election law cases (ii)

8/13/2019 Election Law Cases (II)

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ELECTION LAW CASES (II)

PURISIMA V SALONGA

... it is also true that in case of patent irregularity in theelection returns, such as patent erasures and super-impositions in words and figures on the face of thereturns submitted to the board, it is imperative for theboard to stop the canvass of such returns so as toallow time for verification. A canvass and proclamation

made withstanding such patent defects in the returnswhich may affect the result of the election, withoutawaiting remedies, is null and void. (Purisima v.Salonga, 15 SCRA 704).

CAUTON V. COMELEC

The purpose of the governing statutes on the conductof elections

[i]s to protect the integrity of elections to suppress

all evils that may violate its purity and defeat the will ofthe voters. The purity of the elections is one of themost fundamental requisites of popular government.The Commission on Elections, by constitutionalmandate, must do everything in its power to secure afair and honest canvass of the votes cast in theelections. In the performance of its duties, theCommission must be given a considerable latitude inadopting means and methods that will insure theaccomplishment of the great objective for which it wascreatedto promote free, orderly, and honestelections. The choice of means taken by th eCommissio n on Elect ions, unless they are clearly

i l legal or const i tu te grave abuse of discret ion ,

shou ld not be interfered

wi th ."8 [Cauton v.COMELEC, 19 SCRA 911 (1967)]

It must be borne in mind that the purpose of governingstatutes on the conduct of elections

[i]s to protect the integrity of elections to suppress allevils that may violate its purity and defeat the will ofthe voters. The purity of the elections is one of themost fundamental requisites of popular government.The Commission on Elections, by constitutionalmandate must do everything in its power to secure afair and honest canvass of the votes cast in theelections. In the performance of its duties, theCommission must be given a considerable latitude inadopting means and methods that will insure theaccomplishment of the great objective for which it wascreatedto promote free, orderly and honestelections. The choice of means taken by theCommission on Elections, unless they are clearlyillegal or constitute grave abuse of discretion, shouldnot be interfered with.21 [Cauton v. COMELEC, 19

SCRA 911 [1967].]

SUMULONG V COMELEC

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

DECISION

December 5, 1940

G.R. No. L-47940

JUAN SUMULONG, in his capacity as president of

Pagkakaisa ng Bayan (Popular Front Party),

petitioner,

vs.

THE COMMISSION ON ELECTION, respondent.

Office of the Solicitor-General Ozaeta and First

Assistant Solicitor-General Reyes for respondent.

N.V. Villarruz as amicus curiae.

Laurel, J.:

In a communication dated October 28, 1940,

addressed to the respondent, the commission on

Elections, the petitioner, Juan Sumulong, as head of

the party denominated Pagkakaisa g Bayan

(Popular Front Party), asks that said party be declared

to be entitled to name the third election inspector in

municipalities where it has candidates either for

municipal or provincial officer in the forthcoming

general election, although it had no candidates and did

not obtain votes in those municipalities in the 1937

election. In this communication, the petitioner cites as

a typical example the case of Bauan, Batangas,

wherein Pagkakaisa g Bayan has candidates for the

coming election but is denied by the municipal mayor

of the said municipality the right to minority

representation on the board of election inspectors, for

the reason that it did not have any candidates and did

not receive votes in the 1937 election. The said

municipal mayor distributed the three election

inspectors between the Nacionalista candidates,

awarding the minority inspector to the minority faction

of said party which opposed the other faction in the

next preceding election. In the communication above

referred to, the petitioner also alleged that in other

provinces, namely, Abra, Agusan, Antique, Cagayan,

Camarines Sur, Capiz, Davao, Ilocos Sur, Isabela, La

Union Leyte, Marinduque, Masbate, Mindoro, Mt.


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Province, Misamis Occidental, Negros Occidental,

Negros Oriental, Nueva Vizcaya, Romblon, Surigao,

Zambales, and Zamboanga, there are cases in which

Pagkakaisa g Bayan finds itself in the same

situation as that described in the example cited with

respect to minority representation on the boards of

election inspectors.

On November 12, 1940, the respondent Commission

rendered a decision denying the petition contained in

the communication of October 28, 1940, the

dispositive part of which reads as following:

Teniendo en consideracion que la carta del Sr. Juan

Sumulong, considerandola como una peticion formal,

plantea ante esta Comision una cuestion de derecho

sin referirse a ningun caso especifico ni alegar los

hechos que sirvan de base, a su peticion, esta

Comision es de opinion que no esta llamada a

resolver cuestiones teoricas y de caracter general. Por

tanto, se deniega la peticion.

On November 18, 1940, the petitioner filed with the

respondent Commission a motion for reconsideration

alleging, that although his petition of October 28, 1940,

covered municipalities in twenty three provinces, the

case of Bauan, Batangas, was specified therein as a

concrete case wherein Pagkakaisa g Bayan has

been denied the right to name the third election

inspector by the municipal mayor for the reason

already stated.

On November 29, 1940, the respondent Commission

rendered a decision on the merits of the petition of the

28th of October, with particular reference to the

municipality of Bauan, Batangas, in which the said

petition was again denied on the following grounds:

Section 70 of the Election Code provides, among other

things, that two of the inspectors and the poll clerkand their substitutes shall belong to the party which

polled the largest number of votes at the next

preceding election, and the other inspector and his

substitute shall belong to the party which polled the

next largest number of votes at said election. In

computing the number of votes polled by the parties, in

case the appointment of inspectors is for a regular

election of provincial and municipal offices the votes

polled by all the candidates of each party for said

offices in themunicipality shall be counted,

(Emphasis supplied.) Evidently, the law grants election

in the municipality. Not having participated in the,

regular election held in 1937 for provincial and

municipal official, the Popular Front Party did not poll

any lack of the basis prescribed in Section 70 of the

Election Code, that is, the obtaining of votesconstituting the next immediate place, said party,

although national in character, is not entitled to the

third inspector.

The Popular Front Party having failed to establish its

right to the inspectors, we now find ourselves

confronted with the task of finding whether the third

inspector was given to the correct party or not. The

presiding officer of the municipal council of Bauan

gave the third or minority inspector to a faction of the

Nacionalista Party opposed to the other faction. Strictly

speaking, under the express terms of Section 70 Code

aforecited, neither a faction of, or group, affiliated to

the Nacionalista Party, nor the Popular Front Party is

entitled to the third or minority inspector in the

municipality of Bauan. This is so because the faction

of the Nationalista Party is not a political party within

the contemplation of said Section 70: and the Popular

Front Party, although it is national in character, and a

political party within the contemplation of said Section

70 of the Election Code did not obtain any vote in the

said municipality in the election held in 1937.

Therefore, the present by the provisions of the Election

Code, but is rather a case falling into that

indiscriminate residue of matter not expressly covered

by legislative enactment but must, in order not to

paralyze the orderly functions of government be held

to fall within the field of administrative discretion; and

in the exercise of that administrative discretion, this

Commission has chosen not to disturb the

appointment of the election inspectors already made

by the presiding officer of the municipal counting of

Bauan. In thus so deciding, we were influenced by the

question as to which of the two minority parties,

namely, the Popular Front Party or the minority faction

of the Nacionalista Party has a better right to the third

inspector, and can exercise a better check and

balance of the workings of the majority representation

in the board of election inspectors. While we have


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always adhered to the fundamental principle that no

party shall be allowed to monopolized all election

inspectors and poll clerks, yet we cannot close our

eyes to the fact that the Nacionalista Party is only

united and is under one leadership in so far as national

politics and national policies are concerned, but

divided on questions of local politics and local

problems. Under the spirit of the law, a faction of thesame party, or a political group if it consists and

constitutes to be the real opposition in the locality and

obtained the next immediate place therein during the

election held in 1937, and presents candidate or

candidates for the forthcoming election, is entitled to

the third inspector. The necessary check and balance

which is the object of the law in giving representation

to, the different political parties in the election board is

properly maintained and observed in this instance

because although the two major political parties, the

Partido Nacionalista Democratico, commonly known

as the Anti Party and the Partido Nacionalista Pro

Independencia, commonly known as the Pro Party,

together with the many other local groups of the

Nacionalista Party, the division of the Nacionalista

Party, notwithstanding this fusion, into what is

commonly known as the Pro and Anti factions in some

province and in the other provinces under the name of

local leader, is maintained. These factions of the

Nacionalista Party have, since the election held in

1937 for provincial and municipal officials, continued to

oppose each other in almost all municipalities of the

country, vigorously and uncompromisingly, in the polls

according to the records of this Commission, thus

demonstrating that the Popular Front Party has not

been the actual opposition party in some municipalities

and therefore should not be entitled to recognition in

the said municipalities under Section 70 of the Election

Code where it did not obtain votes in the preceding

election of 1937 to the prejudice of the majority faction

of the Nacionalista Party which obtained the next

largest number of votes in the 1937 regular election.

The petitioner now presents this petition for review,

praying that this court hold the aforecited decisions of

November 12 and 29, 1940, to be erroneous and

declare Pagkakaisa g Bayan to be the party entitled

to nominate the third election inspector and his

substitute in Bauan, Batangas, as well as in other

municipalities where conditions similar to those

existing in the former obtain. As grounds for the

allowance of this petition, the petitioner contends that

the respondent Commission has erred:

(a) in permitting the Nacionalista Party to have a

monopoly of election inspectors in Bauan, Batangas,

for the forthcoming elections;

(b) in allowing the municipal mayor of Bauan,

Batangas, to grant the third inspector to a faction, the

so-called minority faction of the Nacionalista Party in

said municipality, in controvention of the plain and

unequivocal provisions of the Election Code;

(c) in depriving Pagkakaisa g Bayan which the

Commission itself recognizes to be the national

political minority, of any representation in the board of

inspectors in Bauan, Batangas, in the comingDecember 10th elections, contrary to the uniform

doctrine laid down by this Hon. Supreme Court both

before as well as after the enactment of the present

Election Code;

(d) in not holding that sec. 70 of the Election Code

contemplates a situation where at least two national

parties obtained votes in the preceding election, and is

not applicable to the case of Bauan, Batangas, where

the candidates in the 1937 elections all belonged to a

single political party, the Nacionalista Party, althoughthey belonged to different factions of that party;

(e) in not holding that the votes received by the

different factions of the Nacionalista Party in the 1937

elections in Bauan, Batangas, must be deemed to be

votes received by the Nacionalista Party, and not as

votes received by each of the contending faction of

said party in that municipality;

(f) in interpreting sec. 70 of the Election Code to mean

that in all cases a political minority party must have

participated and must have obtained the next largest

number of votes in the next preceding election before

it can claim the right to nominate the third minority

inspector,and interpretation which would render

empty and meaningless the provision of sec. 71 of the

same Code which permits the granting of the third

inspector to candidates of the opposition party even

though it did not poll the next largest number of votes

in the next preceding election, in cases where the


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parties polling the largest and next largest number of

votes at next preceding election have united; and

(g) in not declaring Pagkakaisa g Bayan to be entitled

to name the third election inspector in Bauan,

Batangas, for the forthcoming elections, well as in all

other municipalities where condition similar to, Bauan,

Batangas, exist.

The respondent Commission filed its answer onDecember 4, 1940, and among other things, alleges:

3. That the so-called majority and minority factions of

the Nacionalista Party, in like situation, are not

branches or faction that have seceded from the

Nacionalista Party, but are branches and divisions of

said Party duly recognized by the National Directorate

thereof;

4. That said so-called majority and minority factions

have presented different sets of candidates for

provincial and/or municipal offices for the elections to

be held on December 10, 1940;

5. That said majority and minority factions of the

Nacionalista Party in Bauan. Batangas (as well as in

the other municipalities mentioned in the petition)

presented different sets of candidate and were the

only parties whose candidates received votes in the

next preceding election for provincial and municipal

offices held in 1937;

6. That the Popular Front Party presented no

candidates in any of the municipalities aforesaid at the

said election of 1937, and consequently polled no

votes therein;

It is admitted that the minority group which was

accorded the minority representation on the boards of

election inspectors in Bauan, Batangas, is but a

fraction of the Nationalista Party, which faction

obtained the next largest number of votes at the

immediately preceding election in the said

municipality. It is likewise admitted that Pagkakaisa

g Bayan is a party of national standing but did not

take part in the immediately preceding election in the

said municipality. The principal question to be

determined, therefore, is as between a faction of party

which obtained the next largest number of votes in the

preceding election and national party which did not

participate in such election and did not obtain votes

therein, which has a better right to minority

representation on the boards of election inspectors.

The question here presented is not specifically

provided for the Election Code, and if we were to

interpret section 70 of the said Code strictly, neither

the faction nor the party in question would be entitled

to name the third election inspection. We are of the

opinion, however, that in case of doubt the balance

should be inclined in favor of an interpretation which

would effectively safeguard the purity of suffrage and

avoid a monopoly of inspectors of election by single

party. It is, of course, to be expected that the opposing

group of the majority party will check up the actuations

of the other group and guard against abuses during

the entire period of election, but this, is only true in

cases where the two groups of the majority party havedifferent candidates for all the provincial and municipal

offices. Upon the other hand, if Pagkakaisa g Bayan

is not accorded an inspector of election, the result

would be that a single party would have a monopoly of

the election inspectors contrary to the spirit and

purpose of the law. In the case of Emiliano Tria Tirona

vs. The Municipal Council of Dagupan, Pangasinan,

36 O.G. 1102, we said:

. . . It is clear, however, that the purpose of the

legislature in providing for a system of politicalrepresentation to which it is entitled should not be

permitted. We are of the opinion and so hold that

where the two major political parties at the last

preceding general elections have fused or

consolidated into one party, and there are two sets of

candidates of this party for elective provincial and

municipal candidates of this party is entitled to one

inspector and substitute inspector and substitute

inspector of election in each and every electoral

precinct of the municipality. As it does not appear that

the Partido Nacionalista has presented official

candidates but that each of the two wings of this party

has presented a complete ticket of candidates for

provincial and municipal offices in Pangasinan, one of

the two inspectors and substitute inspectors of election

in every electoral precinct of the municipality of

Dagupan shall correspond to the anti faction and the

other inspector and substitute inspector to the pro


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faction. The third inspector and substitute inspector

shall go to the Frente Popular.

The judgment of the lower court is accordingly

reversed and the municipal council of Dagupan is

hereby ordered to meet within 48 hours from notice of

this decision and to revoke the appointments of

inspectors and substitute inspectors of election for the

anti faction and forthwith to appoint an inspector and

substitute inspector of election for the Frente Popular

in each and every electoral precinct of Dagupan,

Pangasinan, such appointments for the Frente Popular

to be made in accordance with the proposal of the duly

authorized representative of this party in the province

or municipality aforementioned.

We see no reason why we should depart from the

doctrine laid down in the above-entitled case. Each

faction of the Nacionalista Party in Bauan, Batangas,

is, therefore, entitled to one inspector and the

Pagkakaisa g Bayan to the third inspector in each

and every precinct of the municipality, such inspectors

to be appointed in the manner prescribed by section

73 of Commonwealth Act No. 357.

The decision of the Commission on Elections is hereby

reversed and the presiding officer of the municipal

council of Bauan, Batangas, is hereby ordered,

through the Commission on Elections, to rescind his

action granting the majority group two inspectors and

to forthwith appoint an inspector of election for

Pagkakaisa g Bayan in each and every electoral

precinct of the municipality, such appointments to be

made in accordance with the proposal of the national

directorate of said party.

Without any pronouncement regarding costs. So

ordered.

LOONG V COMELEC

FACTS: Automated elections systems was used for

the May 11, 1998 regular elections held in the

Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)

which includes the Province of Sulu. Atty. Jose

Tolentino, Jr. headed the COMELEC Task Force to

have administrative oversight of the elections in Sulu.

On May 12, 1998, some election inspectors and

watchers informed Atty. Tolentino, Jr. of discrepancies

between the election returns and the votes cast for the

mayoralty candidates in the municipality of Pata. To

avoid a situation where proceeding with automation

will result in an erroneous count, he suspended the

automated counting of ballots in Pata and immediately

communicated the problem to the technical experts of

COMELEC and the suppliers of the automated

machine. After the consultations, the experts told him

that the problem was caused by misalignment of the

ovals opposite the names of candidates in the local

ballots. They found nothing wrong with the automated

machines. The error was in the printing of the local

ballots, as a consequence of which, the automatedmachines failed to read them correctly. Atty. Tolentino,

Jr. called for an emergency meeting of the local

candidates and the military-police officials overseeing

the Sulu elections. Among those who attended were

petitioner Tupay Loong and private respondent

Abdusakar Tan and intervenor Yusop Jikiri (candidates

for governor.) The meeting discussed how the ballots

in Pata should be counted in light of the misaligned

ovals. There was lack of agreement. Some

recommended a shift to manual count (Tan et al) whilethe others insisted on automated counting (Loong

AND Jikiri).

Reports that the automated counting of ballots in other

municipalities in Sulu was not working well were

received by the COMELEC Task Force. Local ballots

in five (5) municipalities were rejected by the

automated machines. These municipalities were

Talipao, Siasi, Tudanan, Tapul and Jolo. The ballots

were rejected because they had the wrong sequencecode.

Before midnight of May 12, 1998, Atty. Tolentino, Jr.

was able to send to the COMELEC en banc his report

and recommendation, urging the use of the manual

count in the entire Province of Sulu. 6 On the same

day, COMELEC issued Minute Resolution No. 98-

1747 ordering a manual count but only in the

municipality of Pata.. The next day, May 13, 1998,


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COMELEC issued Resolution No. 98-1750 approving,

Atty. Tolentino, Jr.s recommendation and the

manner of its implementation. On May 15, 1998, the

COMELEC en banc issued Minute Resolution No. 98-

1796 laying down the rules for the manual count.

Minute Resolution 98-1798 laid down the procedure

for the counting of votes for Sulu at the PICC.

COMELEC started the manual count on May 18, 1998.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not a petition for certiorari and

prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the

appropriate remedy to invalidate the disputed

COMELEC resolutions.

2. Assuming the appropriateness of the remedy,

whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in ordering

a manual count. (The main issue in the case at bar)

2.a. Is there a legal basis for the manual count?

2.b. Are its factual bases reasonable?

2.c. Were the petitioner and the intervenor denied due

process by the COMELEC when it ordered a manual

count?

3. Assuming the manual count is illegal and that its

result is unreliable, whether or not it is proper to call for

a special election for the position of governor of Sulu.

HELD: The petition of Tupay Loong and the petition in

intervention of Yusop Jikiri are dismissed, there being

no showing that public respondent gravely abused its

discretion in issuing Minute Resolution Nos. 98-1748,

98-1750, 98-1796 and 98-1798. Our status quo order

of June 23, 1998 is lifted.

(1.) Certiorari is the proper remedy of the petitioner.

The issue is not only legal but one of first impression

and undoubtedly suffered with significance to the

entire nation. It is adjudicatory of the right of thepetitioner, the private respondents and the intervenor

to the position of governor of Sulu. These are enough

considerations to call for an exercise of the certiorari

jurisdiction of this Court.

(2a). A resolution of the issue will involve an

interpretation of R.A. No. 8436 on automated election

in relation to the broad power of the COMELEC under

Section 2(1), Article IX(C) of the Constitution to

enforce and administer all laws and regulations

relative to the conduct of an election , plebiscite,

initiative, referendum and recall.Undoubtedly, the

text and intent of this provision is to give COMELEC all

the necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve

the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful,

and credible elections.

The order for a manual count cannot be characterized

as arbitrary, capricious or whimsical. It is well

established that the automated machines failed to read

correctly the ballots in the municipality of Pata The

technical experts of COMELEC and the supplier of the

automated machines found nothing wrong the

automated machines. They traced the problem to the

printing of local ballots by the National Printing Office.

It is plain that to continue with the automated count

would result in a grossly erroneous count. Anautomated count of the local votes in Sulu would have

resulted in a wrong count, a travesty of the sovereignty

of the electorate

In enactingR.A. No. 8436,Congress obviously failed

to provide a remedy where the error in counting is not

machine-related for human foresight is not all-seeing.

We hold, however, that the vacuum in the law cannot

prevent the COMELEC from levitating above the

problem. . We cannot kick away the will of the people

by giving a literal interpretation to R.A. 8436. R.A.

8436 did not prohibit manual counting when machine

count does not work. Counting is part and parcel of the

conduct of an election which is under the control and

supervision of the COMELEC. It ought to be self-

evident that the Constitution did not envision a

COMELEC that cannot count the result of an election.

It is also important to consider that the failures of

automated counting created post election tension in

Sulu, a province with a history of violent elections.COMELEC had to act desively in view of the fast

deteriorating peace and order situation caused by the

delay in the counting of votes

(2c) Petitioner Loong and intervenor Jikiri were not

denied process. The Tolentino memorandum clearly

shows that they were given every opportunity to

oppose the manual count of the local ballots in Sulu.

They were orally heard. They later submitted written

position papers. Their representatives escorted the
http://philippinelaw.info/statutes/ra8436.htmlhttp://philippinelaw.info/statutes/ra8436.html


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transfer of the ballots and the automated machines

from Sulu to Manila. Their watchers observed the

manual count from beginning to end.

3. The plea for this Court to call a special election for

the governorship of Sulu is completely off-line. The

plea can only be grounded on failure of election.

Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code tells us when

there is a failure of election, viz:

Sec. 6. Failure of election.If, on account of force

majeure, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes,

the election in any polling place has not been held on

the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour

fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the

voting and during the preparation and the transmission

of the election returns or in the custody or canvass

thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and

in any of such cases the failure or suspension ofelection would affect the result of the election, the

Commission shall on the basis of a verified petition by

any interested party and after due notice and hearing,

call for the holding or continuation of the election, not

held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect

but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the

cause of such postponement or suspension of the

election or failure to elect.

There is another reason why a special election cannot

be ordered by this Court. To hold a special electiononly for the position of Governor will be discriminatory

and will violate the right of private respondent to equal

protection of the law. The records show that all elected

officials in Sulu have been proclaimed and are now

discharging their powers and duties. These officials

were proclaimed on the basis of the same manually

counted votes of Sulu. If manual counting is illegal,

their assumption of office cannot also be

countenanced. Private respondents election

cannot be singled out as invalid for alikes cannot be

treated unalikes.

The plea for a special election must be addressed to

the COMELEC and not to this Court.

ALVAREZ V COMELEC

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 142527 March 1, 2001

ARSENIO ALVAREZ,petitioner,

vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and LA RAINNEABAD-SARMIENTO,respondents.

R E S O L U T I O N

QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition for certiorari assails the Resolution of theCommission on Elections En Banc, denying the Motionfor Reconsideration of herein petitioner and affirmingthe Resolution of the Second Division of theCOMELEC that modified the decision dated December

4, 1997 of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Br. 40, ofQuezon City in Election Case No. 97-684. Saiddecision declared herein private respondent La Rainne

Abad-Sarmiento the duly elected Punong Barangay ofBarangay Doa Aurora, Quezon City during the May12, 1997 elections; directed the herein petitioner tovacate and turnover the office of Punong Barangay toprivate respondent upon the finality of the resolution;and directed the Clerk of the COMELEC to notify theappropriate authorities of the resolution upon finaldisposition of this case, in consonance with theprovisions of Section 260 of B.P. Blg. 881 otherwiseknown as the Omnibus Election Code, as amended.

1

The facts of the case are as follows:

On May 12, 1997, petitioner was proclaimed dulyelected Punong Barangay of Doa Aurora, QuezonCity. He received 590 votes while his opponent,private respondent Abad-Sarmiento, obtained 585votes. Private respondent filed an election protestclaiming irregularities, i.e. misreading andmisappreciation of ballots by the Board of ElectionInspectors. After petitioner answered and the issueswere joined, the Metropolitan Trial Court ordered thereopening and recounting of the ballots in ten

contested precincts. It subsequently rendered itsdecision that private respondent won the election. Shegarnered 596 votes while petitioner got 550 votes afterthe recount.

2

On appeal, the Second Division of the COMELECruled that private respondent won over petitioner.Private respondent, meanwhile, filed a Motion forExecution pending appeal which petitioner opposed.Both petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration andprivate respondent's Motion for Execution pendingappeal were submitted for resolution. The COMELECEn Banc denied the Motion for Reconsideration and


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affirmed the decision of the Second Division.3It

granted the Motion for Execution pending appeal.

Petitioner brought before the Court this petition forCertiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion on thepart of the COMELEC when:

(1) it did not preferentially dispose of the case;

(2) it prematurely acted on the Motion forExecution pending appeal; and

(3) it misinterpreted the Constitutionalprovision that "decisions, final orders, orrulings of the Commission on Electioncontests involving municipal and barangayofficials shall be final, executory and notappealable".

First, petitioner avers that the Commission violated itsmandate on "preferential disposition of electioncontests" as mandated by Section 3, Article IX-C,

1987 Constitution as well as Section 257, OmnibusElection Code that the COMELEC shall decide allelection cases brought before i t within ninety daysfrom the date of submission. He points out that thecase was ordered submitted for resolution onNovember 15, 1999

4but the COMELEC En Banc

promulgated its resolution only on April 4, 2000,5four

months and four days after November 14, 1999.

We are not unaware of the Constitutional provisioncited by petitioner. We agree with him that electioncases must be resolved justly, expeditiously andinexpensively. We are also not unaware of the

requirement of Section 257 of the Omnibus ElectionCode that election cases brought before theCommission shall be decided within ninety days fromthe date of submission for decision.

6The records show

that petitioner contested the results of ten (10) electionprecincts involving scrutiny of affirmation, reversal,validity, invalidity, legibility, misspelling, authenticity,and other irregularities in these ballots. TheCOMELEC has numerous cases before it whereattention to minutiae is critical. Considering further thetribunal's manpower and logistic limitations, it issensible to treat the procedural requirements ondeadlines realistically. Overly strict adherence todeadlines might induce the Commission to resolveelection contests hurriedly by reason of lack ofmaterial time. In our view this is not what the framersof the Code had intended since a very strictconstruction might allow procedural flaws to subvertthe will of the electorate and would amount todisenfranchisement of voters in numerous cases.

Petitioner avers the COMELEC abused its discretionwhen it failed to treat the case preferentially. Petitionermisreads the provision in Section 258 of the OmnibusElection Code. It will be noted that the "preferentialdisposition" applies to cases before the courts

7and not

those before the COMELEC, as a faithful reading ofthe section will readily show.

Further, we note that petitioner raises the allegeddelay of the COMELEC for the first time. As privaterespondent pointed out, petitioner did not raise theissue before the COMELEC when the case waspending before it. In fact, private respondent points outthat it was she who filed a Motion for Early Resolutionof the case when it was before the COMELEC. The

active participation of a party coupled with his failure toobject to the jurisdiction of the court or quasi-judicialbody where the action is pending, is tantamount to aninvocation of that jurisdiction and a willingness to abideby the resolution of the case and will bar said partyfrom later impugning the court or the body's

jurisdiction.8On the matter of the assailed resolution,

therefore, we find no grave abuse of discretion on thisscore by the COMELEC.

Second, petitioner alleges that the COMELEC EnBanc granted the Motion for Execution pending appealof private respondents on April 2, 2000 when the

appeal was no longer pending. He claims that themotion had become obsolete and unenforceable andthe appeal should have been allowed to take itsnormal course of "finality and execution" after the 30-day period. Additionally, he avers it did not give onegood reason to allow the execution pending appeal.

We note that when the motion for execution pendingappeal was filed, petitioner had a motion forreconsideration before the Second Division. Thispending motion for reconsideration suspended theexecution of the resolution of the Second Division.

Appropriately then, the division must act on the motion

for reconsideration. Thus, when the Second Divisionresolved both petitioner's motion for reconsiderationand private respondent's motion for execution pendingappeal, it did so in the exercise of its exclusiveappellate jurisdiction. The requisites for the grant ofexecution pending appeal are: (a) there must be amotion by the prevailing party with notice to theadverse party; (b) there must be a good reason for theexecution pending appeal; and (c) the good reasonmust be stated in a special order.

9In our view, these

three requisites were present. In i ts motion forexecution, private respondent cites that their case hadbeen pending for almost three years and the remaining

portion of the contested term was just two more years.In a number of similar cases and for the same goodreasons, we upheld the COMELEC's decision to grantexecution pending appeal in the best interest of theelectorate.

10Correspondingly, we do not find that the

COMELEC abused its discretion when it allowed theexecution pending appeal.

Third, petitioner contends that the COMELECmisinterpreted Section 2 (2), second paragraph, ArticleIX-C of the 1987 Constitution. He insists that factualfindings of the COMELEC in election cases involvingmunicipal and barangay officials may still be appealed.


9/9

He cites jurisprudence stating that such decisions, finalorders or rulings do not preclude a recourse to thisCourt by way of a special civil action forcertiorari,

11when grave abuse of discretion has

marred such factual determination,12

and when there isarbitrariness in the factual findings.

13

We agree with petitioner that election cases pertainingto barangay elections may be appealed by way of aspecial civil action for certiorari. But this recourse is

available only when the COMELEC's factualdeterminations are marred by grave abuse ofdiscretion. We find no such abuse in the instant case.From the pleadings and the records, we observed thatthe lower court and the COMELEC meticulously poredover the ballots reviewed. Because of its fact-findingfacilities and its knowledge derived from actualexperience, the COMELEC is in a peculiarlyadvantageous position to evaluate, appreciate anddecide on factual questions before it. Here, we find nobasis for the allegation that abuse of discretion orarbitrariness marred the factual findings of theCOMELEC. As previously held, factual findings of the

COMELEC based on its own assessments and dulysupported by evidence, are conclusive on this Court,more so in the absence of a grave abuse of discretion,arbitrariness, fraud, or error of law in the questionedresolutions.

14Unless any of these causes are clearly

substantiated, the Court will not interfere with theCOMELEC's findings of fact.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED, andthe En Banc Resolution of the Commission on Electionis AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

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