elections and mass politics

8/6/2019 Elections and Mass Politics

1/6

Elections and Mass Politics in Yemen

Author(s): Sheila CarapicoSource: Middle East Report, No. 185, Despots and Democrats Political Change in Arabia (Nov. -Dec., 1993), pp. 2-6Published by: Middle East Research and Information ProjectStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3013193 .

Accessed: 05/05/2011 19:08

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless

you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you

may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at .http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=merip. .

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed

page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

Middle East Research and Information Projectis collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend

access toMiddle East Report.

http://www.jstor.org
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=meriphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/3013193?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=meriphttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=meriphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/3013193?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=merip


2/6

'W ml

Elections and Mass

Politics in Yemen

m's Presidentialouncil, ay 5,1990.Fromeftoright:alim allh, icePresidentH aliml-Bayd,residentll bdallahallh, bdl-Karlml-ArashlndAbdahAziz bdl-Ghani.Yemen's experiment in popular parliamentary elec?tions has shaken things up in the Arabian Peninsula,the last place on earth that the United States wants tosee democracy flourish. But internal political differ?ences, profound economic crisis and Saudi hostilityputs this achievement at risk.

The Yemeni parliamentary election ofApril 27, 1993,marks a watershed for the Arabian Peninsula. Themultiparty contest for 301 constituency-based seats, andthe period ofunfettered public debate and discussion thatpreceded it, represents the advent oforganized mass pol?itics in a region where political power has long remaineda closely-held family affair. In the weeks after YemenisSheila Carapico, an editorofthismagazine,teaches nternationalrelations t theUniversityfRichmond n Virginia. he is currentlynYemen n a Fulbright rant,researching oliticaldevelopmentsinceunification.

Middle East Report ? November-December 1993


3/6

went to the polls, the regime next door in Saudi Arabiasent armed police to raid a university campus in Riyadhand arrest a professor active in a banned human rightscommittee. These and other developments in the regionmay compel the Clinton administration to weigh its democ?ratization rhetoric a little more seriously. When a high-ranking State Department official visited Yemen in mid-May, he followed his pro-forma congratulations with acautionary note: "I don't think you should look on what youdo here as a model for anyone else to follow."1Yemen's commitment to elections accompanied the uni?fication agreement between Ali Abdallah Salih, presidentofthe (North) Yemen Arab Republic (YAR), and Ali Salimal-Bayd, leader ofthe ruling party in the (South) People'sDemocratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY). Following for?mal unification on May 22,1990, a five-member PresidentialCouncil headed by Salih held executive power, and the twoformer parliaments were combined in a unified Chamberof Deputies. Under a constitution approved by nationalreferendum in May 1991, political parties organized open?ly and most restrictions on association, expression andmovement were lifted. The 1991 referendum specified thatthe elections be held within 30 months ofunification, buta combination oftechnical problems, procrastination andconflicts between "Ali and Ali" (Salih and al-Bayd) post?poned polling beyond the November 1992 deadline.In the months before April, a multiparty SupremeElections Committee (SEC) drew up 301 districts and estab?lished procedures for voter and candidate registration, a10-day campaign period, write-in ballots, and countingprocedures.2 In early 1993, 2.7 million adults (including77 percent of eligible males and 15 percent of eligiblefemales) registered to vote. Some 4,800 candidates regis?tered, the majority ofthem independents.3 More than 3,600,including 50 women, stayed in the campaign until the end.Political SpaceHow did it happen that two erstwhile dictators presidedover relatively fair, peaceful multiparty elections?The answer lies mainly in the conditions that led to uni?fication. The end of the Cold War eliminated the Sovietassistance so essential to the PDRY's survival, and reducedWestern and Gulf interests in sustaining inter-Yemenitensions. Dissidents from each polity had sought refuge inthe others' capital, and most independent political move?ments, organizations and unions were committed to unity.Planners looked to recent oil discoveries along their com?mon frontier to bring in foreign investment and exchange.In short, realizing that in order to maintain power theywould have to share power, Ali and Ali agreed not only tomerge their polities but to open up the process to widerparticipation.4The process had some unique facilitating features.Unlike other "democratizing" systems, Yemen inheritedtwo ruling parties that shared power in a delicate, oftentense balance during the transitional period, each retain?ing control of its former military and security apparatus-

es. The General People's Congress (GPC) was founded byAli Abdallah Salih in the 1980s as an Egyptian-style amal?gam of all political tendencies within Salih's regime. AliSalim al-Bayd's Yemen Socialist Party (YSP), born duringSouth Yemen's anti-colonial struggle and divided betweenold-guard Leninists and a growing number ofsocial democ?rats, was better organized and had a more coherent ide?ology than the GPC.This rough two-party equilibrium created space for otherpolitical organizations. The Saudi-backed Isiah (Reform)Party is a marriage of convenience between ShaikhAbdallah al-Ahmar, the head of the powerful Hashid con?federation, and the urban-based Muslim Brotherhood.In 1991, the Isiah had led an unsuccessful boycott of the1991 constitutional referendum because the shari'a is stip?ulated simply as "the main" rather than "the only" sourceof legislation. The Iraqi-leaning Yemeni Ba'th is muchsmaller in numbers, but also wields some influence in trib?al and military circles through its charismatic leader,Mujahid Abu Shuarib.5 The most important among some40 other parties are three Nasirist factions; a sayyid* groupknown as al-Haq (Right); Omar al-Jawi's progressiveUnionist Party; and the League of the Sons ofYemen ledby Abd al-Rahman al-Jifri. Some smaller parties, unableto field a full slate and obtain state campaign financing,ran candidates as "independents."Despite instances of disorder and violence, and scoresof complaints, the outcome indicated a genuine contest.The GPC won 123 constituencies; Isiah came in secondwith 62 seats, mostly from ts tribal rather than its Islamistwing; the YSP took 57, mostly in the former PDRY; inde?pendents won 47; the Ba'th seven; three Nasirist partieseach gained one seat; al-Haq won two, and one district'selection was postponed.6 The YSP claimed that in additionto 57 party members, 13 independent socialists won withits support, and an additional 17 genuinely independentdeputies-elect share its vision of the future.7 Some spec?ulated that Isiah, which declined to estimate its unofficialsympathizers, had 30 supporters who won under the GPCbanner, plus three independents. By any count, the arith?metic mandated a coalition government.8Domestic PressuresArab leaders have promised free elections in the past andnot delivered. What made Salih and al-Bayd?neither ofwhose personal histories indicates a commitment to polit?ical liberalism?follow through? The answer lies in soci?etal pressures which took different forms: mass confer?ences, strikes, demonstrations, political organizations,press commentaries, academic symposia and maqiyal or"salons."Prior to the elections, a series ofmass conferences pro?vided outlets for articulate opposition elements. A nine-day Talahum (Cohesion) Conference in December 1991,gathered some 10,000 men; although its banner was the*Sayyidpluraladah) eferso ersonslaimingescentromuhammad,he rophet,whoomprisedrulingristocracynNorthemenrioro he 962 evolution.



4/6

Bakil tribal confederation, urban intellectuals were amongthe organizers and authors ofa 33-point resolution callingfor udicial independence, strengthening ofrepresentativeparliamentary and local bodies, fiscal restraint and man?agement, revitalization of agricultural and services.coop-eratives, an independent media, environmental protec?tion, free elections within the mandated time-frame,peaceful resolution of tribal conflicts, and other reforms.9Some seven other tribe-based but civic-oriented mass con?ferences in 1992 each issued written demands for therule of law, pluralism, economic development and localautonomy. The Saba' (Sheba) Conference of Bakil andMadhaj tribes elected a council of trustees, a council ofsocial reform, and follow-up committees to ensure insti?tutional continuity.This activity culminated with a national conference ofrepresentatives ofthe smaller center and left parties andpolitical organizations, led by Omar al-Jawi. This time,the two ruling parties strove to delay, discourage, cooptand eventually offset what promised to be a major eventby holding a simultaneous counter-conference and byarranging the ouster of their opponents from the San'aCultural Center to the local Sheraton. Well-publicized inthe opposition press but ignored by the official media,the center-left conference criticized delayed preparationsfor the elections and the government's reckless printing ofmoney, and proposed a code of political conduct forpolit?ical parties.10 The Ta'iz Conference in November 1992,headed by al-Jifri, went even further in attracting facul?ty, ournalists and professionals; challenging Ta'iz's gov?ernor; constituting steering and work councils; and artic?ulating explicit demands for civic and human rights, localelections, and improved local services.11 Not to be outdone,the Isiah organized a 4,000-strong Unity and PeaceConference in December under the slogan "The Quran andthe Sunna Supersede the Constitution and the Law."12These conferences, both tribal and urban-based, involv?ing tens of thousands ofpeople, were among the transitionperiod's most important political developments. In response,the regime felt compelled to adopt its own code of politi?cal conduct, dismiss the Ta'iz governor, accept the princi?ple of ocal elections, and adopt a rhetoric of electoral rights.There were also several outbursts of popular frustra?tion, most notably in December 1992. Outrage with thecollapse of the value of the riyal, inadequate services, mount?ing unemployment, government corruption and post?ponement of the elections erupted in mass demonstrationsagainst both the state and private merchants in all majorcities. Along with strikes and threatened strikes by groupsranging from garbage collectors to judges, the near-riotsreminded the government of the power ofpopular wrath.On a smaller scale but a more institutionalized basis,numerous independent political organizations emerged.The Committee for the Defense of Human Rights andLiberties, established by liberal university professors, ini?tiated the National Committee forFree Elections (NCFE),in turn spurring the formation of other electoral NGOs.Although they failed on their own terms to guarantee the

integrity ofthe balloting process, they did perform a mod?est watchdog function and met again after the elections toprepare for the next round. Syndicates, charities and inter?est groups have been increasingly active.The press is also significant within the political arena.More than 100 partisan and independent newspapers andmagazines, mostly founded since 1990, covered theseevents. Although the government daily, Al-Thawra, andstate-run television and radio tend to dominate news cov?erage, a number ofopposition weeklies have a strong read?ership among the literate, urban, politically active popu?lation: Sawt al-(Ummal (Voice of the Workers), based inAden, has the largest circulation ofany paper. Party organs,includingRaay, Al-Tashih, Al-Sahwa and others, providecritical commentary and information about opposition con?ferences and independent organizations. There has emergeda press corps of scores of men and several dozen womenwho more and more approximate a fourthestate, conductinginterviews, attending parliament, asking critical questionsat press conferences, testing the limits of press law anddefending one another against lawsuits.13Related to the mass conferences, political organizingand press activity was a trend toward academic symposiaon topics such as the constitutional amendments, admin?istrative decentralization, municipal services, and the cam?paign experience of women candidates. Typically invit?ing members of each party and independent specialists,such symposia, virtually unheard of in the old North orSouth Yemen, provided fora for discussion, debate andrefinement of deas which were then reported in the oppo?sition press.More frequent and informal is an updated variationon the male qat session, or maqiyal, which approximatesthe "salons" of 19th-century Europe.14 Nowadays thesecustomarily informal social gatherings may elect a chair,select a topic, establish rules oforder, and hold organizedpolitical discussion on topics ranging from relations withthe Gulf to women's rights to exchange rate policy.Collectively, these civic activities applied consider?able pressure on the regime to fulfill ts promises, abide bya code of conduct, address its critics and respect politicalpluralism. Several Yemeni intellectuals have criticizedinternational observers and reporters for presenting anunduly positive picture of the electoral experience, andmany participants in the conferences and seminars arequite cynical about their own influence, insisting that theyhave been marginalized from the political process. Bythe same token, it is difficult to imagine the events of thepast year taking place had they been passive.External InvolvementRumors in San'a had the US playing a major if covertrole in organizing the elections and the post-electoral com?promise. There is scant evidence, though, ofWestern pres?sure for political liberalization in Arabia. Although US-Yemeni relations seemed poised to improve immediatelyafter unification in May 1990, they deteriorated after Iraq's



5/6

invasion of Kuwait because, in the words of US AmbassadorArthur Hughes, "San'a wanted to maintain normal rela?tions with Baghdad."15 American aid, never monetarilysignificant, was slashed from$30 million to $3 million, andAgency for International Development (AID) direct-hirestaff reduced from 19 to four or five.Unity and electoral democracy have never been highon the US agenda forthe Arabian Peninsula. Washingtonhabitually defers to Saudi perceptions. James Schelsinger,former CIA director and secretary of defense and a manwith some experience in setting the US strategic agenda inthe Middle East, asked recently "whether we seriously desireor prescribe democracy as the proper form of governmentfor other societies. Perhaps the issue is most clearly posedin the Islamic world. Do we seriously want to change the

institutions of Saudi Arabia? The brief answer is no...."16Once elections were scheduled, though, Washington feltobliged to make a show of support. An embassy memo?randum in April 1993 claimed that "We have shaped near?ly every program to strengthen Yemen's emerging demo?cratic institutions and to underline US support for thisdevelopment...."17 Deputy Assistant Secretary of StateDavid Mack arrived in early May to say that he was"instructed to congratulate the Yemeni people and gov?ernment."18Accordingly, with $480,000 (mostly for American staffand their travel expenses), AID funded the InternationalFoundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), the National

Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), andthe International Republican Institute (IRI) to assist elec?tion officials and observers.19 Hastily arranged, these pro?jects had minimal effect. IFES was still conducting train?ing on the eve ofthe elections, using a syllabus their ownteam leader considered inadequate. IRI's team of inter?national observers included few Arabic speakers. Even theUS Republicans could not overcome neighboring Arabstates' reluctance to have their citizens observe the process.The IRI team included one person from the United ArabEmirates and a Bahraini who arrived on a tourist visa.NDI's plan to organize volunteer Yemeni monitors foreachof the 7,000 polling stations was a fiasco, and illustratedthe NDI's lack offamiliarity with an Arab environment.20US press coverage was favorable, as were the reportsof these US and international observer groups. ButWashington's reaction was qualified by an obvious concernthat pluralism not spread to other parts of the Peninsula.The State Department's Mack emphasized that "one elec?tion does not make a democracy" and that US support ismore likely to consist ofcorporate investments than restoredlevels of aid. While holding that Yemen would have to takefurther steps toward democracy before satisfying US stan?dards, and agreeing that countries have the right to choosethe style of democracy that best suits their internal envi?ronments, Mack then cited Kuwait's more controlled, lim?ited-participation poll last August as a precedent forYemen!21



6/6

US and Gulf pressures may have been a factor inYemen's appointment of a new foreign minister,Muhammad Salim Basindwa, who publicly disavowedYemen's Gulf war stance and spent much of his time awayfrom the fray courting a rapprochement with the Gulfmonarchies.22 Ambassador Hughes announced a modest$1.7 million increase in US assistance, but made it clearthat improved Yemeni relations with the Gulf are moreimportant to Washington than civil rights and politicalpluralism.23Post-Election DevelopmentsIn the new parliament's first session, Shaikh Abdallah al-Ahmar, the Isiah leader, won the speakership with 223votes. Balloting for three deputy speakers returned oneeach fromGPC, Ba'th and YSP. A package of constitutionalamendments put immediately to the Chamber proposedreplacing the existing five-man Presidential Council, tech?nically selected by the Chamber, with a US-style two-termpresident and vice president; creating an upper house (aConsultative Council) with equal representation for eachgovernorate; and mandating elections for the local coun?cils, district administrators and governors.24 An Islah-pro-posed amendment would require that all Yemeni lawsconform to shari'a.

Pending discussion of these amendments, parliamentextended the term of the transition Presidential Council,with three Congress members and two Socialists, throughOctober. Prime Minister Abu Bakr al-Attas of the YSP,asked to form the new government, appointed 15 minis?ters fromthe GPC, eight Socialists, six fromIsiah, and AbuShuarib of the Ba'th.25 Only a third of these 30 ministerswere new.A general eight-point government program, whose mostsensitive proposal concerned the long-delayed merger ofthe two armies, was put to parliament for a vote of confi?dence in early July.26But just when bargaining and com?promises seemed to produce a workable coalition, thedeputies balked. For more than a week in late July andearly August, al-Ahmar pounded his gavel in a vain attemptto restore order as a raucous debate raged over the pro?gram, the constitutional amendments, the compositionof the Presidential Council, and unification of the armedforces. After an alternative program drafted by parlia?mentary committee was presented, 260 deputies demand?ed to address the floor, threatening to drag on the debateendlessly. Finally a vote of confidence on the programpassed on the implicit premise that the substance of thedebate would be deferred to deliberations on the consti?tutional amendments package. As the Chamber went intorecess in early August, the Isiah and the Socialists wereeach threatening to withdraw from the coalition unlesstheir respective demands forshari'a law and the vice pres?idency were met.When parliament reconvened in September, a three-party committee was formed to discuss the proposed con?stitutional amendments, now revised to concentrate more

power in the hands of the chief executive. Critics, includ?ing the newly-formed opposition coalition of five small par?ties, many Socialists, and independent intellectuals, con?tended that the current constitution has not yet beenimplemented, and that the continuing focus on the com?position of government institutions only served to divertattention away from a deepening economic crisis whichpromises to grow more acute as a World Bank-IMF struc?tural adjustment program is put into effect. Popular rat?ification of the political establishment has not diminishedprofound disagreements over basic issues of governanceand accountability, and more than a few thoughtfulYemenis fear that even the startling accomplishments ofthe last several years?unification and participatory pol?itics?remain vulnerable to hostile forces in the countryand in the region. ?Footnotes1Financialimes, ay 4,1993.2SECTechnicalommitteeinaleport,l-Taqrirl-khatami'lijnahl-faniahSan'a, .d.).3 SEC nformationommittee,Parliamentarylections7th pril,993,"an'a. helow egistrationates or omenave een ttributedo ack f eparateegistrationfacilitiesnmanyonstituencies;he equirementf hotographsor oteregistration;exceptionallyighates flliteracymongomen;nd,n omelaces,utrightiscour?agementfwomenromoting.he onservativesiah, hileiscouragingomenromrunning,ctivelyecruitedemaleoters.4 Conversationsith uhammadabarah,bd l-'Aziz asaud,ndHamudl-'Udi,llof an'a niversity.n he conomicspects,ee heila arapico,The conomicimensionof emeninity,"iddleastReport184September-October993),p. -14.5Despitentagonismetweenheirackers,audi rabiandraq,heeadershe siahand he a'thhareinksoYemen'sribal ilieu.QAl-Thawrah,ay,1993.fterearingppeals,heupremeourtecommendedecountsin ix istrictsnd e-electionsn our,ncludingne odeidaonstituencyherehe ssas?sinationf GPC andidateays eforehe lectionorcedts uspension.7YSPpressonference,pril0,1993;ECpressonference,ay ,1993.8 Seat ountsid otccuratelyeflecthe opularote:8percentorheGPC, 8per?cent or he ocialists,7percentorsiah,9percentorndependents,nd he emain?der or 0 mallerarties.l-Quds,ay 3,1993.he fficialovernmentress ut heGPC head fndependents.9SeeAl-Mustaqbal,ecember2, 991;nd he nterviewith haikh bdl-WahabMuhammadinan,emenimesYT), ecember5,1991.10 ee herticlesyMuhammadbdul-Malikl-MutawakkilnYT, ugust2 nd ugust19,1992;nd Nationalonference'soliticalommunique,"T,November5,1992.11Ahmad o'manl-Madhagi,Assessinghe aizConference,"T, ecember,1992.12Ahmado'manl-Madhagi,Yemen'sightlexestsMuscles,"T, ecember0,1992.13Abd l-Azizl-Saqqafefeatedsuit roughtgainstim orriticizinghe residentinYemenimes,ivingopeoMuhammadbd l-Rahmanf l-Tashihnd awt l-'Ummal,ccusedf imilarcrimes."14Womenlso ave at essionsut ave ot een bservedn his ew,oliticalode.15Yemen-AmericanriendshipssociationYAFA)eminarnUS-Yemenielations,an'a,July2,1993.16 The uestorPost-Coldar olicy,"oreignffairs2,1, .20.17USIA/San'a,nclassifiedable.18 nterviewithhmado'manl-Madhagi,T,May 6,1993;nd roupiscussionithMack, ay ,1993.19TheNDI nd heRI re othffiliatesf he uasi-officialationalndowmentorDemocracy.hese Sfunds ererantedoUS nstitutions,ndnot ivensassistanceto he emeniovernment.20Ahmadomanl-Madhagi,npublishedaperon lectionbservers),pril993.21Seefootnote8.22SeeAl-Islah,ugust,1993,eportingaudi cceptancef emeniemocracy.23Ambassadorughes'emarkstYAFAymposium.n hemeantime,niversityro?fessorsndawyersrganizingSaudi rganizationor hari'a ightsererrestedorcrimesncludingmugglingapesf emenioliticalampaignsnd arliamentaryebates.24 The irstf everalersionsf he mendmentsroposedhat he ice resident,Consultativeouncilnd ocal fficialsp o ndncludingovernorsoulde lected;later ersionalledorlectionnlyf istrictfficials.eeAbu akrl-Saqqaf,Malahuzatfi l-Inqalabl-Disturi,"art,Al-Mustaqbal,ugust,1993.25Al-Thawra,ay 1,1993.26Al-Raay,uly,1993


elections and mass politics

Documents