electoral politics || electoral reform in jamaica

13
ELECTORAL REFORM IN JAMAICA Author(s): G.E. MILLS Source: Caribbean Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 1, ELECTORAL POLITICS (MARCH, 1981), pp. 20-31 Published by: University of the West Indies and Caribbean Quarterly Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40653411 . Accessed: 15/06/2014 03:52 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. . University of the West Indies and Caribbean Quarterly are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Caribbean Quarterly. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 194.29.185.109 on Sun, 15 Jun 2014 03:52:20 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Upload: ge-mills

Post on 20-Jan-2017

217 views

Category:

Documents


1 download

TRANSCRIPT

Page 1: ELECTORAL POLITICS || ELECTORAL REFORM IN JAMAICA

ELECTORAL REFORM IN JAMAICAAuthor(s): G.E. MILLSSource: Caribbean Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 1, ELECTORAL POLITICS (MARCH, 1981), pp. 20-31Published by: University of the West Indies and Caribbean QuarterlyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40653411 .

Accessed: 15/06/2014 03:52

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

University of the West Indies and Caribbean Quarterly are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve andextend access to Caribbean Quarterly.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 194.29.185.109 on Sun, 15 Jun 2014 03:52:20 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 2: ELECTORAL POLITICS || ELECTORAL REFORM IN JAMAICA

ELECTORAL REFORM IN JAMAICA

by

G.E. MILLS

The Jamaican general election of 30 October 1980 was the focus of considerable international attention - a focus centred primarily on the struggle between the two major contending parties and divergent forecasts of the likely outcome. In the event, following a record 86.7 per cent voter turnout,1 the opposition Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) gained a landslide victory over the governing democratic socialist People's National Party (PNP) which had itself won a second term overwhelmingly less than four years before.

However, a highly significant feature of the framework within which the election was held has attracted scant attention outside of Jamaica: I refer to the new electoral system, functioning under the direction of an independent bi-partisan committee, which under- went its first major test.

The political context and background

The new constitution of 1944 which brought a modicum of semi-responsible govern- ment to Jamaica also ushered universal adult suffrage into the electoral system. Significantly, too, the general election of 1944 was the first fought on the basis of organized political parties. Since that time, despite continuous efforts to improve the electoral machinery and especially the enumeration-registration process, allegations of fraud in the administration of the system have perennially been expressed in election post-mortems - usually by the losers.

Criticisms and strictures have been directed generally against breaches provided through loopholes inherent in the system and abuses perpetrated by corrupt election officials. These have focused more specifically on charges such as "bogus voting", that is, imperson- ation (voting in a fictitious name, in the name of a deceased person, etc.), multiple voting by an individual, the deliberate omission of qualified persons from the electoral list, the "padding" of the list, and the stuffing of ballot boxes.

These irregularities and malpractices are not peculiar to Jamaica. Similar problems obtain in a number of other countries - both "developing" and "developed" - including Canada and the United States. However, as Ann Spackman has observed in a comprehen- sive article on Electoral Administration in Jamaica, "widespread dissatisfaction with the register (and other elements of the system) can lead to an erosion of faith in the whole electoral process."2 The level of dissatisfaction with the system is reflected to some extent in the number and nature of petitions filed after each election.3 Of relevance, too, is the fact that from time to time committees of the House of Representatives were .set up to investigate malpractices following certain general or by-elections.4

20

This content downloaded from 194.29.185.109 on Sun, 15 Jun 2014 03:52:20 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 3: ELECTORAL POLITICS || ELECTORAL REFORM IN JAMAICA

The two-party schism

The Spackman article was written after the 1967 general election. Since then, the problems have intensified with the entrenchment of the two-party system. It should be noted that the two major parties have continuously alternated in office, virtually on a two-term rota, since the introduction of party government more than 35 years ago. In fact no third party has ever won a seat in general or by-elections nor has an independent candidate won a seat since the 1949 election.

The entrenchment of the two-party system with its accompanying feature of intense party competition has culminated, especially during the past decade, in a condition of deep-seated cleavage and political polarization of the society.

Indeed, a virtual tribal situation exists, which affects almost all facets of life. The acrimony between the "ins" who support the party of the day and the "outs" springs primarily from a contest for control over the distribution of the scarce spoils of victory at the polls. Charges and counter-charges are levelled continuously by one side or the other (depending on which party happens to be in power at the time) alleging victimization in the allocation of such spoils and the denial of government contracts, housing, and jobs to non-supporters of the governing party.5

A.W. Singham noted that these phenomena are characteristic of many small societies. In such societies "where jobs are scarce politics are taken very seriously, and these relation- ships seriously affect all other relationships in the community."6

In Jamaica the process of political polarization has grown apace following the recent governing PNPs declaration in 1974, of its ideology of "democratic socialism." Political partisanship has accentuated the schisms in a deeply divided society - divided even in relation to personal relationships. In this highly charged atmosphere, individuals are simplistically and often maliciously labelled politically and slotted into pigeon-holes and partisan political perspectives colour many everyday judgments - sometimes on the basis of unfounded rumours.

Committee appointments "Individuals who hold public office have a high visibility quotient"; and in an environ-

ment of pervading suspicion where the credibility of public officials has reached its nadir, it is difficult to identify for appointment to such positions, persons in whose integrity and impartiality the public has full confidence.7 This problem exists especially in relation to appointments to commissions enshrined in the constitution as independent bodies, such as the Public Service (PSC) and Police Service Commissions.8

The problems were aggravated in the aftermath of the PNP Government's election victory of December 1976, with the creation of a party "accreditation committee" to screen and clear persons for selection to boards and committees. The public debate about the relative merits of commitment to the party's goals as against skills and competence as criteria for selection extended to the PSC and Police Service Commission. In the midst of this controversy, the then Leader of the Opposition, Mr Edward Seaga, emphasized his

21

This content downloaded from 194.29.185.109 on Sun, 15 Jun 2014 03:52:20 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 4: ELECTORAL POLITICS || ELECTORAL REFORM IN JAMAICA

party's strong views about the need for impartial commissions free of any partisan political control or direction. The members of such commissions should, in their opinion, be selected jointly by the Government and Opposition (or by the Governor-General when there is failure to agree).

Even more seriously, the deep intensity of feelings of rival party supporters and fanatical partisan loyalties on the part of some have stimulated violent eruptions sporadically, and particularly during election campaigns, since 1967. But the incidence of political violence and murders assumed a new dimension and became a more persistent, sustained, and highly significant element during the year preceding the general election of 1980.

Yet, despite this catalogue of problems, the increasing level of politicization of the society during the PNP's regime, and especially since 1974, has also had some positive consequences. This fact, together with the process of political education, has contributed towards the development of an "electorate which has become more politically conscious and aware of both political and social issues"; a situation which is reflected in the very high voter turnout at recent general elections.11

The economic context

The economic environment of the period 1974-80 also had a significant impact on decisions relating to the electoral system. A combination of international and internal factors led to a deterioration of the country's balance -of-payments position and "culminated in the complete exhaustion of foreign reserves at the end of 1976."12

As a result, the Government entered into a support agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in July 1977, which was restructured in 1978 but eventually terminated in 1979 following repeated failure by the country to meet performance targets. At the end of 1979 and early in 1980, intensive discussions took place between government representatives and IMF officials in efforts to devise a new agreement.

However, in the wake of controversy centring on the harsh terms required by the IMF, the Government decided in March 1980, to discontinue the negotiations. This decision had significant repercussions, imposing considerable pressure on those responsible for the electoral system.

The pressure for reform

Against this background, Members from both sides of the House from time to time expressed concern about flaws in the "entire electoral machinery and system."13 Dissatisfaction grew to unprecedented levels and reached a climax following the December 1976 general election. Two days after the election the defeated JLP leader raised with the Prime Minister, Michael Manley, a number of fundamental issues relating to consti- tutional and electoral reform, but the Government appeared to sidestep his representa- tions. The JLP then embarked on a national campaign, mobilizing public support for reform. At its annual conference in November 1977 the party decided that if electoral

22

This content downloaded from 194.29.185.109 on Sun, 15 Jun 2014 03:52:20 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 5: ELECTORAL POLITICS || ELECTORAL REFORM IN JAMAICA

reform to establish an impartial body to remove the conduct of elections from within the influence of an elected Minister was not forthcoming, the JLP would not participate in any further elections.

Eventually, after protracted discussions between Government and Opposition com- mencing in February 1978, and agreement on fundamental issues,16 a Special Joint Select Committee on Constitutional and Electoral Reform was set up by Parliament in December 1978. Generally, the committee's deliberations proceeded smoothly with Members from both sides displaying genuine efforts to achieve consensus on removing significant defects from the electoral system. However, during the concluding stages serious conflict threatened to abort a successful conclusion.

In a press statement, the Opposition charged that the Government was "reneging" on decisions agreed between both parties in respect of the proposed method of appoint- ment of the Chief Electoral Officer and of election officials, e.g. returning officers respon- sible for each of the country's 60 constituencies. The JLP strongly opposed the proposal for retention of the system of appointments by the Governor-General acting on the advice of the PSC: this "would place the appointment of the Chief Electoral Officer firmly in the hands of the PSC, which is packed up with known active supporters of the PNP." Further, such an arrangement would continue to allow the Government to appoint its "corrupt henchmen" as election officials and would be a "blueprint for bogus elections."17

These charges were refuted by the Minister responsible for electoral matters who stated "categorically that the Government uncompromisingly rejects any statement or assertions to the effect that we have doublecrossed the Opposition in our discussions on the subject of electoral reform."18

With the eventual resolution of the areas of disagreement, two Bills amending the Representation of the People Act were presented to Parliament and passed unanimously in both Houses in August 19^9.19 The new electoral machinery

The principal outcome of the joint select committee's deliberations was first, the creation of a new statutory institution, the Electoral Advisory Committee which, with the Director of Elections, would assume authority and responsibility for making preparations for and conducting future general and local government elections and by-elections. The committee would consist of four "nominated" members to be proposed equally by the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition and three "selected" (independent) members, one of whom would be Chairman.

It was envisaged that though the committee would serve as an advisory body to the Director (whose statutory powers and functions were prescribed),20 normally the Director would accept its advice. Indeed, the amending Act assigns a seat to the Director, but without voting rights, and stipulates further that where the Director refuses to follow any advice or recommendation of the committee, he shall report the matter to

23

This content downloaded from 194.29.185.109 on Sun, 15 Jun 2014 03:52:20 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 6: ELECTORAL POLITICS || ELECTORAL REFORM IN JAMAICA

Parliament within fourteen days of such refusal. The committee would be an interim institution; to be replaced eventually by an electoral commission with provisions deeply entrenched in the constitution.21

Secondly, the Director of Elections would be appointed by the Governor-General on the recommendation of the committee; and election officials would be appointed and subject to dismissal by the committee. Thus, all these posts, including that of Director, would be removed from ministerial influence and would be independent of ministerial control. Thirdly, a number of glaring weaknesses in the enumeration registration and polling procedures were concurrently removed and additional safeguards provided via amendments to the Act and relevant regulations.22

In presenting the Bill for establishment of the committee to the House, the then Deputy Prime Minister, Mr P.J. Patterson, re-emphasized the objectives of the Government of the time and of the PNP of ensuring

that the electoral system is as fair, as impartial, as beyond question as possible... It must be seen and respected by the entire country to be fair and impartial... Our intention was and remains to get into place in Jamaica an electoral system which removes the political red herring which is constantly being thrown into the pond when people seek to justify their own political reversal.

During the Senate debate which followed, JLP Senator Bruce Golding summarized the main objective of the proposed legislation thus:

What this Bill seeks to do is to remove the control of the electoral machinery, the right to appoint officials, (and) the right to determine decisions within the whole range of things that fall under the Electoral Office, once and for all out of the control of politicians and placed under the control of a body...which is being set up in such a way that is expected to be as impartial as any body could possibly be.

Following "this first giant step towards electoral reform"25 the new Electoral Com- mittee was appointed, but some difficulty was encountered in choosing the selected members. The statute provides for the selection of these members by majority decision of the nominated members, but stipulates that in the event of their failure to complete the recommendations within two weeks after their own appointment, the Governor- General shall make the appointments after consultation with the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition. In fact, the Governor-General was obliged to exercise his prerogative. This was not surprising given the context of political polarization and distrust within the society.

The committee held its first meeting in early October 1979. Its composition is interest- ing: of the four political nominees, one was secretary of the JLP, one was deputy secre- tary of the PNP, one was a lawyer, and the fourth the group managing director of a public enterprise organization. The independent members consisted of the Government's Director of Legal Reform, the recently retired Auditor-General, and the University of the West Indies Professor of Public Administration and Head of its Department of Govern- ment, as Chairman.27

24

This content downloaded from 194.29.185.109 on Sun, 15 Jun 2014 03:52:20 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 7: ELECTORAL POLITICS || ELECTORAL REFORM IN JAMAICA

The committee recruited as Director of Elections and its eighth member and the chief executive officer, a lawyer who had served as adviser to the joint select parliamentary committee - the parent of the new institution. His legal skills and special experience were to prove invaluable during the preparations for and in the conduct of the election itself.

The reform programme The committee set a number of inter-related objectives which it considered essential

pre-requisites for a reformed electoral system to meet the primary criteria of a democratic society. The objectives were enumerated in terms of ensuring the following: 1. that every citizen who is qualified to vote is allowed to exercise his/her right to do so

and to express his preference for a political representative freely and without impedi- ment;

2. that no citizen who is not qualified to vote is allowed to do so;

3. that the "one person - one vote" principle is preserved, and

4. that the outcome of all elections truly represents the will of the electorate.

These goals were set within the context of creating an electoral system which is fair, impartial, honest, and efficient; in which loopholes are plugged to the greatest extent that is humanly feasible. The committee was conscious of the necessity of developing an electoral machinery which would command and fully justify public confidence. Moreover, these characteristics should apply not only to the machinery but also to the quality and behaviour of the personnel charged with administering the system.

If the suspicion and distrust which have characterized attitudes towards the adminis- tration of recent elections were allowed to continue, there would be a real danger of the development of total cynicism leading to grave consequences for Jamaican public life.28

Some of the measures introduced in 1979 to improve enumeration and polling-day procedures provide more effective checks and controls, and greater recognition of and facilities for the political parties. As regards the enumeration process, the improvements include: provision of opportunities for party representatives to make objections to candi- dates for appointment as enumerators; to receive advance notice in writing of the times and places where enumeration will begin from day to day; to sign certificates of enumera- tion, and inspect all enumeration documents.

The amendments provide also for: greater protection of the secrecy of the ballot; the assignment of serial numbers to ballot boxes; the identification of ballot papers by con- stituency name and polling division number; the provision of substitutes (with distinctive features) in the event of loss or destruction of ballot papers, and an agent of each candi- date to accompany the ballot boxes to the returning officers after the preliminary count on polling day.

25

This content downloaded from 194.29.185.109 on Sun, 15 Jun 2014 03:52:20 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 8: ELECTORAL POLITICS || ELECTORAL REFORM IN JAMAICA

Voter identification

The first major concerns of the committee then were to devise safeguards against two significant and recurring sources of abuse, namely impersonation and multiple voting. Elimination of the incidence of impersonation or its reduction to minimum levels would require the provision of an effective means for identifying each qualified elector and his appropriate polling division. The committee therefore decided that each elector should be required to bear a photograph as an integral element of an identification card - the photographing to be carried out simultaneously with the house-to-house enumeration process.30 This would form the nucleus of a proposed national registration system agreed upon during the bi-partisan discussions of 1979.

To avoid multiple voting, the committee decided to use on polling day "integrity equipment", a mechanism (involving ultra-violet light) designed to detect within a 48- hour period, the presence of electoral ink on the fingers (even when scrubbed) of a person presenting himself at the polling station. Implementation of the first decision was aborted when, following the Government's withdrawal from the IMF negotiations, the Leader of the Opposition indicated in a letter to the committee's chairman31 that in the JLP's view

the events of the past few days have so altered the course of the nation that in the interest of national stability and ultimately survival, mid-year general elections must now become the most urgent national priority.

This view, supported immediately by the Prime Minister,32 was accompanied by sug- gestions for the introduction of a modified arrangement, one which could be implemented earlier than the proposed photograph-ID system but should nevertheless contain adequate safeguards and ensure the production of a fair voters' list.

Earlier, in a radio and television broadcast on 3 February 1980, the Prime Minister announced that in the light of the economic situation and the failure to agree to the IMF terms, "Jamaica needs to settle the question of the economic strategy which is to be pursued in the immediate future" and to "settle a clear line of unified national action." Hence, "as soon as the Electoral Committee is able to advise me that an appropriate new electoral system is in place, I shall call a new election."33

The proposals put to the committee by the Leader of the Opposition and the Prime Minister would involve dispensing temporarily with the photograph-ID system. Their implications were considered very carefully. The committee had to be convinced that it could design a system which, though "second best", would provide reasonable safeguards against irregularities and especially against impersonation. Concluding that this was feasible the committee agreed, in the national interest, to introduce a modified system in the short-term; but the important photograph-ID component would be held in abeyance for revival later.

These conclusions were based primarily on the checks which would be provided by the proposed certificate of enumeration - to be prescribed as a form of identification on polling day - and the elector's personal data which would be available to election

26

This content downloaded from 194.29.185.109 on Sun, 15 Jun 2014 03:52:20 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 9: ELECTORAL POLITICS || ELECTORAL REFORM IN JAMAICA

officials.34 These features would be supported by the use of the integrity equipment by the new procedures for selection and appointment of returning officers and other election officials (by the electoral committee after advertisement and interview),35 and the train- ing and supervision of these officials. Moreover, restricting the number of electors at each polling station to approximately 250 would facilitate identification by local election officials and party agents, most of whom would be recruited from the same communities as the electors.

Preparation for the general election

In approaching the enumeration exercise, the committee had to decide whether to up- date the current list of electors - prepared in 1976 - or to embark on an entirely new enumeration. Although the former would have been a less time-consuming process, the committee concluded, primarily because of the significant number of omissions from and improper inclusions in the 1976 lists, that there were overriding advantages in conducting a fresh enumeration. This decision was strengthened by the disclosures and the judge's findings in a recent election petition case.36

The field operations, involving house-to-house data collection, were completed in a record six weeks and were most successful. A total of 990,500 persons (more than 90 per cent of those eligible) were registered, in spite of violence and intimidation which pre- vented enumerators and scrutineers (from one or the other political party) from entering some areas, especially in certain parts of Kingston and neighbouring parishes.37 The incidence of violence in these areas, fanned by partisan loyalties, proved an almost intractable problem not only during the enumeration period but throughout the months leading up to polling day. This condition threatened to vitiate the objective of ensuring free and fair elections and the co-operation of the Security Forces (police and military) had to be enlisted in organizing arrangements for the protection of election officials and electors. In the event, nomination day and polling day were relatively free of violence.

From the summer of 1980, anxiety began to build up in Jamaica and the atmosphere was charged with public expectation and speculation concerning the likely date of the general election. This attention was mainly focused on the committee in terms of the state of readiness of the electoral machinery,3^ in view of the Prime Minister's announce- ment of 3 February.

Meanwhile, the committee and the Electoral Office were engaged under considerable pressure, within a restricted time frame, to process the field data, complete the printing of the electoral lists, recruit and train officials for service on polling day, and select polling stations and counting centres - in a context in which many persons were reluctant to serve or to make their premises available. These represented significant components of a complex chain which had to be ready for "Jamaica's most crucial election."

Performance of the system and the aftermath In evaluating the performance of the new electoral system under the rigours of its first

27

This content downloaded from 194.29.185.109 on Sun, 15 Jun 2014 03:52:20 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 10: ELECTORAL POLITICS || ELECTORAL REFORM IN JAMAICA

major test, it seems to have come out well. A number of weaknesses appeared in personnel and machinery, the most significant being: the need to replace the returning officers of two constituencies on the eve of polling day, the dropping out of a number of presiding officers and ballot box couriers on polling day (as a result some stations were late in opening), and failure of some of the integrity lamps. The most serious incident occurred in one constituency where ballot boxes and papers were tampered with after the preliminary count; thus necessitating a magisterial recount.

However, given the circumstances in which the committee and the Electoral Office were required to prepare for this election, the performance was generally creditable. The restructuring of the system ab initio, the recruitment and training of tens of thousands of personnel, an entirely new enumeration - all were carried out in extremely difficult conditions and during a protracted election campaign.40

Among the conclusions which can be drawn from this recent experience are: that a bipartisan group, associated with independent members, can cooperate in conducting effectively an exercise of such sensitivity in an extremely polarized environment; the importance of a communications network for a project which involves extensive field operations 41 and that the performance of a system, especially an electoral system in this context, depends considerably on the calibre and behaviour of its field personnel.42

Another significant feature of the new Jamaican system is the opportunity provided for the political parties to lodge objections to candidates for positions as returning officers, enumerators etc., and to the proposed location of polling stations and counting centres. These provisions, though valuable, were a source of delay in completing arrange- ments for the enumeration and the election.

In recruiting these officials, efforts were made to emphasize criteria of competence, integrity, and non-partisanship. While it was expected that a candidate would be sympa- thetic to or support a particular party, the crucial issue centred on whether he was an "activist"; or whether he could submerge these preferences and undertake the functions impartially and honestly.

The Committee has conducted a detailed and comprehensive review of the system and personnel in the light of their performance during the General Election and the Local Government election held in March 198 1.43 On the basis of this evaluation the services of a number of election officials have been terminated; and efforts are being made to eliminate weaknesses identified in the course of the review.

The stage is now set for the next phases of reform: introduction of the photograph/ID system which has been held in abeyance (as indicated above), continuous updating of the Electoral Lists, entrenchment of an Electoral Commission, and of an independent Boundaries Commission. The Committee has set in train arrangements for a house-to- house enumeration in 1983 which will incorporate the photograph/ID component.

28

This content downloaded from 194.29.185.109 on Sun, 15 Jun 2014 03:52:20 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 11: ELECTORAL POLITICS || ELECTORAL REFORM IN JAMAICA

Meanwhile, following agreement by the bi-partisan Committee of Parliament, the Minister of the Public Service has appointed a Committee "to examine various aspects of the proposed National Registration System which could form the basis of the relevant legislation." The Committee includes the three selected members of the Electoral Advisory Committee, with the Chairman of the latter body as Chairman. Given the relationship between the two systems, this is a rational arrangement.

FOOTNOTES

1. As percentages of registered electors.

2. Ann Spademan, "Electoral Law and Administration in Jamaica", Social and Economic Studies, UWI, March 1969.

3. General Elections and No. of Petitions

1944 - 1962 1949 3 1967 12 1955 1 1972 1 1959 4 1976 13

4. For example, in 1949, 1956, and in 1959 a Select Committee to Investigate Electoral Malpractices.

5. See G.E. Mills, "The Environment of Commonwealth Caribbean Bureaucracies", International Review of Administrative Sciences, 1973, No. 1.

6. A.W. Singham, "Legislative-Executive Relations in Smaller Territories", Burton Benedict (ed), Problems of Smaller Territories, Athlone Press, 1967.

7. G.E. Mills, Politics, Administration and Change in Small Developing States: The Caribbean (forthcoming).

8. Appointed by the Governor-General on the advice of the Prime Minister after consultation with the Leader of the Opposition.

9. Repeated in "Change without Chaos" (JLP's Election Manifesto), Daily Gleaner, 11 October 1980.

10. Carl Stone, "Public Opinion and the 1980 Elections in Jamaica", Caribbean Quarterly, UWI (forthcoming).

11. Votes Cast as Percentage of Registered Electors

1959 66 1972 78.9. 1962 72.9 1976 85.2 1967 82

29

This content downloaded from 194.29.185.109 on Sun, 15 Jun 2014 03:52:20 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 12: ELECTORAL POLITICS || ELECTORAL REFORM IN JAMAICA

12. See N. Girvan et al, "The IMF and the Third World: The Case of Jamaica, 1974-80", Development Dialogue, 1980: 2.

13. For example, Mr M. Manley, Proceedings of the House of Representatives, Hansard, 4 June 1969.

14. The Prime Minister responded that the people had voted overwhelmingly against these proposals in December 1976.

15. Recounted by Mr Seaga during debate in the House of Representatives, Hansard, 8 August 1979. The JLP boycotted a by-election in 1978.

16. See Ministry Paper No. 50 presented to House of Representatives, 11 December 1978.

17. Daily Gleaner, 11 July 1979. See also speech by Senator Golding, Proceedings of the Senate, Hansard, 17 August 1979.

18. Hansard, 10 July 1979.

19. The Representation of the People (Interim Electoral Reform) Act and the Representation of

the People (Amendment) Act, 1979.

20. The Director assumed the powers of the former Chief Electoral Officer under Cap. 342.

21. Sec. 49(3) indicates the strict provisions for amending entrenched clauses.

22. Law 21 of 1979.

23. Hansard (House of Representatives), 8 August 1979.

24. Hansard (Senate), 17 August 1979.

25. Mr E. Seaga in House of Representatives, Hansard, 8 August 1979.

26. All four are members of their respective party executive committees. Coinciden tally, two on opposite sides, are graduates of the University's Department of Government.

27. A former Chairman of the Public Service Commission»

28. See Spackman, op. cit.

29. Each party having five or more Members in the House, is entitled to appoint one person as scrutineer for each polling division.

30. Note the late Sir W. A. Bustamante's statement: "We will never have an honest election until we have the photographs of the people." (Hansard, 28 March 1956). An experiment of photo- graphing in "prescribed" (mainly urban) areas was tried in the 1960s, but abandoned later.

31. Also published in Daily Gleaner, 27 March 1980.

30

This content downloaded from 194.29.185.109 on Sun, 15 Jun 2014 03:52:20 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 13: ELECTORAL POLITICS || ELECTORAL REFORM IN JAMAICA

32. Letter to the Chairman dated 27 March; published in the Daily Gleaner, 28 March 1980.

33. Reiterated in a letter to the chairman of the committee. During this period there was a series of letters between the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition and the chairman.

34. Where the certificate was mislaid, the elector would be required to answer certain questions on oath.

35. Recruitment and appointment have been removed from ministerial influence.

36. Election Petition: Buck vs King & Campbell.

37. It needs to be emphasized that this was not a general condition throughout Jamaica.

38. The Prime Minister announced the date of the election dramatically at a mass rally (widely broadcast), calling attention to the chairman as having advised him that the machinery was in place.

39. Careful checking of multiple appearances of the same name revealed a number of multiple registrations which had to be reduced to single registrations where they did not represent different persons.

40. The campaign lasted for about nine months.

41. An intensive and extensive public-education campaign was mounted by the committee and supported by the press.

42. This point was emphasized in many public addresses by the chairman during the preparatory period.

43. Scheduled for March, 1981.

31

This content downloaded from 194.29.185.109 on Sun, 15 Jun 2014 03:52:20 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions