Ruling:

As an independent Constitutional Commission, it is clothed with the three powers of government - executive or administrative, legislative, and quasi-judicial powers. The administrative powers of the COMELEC, for example, include the power to determine the number and location of polling places, appoint election officials and inspectors, conduct registration of voters, deputize law enforcement agencies and government instrumentalities to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections; register political parties, organization or coalitions, accredit citizens arms of the Commission, prosecute election offenses, and recommend to the President the removal or imposition of any other disciplinary action upon any officer or employee it has deputized for violation or disregard of its directive, order or decision. It also has direct control and supervision over all personnel involved in the conduct of election.[11] Its legislative authority is found in its power to promulgate rules and regulations implementing the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code or other laws which the Commission is required to enforce and administer.

Aside from the powers vested by the Constitution, the Commission also exercises other powers expressly provided in the Omnibus Election Code, one of which is the authority to deny due course to or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. The exercise of such authority, however, must be in accordance with the conditions set by law.

The Commission may not, by itself, without the proper proceedings, deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy filed in due form. When a candidate files his certificate of candidacy, the COMELEC has a ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge its receipt.

The Court has ruled that the Commission has no discretion to give or not to give due course to petitioners certificate of candidacy.[14] The duty of the COMELEC to give due course to certificates of candidacy filed in due form is ministerial in character. While the Commission may look into patent defects in the certificates, it may not go into matters not appearing on their face. The question of eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate is thus beyond the usual and proper cognizance of said body.

Baytan v COMELEC

G.R. No. 153945

Ponente: CARPIO

Author: MP (via the digest of user cess5655 of scribd hehe)

FACTS:

1. Petitioners, Reynato Baytan, Reynaldo Baytan and Adrian Baytan were on their way to register for the May 1998 elections when they met the newly-elected Barangay Captain, Roberto Ignacio, in Barangay 18, Zone II of Cavite City, who led them to register in Precinct No. 83-A of Barangay 18.

2. Upon realizing that their residence is situated within the jurisdiction of Barangay 28 not Barangay 18, petitioners proceeded to Precinct 129-A of Barangay 28 and registered anew.

3. Subsequently, petitioners sent a letter to former COMELEC Assistant Executive Director Jose Pio O. Joson requesting for advice on how to cancel their previous registration.

4. Petitioners’ Voters Registration Records were forwarded to the Provincial Election Supervisor, Atty. Juanito V. Ravanzo, for evaluation

5. Atty. Ravanzo recommended filing an information for double registration against petitioners. 6. The COMELEC affirmed Ravanzo’s resolution. 7. Petitioners moved for reconsideration, which, was denied by COMELEC en banc.8. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it recommended the prosecution of petitioners for double registration despite lack of intent and substantial compliance with the requirement of cancellation of previous registration.

HELD: No. There is no question that petitioners registered twice on different days and in different precincts without canceling their previous registration.

RATIO:

1. Since "double registration" is malum prohibitum, petitioners’ claim of lack of intent to violate the law is inconsequential.

2. Neither is the letter to Joson an application to cancel their previous registration. 3. This letter was sent after their second registration was accomplished and after the election

officer of Cavite City had already reported their act of double registration to a higher official.4. Moreover, petitioners’ claims of honest mistake, good faith and substantial compliance with

the Election Code’s requirement of cancellation of previous registration are matters of defense best ventilated in the trial proper rather than at the preliminary investigation.

5. The established rule is that a preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence.

6. It is for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof.

Bedol v COMELEC

G.R. No. 179830

Ponente: Leonard-De Castro

Author: PANGANIBAN

FACTS

1. As Chair of the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) for the province of Maguindanao, Bedol discharged his official functions and was able to ensure the PBOC’s performance of its ministerial duty to canvass the Certificates of Canvass coming from the twenty two (22) city and municipalities in the province.

2. Bedol was also charged of being the Provincial Elections Supervisor. He appeared before COMELEC EN BANC to submit the canvass for Maguindanao, but it was held in abeyance and he was queried on alleged fraud

3. He was informed of resetting of canvassing, but he failed to appear. COMELEC issued certification that the canvassing documents were not transmitted.

4. Bedol explained in a fact-finding committee that while in his possession and custody, election paraphernalia were stolen after 15 days of election.

5. On another scheduled investigation, he still failed to attend and even refused to submit written explanation of his absences.

6. Bedol came out on National newspaper in Inquirer and GMA-7 saying that those who say that there was cheating in Maguindanao should file a case and he will immediately answer accusation.

7. COMELEC issued contempt charge and show cause order. Eventually, he was found guilty of Contempt of Commission

ISSUE: WON the COMELEC has jurisdiction to initiate or contempt proceeding?

HELD: Yes.

RATIO:

The powers and functions of the COMELEC, conferred upon it by the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code, may be classified into administrative, quasi-legislative, and quasi-judicial. The quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC embraces the power to resolve controversies arising from the enforcement of election laws, and to be the sole judge of all pre-proclamation controversies; and of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications. Its quasi-legislative power refers to the issuance of rules and regulations to implement the election laws and to exercise such legislative functions as may expressly be delegated to it by Congress. Its administrative function refers to the enforcement and administration of election laws.

> The COMELEC, through the Task Force Maguindanao, was exercising its quasi-judicial power in pursuit of the truth behind the allegations of massive fraud during the elections in Maguindanao.

WAS HE PRE-JUDGED? No.

Petitioner was duly notified of the scheduled hearings. It was his official responsibility to be present during the scheduled hearing to shed light on the allegedly stolen election documents but he failed to do so without offering any valid justification for his non-appearance.

Second, he unlawfully assumed custody of accountable election documents, which were lost while in his possession, and consequently failed to deliver the same, in violation of paragraphs (a), (c) and (d) Section 2, Rule 29 of same Rules.

Petitioner admitted that the subject certificate of canvass and other election documents were lost while in his custody.

Third and fourth, he publicly displayed disrespect for the authority of the COMELEC through the media (interviews on national television channels, and in newspapers and radios) by flaunting an armory of long firearms and side arms in public, and posing for the front page of a national broadsheet, with a shiny pistol tucked in a holster, in violation of paragraphs (a) and (d), Section 2, Rule 29 of same Rules.

COMELEC v Noynay

G.R. No. 132365

Ponente DAVIDE JR

Author: Jackie

FACTS:

1. 9 informations for violation of SEction 261(i) of the Omnibus Election were filed with RTC against private respondents Amor, Chua and Magluyoan.

2. Judge Noynay as presiding judge, motu proprio ordered the records of the case to be withdrawn and directed the COMELEC law dept to file the cases with the approprate MTC on ground that pursuant Sec 32 of BP 129, the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case. MRed - denied

3. Hence this special civil action.

ISSUE: WON RA7691 HAS DIVESTED RTCs OF JURISDICTION OVER ELECTIONS OFFENSES WHICH ARE PUNISHABLE WITH IMPRISONMENT OF NOT EXCEEDING 6 YEARS

HELD: NO.

RATIO:

1. SC have explicitly ruled in Morales v. Court of Appeals that by virtue of the exception provided for in the opening sentence of Section 32, the exclusive original jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts does not cover those criminal cases which by specific provisions of law fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, regardless of the penalty prescribed therefor. Otherwise stated, even if those excepted cases are punishable by imprisonment of not exceeding six (6) years (i.e., prision correccional, arresto mayor, or arresto menor), jurisdiction thereon is retained by the Regional Trial Courts or the Sandiganbayan, as the case may be.

2. R.A. No. 7691 can by no means be considered as a special law on jurisdiction; it is merely an amendatory law intended to amend specific sections of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. Hence, R.A. No. 7691 does not have the effect of repealing laws vesting upon Regional Trial Courts or the Sandiganbayan exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the cases therein specified.

Aguilar vs. COMELEC

Topic:

Ponente: Nachura

Written by: JCB

FACTS:

1. October 2007 barangay elections, petitioner Aguilar won the chairmanship of Brgy. Bansarvil 1, Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte, over private respondent Insoy by a margin of one vote. Not conceding his defeat, Insoy instituted a protest in MTC of Kapatagan.

2. On April 17, 2008, the MTC rendered its Decision finding Insoy, who, during the revision garnered 265 votes as against Aguilars 264 votes, as the duly elected punong barangay. - The trial court consequently nullified the proclamation of Aguilar and directed him to vacate the office.

3.Aggrieved, Aguilar filed on April 21, 2008 his notice of appeal and paid to the trial court the appeal fee of P1,000.00, in accordance with Rule 14, Sections 8 and 9 of the recently promulgated A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC or the Rules of Procedure in Election Contests Before the Courts Involving Elective Municipal and Barangay Officials. Aguilar elevated the case to the COMELEC, subsequently COMELEC ruled on the matter.

COMELEC FIRST DIVISION RULING:

Dismissed the said appeal filed by Aguilar on the ground that the appeal fee is in the amount of P3,000, and failure to pay the appropriate appeal fee as stipulate under Sec. 3 & 4, Rule

4. Aguilar filed a MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, arguing that the newly promulgated A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC only requires the payment of P1,000.00 as appeal fee.

COMELEC FIRST DIVISION 2nd RULING:

DENIES the MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

5. Unperturbed, Aguilar filed another motion for reconsideration, contending, among others, that the order was null and void because it was issued in violation of the rule that motions for reconsideration should be resolved by the COMELEC en banc.

COMELEC FIRST DIVISION 3rd RULING:

DENIES the said MR.

6. On October 16, 2008, the COMELEC First Division issued the Entry of Judgment.

7. Faced with imminent ouster from office, petitioner instituted the instant petition to assail the aforementioned issuances of the COMELEC First Division.

ISSUE: W/N the decision made the COMELEC FIRST DECISION is valid.

HELD: PETITION GRANTED. Entry of Judgment issued by the COMELEC First Division in EAC (BRGY) No. 211-2008 are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. COMELEC herein acted with grave abuse of discretion.

RATIO:

I. Ruling as to the validity of denial of MR. ( Procedure J )

1. The Constitution provides, in Article IX-C, Section 3, the procedure for the resolution of election cases by the COMELEC, thus:

Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.

Basically, it should have been an en banc decision in order properly resolve an MR.

2. In this case, petitioners motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing his appeal was not resolved by the COMELEC en banc, but by the COMELEC First Division, an obvious violation of the provisions of the Constitution and the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Stated differently, the division, after dismissing petitioners appeal, arrogated unto itself the en bancs function of resolving petitioners motion for reconsideration.

4. In Soriano, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, this Court emphasized the rule that a motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a COMELEC division, except with regard to interlocutory orders, shall be elevated to the COMELEC en banc. Here, there is no doubt that the order dismissing the appeal is not merely an interlocutory, but a final order. It was, therefore, incumbent upon the Presiding Commissioner of the COMELEC First Division to certify the case to the COMELEC en banc within two days from notification of the filing of the motion.

5. Being a violation of the Constitution and the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the assailed September 4 and October 6, 2008 Orders are null and void.

They were issued by the COMELEC First Division with grave abuse of discretion. By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough.

II. RULING AS TO THE APPEAL FEE ( SUBSTANTIVE PORTION)

6. The appeal to the COMELEC of the trial courts decision in election contests involving municipal and barangay officials is perfected upon the filing of the notice of appeal and the payment of the P1,000.00 appeal fee to the court that rendered the decision within the five-day reglementary period. ( TAKE NOTE, 1,000 PESOS IS PAID TO COURT, NOT COMELEC)

8. The non-payment or the insufficient payment of the additional appeal fee of P3,200.00 to the COMELEC Cash Division, in accordance with Rule 40, Section 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended, does not affect the perfection of the appeal and does not result in outright or ipso facto dismissal of the appeal.

( DIFFERENT FILING FEE FOR COMELEC

9. The COMELEC First Division should have been more cautious in dismissing petitioners appeal on the mere technicality of non-payment of the additional P3,200.00 appeal fee given the public interest involved in election cases. This is especially true in this case where only one vote separates the contending parties. The Court stresses once more that election law and rules are to be interpreted and applied in a liberal manner so as to give effect, not to frustrate, the will of the electorate.

Calucag v COMELEC

G.R. No. G.R. No. 123673. June 19, 1997

Ponente: J. Romero

Author: Scorpio

Review of Final Orders, Resolutions and Decisions

FACTS:

1. Petitioner Calucag and private respondent Carbonell were both candidates for Brgy. Captain in Brgy. Caritan Centro, Tuguegarao, Cagayan during the election. Calucag won by 1 point.

2. Thereafter, Carbonell filed an election protest praying for the judicial recount of the ballots and the annulment of the proclamation of petitioner. The ballots were recounted and Carbonell won.

3. MTC promulgated a decision declaring the Carbonell as the duly elected Brgy. Captain.

4. Calucag appealed to RTC. Carbonell moved to dismiss the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction – it should have been with the COMELEC. RTC dismissed the appeal. MR denied.

5. On appeal, COMELEC likewise dismissed petitioner's case for lack of appellate jurisdiction. MR denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over election contests involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.

HELD: NO. COMELEC is the proper appellate court clothed with jurisdiction to hear the appeal, which must be filed within 5 days after the promulgation of the MTC's decision.

RATIO:

1. The Court ruled in Flores vs. Commission on Elections that Sec. 9 of RA 6679, insofar as it provides that the decision of MTC or MeTC in a barangay election case should be appealed to the RTC, is unconstitutional. It is in direct contravention of Art. IX-C, Sec. 2(2) of the Constitution, providing that the COMELEC shall “(e)xercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction."

2. The erroneous filing of the appeal with the RTC did not toll the running of the prescriptive period.

3. Contrary to petitioner’s argument, COMELEC dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction, based on his failure to perfect his appeal on time. That this is NOT A TECHNICALITY is correctly pointed out in the questioned order citing various jurisprudence.

4. The rules governing ordinary civil actions are not necessarily binding on special actions like an election contest wherein public interest will be adversely affected. Ordinary civil actions would generally involve private interests while all election cases are, at all times, invested with public interest which cannot be defeated by mere procedural and technical infirmities."

Mendoza v COMELEC

G.R. No. 188308

Ponente Brion

Author Migs

FACTS

1. Mendoza and Pagdanganan vied for Governor of Bulacan in May 2007 elections. Mendoza was proclaimed winning candidate and assumed the office.

2. Pagdanganan filed an election protest with the COMELEC.

3. Revision of ballots involving the protested and counter-protested precincts in 14 towns followed.

4. The revision was conducted at the COMELECs office. After revision, the parties presented their other evidence.

5. COMELEC then transferred the Bulacan ballot boxes, including those involved in the provincial election contest, to the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) in connection with the protest filed by Koko Pimentel against Migz Zubiri.

6. In light of this development, Mendoza moved to suspend further proceedings.

7. The COMELEC denied the motion, ruling that the COMELEC has plenary powers to find alternative methods to facilitate the resolution of the election protest; thus, it concluded that it would continue the proceedings.

8. Mendoza’s counsel wrote the SET Secretary a letter to confirm the veracity of the reported conduct of proceedings. The SET Secretary said that the conduct of proceedings in the provincial election contest within the SET was authorizes by then SET Chairman J. Carpio, upon request of Commissioner Tagle.

9. The said basis of such grant is Section 3, Comelec Resolution No. 2812, stating that the Tribunals, the Commission and the Courts shall coordinate and make arrangement with each other so as not to delay or interrupt the revision of ballots being conducted. The synchronization of revision of ballots shall be such that the expeditious disposition of the respective protest case shall be the primary concern.

10. While the said provision speaks only of revision, it has been the practice of the Tribunal to allow the conduct of other proceedings in local election protest cases within its premises as may be requested.

11. Mendoza claims entitlement to notice and participation in all matters that involve or are related to the election protest. He asserts that he was denied his day in court when the COMELEC conducted the examination and appreciation of ballots.

ISSUE

1) WON COMELEC has judicial power? NONE.

2) WON COMELEC is wrong in appreciating ballots which are not in its official custody and are outside its own premises, authority and control? NO.

RATIO

1. Judicial power in our country is vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

2. The COMELEC is a constitutional administrative agency and its powers are essentially executive in nature (to enforce and administer election laws), quasi-judicial (to exercise original jurisdiction over election contests of regional, provincial and city officials and appellate jurisdiction over election contests of other lower ranking officials), and quasi-legislative (rulemaking on all questions affecting elections and the promulgation of its rules of procedure).

3. The COMELECs adjudicative function is quasi-judicial since it is a constitutional body, other than a court, vested with authority to decide election contests, and in the course of the exercise of its jurisdiction, to hold hearings and exercise discretion of a judicial nature; it receives evidence, ascertain the facts from these submissions, determine the law and the legal rights of the parties, and on the basis of all these decides on the merits of the case and renders judgment.

4. Despite the exercise of discretion that is essentially judicial in character, particularly with respect to election contests, COMELEC is not a tribunal within the judicial branch of government and is not a court exercising judicial power in the constitutional sense; hence, its adjudicative function, exercised as it is in the course of administration and enforcement, is quasi-judicial.

5. The appropriate due process standards that apply to the COMELEC, as an administrative or quasi-judicial tribunal, are those outlined in the case of Ang Tibay.

1. The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.

2. Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.

3. While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.

4. Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be "substantial. "Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."

5. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.

6. The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.

7. The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.

The Right to Notice and to be Heard

1. A critical question to be answered in passing upon due process questions at this stage of the election contest is the nature of the so-called proceedings after the ballots and other materials pertinent to the provincial election contest were transferred to the SET.

2. The proceedings at the SET (contested proceedings) are no longer part of the adversarial aspects of the election contest that would require notice of hearing and the participation of the parties. In other words, what took place at the SET were the internal deliberations of the COMELEC, as a quasi-judicial body, in the course of appreciating the evidence presented and deciding the provincial election contest on the merits. These deliberations are no different from judicial deliberations which are considered confidential and privileged.

Conduct of COMELEC Deliberations at the SET Premises

1. COMELEC did not lose jurisdiction over the provincial election contest because of the transmittal of the provincial ballot boxes and other election materials to the SET.

2. The Constitution conferred upon the COMELEC jurisdiction over election protests involving provincial officials.

3. The COMELEC in this case has lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter, as well as over the parties. After its jurisdiction attached, this jurisdiction cannot be ousted by subsequent events such as the temporary transfer of evidence and material records of the proceedings to another tribunal exercising its own jurisdiction over another election contest pursuant to the Constitution. This is the rule of adherence of jurisdiction.

4. The order of preference:

1. Presidential Electoral Tribunal;

2. Senate Electoral Tribunal;

3. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal;

4. Commission on Elections; and

5. Regional Trial Courts.

5. With the COMELEC retaining its jurisdiction over the provincial election contest, the legal effect of the physical transfer of the ballots to the SET for purposes of its own revision becomes a non-issue, given the arrangement between the COMELEC and the SET to coordinate and make arrangements with each other so as not to delay or interrupt the revision of ballots being conducted, all for the purpose of the expeditious disposition of their respective protest cases.

6. There is nothing to prohibit the COMELEC from undertaking the appreciation of ballot side by side with the SETs own revision of ballots for the senatorial votes.

7. On the basis of the standards set by Section 4 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, and of the Constitution itself in the handling of election cases, SC rule that the COMELEC action is a valid exercise of discretion as it is a suitable and reasonable process within the exercise of its jurisdiction over provincial election contests, aimed at expediting the disposition of this case, and with no adverse, prejudicial or discriminatory effects on the parties to the contest that would render the rule unreasonable.

Aggabao v COMELEC (from scribd)

Georgidi B. Aggabao and Anthony Miranda were rivalcongressional candidates for the 4th District of Isabeladuring the May 10, 2004 elections.

During the canvassing of the certificates of canvass of votes (COCV) for the municipalities of Cordon and SanAgustin, Miranda moved for the exclusion of the 1st copy of the COCV on grounds that it was

1.tampered with

2.prepared under duress

3.differed from other authentic copies and

4.contained manifest errors.

Aggabao objected arguing that the grounds raised byMiranda are proper only for a pre-proclamationcontroversy which is not allowed in elections forMembers of the House of Representatives.

May 22, 2004 - the reconstituted Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBC ) excluded from canvass the contested COCVs and used instead the 4thand 7th copies of theCOCVs. Based on the results, Miranda garnered thehighest number of votes for the position of Congressman.

On appeal with the COMELEC, Aggabao asserted that the PBC acted without jurisdiction when it heard Miranda’s Petition for Exclusion. Even assuming that the PBC had jurisdiction over the petition, it still erred in excluding the contested COCVs as they appeared regular and properly authenticated.

June 6, 2004 - Miranda filed a Very Urgent Motion for Proclamation.Aggabao opposed it. He contended that the pendency of his appeal with the COMELEC Second Division is a bar to Miranda’s proclamation.

In a Memorandum dated June 8, 2004, CommissionerMehol K. Sadain, commissioner in-charge for Regions IIand III, approved the proclamation of the remainingwinning candidates for the province of Isabela.

June 9, 2004 - the COMELEC En Banc issued ResolutionNo. 7233 likewise directing the proclamation of theremaining winning candidates in Isabela.

On the same day, Aggabao filed with the COMELEC anUrgent Motion to Set Aside the Notice of Proclamationwith Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary RestrainingOrder

June 14, 2004 - Miranda was proclaimed as the dulyelected Congressman for the 4th District of Isabela.

Two days after the proclamation, Aggabao filed thispetition assailing Resolution No. 7233. He claimed that the COMELEC En Banc acted without jurisdiction when it ordered Miranda’s proclamation considering that theSecond Division has not yet resolved the appeal.

In his comment, Miranda moved for the dismissal of thepetition considering that the issue raised by Aggabao is best addressed to the House of RepresentativesElectoral Tribunal (HRET).

August 27, 2004 - Aggabao filed a Consolidated Motion for Early Resolution; Manifestation that the COMELEC Second Division Issued a Resolution Sustaining the Appeal of the Petitioner; and Reply to the Comment.

He manifested that on August 16, 2004, theCOMELEC Second Division gave due course to hispending appeal.

At the same time, he bewailed the failure of theCOMELEC Second Division to annul theproclamation.

Issue:

WON Aggabao resort to certiorari lies [NO]

Ratio:

Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution provides:Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representativesshall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be thesole judge of all contests relating to the election,returns, and qualifications of their respective Members.Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nineMembers, three of whom shall be Justices of theSupreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice,and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate orthe House of Representatives, as the case may be, whoshall be chosen on the basis of proportionalrepresentation from the political parties and the partiesor organization registered under the party-list systemrepresented therein. The senior Justice in the ElectoralTribunal shall be its Chairman.

In Pangilinan vs. COMELEC, the SC ruled that:The Senate and the House of Representatives now havetheir respective Electoral Tribunals which are the "solejudge of all contests relating to the election, returns, andqualifications of their respective Members, therebydivesting the Commission on Elections of its jurisdictionunder the 1973 Constitution over election casespertaining to the election of the Members of theBatasang Pambansa (Congress). It follows that theCOMELEC is now bereft of jurisdiction to hear anddecide pre-proclamation controversies against members of the House of Representatives as well as of the Senate.

The HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction overall contests relative to the election, returns, andqualifications of members of the House of Representatives.

Thus,once a winning candidate hasbeen proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.

It is undisputed that Miranda has already beenproclaimed, taken his oath and assumed office onJune 14, 2004.

As such, Aggabao’s recourse would have been to file an electoral protest before the HRET. His remedy is not this petition for certiorari.

The allegation that Miranda’s proclamation is null and void ab initio does not divest the HRET of its jurisdiction

In an electoral contest where the validity of theproclamation of a winning candidate who hastaken his oath of office and assumed his post asCongressman is raised, that issue is best addressedto the HRET. The reason for this ruling is self-evident, for it avoids duplicity of proceedings and aclash of jurisdiction between constitutional bodies,with due regard to the people’s mandate.

In Lazatin v. Commission on Elections,the SC ruled that,upon proclamation of the winning candidate anddespite its alleged invalidity, the COMELEC is divested of its jurisdiction to hear the protest.

In this case,certiorari will not lie considering that there is an available and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the purpose of annulling or modifying the proceedings before the COMELEC

After the proclamation, Aggabao’s remedy was an electoral protest before the HRET. The resolution of the issues presented in this petition is best addressed to the sound judgment and discretion of the electoral tribunal.

Dispositive: Petition dismissed for lack of merit

Salva v Makalintal

G.R. No. 132603

Ponente: BUENA

Author: MP (via jamesmamba.blogspot.com :D)

Facts:

1. The petitioners filed with the RTC a class suit against the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Batangas, Sangguniang Pambayan of Calaca, Batangas, and the COMELEC for annulment of Ordinance No. 05 and Resolution No. 345 both enacted by the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Batangas, and COMELEC Resolution No. 2987.

2. Ordinance No. 05 declared the abolition of Barangay San Rafael and its merger with Barangay Dacanlao, municipality of Calaca, Batangas and accordingly instructed the COMELEC to conduct the required plebiscite.

3. Resolution No. 345 affirmed the effectivity of Ordinance No. 05, thereby overriding the veto exercised by the governor of Batangas.

4. Ordinance No. 05 was vetoed by the governor of Batangas for being ultra vires, particularly, as it was not shown that the essential requirements regarding the attestations or certifications of several government agencies were obtained.

5. The COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2987, providing for the rules and regulations governing the conduct of the required plebiscite scheduled on February 28, 1998, to decide the issue of the abolition of barangay San Rafael and its merger with barangay Dacanlao, Calaca, Batangas.

6. The trial court denied the petition saying that any petition or action questioning an act, resolution or decision of the COMELEC must be brought before the Supreme Court.

7. The petitioners contend that when the COMELEC exercises its quasi-judicial functions under Section 52 of the Omnibus Election Code, its acts are subject to the exclusive review by SC Court; but when the COMELEC performs a purely ministerial duty, such act is subject to scrutiny by the Regional Trial Court.

8. Petitioners submit that the conduct of a plebiscite, pursuant to Ordinance No. 05 and Resolution No. 345, is not adjudicatory or quasi-judicial in nature but simply ministerial or administrative in nature and only in obedience to the aforesaid Ordinance and Resolution.

Issue: Is the conduct of a plebiscite a quasi-judicial act, which can be reviewed by the SC?

Held: No. The conduct of a plebiscite is not an exercise of the COMELEC’s quasi-judicial function.

Ratio:

1. The SC ruled that “…What is contemplated by the term final orders, rulings and decisions of the COMELEC” reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by law are those rendered in actions or proceedings before the COMELEC and taken cognizance of by the said body in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.

2. Briefly, COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 which provides for the rules and regulations governing the conduct of the required plebiscite, was not issued pursuant to the COMELECs quasi-judicial functions but merely as an incident of its inherent administrative functions over the conduct of plebiscites.

3. Thus, the said resolution may not be deemed as a final order reviewable by certiorari by this Court.

4. Any question pertaining to the validity of said resolution may be well taken in an ordinary civil action before the trial courts.

Cagas v COMELEC

G.R. No. 194139

Ponente: Bersamin

Author: PANGANIBAN

1. (Bautista) contested the position of Governor of the Province of Davao del Sur in the May 10, 2010 automated national and local elections.

2. Petitioner was prclaimed winner in a fast transmission of results

3. Alleging fraud and anomalies, Bautista (the opponent) filed a an electoral protest

4. Petitioner in his answer averred that Bautista did not render a detailed specification of the acts or omissions complained of and did not post a cash bond.

5. COMELEC FIRST DIVISION DENIES the petitioner’s affirmative defense. MR of Petitioner was also denied.

ISSUE: WON the COMELEC FIRST DIVISION COMMETTED GAOD IN REFUSING TO DIMSISS THE PROTEST OF BAUTISTA?

HELD: No.

RATIO:

> Court may take cognizance of a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 to review an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC on the ground of the issuance being made without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it does not appear to be specifically provided under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure that the matter is one that the COMELEC en banc may sit and consider, or a Division is not authorized to act, or the members of the Division unanimously vote to refer to the COMELEC en banc. Of necessity, the aggrieved party can directly resort to the Court because the COMELEC en banc is not the proper forum in which the matter concerning the assailed interlocutory order can be reviewed.

> The Court has upheld the COMELECs determination of the sufficiency of allegations contained in election protests, conformably with its imperative duty to ascertain in an election protest, by all means within its command, who was the candidate elected by the electorate.

> The Court, however, will not indulge in the presumption that nothing would go wrong, that a successful automation election unmarred by fraud, violence, and like irregularities would be the order of the moment on May 10, 2010. Neither will it guarantee, as it cannot guarantee, the effectiveness of the voting machines and the integrity of the counting and consolidation software embedded in them. That task belongs at the first instance to Comelec, as part of its mandate to ensure clean and peaceful elections. This independent constitutional commission, it is true, possesses extraordinary powers and enjoys a considerable latitude in the discharge of its functions.

Municipal Board of Canvasser of Glan v COMELEC

G.R. No. 150946

Ponente azcuna

Author jack jack

FACTS

1. Respondent Benzonan, who was a mayoralty candidate in the Municipality of Glan during the May 14, 2001 elections, sought to declare null and void the canvass conducted by the Municipal Board of Canvasses (MBC) of Glan and to recall the proclamation of petitioners Yap et al, as duly elected Mayor, Vice and members of SB.

2. COMELEC en banc issued a resolution finding that based on the evidence presented, the canvass of votes had been conducted in a place other than the previous venue at the inception of the proceedings to which all were notified. Thus, the proclamations of the winning candidates were declared null and void and a re-canvass of the election returns was ordered.

3. Hence this petition for certiorari Rule 65.

ISSUE: WON THE COMELEC HAS JURISDICTION OVER THIS CASE

HELD:

RATIO

1. Beginning with Sarmiento v. COMELEC and reiterated in subsequent cases, the most recent being Balindong v. COMELEC,8 the Court has upheld this constitutional mandate and consistently ruled that the COMELEC sitting en banc does not have the requisite authority to hear and decide election cases in the first instance. This power pertains to the divisions of the Commission and any decision by the Commission en banc as regards election cases decided by it in the first instance is null and void for lack of jurisdiction.

2. It is important to clarify, however, that not all cases relating to election laws filed before the COMELEC are required to be first heard by a division. Under the Constitution, the COMELEC exercises both administrative and quasijudicial powers. The COMELEC en banc can act directly on matters falling within its administrative powers. It is only when the exercise of quasijudicial powers are involved that the COMELEC is mandated to decide cases first in division, and then, upon motion for reconsideration, en banc.

3. It is clear that SPC No. 01032 is one that involves a preproclamation controversy that requires the exercise of the COMELEC’s quasijudicial powers, as the illegality of the composition and proceedings of the MBC, including the falsification of election returns and certificate of canvass, were alleged to be in issue. Furthermore, in her comment to the petition dated January 9, 2000,11 Benzonan categorically stated that it is not disputed that what is involved here is a preproclamation controversy.