electoral politics || electoral behaviour in montserrat

ELECTORAL BEHAVIOUR IN MONTSERRATAuthor(s): HOWARD A. FERGUSSource: Caribbean Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 1, ELECTORAL POLITICS (MARCH, 1981), pp. 32-41Published by: University of the West Indies and Caribbean QuarterlyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40653412 .

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ELECTORAL BEHAVIOUR IN MONTSERRAT

by

HOWARD A. FERGUS

Introduction In the November 1978 general elections in Montserrat, the Government of Austin

Bramble's Progressive Democratic Party (PDP) was plucked from power, root and branch, and replaced by the People's Liberation Movement (PLM) led by John A. Osborne. The latter owns a number of ships and is a reputed millionaire. The PLM won six of the island's seven seats, with an equality of votes in the seventh. The seventh seat naturally went to the PLM since the Constitution of the island permits the Legislative Council to meet and resolve such a tie.

In their total rejection of the incumbent party the Montserrat electorate re-enacted history. Austin Bramble's PDP had swept the polls when he gained power eight years previously; and his father whom he ousted, had in 1952 captured all of the island's four seats when his Montserrat Labour Party (MLP) won the merchant-planter oligarchy, to form the first popular government.

When in 1973 Bramble called a snap election ostensibly to seek a mandate to combat racism-an issue which was hardly aired in the campaign- he won six of the seven seats of the Legislature. The seventh went to incumbent candidate, John Osborne who had won it in 1970 on Bramble's party ticket.

This article explores and analyses this extremist trend of the Montserrat electorate. It also examines the enigmatic alignments which have emerged in party politics in Mont- serrat and the way both phenomena combine to give what is emerging as a characteristic unpredictability, if not schizophrenia to political behaviour in the 39.5 square mile British colony.

Electoral Practice and Political Alignments TABLE I

The 1952 Election Results

Constituencies Montserrat Labour Party Merchant-Planters

Wouthern B.W. Edwards 665 H.S. Mercer 201 Plymouth R.W. Griffith 816 W.L. Wall 335 Northern E.T. Edgecombe 284 J. Edgecombe 115 Windward W.H. Bramble 268 R.E.D. Osborne 245 Central M.E. Walkinshaw (Unopposed)

Source: The Observer, February 23, 1952.

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TABLE II


Montserrat Progressive Constituencies Labour Party Democratic Party Independents

Southern Michael Dyer 207 Mary R. Tuitt 302 P.R. Riley 68 Plymouth Erik Kelsick 177 P.A. Bramble 703 Northern J.J. Howe 106 J.J. Weekes 159 Joshua Weekes 136 North-western D.C. Fenton 134 J.A. Osborne 426 Windward R.G.Joseph 236 J.S.Dublin 246 Central W.H. Bramble 248 E.A. Dyer 393 Eastern B.W.Edwards 75 W.H.Ryan 286

Source - File: General Elections, Government House, Montserrat.

TABLE III


Progressive Montserrat Constituencies Democratic Party Action Party Independents

Southern M.R. Tuitt 383 M. Dyer 200 Plymouth P.A. Bramble 612 D.C. Fenton 91 Northern J.J. Weekes 143

Joshua Weekes 136 North-western R.C. Allen 125 J.A. Osborne 292 Windward R.J. Joseph 261 D.A. Payne 87 Central E.A. Dyer 440 J.S. Dublin 106 T.E. Meade 130 Eastern W.H. Ryan 314 R. Lewis 41

Source - Montserrat Mirror, September, 1973.

TABLE IV


Progressive People's Libera- Constituencies Democratic Party tion Movement Independents

Southern M.R. Tuitt 244 J.A.Taylor 244 R.Samuel 62 Plymouth P.A. Bramble 420 F. Marge tson 684

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Northern J.D.C. Allen 43 J.B.Chalmers 256 M. Bramble 29 A.A. Joseph 94 J. Weekes 8

North-western D.C. Fenton 102 J.A. Osborne 439 Windward R.G.Joseph 222 T.E. Meade 398 Central E. A. Dyer 245 J.S.Dublin 429 Eastern W.H.Ryan 166 Ν. Tuitt 255

Source - File: The 1978 General Elections, Council Chamber, Montserrat.

The saga begins with W.H. Bramble (Bramble senior) the most prominent leader of the working-class movement which started in Montserrat in 1946, a decade after the catalytic riots in nearby St Kitts. Operating from a trade and labour union base, Bramble wrested power from the merchant-planters, the heirs of the old plantocracy and the new agents of post-emancipation colonialism. The winning of all the seats may have been without parallel, but the rest was ordinary enough; for several Labour Parties had already gained power in the Anglophone Caribbean.

What was extraordinary, was the overthrow of W.H. Bramble by his eldest son and supposed heir in 1970. He was then Minister of Social Services and a member of his father's Cabinet (Executive Council). (It might be noted that a member of Bramble's Montserrat Labour Party, E.T. Edgecombe, had opposed and defeated his brother, J.W. Edgecombe, in 1952). Young Bramble won all seven seats and banished his father to the proverbial political wilderness. This happened when Bramble seemed at the zenith of power and could make some justifiable claims to a successful regime. He had begun the protracted task of translating the legal freedom conceded by the British in 1838 into some semblance of socio-economic reality for the masses; he had mitigated the inequity of metayage and later terminated it , he had outlawed arbitrary and vindictive tenant evictions by over-mighty landlords; and had secured for the common man who comprised over 90 per cent of the population, a voice in the citadel of political power- a voice albeit subdued by powerful economic forces and interests and by the constraining clauses of a colonial constitution.

But Bramble may have served his turn. At any rate, he appeared to his son and under- study to be making political blunders grave enough to outweigh familial considerations and warrant the declaration of an intestine political war. Young Bramble accused his father of being autocratic, though he blamed this partly on the supineness of his yes-men Cabinet colleagues; he also criticized his father for alienating agricultural land in his policy of accommodating 'resident' tourists from North America.

In John Osborne his 1978 arch-enemy, Austin Bramble found a willing and financially able political ally in 1970. Although young Bramble's faction included a one-time primary school Head Teacher in Mary Tuitt, the capabilities of his followers were far from impressive. Even if they were not all yes-men, many of their no's were uninformed.

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Ironically, therefore, young Bramble's political enemies criticized him for absolutist tendencies,4 thereby repeating Bramble's own charge against his father. In the 1970 campaign, senior Bramble had advised the electorate, with either worldly wisdom or prophetic insight, that "a chip off the old block is still the same block"-a quote used to his disadvantage by young Bramble's political opponents.

Like the father, the son fell from power at a point where his claims to a successful regime seemed tenable; his social services and welfare programme -free drugs and medical attention for the aged, a school feeding programme, a milk dole for infants-were bene- fitting the masses; he had contained the inflation fueled by the petroleum prices within tolerable limits; engineered the take-off stage of industrialization, and had earned some respect within the Caribbean Economic Community (CARICOM), as an LDC (Lesser Developed Countries) statesman. True, export agriculture had declined and his trade union policy incomprehensibly dated.5 But on balance, he had to an appreciable extent enhanced the general welfare. In fact, his policies may have been more directed towards the masses and in mass participation in development than were his father's. The latter had settled for traditional methods of wooing foreign investment; he aided and abetted a traffic in real estate which not only carved up prime agricultural land, but bade fair to creating a wealthy North-American ghetto in a black, insolvent colony. In so doing, W.H. Bramble raised both the standard and cost of living and may also have invested in serious social problems.

It would seem easier to rationalize the father's fall than that of the son. The mass exodus of agricultural workers to the United Kingdom in 1960s robbed the island of the direct beneficiaries of senior Bramble's earlier work. Consequently, his appeal to the masses became less stirring. In denouncing his father's weaknesses as he perceived them, Austin Bramble's voice had a sincere ring. With his better formal education, he had a more sympathetic ear for the younger generation. At the same time he was preserving both the working-class leadership and the Bramble "dynasty." William Bramble himself lost his seat to a youngster of about thirty years old.

Academic, trade union leader, and political agitator George Irish, in a comment on Austin Bramble's defeat, attributed it to the coalition between his own Montserrat Allied Workers Union (MAWU) and John Osborne's PLM. He also asserted that the workers joined forces with the distressed merchants (my emphasis), and disenchanted civil servants to oust the younger Bramble. Irish's comment complicates rather than elucidates the issues. His own alliance with the PLM is at least surprising and not because he once had a cordial relationship with Austin Bramble. That had obviously turned sour if not bitter. (In a micro island "personal antagonisms can poison public affairs")7. But because Irish the professed champion of the workers was supporting a bourgeois-backed party. In addition, the economic forces and interests behind the PLM were the direct socio-economic, and in some cases, blood descendants of the merchant-planter clique whom W-.H. Bramble had originally defeated. (Significantly W.H. Bramble entered the legislature in 1952 by defeating merchant-planter R.E.D. Osborne. In 1978 John Osborne, a relative of the latter, led his party to victory against P. Austin Bramble,

35



son of the former). The alliance of the working classes with the middle and upper classes against Austin Bramble seemed as unlikely as Irish's own entente with the stal- warts of the PLM.8

Irish's political behaviour is consonant with the unpredictable and enigmatic manoeuvres which characterise Montserrat politics. It belongs to that same political milieu in which a son opposes a father, and brothers run against each other. D.C. Fenton runs against Austin Bramble's Party in 1970 and 1973 and then runs with him in 1978. Richard G. Joseph campaigns on a W.H. Bramble party ticket and loses in 1970, turns to Austin Bramble's Party in 1973, and wins in the same constituency. Irish's campaign rhetoric was directed against the Brambles, but his ideological position is congruent with their socio-political philosophy and inconsonant with the PLM platform.9

In the examination of electoral behaviour and political alignments in Montserrat, certain clear features emerge: electoral mandates are total and unequivocal; this has tended to give the island a one-party legislature; defection from parties and the switching of party allegiance are not uncommon; intra-familial party opposition has surfaced at least wice. What is not clear is the explanation for this situation.

In Search of a Rationale

It is indeed difficult to find a rationale for the seeming irrationality of the political behaviour patterns revealed by this paper. One is superficially tempted to conclude that the behaviour of the electorate is dictated by caprice and emotionalism while that of the political protagonists is dictated by opportunism. But the coziness of such a conclusion prompts a suspicion of over-simplicity.

The defeat of the merchant-planter oligarchy in 1952 is understandable. It was fitting for the proletariat to celebrate and appropriate universal adult suffrage by ousting the old monopolists from power. Other Labour Parties had attained power in the neighbour- ing islands. In a society in which occupation was dominated by estate labour, the word "Labour" had an emotional appeal. (When Montserratians emigrated to Britain, they automatically voted for the British Labour Party). On Bramble's tongue, the word "labour" took on a liberating tone of tremendous impact. This explanation is however inapplicable to the other electoral see-saws and political musical chairs which have been noticed.

In ad hoc interviews and informal discussion with Montserratians on this subject, two explanations have been advanced. One view is that because of the size of the island and the smallness of the electorate, the people respond as if they were but one constituency. (In 1952 the number of registered voters were 2,600; 5,030 in 1970 and 5,679 in 1978). Proponents of this view argue that there is little or no divergence in the needs and aspirations of the voters. The people of the "one-constituency" island respond therefore with a unanimous voice. This submission has merit, but ignores the fact that the Northern Electoral District has always returned Independents except in the years of total mandate; that the present Chief Minister Osborne retained his seat as an Independent after his

36



defection from Austin Bramble's PDP, and that there are distinct cultural, ethnic and economic differences between the people of the far north of the island and the far east, island size notwithstanding. The size of the island cannot, however, be totally discounted as a partial explanation for political behaviour in Montserrat.

The other explanation and one that is widely subscribed to, is that Montserratians vote for the party rather than for the personality. Again, this ignores the tendency in the Northern Electoral District to vote Independent and John Osborne's monopoly of the North-western seat. Moreover, to argue that Montserratians vote for the party is to endow party organization with a pretentiousness and sophistication to which they cannot justifiably lay claim. Political parties in Montserrat are loose ephemeral organizations formed for contesting a specific election. There are no ancillary bodies, or area branches, and no central party executive. The first Labour Party of W.H. Bramble may have been somewhat different because it had its foundation in the Trade Union Movement. The manifesto of the ruling People's Liberation Movement claims to be a party of "the agricultural and domestic workers, the fishermen, the mechanics and taximen, the small farmers, the small shopkeepers and the professional and businessmen."10 If this is so, it is an ad hoc and uncoordinated assemblage without any unifying principles. D.P.J. Wood makes a similar point in his discussion of the political consequences of smallness: "instead of parties based on intellectual convictions or class, factions may spring up which are only kept loosely together by various personal bonds." The PLM is a Party which at once embraces the radical platforms of a George Irish (in Montserrat terms at least)11 and the traditional middle-to-upper class conservatives of Montserrat. Worker participation in management and free enterprise are unusual, if not strange bedfellows; the former is demanded by Irish and the latter tooted by the PLM bosses 12 who are apparently sup- ported by the powerful Montserrat Chamber of Commerce.13 The PLM as constituted therefore, does not promise permanence, consistency or tight organization. The ease with which candidates change sides is further evidence of the fluid nature of parties in Montserrat.

Neither the "one-constituency" argument nor the "party basis" argument offers an adequate rationale for the extremist electoral responses of the Montserrat voters. While the size of the island is a contributing factor, it is not an adequate explanation. The answer in our view lies mostly in the fact that all the ruling parties which have so far emerged have been one-man parties. This also serves to explain the ease with which party members change sides as opportunity dictates for both the party and the individuals. Both patterns of behaviour are part and parcel of the sample political phenomenon.

Before advancing this argument, it is useful to summarize the history of the party dominants. In 1952, W.H. Bramble was the dominant. With a messianic accent, he called on the people of the east to "arise and throw off the yoke which binds you to Wade plantations."14 The first leader of the working classes was really R.W. Griffith who won a seat in the legislature as early as 1943. He accomplished little in a parliament dominated by planters and merchants, but became part founder and leader of the Montserrat Trades and Labour Union. By the mid-nineteen fifties, he had lost the initiative to Bramble's

37



more radical leadership. In 1970, Austin Bramble's leadership potentials and aspirations could not be accommodated within his father's "one-man" party, so he broke away to form his own. About a year later, John Osborne and John Dublin, themselves ambitious for leadership, abandoned Austin Bramble and later formed their own party.

Osborne and Dublin's first attempt to form a party was for the 1973 snap election. It was never quite clear who was to be leader, but by election eve the party, The Montserrat Action Party (MAP), had disintegrated leaving Dublin as both leader and member. His loss of the election led to the demise of this one-man party. An interesting feature of this election was the number of independents (seven) who participated and their obvious inability to combine into one strong Opposition faction. By 1978, the leadership problem was settled and John Osborne emerged as the party dominant and ultimately the new politician-king.

TABLE V

Dates Politician-Kings Party

1943 - 195215 R.W. Griffith "The Book of Life" 1952 - 1970 W.H. Bramble Montserrat Labour Party 1970 - 1978 P.A. Bramble Progressive Democratic Party 1978 - J.A. Osborne People's Liberation Movement

The Montserrat electorate has always looked to a patriarchal figure. In changing governments, they are really changing one father figure for another. It may be a psychological relic of the dependence bred by the slave system and perpetuated by the post-emancipation landlordism. The new estate owners affectionately titled "Marse" (the etymological connection with "master" is readily apparent), succeeded the slave owner or his attorney as guardian "provider" and disciplinarian. With the advent of universal adult suffrage, a crucial landmark in the process of liberation, the politician-king became the new boss and mentor with an added role of saviour.

Austin Bramble's 1970 attack was aimed essentially at his father and not his Labour Party. The other members of government were yes-men and vote catchers. In response, the people voted for Austin and not so much for his father. They identified themselves with the new messiah. Similarly, the political arsenal of John Osborne 's group was reserved for Austin Bramble. When his party members were mentioned, their non- participation and the "silence" in the Council was referred to. And although the PLM is promising "team work where there was one-man rule"16; it is the voice of John Osborne which stirs the people. Symbolically, he rode with an election victory float, taking the χ position normally reserved for a calypso king or a carnival queen. He has become the new politician-king.

The political immaturity of the populace helps to perpetuate the practice of voting for

38



a father figure. The masses respond at an emotional level; there is no real assessment of platforms, abilities and achievements. Comments such as the following were common prior to the 1978 elections: "the Brambles were there long enough: let someone else get some of the money"; "Osborne can't do any worse"; "time for a change." The state- ments evince an illogicality and a marked puerility. It is true that the sacrosantity which hedges the politician-king has diminished considerably since W.H. Bramble and neither his son nor the present leader possesses his kind of charisma. For this reason, the new leaders may have shorter reigns, but their patriarchal stature is unmistakable.

The choice of the politician -king is aided by an established dominant mood. The people read the climate and wait to be swayed by it. The size of the island facilitates the establishment of such a mood as well as unified action. In rejecting the man, they automatically reject the party, for the man is the party. This, in our view, explains Austin Bramble's fall and his father's before him.

Future Perspectives It is not readily discernible whether these trends in political behaviour will persist.

Certain reasonable prognostications can however be made. John Osborne is the undoubted leader, but he is not a collossus, except in wealth. In Dublin and Margetson, he is flanked by two men with some ability which at least equals his own. Because this troika needs each other, an internal challenge for leadership is not likely. George Irish's appearance on the PLM platform also has implications for the political contours of the future. He appeared after a definite pro-PLM mood had been established, but crowds warmed to his impassioned rhetoric and his criticisms of the Brambles. He did not win the election, but ensured the decisiveness of a PLM victory. More importantly, he registered his claim as a possible successor or alternative to John Osborne.

If new alignments and polarisations are to emerge Osborne and Irish may be the natural leaders. The potential for strains which are inherent in the Irish-PLM pact has already been remarked on. Where Osborne offers his personal achievements and a pedestrian attachment to free enterprise, the university -fostered agitator is after radical social changes. Irish has the ear of some of the masses and so too does Osborne. The latter, sometimes a merchant, has the support of the Chamber of Commerce and a large section of the middle and upper classes-the group who are opposed to some of Irish's schemes. Against such a team, Irish will need assistance. It is possible, however, for Osborne and Irish to strike an operational compromise. (The power of Osborne's wealth and connec- tions cannot be discounted). Even so, Austin Bramble, young, vigorous and intelligent, cannot be written off. Much will depend on how successfully the PLM governs the country. At any rate, to stage a return, Bramble will need not only programmes and policies, but personalities to champion the causes. The day of the one-man government may be over.

The fall of the Brambles seems to mark the end of an age. It may have brought the curtain down on the solo rule of the politician-king and opened the way for members of the intelligentsia to enter the political arena. Hopefully, this will create a more enlightened

39



political climate in which the electorate will mature. Thus, the way will be paved for a genuine two-party system to emerge and with it some rationality and stability in electoral behaviour and party alignments.

If these developments fail to take place, it were time that Montserrat drop the preten- tious attempts to work a two-party system along the lines of Westminster. It could then devise a simpler form of government more suited to its size, the temperament of its people and the slimness of its public purse.

FOOTNOTES

1. Government of Montserrat, Montserrat Constitution and Elections Ordinance.

2. The merchant and planters did not form a formal party, but there was an understanding among them. J. Edgecombe is placed in this column for convenience. Although a small land-owner like his brother whom he opposed, he was outside the social circle of the planter-merchant class qua class.

3. H.A. Fergus, History of Alliouagana: A Short History of Montserrat, University of the West

Indies, Department of Extra-Mural Studies (Montserrat), 1975, p. 40.

4. The People's Liberation Movement, Manifesto: Policy for Progress, 1978, pp. 3, 10, 13.

5. J.A.G. Irish, "MAWU Speaks Out" in Montserrat Mirror, November 25, 1978, p. 3. He may not have gone to the extent suggested by Irish, but had shown reluctance to recognize the Montser- rat Allied Workers Union. For a rejoiner from P.A. Bramble, see Montserrat Mirror, December 9, 1978, p. 4.

6. J.A. George Irish, idem.

7. D.P.J. Wood, "The Smaller Territories: Some Political Considerations" in Problems of Smaller Territories, R. Benedict (edr), London, University of London, The Athlone Press, 1967, p. 33.

8. For the terms of the Irish-PLM pact as stated by Irish, see Montserrat Mirror, November 18, 1978, p. 7.

9. J.A.G. Irish, idem.

10. J.A.G. Irish, "MAWU Speaks Out", op. cit.

11. D.P.J. Wood, op. cit.

12. J.A.G. Irish, Montserrat Mirror, November 18, 1978, p. 7.

13. Montserrat Mirror, March 23, 1978, p. 12; The People's Liberation Movement, Manifesto: Policy for Progress, 1978, p. 3.

14. See article "Chicken, D.F.M.C. and the Chamber" and "Editor's Note" in Montserrat Mirror November 18, 1978, p. 7.

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15. Montserrat Labour Party, Manifesto, 1951.

16. The People's Liberation Movement, op. cit.

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