egyptian deception

8/10/2019 Egyptian Deception

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Overcoming Strategic Weakness:

The Egyptian Deception and the

Yom Kippur War1

YIGAL SHEFFY

Analysis of the Egyptian deception on the eve of the October 1973 (Yom

Kippur) War serves to illuminate operational rationale, which may

guide future strategic deception models and processes. The Egyptians

used deception to neutralize two Israeli strong points that might

jeopardize the crossing of the Suez Canal: the capacity for a

preemptive strike and deployment in strength in the Canal region.

The deception aimed to minimize Israels early warning space,

delaying the moment of decision-making and slowing down the IDFs

operational response. Implementing a dual technique of concealing and

misleading, the deception lulled the Israeli early warning system, the

linchpin of its security doctrine, into accepting the (wrong) alternative

option. The deception gained the upper hand because it corresponded

even if unintentionally with the fundamental perception maintained

by the victim, contributing to winning the first round of the surprise

attack.

The contribution of Egyptian deception to the total surprise experienced by

Israel at the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War (the Ramadan War for theArabs) has been discussed in almost every work published on the subject of

the war.2 Although it is generally conceded that deception made a significant

contribution to Israels surprise, their judgement on the place of deception in

Egyptian planning and the professional merits of this specific instance of

deception covers a spectrum, ranging from the sole element [in the war]

that was intelligently constructed and implemented with great skill3 to of

middling quality and even rather primitive.4

This diversity of opinion is nourished by the fact that even after 33 years,

the precise nature of the deception remains cloaked in mystery. No archivaldocumentation has been released so far on Egyptian decision-making, or


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on the part played by deception at the stages of conceptualization and

planning, and even less on the deceptions actual implementation. The only

available high-level sources presenting the Egyptian version are memoirs by

Egyptian politicians and senior officers; these generally exalt the deception

operation, but contradict one another regarding its nature, its componentparts and its relative weight in the war plans.5 Additional information about

events on the Egyptian side has been culled from documents captured

by the Israelis during the war. However, they relate primarily to the

operational and tactical levels; hence they shed little light on strategic

decision-making.6

The problematic nature of sources is one of the factors motivating the

academic debate in Israel over the contention that deception originally played

a minor role in Cairos planning. According to proponents of this position,

Egyptian historiography is inaccurate with respect to the deceptions salience

and signifies post facto attempts to exaggerate its importance as a belated

response to Israeli publications, which had enlightened Egyptians about the

deceptions practical impact on the battlefield.7

Stumbling blocks to an in-depth study of the affair are not limited to the

Egyptian side. In Israel as well, much information remains unavailable

publicly. The 1974 state commission of inquiry appointed to investigate the

wars events (the Agranat Commission) dwelled on the issue of deception,

devoting ten pages of its report to the subject. However, when the report wasmade public in 1995, all the relevant pages remained confidential.8

In response to further attempts to gain access to the material, the Israeli

Defence Forces (IDF) Archive, which holds the confidential report, stated:

After careful re-examination of the report [we have concluded] that it is

still impossible to open for review those portions of the report that have yet

to be publicized, given that their exposure may still endanger national

security. Those same sections therefore remain hidden from public scrutiny

to this day.9

This veil of secrecy has also hampered comparison of the event with othernotable acts of deception that attest to the role and ingenuity of such military

stratagems in the twentieth century. These include, for example, General Sir

Edmund Allenbys operations during the Palestine Campaign in World War I

(commonly known as the haversack ruse); German deception prior to

Barbarossa, 1941; British deception during the Western Desert Campaign,

194042; the man who never was affair, 1943; the double-cross system

that culminated in Fortitude and the Normandy invasion, 1944, and

the Coalitions hail-Mary manoeuvre in Desert Storm, 199091. When

compared to these glamorous operations, the seemingly lacklustre Egyptiandeception has failed to attract the attention of intelligence historians and

810 I N T E L L I G E N C E A N D N A T I O N A L S E C U R I T Y


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1973 traumatic surprise from the victims perspective. They therefore

focused on Israeli errors in defensive actions, to the neglect of Egypts

offensive rationale.

One aspect of this war of wits, though, greatly whets the historians

appetite and may eventually become the smoking gun prompting a revisedevaluation of the cunning behind the Egyptian deception. For years,

intelligence veterans, followed by journalists and recently by academics,

have been involved in an argument over the reliability of the Mossad

crown jewel asset, which had regularly supplied Israel with Egyptian

operational war plans and had warned of the wars outbreak 36 hours in

advance. The argument focuses on whether he had indeed worked for Israel

or had been, in fact, an Egyptian double agent. Had he misinformed Israels

intelligence community for five years, and thus drugged it into drowsiness

and skewed its perception? Had he delivered his warning at a time

considered by the Egyptians to be too late for an effective Israeli

operational response? Should this spy (lately claimed to be no less than

Egyptian President Gamal Abd al-Nassers son-in-law) indeed turn out to

be a double agent, who walked in and supplied information under

Egyptian guidance, it may very well become one of the most successful

cases of strategic deception in modern history. However, the paucity of

historical evidence necessitates that any conclusion reached with respect to

this issue be treated as pure conjecture. Therefore, the present discussionignores the entire affair; should the double-cross theory be substantiated in

the future, it will only add to, and in no way detract from, the Egyptian

success.10

Considering the lack of reliable evidence, it would be bold not to say

impertinent to claim to have made a detailed reconstruction of the

deception from the Egyptian perspective, especially regarding its planning,

development and execution on all its levels. Nevertheless, the existing

information is sufficient to put forward two reasonable arguments irrespective

whether the Egyptians actually planned all the aspects of the deceptionsprocess in advance or whether some of its success was unintentional,

resulting primarily from Israeli errors and miscalculations, to the point of

taking the Egyptians themselves by surprise.

a. On the historical level, this article argues that the Egyptian deception

was thedecisive even if not exclusive factor to affect IDF readiness

and its faulty response to the specific threat on the eve of the war.

b. On the conceptual level, the article argues that the deceptions proven

success in the field points to the methods appropriateness as a model,worthy of doctrinal emulation in the preparation of similar deception

T H E E G Y P T I A N D E C E P T I O N A N D T H E Y O M K I P P U R W A R 811


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The underlying assumption shared by the two arguments is that the

deception should be judged by its outcome much more than by its methods.

That is, a deception, however creative and sophisticated should be dis-

counted (or worst, may be judged counterproductive), if it fails to achieve its

goals. Conversely, a successful deception, even if simple and primitive inits design, is entirely laudable. Thus, the truth may eventually lie with those

who believe that deception originally played a secondary role in the Egyptian

planning and with those who contend that its fruits were less the labour of

Egyptian wisdom than of Israels self-deception. Nevertheless, all this is

insufficient in itself to measure the significance of the lesson to be learnt: the

path taken by the Egyptians is a paradigm that initiators of deception should

embrace and against which potential victims must guard.

T H E D E C P T I O N S O B J E C T I V E S

Egypt went to war in order to achieve three strategic objectives: (1) to restore

its national honour and pan-Arab prestige, forfeited in public eyes after its

military defeat and Israels capture of the Sinai Peninsula in the 1967 Six Day

War; (2) to exploit military success as a lever to end the stalemate and

revitalize the diplomatic process, which would bring international pressure on

Israel to return to the bargaining table; (3) to force Israel to soften its stubborn

stance regarding the return of the Sinai to Egyptian sovereignty.

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These goals were defined by Anwar Sadat (who had inherited the Egyptian

Presidency from Gamal Abd al-Nasser in 1970) and had reached maturity by

late 1972. They replaced previous war objectives, aimed at recapturing the

Sinai Peninsula but since recognized as unobtainable. In order to achieve

the new limited objectives of what may be called a strategic compromise,

Egypt discovered it no longer needed to occupy the entire peninsula by force,

or gain control over the 4050 kilometre strip (as the crow flies) lying

between the Suez Canal on the west and the Gidi and Mitla Passes in the

mountainous ridge on the east, as previously intended. Crossing the Canaland capturing a foothold along an expanse as narrow as 912 kilometres east

of the waterway (four inches . . . a foothold, pure and simple according to

Sadats picturesque description), was now considered sufficient. Such an

accomplishment would regain prestige on the one hand and accelerate

renewal of the political process on the other.12

For the Egyptians, these new strategic goals and operational objectives

were not, perhaps, ideal; they would undoubtedly have preferred to retake the

entire Sinai territory (up to the pre-1967 border) by their own efforts.

However, in the face of existing international, political and military con-straints, an examination of which goes beyond the scope of this article, the



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The Egyptian army undertook a process of re-evaluation after the war of

1967, which was accelerated after the end of the War of Attrition in 1970.

This process meant that Egypts military leaders located or thought they

had located appropriate doctrinal and technological responses to almost all

of the operational and tactical strengths enjoyed by Israel Defence Forces.This assessment was based on a rigorous Egyptian effort to identify potential

weaknesses in any future conflict on the basis of past experience. This

contributed to the fact that, in the 1973 war, Egypt achieved initial military

success by means of the rectification of certain of these weaknesses. Thus, for

example, the advancement of their dense air defence system eastwards to the

Suez Canal severely limited the Israeli air forces freedom of action in the

Sinai; the development of a water jet technique for breaching the high

berms13 Israel had constructed along the canals eastern embankment

facilitated the crossing of Egyptian armour; and the reinforcement of infantry

with anti-tank missiles far above establishment provided an immediate

response to the blitz tactics used by Israeli tanks.

However, the Egyptians found neither doctrinal nor technological counter-

measures to overcome two operational weaknesses that, in fact, threatened

the wars strategic objectives. The first was a classic weak point of any

amphibious operation, namely, the failure to gain or hold a beachhead the

most critical phase of the operation. A strong Israeli defence along the eastern

bank of the Suez Canal might frustrate the crossing and prevent the capture ofbridgeheads, pushing the attackers back to the opposite bank. The second

weak point was the IDFs ability to launch a pre-emptive counteroffensive

against Egyptian forces still gathering on the west bank of the Canal during

the operations preparatory phase. Such a spoiling attack could delay or even

totally prevent the Egyptian attack.

These threats could materialize if the Israelis were to learn in advance of

the Egyptian decision to go to war and of its timing. This would allow

the Israelis to mobilize their reserve formations (the IDFs main combat

component) in time, deploy in force along the canal and react in tune withtheir established security doctrine. This doctrine, intensively studied by the

Egyptians since 1967, called for the launching of a pre-emptive counter-

offensive and thus rapidly transferring the battle to enemy territory before the

latter could begin its own offensive moves.14 To thwart such threats with any

efficiency, it was essential to surprise the Israelis over any Egyptian decision

to go to war and the prospective date of any such war. Surprise would thus

kill two birds with one stone: slow up IDF defensive deployment and prevent

an Israeli pre-emptive strike. It was this strategic surprise that the Egyptians

sought to achieve by means of deception.Conceptually, deception is a consciously initiated process in which the



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(or her) to adopt or adhere to an erroneous opinion or belief and to

consequently construct an unrealistic picture of the prevailing situation.

In abiding by this illusion, the victim serves the deceivers interests.

Operationally, however, the meaning of deception goes beyond these

boundaries. Deception is not confined to fixing the victims perception andmanipulating his judgement alone; it goes one step further, causing the victim

toact(or to abstain from acting) in a way that will create or reinforce his own

(actual or mental) weakness, thereby allowing the deceptions initiator to

exploit the stratagem on the practical level.

To realize deceptions mission in to do or not to do terms (rather than

instead of only to think or not to think terms), Egyptian planners were

required to cause the Israelis notto take those operational steps that, in the

formers view, would perpetuate Egyptian weaknesses or at least cause the

Israelis to tarry in taking them, a delay that would neutralize their effec-

tiveness during the critical first phase of the offensive. The specific Israeli

steps the Egyptian were so concerned about were the timelyfull mobilization

of reserves, completion of defensive deployment, and launching a pre-

emptive counteroffensive. The message embodied in the deception was thus

meant to state that all three operational steps were utterly unnecessary.

For the message to reach its objects Israeli decision-makers and

convince them to accept its false content, it had to survive initial scrutiny by a

buffer, namely Israeli intelligence, and lull, first and foremost, the earlywarning system that was and continues to be a cornerstone of Israels national

security doctrine. Maintaining a small standing army, with most of its

strength resting on reserve forces, Israel grounds its security on four core

elements: (1) deterrence; (2) early warning (in case deterrence fails and

hostile attack is contemplated) to allow reservists to mobilize on time,

decision-makers to make decisions and the IDF to react (in other words, to

provide adequate time for an effective response to specific threats); (3) a

strong standing air force (the prime component of defence) meant to stop or

frustrate any attack, even under conditions of surprise, until arrival of reserveformations; (4) rapid resolution of the battle by means of pre-emptive strikes

or counteroffensives that transfer the battlefield to enemy territory at the

earliest possible moment, thus compensating for Israels limited territory and

short operational breath.

Three pillars upheld this early warning structure: first, an intelligence

collection system aimed at penetrating the enemys (i.e. Arab) intimate

decision-making circles and learning about intentions, especially the decision

to launch a war; second, a collection and analysis capacity to locate and

identify early warning indicators during a wars preparatory stages. The basicassumption governing this rationale was that although it was possible to



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preparations and unusual activity from a well-tuned intelligence collection

system; third, existence of an adequate early warning space defined as the

span of time required for intelligence to reach conclusions regarding an

impending war and raise the alarm; for the leadership to make decisions; and

for operational elements to initiate and complete counter-steps (e.g.,mobilization, deployment, pre-emptive strike or spoiling attack). An early

warning space is considered adequate if all its components are completed

prior to the enemy attack; and inadequate if the enemy opens hostilities

before the defender completes its preparations. Therefore, creation of an

adequate early warning space is not confined to the province of intelligence

alone; it is a process that incorporates the components of intelligence,

decision-making and operations alike.15

The working assumption common to the entire Israeli security apparatus

from the early 1950s onwards postulated that the Intelligence Community

would be able to provide warnings of war early enough for the

IDF to prepare itself in timely fashion, whether for defence or offence.

Early warning and its centrality in Israels defence perception therefore

became one of the main obstacles to the Egyptian intention to surprise the

Israelis.

To minimize that threat, Egyptian planners had to narrow Israels early

warning space, thus allowing successful conclusion of what they perceived to

be the most critical phases of the operation concentration of Egyptianforces along the west bank of Suez, crossing of the canal and establishment of

beachheads along the east bank all free of Israeli interference. Stated

differently, the Egyptians aimed to shorten the time span between the

moment that the Israelis finally realized that war was imminent and the

moment that the Egyptian army had completed establishing sufficient

bridgeheads to make any IDF response irrelevant.

C O N S I D E R A T I O N S A S S O C I A T E D W I T H D E C E P T I O N

The initial obstacle to the deceptions success was the very transition from

the state of lull that had reigned along the Suez Canal since 7 August 1970,

the date the IsraeliEgyptian ceasefire agreement came into effect at the close

of the War of Attrition, to the newstate of war. Such an acute change offered

the deceptions planners a basic advantage but also a disadvantage in relation

to their victim.

The deceivers advantage lies in the fact that the victims immersion in a

state-of-lull mindset interferes with his ability to psychologically adjust to the

diametrically different situation instigated by the new situation of war.Therefore, because such a dramatic transition deviates from the orderly



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thought patterns, the capacity to recognize change and respond appro-

priately and in good time declines.

Without entering into a detailed discussion about cognitive bias, perceptual

deviations, or rational versus intuitional judgement, it is sufficient to note that

experience has shown that when individuals and organizations consciouslydecide to avoid the initiation of change, which placed them in a passive-

defensive position they exhibit two types of mental bias. Those exhibiting

loss aversion prefer continuation of the prevailing situation irrespective of

actual events. Attempts to maintain the status quo (status quo bias) therefore

steers towards mirror-image distorting, that is, a belief that the other side

inclines to the status quo too, or, at the minimum, intends to refrain from

taking any risk sufficient to introduce such meaningful change. This type of

the status quo seeker usually disregards the possibility that for the opponent,

in this case post-1967 Egypt, sustaining the current situation may entail

losses. Hence, it may well be worthwhile for the aggressor (in this case,

Egypt) to take the risks required to change the status quo or, as in the present

case, to reinstate the status quo ante bellum.16

These two biases outlined above can significantly contribute to the success

of strategic surprise. On the intelligence level, they are likely to steer toward

interpretation of information and signals indicating undesirable changes on

the enemy side as unreliable. On the operational level, they may cause the

defender to hesitate and delay providing the required response (e.g.,mobilization or pre-emptive attacks) from fear that such moves per se will

prompt deterioration in the status quo.

In contrast to this advantage, the disadvantage inherent in the initiators

position during the transition from lull to war rests on the fact that the process

entails noticeable, highly irregular and unavoidable activities. Under such

conditions, the risk of detection by the victim is much greater than, for

example, during a state of war or active operations, situations already

saturated with activity, which make the differentiation between regular and

irregular events quite problematic.A marine metaphor demonstrates the distinction between the two states. In

calm seas, the smallest ripple catches the eye; in rough seas, however, even

truly threatening waves may be noticed only in the wake of comparison

their height, density and direction with all the other high waves in the

vicinity. Stated differently, the mere observation of a threats presence may

be ineffective as an indicator of that threat.

Detection of those acute changes associated with the transition from peace

(or lull) to war stood, as stated, at the core of Israels war indicators theory

and early warning doctrine. Yet analysis of the nature of the transitionscharacteristics may have led the deceptions planners to the following



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the status quo and the cessation of the ceasefire, the greater would be the gap

between their perceptions and the reality and, therefore, the slower would be

their response.Second, the deception should avoid the operational level of the

imminent campaign and aim at the strategic level only. This conclusion was

inevitable, as the objectives associated with operational deception (such asmisleading the victim with respect to direction, strength or time of an

offensive) were not only ill-suited to overcome the Egyptian strategic

weaknesses, they might very well exacerbate them. That is, the very talk of

any kind of military operations (irrespective of its direction, strength or date)

or intentions of war might turn out to be the single irregular wave capable of

waking the comatose IDF and triggering an Israeli reaction.

Responses to these strategic weak points were rooted in the Egyptian

ability toconcealtheir decision to attack more than in the attempt to deceive

the Israelis with respect to the offensives operational components. Hence,

the Egyptians forsook, apparently by conscious choice, operational deception

in favour of safeguarding their strategic objectives. Doing so reduced the risk

of transforming the deception into a double-edged sword instead of a force

multiplier. In effect, historians who have stated that the Egyptians did not

include operational deception within the arsenal employed during the war

were correct.17 However, the present study argues that instead of categorizing

this state of affairs as an outcome of the deceptions poor quality (implied by

some), the Egyptian process should in fact be lauded for avoiding thistempting but under the specific circumstances risky track of operational

deception.

Egypts deception was strategic in nature because its message was targeted

at those Israeli national leaders responsible for decision-making regarding

actions general mobilization, full alert and combat preparedness, and

the launch of a pre-emptive counteroffensive crucial for the success of

Egyptian strategy. The deceptions message, rooted therefore in the strategic

layer, was thus crystal clear: Egypt has no intention of going to war in the

near future. Even the use of tactical deception means was employedexclusively to support their strategic goals by transmitting an identical

message. Thus, for example, the situation was portrayed as business as

usual at every level possible, starting with the Egyptian presidents tranquil

policy declarations, and ending with groups of half-naked soldiers leisurely

fishing along the Suez Canal (labelled idle bands by the Egyptians).

To convey the core message, the Egyptians employed two classic methods

identified with the logic of deception. The first and earlier tack, apparently

nested in President Sadats decision as to the new wars objectives and

character, was meant to totally conceal the very fact of the decision, itsplanning and preliminary preparations for as long as possible. Concealment



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stages: when most of the activity conducted was enacted behind closed doors,

involving a miniscule number of senior officials and officers. Nevertheless, it

was obvious that as D-day approached, activities related to the upgrading of

military capacity would accelerate and participants would grow in numbers to

the point where it would no longer be possible to hide their existence. Anyattempt to continue concealing such activity was not only doomed to failure,

it would likely boomerang and arouse the suspicions of the victim. Assuming

that such indicators would eventually attract the defenders attention, the

deceivers introduced a second method, what I call a warning denier, meant

to provide an alternative explanation for the slice of threatening reality being

slowly exposed. Such an explanation would have to be sufficiently logical

for the Israelis to accept and sufficiently substantive to allay any of their

suspicions.

The Egyptian deceptions rationale was, therefore, twofold. First, a

fundamental deception, lasting several months at the least, was meant,

according to testimony by Sadat and other senior officials, to freeze the

victims perception, specifically that Egypt has still renounced the military

option, intending to sustain the diplomatic negotiations with regard to future

Israeli withdrawal.18 This was accompanied by a follow-up situational

deception, shorter in length, that by presenting a plausible explanation

aimed at eliminating any Israeli suspicion aroused by the inevitable

discrepancy between its erroneous perception (supported by the fundamentaldeception) and the evolving reality once open activity had begun.19

All the methods applied contributed to the deceptions coherence: its

closely melded political, diplomatic, civil and military components, and

unified message and two-pronged cover story. The first of these elements,

concealment of the decision to go to war and its initial preparations, was

constructed with a story confirming Egypts continuing commitment to a

political solution. So long as diplomatic talks continue, the story read, there

would be no alteration of the military stance and no deviation from the

business as usual attitude characterizing Egyptian behaviour. The secondelement involved misleading the victim by relating his interpretation of any

irregular activity discovered to another story, that of an innocent, large-scale

military exercise, unworthy of concern.

The deceptions core message that war was not imminent marks it out

as a channelizing deception (or misleading-type deception, according to

Daniel and Herbigs definition), aimed at focusing the victims entire

attention on a single and false option while convincing him to deny the

plausibility of all other courses of action available to his opponent. The

Egyptians apparently preferred this method to its alternative, an ambiguity-increasing deception. The latter option necessitates that the deceiver offer



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doubts, confront him with the horns of a dilemma and thus hinder the victims

ability to reach a decision even if he is not entirely duped. This approach does

not, however, fit a situation of sharp transition from peace-like calm to actual

war, because the mere mention of armed alternatives will alert the watchdog

instead of letting him lie still.An important advantage of channelizing deception is ability to intensify

the victims confidence in the (false) messages veracity. This is accom-

plished by being clear, reducing uncertainty and preventing the weighing of

alternative explanations that might lead to the correct conclusion, even if by

chance. The main disadvantage of this type of deception lies in the deceivers

having to stake all on one alternative that might be rejected by the victim or,

even worse, jeopardize the real mission if exposed. Posteriori, however, it

becomes clear that the Egyptians were correct in the choice of the singular

and focused message that was so appropriate to the contemporary Israeli

mindset.20

The specific methods and means adopted by the Egyptians have been

intensively detailed in other studies, and need not be reviewed here.21 It

would be sufficient to note that throughout the entire period the Egyptians

employed all three traditional methods of deception in conjunction with each

other: misleading (by real or notional activities); concealment (acts and

communications meant to conceal the existence, identity and substance of

objects, processes and activities); and disinformation (verbal transmission offalse messages). They used a variety of physical, visual, communicational

and verbal mechanisms to take advantage of the avenues entailing political,

diplomatic, civil and military leaks. In the end, all were integrated within a

tight contexture.

No deception can succeed without employing concealment lies pro-

pagated to obscure the truth. In the summer and autumn of 1973, the

Egyptians adopted concealment apparently in order to overcome what they

considered their own knowledge gaps about the penetration of Israeli

intelligence into Egypt. The more a country lacks precise detailed andconcrete information on the success of foreign efforts in breaching its own

security, the more difficult it will be for it to completely neutralize the

specific cracks. Therefore, instead of wasting efforts to seal known Israeli

collection channels or use them to feed bogus information an ideal method

where it is possible to guarantee that all channels are controlled the

Egyptians, uncertain about the scope of Israeli coverage, chose to tread

another path. This path would potentially seal possible breaches of security,

while facilitating transmission of deceptive messages through unknown

cracks, which might not be sealed irrespective of Cairos efforts.So, the Egyptians first directed the deception at their own forces by



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The story stated that all the vast military preparations and activities were

but part of a large-scale all-arms exercise, named Tahrir [freedom] 41, in

which all military headquarters and staffs as well as a significant proportion

of the field armies would take part during the first third of October 1973.

The logic behind this step was clear: the more the cover story took rootamong Egyptian troops and the greater the number of individuals acting as

unwitting agents for the deception, the greater the likelihood that Israeli

intelligence sources would be convinced of the tales veracity. The latter

would then all deduce from the deceptive message that what was taking

place was an exercise, and not the launching of a war and the Israeli

intelligence community would then pass this on to decision-makers in

Jerusalem and Tel Aviv.

The successful planting of such a cover story inside Egypt itself was

meant, at least in theory, to ensnare not only human sources, but likewise

thwart intelligence collection systems first and foremost signal intelli-

gence considered to be even more reliable by their handlers. By adopting

the tactic of an all-embracing cover story, Egypt could assume that it would

reach the headphones of Unit 848, Israels signal intelligence agency (the

central early warning component in the DMI armoury22). The Egyptians thus

had no need to establish dedicated wireless nets (more vulnerable to exposure

as fakes) for deception. Nor did they need to identify the specific com-

munications channels thought to be monitored by the Israelis in order toutilize them as well for the deception. Instead, the tactic adopted enabled the

spread of the false message by means of genuine, regular communication

networks, passed along by innocent and unwitting operators and users (those

few in the know, it became clear post factum, were extremely careful in the

conduct of their communications). After the war, the Egyptians claimed that

they had established, and indeed used, wireless networks for deception

purposes only, but the evidence available is, unfortunately, murky and

lacking in concrete references.

In truth, none of these measures would have been impervious to a spyplaced close to the inner circle and those privy to the secret, as was

demonstrated by the albeit belated warning conveyed by the said top agent

about the impending war (unless the warning, like its delay, were also

intentional, the argument proffered by supporters of the double agent

theory). However, considering the constraints that the Egyptians faced, such

as inadequate information on Israeli intelligences penetration and the

difficulties in allocating substantial forces to the deceptive exercise, the

course of action chosen (the misleading of the enemy by concealing the truth

and planting the lie among their own people) appears the correct one. On theeve of the war the Egyptians acted on two levels, with the majority believing



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preparing for war. Egyptian memoirs, the most prominent among them being

a book by the then Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Saad al-Din

Shazly, demonstrate just how few were in the know. According to Shazly, the

commanders of the Egypts Second and Third Armies were officially

informed about the moment of truth only five days before D Day, divisionalcommanders were enlightened only 72 hours before H hour, brigade

commanders 48 hours earlier and battalion COs only 24 to 12 hours in

advance. Egyptian POWs stated that most troops belonging to the first assault

echelon were told they were at last heading for a real war only minutes before

they entered their rubber dinghies.23

T H E D E C P T I O N S A B S O R P T I O N

Israels fundamental beliefs and perceptions regarding its position vis-a-vis

the surrounding Arab countries, as well as its concrete intelligence

assessment on the eve of 6 October 1973 (popularly called the concept

after the war), are among the most widely discussed in the literature. For our

purposes we briefly summarize their essence as follows:

1. Egypt and Syria are preparing for open war in order to regain the

territories lost during the Six Day War.

2. Egypt is interested in retaking western Sinai (a territorial objective that,as stated, was dramatically modified toward the end of 1972 without the

change being discovered by Israeli intelligence) whereas Syria wishes to

occupy the entire Golan Heights.

3. Syria is not, however, prepared go to war without Egypt, while the latter,

on its part, will refrain from initiating an armed confrontation until it has

found an appropriate response to Israeli air superiority and the ability to

threaten deep into Egyptian territory.

4. The new USAUSSR detente discourages the war option for the near

future.5. Egypts leadership, headed by a weak and indecisive president and aware

of the countrys vulnerability and Israeli military superiority, is unwilling

to risk a premature war that Egypt is sure to lose.

The explicit intelligence assessment, conducted during the summer and

autumn of 1973 by the Directorate of Military Intelligence (the DMI was and

still is responsible for the states national intelligence assessment for war)

was unequivocal: the Arab states would not open war in the near future.24

The implicit operational conclusion also derived from the intoxication ofpower syndrome experienced by Israeli society at the time and was likewise



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war, they would be trounced on the battlefield and therefore fail to achieve

their goals.

Egypts deceptive message fitted these basic preconceptions and ensuing

intelligence assessment like a glove, either by intention or by sheer accident,

confirming the one conclusion shared by all students of deception andsurprise: the more a deception story fits the victims perceptions and beliefs,

the more readily is the story accepted, absorbed, and acted on, courtesy of

cognitive biases, heuristic judgement and fixed mindset. The misleading

message was, therefore, absorbed in Israel lock, stock and barrel during what

turned to be a critical period for both protagonists.

What, one may wonder, had occurred to the early warning system designed

to detect Arab attempts at surprise? According to accepted opinion, the

systems fail-safe mechanism was based on detection of signals that

would indicate, first and foremost, actual changes in the capabilities and

preparedness of enemy forces, whether or not detrimental to Israel.

Recognition of such signals would almost automatically initiate operational

countermeasures, either defensive or offensive, regardless of intelligence

assessments about the other sides motives, intentions and decisions. In

theory, therefore, the very fact of detecting irregular Egyptian and Syrian

activity, detached from any interpretation, was sufficient to cause an alert and

activate operational response. In practice, however, the Israeli alarm was

heard (and even then only partially) with respect to Syria exclusively, buttotal silence resounded on the Egyptian front. Some have consequently

concluded that it was not a deficient early warning rationale that should be

blamed for the failure, as first argued by practitioners and academics, but

the departure from its fundamentals, observed in the consideration of the

enemysintentionsrather then hiscapabilities.25 However, once the evidence

is examined more closely, it becomes evident that in October 1973 the Israeli

reaction was not a deviation from doctrine at all. Contrary to the accepted

beliefs and educated theories, ever since the Sinai Campaign (1956) and

perhaps even earlier, Israels early warning system, incorporating intelligenceand operational components, has been in effect based on assessments (or

knowledge) of the enemys intentions and decisions not less, and sometimes

more, than his capabilities, readiness and preparedness.26

Considered from this stance, the Yom Kippur War was no different. This

may explain why the early warning system failed to discover the truth despite

the many capability signals it detected. It thus appears that the deception

story was able to manipulate the one element that, again contrary to accepted

views, turned out to be most influential in completing the intelligence puzzle:

assessment of the enemys intention. By placing the Tahrir 41 exercise on afallacious footing Egyptian willingness to continue the political process



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to deactivate Israels capacity to comprehend the significance of activity and

events that could no longer be concealed and, once detected, should be

treated as warning signals. They thus coaxed the victim into adopting a

soothing interpretation that was completely swallowed, as it so beautifully

harmonized with the existing assessment.Intelligence reports regarding the exercise began to arrive in Israel on 25

September 1973, 11 days before the wars outbreak. A Special Intelligence

Summary, disseminated by the DMIs Production and Assessment Division

five days later, clearly demonstrates the impact of the process:

Between 17 October, a large-scale joint staff exercise on the

occupation of Sinai is going to take place . . . Because of the exercise

the state of alert will be raised (as of 1 October) to the highest in the air

force, and all the units, which are to participate in the exercise, and all

leaves will be cancelled. As noted, it was reported of the advance of a

division from Cairo to the Canal Zone, with additional reports on [other

movements] . . . The information about the expected exercise and the

call of reserve soldiers for limited time, implies, therefore, that the

advancement of forces and additional preparations that are underway or

will be done in coming days, such as completion of fortifications,

mobilization of civilian fishing boats, and check of state of readiness of

units,which, at first sight, can be seen as alert signals, are, in actualitysolely connected to the exercise.27

A day later, the Daily Intelligence Summary stated that the joint command

exercise has begun and connected the highest level of alert within the entire

Egyptian armed forces as well as mobilization of reservists to the exercise.28

A reading of intelligence summaries and meeting protocols at the decision-

making level, since made public, demonstrates that from that very moment

the exercise cover story starred as the ultimate explanation, thus serving to

nullify the true significance of all the early warning signals that had in factbeen detected. Even more, this tranquillising interpretation about Egyptian

intentions affected the IDFs reading of what was happening in the Syrian

boarder. That is to say notwithstanding the alarming signals recognized as

coming from Syria, no large-scale offensive is to be expected from Damascus

either, as the Syrians will not go to war without the Egyptians and Cairo is

currently busy only with its preparations for an exercise.

Had the exercise explanation appeared first only in September 1973, in all

likelihood it would not have been so readily accepted, even given the

concept. After all, experience had shown that untested channels ofinformation, especially qualitative ones, or messages arriving out of the blue



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unverified, unreliable or false. Moreover, the Director of Military Intelligence

and his senior staff had duly noted the Soviet use of an exercise cover story

within the Maskirovka they conducted prior to the invasion of Czechoslo-

vakia in 1968. They also noted that going to war from a peacetime exercise

was rooted in Soviet doctrine, adopted by the Arab armies. The DMI thusissued a warning as early as 1970 that the Arabs might launch a sudden attack

under a similar pretext.29 However, in 1973 the exercise explanation did not

appear out of nowhere because over the six years preceding the war the

Egyptian army had repeatedly conducted similar exercises. Time and again,

Israeli intelligence had learned that the irregular Egyptian military activity

observed and treated with alarm at first was actually simple preparations for

these exercises. At that time the DMI was perfectly on the mark as the series

of genuine exercises (under a similar name: Tahrir a consecutive uneven

number, such asTahrir13, 15 . . . 33, 35, etc.) conducted from 1968 onwards,

had nothing to do with deception or accustomization. Only as the war

approached, probably in mid-1973, did Egypt decide to take advantage of this

established pattern to the benefit of deception.

Just how great was the influence of the bogus exercise on the Israeli

decision-makers? And how much did the deception, even if indirectly,

contribute to the Israeli surprise? Answers to these questions can be

suggested following a comparison of the positions taken by the leadership in

SeptemberOctober on the one hand and during a previous alert in AprilMay 1973 on the other, when information was received (and not for the first

time) about imminent Egyptian intentions to go to war. Despite the lower

volume of early warning signals received in April and their weaker intensity,

no reassuring explanation was then forwarded. Contrary to the belittling of

the DMIs stance, the Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General David

Elazar and the Minister of Defence, Moshe Dayan, took the April reports and

the early warning signals much more seriously than they did in October, as

shown by the IDFs decision to take several steps to improve readiness and

increase preparedness.30

Proof of the paralyzing effect of the assuaging explanation appears in the

DMIs assessment about the frantic evacuation of Soviet advisers families

from Egypt and Syria. The Soviet airlift was first observed on the night

between 4 and 5 October. For the first time, intelligence analysts were

required to contend with a clear strategic early warning signal that appeared

totally divorced from the exercise. Also, for the first time, the Director of

Military Intelligence, Major General Eli Zeira, informed his superiors that he

had no logical explanation for the hasty Soviet move and even proposed the

idea (immediately withdrawn) that this evacuation indicated an impendingwar.31 Unfortunately for the Israelis the event, as an isolated piece of



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combination of fixed mindset and deceptive messages, both accepted as real.

Nevertheless, the DMIs treatment of this episode indicated a more

inquisitive trend in assessing warning signals lacking calming explanation,

even given cognitive dissonance. Had there not been an easy albeit

misleading answer readily available, the Soviet evacuation might havestimulated attempts to overcome the so-called concept in time, causing

decision-makers, though perhaps not intelligence analysts, to question its

validity (which they eventually did on 5 October, when the alarm signals

inexplicably multiplied).

C O N C L U S I O N

The Egyptian deceptions objectives did not require it to continue beyond

H-hour. Therefore, the deception completed its role with the opening

shots of the Baderoperation on the early afternoon of Saturday, 6 October

1973.

Were this deception to stand its main test, it would be that of the outcome.

The deception undoubtedly was among the fundamental generators of the

Israeli surprise (on the relative weight of these generators, a good deal of ink

has yet to be spilt). Although deception did not create the faulty concept

(unless, as said, the double agent theory is substantiated), it no doubt

reinforced it. The greatest benefit for Egypt of the deception was retardationof any cognitive transformation among Israeli decision-makers. In conse-

quence, the IDFs military response was delayed to a date that was, by itself,

irrelevant to Egypts war aims.

The Egyptians succeeded in achieving the deceptions three goals:

(1) reduction of Israels early warning space; (2) a delay in decision-making

by the Israeli leadership; (3) a delay of IDF operational responses in the field.

Although the available information is far from complete, it would not be too

far-fetched to conclude that had deception not been in force, it is highly

probable that decision-makers would have questioned the validity of theintelligence assessment at an earlier date. This conclusion would probably

hold even if DMI analysts had held fast to their basic assessment until the last

moment (as some in fact actually did). At that point they might have decided

that the possible risk was much too high not to react, as they indeed had

decided in AprilMay 1973. In reality, they did question the concepts

validity, but only hours before the sirens began wailing.

The Egyptian deception on the eve of the 1973 Yom Kippur War thus

provides an excellent example for planners of strategic deception operation,

because its success can be attributed to it being unpretentious, sober, realisticand synchronized with its environment. Whether intentionally or acciden-



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magnitude of their own weaknesses on the one hand, while intensifying

Israeli weaknesses on the other.

Even if the debate over who deserves a larger portion of the credit the

Egyptian deception planners or the Israeli followers of their own self-

deception remains unresolved, the methodological-doctrinal lesson to belearned remains the same: the rationale framing the Egyptian deception is a

highly appropriate model for the conduct of other strategic deceptions in the

future.

N O T E S

1 An earlier version of this article was published in Hebrew in: Haggai Golan and Shaul Shai(eds.), milhama ha-yom: hikrai milhemet yom ha-kipurim[War Today: Yom Kippur War

Studies] (Tel Aviv: Maarachot 2003) pp.15372.2 Most studies on the 1973 war are in Hebrew or Arabic only. Those which specifically

examine the Egyptian deception will be referred to individually in the relevant notes below.The most comprehensive and updated academic study on Israeli intelligence and the war isUri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise of Yom Kippur and Its Sources(New York: State University of New York Press 2005). Overview of the wars militaryaspects in English include: Zeev Schiff, October Earthquake: Yom Kippur 1973 (Tel Aviv:University Publications Project 1974); Chaim Herzog, The War of Atonement (London:Weidenfeld and Nicolson 1975); Trevor N. Dupuy, Elusive Victory: The ArabIsraeli Wars,19471974(New York: Harper & Row 1978); Hanoch Bartov,Dado. 48 Years and 20 Days(Tel Aviv: Maariv Books 1981); Donald Neff, Warriors Against Israel(Battleford: AmanaBooks 1988); John Hughes-Wilson,Military Intelligence Blunders(London: Robinson 1999);

P.R. Kumaraswamy (ed.), Revisiting the Yom Kippurim War (London: Frank Cass 2000);Kenneth Pollack,Arabs and War: Military Effectiveness, 19481991 (Lincoln: University of

Nebraska Press 2002); Howard Blum, The Eve of Destruction: The Untold Story of the YomKippur War (New York: HarperCollins 2003).

3 Eli Zeira, milhemet yom kippur: mitos mul metsiut [The October 73 War: Myth againstReality] (Tel Aviv: Yedioth Ahronot 1993) p.126 (in Hebrew). Zeira served as Director ofMilitary Intelligence, IDF between 1972 and 1974.

4 Bar-Joseph, The Watchman (note 2) p.31.5 The two main opponents in this debate are the late Egyptian President, Anwar Sadat and the

then Egyptian Chief of Staff, General al-Shazli. See Anwar Sadat, In Search of Identity: AnAutobiography (New York: Harper & Row 1977) and Saad el Shazli, The Crossing of the

Suez (San Francisco: American Mideast Research 1980).6 Main Egyptian sources on the deception, translated into English are: Hasan el-Badri et al.,The Ramadan War, 1973 (New York: Hippocrene Books 1978) pp.4552; Mohamed Heikal,The Road to Ramadan (Glasgow: Fontana 1976) pp.1415ff; Sadat, In Search of Identity(note 5) pp.2414; Shazli, Crossing of the Suez (note 5) pp.323, 20211; MohamedMohamed Abdel Ghani el-Gamasy,The October War: Memories of Field Marshal Gamasy of

Egypt (Cairo: American University of Cairo Press 1993) pp.192202.7 For example, see Zvi Lanir, ha-haftaa ha-besisit: modiin be-mashber [Fundamental

Surprise: The National Intelligence Crisis] (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad 1983) p.81(in Hebrew); Bar-Joseph, The Watchman (note 2) p.25.

8 Israeli Government, State Inquiry Commission, The Yom Kippur War, Additional PartialReport: Reasoning and Completion to the Partial Report of 1 April 1974 (Jerusalem: GPO

1974), Vol. I, pp.11423 (in Hebrew).9 Director of the IDF Archives, to the author, 15 April 2001. During the final proof-reading of

this article (September 2006), the IDF Archives announced that the Agranat Report has been



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10 On the agent, his contribution and possible identity: Ahron Bregman, A History of Israel(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000) pp.1428, 15052; Ronen Bregman and Gil Meltzer,

zeman emet: milhemet yom kippur [Moment of Truth: The Yom Kippur war] (Tel Aviv:Yedioth Ahronot 2003) pp.413ff. (in Hebrew); Zeira,milhemet yom kippur(note 3) pp.11925; Bar-Joseph, The Watchman (note 2) pp.56, 4951ff; Haaretz [Israeli daily], 17 and 24

January 2003, 29 and 30 September, 9 and 13 October 2004.11 Dani Asher, li-shebor et ha-konseptsiyah [Breaking the Concept] (Tel Aviv: Maarachot2003) p.69 (in Hebrew). The book examines the Egyptian perception of the 1973 war. Also:Yossef Katarivas, Tfisat ha-bitahon shel yisrael be-ene medinot arav [The Arab StatesPerception of the Israeli Security Doctrine] (in Hebrew), in Golan and Shai, milhamaha-yom (note 1) pp.949.

12 Sadat,In Search of Identity (note 5) p.244.13 Military term for an artificial barrier made from earth.14 For example: Egyptian War Office, Military Intelligence Directorate, Information

Branch, Periodical Intelligence Summary, No. 45: Israel (July 1973) pp.1819 (in Arabic).In authors possession.

15 For a discussion of the essence of early warning se: Efraim Kam, Surprise Attack: The

Victims Perspective (Cambridge: Harvard UP 1988) pp.784; with respect to the Israeliconcept of early warning see: Yigal Sheffy, Our First Line of Defense: Intelligence and theIsraeli National Security Perception, in Lars Christian Jenssen and Olav Riste (eds.),

Intelligence in the Cold War: Organisation, Role and International Cooperation (Oslo:Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies 2001) pp.87102.

16 Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision UnderRisk in Paul Moser (ed.) Rationality in Action: Contemporary Approaches (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press 1990) pp.14070; Jack levy, Prospect Theory and theCognitive-related Debate in Nehemia Geva and Alex Mintz (eds.) Decision Making onWar and Peace: the Cognitive-Rational Debate(Boulder: Westview 1997) pp.349; RichardHeuer,Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (Washington: Center for the Study of Intelligence,Central Intelligence Agency 1999) part 3.

17 Asher, li-shebor et ha-konseptsiyah (note 11) p.146.18 Sadat, In Search of Identity (note 5) p.244.19 The author has adopted the conceptual framework of fundamental surprise and

situational surprise proposed by Zvi Lanir with respect to the victims perspective. See:Lanir ha-haftaa ha-besisit(note 7) pp.4047.

20 On the theoretical characteristics of the two methods see: Donald Daniel and KatherineHerbig, Propositions on Military Deception, The Journal of Strategic Studies 5/1 (1982)

pp.1579.21 Egyptian deceptions methods and means are discussed in the following publications: Aharon

Zeevi, tochnit ha-honaah ha-mitsryyt [The Egyptian Deception Plan] in Zvi Ofer and AviKober (eds.) modiin u-bitachon leumi [Intelligence and National Security] (Tel Aviv:

Maarachot 1987) pp.4318; idem, hebetim mediniyim be-tochnit ha-mitsryyt le-honaahbe-milhemet yom ha-kipurim [Political Aspects of the Egyptian Deception Plan in theYom Kippur War], Maarachot338 (1994) pp.49; Shmuel Bar, milhemet yom ha-kipurimbe-ene ha-aravim [The Yom Kippur War in the Eyes of the Arabs] (Tel Aviv: Maarachot 1986)

pp.3842; Asher, li-shebor et ha-konseptsiyah(note 11) pp.14654 (all in Hebrew); MichaelHandel,Perception. Deception and Surprise: The Case of the Yom Kippur War(Jerusalem:Leonard Davies Institute, Hebrew University 1976); John Amos, Deception and the 1973Middle East War in Donald Daniel and Katherine Herbig (eds.) Strategic Military Deception(New York: Pergamon Press 1982) pp.31734; Janice Gross Stein, Military Deception,Strategic Surprise and Analysis of Egypt and Israel 19711973 in John Gooch and AmosPerlmutter,Military Deception and Strategic Surprise(London: Frank Cass 1982) pp.94121;Eliot Cohen and John Gooch,Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War(New York:

Vintage Books 1991) pp.95131; Bar-Joseph, The Watchman(note 2) pp.2530.22 Yoel Ben-Porat, neila [Locked-on] (Ramat Hashron: Idanim 1991) (in Hebrew). Brigadier

General (ret.) Ben-Porat was Unit 848s commander in the war. Quotation taken from the



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23 Shazli,Crossing of the Suez(note 5) p.211; Zeevi, tochnit ha-honaah ha-mitsryyt (note 20)pp.4345; Herzog,War of Atonement(note 2) p.39.

24 State Inquiry Commission,The Yom Kippur War(note 8) pp.6067.25 For example, Yisrael Tal, ha-hatraah ke-markiv be-tfisat ha-bitahon shel yisrael [Early

Warning as an Element in the Israeli Security Concept], Hamanit 12 (1987) pp.67

(in Hebrew). Major General Tal was Deputy Chief of the General Staff in the 1973 war.26 Yigal Sheffy, tfisat ha-hatraah shel yisrael, 19571973 [Israeli Early Warning Perception,19571973], work in progress (in Hebrew).

27 Quoted in Bar-Joseph,The Watchman (note 2) p.97 (emphasis added).28 Quoted in Arie Braun, Moshe Dayan be-milhemet yon ha-kipurim [Moshe Dayan and the

Yom Kippur War] (Tel Aviv: Edanim 1993) p.48 (in Hebrew).29 Private knowledge.30 Bartov, Dado. 48 Years and 20 Days (note 2) pp.198202.31 State Inquiry Commission,The Yom Kippur War(note 8) pp.7880.



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egyptian deception

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