eighteenth international maritime law arbitration … · 2020-06-18 · merchant shipping act...
TRANSCRIPT
EIGHTEENTH INTERNATIONAL MARITIME LAW ARBITRATION MOOT
2017
MEMORANDUM FOR THE CLAIMANT
\
THE UNIVERSITY OF AIRLANGGA
TEAM 18
FURNACE TRADING PTE LTD INFERNO RESOURCES SDN BHD
(Claimant) (Respondent)
V.
TEAM 18
ANGGRAENI KESUMA N. SAMPURNA
CRISTIAN
REGINE WIRANATA
SHOFY SUMA NISRINA
TAMARA MEILIANA SISWANTO
WALIDA AHSANA HAQUE
i
Table of Contents
ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................................................. iii
LIST OF AUTHORITIES ...................................................................................................... iv
STATEMENT OF FACTS .......................................................................................................1
I. THE TRIBUNAL HAS THE JURISDICTION TO ORDER THE SALE OF THE
CARGO ON BOARD THE TARDY TESSA PENDENTE LITE ...........................................3
A. THIS TRIBUNAL HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE PRESENT DISPUTE .................3
1. This Tribunal has jurisdiction over the Parties to the dispute ............................................3
2. This Tribunal has the jurisdiction to determine issues arising out of the Voyage
Charterparty ...........................................................................................................................3
3. This Tribunal has the jurisdiction to apply the International Arbitration Act (Cap
143A) ......................................................................................................................................4
B. THIS TRIBUNAL HAS JURISDICTION TO ORDER PENDENTE LITE SALE OF
THE CARGO ............................................................................................................................5
1. The Voyage Charterparty is incorporated into the Bill of Lading .......................................5
2. This tribunal has the authority to order pendente lite sale of the cargo. .............................6
II. CLAIMANT HAS A VALID AND ENFORCEABLE LIEN OVER THE CARGO
IN RESPECT OF FREIGHT, DETENTION, DAMAGES, AND ALL AMOUNTS DUE
UNDER THE CHARTERPARTY ...........................................................................................7
A. RESPONDENT HAS CONDUCTED A REPUDIATORY AS THE RESULT OF
BREACH OF VOYAGE CHARTERPARTY ........................................................................7
1. Respondent breached its obligation pertaining to the nomination of a discharging port ....7
2. Respondent has breached its obligation in paying freight, demurrage, and all other
expenses under the Charterparty ............................................................................................9
ii
3. Hence, Claimant’s termination of the Voyage Charterparty is appropriate ...................... 10
B. CLAIMANT HAS THE RIGHT TO ENFORCE LIEN OVER THE CARGO
AND ALL OTHER EXPENSES............................................................................................. 11
1. Claimant has the contractual right to lien ........................................................................ 11
2. Alternatively, Claimant may exercise lien over the cargo vis-a-vis Imlam ........................ 13
III. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE ARE SUCH THAT IT IS
NECESSARY AND JUST FOR THE TRIBUNAL TO ORDER THE SALE OF THE
CARGO ................................................................................................................................... 15
A. THE SALE ORDER OF THE CARGO PENDENTE LITE IS NECESSARY ............... 15
1. Sale of the cargo is necessary to preserve Claimant’s right to lien ................................... 15
2. Sale is necessary to alleviate the urgency of the situation ................................................. 16
3. There are no alternatives to the sale of the cargo ............................................................. 16
B. THE SALE ORDER OF THE CARGO PENDENTE LITE IS JUST ............................. 17
1. The balance of convenience favors the sale of the cargo .................................................. 17
2. The lack of an order to sell the cargo causes irreparable harm to Claimant .................... 18
REQUEST FOR RELIEF ....................................................................................................... 19
iii
ABBREVIATIONS
Voyage Charterer Inferno Resources Sdn Bhd
Time Charterer Furnace Trading PTE LTD
M/V Merchant Vessel
Master Tan Xiao Ming
SCMA Singapore Chamber of Maritime
Arbitration
SPSB Safe Port Safe Berth
Parties Claimant Respondent
Vessel M/V Tardy Tessa
Port Discharge port
IAA International Arbitration Act
Tribunal Present Arbitral Tribunal
iv
LIST OF AUTHORITIES
LEGISLATION
International Arbitration Act (Cap 143A) 2002 ............................................................. 4, 5, 6
Merchant Shipping Act (Chapter 179) 1996 ........................................................................ 17
Singapore Chamber of Maritime Arbitration Rules 2015 (SCMA Rules) ........................... 3, 4,
Merchant Shipping Act (Chapter 179) 1996 ............................................................... 7, 16, 17
CASES & ARBITRAL AWARDS
Akinlose v Ait [1961] WNLR 116 ........................................................................................ 18
Alfred Toepfer International GmbH v. Itex Itagrani Export SA
[1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 360 ................................................................................................ 10
American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd., [1975] A.C. 396 ............................................. 17, 18
Bayoil v. Seawind Tankers Corp.
(The Leonidas) [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 533 ........................................................................ 11
Bovis Lend Lease Pte Ltd v Jay-Tech Marine Projects Pte Ltd
and Another Application [2005] SGHC 91 ......................................................................... 3
Bunge Corporation v. Tradax Export SA [1981] 1 WLR 711 ................................................. 8
Castleton Commodities Shipping Co Pte Ltd v Silver Rock Investments
(The “Clipper Monarch”) [2015] EWHC 2584 .................................................... 12, 13, 14
Cayne v Global Natural Resources Plc [1984] AII ER 225 ................................................. 17
Cetelem SA v Roust Holdings Ltd [2005] EWCA Civ 618 ................................................... 15
Concordia Agritrading Pte Ltd v Cornelder Hoogewerft (Singapore) Pte Ltd
[1999] 3 SLR(R) 618 ......................................................................................................... 5
Elder Dempster v. Paterson, Zochonis [1924] A.C. 552 (H.L.) ............................................ 12
Five Ocean Corporation v Cingler Ship Pte Ltd (PT Commodities & Energy Resources,
intervener) [2015] SGHC 311 ................................................................ 5, 14,15, 16, 17, 18
Harrison v. Huddersfield Steamship [1903] 19 T.L.R. 386 .................................................. 12
Hongkong Fir Shipping v. Kawasaki Kisen Keisha [1961] EWCA Civ 7 .......................... 8, 10
v
Itex Itagrani Export SA v Care Shipping Corporation
and others (No 2) [1990] ................................................................................................... 5
J.Y.A. Lamaignere v. Selene Shipping Agencies, Ltd [1982] C. L. R. 227............................... 7
Jurong Engineering Ltd v Black & Veatch Singapore Pte Ltd [2003]
[2003] SGHC 292. P. 3 ...................................................................................................... 3
Kirchner v Venus [1859] 12 Moore 361, 390 ....................................................................... 14
L&M Concrete Specialist Pte Ltd v United Eng Contractors Pte Ltd
[2000] 2 SLR(R) 852 ......................................................................................................... 5
Lansing Linde Ltd v Kerr [1991] 1 WLR 251 ...................................................................... 17
Leeds Shipping Co v Societe Francaise Bunge
(The Eastern City) [1958] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 127 ..................................................................... 9
Maldives Airports Co Ltd and another v GMR Malé
International Airport Pte Ltd [2013] SGCA 16 ................................................................ 15
Miramar Maritime Corporation v. Holborn Oil Trading Ltd
(The Miramar) [1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 319 ........................................................................ 11
Motor Oil Hellas Refineries SA v Shipping Corp of India.
(The Kanchenjunga) [1990]............................................................................................... 9
Pagnan v. Tradax Ocean Transportation [1987] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 342 351 ............................. 11
Paradine v. Jane [1647] Aleyn 26; 82 ER 579, 897 ............................................................... 8
Samuel v. West Hartlepool Steam Navigation [1906] 11 Com Cas 115 ................................ 12
Santiren Shipping Ltd v. Unimarine S.A.
(The Chrysovalandou Dyo) [1981] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 159 ............................................... 11, 14
Seele Middle East FZE v. Drake & Scull International Co SA
[2014] EWHC 435 (TCC) ................................................................................................ 15
Spar Shipping AS v Grand China Logistic Holding
(Group) Co., Ltd [2015] EWCA CIV 982 ........................................................................ 10
Star-Trans Far East Pte Ltd v Norske-Tech Ltd [1996] 2 SLR(R) 196 ................................... 5
Stocznia Gdanska SA v. Latvian Shipping Co. [2002] EWCA Civ 889 [2002] 2 All ER
[Comm] 768, [2003] 1 CLC 282 (CA) ............................................................................. 10
Telenor East Holding H AS v. Altimo Hodling & Investment Ltd [2014]
EWHC B5 (Comm) ......................................................................................................... 15
The “Dwima 1” [1996] 2 SLR 670; [1996] SGHC 83 ......................................................... 14
vi
The “Rewia” [1991] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 325 (C.A.) ................................................................... 12
The “Star Quest” and others [2016] SGHC 100 .................................................................... 5
The Ardennes [1950] 84 LI. L. Rep. 304; [1951] 1 K.B. 55 (CA.) ....................................... 13
The Evia No. 2 [1982] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 334............................................................................. 8
The Fort Kip [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 168 .............................................................................. 10
The Jocelyne [1977] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 121 ............................................................................... 6
The San Nicholas [1976] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 8 ............................................................................. 5
The SLS Everest [1981] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 389 ........................................................................... 5
Unitramp v. Garnac Grain Co. Inc
(The Hermine) [1979] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 212 .......................................................................... 5
Vitol SA v. Norell Ltd (The Santa Clara) [1996]OB 108 ...................................................... 10
Wegener v Smith [1854] 15 CB 285, 139 ER 432 .................................................................. 5
Welex AG v Rosa Maritime Ltd [2003] EWCA Civ 26........................................................... 5
Woodar Investment Development Ltd v. Wimpey Construction
(UK) Ltd [1980] 1 WLR 277 ............................................................................................ 10
OTHER SOURCES
Cooke, J, Young, T, Taylor, A, Kimball, JD, Martowski, D and Lambert, L, Voyage Charters,
3rd edn, LLP (2007) .......................................................................................................... 8
F Wilson, John. Carriage of Goods By Sea. 7th ed., Pearson Education Ltd., 2010 ........... 7, 9
Jones, Leonard. A., “A Treatise on the Law of Liens, Common Law, Statutory, Equitable and
Maritime” (New Jersey, The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd:2005) ........................................... 12
Julian Cooke, Tim Young, Michael Ashcroft, Andrew Taylor, John Kimball, Voyage Charters,
CRC Press. ................................................................................................................ 13, 14
Moser & Choong (eds) Asia Arbitration Handbook [1975] ................................................. 18
Richard Aikens, Richard Lord & Michael Bools, Bills of Lading,
(Oxon: Informa Law, 2016) ............................................................................................. 14
Voyage Charterparty. ........................................................................................................ 7, 8
1
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. The vessel M/V Tardy Tessa was chartered by Furnace Trading Pte Ltd (CLAIMANT) on a
Time Charterparty from Imlam Consignorist GmbH. Under the time charter, the vessel was to
be employed within safe ports and safe places within Asia and Australia.
2. Subsequently, CLAIMANT chartered the vessel on a voyage charter to Inferno Resources
Pte Ltd (RESPONDENT) for a shipment of Australian Anthracite. A Voyage Charterparty
was received by CLAIMANT on September 1, 2016 from RESPONDENT. Under the
Charterparty, freight was to be paid 5 days after the beginning of the voyage, and the
discharge port was to be a safe port and safe berth in China, to be declared by
RESPONDENT when the vessel passed Singapore for bunkering.
3. In turn, RESPONDENT sub-let the vessel to Idoncare Berjaya Utama Pty Ltd, owners of the
shipped cargo. Pursuant to the Voyage Charterparty, a Bill of Lading was issued, naming
Idoncare as shipper and signed by the Master of the vessel. The vessel began its voyage on
December 4, 2016.
4. On October 10, 2016, the vessel arrived in Singapore for bunkering. RESPONDENT had
yet to pay freight, which had been due on October 9, nor had it declared a discharging port.
CLAIMANT notified RESPONDENT on the arrival of the vessel and the due freight.
5. The vessel finished loading on October 11, 2016, and drifted outside Singapore off-port
limits. CLAIMANT requested RESPONDENT to declare the discharging port and remit
freight, however RESPONDENT replied that they were unable to do either.
2
6. On October 16, 2016, RESPONDENT nominated Busan, South Korea as a discharge port.
CLAIMANT refused as it was outside of the permitted range under the Voyage Charterparty
and Time Charterparty, and was not a safe port due to the arrival of zombies onboard a train.
7. Due to RESPONDENT’s persistent failure to perform their obligations, CLAIMANT
declared that should RESPONDENT not perform them by October 20, 2016, CLAIMANT
reserved their right to terminate the Voyage Charterparty and claim all losses incurred.
8. RESPONDENT had neither nominated a discharge port nor remitted freight by October 20,
2016. CLAIMANT sent a notice of lien to RESPONDENT and Idoncare via All’s Good over
the cargo on board the vessel. In addition, CLAIMANT requested the Imlam’s assistance in
exercising lien over the cargo, to which Imlam agreed.
9. On October 21, 2016, RESPONDENT nominated the discharge port of Ningbo, China, and
promised to remit freight after discharge of the cargo. As RESPONDENT refused to perform
any of Charterparty obligations, on October 22, 2016, CLAIMANT terminated the Voyage
Charterparty.
10. CLAIMANT sent a notice of arbitration to RESPONDENT and Idoncare on November 25,
2016. In response, both RESPONDENT and Idoncare consented to it being dealt with by an
arbitration under the Singapore Chamber of Maritime Arbitration.
11. On November 30, 2016, Imlam notified CLAIMANT of a report by the Master on the
gravity of the situation on board the vessel. In response, CLAIMANT created an urgent
application for consolidation and liberty to sell the cargo, on December 1, 2016. Both
RESPONDENT and Idoncare agreed to the consolidation, and Idoncare declined to make
submissions at the oral hearing.
3
ARGUMENT ON JURISDICTION
I. THE TRIBUNAL HAS THE JURISDICTION TO ORDER THE SALE OF THE
CARGO ON BOARD THE TARDY TESSA PENDENTE LITE
A. THIS TRIBUNAL HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE PRESENT DISPUTE
1. This Tribunal has jurisdiction over the Parties to the dispute
1. Parties to a dispute have the autonomy to choose the arbitration regime to govern their
dispute resolution.1 In the present dispute, the Parties have agreed to resolve their disputes
under the SCMA, pursuant to Clause 29 of the Voyage Charterparty.2 Pursuant to the urgent
application created by Claimant, the Parties have agreed to consolidate the arbitration
proceedings between Claimant and Respondent, and Claimant and Idoncare, into a single
arbitration proceeding.3 Under Rule 33.2 of the SCMA Rules which governs this Tribunal,
other parties may be added with their consent to an arbitration.4 Therefore, this tribunal has
the jurisdiction to determine and solve the parties’ dispute.
2. This Tribunal has the jurisdiction to determine issues arising out of the
Voyage Charterparty
2. This Tribunal has the jurisdiction to determine all disputes arising under or in connection
with the transaction or the subject of reference, pursuant to Rule 20 of the SCMA Rules. In
the present case, the subject of reference under which Claimant and Respondent have agreed
1 Jurong Engineering Ltd v Black & Veatch Singapore Pte Ltd [2003] SGHC 292; Bovis Lend Lease Pte Ltd v
Jay-Tech Marine Projects Pte Ltd and Another Application [2005] SGHC 91 2 Moot Scenario (9 December 2016) at 26, Clause 29 3 Moot Scenario (9 December 2016) at 90, 93, 95 4 Singapore Chamber of Maritime Arbitration Rules 2015 (SCMA Rules); Rule 33.2
4
to arbitrate is the Voyage Charterparty.5 In consequence, this Tribunal’s jurisdiction extends
to issues arising out of, or in connection with, the Voyage Charterparty.
3. This Tribunal has the jurisdiction to apply the International Arbitration Act
(Cap 143A)
3. Pursuant to Article 16 (1) of the UNCITRAL Model Law, the "Kompetenz-Kompetenz”
principle grants this tribunal with the competence to decide on their own jurisdiction of this
matter. Based on Rule 21 of the SCMA Rules, this Tribunal has decided to apply the law
designated by the parties as applicable to the substance of the dispute.6 Clause 29. Law and
Dispute Resolution designates that Claimant and Respondent have agreed to arbitrate under
Singapore law.7 As such, Rule 2 of the SCMA Rules gives a force of law to the International
Arbitration Act (Cap 143A),8 which applies to international arbitrations.
9 The present dispute
constitutes an international arbitration as two Parties, Respondent and Idoncare, have their
places of business outside of Singapore, in Malaysia and Australia respectively.10
5 Moot Scenario (9 December 2016) at 76-82, 86-88 6 SCMA Rules; Rule 21 7 Moot Scenario (9 December 2016) at 23 8 SCMA Rules; Rule 2 9 International Arbitration Act (Cap 143A) 2002 (“International Arbitration Act”); Sect 5(2) 10 Moot Scenario (9 December 2016) at 71, 77
5
B. THIS TRIBUNAL HAS JURISDICTION TO ORDER PENDENTE LITE SALE OF
THE CARGO
1. The Voyage Charterparty is incorporated into the Bill of Lading
4. Clauses within a charterparty can be incorporated into a bill of lading,11
if it is applied in
specific and adequately clear terms.12
The Bill of Lading contains the special instruction of
“freight payable as per charterparty”, and the Conditions of Carriage states “all terms and
conditions, liberties and exceptions of the Charter Party, dated as overleaf, including the
Law and Arbitration Clause/Dispute Resolution Clause, are herewith incorporated.”
Although no charter party has been identified, it does not negate the incorporation of the
Voyage Charterparty.13
5. First, the word “freight” in Bill of Lading indicates that it refers to a voyage charter party.14
Second, whereby there is an absence of identification, reference is considered to be made
towards any charter under which the goods are being carried.15
In the present dispute, the
Voyage Charterparty is the only substantive charter containing carriage of the goods. Finally,
extrinsic evidence is admissible to prove the charter party in question,16
and demonstrates
support that the Voyage Charterparty is incorporated. Pursuant to Clause 26. BILL OF
LADING, the Master may sign and issue non-liner bills of lading on behalf of Claimant. The
Bill of Lading in question fulfills the provisions of the Voyage Charterparty, as it is signed by
the Master and is not a liner bill of lading.
11 International Arbitration Act; Art 2A(8), Wegener v Smith (1854) 15 CB 285, 139 ER 432 12 Star-Trans Far East Pte Ltd v Norske-Tech Ltd [1996] 2 SLR(R) 196; Concordia Agritrading Pte Ltd v
Cornelder Hoogewerft (Singapore) Pte Ltd [1999] 3 SLR(R) 618; L&M Concrete Specialist Pte Ltd v United
Eng Contractors Pte Ltd [2000] 2 SLR(R) 852 13 The San Nicholas [1976] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 8; The SLS Everest [1981] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 389 14 Five Ocean Corporation v Cingler Ship Pte Ltd [2015] SGHC 311; Itex Itagrani Export SA v Care Shipping
Corporation and others (No 2) [1990] 15 The “Star Quest” [2016] SGHC 100 16 Welex AG v Rosa Maritime Ltd [2003] EWCA Civ 26
6
2. This tribunal has the authority to order pendente lite sale of the cargo.
6. Section 12 (1) of International Arbitration Act grants the Tribunal the power to make order
sale of any property which forms part of the subject-matter of the dispute17
. Whereby a bill of
lading is issued under a charter party, it is governed by the terms of the latter.18
As such, the
Bill of Lading, having incorporated, inter alia, Clause. 29. LAW AND DISPUTE
RESOLUTION,19
is included into the present dispute. Hence, the cargo constitutes part of the
subject-matter of the dispute, and this Tribunal is empowered to order pendente lite sale
thereof.
17 International Arbitration Act; Sect 12(1) 18 The Jocelyne [1977] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 121 19 Moot Scenario (9 December 2016) at 23
7
ARGUMENT ON MERITS
II. CLAIMANT HAS A VALID AND ENFORCEABLE LIEN OVER THE
CARGO IN RESPECT OF FREIGHT, DETENTION, DAMAGES, AND ALL
AMOUNTS DUE UNDER THE CHARTERPARTY
A. RESPONDENT HAS CONDUCTED A REPUDIATORY BREACH OF THE
VOYAGE CHARTERPARTY
1. Respondent breached its obligation pertaining to the nomination of a discharging
port
7. Whereby a voyage charter provides a range of discharge ports, a charterer has no right to
nominate a discharge port outside of the agreed range.20
In the present dispute, Clause 16.
DISCHARGE PORT in the Voyage Charterparty provides that Respondent must declare one
safe port, safe berth in China.21
On the contrary, Respondent had failed to perform its
obligation, and is personally liable for such a failure.22
a. Respondent’s failure to nominate a legitimate discharge port is a fundamental breach
8. In a Voyage Charterparty, there is implied undertaking where the vessel will proceed on the
voyage, load and discharge at the time agreed or within a reasonable period of time.23
Under
Clause 16. DISCHARGE PORT, Respondent is obliged to nominate a discharge port after the
20 Shipping Law 21 Voyage Charterparty, Clause 16 22 J.Y.A. Lamaignere v. Selene Shipping Agencies, Ltd (1982) C.L.R. 227. 23 F Wilson, John. Carriage of Goods By Sea. 7th ed., Pearson Education Ltd., 2010, page. 15
8
vessel passed Singapore for bunkering.24
However, until the vessel had drifted past
Singapore, Respondent had not nominated a discharge port to Claimant.25
9. A delay in the nomination of a port constitutes a breach of the promise contained in a
contract.26
Whether such a breach constitutes a fundamental breach depends on the nature of
the term, be it a condition, warranty, or innominate term.27
When a term is not expressly
categorized as a condition, and a breach of which may have trivial, minor, or grave
consequences, it constitutes an innominate term,28
a breach of which is fundamental when it
has grave factual consequences.29
As such, the timely nomination of a discharge port under
Clause 16. DISCHARGE PORT falls within the category of an innominate term. In the
present case, Respondent’s failure to nominate a legitimate discharge port has caused severe
distress to the vessel and its crew, due to inadequate supplies to accommodate the delay, and
the unstable condition of the cargo.30
Hence, Claimant is entitled to treat the breach as
repudiatory.
b. Respondent’s discharge port nomination of Busan is not justified
10. An agreement on the range of ports from which a discharge port is to be nominated creates an
assumption that the parties have agreed to the safety of such ports.31
As such, any nomination
outside of the agreed range is illegitimate.32
On the other hand, Respondent had insisted on
24 Voyage Charter Party, Clause 16
25 Moot Scenario (9 December 2016) at 51
26 Unitramp v. Garnac Grain Co. Inc (The Hermine) [1979] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 212; The Evia (No. 2) [1982] 1
Lloyd’s Rep 334
27 Hongkong Fir Shipping v. Kawasaki Kisen Keisha [1961]
28 Bunge Corporation v. Tradax Export SA [1981] 1 WLR 711
29 Hongkong Fir Shipping v. Kawasaki Kisen Keisha [1961] EWCA Civ 7 30 Moot Scenario (9 December 2016) at 34,37. 31 Cooke, J, Young, T, Taylor, A, Kimball, JD, Martowski, D and Lambert, L, Voyage Charters, 4th ed
(London: Informa Law, 2014) 32 Paradine v. Jane (1647) Aleyn 26; 82 ER 579, 897.
9
discharge at Busan, which was outside of the agreed range in the Voyage Charterparty and
Time Charterparty.33
As such, its nomination is not a valid one.
11. Furthermore, the port is inherently unsafe. A port will not be safe unless, in the relevant
period of time, the particular ship can reach it, use it, and return from it without, in the
absence of some abnormal occurrence, being exposed to danger which cannot be avoided by
good navigation and seamanship.34
On the contrary, there are zombies arriving from Seoul
onboard a train, and there is insufficient time to make necessary arrangement for vessel to
safely call at Busan.35
This condition refer to an abnormal risk or occurrences, and not within
the scope of the safe port.36
Whereby the nominated port is unsafe, a shipowner has the right
to consider whether to accept such a nomination, and subsequently reject it.37
Should
Claimant agree to sail to Busan, which is an unsafe port, it would be liable to novus actus
interveniens, and would be unable to recover damages subsequently suffered by the vessel.38
As such, its refusal to discharge the cargo at Busan is appropriate.
2. Respondent has breached its obligation in paying freight, demurrage, and all other
expenses under the Charterparty
12. Respondent has failed to remit freight, which had become due on October 9, 2016,39
in spite
of repeated notices by Claimant, as well as an extension of time.40
Additionally, Respondent
requested for payment to be made after the discharge of the cargo,41
contradicting the
provision under Clause 19. FREIGHT that in any case, payment must be done before
33 Moot Scenario (9 December 2016), at 57-58, 60 34 Leeds Shipping Co v Societe Francaise Bunge (The Eastern City) [1958] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 127 at p.131. 35 Moot Scenario (9 December 2016), at 58. 36 Leeds Shipping Co v Societe Francaise Bunge (The Eastern City) [1958] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 127; 37 Motor Oil Hellas Refineries SA v Shipping Corp of India. The Kanchenjunga [1990] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 391. 38 F Wilson, John. Carriage of Goods By Sea. 7th ed., (Harlow, Pearson Education Ltd: 2010) p. 28. 39 Moot Scenario (9 December 2016) at 51-68. 40 Moot Scenario (9 December 2016), at 51,54, 56, 62, 64. 41 Moot Scenario (9 December 2016), at 67
10
breaking bulk.42
The obligation to make a timely payment of freight is an innominate term,43
and gives rise to a shipowner’s right to terminate the contract if it is denied the benefit of the
contract.44
The benefit of the contract, in the present case, is the freight earned Claimant prior
to the discharge of the cargo, which would allow it to retain a lien on the cargo aboard the
ship. Should freight be payable after discharge, Claimant as an owner would be forced to
exercise it off-ship through intercepting the cargo before it is delivered, and seek alternative
storage facilities.45
3. Hence, Claimant’s termination of the Voyage Charterparty is appropriate
13. Repudiation is considered to occur whereby a party’s conduct indicates an intention to
abandon and refuse performance of the contract,46
in that they renounce or are incapacitated
to perform their obligations.47
Where an innocent party elects to treat a breach as repudiatory,
it can be effective if communicated to the other party.48
In the present case, Claimant had sent
an ultimatum to Respondent stating that in the event that they did not perform their
obligations to remit freight or nominate a discharge port by October 20, 2016, it would treat
Respondent as having conducted a repudiatory breach of the Voyage Charterparty.49
14. On the contrary, Respondent failed to demonstrate its willingness to perform the contract by
the set date, and did not contact Claimant in any manner.50
Such a silence could be inferred to
mean a continuing refusal to perform the obligations under a contract,51
hence allowing
Claimant to treat the breach as repudiatory. Furthermore, when Respondent did communicate
42 Moot Scenario (9 December 2016) at 22 43 Spar Shipping AS v Grand China Logistic Holding (Group) Co., Ltd [2015] EWHC 718 (Comm) 44 Hongkong Fir Shipping v. Kawasaki Kisen Keisha [1961] EWCA Civ 7 45 The Fort Kip [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 168 46 Woodar Investment Development Ltd v. Wimpey Construction (UK) Ltd [1980] 1 WLR 277 47 Alfred Toepfer International GmbH v. Itex Itagrani Export SA [1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 360 48 Vitol SA v. Norell Ltd (The Santa Clara) [1996] QB 108. 49 Moot Scenario (9 December 2016) at 56, 84. 50 Moot Scenario (9 December 2016), at 52-55. 51 Stocznia Gdanska SA v. Latvian Shipping Co. [2002] EWCA Civ 889, [2002] 2 All ER [Comm] 768, [2003] 1
CLC 282 (CA).
11
with Claimant after the set date, it refused to perform its obligation to pay freight.52
Hence,
Claimant had the right to terminate the Voyage Charterparty.
B. CLAIMANT HAS THE RIGHT TO ENFORCE LIEN OVER THE CARGO
1. Claimant has the contractual right to lien
a. Claimant has a right to lien under the charterparty
15. Within a voyage charter party, an owner has the right to exercise lien over cargo belonging to
a third party, provided that such a right is incorporated into the bill of lading.53
The Voyage
Charterparty in the present case is a modification of the Standard Coal-Orevoy form, attached
in the e-mail containing the Voyage Charterparty.54
Whereby parties contract upon a standard
form of charter, effect must be given to its provisions, and the terms of the standard form are
only undermined by inconsistencies between the negotiated clauses between the parties.55
Clause 19. Lien of the Standard Coal-Orevoy grants Claimant as owners a lien on the cargo
for freight, deadfreight, demurrage, and general average contribution due to them under the
charterparty.56
Such a term was incorporated into the Bill of Lading, through the statement of
“all terms and conditions … of the Charter Party … are herewith incorporated”. No
provision within the Voyage Charterparty contradicts the lien clause, and if any, Clause 19.
FREIGHT is consistent with the right to lien as freight must be paid before breaking bulk.57
52 Moot Scenario (9 December 2016) at 56-63. 53 Miramar Maritime Corporation v. Holborn Oil Trading Ltd (The Miramar); Santiren Shipping Ltd v.
Unimarine S.A. (The Chrysovalandou Dyo) [1981] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 159. 54 Moot Scenario (9 December 2016) at 20-23. 55 Pagnan v. Tradax Ocean Transportation [1987] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 342, 351; Bayoil v. Seawind Tankers Corp.
(The Leonidas) [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 533. 56 Moot Scenario (9 December 2016) at 31. 57 Moot Scenario (9 December 2016) at 22.
12
b. Claimant has the right to a carrier’s lien under the Bill of Lading
16. Under a bill of lading, a time charterer who has taken the role of carrier has the right to
freight.58
Such a right grants it with the right to a carrier’s lien.59
In the present case, Claimant
fulfills the elements necessary to be a carrier under the Bill of Lading.
17. First, the Bill of Lading must be made with Claimant alone, and not Imlam.60
The vessel is
under a time charter by Claimant, and Clause 1. Duration/Description of the Time
Charterparty states that Claimant has the right to sublet the vessel.61
Further, the vessel has
yet to be delivered to Imlam,62
and as such remains under the employment of Claimant.
18. Second, the Master must have the authority to sign, and signed on behalf of Claimant.63
Clause 26. BILLS OF LADING of the Voyage Charterparty stipulates that Claimant has
given the Master the authority to sign and issue Bills of Lading on behalf of Claimant.64
19. Third, the wording of the bill of lading and surrounding circumstances must state that the
Master, in signing, acts as agent of Claimant.65
The Bill of Lading incorporates the terms of
the Voyage Charterparty,66
Clause 26 of which stipulates no liner bills of lading are to be
issued by the Master.67
Further, the Notice of Readiness signed by the Master states that it is
issued in accordance with the Charterparty.68
58 Castleton Commodities Shipping Co Pte Ltd v Silver Rock Investments [2015] EWHC 2584 (Comm) 59 Jones, Leonard A., A Treatise on the Law of Liens, Common Law, Statutory, Equitable and Maritime (New
Jersey, The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd: 2005) 60 The “Rewia” [1991] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 325. 61 Moot Scenario (9 December 2016) at 1. 62 Moot Scenario (9 December 2016) 63 The “Rewia” [1991] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 325. 64 Moot Scenario (9 December 2016) at 22. 65 Harrison v. Huddersfield Steamship [1903] 19 T.L.R. 386; Samuel v. West Hartlepool Steam Navigation [1906] 11 Com Cas 115; Elder Dempster v. Paterson, Zochonis [1924] A.C. 552 (H.L.). 66 Moot Scenario (9 December 2016) at 42, 44, 46. 67 Moot Scenario (9 December 2016), at 22. 68 Moot Scenario (9 December 2016), at 39.
13
c. Claimant may direct the Master to exercise lien over the cargo
20. An employment clause under a time charter party grants a time charterer the right to direct
the Master of the vessel to exercise a lien over the cargo in his possession.69
The Master in
effect acts as the trustee of the time charterer.70
In the present case, Clause 8. Performance of
Voyages stipulates that the Master shall be under the orders and direction of Claimant as
regards employment and agency.71
Consequently, Claimant has the right to direct the Master
to exercise lien over the cargo pursuant to its contractual right thereof.
2. Alternatively, Claimant may exercise lien over the cargo vis-a-vis Imlam
a. Claimant’s right to freight is incorporated into the Bill of Lading
21. Clause 19. FREIGHT of the Voyage Charterparty provides that freight must be paid to
Claimant 5 days after the completion of loading and signing/release of bills of lading.72
Due
to Respondent having not remitted freight after Claimant has become entitled to it,73
Claimant’s right to freight remains. Such a right was incorporated into the Bill of Lading via
the term “freight payable as per charterparty”, which creates an obligation to pay freight in
accordance with the terms of the Voyage Charterparty.
b. Imlam may exercise lien on the cargo for sums due to it
22. Bill of lading is not a contract, but only the best evidence of a contract.74
Under the term
“freight payable as per charterparty”, a shipowner has the legal right to receive freight due
to it under the bill of lading, in accordance with the terms of the charter party, whoever may
69 Castleton Commodities Shipping Co Pte Ltd v Silver Rock Investments [2015] EWHC 2584 (Comm) at [58-
85]. 70 Julian Cooke, Tim Young, Michael Ashcroft, Andrew Taylor, John Kimball, Voyage Charters, CRC Press. 71 Moot Scenario (9 December 2016) at 3. 72 Moot Scenario (9 December 2016), at 22. 73 Moot Scenario (9 December 2016), at 64. 74 The Ardennes (1950) 84 LI. L. Rep. 304 at p. 344; [1951] 1 K.B. 55 at p. 59 (CA.)
14
have an equitable right to the freight vis-a-vis it.75
As such, the freight due under the Voyage
Charterparty may be demanded by Imlam from Idoncare as a shipper.
23. However, as Idoncare has failed to pay such freight, Imlam is entitled as a shipowner to
exercise common law lien over the cargo. A right to lien at common law, which is recognized
by Singaporean law,76
arises independently by implications of law for freight due under a
carriage.77
Such right is a self-help remedy enacted in defense to a recovery action of the
goods by a person who would otherwise be entitled to immediate possession.78
In the event
that this tribunal holds that claimant as time charterer is not the right carrier,79
Imlam’s right
to exercise lien as shipowner remains.80
c. Consequently, Claimant may exercise lien on the cargo as an equitable asignee
24. Claimant as the time charterers can secure a lien in favour of shipowner81
from Idoncare as
the cargo owner.82
A time charterer may exercise lien on cargo on board the vessel as an
equitable assignee, where the head owners have agreed to grant it such a right.83
Claimant’s
action in exercising the lien over the cargo for sub-freight due to it has been done with the
consent of Imlam, as Claimant has paid hire in a timely manner as requested by Imlam.84
75 Julian Cooke et al., Voyage Charters (London: Informa Law, 1993) 76 Five Ocean Corporation v Cingler Ship Pte Ltd [2015] SGHC 311, at 44.
77 Kirchner v Venus [1859] 12 Moore 361, 390.
78 The “Dwima 1” [1996] 2 SLR 670; [1996] SGHC 83.
79 Moot Scenario (9 December 2016) at 10, Clause 26.
80 Richard Aikens, Richard Lord & Michael Bools, Bills of Lading, (Oxon: Informa Law, 2016).
81 Castleton Commodities Shipping Company Pte Limited v. Silver Rock Investment, The Clipper Monarch
[2015] EWHC 2584 (Comm); [2016] 1 Lloyds’ Law Rep 1. 82 Santiren Shipping Ltd v Unimarine SA (The Chrysovalandou Dyo) [1981] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 161 at 28.51. 83 Five Ocean Corporation v Cingler Ship Pte Ltd (PT Commodities & Energy Resources, intervener) [2015]
SGHC 311, at 61 84 Moot Scenario (9 December 2016) at 36.
15
III. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE ARE SUCH THAT IT IS
NECESSARY AND JUST FOR THE TRIBUNAL TO ORDER THE SALE OF THE
CARGO
A. THE SALE ORDER OF THE CARGO PENDENTE LITE IS NECESSARY
1. Sale of the cargo is necessary to preserve Claimant’s right to lien
25. A tribunal’s order of sale of a cargo forming the subject-matter of a dispute may be justified
as a legal action through the presence of the urgency of the order,85
as well as the necessity
thereof.86
The definition of “necessary” within the International Arbitration Act imports the
notion that without the order from the Tribunal to order a sale of the cargo in question, the
evidence or asset which is sought to be preserved would be lost.87
In other words, there are no
other alternatives available to preserve the assets.88
Such an asset could take the form of
Claimant’s right to exercise lien over the cargo.89
26. Sale may be held necessary when the liened cargo is perishable in nature,90
and there is a
non-negligible risk that the value of the cargo would be diminished over time due to its
condition.91
Furthermore, whereby there is a risk that the value of the cargo would be
superseded by the costs and expenses, sale is necessary so as to not render the lien
ineffective.92
In the present case, the coal which constitutes the cargo is overheating and risks
85 Telenor East Holding H AS v. Altimo Hodling & Investment Ltd [2014] EWHC B5 (Comm). 86 Seele Middle East FZE v. Drake & Scull International Co SA [2014] EWHC 435 (TCC) 87 Maldives Airports Co Ltd and another v GMR Malé International Airport Pte Ltd [2013] SGCA 16 88 Five Ocean Corporation v Cingler Ship Pte Ltd (PT Commodities & Energy Resources, intervener) [2015]
SGHC 311, p.61 89 Five Ocean Corporation v Cingler Ship Pte Ltd (PT Commodities & Energy Resources, intervener) [2015]
SGHC 311, p.61 90 I Five Ocean Corporation v Cingler Ship Pte Ltd (PT Commodities & Energy Resources, intervener) [2015]
SGHC 311, p.61; Cetelem SA v Roust Holdings Ltd [2005] EWCA Civ 618 91 Five Ocean Corporation v Cingler Ship Pte Ltd (PT Commodities & Energy Resources, intervener) [2015]
SGHC 311, at 62 92 Five Ocean Corporation v Cingler Ship Pte Ltd (PT Commodities & Energy Resources, intervener) [2015]
SGHC 311, at 62
16
self-ignition.93
Furthermore, there is a risk that the costs and expenses which are mounting in
the maintenance of the cargo onboard the vessel, may eventually exceed its value.94
2. Sale is necessary to alleviate the urgency of the situation
27. Considerations of the condition of the vessel and her crew, the cargo, and the surrounding
circumstances must be taken into account in considering necessity.95
In the present case, such
conditions must be taken from the Master’s judgment, as his voice carries much weight.96
First, the vessel has been kept adrift in open seas since October 11, 2016.97
Second, supplies
onboard the vessel are running dangerously low. Third, the cargo shows signs of overheating
and has the potential to self-ignite and explode. And finally, the monsoon season exacerbates
the already dire situation. As stated by the Master, consequently, an urgent measure needs to
be taken immediately.98
3. There are no alternatives to the sale of the cargo
28. Necessity further stipulates that the cargo in question cannot be preserved by the means of its
discharge.99
In the present case, although Claimant can indeed discharge the cargo in
Singapore, where the vessel is floating off-port limits,100
such a measure is ineffective to
preserve Claimant’s right to the value of the cargo. Singaporean law requires that liened
cargo must be discharged to the custody of a wharfinger or warehouseman.101
Such a cargo
could be discharged only through the deposit of a receipt or a sum of money in the value of
93 Moot Scenario (9 December 2016) at 37. 94 Moot Scenario (9 December 2016, at 65. 95 Moot Scenario (9 December 2016, at 56, 57, 58. 96 Five Ocean Corporation v Cingler Ship Pte Ltd (PT Commodities & Energy Resources, intervener) [2015]
SGHC 311,p.58 97 Moot Scenario (9 December 2016) at 34, 37, 61-63. 98 Moot Scenario (9 December 2016, at 37-38, 62. 99 Five Ocean Corporation v Cingler Ship Pte Ltd (PT Commodities & Energy Resources, intervener) [2015]
SGHC 31 100 Moot Scenario (9 December 2016) at 97. 101 Merchant Shipping Act (Chapter 179) 1996; Art. 127
17
the cargo,102
otherwise it would be subject to sale at the expiration of 90 days.103
The
proceeds of such a sale must be applied to various parties, including for the rent, rates, and
other charges due to the wharfinger or warehouseman.104
As such, there is a threat that
Claimant would earn less than the value due to it from Respondent.
B. THE SALE ORDER OF THE CARGO PENDENTE LITE IS JUST
1. The balance of convenience favors the sale of the cargo
29. The main question in granting interim measure is the balance of doing injustice;105
or the
balance of convenience.106
The assessment of balance of convenience is that the tribunal has
to seek whether it does less harm to grant an order which subsequently turns out to be
unjustified,107
or to refuse one if it subsequently turns out that it should have been granted.108
Should this Tribunal not grant Claimant a right to sell the cargo, Claimant would be harmed
more substantially than Respondent would if an order of sale were to be granted. Should
Claimant be forced to lien the cargo off the ship, as argued supra, there is a threat that the
value received by Claimant in the event that this Tribunal grants an award in favor of
Claimant’s lien will have been diminished. Meanwhile, in the event that this Tribunal
eventually grants an award in favor of Respondent, Idoncare would all the same be entitled to
the proceeds of the sale made by Claimant.109
102 Merchant Shipping Act (Chapter 179) 1996; Art. 128 103 Merchant Shipping Act (Chapter 179) 1996; Art. 130 104 Merchant Shipping Act (Chapter 179) 1996; Art. 131(1); 132 105 Cayne v Global Natural Resources Plc [1984] 1 AII ER 225. 106 American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd., [1975] A.C. 396 107 American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd., [1975] A.C. 396 108 Lansing Linde Ltd v Kerr [1991] 1 WLR 251 109 Five Ocean Corporation v Cingler Ship Pte Ltd (PT Commodities & Energy Resources, intervener) [2015]
SGHC 31
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2. The lack of an order to sell the cargo causes irreparable harm to Claimant
30. Irreparable damage must be utilized in considering where the balance of convenience lies.110
Such a damage exists whereby if a relief is not granted, the applicant’s legal rights would be
violated in a manner that would be incapable of being compensated.111
A lack of
compensation could be inferred from the actions of the charterer and shipper, in their inability
or unwillingness to obtain the cargo through a payment of the sums due.112
In the present
case, neither Respondent nor Idoncare have demonstrated any steps towards releasing the
cargo,113
and there is no guarantee that they are able to compensate Claimant in the event that
this Tribunal grants an award in favor of Claimant. Meanwhile, as argued supra, the value of
the cargo continues to steadily diminish, potentially rendering it worthless even if it is
awarded to Claimant.
110 Akinlose v Ait [1961] WNLR 116 111 American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC 396. 112 Five Ocean Corporation v Cingler Ship Pte Ltd (PT Commodities & Energy Resources, intervener) [2015]
SGHC 31 113 Moot Scenario (9 December 2016), at 73
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REQUEST FOR RELIEF
1. For the reasons set out above, CLAIMANT seeks an award for various reliefs including
but not limited to:
a) Freight in the sum of US$771,120.48 or such amount to be assessed;
b) Damages for detention to be assessed;
c) Further damages which are continuing to accrue on a daily basis until such time
the lien over the Cargo is discharged and such damages to be assessed;
d) Costs and expenses including the costs of exercising the lien to recover the
freight and other sums due;
e) Damages for breach or breach of the Voyage Charterparty to be assessed;
f) A declaration that the Claimant is entitled to exercise a lien over the Cargo and
all sub-freight payable in respect of the Cargo for freight, demurrage, claims, for
damages and for all other amounts due under the Voyage Charterpary including
costs of recovering the same;
g) A declaration that the exercise of the lien over the Cargo is a valid and lawful
one;
h) An indemnity in respect of any and all costs, claims, damages, losses and
expenses whatsoever incurred as a result of the exercise of their lien;
i) Such order for the preservation, detention, interim custody or sale of the Cargo as
may be necessary;
20
j) Interest on such amount at such rate and for such period as the Arbitral Tribunal
deems fit;
k) Costs (including but not limited to costs of the arbitration and the Claimant’s
legal and other costs); and
l) Such further and/or other relief, remedies or orders as the Arbitral Tribunal
deems fit.
2. The Claimant reserves the right to claim such further or other losses, damages, costs
and/or expenses and seek such further or other reliefs or remedies as the Claimant may
be entitled to at the time the Claimant submits its Statement of Claim.