. We traced how humanbeings and human organizations perceiveactions, make sense of them, and then use thisdeep understanding of an emerging situation torespond. This cognitive process described notonly the variables inherent in our owndecisionmaking process, but in the context of aneffects-based action-reaction cycle, provided aninsight as to the variables involved in shapingthe behavior of others. While such an insightmay not remove the complexity from humanreactions, it does provide us with a logical basefor further bounding the complexity involved.

• Second, using the insights gained from thecognitive process, we began to define thedimensions that actions and effects might takeon in the human mind. As illustrated in Figure51, the attributes of actions described whichelements of our actions were likely to alterperceptions, affect decisions, and produce thekinds of effects that shape an observer’s

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decisions and behavior in a certain direction. Bydefining actions and effects in terms of two setsof variables rather than leaving them as aninfinite variety of possible actions and effects,we bound the problem and also create a menuof the options available to us in orchestratingthe effects needed to achieve a unified overalleffect. We even used a series of Middle Eastcrises to illustrate historically how we have usedthese options and varied the nature of militaryactions to create specific effects. Thisrelationship between actions and effectsprovides the core element for planning andexecuting effects-based operations

• Third, we also began to define the action-reaction cycle mechanics of an effects-basedoperation. The effects-based rule set that wederived from the Middle East crises andseveral wartime examples laid out a roughidea of how the action-reaction cyclesactually work in real-world effects-basedoperations. The rule set also began to definethe decisionmaking and organizationalstructure used in such operations. Althoughthis functional description was primarilydrawn from decisionmaking on the Americanside of the conflict, the crisis interactionsmake it clear that the model could also beroughly extrapolated to the structures andreactions of any “state” actor.1 Thus, the rulesset mechanics provide a framework withinwhich the planning and execution of at leaststate-to-state effects-based operations canbe considered.


These insights into the cognitive process and intothe system mechanics are particularly relevant to theprocess of planning and executing effects-basedoperations so as to achieve the nonlinear impactswe seek.

Much of the problem that we confront in the planningand execution of effects-based operations derivesfrom a need to predict the responses of theindividual or organization that we intend to stimulate.If we are to plan deliberately and logically, we mustbe able to anticipate how an initial or direct effectcreated by our actions will propagate additionaleffects. This step is critical because our hope ofcreating nonlinear impacts grows at least in part fromthe expectation that our actions will set off a chainreaction or cascade of indirect effects whose scaleand scope may dwarf the initial effect we create.Planning an effects-based operation then revolvesabout the challenge of setting off a controlled chainreaction rather than an uncontrolled reaction whoseconsequences we cannot imagine.

In order to plan effects-based operations, therefore,we must address two questions. First, how does thischain reaction or cascade of effects occur? Andsecond, how might such a cascade of effectsoperate in the context of the effects-basedmechanics outlined in the rule sets that weintroduced in Chapter 5?

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Exploiting Complexity:The Logic of Effects CascadesIn the discussion of effects throughout this book, wehave drawn a distinction between physical effectsand psychological or cognitive effects. We definedphysical effects broadly as the physical impact of anaction upon others and illustrated that such animpact that might not involve destruction or, indeed,any violent use of military force at all. At Midway, theinitial physical effect was simply the act of aJapanese reconnaissance pilot observing an object,the carrier Yorktown, and reporting that object. InInformation Age warfare, a similar initial physicaleffect might be the entry of a computer virus into asystem network or the discovery of an effort to hackinto a network.

However, we need to take this logic a bit further. Aswe saw in the Midway example, the direct physicaleffect can indeed provoke a chain of subsequentimpacts. In the cyberwar example, similarly, wealmost instinctively accept that the initial, directphysical effect will not be the end of the impact. Weexpect that this initial or direct effect will createadditional indirect effects of some sort. And weexpect that some combination of these effects willeventually bring changes in behavior, just as theYorktown sighting report caused VADM Nagumo tochange his intended course of action and to rearmhis planes for a fleet action.2 Putting this in the termsof our rule sets, we expect that the effects created byour action will not remain isolated but will spread toother dimensions.3


Two additional distinctions are needed here:

First, the actions we are considering are, bydefinition, physical in nature. The alternating ofphysical actions and reactions was reflected in theaction-reaction cycles in the rules sets we examined.Similarly, the cognitive process we described dealtwith those actions that could be observed orperceived in some way, and it even defined actionsin terms of physical objects and events.

• We saw that, although such a physical eventcould be the destruction of forces andcapabilities, it could equally be a maneuversuch as the movement of military forces asillustrated in the Middle East crises. Moreover,as the history of the Middle East crises clearlydemonstrates, the event could also beeconomic, political, or diplomatic in nature. Likemilitary actions, the economic actions such astrade sanctions, the political maneuvers, thepress announcements, and the exchanges ofdiplomatic messages all rely on some form ofphysical action intended to be observed andperceived. Logically, if we are to create a unifiedoverall effect, these actions need to becoordinated with all other actions that might beseen by the same observers.

• We also saw that a physical action, such asthe sighting of the Yorktown in the Midwayexample, might simply be an object that isplaced (intentionally or unintentionally) in theright place at the right time to be seen by theright observer. Again, a physical presence wasrequired to create the effect.

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Notice that in each of these cases, both the objectsand events involve real physical entities and thus,are actions in the physical domain.

Second, we have already drawn a distinctionbetween a direct physical effect (the immediatephysical impact of an action) and an indirect effect(one of a series of follow-on or derivative impactsthat result from the direct effect). These indirecteffects may also be physical in nature, but as in theYorktown sighting in the Battle of Midway, they mayalso be psychological and cognitive effects that growfrom the action and its initial physical impact.

These distinctions are at the core of our concept ofeffects-based operations and of nodal targeting. Weuse physical actions to create a stimulus, a directphysical effect that sets in motion a chain reactionor cascade of additional indirect effects. We alsohope that, if the stimulus is properly planned, thischain of effects will sooner or later cross from thephysical to the psychological or cognitive domain sothat the resulting psychological and cognitive effectswill in some way affect the behavior of observers.

Normandy, 1944Clearly, the idea of creating a cascade of effects isnot new. The World War II bombing campaign insupport of the June 1944 Allied landings inNormandy is a good example of a deliberatelyplanned cascade of physical effects.


Normandy: Physical Effects

The direct physical effect sought by the planners ofthe Allied air campaign, the so-called“Transportation Plan,” was the destruction of theFrench rolling stock and the rail yards, bridges, andjunctions leading toward the Normandybeachheads.4 In Churchill’s words, the bombing wasto create “a railroad desert” around Normandy.5

However, the objective of the Allied planners of theair campaign was not limited to the direct physicaleffect of destroying the rail system. Their realobjectives were two indirect or derivative physicaleffects: to incapacitate the railway system innorthern France so that rail movement becamedifficult or impossible; and to thereby prevent themovement of German panzer divisions into theNormandy area in the critical hours and days afterthe D-Day landings.6

Had the planners of the air campaign approachedthe problem by simply looking at the initial directphysical effects of the bombing (from the standpointof pure attrition7) and disregarded the indirect orderivative effects, they might have adopted ageneral, almost random approach to the bombing.They might have chosen to attrite the capability ofthe entire French rail system, much as vonFalkenhayn had attempted to bleed the FrenchArmy white at Verdun in 1916. However, it wouldhave certainly been clear to the Allied air plannersthat, even if such an attrition campaign wereconfined to a given region or to the given categoriesof rail facilities, it still would have been too costly,too slow, and given some level of enemy capability

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to repair the damage,8 might even have beendoomed to failure from the start.

Instead, to all intents and purposes, the strikeplanners worked backwards from their ultimateobjective. They started with the second cascadeindirect effect they hoped to create: blockingGerman movements toward the invasion beaches.Then, they identified the reduction of theperformance of the French rail system as the firstcascade indirect physical effect they needed in orderto bring that about. Finally, they used theirknowledge of the rail system and how it functionedto identify the 93 rail yards, bridges, and junctionsthat would be most significant in creating this indirecteffect.9 In short, they focused their direct effect (thebombings) so as to achieve two levels of indirectphysical effects. This was a nodal targetingapproach that focused upon the cascade of indirectphysical effects that they thought would likely flowfrom the direct physical effect they inflicted.

Notice that in both the attrition and effects-basedapproaches, the generic initial direct physical effectof the bombing campaign (the destruction of railfacilities) would have remained the same. However,by adopting an effects-based targeting approach,the planners refined and focused the bombingcampaign by looking at the successive cascades ofindirect physical effects that might be produced by agiven set of targets. In the planners’ calculations,the impact of the bombing on the throughputcapacity of the French rail system was the firstcascade indirect physical effect.10 The inability of theGerman troops, especially the armored divisions, to


reach the Normandy battlefield was the secondcascade indirect physical effect, and the ultimateobjective of the campaign.11

Cascades of Psychological EffectsIn the psychological and cognitive effects, thephysical effect of an action takes on a humandimension. Again this is not new. The impact ofphysical actions upon the will or decisionmaking isrepeated time and again throughout military history.Classically, if the disruption of a military operation isparticularly sudden or severe, or if there are nogood alternatives, then the psychological impact ofthe physical destruction may be to shock theopponent. It may also induce an incapacitatingdespair either immediately or as a result of repeatedstimuli over some period of time. Physicaldestruction can cascade into psychological effects,which in turn can cascade into a series of furthereffects far beyond the immediate tactical impact ofthe targets destroyed.

Normandy: Psychological Effects

Although the two cascades of indirect physicaleffects outlined earlier were consciously sought byAllied air planners, further cascades from thesephysical effects into a series of indirect psychologicaleffects do not appear to have been an immediatepart of the air planning. Yet, clearly there were suchpsychological effects. The inability to move theforces needed to mount a counter-attack might havebeen expected to undermine German morale anddiscourage German commanders12 even as it

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encouraged the boldness of the French Résistance.It is even possible to speculate about a series ofcascading indirect psychological effects stretchingfrom the German inability to mass forces for asuccessful counterattack in June 1944 to theparticipation of senior German commanders in theJuly 1944 plot to kill Hitler.

We can also observe in the Normandy air campaignan attempt to prevent one particular psychologicaleffect. The Allied forces hoped to hide the site of theinvasion from the Germans and avoid revealingtheir strategy through the targets they chose. Therewas ample reason for concern. Most of the potentialGerman reinforcements were located in the regionof the Pas de Calais where the German HighCommand was convinced that the actual invasionwould take place. Thus, the Allied air campaignplanners had to keep the Germans convinced thatthe invasion would in fact take place in the area ofthe Pas de Calais so that the German forces in thatarea would not be committed to the Normandybattle. They dealt with this problem by enlarging thescope of the bombing campaign to include the railsystem leading into the Pas de Calais as well asinto Normandy, and by ensuring that the scale of thebombing in that area was even greater than inNormandy.13

Since behavior is the real focus of our effects-basedoperations, the cascade from direct or indirectphysical effects to indirect psychological effects,which is only slightly evident in the Normandyexample, needs further examination. In fact, theprocess of translating physical actions into


psychological effects is another way of looking at thestimulus and response interactions at the root of ourconcept of effects-based operations. The physicaleffects are stimuli that the observer must take intoaccount in his decisionmaking process.

In the example, the direction of the bombing eithertoward Normandy alone or toward the Pas deCalais alone would have been a stimulus applied tothe German decisionmaking process. The responsewould have been a confirmation of the Germans’existing mental model that the invasion was to comeat the Pas de Calais, or an impetus to consider anew mental model based on an Allied invasionthrough Normandy. The care exercised by the Alliesto divide the bombing, to orchestrate the nature ofthe physical actions undertaken, deprived theGermans of that stimulus. And in its absence, theywere left with their existing Pas de Calais modelintact, a model that continued to dominate thethinking at both the German Western andHeadquarters Commands even after the Normandyinvasion was well underway.

The Normandy example does point to two importantdifferences between the cascades of physical effectsand those of psychological and cognitive effects.These differences were at the center of the aircampaign planning.

• First, psychological effects did need not to beobserved in the same sense as those of acascade of physical effects.14 In the Normandyexample, it was not necessary for the GermanCommand in the West to receive reports of

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the level of bomb damage to the railwaysystem, or to measure the level ofperformance of the railway system after thebombing in order to reach the conclusion thattheir mental model of an invasion at the Pasde Calais was wrong. It was only necessaryfor the German commanders to know that afocused, large scale bombing campaign wasin progress and where.

Although physical effects can set off a cascadeof psychological effects and a continuingcascade of physical effects can certainlycontribute to it, the cascade of psychologicaleffects itself may be largely independent of thephysical cascade or, indeed, in the case ofpanic, it may be independent of any physicalreality at all. This is important for how wecalculate the nonlinear impact of our actionsbecause it indicates that psychological effectscan propagate far more quickly than anequivalent cascade of physical effects.

The example that comes to mind here is theshock and panic that set in among the Frenchsenior military and political leadership as theGerman blitzkrieg rolled across northernFrance in May 1940. Although the panic wasset in motion by a cascade of physical effectsstemming from the success of German militaryforces, the cascade of psychological effectssoon attained a life of its own. The spreadingpanic then debilitated French efforts to dealwith the physical effects of the blitzkrieg or, in

fact, to continue the war from France’s vastoverseas empire.15

• Second, as the extent of the coordinationrequired for successful effects-based operationsunderlined, the scope of the effects possible inthe psychological domain is far greater than thatpossible in the physical domain. In theNormandy example, the cascade of physicaleffects from the direct effect of physical damageto rail yards to the indirect effects of degradedrail system performance and the inability of theGermans to move armored divisions into thebeachhead area was relatively narrow andclosely interconnected.

The cascade of psychological effects need not beso bounded. The impact extends to anyone whocan observe the action or even the follow-onpsychological effects of the action with the latterpotentially spreading at a geometric rate. Thatimpact, further, is not limited to those observersdirectly involved in the action-reaction cycle butincludes the passive observers.16 17 The onlycriterion for the cascade of psychological effectsis that some portion of the effect has to beobservable in some fashion.

A Cascade Model: Applying theLogic to Military OperationsWe can use the Normandy air campaign model andthe earlier examples of noncombat interactionsseen in the Middle East crises to construct a modelof how these “effects cascades” work.

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Cascades of Physical EffectsThe starting point, as illustrated in Figure 52, is aphysical action, an object or event of some kind. Inthe manner outlined in the cognitive cycle, theobject or event is perceived by observers. Thedirect effect produced may be the destruction ofcapabilities, as in the case of the Normandybombing campaign, or it may be simply observingand reporting a maneuver, as in the cases both ofthe Battle of Midway and all three of the 1967-1973Middle East crises.

However, what we really hope is that the initial directeffect will not be the end of this stimulus andresponse interaction. We hope that the impact of thedirect effect will be such that it will provoke otherphysical effects, that the direct effect will cascadeinto at least one more indirect effect (see Figure 53).In the Normandy example, the first cascade, indirectphysical effect of the bombings would have been theimpact on the performance of the French railwaysystem and specifically the reduction of itsthroughput capacity.

We might further hope, as did the Allied airplanners, that this first cascade, indirect physicaleffect would produce an additional second cascadeconsisting of additional indirect physical effects (seeFigure 54). In the context of the Normandy aircampaign, the first cascade (reduction of the Frenchrailway system performance) would have beenmeaningless unless it produced the secondcascade impact on the German ability to movereinforcements into the area of the intended

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Figure 54. Effects Cascades: Second Cascade of IndirectPhysical Effects

Figure 52. Effects Cascades: Physical Action to DirectPhysical Effect

Figure 53. Effects Cascades: First Cascade of Indirect Effects

invasion. Moreover, the second cascade impact onthe performance of German military forces mightalso have produced an indeterminate number ofadditional cascades of indirect physical effects inthe manner of the “for want of a nail…the kingdomwas lost” nursery rhyme.

These successive cascades of indirect physicaleffects are the context for the application of aneffects-based approach to attrition-based warfare,and are the focus of effects-based targeting andnodal targeting. In such targeting, we choose highlyspecific direct physical effects exactly for theirpotential to set off a chain reaction so that we canmultiply the impact of our actions on the forces andcapabilities of our opponent.

Cascades of Psychological andCognitive EffectsHowever, as our discussions of actions and ofstimulus and response make clear, the indirecteffects are not limited to a chain reaction of indirectphysical effects. The cascades of effects can alsojump from physical to psychological effects. This isindeed the phenomenon we considered in thecontext of the cognitive process (see Figure 55). Inthe Midway example, the direct physical effect (theYorktown sighting) created an immediate impact onVADM Nagumo’s cognitive decisionmaking process,an indirect psychological effect. The same is true ofthe maneuvers and reinforcements of Soviet andAmerican fleets during the three Middle East crises.In a negative sense, this jump from a physical effect,the bombing, to a cognitive effect, a German


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conclusion that the Allied invasion would come inNormandy rather than the Pas de Calais, wasexactly what the Allied planners of 1944 fearedwould happen and were at pains to avoid.

Like the chain of indirect physical effects, the impactof the indirect psychological or cognitive effect is notnecessarily limited to this first cascade. Instead, wehope that it will produce successive cascades ofother psychological and cognitive effects, that thedirect physical effect and the first cascade indirectpsychological or cognitive effect will set off a furtherchain reaction of additional cascades ofpsychological and cognitive effects. The spread ofpanic in France both in the government and thecivilian population in the face the German blitzkriegof 1940 is a case in point.

However, notice as well something else that isperhaps even more significant. As illustrated inFigure 56, each of the physical effects in the diagram(both the initial direct physical effect and all thesubsequent indirect physical effects) can set offindirect psychological and cognitive effects. These inturn can themselves likewise set off cascades ofpsychological and cognitive effects.

Again, we can see this in the Normandy campaign.The overall psychological and cognitive effect ofthe bombing campaign can be traced to threedistinctly different sets of physical effects. In part itarose from the direct physical effect of thebombing, in part from the indirect physical effect ofthe collapse of the French railway system, and inpart from the indirect physical effect of the German


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inability to move reinforcements to Normandywhen the invasion began. The overall effect is tomultiply the impact of the initial action and theresulting direct effect geometrically. Thisphenomenon is a key aspect of the nonlinearimpact we seek in effects-based operations.

However, there is another aspect of this model thatwe need to note. The cognitive audience wouldhave been at least slightly different for each of thedirect and indirect physical effects cited above.Thus, the direct effect of the bombing mightperhaps have posed a more pressing dilemma forthose charged with railway repair. The indirecteffect of the collapse of the railway system mighthave had more of an impact on the thinking anddecisions of the German railway administrators andthe German High Command in the West. Theinability of the armored divisions to move intoNormandy might have had more of an impact onthe thinking of the German Headquarters Staff.

What this suggests is that, like each of the direct andindirect physical effects, each of these indirectpsychological effects can also produce other indirectpsychological and cognitive effects. And what is stillmore, the path of this cascade is likely to vary fromone incident to the next and from one observer to thenext. While the diagrams assume for the sake ofillustration that the initial direct effect will, in fact,provoke a chain reaction, the implication is clear.The cascade of effects set in motion by our originalaction can extend to an expanding set of indirecteffects both physical and psychological.

Planning an Effects Cascade The difficulty in orchestrating our actions exists notso much in simply setting off cascading effects as itdoes in determining where these cascades ofphysical and psychological effects might actuallylead. This is no small challenge. If we bear in mindthat the wars and crises as well as peacetimeactivities like exercises and port visits areinteractions between complex adaptive systems(e.g. states, militaries, or other humanorganizations), and if we consider that theseinteractions occur at multiple levels (e.g. units,military forces, and entire states), then it becomesclear that the ultimate extent of the effects cascadeor chain reaction could potentially be breathtaking inboth its scope and complexity. Setting such acascade in motion and predicting even roughlywhere it will lead is both the promise and thechallenge of effects-based operations. To addressthat challenge, however, we must understandsomething more of the complexity involved.

An example frequently used to describe complexityis that of a butterfly flapping its wings in Beijing andthereby producing a hurricane in the distant AtlanticOcean. The idea portrayed in the analogy is that, incomplex systems, very minute changes in one areacan provoke enormous changes in another,apparently unrelated area. The problem is that wecannot trace or explain the cause and effect chain bywhich the butterfly produces the hurricane nor figureout how to duplicate it. In a complex system, thecause and effect chain from the butterfly flapping its

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wings to the creation of the hurricane is simply toocomplex to either fully understand or predict. In the effects cascades, we too must deal with setsof complex systems and what we seek to exploit ineffects-based operations is exactly the possibility ofengineering the right set of relatively small actions tocreate a set of disproportionate effects. If thosedisproportionate effects are to shape behavior in thedirection we want, however, we must figure out firsthow to trace the path of an action to a certain effect,and then how to plan the right actions to set thechain in motion.

Of Dominoes and Ping-Pong BallsAt first blush, this sounds impossible. However, thefacts argue otherwise. The many historical examplesconsidered thus far demonstrate that we can in factcope with this kind of complexity. But the examplesdo more than simply indicate that this is possible.They show us how to deal with this complexity. The model of the effects cascades and theNormandy example points to a dichotomy betweenchains of physical effects on the one hand andthose of psychological and cognitive effects on theother. Both of these cascades are complex, but inthe Normandy and Middle East crisis examples, wecan identify two distinctly different sorts ofcomplexity at work.

Falling Dominoes

The chain reactions of physical effects operate in afashion analogous to falling dominoes. These


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domino chains may be relatively simple or, aschallenges to Guinness World Records exemplify,they may be very complex in nature with manyadditional chains branching off and they may be ofvery substantial length and scope. Despite thiscomplexity and even though we may not knowwhere the chains end, we can nevertheless tracethe flow of physical effects along the chain ratherreadily. More than that, we can predict a cause andeffect relationship between any two adjacentdominoes or even along entire stretches of thedomino chains with some degree of certainty.

Like the chains of physical effects, the fall ofdominoes takes a predictable duration of time tooccur. One domino must physically strike and pushover the next for the chain reaction to continue. Thelonger the chain, the longer time it will take tocomplete the entire reaction. Similarly, in theNormandy air campaign, the bombing had toproduce one effect (the reduction in the capacity ofthe French railroads) before the next effect (theprevention of panzer movements toward Normandy)could occur.

Ping-Pong Balls

The relative predictability of the above physicalchain reaction contrasts sharply with the chain ofpsychological and cognitive effects. That chainreaction is both more complex and moreinstantaneous than that represented by thedominoes. The psychological chain, instead, is moreanalogous to a demonstration in which Ping-Pongballs are placed on spring loaded mousetraps

across the entire floor of a room, and are then set offby tossing a single ball into the room. Even thoughthe cause of the subsequent chain reaction isobvious, we cannot predict with any certainty theexact course that chain reaction will take, the exactsequence in which the reactions will occur, or whichof the original balls if any might remain untouched atthe end of the reaction. As this suggests, we alsocannot predict the amount of time that the reactionwill take. We simply know that it will spread veryrapidly, and indeed geometrically, until there areeither no more mousetraps left un-sprung or untilthere are no more balls in the air and thus no furtherability to set off new reactions.

The situation is similar with the cascades ofpsychological and cognitive effects. An initialstimulus provokes a series of responses that in turnare the stimuli for still more responses. This patternwas very evident in the interaction of political,military, and economic actions and reactions duringthe three Middle East crises. Where we could predictcause and effect relationships along a domino chainof physical effects, we could not entirely predict theparallel chain of psychological and cognitive effects.

How do we deal with these two different kinds ofcomplexity so as to plan effects-based operations?

Chain Reactions of Physical Effects The relationship between a physical action and adirect physical effect and from one physical effect tothe next as exemplified in the fall of dominoes isrelatively straightforward and understandable (at


least for a limited number of causes and effects).The problem here is that, while we may be able tounderstand and predict this limited and largelylinear relationship over a limited number of links inthe chain, we cannot predict all of the potentialcascades that might take place. By extension, wecannot know the ultimate impact or all of the waysin which the direct effect we propose mightpotentially affect a particular situation.

“Pruning”

In the case of the Normandy air campaign, as inmost nodal targeting, we solve this problem at leastin part by bounding the complexity involved in someway. Typically, planners follow two approaches tothis end. They ignore the course of a cascadebeyond some certain point, which is usually theultimate objective they set for themselves, or theymay elect to ignore some entire chains of effects thattheir actions might set in motion.

In the Normandy example, the Allied air plannerslooked closely only at the first two cascades ofindirect physical effects: first, the railroad throughputcapacity degradation; and second, the ability ofGerman panzer divisions to move to the front. Theydeliberately ignored several entire additional chainsof indirect physical effects that might have resultedfrom their initial direct effect.

For one, however accurate Allied pilots might try tobe, the bombing of rail junctures and rail yards indensely populated areas would have inevitablycreated significant collateral damage and large

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numbers of French civilian casualties, which in facthappened. Given the stakes involved in a successfulinvasion, however, the Allies at least partially ignoredthe importance of that possible cascade of physicaleffects. It was subordinated to the pressing militaryneed to reduce the performance of the rail systemand thereby keep the German armor away from theinvasion beaches.18 Similarly, while rendering the railsystem incapable of operation would have had theindirect effect of preventing the German armoreddivisions from moving toward Normandy, it wouldalso prevent the movement of food and goods tosupport the local French civilian population.

In the context of a war for survival, the Alliedplanners deliberately chose to ignore a series ofpossible effects that might otherwise have put anend to any hope of meeting their primary objective ofdefeating Nazi Germany.

We can recognize here that the approach taken bythe planners was to bound the complexity of theproblem by “pruning” the tree of potential effectschains to some limited number for consideration(see Figure 57).

In planning effects-based operations, we can dolikewise. We can set a limit to how far we are willingto pursue a particular chain of cascading effects. Wecan also identify which chains of effects we want toconsider, and which we can prudently set aside.Where we do this “pruning” is a function of the riskcalculus we apply. In the Normandy case, it was theresult of decisions made by Roosevelt and Churchillas to which political, military, and economic risksthey were prepared to accept and where.

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These risks, as the Normandy example makes plain,will be a function of a particular situation. In general,the less dire the circumstances to which we mustrespond, the less will be the differences in the risksand consequences of each chain and the moredifficult it will be to ignore some chains. The moredire the circumstances, as in the case of a war forsurvival, the easier it will be to prune the chains andaccept the risks.

Psychological Effects ChainsIn the Normandy example, as in the chains ofdominoes, there was a predictable relationship fromone physical effect to the next. The number ofbridges and rail yard junctions destroyed had adirect, predictable, and quantifiable relationship tothe performance of the railroad system.19 In turn, therailroad performance had a direct andunderstandable relationship to the Germans’ abilityto move armored divisions to the invasion area.Similarly, among those pruned chains of physicaleffects to be ignored was the effect of the decreasein railroad performance upon the ability to providefood to the local French population.

This relative predictability is not the case in thechains of psychological and cognitive effects.Instead, the degree of complexity involved in thepsychological chains is multiplied by two factorsevident in the Ping-Pong ball chain reaction. First,because there is no need to wait for one set ofphysical effects to engender a physical outcomebefore giving rise to a succeeding effect, the speedat which the cascade can propagate is far greater.


In essence, the speed of the reaction is the speedof communications because it is by thecommunications that the reaction spreads. Second,because there are no physical limits to the chain,the ultimate scale and scope of the psychological-cognitive cascade can be global.

As in the example of the butterfly and the hurricane,the relationship between the links in the chain ofpsychological and cognitive effects is usually indirectand nonlinear. They are not predictable in the senseof the relationship between railway performance andGerman mobility, nor are they easily quantified. Wecannot predict the ultimate outcome of thepsychological cascade (for example, a cause andeffect linkage between the effectiveness of thebombing campaign in Normandy and the plot to killHitler in East Prussia). We may not even be able topredict an initial set of outcomes reliably. Thus, wewill not be sure of the form the cascades may take orthe speed and extent of the chain of psychologicaland cognitive effects we set in motion.20

If we were to assume the kind of seemingly randomspread that is implied by the complexities involved inthe psychological cascades, then the number ofpossible outcomes that might accrue from an actionbecomes nearly infinite. The core question forplanning and executing psychological and cognitiveeffects, therefore, becomes that of somehowbounding the scope of this complexity to a workablesize. Here again, the problem we face is not new.We have dealt with similar complex chains in thepast. Accordingly, the history of what has succeededor failed in past wars and crises provides an insight

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to bound the complexity. As in the three Middle Eastcrises examined earlier, it is apparent that thedecisionmakers at all levels reacted as they did andchose the courses of action that they did exactlybecause they could predict roughly what parts of thecognitive chains would be. It is also evident that, inthese crisis interactions, commanders anddecisionmakers at all levels did not assume acomplex and perfectly random spread ofpsychological effects.

If we study the history of the Middle East crises, itbecomes apparent that the decisionmakers at alllevels did two things. First, they again pruned thenumber of chains and cascades of psychologicaland cognitive effects that they would consider,bounding the complexity involved. Second, theyassumed that there would be a structured flow to thecognitive effects that they created.21

Part of the complexity of the cascade ofpsychological and cognitive effects arises from thefact that any action taken can be observed byvirtually anyone, and that these actions shape thebehavior of “friends, foes, and neutrals” (see Figure58). Since each observer, whether a human beingor organization, will perceive a single action in lightof a particular idiosyncratic mental model,background, and agenda, a single action will tendto produce a large number of very different chainsof psychological and cognitive effects for eachobserver. A single action or set of actions,therefore, will tend to produce different behavior ina friendly observer from that in an enemy observer.


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If we look to the examples presented by the 1967-1973 Middle East crises, it is evident thatdecisionmakers pruned this complexity bydeliberately limiting the number of potentialpsychological chains to certain players or groups ofplayers in some order of priority. While this is tosome degree analogous to the decision to ignoremany of the psychological repercussions of the1944 Normandy bombings, there is an importantdifference. In the Normandy case, the pruning wasnonreactive. It largely took place in the planningprocess that preceded the strike operations anddoes not appear to have been significantlyrevised.22 In all three of the Middle East crises, bycontrast, we can trace distinct changes to thepruning as the crisis evolved.

In the early stages of the Middle East crises, bothSoviet and American decisionmakers tended tolook at the effects of their actions in terms ofmultiple chains of cognitive effects. At a minimum,they considered the potential responses of theirsuperpower opponent, the reactions of theirrespective NATO or Warsaw Pact Allies, those oftheir local client states, and those of the neutrals inthe area (four principal chains, each of which mighthave ancillary chains for each country comprisingthe category). However, in the most dangerousmoments of the Soviet-American confrontations,the cognitive focus of the decisionmakers focusedon the single chain of cognitive effects that wasmost consequential: the potential reactions of theother superpower.23


In essence, the decisionmakers pruned the decisiontree as they went. They were aware that additionalchains of psychological and cognitive effects wouldinevitably be created by their actions, but whenpressed by events, they subordinated theseconsiderations to their most dangerous concern, thereactions of the opposing superpower.

Structured Flow of Effects

Although this pruning may reduce the number ofchains of psychological and cognitive effects to beconsidered at any one time, it still leaves us with theproblem of trying to anticipate the flow of effectsalong those chains that remain. Given a largenumber of potential observers and decisionmakersin the remaining chain, we are still left with thepotential for a nearly infinite number of possiblevariations in where and how fast a cognitive effectwill spread and the impact it will have on behavior.How then might we bound this complexity to thepoint that we could plan operations based on arational assessment of the changes in behavior thatwould result from a particular set of actions?

If we reexamine the three Middle East crises, it isclear that the decisionmakers at each level of theinteraction accompanied the process of pruningpsychological and cognitive effects with anotherform of complexity bounding. They assumed thatthe flow of psychological and cognitive effects wouldnot be random and, thus, infinitely varied. Theyassumed that the observers of their actions wererational decisionmakers who were operating in thecontext of a rational decisionmaking structure.24

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Notice that this does not mean that they were“mirror-imaging” or assuming that the otherdecisionmakers would react as they would. Rather,they assumed that the other decisionmakers wouldperceive and react logically within the rationality oftheir own national and institutional cultures. Theyfurther assumed that organizations (governments,military units, and bureaucracies) would do likewise.Then, into this logical framework of the rationaldecisionmaker, they inserted what they knew of theparticular foe or ally and the particulardecisionmaking structure they faced. This is to say,the decisionmakers attempted to bound the chaoticcomplexity of a purely random spread ofpsychological effects by assuming that any effectscreated would flow in a rational, structured manner. We can represent this rational, structured flow interms of an ordered “nesting” of effects (see Figure59). In the nest, we assume that actions observed atthe tactical level would create a cognitive effect thatwould be propagated from the tactical level all theway to the national command authority. That is, weassume that psychological and cognitive effectswould flow in some logical pattern.While this nesting was used to explain theinterrelationship of effects and actions on our ownside, it was also a major feature of the militaryoperations of both superpowers and their clientstates during all three of the Middle East crises.More to the point, the model of a nested, logical flowof effects was employed by decisionmakers at thenational or geo-strategic level to direct militaryactions. Thus, the movement of the U.S. Sixth Fleet


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toward the coast of Syria in the 1967 crisis, thedispatch of a carrier transport aircraft to Israel duringthe 1970 crisis, and the movements andreinforcement of the Sixth Fleet during the 1973crisis were all executed specifically because theywould be observed and reported and because thecognitive effect would be rapidly propagated along arational and predictable path. In each case, the assumption of a logical flow wenta step further. The decisionmakers from theoperational level upwards assumed that specifictactical military actions would create cognitiveeffects that not only would rise through a militarychain of command, but also that these militaryeffects would cross over into at least the politicalarena. They also assumed that the cognitive effectsgrowing from these military actions would combinewith the psychological and cognitive effects wroughtby diplomatic, political, and economic actions so asto create a single overall effect that would thenshape the observers’ behavior in the desireddirection (see Figure 60).

There is, of course, a down side to this. For both themilitary and political decisionmakers, the assumptionof a structured flow also meant accepting two things:(1) the effects of any military action undertakenwould not and could not be limited to the militaryoutcome of a specific individual engagement; and(2) the effects of any military action might extend toanyone who could observe that action.


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Coalition Operations: Ours andTheirsImplicit in these nesting assumptions is yet anotherlevel of complication. The interactions representedby the nest are not likely to be those of just one stateor just one organization trying to coordinate itsactions so as to deal with the reactions of anothersingle state or even with those of a singleorganization.25 26 27 The likelihood of multi-nation ormulti-organizational interactions has two significantimpacts. It multiplies the complications ofcoordinating a unified effect, and in the case of anopposing coalition, it provides an additionalcomplexity to exploit.

Conducting Coalition OperationsOver the past half-century, many of the crises andconflicts in which we have found ourselves engagedinvolved either alliances such as the North AtlanticAlliance, or coalitions.28 This fact suggests that, farfrom being able to prune complexity by largelyignoring or diminishing the reactions of our partners,we will instead be confronted by a pressing need tofactor these chains of psychological and cognitiveeffects into the complexity of our effects nest. Thischallenge is threefold.

• First, we need to recognize that, in the strictestsense of an alliance or coalition, there is nosingle unified objective and therefore, no singleunified effect that can be created. Rather, anyalliance or coalition will represent a collection ofnational or organizational objectives that may


more or less coincide, but that will never beentirely the same. The national interests of eachstate (or non-state) actor will always be differentin some respect. In an alliance, the coincidenceof national interests and objectives and thus, ageneral agreement on the effects to be soughtmay be long-term and habitual. In a coalition,any such accord may be very temporary.Deciding on the overall effect or outcome to beachieved by the coalition is therefore likely toinvolve some considerable degree ofnegotiation and compromise.29 In other words,multi-state or multi-actor effects-basedoperations are likely to have a strong politicalaspect to them. This means that coordinatingthe actions and desired effects of a coalitionand responding to the actions of a foe are likelyto be cumbersome. This process will be stillmore cumbersome where there is no history ofcooperation and no established modality ofresolving conflicting national objectives.

• Second, whereas in a one-on-one, state-on-state interaction an adversary would tend toregard all of the actions of an individualgovernment as interrelated parts of acoordinated effort, in alliance or coalitionoperations, the contrary is likely to be true. Theadversary or adversaries will be looking forexploitable discord in the coalition and willsearch out any indication of such discord in theactions of individual coalition members. Thus,however unified the coalition effort, any misstepor conflict of actions failure at any level of theoperation will tend to be treated as an

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opportunity to split the coalition and will have adisproportionately negative impact on the overalleffect the coalition may be trying to create.

• Third, as we have seen, effects are cumulativeover time and create a history of previousactions that either can be built upon or thatmust be overcome. However, in the case of analliance or a coalition, this history is additiveacross the membership. The previous actionsof each individual member contribute to ahistory of the coalition as a whole. If a coalitionmember has a history of weak governmentsand desultory participation in joint efforts, or ofmilitary forces with little capacity for the kindsof operations required, then these factors willdiminish the effect that can be achieved.Similarly, if the members have a colonialhistory in a given area, this will be part of themental models and experiences of theobservers that the coalition must eitherovercome or build upon.

Coalition Effects Nests

If we return to the diagram of an effects nest, and ifwe assume the same basic rule sets that applied tothe original nest, we can postulate a coalition nestalong the lines depicted in Figure 61.

In this diagram, all of the problems associated withtrying to coordinate actions and plan effects overthe four levels of military operations and over threeor more arenas are multiplied by the number ofactive members in the alliance or coalition. Each


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actor will have operational commanders trying tocoordinate the actions of various tactical units. Eachwill also have a military staff trying to coordinate abroader military effort. Each will have a nationalleadership trying to balance political, economic, andmilitary actions so as to accomplish a nationalobjective. Thus, the complexity represented by thenest is multiplied by the number of activeparticipants in the coalition operation.

We also need to look at this coalition nestingstructure from the standpoint of how it deals with thestimulus and response of effects-based operations.Each of the partners, for example, might have air,sea, and/or ground forces in the field and thus, thepossibility of tactical level interactions with theadversary. Hence, the number of potential physicaland psychological chains that could be createdwould also be multiplied by the number ofparticipants. While the physical effects of each suchinteraction might remain confined to the local area ofthe engagement, this cannot be said of the cognitiveeffects.30 These latter effects are likely to spread notonly through the coalition partner’s own nest, butalso through those of other members.

To make matters worse, this spread is not likely to besimply from one national command authority to thenext, but will also be from one member to the next ateach level of command. Thus, a tactical level actionmight spread to other nations’ forces in adjacentareas, from one commander to his peers in otherforces, and from one national military staff to thenext. This suggests a geometrically expandingopportunity for confusion and misinformation that


would only be mitigated by a common understandingof the ground truth situation awareness. Thissuggests that the ability to control coalition confusionwill only be as good as the awareness of theweakest link.

Still worse, each interaction will have the potentialfor providing an uncoordinated, contradictory, ornullifying stimulus to the opponent. Each mayequally be the recipient of a stimulus that willresound through the coalition. As indicated in ourdiscussion of the cascade of psychological effects,these effects will spread at the speed ofcommunications. In each case, the speed of thosecommunications and the extent of the spread willtend to vary with the nature of the effect. The moreserious the implications of an action, the farther andmore rapid the spread is likely to be.

As difficult as all of the above sounds, it doesunderline two things. First, the better the situationawareness and understanding of intent are acrossthe coalition, the more likely it is that the participantswill be able to deconflict their actions so as toachieve a unity of effect. Second, the moreexperience nations and forces have in operatingtogether, the more likely they are to be able to dealwith the complexities of coalition operations.

Exploiting the Hostile CoalitionAlthough most of our threat scenarios deal withsituations in which the United States and coalitionpartners confront a single nation-state opponent, wemay not be confronted with a single entity, but rather

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with some group of actors. Although such anopposing coalition may be of states in the sense of aclassic symmetric conflict, it also may be of tribes,ethnic dissidents, and/or terrorist organizations in anasymmetric conflict.

If we look more closely at the wars and crises of thelast half-century, we often have had to deal withsome form of coalition ranged against us, even ifmulti-state military operations against Americanforces were not the norm. Each of the three MiddleEast crises surveyed can be described as aconfrontation between two loose coalitions (theSoviet Union and its local clients versus the UnitedStates and its local clients), even though the armedconflict in each case was confined to the localclients. Similarly, in the Cuban Missile Crisis, wecan see not only a confrontation between theSoviet Union and the United States, but alsoactions by coalition partners on both sides such asCuba and the Organization of American States. Wecan further see in the Afghan War another loosecoalition between the Taliban Government ofAfghanistan and an international terroristorganization, al-Qaida. With al-Qaida, we can eventrace a loose coalition of radical Islamist groups topursue operations around the world with the wholecoalition sponsored both by states and a series ofnongovernmental organizations.

If we look more closely still, we can see that in mostgovernments or organizations, power is shared insome form of internal coalition. These internalcoalitions may be formalized in the context of aparliamentary government, or it may reflect


precarious and potentially very tenuous balancing ofpolitical factions, social, and ethnic groups, as in thecase of the Milosoevic government in Yugoslaviaduring the NATO peacekeeping operation in Kosovo.In many respects, these internal arrangements alsofunction as a classic interstate coalition.

The salient point here is that the complexities ofcoalition operations work both ways. Howeverdifficult it is for us to coordinate a coalition operation,it is equally hard for the opposing coalition, whetherit is of nations, organizations, or groups. Herein liesan opportunity. If we look closely at the historicalexamples of coalitions and the problems theyencountered, two things become obvious. First, thesame problems that confront us in coordinatingcoalition effects-based operations also afflict theadversary. Second, the same kinds of rules andsome version of coalition nesting continue to apply.

In each coalition, we can see that an action createsa physical effect that somehow crosses into thecognitive domain as an indirect effect. That indirectpsychological effect then stands to propagatethrough the successive levels of some form ofcontrol structure (intrastate, state or otherwise), thatprobably has discernible tactical, operational, andstrategic levels. It may also propagate into otherarenas, for example to the political arm or financingof a terrorist organization.31 Where this structureoperates with other groups in a coalition, thepsychological effects will propagate to other coalitionmembers. The same complexities that confront usare likely to plague the opposition as well and theymay be similarly exploited.

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We do not need to mirror an arrangement of statesas coalition partners in order to conduct such anti-coalition effects-based operations. On the contrary,the ability to exploit the complexities involved islikely to be most pronounced in those coalitionsfarthest from the standard models of states-versus-states or of an internal parliamentary arrangement.Five aspects of this coalition complexity are ofprimary concern.

• Any accord on a course of action within acoalition is likely to be time-sensitive. Theinterests of nations, organizations, and factionschange over time and tend to do so especiallyrapidly as they attempt to adapt to a challenge.The looser the coalition and the moreheterogeneous the membership, the morefleeting the accord is likely to be. In most cases,the partners in an asymmetric conflict coalitionwill not have had a long history of operationstogether. In many cases, they will not haveanything more than a negative generalagreement. They may agree only on the need tostrike at America and the West, but not on anyspecific long-term plan. As a result, each willtend to react separately to stimuli andcoordination of efforts is likely to be difficult.

• Also, an ad hoc coalition of entities with nohistory of working together is likely to besubject to the same problems that weexperience in managing our own coalitions andmay be considerably more susceptible tofracture. Partners often bring a history ofdistrust and suspicion to the coalition, which


compounds the tendency to look at eachmisaction as evidence of ill intent or an attemptto pursue individual interests at the expense ofthe group.

• As in our own coalition nesting model, stimuliapplied to the nest at any level will tend toproduce a chain reaction of psychologicaleffects that propagates throughout the nest.The right stimulus applied to one part of thecoalition therefore has the potential to alter thebehavior of the entire coalition.32

• The opposing coalition will also have somerational decisionmaking structure throughwhich the stimuli and the psychological effectswill flow. The closer an actor resembles astate, the more stable the structure is likely tobe. The less like a state the member is, theless stable the decisionmaking structure islikely to be. And, when a coalition mixes stateand non-state actors, the tensions between thevarious decisionmaking structures and theways in which they react to stimuli are likely tobe pronounced.

• Finally, the speed of communications at whichthe flow of stimuli and effects occur will varybetween members depending on the level ofshared awareness within the coalition, and theorganization and sophistication of theindividual coalition partners. This can alsoprovide seeds of discord.

Each of the above suggests a difference betweentwo opposing coalitions that is analogous to the

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edge of chaos we discussed in Chapter 2. Like thebetter trained and equipped unit, the coalition withthe superior organization, communications, sharedawareness, and stability wrought by a history ofcollaboration will have a distinct advantage. Eachalso represents a potential opportunity to exploitadversaries’ vulnerabilities by planning andexecuting effects-based operations to create andexacerbate the differences that are part of anycoalition.

Complexity and PlanningThe message of this chapter is that complexity isinherently a part of effects-based operations and isindeed what gives them their nonlinear impact,whether from cascading physical or psychologicaleffects. What we have sketched here are both waysof bounding the complexity involved in planning andexecuting an effects-based operation and ways ofexploiting the parallel complexities faced by ouropponents. As this underlines, the better able weare to deal with the complexity (in our thinking, inour internal and coalition organization, and in oursupport to decisionmaking at all levels), the lesslikely an opponent will be to use it successfullyagainst us and the more likely it is that we will be toexploit the complexity to our own advantage.

1The fact that these descriptions are historical rather thantheoretical is significant here because it demonstrates thatthe complexities described above, however daunting theymay be, have routinely been handled in military anddiplomatic interactions for centuries. The challenge is deriving


the lessons from these interactions that will better enable usto understand what was going on and to apply the emergingcapabilities of network-centric operations to them. 2It is worth noting again that at Midway, neither the action (theYorktown’s presence) nor the observation and reporting wasintentional on the part of the Americans, and that thesubsequent cascade of effects was neither planned norunderstood by the Americans at the time. 3Even though we routinely accept this idea of a chain ofeffects, we should also note that this expectation of asuccession of derivative effects differs somewhat from theexpectations involved in a pure attrition model. Onedifference is obvious. In both of the cases shown above, nophysical damage was inflicted in the initial physical effect norcould the outcome of the entire chain be described in termsof a level of destruction, whereas in a pure attrition model,success would be defined in terms of what was destroyed.However, another, perhaps greater difference is that instraight-line physical attrition such as that at Verdun in 1916,the destruction itself would have been the objective of theoperation and the question of any other effects would havebeen largely ignored. In an attrition model, there are onlydirect physical effects. Yet, the fact of the matter is thatexamples of straight-line attrition such as Verdun arerelatively rare. In most military combat operations, we do seekto create chains of physical effects in order to multiply theimpact of our actions. Also, we do seek in some way to breakthe opponent’s will and move from simply creating a physicaleffect to creating a still more far-reaching psychologicaleffect.4Pogue, Forrest. The Supreme Command. Washington, DC;Department of the Army. 1954. pp. 124ff. 5Churchill. Closing the Ring. p. 528.6Pogue. p. 127.7Taken in the context of pure Lanchestrian attrition, thedestruction of the rail facilities had a logic all of its own. Thebombing of rail targets as a category served to eliminatesome portion of the French railroad transportation network inthe expectation that, when a large enough portion of thatnetwork was destroyed, the system would be unable tofunction and thus produce the desired effects. If we were tofollow the logic of pure attrition-based warfare, we mightexpect that strikes on rail yards would cumulatively achievethe requisite level of destruction for the system to collapse.8In fact, the Germans showed a remarkable ability to repairthe damages to the rail system as a result of Allied air strikes,often opening junctions within 48 hours of their destruction.

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Similarly, although Allied bombings destroyed some 1,700locomotives and 25,000 rail cars in the weeks before D-Day,this amounted to only a small percentage of the total availablerolling stock. SHAEF Weekly Intelligence Summary. No. 11, 3June 1944.8Churchill. Closing the Ring. p. 528.9That capacity had been reduced to 69 percent of the January1944 level by mid-May 1944, and to just 38 percent of thatlevel by D-Day.Ambrose, Stephen. D-Day June 6, 1944. New York;Touchstone. 1994. p. 97.10Tedder, Sir Arthur. With Prejudice. London; Cassell. 1966.pp. 524ff.11It is clear from the comments of German generalsinterviewed after the war that the Allied success in this regardwas very discouraging as it was “ruinous to theircounteroffensive plans.” Pogue, p. 132.12Tedder, p. 524.13The direct physical effect that sets off a cascade of indirectpsychological effects may be “felt” in terms of destructioninflicted and options foreclosed, or it may be in terms of amaneuver observed, an announcement made, a diplomaticnote delivered, or a bank deposit frozen, to name just a fewexamples.14Churchill’s description of this despair and inability to actcoherently is vivid.Churchill. Their Finest Hour. pp. 322ff. 15Again the example of the reactions to the blitzkrieg of 1940is relevant. In that case, the sense of panic in the Frenchmilitary and political leadership that occurred as a result of theswift German offensive brought the British Prime MinisterChurchill to refuse any further commitment of Royal Air Forceassets to what he perceived to be a lost cause. Similarly, theimminent French collapse brought another passive observer,Mussolini, to conclude that he could safely launch anoffensive of his own against France. This spread ofpsychological effects rapidly became pervasive and set off achain of effects of its own in multiple directions. Churchill. The Gathering Storm. pp. 132ff.16These possibilities were in fact the subject of much debateby both the Allied military and political leadership, despite theagreement of the Free French to the bombing campaign. Thematter was deemed of such importance that the final choiceto ignore the collateral damage and casualties physicaleffects paths fell to Roosevelt and Churchill.


Churchill. Closing the Ring. pp.528-531.17Eisenhower, Dwight D. The Eisenhower Diaries. New York;Norton. 1981. pp. 114-115.18This was done after consulting with the Free Frenchleadership, which endorsed the plan despite the collateraldamage entailed. Pogue, p. 128.19This was certainly reflected in the SHAEF intelligencereporting that, by D-Day 1944, the French rail system was at38 percent of its pre-bombing capacity. SHAEF Weekly Intelligence Report No. 11, 3 June 1944.20Although the information revolution has increased both thespeed and the scope of communications dramatically, neitherthe speed nor the scope is uniform across all opponents or allobservers. This phenomenon was very evident in the spreadof information during the operations in Afghanistan during2001-2. This “communication quotient” thus becomes yetanother variable to be considered in plotting the potentialspread of psychological and cognitive effects. 21In fact, in the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, it was the speedof the cognitive effects that made the signaling between thetwo superpowers possible at critical moments of the crises.22Obviously, the results of the air strikes were closelymonitored so as to ensure that the 93 targets on the list werein fact destroyed and to trace any efforts to repair the damagethat might necessitate a second strike. However, there wasno significant change to the German posture as a result of thebombings and thus no further change in the chains ofphysical effects at the core of the air campaign plan. 23This was most apparent at the geo-strategic level in theinteractions between the two national command authorities,but it is also apparent at the level of the operationalcommanders. Thus, in each crisis, the Commander of theUnited States Sixth Fleet started the interaction with multipledirections of concern and narrowed his focus to the actions ofhis Soviet opponent as the crisis turned into a major militaryconfrontation. Not surprisingly, a similar shift in the tacticalfocus of both sides followed. 24These bounding assumptions reflected the prior knowledgeand mental models of the decisionmakers involved. Yet, asshown in the Middle East crises, the models and knowledgeare not so esoteric as to make them inapplicable to thesituation. On the contrary, the assumptions of rationaldecisionmakers operating in a rational decisionmakingcontext were shared by all the participants in the crises (notonly the Soviets and Americans, but equally by the Arabs and

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Israelis and major allies of the two superpowers). Theyrecognized that, at a minimum, the effect of the action wouldbe cumulative over time and contribute to the history ofactions upon which an observer’s future decisions would bebased and, thus, shape his future behavior.25In approaching the problem of multi-actor effects-basedoperations, we will assume that since the rule sets examinedearlier describe effects-based operations in general ratherthan any peculiarly American approach, those rules willcontinue to operate and impose similar kinds of coordinationproblems. As in the case of an individual actor, therefore, wewill assume that all of the actions of any player that can beobserved will be observed by the other actors. And, in thecase of coalition partners, we will likewise assume that theeffect created by each action will combine with the effectswrought by all other actions, and have either a positive or anegative impact on the overall effect created by the coalitionas a whole.26This was in fact the case in the creation of the“Transportation Plan” aerial bombing campaign in Normandy,which had to take into account not only the different desiresof the British and American governments but also thecompeting demands of the U.S. Army Air Corps and Royal AirForce (which saw the operations as detracting from thestrategic bombing campaign against Germany), and theSupreme Commander (who saw the “Transportation Plan” asso essential to the success of the invasion that he threatenedto resign his command over the issue). Eisenhower. p. 114. 27Tedder, pp. 524ff. 28Churchill. Closing the Ring. pp. 528-9. 29Coalitions can be defined as ad hoc alignments of states orgroups which arise to deal with a particular threat or problemand which disperse when the problem is resolved.30In most cases, this latter situation will mean that eachpartner would be operating under a set of national rules ofengagement or instructions while attempting to coordinate aswell as possible with the other partners.31In these engagements, the passive players would includenot only national forces in adjacent patrol stations, but also allcoalition forces in the area. If the interaction were to result inhostilities, then all coalition units might become activeparticipants and with them, their respective nations. At aminimum, such an uncontrolled interaction would mostcertainly become a stimulus confronting both the military andcivilian leadership at all levels. This is to say that, in acoalition operation, the effect of an action by the opponent


could be not only to expand abruptly the scope of theinteraction to other warfare areas, but to do so across thebreadth of the coalition. 32It should be noted, however, that in a loose coalition of thetype described, actions are not likely to be as coordinated asthose demonstrated by the United States or the Soviet Unionin the three Middle East crises. Thus, the expectation of analmost instantaneous relay and impact of military actions thatcharacterized those crises needs to be tempered by arealistic assessment of what the opposing nest will look likeand just how fast its speed of communications is likely to be.

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CHAPTER 8

DynamicEffects-Based

Operations:The Challenge

of EffectsAssessment and

FeedbackIf we accept the maxim that no plan survives first

contact with the enemy, then it stands to reasonthat it is not enough for a commander to orchestratethe opening engagement of an effects-basedoperation. No matter how good this preplanning maybe and no matter what the scale of any initial strike,no single military action by itself is likely to create theoverall outcome sought. What is far more likely,indeed almost inevitable, is that the initial operationwill be followed by a succession of additional action-reaction cycles in which each side adapts to thechallenges of the other. It is a reality of war that, in

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these successive cycles, the enemy will notintentionally cooperate with the commander’s plansand will seldom fight in the manner expected.Elementary prudence dictates that commanders atall levels assume the reverse. They must plan for anintelligent adversary who will be determined todefeat their efforts by whatever means possible.

Stating the above in terms of complexity theoryreinforces this interactive, give-and-take view ofbattle. In this context, war is seen as a clashbetween complex adaptive systems, be they states,non-states, armies, guerrillas, or terrorists. In theseclashes, each side will attempt to preserve itself as asystem and must adapt to and deal with anychallenge presented. Furthermore, given thecomplex nature of the human organizations involvedin these clashes, we should expect that theseadaptations would take forms that we will never beable to predict entirely.1

In the history we have reviewed, we can also seethat both these realities of war and the challengesassociated with them are not in fact restricted to war.Rather, the realities and challenges are in one wayor another true of all interactions between complexadaptive human organizations whether in peace,crisis, or war. Opposing sides maneuver to protecttheir interests and adapt to the challenges presentedin new and innovative ways. This is true even whenthe challenges are denominated in primarily politicalor economic terms, rather than military terms. Inshort, the give-and-take is characteristic of theinteractions of all complex adaptive systems and notjust of a war between two nation-states.2


Accordingly, if our concept is to have any value, wemust be able to adapt our effects-based operationsto evolving situations in peace, crisis, and war at allfour levels of conflict, and across the political-diplomatic, economic, and military arenas. That is,we must be able to conduct dynamic effects-basedoperations that account for the ebb and flow of abattle, a crisis, and of all the interactions we mayhave with both the state and non-state actors thatpopulate our national security environment.

However, there is a hitch. If commanders at any levelare to adapt effects-based operations to a changingbattlefield or crisis situation, and if they are to beproactive rather than reactive, then they will needsome form of continual feedback on the effects oftheir actions. Such effects assessment would alsoneed to address the changes in behavior that anenemy might be trying to force upon us and thedirection that any succession of effects-basedaction-reaction cycles might be taking. It must alsotell the commander how his actions affect thebehavior of others who observe his actions. Withoutthe right kind of feedback, commanders will neitherbe able to respond intelligently to enemy actions noroptimize their own actions in the manner foreseen byNetwork Centric Warfare theory.3

This requirement for feedback raises two morequestions: First, how do we measure the success ofeffects-based operations from one interaction to thenext so as to determine how best to adapt andrespond? And second, how do we do so with atimeliness commensurate with the speed ofcommand that we seek to exploit in network-centric

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operations? The challenge posed by thesequestions is even more formidable because itimplies that we must somehow measure thebehavior of complex adaptive organizations, abehavior that by definition we can never entirely andprecisely know or predict.

The abundance of historical examples of effects-based operations makes a salient point here. Forthe past 50 years and more, successfulcommanders at all levels have been coping with thesame problem. They have done so by mixingintuition and ad hoc metrics, and they havemanaged to use uncertain and often ambiguousfeedback to make decisions. They did so notbecause the metrics and feedback were what theyearnestly desired, but because they had no choice.They had to make decisions at critical moments andtherefore had to use whatever information andmetrics were available at the time. This suggeststhat if we study how past commanders at all levelsapproached the challenge, what they needed toknow, and how they obtained and used it, then wemight also be able to understand how to apply thecapabilities of the Information Age to the task.

The Normandy Air Campaign, 1944 One good example of this coping is the 1944Normandy air campaign used in the precedingchapter to describe the cascade of effects. We cancontinue this example to trace the requirements formultiple different kinds of measures of effectiveness,how each contributed to the feedback needed tosupport the operation, and how different kinds of


measurements were balanced to that end. We canalso use this example to see how planners andcommanders dealt with the ambiguities anduncertainties that were an inherent part of theplanning and execution of the campaign.

As we have seen, the Normandy air campaign wasfocused on a particular end-state or overall military-strategic effect: the isolation of the intended Alliedlanding areas from a riposte by German armoreddivisions in the regions of the Pas de Calais andsouth of the Loire River.4 Because the successfulexecution of the air campaign was seen as aprerequisite to the success of the invasion itself, itsexecution involved decisionmaking at all levels fromthe tactical through the national leaderships ofBritain and the United States. This multi-levelinvolvement of commanders makes the Normandyexample particularly useful because it offers us anopportunity to see what the requirements forfeedback were at each level and how theserequirements were accommodated with a mixture ofthree different metrics applied to an array ofobservable actions.

• Bomb Damage Assessment

The first and most obvious measurement of effectsused in the air campaign was the assessment of thephysical damage to the rail yards, junctions, andbridges along the principal routes leading to theNormandy battlefields. In the context of the effects-based desired end-state, this essentially attrition-based metric assumed a new dimension. The bombdamage assessment was not just a running tally ofthe amount of destruction in the manner of a body

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count. Instead, it was an index of whether or not anaction had been completed as planned and whetheror not it had had the immediate or direct effect thatthe air campaign planners intended.5 In theNormandy example, this meant that the plannersneeded to determine whether the 93 facilitiesdesignated as critical nodes in the French railwaysystem6 were no longer functional or whether theyrequired a restrike so as to ensure that the desireddirect effect on the railway system was achieved.

Despite this effects-based context, the process wasrelatively straightforward, quantifiable, and littlechanged from the traditional attrition-basedapplication. Post-strike photography was examinedto gauge the damage to targets and the resultswere provided to commanders. The speed of thisprocess varied only with the collection, execution,processing and reading of the photography,variables that could largely be controlled by thetactical and operational commands involved in theoperation. This reporting was supplemented byintelligence from the French Résistance, which wasmore detailed but was delayed to a degree thatbecame unacceptable in the latter days of thecampaign as D-Day approached.

• Railway System Performance

For the Allied commanders and operational levelair campaign planners involved in the operation,however, the key measure of effects was notsimply the destruction of particular rail facilities.Their principal interest was in the cascades ofindirect physical effects that they hoped would


grow from that destruction. Thus, they soughtfeedback from two very different measures ofeffect: the ability of the rail system as a whole toperform; and the ability of additional Germanarmored divisions to be brought forward quicklyenough to affect the Allied landings in Normandy.7

This demanded an assessment not of damage, butof system performance.

This assessment was obligatorily multi-level. Itentailed measuring the throughput capacity of therail lines both before and after the destruction of thecritical nodes. It also involved observing andmeasuring the ability of the rail system to adapt tothe destruction inflicted by repairing the damageand/or by finding work-arounds. Finally, it alsorequired the continual observation of the movementsof the German armored divisions that were to beprevented from approaching the invasion beaches,both to gauge the threat to Allied operations and totake advantage of any opportunities for Allied airstrikes that may have been created by bottling upthe divisions along the routes into Normandy.8

Such multi-level assessment was more difficult,complex, and time-consuming than simple bombdamage assessment. Measuring the throughputcapacity of a rail system meant assembling adatabase to establish a norm from which changescould be calculated and then observing themovements along the rail lines over time after therail nodes had been attacked and destroyed. It alsomeant observing what bypasses were beingcreated9 and then determining what throughputcapacity each work-around would support. It also

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meant observing how quickly and completelyrepairs were being accomplished and thus, how thediminished throughput capacity was changing overtime. A similar challenge was encountered intracking the efforts of German military forces toreach Normandy by other means.

Notice that in the case of these performance metrics,real-time feedback was not an option. Theinformation required was both too complex for asimple read-out and it changed continually overtime. This delay, however, was quite acceptable in acampaign lasting many weeks and the intelligencereporting of the French Résistance, even thoughlate, became a more critical part of the feedback.

• German and French Behavior

For the air campaign planners, the Alliedcommanders at SHAEF, and the nationalleaderships of Britain and the United States, perhapsthe most pressing concern was the indirectpsychological effects, which almost caused PrimeMinister Churchill to turn down the entire project. Inthe case of the air campaign planners and theSHAEF staff, the concern over these indirectpsychological effects appeared in a reverse context.Their most pressing fear was that the focus of the aircampaign should not disclose the location of theinvasion and thus induce the Germans to reinforcethe Normandy area with forces then being held inthe area of the Pas de Calais. To avoid thiseventuality, the Allies deliberately sought to create apsychological effect (to maintain German confusion)even as they executed an extensive bombing


campaign to deny the key German forces access tothe invasion area.

Yet, in spite of the importance of this indirectpsychological effect to the Allies, they could notdirectly measure the degree of confusion that hadbeen left in the German cognitive process after thebombings.10 Rather, Allied intelligence had to relyon indirect evidence such as the continuedpresence of the German armored divisions in thePas de Calais area.

Beyond this immediate concern, the Allies’assessment of the cascading effects of the aircampaign in the psychological domain was fuzzyat best. There was no real expectation by the Alliedleadership that the bombing campaign wouldcause the German Army to surrender, though therewas a continuing hope that the campaign andinvasion would shorten the war and aid in anoverall German collapse.11

Here again reliable information was sparse.Information on the reactions of the Germancommand might have been available from signalsintelligence, notably in the Ultra code-breakerintercepts, but each of these sources would havebeen delayed, subject to chance availability, andsubject to varying interpretations by differentanalysts. Similarly, the impact of the operation uponthe national German leadership might have beenloosely discernible in subtle changes in propagandaand public announcements, but again withsubstantial delays and only a tenuous tie to anyparticular Allied action.

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However, the concern of the Allies’ national levelleaderships was also very much focused on adifferent set of indirect psychological effects. Thesecentered on the amount of collateral damage andcasualties that might be caused by bombing criticalrail facilities in heavily populated areas of France.They feared that a cascade of indirectpsychological effects might grow from the bombingcampaign to the point that an angry or hostileFrench citizenry would meet the invasion. Althoughthe Free French government of General de Gaulledismissed this likelihood and advocated thebombing campaign as a necessary step in thecountry’s liberation, Prime Minister Churchill wasmost apprehensive as to the psychological effectwrought by the bombing. It ultimately required athreat of resignation by General Eisenhower and asubsequent intervention from President Rooseveltto launch and sustain the air campaign.The quantity and quality of the feedback into theleadership’s cognitive processes at the military-strategic and geo-strategic level was minimal orcontradictory. The Free French government mightoffer reassurance, but its input might be consideredto be at least partially self-serving. The controlledmedia in German-occupied France and in what wasleft of Vichy France might similarly be expected tocondemn the bombing as well as to magnify thesuffering of the local people for propagandapurposes. Thus, the feedback available to majordecisionmakers was sparse and potentiallyunreliable. Yet, decisions were required and thedecisionmakers in question made them on the basis


of what they knew both from prior knowledge andwhat little feedback they did have.

Lessons LearnedIn the Normandy example, we can see the abovemetrics addressing three distinctly different kinds offeedback requirements: the measurement ofphysical damage (direct effect), the measurement ofperformance (indirect physical effects), and a looserset of diverse intelligence information (indirectpsychological effects).

1. Direct Effects Assessment

As we noted, the Normandy air campaign plannershad to assess the level and nature of destructionwrought by their bombs to see whether the actionhad the immediate, direct effect that they hadintended. Even though the purpose of the feedbackwas different, the effects assessment of the actionclosely resembled the classic, attrition-based bombdamage assessment.

This applicability of an attrition-based metric shouldnot be surprising since the actions undertaken wereair strikes and the kind of direct effect sought wasthe destruction of a set of ground targets. The bombdamage assessment remained a validmeasurement because the physical action was thesame as in a straight attrition conflict, even thoughthe ends for which the assessment was to be useddiffered fundamentally. This contributes to thedevelopment of effects-based metrics becausesuch assessments of physical damage are

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something we know how to do and which we canquantify relatively promptly.

However, as we look beyond this wartime exampleof destructive direct effects, we are faced with aquestion: What metric would we use if the directeffect we sought did not or could not involve suchmeasurable destruction? How would we measurethe direct effect of an action in peacetime or in crisisresponse operations, or the impact of an action uponcoalition partners, friends, and neutrals? Notice thatin all of these situations, the requirement forfeedback on the direct effects of our actions remainsessentially the same as in the Normandy example.Was the stimulus applied, for better or worse? Wasthe action seen or felt by the intended observer andother observers in such a way as to enter theircognitive processes? This extension of the directeffects assessment feedback requirement tononcombat situations means that we can no longerthink solely in terms of bomb damage assessmentas a metric for direct effects. Instead, we mustexpand the effects assessment process to includemetrics that may be significantly different fromassessment of physical damage to forces andcapabilities. This expanded requirement leaves uslooking for new indices not only of actions observed,but also how other observers perceived the action.

A better example is that of the closing days of the1967 Middle East crisis and the dispatch of theUnited States Sixth Fleet toward the coast of Syria tosignal American opposition to the Soviet threat tosend troops into Damascus. The American militaryaction, in conjunction with national level diplomatic


actions, sought to foreclose an unacceptablydangerous Soviet behavior. However, in order tobecome a factor in the Soviet nationaldecisionmaking process, the military action had tobe seen, understood, and reported by local Sovietobservers. In this example, President Johnsoncounted upon the fact that the Soviet intelligencecollection ships monitoring the Sixth Fleet wouldobserve the American action and that they wouldimmediately report the American action up theirchain of command to Moscow. In this case, themeasure of a successful direct effect might havebeen found in the actions of the Soviet tattletaleswhen their American prey came about and headed inthe opposite direction at high speed.

The above suggests that the indices of direct effectscan take two dimensions: physical effects that wecan monitor and possibly quantify, and behavior thatwe can monitor but must be put into some context(e.g. the difference from established norms) before itcan be useful as feedback.

2. Performance Assessment

This latter idea is central to performanceassessment. In the Normandy example, air plannerscarefully monitored activity on the French railwaysystem to determine whether the cascade of indirectphysical effects that they had hoped to create was infact occurring. They had to monitor the physicalperformance of the system over a period of time bothbefore and after their action, and then use theresulting, changing delta between the baseline andpost-strike performance. In this manner, they were

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able to determine that by the end of May 1944,despite a concerted German-directed repair effort,the rail activity in northern France had been reducedto just 38 percent of its pre-war total.12 Although suchsystem physical performance assessment cannotprovide any immediate feedback, the process ofmeasuring such performance is again somethingwith which we are familiar and is largely quantifiable.

What is significant to note here is what was requiredbefore a delta could be determined and measuredas system performance. To obtain any meaningfuldata on the performance of the targeted system,13

we must first have a relatively good picture of whatthe system is, how its component parts relate to oneanother, how the system has performed in the past,and some idea of how it might react to the stimulusprovided by the direct effect. In the Normandy case,this meant that the air planners had to thoroughlyresearch the railway system of northern Francebefore they could begin work. This implies that theassessment and feedback process must addressnot only what the evolving performance of thissystem may be in a given area, but also the likelycausal relationship between the actions taken andthat changing performance.

In several respects, the above underscores how thecritical element in performance assessment is lessthe collection of new data on the system than it is theavailability of a data or knowledge base from whichto calculate change. That knowledge base, asillustrated above, must include how the systemworks and how it has functioned in the past.


Although this is no minor challenge, it is alsofamiliar territory. We have done all of this not onlyagainst the French railway system in the case of theNormandy air campaign but equally against theelectrical grid in Iraq during the Desert Stormoperations. In most instances, we can identify andmonitor a specific set of indices to follow the impactupon the physical systems in question, and we mayeven be able to predict some of the ramifications ofthe system’s degradation. The problem is that thelarger and more complicated the system is, themore difficult it is to estimate all of the possibleramifications of our actions against it. For example,we might be able to predict the impact of thedestruction of a transformer on a power grid, but itwould be considerably more difficulty to predict all ofthe potential impacts that might result from the lossof electric power through a country.14

If we think in terms of the falling domino modelexamined in the preceding chapter, we would belimited to looking at just a short stretch of thecause and effect chain reaction. The larger andmore complex the chains to be monitored are, thesmaller the proportion of the entire chain we arelikely to have to judge the totality of the effects weare creating. Thus, the feedback we could supplywould be less accurate and more ambiguous.

We also need to recognize that for larger systems(e.g. a national or regional economy), it is morelikely that the effects we create will not remainconfined to the physical domain, but will cross overinto the psychological domain. Indeed, as we sawin the models of chains of effects, each successive

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falling domino can set off its own series of indirectpsychological effects.

How would this performance assessment apply toeffects-based operations in peace and crisis?Obviously in such cases, we might not be monitoringthe performance of physical systems following abombing campaign, but we might be seeking indicesof changed performance in the sense of systembehavior. A good example here is the 1962 CubanMissile Crisis. During that crisis, a critical momentwas the feedback to White House decisionmakersfirst that Soviet cargo ships en route to Cuba hadstopped, and then that a large number of these shipswere turning back. The performance of thecommercial shipping system of the Soviet Unionprovided a key indicator of a change in Soviet policy.

Notice that the same kinds of issues andconstraints apply here as in the monitoring of therail system performance in the Normandy example.The performance of the shipping had to bemonitored over time in order to determine a set ofnorms from which a delta might be monitored. Inthe Cuba case, this meant that the United Stateshad to understand how Soviet commercial shippingoperated, what kinds and quantities of shippingwould normally have been en route to Cuba,15 andthen what all of the ships en route to Cuba at thetime of the crisis were doing on a minute by minutebasis. However, in the Cuban case, there was alsoa difference. Unlike Normandy rail traffic, the shipsen route to Cuba could be monitored on a minuteby minute basis and, using the Navy’s reportingnetwork, that data could be rapidly collated,


assessed, and reported to the decisionmakers in atimely enough manner to be of significant use. Inthe Cuban instance, this timeliness became evenmore critical in the hours following the initial halt ofthe ships when some of the ships continued ontheir way, possibly with submarine escort. The finalhalt of these ships signaled the beginning of theend of the confrontation.

However, notice that for this timeliness to beachieved, the surveillance system had to set up theentire context for the critical piece of information. Ithad to know the system well enough to establish anoverall norm of routine merchant shippingperformance and a sliding norm of what theshipping was doing in the steady state of crisisoperations. Given this context, all that needed to bedone was to look for one critical datum: divergencefrom the sliding norm. That datum could then bereported with little further assessment in much thesame fashion as the last datum needed to completea sensor to shooter link.16

In the above examples, we can distinguish twotypes of performance assessment. There isperformance reckoning of how the system performsafter the target has been destroyed, and there is abehavioral performance metric manifest in theongoing actions of such systems as commercialshipping, telecommunications, military operations,and diplomacy. We can distinguish between twodifferent kinds of performance metrics. In theNormandy example, the reporting on performancewas an aggregate indicator, the measurement of alevel of throughput capacity of the rail system in a

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particular area. In the Cuban example, the keyfeedback was a point indicator, the detection andmeasurement of an event that differed from theestablished norm (the continued transit towardCuba of Soviet merchant ships). Both aggregateindicators and point indicators demand a significantdatabase on the system in question to determine anorm, and both demand continued monitoring. Inthe latter case, the availability of a large, networkedsurveillance system permitted immediate detectionof a change in system performance and timelyfeedback to decisionmakers.

3. Psychological Effects Assessment

Effects-based operations may be about shapingbehavior and creating psychological effects, but howdo we assess these psychological effects?Performance assessment can be used to assessbehavioral changes. It focuses on the changes insystem behavior, which might be monitored asindicators of an ongoing, adapting decisionmakingprocess. What other indicators of psychologicaleffects might be relevant?

In the Normandy example, we can see this searchfor indicators at two distinct levels:

• For the Allied campaign planners concerned thattheir railway bombings might indicate theintended location of the invasion to the Germancommanders, there was clearly a set of physicalindicators of the German Western Command’scognitive process. These indicators reflected thevarious actions involved in preparing and


moving the armored divisions. These wereessentially point indicators of divergence fromnormal operations in the Pas de Calais andcould be closely monitored. If detected, theywould have provided critical feedback to Allieddecisionmaking at all levels.

• By contrast, the cascade of indirectpsychological effects that so worried Churchill (ahostile French reaction to the bombingcampaign) did not have a reliably measurableindex. Instead, the senior commanders andnational leaders involved had to fall back on analmost intuitive assessment of the situation. ForEisenhower, this intuition was based on amilitary perspective that told him that, in theabsence of the bombings, the invasion wouldfail and thus, that the risks of a hostile Frenchpublic reaction had to be borne. For Churchilland Roosevelt, the intuition was based on alifetime in politics, an occupation that was builtaround assessment of public reactions toevents. These mental models of public opinion,plus assessments of actual French reactionsand military assessments of the risks ofinvading without blocking the German armoreddivisions, would have provided the basis fortheir decisions.

Any feedback inserted into the decision processesof each of these commanders has to have beenuncertain and ambiguous, no matter how wellanalyzed. Ultimately, the decision reached by eachcommander would have represented both aconscious and unconscious consideration of a wide

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variety and large number of variables that theleaders themselves would have been hard pressedto explain.

This latter predicament is not new. Successfulleaders and commanders at higher levels havealways been forced to reach decisions on the basisof metrics that are uncertain. Napoleon, for example,used to claim that his job as a general consisted ofsetting up the battle to be fought and then watchingfor the right moment to throw in the reserves so asto break the enemy’s will and drive him from thebattlefield. Therefore, his primary role during thebattle was to gauge when the enemy psychologywas such that the addition of a relatively smallamount of additional force would turn the tide ofbattle. In Napoleon’s case, as in that of the Allies,determining the right moment was a subjectivedecision that combined years of experience withwhatever was visible on the battlefield. ButNapoleon’s task was much simpler than that whichthe World War II leaders faced. After all, Napoleon’sdecisions were an assessment of a purely militaryreaction within a relatively confined area that hecould himself observe.

In essence, what Napoleon, Eisenhower, de Gaulle,Churchill, and Roosevelt were providing was aparticular expertise. That expertise enabled them tointegrate an extensive set of variables and to dealwith the ambiguities and uncertainties by filling in theblanks from their own knowledge base. Theirexpertise was supplemented by feedback from otherexperts, as well as whatever indicators of behaviorwere gathered by the intelligence and surveillanceeffort, but it remained highly idiosyncratic.


Our challenge in conducting dynamic effects-basedoperations is to provide ongoing feedback not onlyon the immediate tactical and operational levelinteractions, but also on how those interactionsaffect a series of larger systems at a national level.In these wider assessments, not only is the linkbetween actions and effects still more tenuous, butany reactions we observe are likely to be longdelayed and subject to varying interpretations.17

MetricsThe above discussions point to an interestingdichotomy between traditional, attrition-basedmeasures of effectiveness and what might betermed human-based metrics, the measurement ofthe reactions and behavior of human beings andhuman organizations. We can see in the Normandyexample that commanders’ decisions were notbased solely on attrition-based metrics, nor werethey based solely on the often-vague human-basedmetrics. The common element in the decisionmakingprocess was the tendency of commanders tocombine attrition-based information with human-based metrics and largely subjective judgmentsdrawn from available estimative intelligence.18 These“mixed metrics” were then used to assess how wellthey were succeeding.

However, the mix of attrition-based and human-based metrics was not uniform across the spectrumof commanders. Instead, the relative value of themetrics varied according to the level of command. Atthe tactical level, the assessment of the level ofdamage inflicted on the adversary might by itself be

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a sufficient indicator of success, but at higher levels,such damage assessment is only one of manycriteria, which tend to expand as the level ofcommand increases. In fact, as commanders’objectives become increasingly denominated interms of enemy behavior, the role of attrition-basedmeasurement of damage in decisions decreases.

This dichotomy bears further examination. Whyand how are attrition-based metrics useful, andwhen are imprecise and ambiguous human-basedmetrics the only alternative? In the latter case,what might we do to choose the right human-based metrics and to make them less ambiguousand contradictory?

Attrition-Based MeasuresThe presumption at the root of attrition-basedmetrics is that the destruction of the means ofwaging war will ultimately result in victory. But whatconstitutes a victory or success?

At a kill-or-be-killed tactical level, the destruction ofthe opponent is a clear and usually conclusivevictory. If we were to describe victory in a war asthe destruction of all of an opponent’s forces andcapabilities, then the results of each of thesetactical victories would be additive. That is, each killwould further diminish the overall enemycapabilities and provide quantifiable progresstoward victory. Following this logic at military-strategic and geo-strategic levels, measuring thelevel of destruction inflicted on a day-to-day basiswould provide an accurate picture of our progresstoward an overall victory.


Yet, as we have seen in Chapter 2’s discussion ofthe Third Punic War, there are very few such totalwars in which victory does equate to the totalphysical destruction of the enemy. Thus, a purelyattrition-based index would not be adequate for thestrategic or military-strategic level and wouldprobably be insufficient for operational leveldecisions as well. The infamously misleading bodycounts during the Vietnam War are a case in point.Moreover, as we saw in the discussion of the greatattrition wars of the past century, there are fewoperational level engagements that resulted in thetotal destruction of an enemy’s forces andpersonnel. Instead, even in wars of attrition, theparadigm has been to reduce the adversary’s forcesand capabilities to the point where his will to wagewar collapsed.In spite of these limitations, we cannot dismiss theattrition-based metrics entirely. We can recognizefrom our earlier discussion of different kinds ofeffects that destruction does matter, even in effects-based operations. What we need to understand ishow and under what circumstances the attrition-based metrics apply in feedback to commanders.Then, armed with that understanding, we canaddress their limitations in an effects-based role andbegin to overcome them. To understand the role of attrition-based metrics infeedback to commanders, we must first understandhow commanders actually use those measurements.In fact, if we look closely at the role of attrition-basedfeedback in the decisions of the commandersinvolved in our crisis examples, it rapidly becomesevident that the measurements of destruction found a

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very different use at the tactical level of commandthan at higher levels of command. For the tactical level combat commander, the effectto be achieved was usually very specific andstraightforward. For example, he may have had todestroy a critical railroad bridge or junction, as in theNormandy example. In such a case, the connectionbetween the desired tactical end-state and thedestruction required to achieve it was clear.Moreover, the tactical actions themselves usuallyconstituted an independent cycle of finite duration.When the level of destruction required wasachieved, then that particular operation was over.Under these circumstances, the measurement of thelevel of destruction inflicted could provide a clearindex of success or failure for a given engagement. At the level of the operational commander, the clarityof this connection between destruction and successmight be expected to diminish. To the degree thatthe assigned objective remains clear, specific, anddenominated in terms of destruction (for example,an order to destroy all of the bridges in Normandyover which German tanks might pass), then theconnection between action and effect remains clear.But when the task begins to take on a humandimension, such as an order to prevent enemyarmored divisions from advancing into Normandy, amore general direction befitting a higher level ofcommand, then the connection between actions andeffects might become more complex. Thecommander might elect to destroy either therailways or the tank column itself. However, if hechooses to destroy the railways (as Eisenhower did),


the choice would involve a decisionmaking processincluding assessments of whether the foe might findsome other way to Normandy, whether thedestruction might immobilize the enemy, or evenwhether the action might break the foe’s will to fight. Notice that in this operational level example, themeasurement of the extent of damage to bridges oreven to the entire rail network would tell theoperational commander only a part of theinformation that he needed to determine the successor failure of the operation. Assessment of damage tothe bridge would not tell the commander whether ornot the enemy advance was permanently halted orwhat the enemy’s intentions were.At the military-strategic and geo-strategic levels ofcommand, the level of Allied SupremeHeadquarters and the national leaderships, theconnection between destruction and a desiredeffect or end-state is even more tenuous. At thislevel, the destruction rendered by one singlemilitary operation or even an entire campaign is butone factor in a complex interaction that spans a farlonger period of time, multiple arenas, and othermilitary operations around the world. At this level,the measurement of damage inflicted is only apartial index of success in a more complicatedpicture where success is defined in political ordiplomatic, not military, terms.19

It should also be noted that, over the 50-yearhistory of American military crisis responses,attrition-based measures of effectiveness providedno index at all of success in the vast majority ofoperations simply because the operations did not

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involve destruction. More significantly, this is true ofall of the Soviet-American military confrontations,including the three Middle East crises cited,because any violent use of military force wouldhave been the antithesis of success in each ofthese confrontations.

Nor did attrition-based metrics reflect the impact ofmilitary actions upon allies, partners, and neutrals, apersistent and very significant consideration for theupper levels of command during coalition combatoperations such as the Kosovo crisis. Attrition-based measures alone were unable to providemeaningful feedback for the nonviolent uses ofmilitary power (which constitute the vast majority ofmilitary operations) or for gauging effects uponanyone but the enemy.

These limitations are noteworthy because theysuggest that for all of their apparent exactitude, thetraditional attrition-based measures ultimatelybecome unproductive when applied to themeasurement of effects. At any but a kill-or-be-killedtactical level or total attrition war, the attrition-basedyardstick still leaves us trying to determine how theaction of destroying forces and capabilitiestranslates into a particular behavior, such as thecollapse or erosion of the enemy’s will to fight.20

Human-Based Metrics for Operations inthe Cognitive DomainThis inability of attrition-based measurement todescribe the human dimension of combat and war isnot new.21 22 It is well recognized, for example, that a


level of damage sufficient to cause the will of oneunit to collapse and retreat will not necessarily havethe same impact on a similarly armed adjacent unit.The differential between units may be one of esprit,as in the case of the performance of German WaffenSS units during World War II, or it may be ofexperience, as in the case of the Union Army of thePotomac in 1861 versus in 1864. It may be the resultof a myriad of human factors that are equally difficultto quantify.

Attempts have been made to measure these humanvariables (e.g. unit cohesion, fatigue, training, etc.)and to assign values to them so as to predict whatlevel of damage or losses might produce a collapse,most notably by the Soviets.23 However, in eachcase, analysts have found themselves trying toquantify intangibles to the point that the validity ofeach set of numbers quickly came to depend uponhuman judgments either on the part of the subjectsor that of the analysts, or both.24 25

Although the above military operations researchefforts have tended to focus on the tactical andoperational levels of war, there is also a rich historyof United States Air Force efforts to assess the linksbetween non-nuclear strategic bombing campaignsand the collapse of national will, or the will of thenational leadership. These efforts date back to GuilioDouhet’s original air power work and are reflected inthe U.S. Army Air Corps bombing studies done in theyears before World War II, as well as in the bombingcampaigns during the war. In their current guise,these linkages are most evident in the work ofColonel John Worden and especially in his theory of

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attacking concentric circles of national power tobreak the will of the leadership, a targeting approachtaken during Desert Storm.26 27 Most recently, thisconnection between attrition and strategic effectshas taken an additional step in Brigadier GeneralDavid Deptula’s concept of simultaneous strikeagainst large numbers of these targets so as toinduce shock.28

However, in each of these cases, the same problemresurfaces. How do we detect and measure therelationship between the bombing campaign and thewill of an opponent or of the opponent’s leadership?

In the case of Desert Storm, and the more recentcases of Serbia and Kosovo, this problem wasreflected in the often tenuous connection betweenregime behavior and target destruction. To makematters worse, in the Kosovo operation, attacks ontargets that might possibly have yielded the desiredeffects on Serbian decisionmaking were foreclosedbecause the same action might produce undesiredeffects in the internal politics of the coalitionmembers or on diplomatic efforts to isolate Milosevicfrom external support. Indeed, the lack of adequatehuman-based metrics in Kosovo posed a doubleproblem. Not only could we not measure theprogress of our effects-based operations withrespect to the enemy, but because we could not doso, it became still more difficult to justify the politicalrisks that our coalition partners were being asked totake in order to achieve coalition objectives.

How might we approach this problem?

IndicatorsIn the Normandy example, each of the three kinds ofeffects assessments outlined depended on indirectmeasures of effect. We measured observablephenomena of some sort (damage, performance, orbehavior), and then used that measurement as anindicator of the impact of our actions on a cognitiveprocess, the true nature of which depended on aseries of factors that we could not observe directly.Thus, in the D-Day example, the damage to railwaysand facilities could be monitored and quantified, butthe damage was only an indication of the desiredeffect that the planners sought to create: blockingrail movement toward the invasion beaches.Similarly, although the movement of forces over therail lines could be monitored, given the possibility ofrapid repairs, the use of alternative rail routes, roadtransport around ruined railways, and so on, theeffect was neither certain nor exactly quantifiabledespite the evident cause and effect relationship.

We can extend this observation to human-basedmetrics in general. Whether we are assessing theimmediate, direct effects of our actions or thecascade of indirect effects through the physical andcognitive domains, what we will really be looking foris a series of observable indicators from which togauge a particular effect. For the most part, theseindicators will not be nearly as straightforward asthe bomb damage to the French railway system.Instead, there always will be an element ofuncertainty and the value of the measurements willdepend heavily on how well we choose andaggregate the indicators and on the context in which

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we consider them. A single indicator may not sufficeto assess an effect or to define a change inbehavior, but the combination of all the indicatorsavailable may provide a reliable guide.

In this respect, the process of assessing effectsbegins to resemble the approach to indications andwarning intelligence developed during the ColdWar.29 The indications and warning methodologycalled for the development of extensive lists ofindicators of the postulated actions a prospectiveenemy might take in order to prepare for a surpriseattack upon the United States and its NATO allies.These indicators were then made intelligencecollection priorities and were regularly observedand reported. Since any observations of potentialactions were expected to be incomplete givendeliberate concealment by the attacker, those thatcould be observed were weighted for theirsignificance and for the place they occupied in thelikely sequence of preparing an attack. Theseweighted indicators were aggregated and put intoan algorithm to yield an overall, evaluatedprobability of attack.30 However, this indications-and-warning model poses another question.

What indicators should we be looking for?

The Cognitive CycleWhat indicators can we observe and how would wedo so?

Perhaps the most fundamental criterion for anyindicator is that it be in some way observable. Thatwhich cannot be observed, cannot be measured,

and therefore, cannot provide meaningfulfeedback. But what are we supposed to observe inhuman-based metrics and how are we supposed toobserve it?

Our stated objective in effects-based operations is“shaping behavior of friends, foes, and neutrals.”Since this shaping is something that occurs in theminds of decisionmakers at all levels, it stands toreason that any phenomenon that emerges from thisprocess might provide a human-based index of howwell we are shaping behavior. If we follow this logicand consider its implications in the context of theaction-reaction cycles examined in the rule sets, itequally stands to reason that the metric we seek issome evidence of a behavioral change that occursbecause of an action that we have taken. Combiningthe two criteria of observability and relevance to thecognitive process, we should be seeking a set ofpotentially observable phenomena that reflect whatis going on in the cognitive process that we outlinedin Chapter 4.

We can delimit the large set of potentially observablephenomena somewhat if we further consider that thecognitive process is built around how each sideperceives and reacts to the stimuli of the action-reaction cycles that make up an interaction. Thiswould suggest that the phenomena we seek tomeasure as a human-based metric revolves aboutwhat is observed by both sides and how.

Here the earlier discussion of the attributes ofactions becomes relevant again. Essentially, we turnthe attributes around. We are now the observers ofanother actor’s actions. What is it that we see?

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Clearly, what was done as a reaction is key. We caneasily see a series of relevant questions building offthis reaction. For example, is the reactionsymmetric or asymmetric? Does the reactioninvolve an escalation of force? Or was there noobserved reaction? And if so, did that represent adecision not to react, a decision to postpone anyreaction, an inability to react, or simply our owninability to detect the reaction? All these questionsaddress essential elements of the feedbackcommanders might require.

Equally important, especially for operationalcommanders, is how the reaction we are observingwas executed. Which military capabilities, if any,were brought to bear? On what scale? Over whatgeographic scope? In which warfare areas? Did thereaction represent a lateral escalation of the battleor confrontation? Did the reaction represent anattempt to exploit our vulnerabilities, and if so,which ones? Did the reaction expose theopponent’s vulnerabilities, and if so, which ones?How fast was any military reaction? How long was itsustained? How long could it have been sustained?How well were individual military actionscoordinated or synchronized? What were we able tosee and what aspects of the operation might wehave been unable to detect? Finally, when we put allof these facets of the reaction together, what dothey tell us about how our last action was perceivedand what we should do next?

Again, we can understand that the answers to thesequestions would be elements of the feedbackessential to commanders. But where do we get the


questions we need to ask? What observables do welook for? In fact, we can see that all of thesequestions simply reverse the variables weconsidered when trying to look at how the qualitiesof our actions might shape the perceptions of someother observer.31 Now, the same variables are whatwe must look for in the reactions of another actor toact as indications of behavioral changes. However,knowing the “what” and “how” of another actor’sreaction still leaves an important question to beanswered: what might we be able to see?

In approaching an inherently complex interactionlike those involved in the conduct of effects-basedoperations, it is necessary to accept from thebeginning that we cannot know everything that wemight want to know and that we cannot knowanything precisely. What we must deal with arethose elements of the action-reaction cognitivecycle that can be seen and to some degreemeasured. This is to say that our feedback mustultimately be based on a relatively limited set ofpotential observables.

What We Cannot “Observe”The process of answering the question “What isobservable?” is perhaps best begun by noting whatis not likely to be observable. To begin with, werecognized and accepted in Chapter 4 that we couldnot really “get inside the enemy’s head,” much lessmeasure what was going on in that head. We alsoaccepted that there was a large degree ofuncertainty in assessing that cognitive process, bothin the data acquired and in the predictions made

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from it. In discussing the cognitive cycle (see Figure62), we have repeatedly taken note of its complexityand of the almost infinite number of variablesassociated with the actual decisionmaking processin the cognitive domain. And, we noted the difficultyof obtaining insights into that process, especially inany way that would be timely enough to providemeaningful feedback to commanders. In essence,we concluded that we could not observe the internalworkings of the cognitive domain itself.

By extension, this indicates that we will not be ableto know exactly how an observer will perceive agiven stimulus, or exactly what mental model he willapply, or how he will transform his perceptions intoan understanding so as to make sense of theemerging situation. Nor will we know exactly how themultiple observers of our stimuli within a givenorganization will interact with each other to influencethe understanding of the situation.32 33 Similarly, wewill not know exactly what options observers willconsider, nor all of the factors that might figure inplanning a reaction to our stimulus.Given this inability to directly and reliably monitorthe decisionmaking process itself,34 we are largelylimited to examining those reflections of thecognitive domain decisionmaking process thatoccur in the information and physical domains, theaspects of the emerging behavior itself. Thismeans that we must examine two parts of thecognitive cycle that occur in those domains. Whataspects of the opponent’s reaction will beobservable, and how do we best observe it tosupport our own decisionmaking?

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What is Observable?Under our definition of effects-based operations, thefocus of our attention is on actions, and the goal ofthose actions is the shaping of behavior. We alsoconsidered those actions to be part of a series ofaction-reaction cycles as the stimuli and responsesin an ongoing interaction between humans andhuman organizations. Finally in this same context,we postulated that any effects we might createwould vary with what an observer could see of ouractions or stimuli.What matters in the action-reaction, stimulus andresponse cycles is not what action was actuallytaken, but what its observable dimensions are. InChapter 4, we pointed to six such dimensions: whatis done, with what, on what scale, in whatgeographical and/or operational scope, with whattiming, and with what visibility. However, now thetables are turned. Whereas our earlier concern waswith determining how our actions would be observedand understood by a friend or opponent, we nowmust look to the same dimensions in the reactions ofothers as indicators of their decisions and behavior. In the cognitive cycle diagram (see Figure 63), theaspects of the other actors’ reactions that arepotentially observable fall into two categories:evidence of transmitting guidance for a course ofaction; and the physical acts that the course ofaction involves.

If we follow the diagram, therefore, we may be ableto observe another actor’s attempts to execute acourse of action, for example, the orders and


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instructions sent and the dialogues betweencommands on how to carry them out. Theseobservations need not be precise to be useful. Asuccessful observation does not demand that webreak an enemy’s codes so as to read all themessages involved. It may be sufficient to know thatactivity has intensified or that certain national andmilitary entities are communicating with each other.That may be as simple as monitoring the media forannouncements or for news on the movements ofmajor decisionmakers.

We might also monitor the efforts of thecommanders to coordinate or synchronize theiractions. As the location of the diagram’s“synchronization” block on the borderline betweenthe information and physical domains suggests, thistask may involve monitoring both the commandinteractions and the physical movements of forcesand decisionmakers subsequent to the application ofa stimulus.

Finally, we probably will be able to observe at leastsome part of the physical actions that may make upthe emerging behavior itself. These observablesmay include events such as an announcement ordiplomatic note or the movement of military forces,which are the results of the decisions and planning.

Notice here the word some. The actions of anyactor are likely to include both those that he wantsus to see (so as to shape our behavior) and thoseactions that he would rather we did not see, whichhe therefore will attempt to conceal. What we seeeither of the actions we are intended to see or of


those that the other actor would prefer to keephidden is a function of how good our surveillanceand intelligence systems are. Notice that in all ofthe above, we are applying a form of behavioralperformance assessment and that the feedback weobtain may be either an aggregate indicator ofperformance trends, or it may be a point indicatorof a sharp divergence from a system norm or somesliding norm.

It should also be underlined that in each of the abovecases, the directives, the synchronization, and theactions to be observed are not restricted just tomilitary efforts. If we remember our rule set foreffects-based operations, any military reaction by astate actor will almost invariably involve decisions inat least the political and diplomatic arena and verypossibly in the economic arena as well. Similarly,political, diplomatic, and perhaps economic movesare likely to parallel those in the military arena.

This does not necessarily mean that there will beintense interaction between, for example, militaryand diplomatic actors at each level, though suchinteractions are by no means excluded. It suggests,rather, that any course of action will have multipleparts and that these parts must be coordinated andsynchronized in some way. Thus, the steps taken toimplement a course of action in one arena may bean indication of a similar and related set of directivesand actions in another arena. Therefore, if we lookbeyond the immediate set of military observables toother arenas, we may be able to find indications thatare substantially easier to see and track.

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To some degree, the same construct applies to non-state actors. The actions of guerrillas or terrorists,asymmetric military reactions, cannot be isolatedfrom a wider context. The liberation movement orterrorist organization operates as a humanorganization. It is held together by a commonly heldinterest in advancing some cause, and thereforemust look not only to its own internal cohesion, butalso to the external audience whose behavior it istrying to shape. It is going to require assets of somesort to sustain its operations, whether these are thefruits of illegal operations (e.g. robbery and drugsales) or of external contributors, it will have someform of economic arena as well. As the pursuit ofthe al-Qaida network since September 11th hasdemonstrated, these financial arenas offer a way ofmeasuring effects that parallel and give at leastsome indication of effects taking place among thenetwork of al-Qaida/Taliban fighters.

In both of the above cases, we can see the operationof the cognitive cycle and a series of elements of thatcycle that may be monitored and measured toprovide feedback to commanders on the effects-based operations we are conducting. However, thisleads to the second part of the problem, the questionof how we observe.

How Do We See the Observables?

Creating an Effects-Based SituationalAwareness

In Chapter 3, we looked at visibility as a criticalaspect of any action, and we concluded that all of


the other qualities of an action were meaningless asstimuli unless they could be seen or observed insome way. In Chapter 4, we noted that the observerwas a prisoner of his sensors and that what hecould see was a function of the surveillance systemhe created.

The same is equally true of ourselves. Theaspects of an enemy’s cognitive process that wecan or cannot see will be a function of thecapabilities of the collectors we have in oursurveillance and intelligence system, how wedeploy them, and how we task them. To the extentthat another actor’s physically observable actionslie outside the scope of what the system can see,those observables will play no role in fashioningour effects-based feedback.35

To understand how we observe the indicators or howhuman-based metrics enter into the feedbackprocess, we need to dissect the left portion of thecognitive diagram in the same fashion as we did tothe right (see Figure 64).

The left corner of the diagram shows the process bywhich a physical action of some sort is detected,reported, assessed, and becomes part of our sharedsituational awareness, the entry point for our owncognitive and decisionmaking process.

In this process, the physical indicators of what ishappening in the other actors’ cognitive processmust first be detected. This detection data then mustbe collated and aggregated with other data andinformation, and then integrated into the sharedsituational awareness.

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We understand this process well from thestandpoint of combat operations. Indeed, most ofour experimentation with network-centric operationshas focused on creating such shared situationalawareness on at least a tactical combat level. Theissue here is different. What we seek to create is ashared effects-based situational awareness. Theshared situational awareness to support effects-based operations, however, rests on not only thesensor data required for combat operations, butalso a broad range of imprecise and ambiguousinputs associated with human behavior that mustsomehow must be collected and integrated into acomprehensive picture.

Creating such an effects-based situationalawareness means that our intelligence collectionand surveillance systems must detect, process, andprovide data that may be very different from thoseinherent to tactical combat situational awareness.The first problem here is the sheer breadth of theobservable data and information that might berelevant to an effects-based picture. Relevantobservables might include most if not all of thetactical data that comprised the commonoperational picture, but they will also include a widearray of other data and information, much of it fromhuman sources and therefore often ambiguous orsubjective. These human information inputs willdraw not only from traditional intelligence sources,but also from unevaluated reporting from worldmedia, which might possibly be disinformation orpropaganda. Moreover, the data will need to includeinputs from other government agencies anddepartments, nongovernmental and international

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organizations, as well as allies and coalitionpartners. The wider the net that we cast, the greaterthe number of observables that is likely to be seen.The better the quality of the net, the more likely weare to see not only what another actor may want usto see, but also what he may not want us to see,and the better our feedback to the commander islikely to be.

However, this is not the end of the problem. Thequality of the feedback in any surveillance system isalso a function of what we do with the data wecollect. The process and challenges of collatingtactical data into a common relevant operationalpicture are relatively clear, however difficult theymay be. But that challenge is relatively smallcompared to what is involved in collating the vastand diverse set of data needed to support effects-based operations. Thus, where the emphasis in atactical level, network-centric awareness tends tobe on sensors and links, effects-based awarenessis likely to emphasize how data is processed,collated, and assessed, and the way in whichavailable human expertise is used and integrated.

Obviously, there are two risks involved with dealingwith very large numbers of inputs. One is the dangerof losing what could be an essential piece ofinformation amid a cacophony of other inputs. Theother is that of providing so many inputs to thecommander that he becomes overwhelmed withdata to the point that the quantity of the effects-based feedback actually hampers the command’sdecision process. We can hope that advances ininformation technology will alleviate the problem with


better ways of processing information onobservables or with decision aids to sort through andat least partially digest the large quantities ofinformation. But there is an additional problem.Since the picture that constitutes a shared effects-based situational awareness is so complex, andsince it is not necessarily easy to visualize, thequestion of how it is presented to commanders willbe critical.

Decision Aids

All of the efforts we put into detecting and assessingindicators will be for naught if they cannot beintegrated into the thinking of commanders at everylevel. Yet, the result of an effects-based assessmentprocess may be very different from a conventionalmilitary “plot” and the demands placed upon acommander’s prior knowledge, understanding, andability to make sense of a fluid and highly variedsituation are likely to be extreme. It is natural,therefore, that many of the opportunities to bringnetwork-centric operations and new informationtechnology to bear focus on what have been dubbed“decision aids,” implements to help commanders atall levels deal with the complex variables of aneffects-based operation. In the final analysis, thereare two parts of the effects-based process that areso complex as to require some assistance.

The first is the dynamic planning and execution ofan effects-based operation. In this instance, thedecision aids might be developed to draw upon andcombine data, knowledge, and expertise in order toprovide an assessment both of the situation and of

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the most likely effects to be generated by differentcourses of action. This might further extend intohighlighting the most likely observable indicators ofthe success or failure of an effect as the basis for asurveillance and collection plan.

The second type of decision aid might revolve aboutthe feedback process. One key capability would beintegrating data so as to establish performancenorms on physical or behavioral systems either overhistory or on a sliding basis within a crisis, war, orother operation. Another element might be to detectand compare relationships between different kindsof data and information so as to collate it and aidassessment. However, perhaps the most significantrole may lie in an ability to perform a function similarto that of the collection and evaluation algorithms inthe intelligence indications and warning system. Thisfunction would not only nominate indicators but givethem weights and then assemble the variedcollection of pieces into a coherent, probabilisticunderstanding of the direction or nature of anobserver’s behavior.

Knowledge and Uncertainty

There are two threads that run through our entirediscussion of effects-based operations and therequirements for supporting them. The first is theneed not for just information, but for knowledge andunderstanding. The second is the degree to whichuncertainty will be a part of everything we do in aneffects-based operation.

Over the course of the preceding chapters, we haveconsidered “knowledge” in three different guises. In


discussing network-centric operations, we wereprimarily concerned with the kind of knowledge thatgrew from the aggregated data and information ofwhere an enemy was, where he was going, andwhat he was doing into a primarily tactical andoperational level shared situational awareness.However, with effects-based situational awareness,we have seen this definition of knowledge take ontwo additional dimensions:

• One form of knowledge is exemplified by thedatabase, or more properly a knowledge base,which can encompass a pool of very diverseinformation covering a large number of multi-level, complex adaptive systems. Thesesystems may be physical such as the electricalgrid, psychological such as a government orpolity, or a hybrid of both, of which Wall Streetwould be an example.

• The other form of knowledge, present both asan input to situational awareness and on thepart of the decisionmakers themselves, is asubjective or intuitive understanding of asituation, actor, or system. This knowledge,reflected as prior knowledge or evenunderstanding in the cognitive cycle, is the basisfor either the expert or the decisionmakerperceiving, evaluating, assessing, and makingsense of an emerging situation.

When we say that in order to execute successfuleffects-based operations, we must know theopponent, the “knowing” implied is multi-dimensional. The knowledge we require and thefeedback that the commander requires will be some

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combination of the three dimensions outlined above.For effects-based operations, it is no longer enoughto know where the adversary is and where he isgoing. A tactical or operational picture composedonly of such elements is of only limited utility when itcomes to dealing with the impressions and cognitiveprocesses of the opponent, and is of even less utilityin dealing with friends and neutrals. Rather, what weneed is the insight into how a system or an individualwill react to stimuli.

The challenge here is more than that of assemblingan adequate battlespace awareness, or ofdeveloping a picture of what the dimensions of aphysical system are and how it functions. Howeverdifficult these tasks may be, we have a good idea ofhow to organize and amass such knowledge andmake it available to commanders. The realchallenge lies in dealing with the human dimensionof war and conflict, and at the core of that challengelies the necessity of dealing with the complexityinherent in human beings and human organizations.This implies that for all of the knowledge andexpertise we might assemble, we will still be facedwith some level of uncertainty.

Again, if we examine how commanders have treatedthis inherent complexity, we can see a process ofpruning occurring. One element of this pruningrevolves around acknowledging the inevitability ofuncertainty and the determination of an acceptablelevel of ignorance. In our earlier discussion oforchestrating effects, we saw that the requirement forknowing the enemy was not an absolute. We did notneed to know enemies, friends, or neutrals so well as


to be able to predict their every move, just wellenough to delimit a reasonable set of likely reactionsfrom which to plan. We saw that we could derive thislevel of knowledge by stating the problem weintended to present in neutral enough terms toapproximate how others would see it, and by havingsufficient insight into decisionmaking processes tounderstand the pressures on decisionmakers. Thismodel for accepting and dealing with uncertaintyapplies equally to the task of assessing effects and tothe task of estimating what cascade of effects ouraction is likely to produce.

It should be noted that neither the model nor itsresults are going to be exact, quantifiable, orcertain. Not only will our knowledge of theobservers always be inexact and incomplete, butalso the measurements we take will be indirect andsubject to error. However, our goal is not toeliminate error. That cannot be done. Our goal is torefine the information we do have, and to collateand assess it to provide the best feedbackavailable in a given circumstance.

Dynamic EffectsWe stated in the beginning of this chapter thatthe problem we confront in effects-basedoperations is dealing with complex adaptivesystems called human beings, whether asindividuals or as amassed in armies, states, orterrorist gangs. The challenges we have outlinedhere can help us to parse that problem in arational way, and the technologies and thinkingof Network Centric Warfare can bring new means

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to bear on solving aspects of the challengesinvolved. Yet at the core, we will still face aproblem and set of cause and effect relationshipsthat can never be entirely defined.

Despite this uncertainty and the challengesinvolved, the fact remains that we have done all ofthis before and we will have to do it again. This isthe reality of war and peace. What we seek is nota perfect answer. There is none. Rather, we seeka way of using the growing means at our disposalto help commanders and decisionmakers conductthe effects-based operations they have alwaysdone in a more dynamic, more precise, and moreinformed way.

1Miller. pp. 851ff.2Miller. pp. 853-4.3In Navy Global Wargame 2000, for example, this effects-based feedback was denominated in terms of bomb damageassessment rather than behavioral effects. The result wasthat, despite their best efforts to plan and fight an effects-based war, the game commanders soon reverted to atraditional attrition conflict. They had no choice. They had littlefeedback to support doing anything else.Author’s notes as a participant in Navy Global Wargame 2000effects assessment cell. 4Tedder. p. 525.5Note that from the perspective of the tactical levelcommanders executing the bombing campaign, such “effects-based” bomb damage assessment is almost indistinguishablefrom the traditional, attrition-based version. For them, thequestion was simply whether or not they had hit the righttarget and inflicted the damage ordered. For the planners, thequestion was not only whether the right target had beenstruck, but also whether the level of damage was sufficient toachieve the larger effect sought in the campaign plan. 6Churchill. Closing the Ring. p. 528.


7Not only were there additional German armored divisions inthe vicinity of the Pas de Calais (temporarily held in place bya successful Allied deception plan), but there were also otherarmored forces south of the Loire River bridges.Tedder. p. 525.8Similarly, if the divisions had been moved into the Normandyarea before the rail campaign was completed, the plannerswould have been forced to reconsider whether the strategicbombing assets involved would have been more effectiveagainst rail targets or against German petroleum supplies. Ibid. 9This was especially true in view of the unexpectedly goodGerman ability to repair the damage to the rail junctionsdemonstrated in the weeks before the invasion.SHAEF Weekly Intelligence Summary. June 3, 1944.10The Allies had Ultra and thus access to some sensitiveGerman communications, however, these intercepts did notindicate a change in the German assessment. But as with anyintercept, there is always a question as to whether theopponent has determined that the code has been broken andused messages in that code as disinformation. Similarly, onecan also speculate that had an Allied spy been operating inthe higher levels of the German Command and had that spybeen able to report quickly and reliably, the feedback mighthave been available. However, such speculation would ignoreboth how rare such successful high-level emplacement of anintelligence agent is and how brief the source’s survival wouldlikely be if any sort of rapid and repeated communicationswere attempted. 11There was, however, a very real concern with the impact onAllied morale and willingness to continue the struggle if theinvasion failed. 12SHAEF Weekly Intelligence Summary. June 3, 1944.13The word system is used in a general context thatencompasses everything from the railroad system attacked inthe Normandy air campaign to a political, economic, or socialsystem. In the sense of an effects-based cascade, it connotesan arrangement of entities bearing enough relationship to oneanother as to transmit physical and/or psychological effects insome manner to the limits of that relationship, with thoselimits in turn defining the limits of the system. 14The widely reported impact of the loss of electricity uponwater purification for the city of Baghdad or on life support forpremature infants in Kuwait are cases in point.15This same indicator had a different role at the onset of thecrisis because it informed American decisionmakers of the

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fact that an unusually high number of ships were en route toCuba and that these included ships with history as armscarriers. Both of these inputs likewise depended on aknowledge base constructed over some period before thecrisis ever began. Allison, Graham T. Essence of Decision, Explaining theCuban Missile Crisis. Boston; Little Brown. 1971. pp. 128-9.16To make a sensor-to-shooter link work, we have to havealready answered all the other questions that might be raisedexcept for the targeting information. We need to know whatkind of target we are looking for and that the criteria for therules of engagement have been satisfied before the sensor-to-shooter link can be used. The same kind of situationapplies to using these behavioral indicators in a timely way.We need to have the situation so well defined that all levelsknow the kinds of indicators we are looking for, so that all thatis needed is the actual detection of a particular physicalaction. 17To the above challenges, we must add another. Thefeedback loop we seek to create must provide informationthat is appropriate to the level of the commander ordecisionmaker receiving it. For tactical level commandersconfronted with immediate kill-or-be-killed decisions,feedback on the performance of distant enemy units or on thepsychological state of the enemy command are likely to benot only irrelevant but dysfunctional. They need a near realtime damage assessment. Is the unit opposing us out ofaction, or can it still kill us? By contrast, operational levelcommanders need to know much more. In the Normandyexample, Allied commanders needed to know both that thetargets had been attacked successfully and what, if any,German forces might still enter their battlespace. To carry theanalogy further, at the military-strategic level, the SupremeCommander needed to know how the German counter-offensive was forming so as to better allocate limited mobileresources, and perhaps how the German commanders werereacting to the air campaign as a whole. Finally, at the geo-strategic level, the concern of Roosevelt and Churchill wouldhave been less with the military specifics than with thebroader questions of the impact of a failure upon the wareffort and the opportunities that might be presented by aquick German collapse. Thus, each level would have requireda different level of detail and a different timeliness of feedbackto undertake different levels and kinds of effects.18The term estimative intelligence is used here to define adistinction between the reporting of aggregated positionalinformation and analyzed intelligence that attempts to deduce


enemy thinking and intentions. A classic example of thisestimative intelligence was the role of Admiral Nimitiz’sintelligence chief Commander Edwin Layton in the daysbefore the Battle of Midway. Layton, who spoke Japanese,had studied in Japan, and knew Nimitz’ opponent (AdmiralYamamoto) personally, was able to assess Japaneseintentions accurately despite a paucity of information. He wastherefore able to provide the continual feedback that Nimitzrequired before and during the battle. Layton, RADM Edwin T. USN. I Was There. New York. 1962. 19This is the measures of effectiveness quandary thatstrategic bombing efforts encounter. The air campaignplanners can quantify the destruction of a carefully conceivedlist of targets and they can observe the final behavior of thenational leadership that was the object of the bombing, butthey cannot trace the exact link from the target destruction tothe behavioral outcome observed. The linkage between thetwo is simply too complex to track, even in historicalinvestigations conducted after the fact with full access todocuments and personnel.20Indeed, this should hardly be surprising in as much asdestruction and physical attrition are two of the kinds ofeffects that may derive from an effects-based operation.21This nonlinear human dimension of war was what in factdistinguished Clausewitz’s writings from the rational, linearNewtonian conception of war as a function of numbers,capabilities and tactics. Watts, Barry D. Clausewitzian Friction and Future War.Washington, DC; INSS. 1996. pp. 19ff.22Schmitt, John F. “Command and (Out of) Control: TheMilitary Implications of Complexity Theory.” Complexity,Global Politics, and National Security. David S. Alberts andThomas J. Czerwinski eds.Washington, DC; NDU/INSS.1997. pp. 229-238.23The Soviet strategists assigned values to units dependingnot only on how they were armed but also on factors such astraining and nationality. These were then factors in complexformulas to calculate the level of destruction required in orderto cause the unit to collapse or the level of numericalsuperiority Soviet forces would require for a successfuloffensive.Sarikin, V.Ye. The Basic Principles of the Operational Art andTactics. Washington; GPO. 1972. pp. 214-223 and 258-260.24Moreover and somewhat strangely, the human factormeasurements that were explored in tandem with attrition-based measures tended to be confined to combat operations.

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Very little work seems to have been done in applying these orsimilar human-centric measurements to gauging operationsshort of combat, especially noncombat operations above thetactical level. 25Warden, John A. III. “The Enemy as a System.” AirpowerJournal. Spring 1995. pp. 40-55.26Fadok, David S. John Boyd and John Warden: Airpower’sQuest for Strategic Paralysis. Air University, Air UniversityPress. 1995.27Deptula, BG David A. USAF. “Firing for Effects,” Air ForceMagazine. April 2001, pp.46ff.28Effects-based Operations, Change in the Nature of Warfare.Arlington, VA; Aerospace Education Foundation. 2001.29Much of this process grew from the epochal work of Prof.Roberta Wohlstetter examining the “surprise” at Pearl Harbor.Wohlstetter concluded that all of the indications needed torealize that a Japanese attack was forthcoming wereavailable to the Americans but that, for various reasons, theytreated each indication separately as being inconclusive. Thefailure in American intelligence thus stemmed from a failure toaggregate individual indications into a clear warning. 30It can be argued that a simpler form of this process was whatintelligence analysts and air planners undertook to determinethe effect of their air operations upon German movementstoward the Normandy battlefield.31Notice that we have been very careful to use neutral termssuch as observer and actor rather than foe or opponent. Thereason is that in an effects-based operation, the reactions thatconcern us are not only those of the opponent or potentialopponent. They are equally those of our allies and coalitionpartners, and of those actors who remain neutral. All of theseactors will have behavior that we will seek to shape either byreinforcing their support for our efforts against another party,or winning support in this or future efforts32Robert F. Kennedy’s account of the decisionmaking in theKennedy White House during the Cuban Missile Crisis is afascinating picture of just such group dynamics andunderlines the nonobservable influences that may beexpected to affect outcomes. Kennedy. Thirteen Days. New York; Norton. 1969. 33Graham Allison’s Essence of Decision dissects in detail thedecisionmaking process and both the group and theorganizational dynamics involved. Allison, Graham T. Essence of Decision, Explaining theCuban Missile Crisis. Boston; Little Brown. 1971.34This does not mean that we cannot have an expert intuitive


insight into the processes that are likely to take place in thecognitive domain, as exemplified by Napoleon, Churchill, andRoosevelt. It means rather that we will have few indicators ofthe actual cognitive process that might be taking place inreaction to our stimuli.35This basic problem was demonstrated in the weeks after theSeptember 11th attacks and throughout the Afghanistancampaign. The intelligence collection system was notoriented to collect the information needed to provideadequate effects-based feedback to commanders. Moreover,while sensors could be readily sighted to provide somecoverage of physical movements of al-Qaida and Talibanforces, the lack of human intelligence sources and of linguistsable to read the information that became available was not aneasily fixed problem. In essence, the way in which theintelligence and surveillance system had been set up andfunded created a filter that cut off some of the physicalreflections of Taliban and al-Qaida decisions that mightotherwise have been observable. Economist. April 14, 2002.

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CHAPTER 9

Effects BeyondCombat:

Deterrence andReassurance

Thus far we have been examining our concept ofeffects-based operations in the context of

combat or crisis response operations. This focus oncombat, whether actual or potential, is proper sincethe only military force that has any value is one thatcan fight and win. Yet, if the mark of a trulysuccessful military force is the ability to prevent suchcombat in the first place, then clearly no study ofnetwork-centric and effects-based operations can becomplete without also examining this peacetimedimension as well. This is especially true becausethe peacetime tasks of war prevention andcrisis/conflict containment constitute the vastmajority of what military forces actually do. In short,we need to begin to think not only in terms of effects-based combat operations, but also in terms ofeffects-based deterrence, reassurance, forwarddefense, presence, and containment.

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In assessing the role of effects-based operations inthis peacetime dimension, we need to recognizethat the task is twofold. We need to prevent wars,contain crises and conflicts, and deal with threats toour citizens and interests. But deterrence of would-be aggressors is only part of the answer and cannotproduce an enduring peace by itself. Rather, thetask has a two-faced quality to it. We must not onlydeter challengers, but must reassure allies andneutrals, often at the same time and with the sameactions. Accordingly, any assessment of the role ofnetwork-centric and effects-based operations inpeacetime must address how they help us bothdeter and reassure.

The central question here is how might effects-based operations and network-centric operationshelp us to deter would-be opponents and to reassureallies and neutrals? However, to address thatquestion properly, we must also deal with twoadditional and more pressing questions. How mightthis effects-based deterrence and reassurancefunction in the post-September 11th global threatenvironment in which we find ourselves? And howmight we use it to create a stable regionaldeterrence/reassurance regime?

Niche Competitors and the Post-September 11th SecurityEnvironmentIn the opening chapter of this book, we discussedchallenges from peer or near-peer competitors withsymmetric means and will, and challenges from


smaller states or non-states that have limited means,but believe themselves to have superior will andendurance. We noted that the strategic nucleardeterrence regime of the Cold War has given way toa new, more complex requirement: deterring not onlythe symmetric, peer competitor, but also theasymmetric competitor whose objective is not toavoid conflict, but to create it, and who has little atrisk in attacking our homeland.

The problem posed by the emergence of asymmetric peer competitor of course remains, butsince September 11th, the more immediatechallenge has been that of asymmetric competitorssuch as terrorists and their state-sponsors, achallenge for which we have no tried and truedeterrence/reassurance regime. This kind of threatdemands an approach to homeland defense andstrategic deterrence that is heavily dependent onconventional rather than nuclear deterrence, that isfocused on prevention rather than retaliation, andone in which peace maintenance and forwarddefense are critical.

How then would our concept of effects-basedoperations better enable us to deal with thischallenge?

To answer this question, we can start by looking atthese asymmetric adversaries as “niche”challengers, would-be foes who seek to identifyand exploit a political, temporal, geographic, and/ormilitary niche where American and Allied powereither cannot be brought to bear or is too weak,slow, or dysfunctional to meet a challenge, but inwhich challengers can realize their own political,

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ideological, economic, or military objectives. Asuccessful niche challenge depends not only onthe choice or creation of a situation that conformsto these constraints, but also upon an ability to limitthe interaction with the larger power to the niche ofchoice. A successful niche strategy, therefore,might be expected to hinge on damage inflictionvice military victory and on psychological vicephysical attrition.1

Because niche competitors generally have little atrisk themselves, they can afford to continuallyprobe suspected vulnerabilities and to attackwhenever and wherever they believe that theyhave found a likely niche. Moreover, because theirstrategy is based on damage infliction andpsychological attrition, they can use the element ofsurprise to attack in one niche, inflict the requireddamage, and then move on to exploiting otherpotential niches as soon as the original probe ismet or foreclosed. In the case of al-Qaida, forexample, the niche exploited on September 11,2001 was presented by the gaps between internaland external security in the United States andbetween the United States and other states in anera of mass movements of people. This loss ofsurprise and closure of the niche was evident evenon September 11th itself as passengers, alerted bycell phone calls as to what hijacking now meant,struggled to retake one plane before it could beused as a missile against an additional target. Asthis implies in niche competition, as security gapsor other niches are plugged in one area, we shouldexpect the direction and nature of the probes to


shift continually as the competitor seeks to surpriseus by exploiting new vulnerabilities.

Logically, to deter such attacks, we would need todemonstrate that we had both the will and themeans to negate the political, temporal, geographicand military niches that the competitor might seek toexploit. Or we might demonstrate a willingness andability to escalate any confrontation beyond thechallenger’s niche of choice. In essence, this wasthe tack taken by the United States and its allies inthe destruction of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.Also, to reassure friends and neutrals, we have todemonstrate that we had the means and will to blockor respond to any niche challenge while maintaininga local order conducive to peaceful change.

Notice that there are two elements to this deterrenceand reassurance: will and means. The willcomponent has been the principal thrust of ourconcept of effects-based combat operations and thereason for our focus on operations in the cognitivedomain. This focus on the cognitive domain is evenmore pronounced in deterrence and reassurance.Indeed, the means component of deterrence andreassurance comes to be defined in terms of itsimpact on the cognitive domain as the physicalcapabilities that can be used to shape will. In thecontext of a niche strategy, the primary militaryactions would center on the demonstration of therange of options at our disposal to meet a probe, tonegate a perceived niche or vulnerability, orotherwise deal with a challenger.

In a sense, we have already laid the groundwork forsuch a peacetime application of military power in our

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concept of effects-based operations. Because wedefined effects-based operations in terms of actionsrather than weapons on targets, we opened the wayto considering nonkinetic, peacetime uses of militaryforce in everything from maneuver to presence.Similarly, by defining effects in terms of the impactsof our actions on the behavior of “friends, foes, andneutrals,” we moved beyond focusing solely on ahostile opponent and into the multi-sidedinteractions typical of a deterrence/reassuranceregime. Furthermore, by looking at military effectsnot as independent phenomena, but as componentsof a unified national effect that encompasses all ofthe elements of national power, we created the basisfor examining the wider interplay of political,diplomatic, economic, and military power across thepeace-crisis-war spectrum. Finally, by consideringeffects-based operations as “operations in thecognitive domain,” we began to view actions andeffects from the complex perspective of an observertrying to make sense of an emerging situation andattempting to decide on a course of action.

In examining the kinds of effects that we mightcreate, we also began to define the deterrence sideof our mission. We looked at the question offoreclosure, the use of military forces to block anadversary’s likely course of action either bydemonstrating an ability to prevent success or byraising the risks of such a course of action untilthey become unacceptable. We noted thatforeclosure can take two forms. Passiveforeclosure is where the scope and scale of ourcapability dissuades aggressors from challengingthe regime. Active foreclosure is where the


response to any challenge is so immediate andoverwhelming that challengers must reassess theirrisk calculus and desist in mid-action.

We now need to take this effort two steps further.First, we need to look specifically at the role ofeffects-based operations in deterrence andreassurance.2 Then, we need to examine how theconcept of effects-based operations itself mightserve as a framework for defining a new securityregime and for determining the capabilities thatforward presence and crisis response forces wouldneed to be successful in preventing as well asfighting wars.

Deterrence and Reassurance asEffects-Based OperationsOn the surface, an effects-based approach todeterrence and reassurance seems eminentlyreasonable. After all, both deterrence andreassurance are inherently matters of humanbehavior, and shaping the behavior of human beingsand human organizations is what effects-basedoperations are all about. More specifically,deterrence and reassurance both involve usingsome combination of military, political, diplomatic,and economic actions to influence what goes on inthe decisionmaking processes of both individualobservers and groups of observers.3 This is to saythat the military side of deterrence and reassuranceinherently entails operations in the cognitive domain.

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The above suggests that a good starting point forunderstanding the role of effects-based operations indeterrence and reassurance is the cognitive cycle(see Figure 65). If we extend the logic of thecognitive process diagramed in Chapter 4 intopeacetime operations, we can postulate that themilitary, political, diplomatic, and/or economicactions we take to deter or reassure are in somerespect physical actions that occur in the physicaldomain. These actions are then somehow monitoredand reported through the information domain toobservers so as to become part of the observers’situation awareness, an awareness that varies withquantity and quality of the reporting or of thesurveillance system. However, the key tounderstanding how we deter and reassure lies lessin understanding how actions are detected andreported than in understanding how situationawareness impacts the cognitive domain (howobservers understand the actions and react to thestimuli provided).

In the cognitive domain, observers (consciously orunconsciously) will compare the actions observed inthe situation to a set of mental models and priorknowledge that is based both on a history of whatthey perceive has happened in similar situationsand on personal experience that they perceive to berelevant. The observers will then apply thesemodels to determining one or more probable causeand effect chains, to assessing temporalrelationships between events, and to forecastinghow the situation is most likely to evolve (dynamicfutures). These assessments together constitute adeep understanding of the situation observed. This


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deep understanding combined with the observers’own value system, the observers’ national, ethnic,religious, organizational, and generational culture,and with an assessment of how they might shapethe perceived futures contribute to how theobservers make sense of what they see. The sensethe observers make of the situation in turninfluences their assessment of what options mightbe open to them to respond or shape the situationto conform to their needs or desires, and thedecisions or choices they make as to which courseof action to pursue. The resulting choices constitutethe observer’s behavior, the outcome we are tryingto shape or influence.

Although we looked at each of these stepspreviously from the perspective of combat andconflict situations in which these cognitiveprocesses were part of rapid-fire action-reactiondecisionmaking, the same processes are in factbasic to deterrence and reassurance. As in theconflict-centered cognitive cycle, deterrence andreassurance will probably involve a succession ofaction-reaction decisionmaking cycles on the partof both sides over some period of time. In theseinteractions, we would strive to identify andorchestrate our actions so as to drive the behaviorof the targeted observers in a particular direction.On the other side, those observing our actionswould assess them and attempt to calculate therisks involved in pursuing various potential coursesof action. Their reactions would then provide uswith feedback and possibly the stimulus for anotheraction-reaction cycle. This interchange is two-sided, with other actors attempting to shape our


behavior even as we try to shape theirs, so thatthese two-sided interactions occur simultaneouslywith multiple actors. The creation of a stabledeterrence/reassurance regime may involveprolonged successions of these action-reactioncycles over a period of years and even decades.

In the case of deterrence and reassurance, as in thecase of the conflict-centered cognitive process,there are only two points in this entire cognitivecycle at which we can hope to influence observers’behavior. One is in the immediate actions we take tocreate a certain combination of effects that will drivethe chain of deep understanding, sensemaking,judgment, and decisions to some acceptable short-term behavior. The other is the accumulated historyof all the actions that we have taken that constitutethe prior knowledge yardstick of the observers andwhich therefore shapes the mental models by whichthose observers will measure any current action.This history may either support the current action,such as a history of good relations and cooperationmight support coalition formation, or it may prove ahurdle to be overcome, such as a history of distrustmight need to be overcome before a coalition canbe formed.

Context Notice that, in the above description of operations inthe cognitive domain, no action or effect occurs in avacuum. Deterrence and reassurance are in the eyeof the beholder and the beholder always will havesome mental baggage. Stated differently, thedeterring or reassuring effect we create with our

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actions arises from those actions being put intosome context by the observer. In the diagram of thecognitive process, this context is embodied in priorknowledge and mental models, in the variousaspects of a deep understanding of the situation,and in the cultural and other factors that supportsensemaking, including physiological factors. Sincethese factors will never be exactly the same for anytwo human observers or for any two humanorganizations, the cognitive context for any actioncan vary radically. Indeed, the shift from oneobserver to the next may be so radical as to makethe same action carry completely oppositemeanings for the different observers.

How then do we bound this infinity of potentialperceptions and reactions so as to be able to makea rational choice of actions to deter and/or reassure?

Two basic facets of this varying context are mostsignificant: the context provided by the observer’sown intentions and plans, and the context that weourselves provide by our actions, past and present.To some degree, we have already been talkingabout the context provided by the observer’s plansand intentions when we broke the down observersinto the three categories of friends, foes, andneutrals. Implicit in this categorization is the idea thatthe plans and intentions of observers are going to bedifferent and those differences are going to shapehow an action is perceived. Is the observer thewould-be aggressor or the likely victim? To a would-be aggressor, the movement of a great powermilitary force into the region and, thus, into thecontext of an invasion the aggressor may be


planning probably would appear threatening. In thatcase, the impact of such a movement might be todisrupt those plans so badly as to foreclose anypossibility of success or to change the risk calculusenough to keep that aggressor from a course ofaction leading to hostilities. By contrast, to the statethat was to be the aggressor’s target, the movewould likely be seen as reassuring and affect itscalculation of the costs and risks of resistingaggression or of cooperating, for example, bygranting access to air bases.

The context will also be provided by history4 and theindividual observer’s own experience. While asubstantial proportion of this historicalpreconditioning (including national history, religion,ideology, organizational or political affiliation) cannotbe controlled or changed by our actions, it is whereour actions contribute to shaping the priorknowledge and mental models of the observers andthereby create the context for our future actions tobe observed. To be successful in deterrence andreassurance, we need to construct a history ofprevious actions against which our future actionscan be assessed by the intended observers.

Forward American military operations includingmilitary exercises with local friends must beunderstood in this role of creating context orpreconditioning, as a means of shaping the contextwithin which all of our future actions will beconsidered. For the friend, the exercises reassure bydemonstrating the will and capability to act whennecessary. For the challenger, the exercisesdemonstrate the combined capabilities of the outside

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power and the local partner against which thechallenger must weigh the risks and probabilities ofsuccess. This latter contextualization occurs not onlyon the part of the state with which the exercise isconducted, but also on the part of any other localentity that observes it. For each observer, theinteraction becomes a part of the history by whichthey will measure future interactions.

This is fine as far as it goes, but is still too general.We need to carry the logic another step and answerthe same question that we posed in examining thecognitive process in combat and crisis operations.What kinds of actions might actually shape thiscontext? In terms of the cognitive cycle, we mustunderstand what aspects of our capabilities and/oractions would be seen by observers and then howthe resulting perception might shape their riskversus gain calculations.

Observe What?What do the observers see that would shape theirbehavior and either deter or reassure them eitherover the short term or over the longer term? Ourdiscussion of actions and effects in Chapter 6proposed that observers’ perceptions andsubsequent behavior are shaped not just by what wedo, but also by how we do it. We described this“what” and “how” in terms of six attributes thatdefined the observable character of any action.Since the actions we undertake are the only meansat our disposal to shape observer perceptions, thesix attributes become the variables at our disposal to


create the perceptions and effects we desire and theaspects of our actions that we need to manipulate tocreate a unified effect. Actions taken to deter orreassure are no different. The attributes of an action(focus, type of force, scale, scope, timing andvisibility) provide the basis for a risk-gain securitycalculus by local observers. They are what woulddrive a would-be aggressor to ask the hardquestions, the answers to which would define hisability to succeed and risks in a particular course ofaction. The attributes define the military niche withinwhich a challenger must operate, determine hislikelihood of success, and anticipate potentialconsequences.5 To the extent that any aggressorconcludes that a particular geographic, temporal, orwarfare niche is not viable, we are likely to deterdisruptive courses of action and reassure local alliesand neutrals.

We break the six attributes down in terms of thisdeterrence/reassurance risk calculus along thefollowing lines.

1. FocusThe focus is the nature of the physical actions thatcan be undertaken to deter or reassure eitherimmediately or over time.6 It is the prospect of whatis being done or might be done to deter andreassure, rather than how it is or might be done. The“what” determines the character of the problem awould-be aggressor might face or the ways in whichconcrete support or reassurance might be providedto a friend. From the standpoint of the observer, it is

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the “what can be done to me?” (opponent) or “whatcan be done for me? (friend). It equates to the natureof a potential foreclosure.

In practical terms, it brings a challenger’s planners,including those of a terrorist cell, to ask questionsas to how a particular course of action might bethwarted and what the consequences of the probeor a conflict might be. For purposes of reassurance,the focus helps drive the friend or neutral’sassessment as to whether an intervention might infact provide the support needed to deal with anemerging situation. For example, a purely navalcapability offshore might be judged irrelevant to anurban guerrilla threat and therefore fail to reassure,but the combination of such offshore support with amarine force that could be inserted from the seawould probably be judged as relevant and thereforewould tend to reassure.

The “what” also begins to define the nature of anymilitary niche that a challenger might seek toexploit. Logically, if a military force that is meant todeter the challenger actually has no capability forcertain kinds of warfare, those gaps are likely to beseen as warfare niches to be exploited and willshape the challenger’s niche strategy in thatdirection. For example, an inability to put “boots onthe ground” might evoke a probe that focuses onground operations, but which minimizes exposureto long-range precision strikes, such as in urbanguerrilla operations. Similarly, an inability to dealwith sea mines might invite an anti-access or areadenial strategy that focused heavily on miningoffshore waters.


For local friends and neutrals, the same inability tocover a perceived military niche would leave thosefriends and neutrals to fill the niches themselves, orto conclude that they cannot oppose the enemy andthat some accommodation with the challenger mustbe found. In either event, the result would be afailure to reassure, one that would be felt not justwhen an active threat was encountered, but ratheras soon as the inability became obvious.

2. Forces The nature of the forces themselves (standoff orclose in, ground, sea, or air) is distinct from thewarfare capabilities they represent and defines adifferent element of the would-be foe’s problem.7

Instead of a “what can be done to me or for me?” itforces a consideration of how the action might beundertaken and how plausible a threat or promise ofsupport might actually be. To the degree that thedeterring or reassuring forces rely on close-in forcesor “boots on the ground,” a challenger might see anopportunity to inflict or to threaten to inflict sufficientdamage and casualties to counter-deter and planaccordingly. Conversely, if the deterrent force wereto rely on standoff precision weapons, the challengermight calculate that there was a greater likelihood ofa reaction. Notice in both these cases that the natureof the forces deployed can be observed by both thewould-be foe and would-be allies, each of whommay be expected to make their own deductions.

We must also take into account that our capabilitiesare by no means restricted to military means.Economic and political pressures may likewise be

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applied, as in the forced British withdrawal from theStrait of Tiran in 1967,8 and these pressures maywork better than any military equivalent.Conversely, if the only pressures that can begenerated are nonmilitary, the military option islikely to be seen as a niche to be exploited.

3. Scale The scale of the action that is possible (passiveforeclosure) or that is being undertaken (activeforeclosure) establishes the quantitative size of theproblem the would-be aggressor must deal with andindirectly affects the range of options available todeter or reassure. When broken down according tothe types of military capabilities involved, it will alsoconvey the specific kind of threat with which thewould-be aggressor must deal.

In passive foreclosure, if the would-be aggressorconcludes that he cannot deal with the numbers andtypes of forces ranged against him, his reaction verylikely will be either to dismiss that course of action orperhaps to seek another more promising niche toachieve his aims.

For active foreclosure, the idea is slightly different.The fact that the active foreclosure is neededimplies that passive foreclosure has failed. Thus,increasing the scale of the force to be applied wellbeyond the would-be aggressor’s expectations isone way of forcing him to reevaluate his probabilityof success.


4. Scope The scope equates to the geographic andoperational range of action that the would-beaggressor may have to face, and in this capacity,scope becomes a prime consideration in thechallenger’s planning.

The geographic scope or area over which a counter-action can be credibly presented determines thespatial dimension of the threat the challenger mustbe prepared to counter and the likelihood of a lateralescalation beyond his chosen niche. At a minimum,it should convey that there would be no sanctuaryand, thus, no prospect of a successful anti-access orarea denial strategy. Better still, it should convey asense of risk to the would-be challenger. That maybe an unstated threat to retaliate in other geographicareas, but it also may be to pose a direct militaryproblem. For example, if a deterring force’s militaryactions can cover a wide geographic area, thechallenger’s own forces may become too diluted todefend against it, or if the challenger elects toconcentrate defenses about some critical point, therest of the country or organization will be subject tounimpeded attack.

The operational scope defines a different dimensionof the deterrent: the extent of the warfare niche thata challenger might hope to exploit. There are twofacets to this exploitation. Limitations in a deterrentforce’s operational scope might reveal a niche that awould-be aggressor would try to exploit in an anti-access campaign. But at the same time, thedeterrent force’s strengths in various areas would

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both define areas that could not be challenged andareas in which the challenger himself might bevulnerable - a reverse niche.

5. TimingThe timing variable for actions was broken into thethree elements of speed, duration, andsynchronicity. All three shape a challenger’srisk/success calculus and the reassurance providedto friends and neutrals.

The speed of a deterrent force response to thestimulus or aggression sets the time element of theniche, the time limits within which the challenger’splan must be successful. Obviously, a challenger islikely to deem it far easier to achieve success in anoperation that can be mounted unimpeded over aperiod of months or even years as compared with anoperation that must be carried out within a muchshorter span of time of hours or days. The faster thedeterring force can move, the fewer theopportunities likely to be presented and the moreprecarious the niche to be exploited will be. Thequestion of timing implies a series of more specificquestions. What capabilities are likely to be availableto thwart the aggression at what time? In whatnumbers would they be available at what time?Together, the answers to these questions woulddefine the would-be aggressor’s timing calculus.

The duration sets the standard for how long thechallenger might have to endure either aforeclosure of some action or some form ofretaliation. If the threatened military actions were


limited to a one time, nonrepeatable strike forexample, it would invite the challenger to consider“riding out” the action and then resuming the probe,or simply accepting the attack as a one-time cost ofdoing business and moving on to the next probe. Bycontrast, if the military actions could be continuedfor months or years, it would force the risk calculusto consider the impact on future operations, theability to sustain damage, psychological attritionstrategy, and even the challenger’s ability to sustaina lengthy confrontation.

Finally, the ability of a deterrent force to time andcoordinate its actions so as to optimize theirimpact forces a worst-case and potentiallydiscouraging risk calculus on the challenger. Howmight the challenger’s vulnerabilities be exploited?How might the consequences of his actionsaccelerate out of control?

6. VisibilityEverything that we have considered in the guise oftools to reassure friends and to shape a would-beaggressor’s risk/success calculus is dependentupon the friend or aggressor seeing andunderstanding the capabilities in question. Thedeterrent will only be valuable to the extent that ithas been demonstrated to observers, and to theextent that this demonstration is periodicallyreinforced both by repetition and by continuingadaptation to changing circumstances. As thissuggests, whereas an overwhelming surpriseresponse to aggression may help deter furtheraggression, the fact that the action was a surprise

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would indicate that the capabilities of the deterringforce were not sufficiently evident to the aggressorto prevent the aggression in the first place.However, it can also be argued that the capacity tosurprise is itself a deterrent because it complicatesthe risk calculus and leaves a would-be challengerto imagine a worst-case response. This suggests abalance between the two that might itself bemanipulated for maximum effect, contingent uponour ability to control the visibility of our actions.

As we noted in the case of effects-based combatoperations, the deterrence we seek to create is nota function of any one of these variables by itself,but rather of how we combine them to shape anobserver’s decisionmaking process. Strengths inone area can balance relative weaknesses in otherareas, or can complement and enhance the valueof other capabilities. A small force that can beapplied immediately can complement a larger forcethat takes more time to mobilize, creating a morecomplex problem for the aggressor to handle.Similarly, while the above is written primarily fromthe standpoint of military forces, the logic extendsto political, diplomatic, and economic elements ofnational power whose actions might be used aspart of an overall deterrent. These alternativeelements of national power multiply the variety ofoptions by which we might deter enemies orreassure friends and neutrals.

Rules of the GameWhat we have done so far is to outline in roughterms how the deterrence-reassurance process


takes place in the context of operations in thecognitive domain. We can take this yet another stepto examine how deterrence and reassurance mightfigure in the effects-based rule sets that wepresented in Chapter 5. The rules of the game thatwe deduced from the series of wars and crisisresponses were (1) that actions create effects, (2)that effects are cumulative, (3) that action-reactioncycles will have both active and passive participants,(4) that the cycles will occur simultaneously inmultiple dimensions, (5) that all actions and effectsat all levels and in each arena are interrelated, and(6) that the effects produced are both physical andpsychological in nature.

• Actions create effects. Any conventionaldeterrence-reassurance regime ultimately mustrest on local observers’ perceptions of ouractions, past and present and, by extension,their expectation of future actions. The keywords in shaping the local security calculus areactions and perceptions. Having a potentialcapability to thwart is not by itself sufficient todeter or reassure. We must also demonstratethat capability and our willingness to use it insuch a way as to be readily observed by allconcerned.9 We must do this on a regularbasis if we are to translate a past history ofaction into a current and continuingexpectation by local observers that futureaction will be undertaken whenever andwherever needed.

• Effects are cumulative. Just as the threats froma niche competitor are likely to be continual, so

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too must the deterrence-reassurance regime bea continuing process. Effects are cumulativeover time. There is no sharp dividing linebetween peace and war, but rather a continuouschain of observed interactions that stretchesfrom routine peacetime presence to combatoperations. Logically, effects-based operationscannot begin with combat or even targetplanning if they are to succeed in deterring, andespecially not if they are to succeed inreassuring. We accept that continued peacetimeexercise is critical to wartime success. It is nodifferent with creating a local conventionaldeterrence-reassurance regime. The peacetimeactions are the means by which we conditionobservers as to what to expect in the face of athreat. The history of peacetime actions, inshort, is the experience base upon which crisisand wartime perceptions are built. If we were towait for a crisis or war before beginning to actand shape perceptions, we would likely discovereither that it was too late to achieve the effectwe required, or that we had to overcome localperception of inaction or inability before ouractions could have any impact on the observers.

• Any action-reaction cycle will have both activeand passive participants. Actions meant todeter or reassure may be focused on a limitedcircle of observers, but in fact will inevitablyhave an effect on anyone who can observethem, and potentially could include an entireregional and global audience and thereby alterthe security environment well beyond theoriginal targets. In so doing, each action


contributes to the cumulative history andexperience base, and in some degreecontributes to shaping the perceptions andbehavior of all observers across that securityenvironment. We may elect to prune thesecascading psychological effects and confine ourconcerns to the targeted friends or challengers,but we will still need to take the impact of ouractions on passive participants into account infuture interactions with those actors.

• Interactions occur simultaneously in multipledimensions. The military components ofdeterrence and reassurance do not exist in avacuum. All actions, whether tactical,operational, military-strategic, or geo-strategic,and whether political-diplomatic, economic, ormilitary, are interrelated and will be seen bylocal observers as a single coordinated nationaleffort, regardless of whether we intended themas such. If we are to make deterrence andreassurance work, we too must see our actionsas an aggregate. For example, even an actionas routine as a port visit by a Navy ship is likelyto be seen against a background of our nationalpolitical, security, and economic policy. Furthercomplicating the situation, the local observerswill also see the visit against the backdrop oftheir own local and national politics, or in thecase of terrorists for example, in the context oftheir organization’s internal politics.

• All actions and effects are interrelated. Giventhe multi-faceted character of our own actions,the diversity of the influences on observers,

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and the relatively small proportion of influencesthat we can control, it becomes even moreincumbent upon us to coordinate ourdeterrence/reassurance efforts to ensure aunity of effect in those measures. At aminimum, we will need to deconflict our ownactions so that they do not leave conflictingimpressions or confuse the observers, or stillworse, unwittingly build a negative synergy thatconveys an effect that is the opposite of whatwe intended. Optimally, in achieving a unity ofeffect, we will build a positive synergy thatreinforces our effort.

• Effects have physical and psychologicaldimensions. Like the cascades of physical andpsychological effects created by militaryactions in crisis and war, our actions to deterand reassure should be expected to set offcascading effects that will have both physicaland psychological dimensions. Thesecascades are likely to be more nuanced thanthose of combat operations. Just as in combatoperations, determining the success of ourefforts and our ability to adapt and innovate willhinge on the feedback that can be provided todecisionmakers and commands. Yet, becauseof the extended and often times subtlecharacter of this complex cascade, thisdeterrence/reassurance feedback is likely to beeven more heavily psychological, political-diplomatic, and subjective than those ofcombat operations.


Although these concepts bring us closer to effects-based deterrence and effects-based reassurance,we are still left with a fundamental problem. Ifdeterrence and reassurance are to work, then bydefinition, they cannot be simply a reactiveoperation.10 They must be a configuration of forces,capabilities, and actions that can establish a stablestate or regime by presence and continued action.We need to create not so much effects-baseddeterrence operations as an effects-based deterrentat the center of a new strategic deterrence regime.This is the underlying challenge posed by thecollapse of the Cold War strategic deterrence regimeon September 11, 2001.

Crafting an Effects-Based DeterrentWhat kind of effects-based deterrent force mightprovide the forward deterrence we need to defendour homeland against an expanding asymmetricthreat? In fact, we have now described severalcomponents of such a deterrent. We have said thatit entails both deterrence and reassurance missionsand that it must look equally at friend, foe, andneutral. We have described a set of variablesincluding actions, locations, timing, and visibility.We looked at these variables in terms of their abilityto define and limit the niches within whichcompetitors might operate. Lastly, we have appliedthe effects-based rule set to deterrence andreassurance. We now must put these together.

The rule sets tell us two more things.

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• First, they indicate that a stable deterrenceregime is a cumulative effect to be builtgradually over a period of years. The decisionsmade and the courses of action pursued thatresult in deterrence arise from an aggregationof economic, political, cultural, and militaryperceptions that may take years to evolve.These perceptions are both rational andemotional in nature. In part, they may reflectreasoned assessments of physical capabilitiessuch as the economic and military power ofcontenders, and of patterns of behavior bythose actors that might indicate how thesephysical capabilities might or might nottranslate into action. In part, they reflect humanelements such as national pride, trust, andpersonal friendships. This is to say that wemust orchestrate not only the responses tocrises and threats, but also our peacetimeactions and that by doing so, we can graduallyshape the history, perceptions, and the contextwithin which local observers will see our futureactions. It is within this peace, crisis, and warcontext that deterrence and its components ofpresence and crisis response operate, andwithin this context that we must consider therole of effects-based operations.

• Second, as the above suggests, wherestrategic nuclear deterrence might beconsidered to be global in dimension, allconventional deterrence, like politics, is local.The deterrence we are concerned about existsin the minds of regional decisionmakers andlocal publics. It is about the balance of power


and capabilities within a given geographic area.That geographic area may be restricted to aregion within the borders of a single country inthe case an ethnic “liberation front.” It may berestricted to immediate neighbors in the case ofsmaller powers. Or it may encompass an entireregion in the case of large powers.11 What goeson beyond the bounds of this area is generallyof interest only to the degree that it affects thelocal situation or that capabilities from outsidethe area that might be brought to bear uponthis local balance of power.12

Thus, any local deterrence regime will have a “wrongend of the telescope” character about it. Observersare not likely to focus on the totality of events takingplace either in the region or in the world, nor will theyconsider the totality of American power that may bebrought to bear. Their perceptions will be shaped bywhat they can see. Dissidents, for example, will tendto create a security calculus that focuses within theircountry, or at most across borders to fellow ethnicand religious groups. States will tend to focus theircalculations on their neighbors, or at most, thosepotential coalitions of neighboring states that mightaffect them.13

In this local calculus, the possibility of action by anonregional power constitutes something akin to astrategic problem. Such an external militarychallenge could be an order of magnitude greaterthan any local force and thus, could be the decisivecomponent of the local calculus. But it is also likelyto be a factor that may or may not be credible in agiven circumstance. Also, like the strategic nuclear

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challenge, this potential for external interventionmay require strategies and capabilities that may besharply different from those the same local actormight use against local adversaries.14

Threefold Military Deterrent

In shaping the local security calculus that is at theheart of stable deterrence, our challenge is tocreate a local constellation of capabilities thatwould force a challenger to ask the series of hardquestions about the risks and chances of successthat we have discussed above. Our effects-basedrule set makes clear that military capabilities areonly one part of this constellation, even though theyare the focus of this book and of the deterrent wehave been considering in this chapter. Moreover,as our initial concern with friends and neutralsimplies, a deterrent cannot be defined in a vacuum,independently of the situation or solely in terms ofAmerican forces and capabilities. Rather, themilitary component of any deterrent will be markedby a balance of three factors: (1) what local powerscan do for themselves, (2) what American or otherallied capabilities are routinely present, and (3)what American or other allied forces can be broughtto the scene (and how fast and for how long). Thethree military forces (local, forward deployed, andforward deployable) play complementary roles inthe shaping behavior and should be thought of asinterlocking parts of the same deterrent.

As one would expect in any interaction betweencomplex actors, these capabilities are not simply


additive, but instead resemble a three-dimensionalcontinuum. The greater the capabilities of the localallies and the greater their will, the lessreinforcement will be required from nonregionalpowers in order to maintain the same level of localdeterrence and reassurance. The same is true of theinternal security apparatus that might have to dealwith threats from non-state organizations, includingterrorist attacks. Similarly, the greater theimmediately available capabilities of the forwarddeployed nonregional forces, the less dependent thedeterrent will be on either the forces of local allies orthose deploying from distant bases. Finally, thegreater the forces that can be deployed and themore rapid their deployment, the less reliant thedeterrent or reassurance will be on either local orforward deployed forces. There is no cookie cutter,one-size-fits-all forward presence force or crisisreaction force. The force needed will vary from oneregion to the next and one situation to the next. Wecan, for example, readily extrapolate the above tothe situation of an international security force in apeacekeeping operation. In that case, the degree ofsupport required to reassure would depend on whatlocal security capabilities remained, the threat tolocal order, the capabilities of the peacekeepers, andhow rapidly they could be reinforced if necessary.

In this deterrence equation, the local forces are theindependent variable. That is, the amount of outsideintervention that will be required to maintain a givenlevel of deterrence and stability will depend on thelevel of local capabilities, and not the reverse. TheUnited States, for example, might encourage localallies to take a greater part in their own defense, but

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in the final analysis, it cannot control what theyactually do or the proficiency that they will bring tothe task. When all is said and done, the UnitedStates and other outside powers have the choice ofmaking up any deficiencies with their own forces oraccepting the instability and risks of conflagrationthat may result from a failure to do so.

…and in Combat Finally, there is another aspect of deterrence andreassurance that we must not ignore. Deterrence isfar from being a peacetime-only mission thatdisappears when combat begins. It is a fundamentalfacet of military operations in combat as well. Thisconcern with deterrence during combat wasapparent in one way during the Cold War when anyopen combat at all between the superpowers hadthe potential for escalating into a globalthermonuclear war. However, the same problempresents itself in any combat situation at any level.

The question of reassurance is equally present inwartime and other combat operations. We veryseldom fight alone and almost never engage incombat operations without some degree of supportfrom friends and allies. Such support rests on anability to reassure allies, an ability that is every bitas continual a task as deterring the verticalescalation of a conflict.

These questions of deterrence and reassurance area fundamental aspect of achieving an acceptableend-state in any crisis or conflict, and of determininghow to contain the conflict and prevent lateral as well


as vertical escalation. This may involvesimultaneously deterring the adversary from lateralescalation while reassuring and encouraging friendsand neutrals to resist. Or, particularly in the laststages of a crisis or conflict, it may involvereassuring an adversary to make an end-state work.

Here the variables and rule sets apply. Especially inthe latter case, every aspect of how we act will comeunder scrutiny as an indicator of whether the solutionproposed is in fact an end-state rather than amaneuver for advantage. Political, diplomatic, andmilitary actions will be inseparable parts of what willbe regarded as a unified national or coalition action,however inchoate it may be.

Effects-Based DeterrenceIf the above sounds commonsensical, it is. We havedone all of this before and usually on an intuitive adhoc basis. However, in this case, by applying theframework of effects-based operations concepts andtheory that we have been exploring in this book, wealso lay the foundation for applying the advantagesof the network-centric revolution to this old problem.It is the mounting urgency of the deterrence problemin the wake of the September 11th attacks andparticularly the potential for the terrorist attackstaking on a nuclear, chemical, or biologicaldimension that make the combination of network-centric and effects-based operations so essential.

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1Thus, the niche challenger might be expected to avoidactions that so enrage the larger power as to negate thechallenger’s perceived advantage in will. This judgment, ofcourse, would not pertain where the challenger is trying toprovoke just such a conflict or where the challenger perceivesthat his actions are simply carrying out a divine mandate inthe face of which questions of human will might be presumedirrelevant. 2For purposes of this work, we will confine the considerationof reassurance to the military domain and to the primarymilitary function of providing security, either in the sense ofsupporting a general deterrence-reassurance regime or thatof specific actions to support it. We will not attempt to assessthe nonmilitary components of reassurance or the use ofmilitary forces in purely humanitarian operations (as opposedto humanitarian operations requiring an a priori establishmentof security), even though these too can be factors inreassurance. 3We established earlier that all who could see an action wouldin some way be affected by it. However, such a broaddefinition of the set of observers would be so unwieldy as tobe impossibly complex. In Chapter 7, however, we postulatedthat this set could be pruned to limit it to the particular sub-setof all these observers who are the targets of our actions. 4This history may be purely tactical or operational in natureand basically factual. However, it also may be a perceivedhistory shaped by culture, propaganda, self-deceit, and avariety of other factors both personal and organizational. Thislatter perceived history, therefore, will vary from one observerto the next. 5The niche will probably not be limited to military capabilitiesalone. It will almost inevitably include political, economic, andmilitary actions. 6As discussed, this can be either over time, in the case ofpassive foreclosure, or in response to a specific incident, inthe case of active foreclosure.7Here again, the power that is applicable may not be military.However, the unavailability of a military component todeterrence would itself shape the would-be aggressor’sperceptions of what was or was not possible and produce adifferent calculation as to risks. 8Wilson, Harold. A Personal Record. Boston; Little Brown.1971. pp. 397-9.9This means planning such demonstrations from thestandpoint of what observers are likely to see and configuringthem so that the intended observers cannot miss seeing thecapabilities we are trying to demonstrate.


10Our problem is complicated by the fact that we tend toregard the military role here in terms of operations, such asthe evacuation of American nationals threatened by localunrest or as crisis responses to block aggression. Yet, as wepointed out earlier, these are responses to deal with thesymptoms of an incipient failure of localdeterrence/reassurance and not a description of theunderlying deterrence regime needed to ensure the stabilitythat would prevent such challenges or make them far lesslikely.11It is worth noting that even in the midst of the Cold War, theconventional confrontations between the superpowers tendedto be on a region by region basis and seldom gave rise to alateral escalation, even though both the Soviets andAmericans had the capability to do so.12There is a rich anecdotal history of this phenomenonepitomized by the “campanilism” or disinterest in anythingthat could not be seen from the campanile (bell tower) of thelocal church, something that was the bane of Italiannationalists in the nineteenth century. From the perspectiveof a local decisionmaker, this horizon corresponds to the limitof his span of control or to that portion of the world uponwhich he feels able to have any impact.13Terrorists such as al-Qaida will tend to focus on a particularregion, such as the expanse of the mythic Islamic caliphate.However, within that wide region, there will be a tendency tofocus on individual local campaigns such as Afghanistan, thePhilippines, Somalia, or even a country-by-country campaignagainst the Western nations. Each locale represents anindividual geographic niche to be exploited, and like othermore conventional threats, will have to be deterred one nicheat a time. 14For example, the would-be aggressor might resort to adamage infliction effects-based strategy in dealing with theextra-regional power while continuing to use an attrition-based approach to dealing with local peers.

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CHAPTER 10

Putting thePieces Together:

An OperationalExample

We have now used a series of examples drawnfrom wars and crisis response operations to

outline a definition and a rule set for effects-basedoperations, including the cascade of physical andpsychological effects. We have also used a model ofthe cognitive process to examine the nature ofactions and effects, and have looked at the attributesof both in the context of the same examples as well.However, most of these historical examples havefocused on the military-strategic and geo-strategiclevels of the interactions. Yet, the cutting edge ofeffects-based operations lies at the operational levelof warfare and crisis reactions. We must now drawall of these elements together so that they becomesomething more than an abstract collection ofobservations and apply them to real-world planningat the level of the operational commander.

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We can do this by treating all of the elements wehave discussed in the context of a single examplethat demonstrates how an operational commanderhas applied the ideas we have been examining andhas coped with the complexities of the effects-based thinking and processes we have outlined,preferably one that involves both kinetic andnonkinetic uses of military forces. Then we cantrace the planning and execution of an effects-based operation from the tactical level upwards,noting how actions were chosen and executed, andobserving the effects manifest in the reactions andbehavior of an opponent.

Attain Document: Operations in theVicinity of Libya, 1986One example of what might now be termed effects-based operations occurred off the coast of Libyaduring the first months of 1986.1 These operationsare of particular interest in the aftermath of theSeptember 11th attacks in that, like the 1970Jordanian Crisis, they responded to a series ofterrorist attacks on Americans conducted with theaid of a state sponsor.

Background to the CrisisThe Attain Document series of predominantly navaloperations off Libya came in response to anupsurge in anti-American terrorism in 1985 at thehands of first Hizballah and later the Abu Nidalorganization. The Hizballah, with the support ofSyria and Iran, had begun an anti-American


terrorist campaign in response to the Israelioccupation of areas of Lebanon. Hizballahoperations in Lebanon ranged from the bombing ofthe U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983 and of aU.S. Embassy annex in 1984, to the seizure of U.S.hostages. However, the operations expanded inJune 1985 with the hijacking of an American aircraftcarrying American tourists. That aircraft was seizedin Greece, then flown to Beirut where a U.S. Navydiver was “executed.” Subsequent U.S. pressureson Syria and Israel brought about the release of thepassengers, but the question of halting “the spreadof international terrorism” had become a majorconcern of the U.S. national leadership.2

In the following months, it became increasingly clearthat Libya was expanding its support for MiddleEastern terrorism and was “talking to Iran and Syriaabout a joint terrorist war” against the United States.3

In October 1985, 6 days after an Israeli air strikeagainst Palestinian Headquarters in Tunisia, Libyan-supported terrorists seized an Italian liner, the AchilleLauro, and murdered a wheelchair-bound Americanpassenger.4 Then, more Libyan supported terroristsattacked groups of largely American tourists in theairports of Rome and Vienna on December 27,killing 20 people including 5 Americans, an actionpraised by Libyan leader Colonel Muammar alQadhafi as “a noble act.”5

In response, the U.S. leadership decided thatAmerica needed “to express in a concrete way[their] displeasure with his terrorism” and began todraw up contingency plans and to reinforce the U.S.Sixth Fleet. One element of these contingency

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plans was a naval operation off the coast of Libya.Attain Document, also known as Operations in theVicinity of Libya (OVL), took place in a series ofthree phases: Attain Document I in January 1986,followed by Attain Document II in February, andAttain Document III in March. Attain Document IIIinvolved Libyan attempts to shoot down Americanaircraft over the Gulf of Sidra with surface-to-airmissiles and attempts to attack U.S. warships withanti-ship missiles. The American response includedattacks on the missile sites and the sinking of themissile patrol boats moving toward Sixth Fleet units.Attain Document III was followed in April by yetanother Libyan supported terrorist operation, thebombing of a Berlin discotheque frequented byAmerican soldiers, and then by Operation ElDorado Canyon, a series of strikes by Air Force andNavy aircraft into Libya.

Attain Document: The OperationalProblemIn apparent reaction to American outrage, the visiblereinforcement of the U.S. Sixth Fleet,6 and the risingprospect of American military action, al-Qadhafiresponded on January 24, 1986 by declaring adenial area in international waters of the Gulf ofSidra off the Libyan coast, which he demarcated witha heavily propagandized “line of death” (see Figure66). Two days later, the United States Battle ForceSixth Fleet began Attain Document I, the first of three“Freedom of Navigation” (FON) operations off thedenied area of the Gulf.

The objectives of the Battle Force in the AttainDocument series of operations were twofold. On onelevel, in keeping with the national objectives, itneeded to convey a message to al-Qadhafi that hecould not fend off the consequences of his supportfor terrorism and that the United States could andwould act forcibly if further provoked. On anothermore concrete level, it needed to undertake alongstanding presence mission by challenging theLibyan restrictions on freedom of the sea embodiedin the “line of death.” The latter became theoperational level framework for the former.

It was recognized from the start that the true national-level objective of the Battle Force’s operations, achange in Libyan behavior, was more political thanmilitary in nature. If the Battle Force were able tooperate visibly and repeatedly in the declared denialarea and the Libyans were unable or unwilling torespond, it would send two messages. To al-Qadhafi,it would signify that he could not evade a forcible

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Figure 66. Libyan Crisis (1986)

United States reaction to his sponsorship of anti-American terrorism. To other regional powers, itwould send a message both that there would be aforceful American reaction to state-sponsoredterrorism and that neither al-Qadhafi nor any otherstate sponsor could forestall it.7 In short, thedemonstration of military power inherent in theFreedom of Navigation operations was intended tobe sufficient to achieve the desired political outcome.

In the event that the Libyans decided either tocontinue terrorist operations or to launch a large-scale attack on the Navy ships and aircraft in theGulf of Sidra, national-level contingency planningcalled for the execution of a “contingency strikepackage” code named Prairie Fire.8 However, withthe blessing of the Sixth Fleet commander, then-Vice Admiral Frank B. Kelso, the commander of theBattle Force, then-Rear Admiral David E. Jeremiah,also began planning potential Battle Forceresponses to a more limited exchange with Libyanforces, a set of contingencies not directly covered bythe Prairie Fire strike planning.

This Battle Force planning process proceeded withthe instruction that the news of any Libyan actionand any U.S. reaction must be reported in the sameissue of the Washington Post (within 24 hours). Thiscaveat, which the Battle Force staff irreverentlydubbed “the Washington Post factor,” reflected akeen insight into the nature of the problem. Thetiming and proportionality of any American responseto a limited Libyan action were more important thanwhich targets were struck. That is, the key tosuccess in any interaction lay not in what destruction


was inflicted, but in understanding and anticipatinghow any American action would be perceived by theLibyans, by U.S. Allies, by others in the region, andby the U.S. public at home.

This perspective, with its requirement for reactingwithin 24 hours or less, signaled a differentapproach to operational level planning. Strikesagainst a pre-planned list of targets in Libya werecertainly possible given a political decision to do so.Indeed, this was embodied in the Prairie Firecontingency strike plan. But, a Prairie Fire-type pre-planned target list was unlikely to have anything todo with the nature of a specific Libyan actionagainst the Battle Force and would therefore likelyfail the proportionality test in any case but that of alarge-scale attack on American forces. On the otherhand, if the Battle Force were to wait until theLibyans took action before developing a responseand asking for approval, the process would result indelays that would likely make it impossible to meetthe timing criterion.

The solution was to define a limited number of al-Qadhafi’s most likely hostile actions toward theBattle Force, and then to plan a specific andproportional reaction that could be swiftly executedwith the forces at hand for each postulated Libyanaction. This set of paired actions and proposedreactions was then briefed all the way up the chainof command through the White House. Its approvalbrought not only standing permission to conduct theproposed responses, but also the allocation of therequisite rules of engagement to the Commander ofthe Sixth Fleet. As a result, in the March 24-25, 1986

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engagements during Attain Document III in which theLibyans fired a surface-to-air missile at a Navyaircraft and then sent missile patrol boats againstU.S. surface forces, the U.S. response was not onlyproportional but timely. It also required no furtherdirection from the National Command Authority.9

Attain Document as an Effects-Based OperationEven in the brief description of Attain Documentgiven above, the effects-based nature of theoperation and of its planning is already evident. Thiseffect-based core becomes still more evident as weexamine the operation to see how our proposeddefinitions of effects-based operations, actions, andeffects are reflected, how the action-reaction,stimulus and response, cognitive cycles worked,how cascades of effects were sought, and whatkinds of feedback were required and available.

Definitions and Rule SetsWhat is perhaps most apparent in this briefdescription of Attain Document is how well itconforms to our proposed definition of effects-basedoperations as “coordinated sets of actions directedat shaping the behavior of friends, foes, and neutralsin peace, crisis, and war.” As we delve into theoperations, we will see this in three ways:

• First, the series of three Attain Documentoperations clearly comprised “coordinated setsof actions” over a 3-month period. However,this coordination was not limited to the


American national leadership and theoperational level commanders; rather, itinvolved a complex coordination of operationsat each level of interaction and across all thearenas of national power.

• Second, from the beginning, it was apparentthat the “actions” commanders consideredwere far more than air or missile strikes.Instead, from the initial reinforcement of theSixth Fleet onwards, the actions or stimulichosen more often took noncombat forms andeach action was calculated to shape localbehavior in some way.

• Third, at the national level in particular, it is alsoclear that the behavior to be shaped extendedfar beyond that of Colonel al-Qadhafi and theLibyans. The actions were equally tailored for atemporarily passive regional audience thatincluded Syria, Iran, Israel, Egypt, thePalestinians, and America’s NATO allies.

We can see this definition being played out in aseries of action-reaction, stimulus and responsecycles at the tactical, operational, military-strategicand geo-strategic levels of the crisis interaction.Indeed, as we trace these cycles at each of theselevels and in each of the arenas of national power,we can begin to see our set of six effects-basedrules reflected as well.10

Levels and Nature of InteractionsAs we look at the Attain Document I, II, and IIIOperations, we can distinguish action-reaction

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cycles taking place on four different levels of themilitary command structures of both Libyans andAmericans. For the Americans, the tactical levelwas represented by the actions and reactions of theU.S. air and naval units operating in and around theGulf of Sidra.11 The operational level was to be seenin the actions and reactions of the United StatesSixth Fleet and Battle Force Sixth FleetCommanders, and the military-strategic level in theactivities of both the European Theater Commanderand the Joint Staff in the Pentagon. Finally, the geo-strategic level was manifest in the actions andconcerns of the Reagan White House.

It can also be surmised that the actions andreactions of the Libyan side roughly paralleled thisbreakdown. At the tactical level, the Libyans alsohad air and naval units operating in the area of theGulf of Sidra, as well as air defense and groundforces located along the coast. They had naval andair defense commanders at the operational levelwho, like their Sixth Fleet and Battle Forcecounterparts, were trying to make sense of adeveloping situation and to direct the actions andreactions of their forces. And, they too had a nationalmilitary staff under al-Qadhafi, who in this caseseems to have functioned both as the military leaderand the national command authority.

The action-reaction cognitive cycles of both theAmericans and the Libyans could be observed onall of these levels during the crisis. Actions weretaken and effects created on four different levels ofa tactical, operational, military-strategic, and geo-strategic nest. In turn, the actual Libyan reactions

were felt and the potential Libyan reactions had tobe considered on each of these levels. Since theimpacts of both the actions and the reactions werenot and could not be limited to any one level, boththe planning of effects and the execution of therequired actions and of reactions to any Libyanreaction had to reach across all levels of the nest.Especially on the American side, we can trace acognitive cycle in which actions were perceivedand evaluated, choices were made, and physicalreactions were directed at each level. We can alsosee the operation of the rule set mechanics ateach level. In fact, what we are describing issomething akin to a multi-faceted nest ofinteractions and decisionmaking. Indeed, thisconstruct provides a useful way of tracing theeffects-based operation through the successivelevels and arenas we must consider.

Nest: Tactical LevelAt the tactical level of the nest, the most frequentinteractions between Americans and Libyans camein the form two-versus-two, air-to-air engagements.These occurred in both Attain Document I and AttainDocument II and are illustrated by the arrows inFigure 67.12 These air-to-air interactions typicallyinvolved two sets of active players, one pair of U.S.Navy aircraft and one pair of Libyan Air Forceaircraft. The object of the resulting aerial ballet wasnot to destroy the opposing aircraft (something thatthe U.S. operational commander at least deliberatelyavoided).13 It was rather to maneuver the aircraft soas to preclude or foreclose an unacceptable tactical

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action, such as the Libyans approaching theAmerican fleet, and the Americans approachingLibyan territorial seas, respectively.

For the pilots involved, these objectives reduced tothe kind of straightforward cognitive cycle envisionedin the original tactical OODA loop, but with oneimportant difference. The objective in these 1986engagements was not to destroy the opposingaircraft, it was rather to foreclose certain kinds ofbehavior on their part. The added difficulty was thatin each of the Attain Document I and IIengagements, there was a relatively strongpossibility that the other side might initiate hostilities,either intentionally or by accident. Thus, each pilothad to monitor the actions of his opponent closely forany clue that might indicate some hostile intent.Rules of engagement obviously were criticalguidelines in making this judgment. However, thespeed of the air-to-air interaction meant that thepilots were called upon to make a succession of

Figure 67. Nesting: Tactical Level

instantaneous, life-or-death decisions and to actupon them with scant time for further guidance.

Because a judgment as to intent hinged on a greatdeal more than sensor data, the pilots’ observationsof the opposing aircraft had to focus not only on whatthose aircraft did, but also on how they did it, forinstance, how “aggressively” the aircraft weremaneuvered. This meant that pilots had to balancethose adversary actions they were currentlyobserving against those that they had seen in thepast and against their own mental models of theactions an opposing pilot might take as a prelude toopening fire. This pilot-centered cognitive cycle wascontinuous throughout the engagement, and formost experienced pilots, was almost subconsciousand intuitive. This was what the American pilots hadbeen trained to do.

As the above suggests too, the effects of these air-to-air engagements were cumulative over time andespecially across the air operations of the AttainDocument series. To start with, both the Libyan andAmerican pilots were familiar with the recent historyof Libyan-American air interactions in the sameregion. That history included the shoot-down ofLibyan aircraft by U.S. Navy aircraft just 5 yearsearlier, a factor that would have shaped the mentalmodels of both sides before the first AttainDocument intercept ever took place. To this initialmental model were added the effects from thegrowing number of Attain Document intercepts. Inthese latter engagements, the Libyans wereconstantly out-matched by the better-trainedAmerican side, a situation reflected in the growing

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confidence of the American pilots and very likely bya growing discouragement among the Libyan pilots.

In this tactical engagement, however, the action-reaction cycle was not limited to the two sets ofaircraft actively engaged in the aerial duel.Rather, the air interaction took place as part of alarger tactical level context that involved otherplayers who remained passive observersthroughout the engagement.

The most immediately concerned of these passiveplayers were the other aircraft in the combat airpatrol stations adjacent to the scene of theinteraction and the Libyan fighters on alert aroundthe Gulf of Sidra (see Figure 68). The passive roleof these assets would have ended when any aircraftundertook a hostile action,14 abruptly changing themental model of an engagement that was notintended to take offensive action. Any such actionwould have instantly broadened the scope of theengagement to include these passive pilots andaircraft as active participants. Thus, these pilots andtheir commanders closely monitored the ongoingair-to-air action-reaction cycle for any clue that itmight be breaking away from the bounds ofexpected behavior.

Also immediately concerned were the shipsoperating in the area. During Attain Document I andII, U.S. surface warships were also manning combatstations throughout the area of the Gulf of Sidranorth of the “line of death,” and Libyan missile patrolboats were located at bases on either side of theGulf. The ships on both sides would also have been

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deployed as search and rescue platforms or mightalso have become parties to the combat. This in factdid happen during the subsequent Attain DocumentIII Operation.

Finally, we might speculate that, had our initial two-versus-two air engagement gone sour, the web ofconcerned parties reacting would have includedLibyan ground and air defense forces along theperiphery of the Gulf of Sidra. Similarly on theAmerican side, the surveillance platforms that weremonitoring the Gulf and Libyan actions wouldlikewise have dramatically altered the scope anddirection of their collection activity.

As the above makes plain, even at the tactical levelof conflict, we can see all of the elements of the rulesets and the cognitive cycle at work. And, we canalso see a tactical level assessment of intent thatdepends upon a great deal more than location,heading, and speed. The breadth of theseexpended requirements for information becomeseven more apparent as we move to the operationallevel of the interaction.

Nest: Operational Level Together, all of these elements of tactical levelinteraction comprised the larger and constantlychanging operational level action-reaction cycle (seeFigure 69). The problem of the operationalcommander was considerably more complex. Hiscore challenge was to orchestrate the actions andreactions of the diverse array of forces under hiscommand so as to create a single, unified military


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effect at the operational level that would reinforcethe overall effect sought by his superiors. Thatchallenge had several different elements to it. First,the commander had to configure the actions of hisforces so that they would be observed andunderstood by the adversary in a way calculated toproduce the desired overall effect. Second, he hadto anticipate roughly how his forces’ actions wouldbe seen and how the adversary might then react.Third, he had to monitor the adversary’s actions andreactions well enough to assess roughly his ownsuccess and adapt to changes imposed by theadversary’s actions. Finally, he had to ensure that allof the operational level actions and induced effectsin fact conformed to the overall national and military-strategic effect sought.

In orchestrating the actions at the operational level,the air-to-air engagement constituted of what wasobviously the most visible and active measure bywhich the respective operational commanders mighthope to shape their opponent’s perceptions andbehavior. But, it was hardly the only one, nor was itnecessarily the most potent. The real impact at theoperational level and higher probably derived morefrom the full scope of the actions taken by the forceas a whole over time. This larger dimension of theoperational level interaction was reflected in theoperational commanders’ preparations for theengagement of their assigned forces. AdmiralJeremiah, the U.S. Battle Force Commander, verycarefully calculated where the combat air patrolstations would be located and how they would befilled. That calculation was made as part of an


overall plan that positioned ships and submarinesthroughout the area. In each case, the decisionswere made not only with an eye to Battle Forcedefense, but also as to how the actions of eachmight be observed by the Libyans, if at all.15

Command Intent

As the above begins to indicate, the Battle Force oroperational commander’s challenge in creating andorchestrating effects was far more complex thanthat of the tactical commanders’, who tended to beeither direct, active participants in an engagementthemselves or were in immediate control of theforces involved. For the operational commander,the scope of the forces to be directed would havemade such a degree of control a difficult propositionat best. The greater the number of tacticalengagements that occurred at one time, the moredifficult the problem became. Yet this span of controlproblem was only partially a question ofcommunications. The driving question was actuallyone of knowledge and understanding. Who couldbest know what was going on and when?

This consideration was most apparent in the high-speed air-to-air engagements. The Battle ForceCommander in the Sidra Operations could and didmonitor closely what transpired in theseengagements, but in many ways he remained aprisoner of what the sensors and communicationsof the information domain could deliver to him. Herecognized not only that there would be situationsin which he could not react fast enough to controlthe tactical action, but also that his appreciation of

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what was going on would always be inferior to thatof the pilots actually engaged.

This predicament might be attributed to some delayin sensor data reaching him, however brief thatdelay might be. In part, it might be attributed in afundamental difference in data presentation. Thepilot’s eyeball picture of what was going on wasnaturally superior to the commander’s form ofvisual display. Yet where new informationtechnologies might address these problems, thereremained two more decisive factors: the intensityand immediacy of the observer’s involvement andthe need to inject this human-derived informationinto the decision process.

A pilot focused on what might be a life-or-deathinteraction not only was in a better position to actand react more quickly, but also probably had abetter deep understanding of what was going onthan an operational commander confronted withmultiple other demands. Even in a straight linecombat air intercept in which an aircraft simplysought to detect and destroy an opposing aircraft,this consideration would have argued strongly infavor of a decentralized command structure thatdelegated a great degree of freedom of action tothe pilot.

In air-to-air engagements (such as those in theAttain Document I and II Operations) that call forfrequent, rapid cognitive judgments by pilots as totheir opponents’ behavior, the ability to act quicklyand decisively depended on the input of informationfrom a human source, the pilot-observer. Given


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these factors, there clearly was no alternative but forthe operational commander to delegate authorityand trust to the judgment of the on-scene actor.16

To prepare tactical commanders to self-synchronize in such situations required more thanrules of engagement drills. Thus, the Battle ForceCommander took great pains to ensure thattactical level participants not only knew thegoverning rules of engagement, but that they alsohad a clear understanding of command intent, therole he expected them to play and why. To thisend, Admiral Jeremiah called a series ofcommander’s conferences in the days leading upto Attain Document I so as to draw all the tacticalcommanders into the planning process bysoliciting their views on how each unit might bemost effectively used. This participation enabledtactical commanders to contextualize their actionsat any given moment and to act both quickly andwith a minimum of further guidance as a tacticalsituation unfolded.17

We can assume that some similar effort tocoordinate actions also took place on the Libyanside. However, in the Libyan case, neither thetraining of the pilots nor an air doctrine that revolvedabout “controlled intercepts” permitted a similarfreedom of action for tactical commanders or theresulting degree of flexibility and adaptability.

To support the tactical efforts and to monitor Libyanmovements, the Battle Force Commander had alsometiculously positioned his organic surveillanceassets18 and tasked available national collection

assets so as to ensure the optimum feedback onLibyan actions and reactions in the crisis area. Ofthese two surveillance elements, the moreimportant for the operational commander were theorganic assets including Air Force and Navy land-based reconnaissance assets, carrier-basedairborne early warning platforms, ships, and nettedelectronic warfare assets. These assets had athreefold advantage over national assets. Not onlycould they report faster, but they could also betasked and respond to tasking faster, and perhapsmost significantly, they could be queried in a dialogbetween collector and operator.

The surveillance commanders were also drawn intothe planning process and participated in thecommander’s conferences. Like the tacticalcommanders, they needed to have a sense of theplan to be executed, of the anticipated Libyanactions, and of their role in the commander’s plan.Given this understanding, they too functioned in arather self-synchronous manner, focusing on thoserapidly unfolding events that warranted the mostattention, undertaking initiative reporting, andfiltering a volume of reporting that might otherwisehave overwhelmed the operational and tacticalcommanders. In actuality, by introducing at least theBattle Force surveillance commanders into theplanning process,19 the operational commander hadenabled them to combine information and cognitivedomain functions on a single platform.

Operational Level Contingency Planning

At the heart of the planning effort and thecommander’s conferences was an effort to


anticipate Libyan actions and reactions and to thinkthrough a series of likely contingencies. In thisrespect, the conferences were a forum for reviewingmore detailed planning already conducted by theBattle Force Commander and his staff. This planninginvolved not only the effort to craft the maneuveractions of the Battle Force to shape Libyanperceptions and behavior in a certain way, but alsoan effort to flesh out potential responses to likelycontingencies. These contingency scenariosfocused on the most likely ways in which Libya mightdeliberately begin hostilities, rather than on anaccidental misstep by a Libyan pilot along the linesof the 1981 shoot down. To that end, AdmiralJeremiah directed his staff to produce a list of thefive most likely ways in which al-Qadhafi might takehostile action and then to propose a way ofresponding to each.

In undertaking this planning effort, as we havepreviously noted, the Battle Force Commandersought to address the questions of timing andproportionality of response in a way that the military-strategic and geo-strategic levels of command didnot and perhaps could not. That is, he was using hiscognitive grasp of the local situation in much thesame way his tactical commanders were expectedto exercise their judgment in the field. In practice,this meant that whereas directives from the JointStaff focused on how the Battle Force ought torespond to a large scale Libyan attack on U.S.forces, the operational commander focused on aseries of lesser contingencies that could morereadily be fine-tuned. The planning effort gave himan opportunity to look closely at the variables in anyresponse. What kinds of force might be used in what

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numbers? How widespread should the responsebe? How fast should it be and over how long a time?In each case, the effort was not to predict what theLibyans would do, but to delimit a range of what theymight do.

The planning effort likewise provided a nucleus forcoordinating the effects sought by the BattleGroup Commander with those sought by higherlevels of command. The five contingenciesexamined by the Battle Force Commander andthe proposed actions for each were briefed tosuccessive levels of command. Each higher levelcould then not only come to understand what wasbeing proposed, but could also factor thatunderstanding into its own actions.

Obviously, there would have been no need for thisup-the-chain coordination if the higher levels ofcommand had simply dictated top-down exactlywhat the operational commander was to do.20 But, inrapidly evolving effects-based operations such asAttain Document, this centralization andsynchronized planning also had two drawbacks.

First, it was in many ways a holdover from anattrition-based approach to warfare in which theoperating forces were simply expected to bombsome number of very specific targets calculated tohave some specific derivative physical effects. Insuch an evolution, the local operationalcommander’s insight might be valuable, but itprobably was not essential. However, in an effects-based operation that focused on shaping orchanging an opponent’s behavior, the forward


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commander’s deep understanding of the situationand the opponent became critical.

Second, by centralizing direction, higher-levelcommanders would largely sacrifice the cognitiveinsight that the local operational commander couldcontribute. The value of that insight, moreover,grew with time as the local commander’sunderstanding of the situation and the opponentgrew. In this case, the Attain Document I and IIOperations in January and February 1986 provideda training ground for the more dangerous AttainDocument III Operation in March.

Again at the level of the operational commander, wecan see all of the elements of the rule sets, cognitivecycle, and action variables at work. The Battle ForceCommander’s efforts to position his forces reflects aconcern both with what his opponent would perceiveand how to manipulate his actions to create the righteffect. The efforts to draw both tactical andsurveillance commanders into the planning processpoints to a recognition of the nature of the cognitiveprocesses involved in his actions, as does thecreation of a set of contingency plans. However, thelatter likewise suggests the need to look further upthe chain to how all of this activity by the operationallevel commander fits into the problem of the military-strategic level.

Nest: Military-Strategic Level The tasks of the European Theater Commander andthe Joint Staff in Washington on the one side and ofthe Libyan military staff on the other side

represented a still wider and still more complexdimension of the military problem (see Figure 70).Theirs was the task of managing the overall militaryresponse so as to produce a coordinated set ofmilitary actions whose direct and indirect, physicaland psychological effects might achieve the ends setby the national political leadership at the nationallevel. This task was fourfold:

• First, they had to identify and task the elementsof national military power that were mostapplicable to the area and situation at hand.

• Second, they had to forecast roughly theactions and reactions of the opponent so asto anticipate additional calls on nationalmilitary resources that might be forthcoming,and then include these in national-levelcontingency planning.

• Third, they needed to undertake what might betermed military diplomacy to coordinate themilitary actions of the operational commanderswith any allied actions and to ensure that allmilitary actions would be perceived in the rightway by other military actors, neutrals, friends,coalition partners, and allies.

• Finally, they were responsible for coordinatingthese military actions with parallel political anddiplomatic actions so as to create a unifiedoverall national level effect.

All of these elements were intertwined in the actionsof the U.S. Joint Staff and the U.S. EuropeanTheater Command. For these American militaryplanners, the central challenge was determining how


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to use United States military power to supportnational efforts to compel a change in al-Qadhafi’sdefiant sponsorship of anti-American terrorism. Themilitary component of this response was asubstantial Freedom of Navigation operation in theGulf of Sidra, an action calculated to raise themilitary pressure on al-Qadhafi and induce a changein his behavior.21

From the military-strategic perspective, the FONoperations had a number of advantages to them.

• First, the action could be conducted withoutinitiating hostilities that might derail diplomaticand economic efforts that had been directed bythe White House.

• Second, because the action relied on navalforces operating in international waters, itsscale, scope, and activity could be varied at will,and could be sustained virtually indefinitely.22

• Third, as would be apparent to the Libyans, theunits conducting the operations were quitecapable of striking with force if the United Stateswere provoked either by further acts of terrorismor by Libyan military action in the Gulf.

In keeping with the latter, the Joint Staff and TheaterCommander began preparing contingency plans forPrairie Fire strikes, while the operationalcommander on-scene prepared plans forproportional responses to more limited Libyan actionagainst the Battle Force. To support military action,the European Theater initially had one carrier battlegroup in the Mediterranean Sea headed by the


smallest and oldest carrier in service, the U.S.S.Coral Sea. This group was moved into the area northof the Gulf of Sidra in early January as the crisisflared. To increase the scale and scope of the actionpossible, the Theater Commander also asked for acovert return to the Mediterranean of the Saratogacarrier battle group, then in the Pacific Theater in theIndian Ocean. And, in conjunction with the U.S. StateDepartment, it began negotiations with Egypt for theSaratoga group’s safe passage through the SuezCanal.23 Finally, in preparation for the March AttainDocument III Operation, the Theater received a thirdbattle group centered around the carrier U.S.S.America.24 The Battle Force for Attain Document IIIthen consisted of 26 warships, including 3 aircraftcarriers and 250 aircraft.25

To coordinate this effort, the Joint and TheaterCommands had several different levels of controlembodied both in rules of engagement to guide theoperational commanders and in direct approval ofcontingency plans. The latter consisted both of theBattle Force Commander’s proposed options fordealing with a set of limited Libyan actions dulyreviewed without change at successive levels ofcommand, and of the staff’s own contingencyplans for dealing with a large scale Libyan attackon the force.26

This review of the Battle Force Commander’soptions by the military-strategic and national levelsof command had another impact. When hostilitiesbegan in Attain Document III, there were nosurprises and no further intervention required. Thestandardized list of rules of engagement (ROE)

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recognized the need for on-scene commanders todeal with the exigencies of a fast moving battle andpermitted the senior military and civilian leadershipto give them a delimited freedom of action to dealwith them by granting particular ROEs. In AttainDocument, some of these were allotted to the BattleForce Commander or to unit commanders and somewere reserved to the Sixth Fleet Commander, then-Vice Admiral Kelso. In Attain Document III, Kelsowas also granted the freedom to decide that aLibyan attack against one unit was to be consideredan attack on all and to react accordingly.27

From the Libyan military perspective, the problemwould have been dealing with the militaryconsequences of two political actions: the Libyansupport of Abu Nidal in his campaign of anti-American terrorism; and more immediately, al-Qadhafi’s declaration of a “line of death,” which,based on previous history, the Americans were sureto challenge. To deal with any American action, theLibyan command had a relatively modern arsenal ofaircraft, surface-to-air missiles, and missile patrolboats,28 but were probably under no delusion as totheir ability to defeat a still better-armed andconsiderably better-trained American force in opencombat. Both the reach of these Libyan forces andthe lack of any long-range surveillance capabilityprecluded a direct military attack on American basesor upon American forces too far out at sea.29 As aresult, the options exercised by the Libyan commandrevolved about the Americans coming to challengeLibya in territorial seas. The military goal in this wasmost likely not to defeat U.S. forces outright, but toaggressively meet the intruders and, if hostilities


were to erupt, to inflict damage on American forcesin a “heroic” defense of the homeland. In the latter,the behavior to be shaped was probably less that ofthe United States than a local and regional public.That is, to be successful in their military actions andthe resulting effects, the Libyan command did nothave to win so much as it had to avoid losing badly.

Nest: Geo-Strategic LevelFinally, this entire military picture was but one facetof the overall national problem that had to beconsidered at the level of the President and thenational leadership. In the case of the LibyanOperations, that national problem was ofcoordinating the military operations with both adomestic and international political dimension thatincluded dealing with the media, briefing Congress,consulting with local allies and neutrals, andactivities in international arenas.30 The WhiteHouse’s challenge in this effects-based endeavorwas especially great as it involved coordinatingvery diverse and often seemingly unconnectedactions in three arenas so as to create acoordinated, unified effect.

Some of the White House’s first actions reflect thisperspective. In a press conference on January 7,1986, the President announced “an executive orderbringing Americans and American business homefrom Libya and canceling relations.”31 The effect ofthe action was to put economic and politicalpressure on Libya while moving quietly to reinforcemilitary forces in the theater. The decision to orderAmerican citizens out of Libya likewise prepared a

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geo-strategic battlespace by removing the possibilityof al-Qadhafi’s seizing American hostages to thwarta U.S. military action in the area.32

The challenge faced by the Administration wasfurther complicated by the fact that the effectssought created overlaps from one arena to the next(see Figure 71). The White House staff would havebeen left to explain the nature of a tactical action inthe event that the interaction resulted in a shoot-down on either side. The State Department, alreadycharged with explaining the U.S. position and thereasons for the operation to the internationalcommunity, would have been left to field similarinquiries from overseas allies.

From the standpoint of the White House, theFreedom of Navigation context of the AttainDocument operations served multiple purposes inthese dimensions, and not all of them related toshaping Libyan behavior. If forcible military actionbecame necessary, then the Libyan closure ofinternational waters provided a clear violation ofinternational law as a justification. That in turn wouldmake it difficult for local fellow travelers to supportthe Libyan position in a face-off. Also, AttainDocument was a confrontation between militaryforces in an international environment in which therewere few civilians likely to be harmed inadvertently ifhostilities did erupt.33

These factors enabled the White House and theJoint Staff to give the local operational commandera bit more discretion in handling the Libyan actionsthan was evidenced in the planning for a Prairie Firecontingency strike package or the El Dorado


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Canyon Operation. The tighter leash in the lattercases was dictated by White House concern overthe possibility of civilian casualties and the effectthat such casualties might have on Americansupport. These concerns were not minor and, in thepreparation for the El Dorado Canyon strikes, werevoiced by close allies, notably British Prime MinisterMargaret Thatcher.

The White House’s concern over the likelihood of al-Qadhafi taking American hostages is instructive in adifferent sense. The departure of the Americansbecame a prerequisite to any significant Americanmilitary action, such as that undertaken in April inthe El Dorado Canyon strikes.34 This meant thathowever prepared military forces may have been torespond in early January 1986, there wereconsequences that the White House needed toconsider that proceeded along an entirely differenttimeline, as depicted in Figure 72. Moreover, thesame timing concerns would have been adetermining factor for any diplomatic action thatneeded to be accomplished before power could beapplied. This was a major factor in the El DoradoCanyon where permission was sought from Britainand France for an over-flight of Air Force F/B-111aircraft en route to Libyan targets.

However necessary this planned synchronizationmay have been, and in this case it clearly wasneeded, it also posed problems. From the start of theLibyan operations, it was obvious to the Battle ForceCommander that the likely interactions with theLibyans would be too rapid and dynamic to be tightlycontrolled by the Joint Staff or the White House. If


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the planning of responses to immediate Libyanactions were centralized, they could no longer be astimely as they needed to be to succeed. It wasaccepted at all levels that some of the rules ofengagement35 for independent action would need tobe delegated to local commanders.36 However, suchroutine grants of ROE were normally confined toquestions of self-defense, and the Cold War-eraprocess of approving operations plans and grantingROEs for larger operations could be lengthy andcumbersome.

All told, the time delay that would be involved in theprocess of approving action would likely have left theBattle Force unable to meet the time line indicatedby the “Washington Post factor” and thus, to achievethe political-military effect sought. AdmiralJeremiah’s innovative solution to the problem was tolook beyond the essentially negative ROE processand to propose instead a series of options to dealwith a set of the most probable Libyan actions. Theapproval of these options by successive levels ofcommand through the White House then providednot only the ROE required, but also a commonunderstanding of the national level commander’sintent that could be translated into localcommanders’ intent and what might be called acommon effects-based operational picture.

Actions and EffectsThroughout the more detailed breakdown of AttainDocument above, we can see the multidimensionalnature of both actions and effects at work. Thismultidimensional nature was clearly more than the


difference between the kinetic impact of weapons ontargets and the nonkinetic impact of forcemovements upon an observer. Rather, in the choicesmade by decisionmakers at all levels, we can seethe various attributes of both actions and effects asfactors in the decisions.

Actions In one respect, the decisionmakers’ active use of themultifaceted character of actions should not besurprising. The interactions in the Attain Documentseries focused on how American actions would beobserved both by the Libyans and by local friendsand neutrals. Therefore, we would expect to seecommanders pay a great deal of attention to whatthose observers would see and thus, to not onlywhat U.S. forces did, but how. Their concern with thewhat and how becomes even more apparent as webreak the two terms into the component attributeswe derived from looking at similar crises in theMiddle East.

Focus

The “what” of the American operations, a Freedomof Navigation operation in force, set the frameworknot only for what was to be accomplished militarily,but also for how the action would be explainedpolitically and diplomatically. At the military-strategicand geo-strategic level, this focus offered a way of“taking the moral high ground” and forcing theLibyans either to accept the lesson offered by themaneuvers or to become the aggressor. Moreover,by conducting the operations at sea, the effects of

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any Libyan propaganda that sought to exploit thecivilian casualties of any combat that might ensuewere very limited. At the operational level, this focusenabled the commander to play to one of thegreatest strengths of the battle group (its defense indepth) and to force the Libyans to come out tochallenge the United States in the face of thatstrength. Finally, at the tactical level, it narrowed therange of likely Libyan actions to the point that theycould be roughly anticipated.

Forces

The heavy reliance on sea-based forces during theAttain Document operations took advantage both ofthe power of the Battle Force and of theinternational status of the high seas. The power ofthe force meant that it could take on Libyan forceslargely unaided, but the real key was the fact that itcould legitimately operate immediately off theLibyan coast. The international status of the seasalso meant that, in contrast to the difficultiesexperienced in getting F-111s from European basesto the target area during the later El Dorado Canyonoperations, no over-flight permission was requiredfor the Battle Force’s air operations. Further, once atsea, the Battle Force could be sustained off theLibyan coast without resort to land bases. Thisrelative independence removed any Libyanpotential to bring political or economic pressure tobear on a U.S. ally to curtail the American action,yet posed a potent threat that could not be ignored,but that could be applied at will in response to anyuntoward Libyan action.


Scale

The question of scale was probably most apparent inthe reinforcement of the Sixth Fleet both before andduring Attain Document. This was one of the firstconcerns of the White House and of the TheaterCommand when the operation was first outlined onJanuary 7, 1986. It was clearly seen by PresidentReagan as one element of teaching al-Qadhafi thathe could not support anti-American terrorists withoutrisking an overwhelming retribution.37 From theperspective of the Battle Force Commander, thereinforcements served not only to help cow a Libyanopposition, but also in a more practical way byincreasing the number of days that the force couldsustain heavy, round-the-clock air operations(virtually indefinitely with three carriers). Finally, theimpact of the scale at the tactical level likely grewfrom the realization of Libyan pilots that anyAmerican aircraft they engaged in one patrol areawere surrounded by other American aircraft inadjacent patrol areas that could swiftly be broughtinto the fray.

Scope

The combat air patrols in Attain Document coveredan offshore international sea area that stretchedalong about two-thirds of the Libyan coastline. Fromthe White House perspective, this span and theobvious ability to extend it further, lent furthercredence to an implied American threat to respondforcefully to any further Libyan-backed terrorism ata time and place of our choosing. From theoperational and tactical perspective, the span of the

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Battle Force operations coupled with its defensepresented the Libyan military with a challenge thatthey knew they could not handle and in whichLibyan forces stood to be overwhelmed, no matterwhere they tried to attack.

Similarly, the operational scope of the Americanforces applied did not offer the Libyans anyobvious exploitable niche. The Americans wereclearly superior in the air, at sea, and under thesea even though the Libyans had some capabilityin each of these areas. From the perspective of theWhite House and the Theater Command, thismeant that they could probably count on theLibyans knowing that they would not be able to winany engagement, and that American forces wouldlikely win it handily. From the perspective of theoperational commander, this breadth ofcapabilities translated into a list of options forBattle Force responses to possible Libyan actions,and thus into a flexibility to adapt to the exigenciesof a rapidly changing crisis interaction.

Timing

The speed of action and reaction was reflected intwo very different ways. At the operational level,there was the Battle Force Commander’s concernthat any Libyan action against the force be metpromptly and proportionately, the “Washington Postfactor.” At the national level, however, the concernwas not only with responding to any Libyanprovocation, but also to ensuring that the timing ofAmerican actions in various arenas be coordinated.Thus, while the response to any Libyan attack


needed to be immediate, the White House alsopreferred to postpone any such encounter until afterAmerican citizens had been evacuated from Libya,and economic and diplomatic efforts had been givena chance to work.38

The 3-month duration of the Battle Force operationcertainly conveyed the notion that the U.S. threatwas not going to go away, but could be sustained aslong as necessary. It also enabled the White Houseto complement the ongoing and time-consumingAmerican economic and diplomatic efforts with avisible military option that could be exercised ifdiplomacy and economics failed.As this latter point implies, the ability of the BattleForce to conduct sustained operations also enabledits actions and postures to be synchronized withU.S. activities in other arenas with very differenttimelines so as to optimize the impact on theLibyans. A different form of this synchronization wasreflected at the operational and tactical level, both inthe rapid intercepts of Libyan aircraft challengingthe Force during Attain Document I and II and in theresponse to the Libyan missile firings in AttainDocument III. In the latter case, this synchronizationinvolved one group of aircraft exciting the enemymissile batteries to activate their radars so thatother aircraft could fire anti-radiation missiles todestroy them.

Visibility

From the perspective of the White House, the wholepurpose of Attain Document was that the operationsbe observed by the Libyans and affect their

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behavior, specifically the support for anti-Americanterrorists. Once the Saratoga battle group returnedto the Mediterranean Sea, therefore, no secret wasmade of the fact that the FON operation was beingconducted in precisely the area to be denied by the“line of death.” Indeed, the intention to operate inthe area was published as notices to airmen andmariners for each operation in the series. For theBattle Force Commander, visibility was a mixedproblem. Combat air patrol stations wereestablished with the full recognition that they couldbe seen by Libyan air defense radars that wouldthen report the scale and scope of American activity.It was also assumed that the Libyan Intelligencewould be aware of the numbers of surface ships inthe American force. However, any Libyanreconnaissance aircraft that approached thesurface ships to observe them at close range mightequally have posed a threat as a suicide bomberintent on causing major damage to a carrier and amajor blow for Libyan propaganda. Therefore, abalance had to be struck between what was shownand what was made less visible.

EffectsIn the Attain Document series of operations, theUnited States set out to produce a strategic-levelpsychological objective, the alteration of Libyanbehavior with regard to terrorism. To do that, it firstrelied on a mix of psychological effects. We canclearly distinguish an element of passiveforeclosure in the effort to convince the Libyans thatany further support to terrorism would bring an


American military response that the Libyan militarywould be unable to handle or mitigate. We can alsodistinguish an element of active foreclosure in thehandling of the Libyan air probes during AttainDocument I and II. Each time the Battle Force waschallenged, the challenger was out-maneuveredand driven off, with each such event reinforcing inthe Libyans a mental model that they would lose inany such confrontation and thus also reinforcingpassive foreclosure. We can perhaps readpsychological attrition into the Libyan Air Force’sfailure to engage during the actual penetration ofthe line of death in Attain Document III, as well as inthe ultimate outcome of the operations: thecessation of Libyan support to terrorists.

The shock and chaos psychological effects in thiscase, however, appear to have resulted more fromthe physical effects the United States inflicted first inthe engagements of March 24-5, 1986, and in the ElDorado Canyon strikes less than a month later. Eventhough the Libyans obviously anticipated that therewas a good probability of an American reaction ifthey fired a missile at a U.S. aircraft, there wasconsiderable confusion and perhaps shock on theLibyan side after the Battle Force’s strikes began.Indeed, this was most evident in the almosthaphazard reactions of Libyan missile boats in theGulf of Sidra. However, the greater shock appears tohave resulted from the El Dorado Canyon strikes,particularly as some of the bombs fell close to al-Qadhafi’s own residence.

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Cascades and Feedback The primary cascade of concern to decisionmakersin Attain Document was that a series of physicalactions and the psychological effects would producea change in Libya’s behavior.

Direct Effects

The direct physical effects were visibly of two types,damage and maneuvers.

The physical damage inflicted in Attain Document IIIand in El Dorado Canyon differed somewhat as tothe direct effect intended and the type of damageassessment required as direct feedback. In AttainDocument III, the targets were operational levelmilitary targets struck in a limited response toLibyan hostile actions and held little prospect ofincluding civilian casualties. In the El DoradoCanyon, they were strategic level targets chosen atthe White House and Joint Staff level to produce animmediate impact on the Libyan leadership’sdecisionmaking. In both cases, the bomb damageassessment was immediate and sufficient toascertain that the direct effect had indeed beenachieved. However, in the case of El DoradoCanyon, which bore a far greater potential forcivilian casualties and thus for creating a cascade ofnegative psychological effects, the strategic leveldamage assessment emphasized the targets thatmight have been unintentionally struck and whatcivilian casualties might have been involved.

Maneuvers offered a considerable range ofpossibilities, particularly to the degree that they


could be exercised in a terrain-free internationalenvironment. This freedom gave Battle Forcemaneuvers three axes along which actions could bevaried for greatest impact.

• First, the size and composition of the forcemight be changed to emphasize the scale andscope of the threat to be implied or supported.This was clearly evident in the reinforcement ofthe fleet and, in El Dorado Canyon, by theaddition of Air Force bombers.

• Second, the activities of the force could bevaried to increase or decrease the level of theimplied or actual threat. To be sure, in thesuccession of Attain Document operations,periods of intense operations off Libyaalternated with port visits and more routine fleetoperations. However, within the operationsthemselves there was a gradual ratcheting up ofpressure as more patrol stations were manned.

• Third, the forces might be moved toward oraway from the area of the crisis. In this case, aircombat patrol stations were moved ever closerto the “line of death,” and then in AttainDocument III, the patrol stations wereestablished well south of the line in full view ofthe Libyans.

The drawback with maneuvers was detecting andmeasuring the direct effect upon observers. TheBattle Force could and did monitor both theincidence and timing of Libyan air probes and theimmediate behavior of Libyan forces on a day-to-day, engagement-to-engagement basis. The air

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probes provided an indication that the Battle Forcepresence, rough numbers, and levels of activity werebeing reported up the Libyan chain of command.Likewise, the performance of the Libyan aircraftinvolved in the engagements provided some index ofthe effect of the interactions at the tactical level.Each of these factors was reported up the BattleForce’s own chain of command.

Indirect Effects

The key element in the entire Attain Document andEl Dorado Canyon operations was the cascade ofindirect effects that the United States wasattempting to create and those that it was trying toavoid creating.

In its targeting effort, the primary American concernwas not with potential cascades of physical effects.Indeed, the indirect physical effects sought fromAttain Document were very limited. The radars onLibyan surface-to-air missile batteries weredestroyed to produce one obvious cascade, toincapacitate any Libyan efforts to acquire and fireupon American aircraft in the Gulf of Sidra, and thiscould be readily tracked in the performance of theLibyan air defense system subsequent to the attack.Since the strikes were to be a proportionateresponse to Libyan hostile actions, theyrepresented no real effort to set in motion a chain ofphysical effects that might destroy or incapacitatesignificant proportions of Libyan military and/oreconomic systems. Such cascades would havebeen more in keeping with the large-scale responseenvisioned in the Prairie Fire contingency


operations, which were not executed. It is worthnoting that, in the later El Dorado Canyon planning,targets that might have yielded a cascade ofeconomic effects were deliberately excluded in partbecause of two cascades of negative indirectpsychological effects that could have resulted, onein the Libyan population and one among those ofAmerica’s European allies who were heavilyinvested in Libya.39

The real focus of Attain Document was rather on thecascade of indirect psychological effects that mightbe set in motion. This was the case both in the initialBattle Force operations in the Gulf of Sidra and inthe air strikes in response to the Libyan attack on theAmerican forces in the Gulf. And, it was equally thecase in the El Dorado Canyon response to theterrorist bombing in Berlin. These cascades could beidentified at all levels.

The simplest indirect psychological effect soughtwas at the tactical and operational levels. There itwas hoped that the drubbing given to the Libyan AirForce in Attain Documents I and II would forestallany Libyan attempt at a large-scale air raid againstthe Battle Force during the Attain Document IIIoperations in the “zone of death.”40 By succeeding inthis effort, the Battle Force in essence reduced thescope of probable Libyan actions and lessened therisks of both tactical and operational surprise.

The Battle Force Commander’s problem in thisregard was simpler than that at the military-strategic and White House levels. The questionwas not only one of creating the right cascade of

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indirect psychological effects to change Libyanbehavior, but equally sending a message to otherstate sponsors of terrorism, especially to Syria andthe Iranian hard-liners who had been supportingthe Hizballah attacks of the preceding 3 years.Further complicating the problem at this level wasthe need to avoid creating undesired cascades ofnegative psychological effects among areaneutrals, regional friends, and European allies.These multiple and complex concerns wereprobably somewhat assuaged by the measurednature of the Battle Force responses proposed todeal with a limited Libyan action. However, in thecase of the larger responses of Prairie Fire and ElDorado Canyon, they mandated a closermonitoring of the planning and execution simplybecause the potential for unwanted indirectpsychological effects was much greater.

The feedback required to support the assessmentof indirect effects was considerably morecomplicated than the measurement of bombdamage assessment.

At the operational level, the Battle Force could anddid monitor the behavior of Libyan pilots and theLibyan Air Defense System during the numerousinteractions of Attain Document I and II. However,jumping from that feedback to assessing whether ornot the Libyan Air Force would launch a mass attackon the Battle Force during Attain Document IIIrequired something more. It demanded that theimpressions of Libyan pilot performance becombined with the prior knowledge of thecommander and planners and the mental models


built on experience and an understanding of thesituation and how it appeared to be evolving. Eventhen, as the continued possibility of an air attackindicated, there could be no certainty.

Similarly, for feedback, the White House closelymonitored any changes in Libyan governmentbehavior following the initiation of Attain Document I,but had little to indicate any direct link between thoseU.S. military actions and overall Libyan conduct.Further, it remained very much a question up untilthe time that Attain Document III was initiatedwhether the combined political and economicmeasures might also be shaping that conduct. Thisis to say that, with the resources of the entire U.S.intelligence community involved, there was stillinsufficient feedback to produce certainty.

This continued to be true in the wake of the AttainDocument III strikes against the Libyan Air DefenseSystem and Navy. Despite vocal Libyan outrage,there was no firm indication whether al-Qadhafi’sbehavior would change or whether he would simplychoose a new niche within which to respond. Whenterrorists linked to Libya bombed the Berlin disco 2weeks later, it was obvious that the pressures stillhad not succeeded in producing the desiredbehavior, even though they had produced somechange in that behavior.

Finally, it should be noted that, even in the aftermathof the El Dorado Canyon bombing, the feedback asto a change in Libyan conduct was not conclusive.The public stance became still more circumspect,but the terrorist operation against the Pan American

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flight over Lockerbie, Scotland indicated that al-Qadhafi had not ended his search for other nichesto exploit.

Putting It TogetherThe picture of effects-based operations thatemerges from the Attain Document example isabove all one of complex coordination requirementsfrom one level to the next, across multiple arenas,and over time. The core challenge in planning andexecuting these effects-based operations, especiallyfrom the level of the White House and JointStaff/Theater Commander level, was to ensure thatall the actions taken across this diverse spectrumreinforced the overall effect sought. This meant thatplanners at all levels needed to deconflict thoseactions that might negate each other or mightconfuse friends, foes, and neutrals as to Americanintentions, and they had to somehow avoid creatinga cascade of psychological effects that was theopposite of what was sought.41

Amid this complexity, however, we can once againsee the rule set and definitions borne out.Decisionmakers clearly thought in terms of actionsrather than simply of targets, and they clearlyconsidered those actions to have dimensions thatincluded both the what and how of the militaryoperations. Indeed, the care given to the targetingin contingency operations underlines the degree towhich even the targets themselves were defined insuch action terms, rather in the simpler terms ofphysical attrition. In the actions of thedecisionmakers, we can see the basic rules at


work: the effects created are both physical andpsychological in nature, cumulative andinterrelated, across four different levels ofcommand and three arenas.

Perhaps we can see how these factors figured in theplanning and execution of an effects-basedoperation by operational commanders, in this case,Vice Admiral Kelso, the Commander of the U.S.Sixth Fleet, and Rear Admiral Jeremiah, theCommander of the Battle Force Sixth Fleet. In noway did these commanders have all of the feedbackthat they needed and in no way were they able toeliminate the uncertainties of a complex operationalproblem. Rather, they improvised and innovated,and then made do with what was available.

1Since the author was assigned to the Battle Force Sixth Fleetstaff as the relieving Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligenceand actively participated in the planning and execution of theAttain Document series, the 1986 Libyan Operations offer theadvantage of permitting a firsthand account of the operationfrom the level of the operational commander. See also: Stanik, Joseph T. “Swift and Effective Retribution.”The United States Sixth Fleet and the Confrontation withQaddafi. Washington, DC; Naval Historical Center. 1996. 2Reagan, Ronald. An American Life. Norwalk, Connecticut.1990. pp. 489-499.3Reagan, p. 496.4The hijackers turned themselves in to Egyptian authorities,but when they were being flown out of Egypt, they wereintercepted by U.S. Navy aircraft and forced down in Italywhere the men were taken into custody. Ironically, the U.S.aircraft that intercepted the hijackers came from the samecarrier that was later to serve as the Battle Force flagship forthe Attain Document Operations. 5Reagan, p. 511.6The USS Saratoga carrier battle group, which had been

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operating in the Indian Ocean, had been pulled back to theMediterranean Sea to reinforce the Coral Sea carrier battlegroup and had transited the Suez Canal a few days earlier. 7President Reagan’s comment here was, “If Mr. Qaddafidecides not to push another terrorist act, okay, we’ve beensuccessful with our implied threat. If on the other hand hetakes this for weakness and does loose another one, we willhave targets in mind and instantly respond with a hell of apunch.”Reagan, p. 515. 8In 1986, the most obvious targets would have been terroristbases in Libya, but the physical destruction of a terrorist camppromised to be little more than a relatively minor setback. Thecamps, if indeed they were still in use, could be replaced.Thus, the major impact on future operations would dependlargely on whether the terrorists themselves were killedduring the attack, a feat of timing and intelligence predictionthat was unlikely. In addition, even if the terrorists were killed,it would be only a matter of time before more candidates wererecruited and the process began anew. Accordingly, the real goal of any operation was notdestruction of terrorist capabilities as such, but a change ofLibyan behavior that would deny terrorists any bases orsupport at all. To this end, any strike package had to hold atrisk something that mattered to Libya, rather than to theterrorists. Questions of what targets and what scale ofdestruction would be needed to this end became centralissues of the targeting debate that endured through thePrairie Fire contingency strike planning during the first 3months of 1986. These debates concluded with the El DoradoCanyon strikes by Air Force and Navy aircraft in April 1986.9In actuality, the only NCA intervention in executing theapproved option was a query from the White House shortlyafter the missile firing to ascertain that the Battle ForceCommander and Commander Sixth Fleet still intended toexecute the agreed course of action, and a request that theWhite House be notified as soon as this was done. 10As outlined in Chapter 5, these are:Actions create effects.Effects are cumulative.Any interaction will affect both active and passive observers.Effects can occur nearly simultaneously in multipledimensions.All effects at each level and in each arena are interrelated.Effects are both physical and psychological in nature.11Although the bulk of the U.S. forces involved in the Attain


Document series were the U.S. Navy units assigned to theBattle Force U.S. Sixth Fleet, U.S. Air Force reconnaissanceaircraft provided much needed support. 12Such tactical level interactions took time and might involve asuccession of maneuvers and counter-maneuvers by theaircraft involved and, thus, a succession of tactical OODAloop type interactions each of which might be considered anaction-reaction cycle. However, for our purposes here, theentire intercept and subsequent maneuvers will be taken asone tactical action-reaction cycle13A shootdown of a Libyan aircraft might have resulted in thecessation of the Attain Document Operation before thedesired effect on Libyan behavior had been achieved. 14This could have been an aircraft that opened fire, or it couldhave been either a Libyan aircraft that made a dash towardthe fleet or an American aircraft that made a dash for theLibyan coast.15It was surmised, for example, that the Libyan radars wouldbe able to detect the aircraft manning most of the combat airpatrol stations, but that they would be unable to detect themovements of the ships north of the “line of death” and thatthey similarly would not be able to detect the movements ofany submarines. 16Although the Battle Force Commander could andoccasionally did intervene in a given ongoing interaction,such intervention was almost invariably to contribute asituational awareness that was beyond the perspective of theaerial dogfight, rather than to direct the engagement.17This process was repeated shortly before Attain DocumentIII in March 1986 when another carrier battle group with USSAmerica joined the Attain Document force bringing the totalforce to three groups. 18That is, those surveillance platforms that were part of theBattle Force or could be launched from it, and those platformsthat may have operated from shore bases but were under thedirect control of the Battle Force Commander. 19The land-based surveillance assets did not participate inthese commanders’ conferences. That fault in the processwas remedied in the operations of 1987 when both Air Forceand Navy land-based surveillance commanders were broughtout to the Battle Force flagship for extended discussionsbefore the start of the operation. 20This was largely the case in the Prairie Fire contingencyplanning that was to go into effect in the event of a large-scaleLibyan attack on the Battle Force. For various reasons thatwill be discussed later, this was also the case in the El Dorado

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Canyon operations that occurred in April 1986. 21Stanik, p. 16.22That is to say, Libya could not stop the action by makingthreats to those Mediterranean nations whose bases might beused to support it as it might have been able to do in the caseof any sustained American land-based strike operation.23Although warship transits of the Suez Canal are guaranteedby treaty, given the circumstances and obvious destination ofthe battle group, Egypt had to take extraordinary securitymeasures along the banks of the canal in order to ensure safepassage. 24In fact, the America group was on its routine deploymentcycle and the concentration in force was achieved by holdingthe Saratoga group that had been scheduled to leave forhome on station in the Mediterranean for several weeksbeyond its normal departure date. 25Sobel. Israel. p. 106.26These consisted of detailed lists of targets that wereupdated throughout the course of the first two AttainDocument Operations. Under standard U.S. Navy practice,the missions to destroy the targets were then planned by theair crews that would fly the actual mission. 27To ensure that the exercise of these ROE proceededsmoothly and that both the Fleet and Battle ForceCommanders were proceeding from the same understandingof the developing situation, VADM Kelso transferred his flagto the Saratoga for the critical first stage of the AttainDocument III Operation and sat next to RADM Jeremiah inSaratoga’s Flag Plot. In this situation, the actual grant of theROE to the Battle Force Commander consisted of a glancetoward the Fleet Commander and an affirmative nod. The twohad an identical appreciation of the situation and what wasrequired to the point that no further conversation was needed. 28Excluded here are the ground forces that would have beeninapplicable short of an American invasion. The Libyans alsohad old Foxtrot-class Soviet submarines that could potentiallyhave been deployed against the Battle Force, but the abilityof these to get underway much less to submerge wasquestionable.29Terrorist attacks, of course, remained a possibility, but as thesubsequent attack on an American frequented disco in Berlinand upon a Pan American airliner over Scotland indicate,even the terrorism option was of only limited use against arelatively hard military target such as a protected base and ofeven less use against defended ships at sea.30Reagan, pp. 515ff.


31Reagan, p. 515.32The White House estimated that there were some 1,000American citizens, mostly oil workers, in Libya as of thebeginning of 1986 and feared that they would becomehostages just as soon as any military operation began tounfold. It became essential to get them out of Libya beforeany offensive operation could be undertaken.Reagan, pp. 511 and 515.33In fact, there were airline routes through the area that had tobe continuously monitored as to ensure that no danger wasposed. Additionally, warning of American live-fire operationsarea in the Gulf of Sidra was published in notices to airmenand mariners to further reduce civilian traffic. 34Reagan, p. 518.35These codified and numbered rules of engagement definewhat actions a commander may or may not take under givensets of circumstances. Some of these ROE are routinelydelegated to local commanders, while others, especiallypermission to conduct offensive operations of any sort, aretightly controlled by national authorities. At their core, theROE constitute political rather military guidance andconsequently vary from one country to the next. In the caseof the combined ROE used for NATO operations, a decisionto grant particular ROEs can involve lengthy politicalnegotiations before a consensus can be reached. 36In the Libya operations, some ROEs would have beendelegated to the Battle Force Commander and others to hisimmediate superior, the Commander of the Sixth Fleet.However still others, would have been retained by theNational Command Authority, i.e. the President and theSecretary of Defense.37Reagan, p. 515.38Stanik, p. 15.39Stanik, p. 33.40The possibility of such an attack was indeed addressed asone of the likely Libyan responses to a crossing of the “line ofdeath.” It had been planned as a contingency and had beenone of the action-reaction options that were proposed tohigher command. However, at least in part due to the beliefthat the air actions in Attain Document I and II woulddiscourage such an attempt, that contingency was placedlower on the list. This proved to be a good decision and theactions taken by the Libyans were in fact numbers one andtwo on the contingency list: surface-to-air missile firings; andattacks by anti-ship missile patrol boats. 41The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis presents a good example of

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both dimensions of this problem. On the one hand, the U.S.military often failed to understand that their actions werebeing used by President Kennedy as a means of signalingAmerican intent. Under such circumstances, normal militaryprecautions such as raising the DEFCON level might eitherconfuse the Soviets or create an effect contradictory to whatthe NCA sought. On the other hand, the stark discrepanciesbetween the communications from General SecretaryKhrushchev and the later official Soviet position bothconfused and alarmed the American NCA, quite the oppositeof what Khrushchev intended.Kennedy, Robert F. Thirteen Days. p. 98ff.


CHAPTER 11

Network-CentricContributions to

Effects-BasedOperations:

Options, Agility,Coordination, and

KnowledgeMobilization

In the introduction to this book, we recountedAdmiral Boorda’s lament that “it sure would be nice

if we had some clear idea what it was we were tryingto do” with the new technologies and capabilities ofthe Information Age before we buy them. Inresponse, we proposed that there were threedifferent levels of potential improvement in militaryeffectiveness to be derived from new technologies.The most basic level of improvement accrued from

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simply applying the new technologies to existingmilitary doctrine, organization, and concepts, muchas Britain and France had done with tanks, aircraft,and radios during the years before World War II. Asecond, greater level was to be attained by applyingthe technologies to new doctrine, organization, andwarfare concepts conceived to exploit the newtechnologies, as the Germans had done in creatingthe blitzkrieg and as we are hoping to do with theintroduction of network-centric operations. Finally,we postulated that a third and still greater increasecould come from applying our newfound network-centric military level of improvement to effects-basedoperations that were focused on the humanbehavioral dimension of conflict. In essence, wetreated network-centric operations as a means to anend, a tool for better implementation of thelongstanding ideas of effects-based operations.Even more than this, we also pointed to effects-based operations as the conceptual gateway toapplying the new network-centric capabilities tomilitary operations short of combat in everythingfrom deterrence to crisis response, exactly the areasof concern in building a post-September 11thsecurity regime.

The concept of effects-based operations that wehave outlined in this book is based on two ideas:

• First, as the name effects-based implies, effects-based operations are about ends rather thanmeans. They focus upon the outcomes thatmight be obtained by military actions in concertwith other elements of national power and uponchoosing the most expeditious and efficient way


of obtaining these outcomes at any level. Theconduct of effects-based operations, therefore,demands that we reason backwards from theoutcome we desire to the set of actions thatmight produce that result.

Since these outcomes are dynamic and can varythroughout the course of an interaction, theplanning and execution of effects-basedoperations must be a dynamic, interactiveprocess in which we constantly assess how eachnew action moves us toward the desired overallobjective of the operation at each level. In thiseffects-based context, more efficient destructionmeans very little unless it somehow contributesto achieving the desired outcome. Indeed, as anumber of the examples in preceding chaptersattest, “kinetic solutions” of any kind may be theexact antithesis of the outcome we seek.

• Second, the focus of effects-based operations ison human behavior and specifically on the useof military operations to shape that behavior. Tothis end, effects-based operations constitute ahuman-centric, stimulus and response approachto military operations. Such an approach strikesat the heart of the battlefield problem. After all, itis this will of an opponent to fight and his abilityto do so coherently and effectively that is thetrue determinant of victory. Moreover, since thehuman dimension is the most nonlinear aspectof any battle, effects-based operations potentiallyoffer the greatest impact per unit of force appliedand thus, the greatest operational efficiency.

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This human-centered, stimulus and responseapproach is especially important in dealing withthe problems of the post-September 11th securityenvironment because it provides a framework forapplying military power short of combat to deterattacks or to contain conflict. It also forces us toconsider military actions in the context of theoverall national power being applied, and as theyaffect allies, neutrals, and foes.

Neither of these ideas is new. The concepts are asmuch a part of Clausewitz’s writings 200 years agoas they are of Sun Tzu’s more than 2,500 yearsago.1 Their practical application can be seen aseasily in Caesar’s commentaries on the Gallic warsas it can be in the examples cited in this book. Thus,the real issue in moving from network-centricoperations to effects-based operations is how wemight best use the concepts and technologies of anetwork-centric transformation to carry out a classiceffects-based approach to military operations in anew and better way.

As this implies, the process of applying network-centric innovations to effects-based operations is notone that hangs on the creation of some futuretechnology or decision aid about which we can nowonly dream. The examples we have used amplyunderline the fact that U.S. military forces have beenconducting effects-based crisis response operationsfocused on influencing the behavior of observers fora half-century and more. They are doing so now inAfghanistan and elsewhere even as this book isbeing written. And, as is all too apparent in the wake


of September 11th, they will be called upon to do soagain and again in the future.

Our challenge, therefore, is to apply the network-centric capabilities of today to the effects-basedoperations of today; and to optimize the emergingnetwork-centric thinking and capabilities for theeffects-based operations of the future. However, thestarting point for meeting this challenge lies in abetter definition of what network-centric operationsbring to effects-based operations.

In laying out a basic concept of effects-basedoperations, we have made frequent references tonetwork-centric thinking and capabilities as anenabler. We now need to draw some more specificconnections and to ask two pointed questions. Justwhat do Network Centric Warfare and network-centric operations (with all of the thinking andcapabilities they imply) bring to effects-basedoperations? And equally important, what more dowe need to build into our network-centric thinkingand capabilities if we are to apply our concept ofeffects-based operations to the post-September11th security environment?

If we accept that some network-centric conceptshave already been adapted in ad hoc ways to real-world operations, then we should be able to identifythe critical functional elements involved in network-centric effects-based operations, understand betterhow the network-centric capabilities contribute, andidentify where they must do more.

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Operations Off Libya, 1987One particularly useful example in this regard is thelittle known, low-key sequel to the 1986 AttainDocument I, II, and III and El Dorado CanyonOperations that we examined in the previouschapter. Just as in the original Attain Documentseries, these new FON operations took place in theinternational waters of the Gulf of Sidra off theLibyan coast, but in this case, the operationsoccurred over a year later in September andOctober of 1987.2 This 1987 sequel is valuable asan example because it involved the same battlegroup with the same carrier, same air wing, andsame staff that had planned and executed theoriginal Attain Document series of operations andthat had participated in the El Dorado Canyoncontingency planning.3 Thus, this example containsimportant constants, but from the network-centricperspective, also has two important differences.First, the introduction of a digital display (the JointOn-line Tactical System or JOTS) linked andintegrated force data, data from organic sensors,and data from theater and national sources.Second, the Attain Document/El Dorado Canyon“lessons learned” were applied to the preparationand execution of a new operation with similar forcesunder similar conditions.

Like Attain Document III, the 1987 Freedom ofNavigation operation involved a three-battle group4

Battle Force of the U.S. Sixth Fleet directed toconduct operations in the Gulf of Sidra (see Figure73). In the 1987 operation, the objective was similar,to reinforce the lessons and mental models created


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by the 1986 Attain Document and El Dorado CanyonOperations. This is to say that, without the urgencywrought by the Libyan-sponsored terrorist bombingsin 1985 and 1986, the effect to be achieved by theBattle Force in the 1987 action was roughly thesame as it had been in Attain Document.

The new operations involved large-scale airoperations in the Gulf, as had the Attain Documentseries, and a Surface Action Group penetration ofColonel al-Qadhafi’s vaunted “line of death.”Unlike Attain Document, however, this SurfaceAction Group was in fact a Battleship Battle Groupunder the Commander of the U.S. Sixth Fleet,which conducted extended operations in the areasouth of the line.

The effects-based planning for the new operationsalso proceeded in much the same fashion that ithad for the original Attain Document series. Again,the objective was to shape future Libyan behaviorby reinforcing not only the international characterof the waters of the Gulf of Sidra, but also the factthat the United States remained ready and able tostrike again in response to any further Libyan-sponsored terrorist activity. Again, the Battle Forceplanning effort assessed the most likely potentialLibyan actions in response to specific aspects ofthe operations and then drew up a series of “if-then” contingency plans for likely Libyan actionsand reactions.

As in the 1987 operations, combat air patrols wereset up in areas north of the “line of death” and thenwere progressively moved southward until they were

well into the “denied” area, although still outsideLibyan territorial airspace and waters. Unlike theAttain Document Operations, however, these airoperations were not challenged by the Libyan AirForce nor were anti-aircraft missiles fired at U.S.aircraft participating in the operation. Finally, unlikeAttain Document III, the operations were conductedwithout incident. No missiles were fired at U.S.aircraft and no missile patrol boats attempted tointercept surface units in the Gulf of Sidra.

1987: Movement Toward Network-CentricOperations While the attempt to create shared situationalawareness using the Joint On-Line TacticalSystem by no means approached the awarenessforeseen for future network-centric operations, itdid reflect a direct application of network-centricsolutions to the tactical and operational levelproblems presented by Attain Document. Thesesolutions took the forms of the JOTS itself and thetactics, techniques, and procedures developed forusing the information provided.

In the 1987 operations, JOTS provided a medium forlinking together the sensors that were organic to theBattle Force, as well as displaying positions andmovement of military forces and neutrals, similar tothe outline in the Chapter 4 diagram of the cognitivecycle (see Figure 74). This Battle Force JOTSpicture covered not only the immediate area of theoperation, but much of the central MediterraneanSea and more importantly, the air corridors

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traversing the operations area. The JOTS alsoprovided a medium for inserting positional data fromboth Air Force and Navy theater reconnaissanceassets. Furthermore, as in the Attain Documentoperations, the Battle Force drew upon the nodalintelligence network of the Navy’s OceanSurveillance Information System (OSIS). Thisintelligence data could be fed into the JOTS andthen displayed not only in the flagship’s Flag Plot,but also in similar displays on all units in the BattleForce.5 Finally, networks were further established tolink the Battle Force intelligence plot to nationaloverhead sensors and area operational intelligenceanalysts.6 Some of this data was entered into JOTS.The result was a JOTS-centered shared situationalawareness that, although imperfect by current andfuture standards, did extend across the Battle Forceand provide the basis for developing a sharedunderstanding of the emerging operational situationand for coordinated operations by the componentcommands.

However, this linkage of hardware and informationflows was only a relatively small part of theproblem. The Battle Force Commander, then-RearAdmiral J.M. Boorda, was also deeply concernedwith how the new situational awareness would beused by the force. His concern was focused onthe organization of command responsibilities andthe fashioning of the tactics, techniques, andprocedures best suited to exploiting the newinformation flow.

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Command Responsibilities

Under the Combined Warfare Commander (CWC)concept used by the Navy in both Libyanoperations, the Battle Force Commanderdecentralized the command structure into a seriesof subordinate warfare commanders, each of whomwas responsible for a given warfare problem (e.g.air warfare, surface warfare). The introduction ofJOTS meant that the Battle Force/Joint Task ForceCommander and each of the warfare commanderscould work from the same picture, a sharedsituational awareness that gave all parties theconfidence to adopt a modest form of self-synchronization. In this context, Boorda used thesituational awareness provided by JOTS to operatein something approaching a command by negationmode. Within the constraints of command intentand the rules of engagement, warfare commanderscould take the initiative in acting but with any actionsubject to being countermanded by the BattleForce Commander if necessary.7 While theCommander could readily revert to direct controlwhenever an issue of particular concern arose, thesystem left him free to concentrate his attention onthe most pressing aspects of the overall situationwhile the warfare commanders handled the lesspressing cases.

To support this decentralization, Admiral Boordawas careful to build a common understanding ofcommand intent. In this case, not only did hediscuss his plans and assumptions in detail witheach of the unit commanders, but he also took thecare to conduct reciprocal “familiarization” visits


with the crews of both Navy and Air Force theaterreconnaissance assets. The crews of these assetswould therefore understand his plans and intent inthe operations, and he, his staff, and the warfarecommanders could understand the capabilities andconstraints under which the reconnaissance assetsthemselves were operating.

To this end as well, Admiral Boorda also conducteda series of ROE exercises that posed scenarioquestions to be answered by an officer in each unitin the battle force, with the solutions personallyreviewed by the Admiral himself. Although theexercises provided critical training for all concerned,they also provided Admiral Boorda with an index ofjust how well the command intent was understoodand what he could expect from his subordinateswhen the operation off Libya actually began.

Organization, Tactics, Techniques, andProcedures

Admiral Boorda was also deeply concerned withhow the organization, tactics, techniques, andprocedures would operate using the new capability.8

Every effort was made to move beyond theinstallation of new technology, to probe the way inwhich information was displayed and used, and toconsider the human factors involved by comparingperformance with the performance from the previousAttain Document operations.

The admiral mandated a series of exercises/experiments that looked closely at the informationflow within the ships of the Saratoga Battle Group to

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ensure that gains made in awareness capabilitiesexternal to the ship were not negated by an inabilityto move the information internally. In this series of“Intelligence Exercises,” the Cruiser-DestroyerGroup Eight/Battle Force intelligence staff tested 10different ships over a 6-month period. In each case,in the context of an accelerating-pace scenario,some 90 to 100 simulated timed inputs ofinformation were provided to seven different sensorand information nodes onboard the ship. Thesubsequent arrival of that piece of information in thehands of the Tactical Action Officer (TAO)9 was notedand similarly timed. Ships could then be assessedas to the time delays involved in getting informationto the TAO (if it did reach the TAO).10 The resultspassed to the commanding officers and AdmiralBoorda highlighted shortfalls in training andprocedures for handling information and, in onecase, uncovered the fact that a circuit fortransmitting key information had never beenconnected when the ship was built.

Further, with Boorda’s encouragement, his entireFlag Plot command center on the U.S.S. Saratogawas made into a sensitive intelligence space so asto ensure that the Flag TAO and all watch personnelwould have continuous access to all availableintelligence and sensitive information. To this end,the Battle Force watch staff was also extended toinclude a dedicated intelligence watch as part ofeach of the regular rotating watch sections so as toensure that needed information passed freely.11

ResultsIn the end, the 1987 operations were not stressed tothe degree that the Battle Force experienced in the1986 operations. There was no combat with theLibyans, and Libyan behavior was marked by asharp reduction in normal military activity. Nor wasthere the degree of national level interest that hadaccompanied the 1986 operations. Nevertheless, itwas clear to those who had participated in bothoperations that the creation of a “network-centricarchitecture” and the revisions in procedures,doctrine, and organization had better equippedthe 1987 Battle Force to handle any evolvingsituation in the effects-based FON operations.Indeed, the closer the Battle Force moved towardeven a rudimentary form of network-centricoperations, the better able it was to serve as aprecise tool in effects-based operations.

1987: What More Was Needed?The increased shared situational awareness andcommon understanding of command intent that hadbeen developed across the Battle Force wasimperfect and left considerable room forimprovement, but it worked sufficiently well to dealwith the tactical requirements of the 1987operations. In fact, we can see in the architecture ofthe system and the procedures for its use anembryonic version of the capabilities we are seekingin network-centric operations. We can likewise seeelements of self-synchronization and speed ofcommand in the Battle Force actions during theoperations. Moreover, the Battle Force’s tactical

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picture could be monitored at higher levels ofcommand and incorporated in their decisionmaking. What more was needed? The underlying problemwas that the system, for all of the efforts to improveit, remained configured to support linear attrition-based combat operations rather than effects-basedoperations requiring some form of “deepunderstanding” of a complex interaction in thecognitive domain. The situational awareness towhich the JOTS and other informationimprovements had been applied was largelyconcentrated in the tactical arena. It focused ongiving commanders a better and morecomprehensive picture of the whereabouts andmovements of their own forces, of Libyan forces,and of white traffic such as commercial craft andneutral military forces. All of this was very muchnecessary and a definite improvement over thegrease pencils and display boards that hadpreceded JOTS, but it created an understandingthat was largely at the tactical level of operations.Despite the improvements, what the system did notprovide in 1987 was a way of assessing the larger,nontactical aspects of Libyan behavior andreporting on the impact of the Battle Force’s actionswere having on al-Qadhafi and the Libyanleadership at any given moment.

As Battle Force Commander, Admiral Boordaunderstood the effects-based dimension of theoperation and had focused his thinking andplanning on the behavioral objectives involved.12

However, to support this thinking and planning, heand his staff needed something more than sensor-


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derived tactical information provided by JOTS. Theyneeded a base of prior knowledge13 and a deepunderstanding of what was going on in the Libyandecisionmaking process,14 and that meant adifferent set of metrics, information flow, andknowledge/databases upon which the existinginformation infrastructure15 was focused.

In the 1987 operations, as in those of 1986, the flowof information to support the effects-based aspectsof the operation was largely ad hoc. Every bit ofinformation available to the Battle Force that mighthave provided an indication of Libyan behavior(including wire service and radio reporting) wastapped and used,16 as was the formal intelligencereporting provided by the national intelligencecommunity and the Navy’s Ocean SurveillanceInformation System.17

However, the OSIS system also offered thepossibility of creating an ad hoc, on call, backchannel, “old boy” network, community of expertisethat permitted free and informal access to experts atmultiple levels.18 In essence, this informal communityof expertise was composed of one verticalcommunity and four lateral communities. Thevertical element in the overall network revolvedabout a network of senior naval intelligence officersat each level. These officers were colleagues in arelatively small intelligence corps, each of whomcommanded a section of the intelligence analysiscapability, and each of whom had experience inbattle group operations and in theater/nationalintelligence (see Figure 75). These participantsincluded the Battle Force/JTF and Fleet Assistant

Chiefs of Staff for Intelligence, the commander of theFleet Ocean Surveillance Facility (FOSIF)supporting Navy Mediterranean operations, theCommander of the Fleet Ocean SurveillanceInformation Center (FOSIC) supporting the theatercommander, and the Navy Ocean SurveillanceInformation Center (NOSIC). Each combined twovery different experience bases, fleet operations andintelligence community operations, which enabledthem to serve as interfaces that had a deepunderstanding of the limitations and needs of bothsides. Each of these players also had a lateralnetwork of experts who could be tapped for theirthinking. At the FOSIF level, this network included all


Figure 75. Communities of Expertise: Libya (1986-7)

the analysts who were minutely following militaryactivity in the Mediterranean Basin each day andwho often had years of experience. At the FOSIClevel, the informal lateral network extended into thejoint theater intelligence structure and to Alliedintelligence services. At the national level, theinformal network extended directly to analysts inmultiple intelligence agencies.

The vertical network operated on a pull-push basis.On the pull side, informal queries could be madedirectly to any level of the network, or a general butequally informal request for information might beaddressed to one element that then would pulse theremainder of the network to obtain the necessaryinformation.19 On the push side, not only could theformal intelligence reporting be tailored to thespecific needs outlined over the network, but alsothe experience base at each level permitted theidentification and forwarding of any information notrequested but deemed to be relevant.20

The lateral networks operated as ad hoccommunities of expertise with analysts in aneclectic mix of fields and from a variety of agenciescontacted to deal with a particular question or issue.The interplay among the analysts was often furtherenhanced by the fact that there had been frequentor even routine (but informal) analyst-to-analystexchanges on subjects of interest in a manner thatunconsciously mimicked academic communities.21

The communities of expertise so created wereevanescent. They came together to deal with aspecific question and disappeared when thequestion was answered or transmuted into a

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different community of experts when differentrequirements for knowledge/expertise arose.

The underlying problem with this system lay not somuch in the flexible organization of the network,which in fact permitted a largely unsanctioned flow ofinformation and intelligence around the regimentedstructure of the intelligence community. Rather, theproblem was both that the work-around had beennecessary in the first place and that theinformation/knowledge focused on the adversary’sbehavior was not readily available through theformal reporting process. The latter problem wasitself twofold. The data and information to supportmilitary operations in the cognitive domain waseither not collected or not available in the militaryintelligence databases, and there was no ready wayto contact outside experts to obtain additional inputs.The limitations were less those of technology than oforganization, techniques, and procedures at levelsabove that of the Battle Force.

At the root of these limitations is the need for a newparadigm for shared situational awareness definedin effects-based terms.

Effects-Based Shared SituationalAwareness The lack of relevant effects-based feedback in the1987 Libyan operation (despite the efforts tootherwise improve the situational awareness ofthe Battle Force) underscores a key point. Theshared situational awareness required for effects-based operations is not the same as that required


for the combat operations. Naturally, if forces areto be able to meet the minimum criterion foreffects-based operations, that they be able to fightand win, they unquestionably will need thiscombat-focused shared situational awareness.But, that is not enough for effects-basedoperations. Those operations require a differentfocus and one that is in many ways considerablywider than the tactical and operational militarypicture. They require what we might term aneffects-based, shared situational awareness.

Providing this effects-based situational awarenessposes two major challenges for network-centriccapabilities over and above those reflected in thecreation of a tactical level situational awareness.

• First, in effects-based operations we must dealwith human beings and their responses to thestimuli presented by our actions. That meansthat our awareness must somehow integratelarge numbers of imprecise, often subjectivedata and information containing complexvariables into a picture that includes all of theelements of the tactical and operationalpicture. Historically, this has been the functionof experts, the community that both the 1986and 1987 operations sought to tap informally.

• Second, because many of the inputs needed tofashion an effects-based awareness areimprecise, subjective, and meaningless withouta context, we must also create and maintain aknowledge base to provide that context. Asoutlined in the Chapter 4 discussion of the

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cognitive cycle, this context knowledge appearsin two forms. First is the knowledge required topredict how our actions will be perceived by theopponent and others, a context that includes therelationship between our own actions and thoseof other elements of national power. Second isthe knowledge required to detect and assessfeedback on the effects created by our actionsand on how others are trying to shape our ownbehavior (see Figure 76).

Both of these elements were reflected in the Libyanoperations of 1986 and 1987. However, we need toemphasize here that this requirement for effects-based awareness is not something restricted to JointTask Force Commanders and above. It is also verymuch present at the tactical level. This was certainlyevident in the judgments required of the pilots of theintercepting aircraft during the Attain DocumentOperations and of the pilots monitoring civilianairliners in 1987. But, it is also the case in a far widerrange of tactical operations well beyond the Navy orairborne intercepts. For example, there are fewoperations as effects-based and knowledge-centricas a soldier on a peacekeeping patrol in Bosnia orKosovo, or as the Special Forces fighting the Talibanin Afghanistan in 2001. The same problems ofculture and language, of creating and usingcommunities of expertise, and of tapping resourcesbeyond a formal intelligence chain of command willapply to asymmetric warfare and peacekeepingoperations elsewhere in the world.


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Knowledge and Understanding

At the heart of the delineation betweentactical/operational and effects-based situationalawareness are the natures and relative roles ofknowledge and understanding in that awareness. Inorder to operate successfully in the cognitivedomain, we must understand the enemy, the friend,or the neutral. Such understanding requires morethan data and information as to his location, directionof movement, and even current intentions. Itrequires that we know something of how theobserver perceives and thinks,22 and it requires thatthis knowledge of the observer has somehow beeninternalized by commanders as deep understanding.The knowledge required to support our effects-based actions falls into three categories: knowledgeof the enemy (or observers); knowledge ofourselves; and knowledge of the situation.

Knowledge of the Enemy

The most obvious requirement is knowledge of theenemy. Clearly, if we want to orchestrate a set ofactions to produce a particular kind of effect, wemust have some notion of how the enemy is going tosee that action, but this “seeing” has a doublemeaning. On the one hand, we must know theenemy surveillance and data collection capabilitieswell enough to determine what he is likely to observeof our action and what he will not. We must alsoknow something of how he will perceive the stimulushe observes, what sense he is likely to make of it,and how he then might translate it into a response.


One aspect of this knowledge, the parameters andlimitations of the physical domain, is relativelystraightforward. For example, we can calculate whatan air search radar will see because we candetermine the detection radius using basic physicsand geometry, and we routinely include this kind ofdata in our tactical level situational awareness.However, the problem can become considerablymore subjective if we look at the information domainand all the other ways in which our actions might becommunicated to targeted decisionmakers. Forexample, how is an action likely to be reported onCNN or in local media and which decisionmakersare likely to monitor these media? The variableshere are numerous and not at all straightforward. Wecan speculate as to whether some decision aidbased on extensive modeling and simulation mightbe developed, but the simpler answer is that we canrely on an expert with the necessary knowledge toframe the variables and provide an opinion as towhat will be reported and how. This kind ofknowledge and expertise mobilization was what wasreflected in the ad hoc “old boy network” that arosein 1986 and 1987.

The cognitive domain question of how observerswill perceive the reports of our action and how theywill react to it is still more subjective. It implies thatwe must get into the mind of the opponent to seethe action as he sees it. This is no small task andmeans that we again will have to rely on expertjudgment on the part of a knowledgeable regionalanalyst and on the part of the local operationalcommander with expertise on the military dimensionof his battlefield. This interface between regional

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and operational expertise was exemplified inAdmiral Boorda’s use of the back channel “old boy”intelligence network to support his decisionmakingduring the 1987 Libyan operation.

Knowledge of Self

The Sun Tzu maxim that “if you know the enemy andknow yourself, you need not fear the result of ahundred battles” carries a special twist in effects-based operations and in effects-based sharedsituational awareness. If the effect we create is theproduct not just of our action, but of all actions thatour country is taking at all levels, then to coordinateour actions we must know not only what those otheractions are, but also how the whole fits together.

Such knowledge of self is reflected in commandintent, but the breadth of command intent in tacticalcombat battlespace awareness is not the same asthat required for effects-based operations. What isneeded is a multi-level understanding of commandintent from the national level downward that istailored to the missions of the units at each level.Moreover, in dynamic effects-based operations, thiscommand intent is never final. Like the actions andplans of the commands involved, it must becontinually updated to reflect ongoing multi-level andinteragency23 (and in coalition operations,intergovernmental) interactions.

Knowledge of the Situation

The knowledge of the situation commences with thecommanders’ appreciation of the battlespace


situation and of what is or will likely be unfolding inthat battlespace. However, in the effects-basedoperation, there is a larger context to thisappreciation, an understanding of the cascades ofphysical and psychological effects that mightintentionally or unintentionally be precipitated by agiven action. Since these cascades are notrestricted to the targeted opponent, the requiredknowledge extends equally to how actions mightaffect other actors in the region. It is this knowledgeof the situation that gives the commander themeans of pruning the complexity of a nearly infiniterange of potential responses so as to assess theoptions or actions best suited to the effect to becreated. This process was in fact at the heart of the“what if” planning that the Battle ForceCommanders and staffs undertook in both the 1986and 1987 operations.

How do we assess cascades? Assessing thesepotential spin-offs requires the availability of experts.However, as the division into physical andpsychological cascades implies, the expertiserequired will similarly be divided into those withknowledge of physical systems and those withregional knowledge to assess the cascades ofpsychological effects within an opposing military,leadership, or public.

Feedback The effects-based situational awareness created forthe Libyan operations was perhaps weakest in itsability to provide timely feedback to commanders onthe impact of their actions and those of other

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elements of national power on the Libyans’cognitive processes. Clearly, if we are to deal with adynamic battlefield or crisis engagement or are tomake speed of command relevant to effects-basedoperations, the situational awareness that wecreate must also support a rapid assessment of theeffects we create. Specifically, commanders willneed to assess three aspects of the effects theycreate: (1) whether the direct effects of their actionswere observed or felt as intended; (2) what cascadeof physical effects were produced; and (3) whatcascade of psychological effects was produced.The feedback to support this assessment was ofthree types: damage assessment; performanceassessment; and behavioral change. The first twolie essentially in the physical domain and aresubject to current metrics. The latter lies in thecognitive domain and is subject to all of thatdomain’s ambiguities. Logically, the situationalawareness we need must support these verydifferent kinds of assessment and then integrate thefeedback to answer a commander’s questions.

Damage Assessment

The simplest problem is that of damageassessment, which already falls under theconventional tactical level network-centricunderstanding of shared situational awareness.However, because what we are measuring here iswhether or not the desired direct effect was created,damage assessment feedback is only relevantwhere such damage was in fact the direct effectsought. When the direct effect sought is not


discernable damage to forces and capabilities butchanges in behavior, what is measured must shiftfrom damage assessment to some form ofperformance measurement.

Thus, during Attain Document III, the Battle ForceCommander had access to photography of the bombdamage to Libyan missile sites and radars as well asphotography of sinking Libyan missile patrol boats.These provided an index of direct physical effects,but they did not address the more fundamentalquestion of Libyan perceptions or of any shift inLibyan behavior that might have resulted, which wasthe objective of the operations

Performance Assessment

Performance assessment, whether for direct orindirect effects, consists of the performance ofphysical systems (usually before and after a directeffect), and the observable behavior of forces oractors. Here again, context is key. We can neithertask the collection of data on performance andbehavior nor use changes in performance as anindication of effect unless first we know which kindsof performance will in fact reflect the information weneed for the assessment. Similarly, we cannot detecta change in performance unless we already have aknowledge base including data as to the observednorms for a system’s or an actor’s performance. Tomake a performance assessment, therefore, oursituational awareness must include a sufficientknowledge base both to identify candidate measuresand to assess a delta and its probable meaning.

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Behavioral Change

The object of effects-based operations is to shapebehavior, but how does a decisionmaker know hehas succeeded or when? Detecting and assessingchanges in behavior is perhaps the greatest effects-based challenge. To some degree, we can observechanges in behavior by observing and assessingperformance, but where the behavior is the result ofcomplex influences in a decisionmaking process,this may not be conclusive. We noted earlier themodel of indications and warning intelligence inwhich large numbers of observations wereassembled and weighted in an algorithm to providean assessment of behavior. Assessment of thecomplex multi-faceted changes in behavior resultingfrom effects-based actions would likely beamenable to the same approach. However, that toohas major implications for how we provideworthwhile situational awareness in effects-basedoperations because it mandates that thesecapabilities be networked to support thecommander on a continuing basis. Specifically,those providing the assessment must be able toidentify which indicators to use and then how toweight them in an algorithm to produce the desiredrolling assessment.

Options, Agility, Coordination, andKnowledge MobilizationThis brings us back to our starting questions. Whatdo network-centric operations bring to effects-basedoperations? And what might they bring in the future?The discussions of the two Libyan operations and of


the concepts outlined in preceding chapters suggestthat network-centric operations have the potential tomake four major contributions to the conduct ofsuccessful effects-based operations. These can besuccinctly summarized in terms of options, agility,coordination, and knowledge mobilization.

OptionsThe first contribution of network-centric operationsseems intuitively obvious. Network-centric militaryforces24 can simply do a wider variety of tasks and dothem better. They present more options todecisionmakers. We have already noted hownetwork-centric capabilities can enable us to targetcritical enemy vulnerabilities, to overwhelm anenemy, or to get “inside the enemy’s OODA loop.”We have pointed to how shared situationalawareness, collaboration, understanding ofcommand intent, and self-synchronization canmultiply the power of combat forces in pace, scale,and scope far beyond non-network-centric forcesand thereby give them a distinct advantage in battle.This is what the Battle Force was striving to do in1987 with its adaptation of JOTS, the use of CWC,and the development of new techniques andprocedures to optimize the information andawareness that was becoming available.

The metrics for evaluating these capabilities can bedefined in attrition-based terms, a quantifiable abilityto inflict more damage on an opponent’s forces andinfrastructure, and to do so more quickly. However,from the perspective of effects-based operations andour post-September 11th security environment, the

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critical measure is not how much damage we caninflict or how quickly we can do it, but rather theutility of these network-centric capabilities in“shaping the behavior of friends, foes, and neutrals.”This effects-based utility hinges on the variety andapplicability of the military capabilities denominatedin terms of options. The role of these options(maneuver, presence, or strike) was evident in thetwo Libyan operations, as well as in the successionof crisis response examples outlined in thepreceding chapters.

The network multiplies the range of options inherentin military forces because it enables us to bringdisparate and geographically separated militarycapabilities to bear on a problem, not simply fordestruction, but to precisely configure our actions tocreate the right effect on the right observer. As wesaw in preceding chapters, these actions havemultiple dimensions. It is not only what we do butalso how we do it, the force employed, the scale ofthe action, the geographic and operational scope ofthe action, its timing, and its visibility that must bemade to fit the requirements of the situation. Underthese conditions, the ability to knit together ad hoc“coordinated sets of actions” from the often-disparate capabilities or forces available becomesthe critical network-centric contribution in both peaceand war.

We can also extend this thinking into the problemsof deterring an asymmetric niche competitor in thecurrent security environment. The better we candemonstrate our network-centric ability to link ourcapabilities into an effective and innovative


response, the fewer exploitable niches we willpresent to a foe and the better the deterrent valueof our forces will be. Similarly, the more optionsmilitary forces can present, the more likely thatmilitary actions can be coordinated with political,diplomatic, and economic actions to create a unityof effect in which diverse actions not only aredeconflicted, but also build synergistically uponeach other to multiply effects.

In brief, the greater the range of actions that amilitary force can undertake, the more options itpresents to decisionmakers to tailor the right actionat the right place at the right time to create adesired effect. If we were to express this notion interms familiar to the acquisition process, the Pk(probability of kill) of attrition-based metrics wouldbe replaced by a Po metric in which the “o” is thenumber of “options” that a given force or capabilitywill present in a given situation.

AgilityThe ability to network forces and capabilitiesexpands the range of military options available, but italso does something more. Implicit in the ability to domore and different tasks better and to operate at apace, scale, and scope of operations far greater thanan opponent is an ability to focus those operationson the right task at the right time as often as requiredto win. In providing more military options, network-centric thinking and capabilities can also give usagility, the innovative ability to develop options thatadapt to changing circumstances, the flexibility androbustness to tap additional or different capabilities,

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and the responsiveness to change and act quicklyenough to seize fleeting windows of opportunity. It isworth noting that, in the Libyan operations, the BattleForce did not content itself with planning for a single“what if” contingency. Instead, it planned for a seriesof most likely “what ifs” and depended on the agilityof the forces involved to shift to one or anotherresponse to emerging Libyan behavior as required.

Such agility is critical to successful effects-basedoperations because such operations are dynamicinteractions between complex adaptive systems inwhich all of the possible outcomes can never beknown and there will often be a succession ofevolving action-reaction cycles25 producing differentrepercussions among a range of observers. Underthese conditions, we cannot expect to pre-plan all ofour actions for the course of an interaction, howevergood our planning process may be. Rather, we mustbe prepared to adapt our actions to evolvingcircumstances and the actions of the friends, foes,and neutrals of most concern. This requirement foradapting and agility exists at each level of conflict(tactical, operational, military–strategic, and geo-strategic) and across the political, diplomatic, andeconomic arenas.

This must be taken a step further. If we are to dealwith an intelligent opponent exploiting a quicklychanging situation, it may not be enough simply tohave a preplanned list of options for which our forcesare prepared. We certainly have no guarantee thatwe would have chosen the correct “what ifs,” and ouropponent would have every reason to thwart ourefforts in any case. Our problem is rather to create


an agility that is so great that we can generate adhoc options from the capabilities at hand and fusethem into the proverbial right action at the right placeat the right time. The shared situational awareness,common understanding of command intent, andcollaboration that are integral to network-centricoperations provide the basic infrastructure to do this.

CoordinationThe third contribution may be slightly less obviousthan the preceding two, but is still more important.We somehow have to coordinate all of the actionsinvolved in creating an effect. The need for suchcoordination is obvious at the tactical andoperational levels. A failure to coordinate would at aminimum produce an ineffectual overall impact onthe enemy, and at worst might result in fratricide andself-defeat. That fear has been one of the principaldrivers behind the concern with a common operatingpicture and with developing shared situationalawareness and a common understanding ofcommand intent. Yet, this degree of coordination,however necessary, is clearly not sufficient forcreating the kind of unity of effect that is essential forsuccessful effects-based operations. To achieve aunity of effect in which individual efforts do notcancel each other out, but instead multiplysynergistically, demands a coordination thatstretches across all military forces, warfare areas,Services, and entire coalitions. It will demand thatsuch coordination equally extend across thepolitical, diplomatic, and economic arenas as well asthe military in a degree of coordination that we have

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seldom managed before and that was onlyperipherally evident in the Libyan operations for all oftheir ultimate success.

Achieving this unity of effect will not be easy. Inlooking at the planning and execution of effects-based operations, we identified three different areasof complexity with which we were obliged to deal. Tocreate an impact in the cognitive domain, we have toorchestrate all of the variables of a complex set ofactions so as to have the best possible chance ofcreating the effect we desire. We equally have toassess where the cascades of physical andpsychological effects would lead, and to identify andbalance the risks involved. Finally, we have tosomehow monitor the changes in an observer’sbehavior by aggregating many diverse indicators.These three levels of complexity are an inescapablepart of operating in the cognitive domain, butexploiting them also offers the nonlinear impacts wedesire from effects-based operations.

Network-centric capabilities can give us the tools notonly to deal with this complexity, but also to exploit itto our advantage. Note that the issue here is not aninability to conduct effects-based operations in theabsence of network-centric capabilities. Indeed, it isthe ability to master these complexities on anintuitive basis that is the mark of great commandersand statesmen. What network-centric capabilitiesbring is rather a new ability to deal with the problemsof complexity inherent in effects-based operationson a routine basis. This ability may take the form ofdecision-aids for commanders, or of planning tools.It may take the form of bringing diverse communities


of expertise to bear on a problem. It may equally bethe ability to database, identify, collate, aggregate,and assess the indicators of changed behavior.

Knowledge MobilizationIt is almost axiomatic to say that the more precisewe attempt to be either in our actions or in ourtargeting, the more dependent we become onknowledge as opposed to data and information. Ineffects-based operations, this dependence ismultiplied. We must know and then understand thefriend, foe, or neutral sufficiently well to anticipatereactions and to couch our own actions accordingly,and our knowledge must be sufficiently timely toenable us to adapt to the actual reactions as theyoccur. This knowledge must include both a sufficientdatabase/historical record to lend context to theactions and reactions encountered and a looserexpertise that blends large quantities of often-indefinable information into a coherent whole. Tomake matters still more challenging, the knowledgewe require is based on information that is oftenambiguous, subjective, incomplete, or evendeliberately deceptive.

In looking at the Libyan operation, we encapsulatedthis knowledge requirement in situationalawareness and understanding of command intentthat include the knowledge to plan actions, theknowledge of oneself to coordinate a unity of effect,and a knowledge of the broader situation thatenabled a commander to put his actions into thecontext of a national effort. In short, effects-basedoperations point to some very different

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requirements for data, information, and knowledgethan the predominantly sensor-based data andinformation we would normally consider in pursuingnetwork-centric operations.

This is where the use of the term knowledgemobilization, as distinct from knowledge orknowledge management, becomes critical. Ineffects-based operations, we cannot assume thatthe knowledge required will be available in a clean,machinable, displayable form, or even that anydatabase will contain what we need. Yet, theimplication of the word mobilization is thatknowledge, however imperfect, will probably beavailable somewhere and that the wider ournetwork is, the greater that probability becomes thatwe can access it. The task of our network-centriccapabilities will be to tap that knowledge andexpertise wherever it is and to make it available tothe warfighters and decisionmakers who need it.The ad hoc communities of expertise that aroseduring the Libyan operations provide a paradigm forsuch mobilization, as do Internet chat rooms. Theexpert26 tapped in this mobilization may not be anintelligence analyst, or even a governmentemployee. It may be an ally with special knowledge.It could be the last Navy ship into port that filed areport on a chat room, or it may be an academicwho has studied a region or leader. In each case,we mobilize available knowledge by networkingwarfighters with experts, databases, and centers ofexperience, our own and those of our friends,civilian and military, government andnongovernment, in a link that will vary from onesituation to the next, potentially from one hour to the


next. The good news is that with effort, such avirtual network is technologically feasible in veryshort order. The bad news is that it demands achange in how we think about information,intelligence, and support to commanders andcommands at every level.

…and in the Future?Network-centric capabilities and thinking are clearlystill evolving and will need to take the requirementsof effects-based operations into account. Initially,this will probably take the form of simply figuring outhow to best use the power of the network, as in thecreation of communities of expertise. However, overthe longer term, new information technologies canclearly help us to deal with the three levels ofcomplexity at the core of operations in the cognitivedomain. In fact, the discussions above point to twoareas of great promise.

One is the development of decision-aids to handlethe multiple levels of complexity, that manage whatan observer sees, and demonstrate the cascadingeffects that a given option may produce. Notice thatwe are not talking about computer-directedresponses, but rather of presenting harrieddecisionmakers with some way of considering theavailable options in an orderly way. Indeed, we havealready been experimenting with decision-aids thatcan provide relative probabilities for a given behaviorin a given situation.

Another area of promise is in the use of indicators toprovide feedback on the effects our actions actually

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produce. Because of the number of variables andpotential indicators of changes in behavior or even inperformance, one key to any effective use ofindicators will probably revolve around data miningof open source materials on a scale unimaginablewith today’s technology. However, to use what wehave mined, we would also have to set upautomated algorithms to spot behavioral andperformance changes that constitute definitiveindicators and then render the indications in terms ofprobabilities of a particular behavior taking place.

These Information Age capabilities could clearly playa major role in the future of effects-basedoperations. The results will never be perfect. Afterall, effects-based operations will always be abouthuman beings, and humans will never be eitherentirely predictable or constant. What is clear is thatthe faster we identify the parameters of what weneed, the faster they will be in commanders’ hands.

To complete the above, we must also add a note ofurgency. The effects-based operations we arediscussing are not an academic exercise, but areapplicable to the problems of the new securityenvironment in which we are now bemired. Thus,the question is not just what might we do toimplement network-centric, effects-basedoperations tomorrow, but how we might bestsupport the effects-based operations we undertaketoday with whatever elements of Network CentricWarfare we may have at our disposal.


ConclusionIn a sense, the connection between network-centricand effects-based operations is very straightforward.Network-centric operations are the means to an end:effects-based operations. We have only begun toappreciate the power and promise of network-centricoperations. But, like any other capability, that powerand promise lie chiefly in how they are applied.Combining network-centric operations with effects-based operations to exploit the human dimension ofwar, with its potential for nonlinear combatefficiencies, would make enough sense by itself tojustify proceeding.

However, with the September 11th attacks and adramatic shift in the strategic threat to the Americanhomeland, we have a still more pressing imperative.We need a way to apply the power of network-centric operations to dealing with an asymmetricopponent, to contain the unrest that threatens ourcities and citizens, and to establishing a stabledeterrence regime to replace a now tatteredbalance of terror. All of these tasks focus on thehuman dimension of war addressed by effects-based operations, our gateway to bringing network-centric power to bear.

Effects-based operations are

coordinated sets of actions

directed at shaping the behavior

of friends, foes, and neutrals

in peace, crisis, and war.

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1Griffith, Samuel B. trans. Sun Tzu, The Art of War. London,1963. p. 11.2The author was Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence for theBattle Force Sixth Fleet coordinating much of the informationand intelligence support during the operation. In his role asAssistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence for Commander,Cruiser-Destroyer Group Eight (the battle group commanderdesignated commander of Battle Force), the authorparticipated in drawing up the “lessons learned” from AttainDocument. He also helped prepare the battle group fordeployment in the months before the 1987 operations. 3The flagship of the Battle Force was the USS Saratoga withthe same air wing embarked, and with the same Battle Forcestaff, this time under the command of then Rear Admiral J.M.Boorda, later to become Chief of Naval Operations, the sameAdmiral Boorda whose lament opened this book. 4In this case, the Battle Force was composed of two carrierbattle groups and one battleship battle group.5Due to the concerns over the sensitivity of the material on theintelligence system, much of the classified intelligencematerial was entered into the JOTS via a cumbersomeprocess that required intelligence watch personnel to sight areport, make a determination on its releasability, and send itto the JOTS. This process continued 24 hours a day and,however awkward it may have been, provided a far morerapid turn-around of intelligence to the operating forces thanwould have been possible with hard copy reports or dailyintelligence briefings. 6To reduce the bandwidth required, the inputs from thenational sensors were readouts that reported only the deltafrom the information already held by the Battle Force, e.g.changes to the numbers and disposition of aircraft at field X. 7The decentralization represented by the CWC concept wasnot new, but was greatly enhanced by the increased degreeof shared situation awareness introduced by JOTS. As apractical matter in both Attain Document and the 1987Freedom of Navigation Operations, the combination of theconcept and the shared awareness permitted the BattleForce/Joint Task Force Commander himself to focus on thefastest breaking and most sensitive interactions where hisinput would be most critical.8The need for this had been brought to Boorda during one ofthe pre-deployment “work-up” exercises for the battle groupduring which the newly installed information capabilities andthe makeshift procedures for using them essentially collapsedunder the workload of exercise operations. As a result, he


became very insistent on both configuration control within thedeploying battle group and on working out and exercisingprocedures for using the new capabilities. 9Under the standard organization for Navy ships, the TacticalAction Officer is the watch officer responsible for “fighting” theship and for directing any operation in which the ship may beengaged. The TAO watch is located in the ship’s “combat,”where all information whether from organic or nonorganicsources was to come together. 10One impact of these tests was to change the procedures forpassing information to the Tactical Action Officer, includingthat of placing the most junior and least trained personnel inthe role of the “phone talkers.” Such phone talkers passedinformation verbally from the nodes to similar talkers in theship CEC for passage to the TAO. Their lack of experienceand training compounded itself, often resulting in comicallydistorted reporting. 11Under prodding from security personnel and with AdmiralBoorda’s encouragement, the author ran an experiment threetimes in which the door to the intelligence section of the FlagPlot was to be closed until any piece of information failed toreach the Flag Tactical Action Officer. The longest the doorremained closed was 25 minutes. 12Admiral Boorda had been the Executive Assistant to theChief of Naval Operations during the 1986 Attain Documentand El Dorado Canyon Operations and, in that capacity, hadbeen privy to the military-strategic and geo-strategic leveldecisionmaking involved. He carried that perspective intoplanning the 1987 operation and specifically into defining itsobjectives in behavioral terms. 13This prior knowledge was supplied by the experience ofthose who had participated in the previous year’s operation.Moreover, that experience was largely limited to the tacticaland operational interactions with the Libyan military and noattempt had been made subsequent to those operations tobrief personnel on the actions undertaken by other levels ofthe U.S. government or on what was known of Libyangovernment reactions. 14Boorda, who subsequently served as NATO’s CINC Southduring the Bosnia Operation in 1992-3, made a similarcomment to the author upon his return. He stated that all hecould get from the intelligence staff in Bosnia were reports ofwhere things were, when what he really needed was to talk tosomeone who understood the area and the people involved. 15That is, organization, database, collection, analysis, anddissemination.16This quest for feedback before the Internet included

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monitoring wire service reporting for any indication of changein Libyan political or economic behavior. 17This formal reporting from the national intelligencecommunity had been organized and tasked for the operationwell in advance with the information fed into the Flagintelligence plot and from thence to the TAO and Battle ForceCommander. 18Boorda recognized the utility of this informal back channelnetwork, encouraged its use, and frequently posed questionsarising from his “what if” thinking through it. 19During the operations in 1986 and 1987, as the pace ofoperations and the workload on the JTF and Fleet leveloperational and intelligence personnel increased, so did theirreliance on the information “brokers” in the verticalcommunity. The brokers’ ability to identify and “push” criticalpieces of information from a mass of data, which mightotherwise have overwhelmed the limited resources of theharried operational commander, was crucial. 20During any major operation such as those in 1986 and 1987,the quantity of intelligence reporting can overwhelm theinterface with the operational commander who has tocombine this nonorganic information with the organicinformation derived from the command’s sensors and humansources so as to assess a continuously rapidly changingsituational awareness. Given the intensity of this interchangeand the tendency of agencies to “push” forward an excess ofinformation, it was necessary to supplement the command’s“pull” of taskings and questions with a knowledgeable but lesspressed interface that could filter the information so as toavoid inundating and distracting the interface at theoperational level.21One example of this was a “writings analysis group” ofexperts (including the author) on the Soviet military fromacross the intelligence community and the government whomet monthly to assess and discuss new Soviet militarywritings. This human networking then provided the basis forrapid but informal queries among its members on ad hocquestions posed to any one member.22We need to underline once again that knowing how theobserver perceives and thinks is not an absolute. Almost bydefinition, we will never truly know how the other observer willactually perceive our actions, nor how he will translate theseperceptions into behavior. Rather, the knowledge andunderstanding we access must be sufficient to prune themyriad of possible reactions down to a set of most likelyperceptions and resulting behavior from which planning mayproceed. This was the approach taken in both the 1986 and1987 Libyan operations.


23The interagency requirement extends to bothnongovernmental and international agencies as needed.24It is increasingly clear from the data emerging from bothreal-world operations and experimentation, both in the UnitedStates and abroad, that network-centric operations do bringan increase in the combat efficiency of military forces. Department of Defense, Network Centric Warfare, pp. 8-1ff. 25Even if we were to limit our perspective to wartime and thefoe, short of the total destruction of all of that foe’s means ofwaging war in the manner of the Third Punic War, we wouldstill have to face the prospect of further interactions before wecould declare victory. This is especially true in the face of athreat from a non-state organization such as al-Qaida inwhich an action successfully countered in one area is likely toresult in a different challenge in anther area. 26If we follow Admiral Boorda’s logic in “cross-training” theaterreconnaissance personnel and their battle force interlocutors,then this pool of experts ought to have enough of anunderstanding of the military commander’s situation toprovide relevant input. Conversely, the military commanderneeds to have enough of an understanding of the region toappreciate what the expert can and cannot tell him.

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About the AuthorEdward A. Smith, Jr. is a retired U.S. Navy Captainwith 30 years of service. He holds a BA inInternational Relations from Ohio State and a MAand doctorate in International Relations from TheAmerican University (Dissertation: NavalConfrontation: The Inter-Superpower Use of NavalSuasion in Times of Crisis).

He saw combat in Vietnam as the IntelligenceOfficer on the staff of Commander Delta NavalForces and Senior Advisor Vietnamese RiverineCommand, completing almost 200 combat missionsin helicopters and OV-10 Broncos. His otherassignments included duty in the Navy FieldOperational Intelligence Office and in the DefenseIntelligence Agency, as Executive Assistant to thePolitical Advisor to CINCLANT/SACLANT, and asAssistant Naval Attache to Paris. He also served asthe Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence for CruiserDestroyer Group Eight/Battle Force Sixth Fleet, atour that included participation in the intercept of theAchille Lauro hijackers and the 1986 and 1987operations off Libya. He then moved to the staff ofthe Director of Naval Intelligence and was a primaryplayer in creating the seminal Navy white paper“...From the Sea.” Subsequently, he set up theIntelligence Directorate in the new Office of NavalIntelligence and served as its first Deputy Directorfor Intelligence. His final tour in the Navy was on thestaff of the Chief of Naval Operations in the CNO

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Executive Panel where he directed the Navy’s RMAwargames and was the author of the Navy’sAnytime, Anywhere vision. He retired from the Navyin 1998 and is now Boeing’s senior analyst fornetwork-centric and effects-based operations.

Dr. Smith’s publications include:

“They Can Buy It, BUT..” Proceedings. (Feb 94).

“What ‘...From the Sea’ Didn’t Say.” Naval WarCollege Review. (Winter 94-5).

“Putting it through the right window.” Proceedings.(June 95).

“The Navy RMA Wargames.” Naval War CollegeReview. (Autumn 97).

Chapter: “The Process of Defining a New Role forNaval Forces in the post-Cold War World.”Turbowitz et al. ed Strategic Adjustment.(Columbia University Press, 1999).

“Network Centric Warfare: What’s the Point?” NavalWar College Review. (Winter 2000-1).

He also has contributed a chapter on anti-access/area denial strategies to a forthcoming book,Globalization and Maritime Power, to be publishedby the National Defense University Press.
