electoral politics in south korea

550 Notes on Recent Elections

Hsieh, John Fuh-sheng (1993) Parliamentarism vs. Presidentialism: constitutional choice in the Republic of China on Taiwan, Chinese Political Science Review 21, 173-202.

Hsieh, John Fuh-sheng (1994) Parliamentarism versus Presidentialism: the politics of constitutional reform in the Republic of China on Taiwan. Paper presented at the XVIth World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Berlin, Germany.

Hsieh, John Fuh-sheng (1996) The SNTV system and its political implications. In Taiwan's Electoral Politics and Democratic Transition: Riding the Third Wave, eds Hung-mao Tien and M. E. Sharpe. Armonk, New York.

Hsieh, John Fuhosheng and Niou, Emerson M. S. (1996a) Issue voting in the Republic of China on Taiwan's 1992 Legislative Yuan Election. International Political Science Review 17, 13-27.

Hsieh, John Fuh-sheng and Niou, Emerson M. S. (1996b) Salient issues in Taiwan's electoral politics. Electoral Studies 15, 219-235.

Electoral Pol i t ics in South Korea

PETER MORRISS

D e p a r t m e n t o f PoHtcs, Universi ty College Galway, I re land

Introduction

South Korea was c r ea t ed in 1948, and for mos t of its h is tory it has k n o w n authori- tar ian government s , e i the r c i v i l i a n - - h e a d e d by the first Pres ident , Syngman Rhee ( 1 9 4 8 - 6 0 ) - - o r mili tary, u n d e r Park Chung-Hee (1961-79) and Chun Doo-Hwan (1980-88) . Dur ing this p e r i o d e lec t ions w e r e regular ly held, but ( e x c e p t for a b r ie f p e r i o d in 1960-61) they w e r e no t w h a t w e w o u l d call democra t ic . The recent , r ecogn izab ly democra t i c , p e r i o d in South Korea ' s h is tory da tes f rom 1987. Since then the pol i t ical sys tem has cer ta in ly no t been perfect , bu t it has fulfilled the mini- mal expec t a t i ons of democ ra t i c systems, in that there are free and (on the w h o l e ) r easonab ly fair e lect ions , u n d e r an e lec tora l sys tem w h i c h does not rule out the poss ib i l i ty of the o p p o s i t i o n winning . The e lec t ions for the Nat ional Assembly that took p lace in Apri l 1996 w e r e the th i rd such e lec t ions s ince the 1987 reforms, and they s h o w h o w e lec tora l pol i t ics is deve lop ing in South Korea.

The 1987 reforms p r o d u c e d a democ ra t i c sys tem by modi fy ing prev ious Korean prac t ice , r emov ing some o f its wor s t abuses. There was not a c o m p l e t e l y fresh start. The g o v e r n m e n t d id no t fall. Instead, the re was a c o m p r o m i s e that satisfied the o p p o n e n t s whi l s t a l lowing the rul ing pa r ty to con t inue in office (at least for the t ime being) . Democra t i za t ion has been gradual; it is no t ye t comple te ; and it is no t ye t c lear w h a t d i rec t ion it will eventua l ly take.

The Electoral System

The cu r r en t e lec tora l system is a democ ra t i z e d vers ion of the prev ious (very u n d e m o c r a t i c ) ones; some of its unusual features can be u n d e r s t o o d as an a t t empt by the g o v e r n m e n t to re ta in the genera l s t ruc ture of the o ld sys tem whi ls t mee t ing the o p p o s i t i o n ' s legi t imate compla in ts . W e need , therefore , to go back be fore 1987, and look in b r ie f at the ear l ier const i tu t ions .

One near -cons tant t h roughou t South Korea ' s h is tory is a s t rong President ia l system

N o t e s o n R e c e n t E l e c t i o n s ~5 t

of gove rnmen t . This obvious ly a p p e a l e d to the author i ta r ian rulers ( w h o w e r e the

s t rong Presidents) , and it has b e e n re t a ined s ince 1987. But the m e t h o d of e lec t ing the Pres ident c h a n g e d several t imes, d e p e n d i n g usual ly on w h i c h m e t h o d the cur-

rent ru ler though t was mos t l ikely to secure his re-elect ion. (Even the two Pres idents w h o se ized p o w e r in mil i tary c o u p s felt the n e e d to legi t imize the i r p o w e r t h rough

e lec t ions , a l though f rom 1972 to 1980 the Pres idents w e r e ' e l ec ted ' by a non-e lec ted e lec tora l co l lege o f the i r pol i t ica l suppor te r s ; this c onve n i e n t m e t h o d was still in

p lace in 1987.) The nego t i a t ed se t t l emen t in 1987 re ta ined the s t rong President , whi ls t res tor ing d i rec t p o p u l a r e lec t ions for the Pres idency.

W h e n d i rec t e lec t ions for the Pres ident w e r e first i n t roduc e d in the 195()s, the cons t i tu t ion was in f luenced (and justif ied) by Amer ican thinking, and so it i nc luded the clause that had just b e e n wr i t t en into the Amer ican Const i tu t ion, l imit ing the Pres ident to two te rms of office. T h i s - - t o British eyes qui te u n n e c e s s a r y - - c l a u s e has caused all sorts of p r o b l e m s in Korean pol i t ics eve r since. Having pu t it in, Syngman Rhee r e m o v e d it as soon as he could. The incoming mil i tary President ,

Park Chung-hee, d id the same thing: he w r o t e a l imit ing clause into his cons t i tu t ion and then r e m o v e d it w h e n he w a n t e d to remain in power . Chun Doo-Hwan, on seizing power , was even s t r ic ter on himself, giving h imsel f only one te rm in office, a l though n o w of seven years. Any poss ib i l i ty Chun might have had of fo l lowing the

pa t t e rn and e x t e n d i n g his t e rm evapo ra t ed w i th the pol i t ical unres t in 1987. A ruth- less c l a m p d o w n on the oppos i t i on was imposs ib le , par t ly because it was not c lear

that Chun w o u l d have had mil i tary suppor t , and also because that w o u l d risk the w i thd rawa l of the O l y m p i c s - - d u e in 1 9 8 8 - - w h i c h w o u l d have b e e n an unaccep t - able b l o w to Korean pres t ige . 2 Therefore , Chun a n n o u n c e d that he w o u l d not s tand again, and n o m i n a t e d (Genera l ) Roh Tae-Woo. It was Roh w h o ca lmed the pol i t ical

unres t by insist ing that Chun lifted the ban on oppos i t i on leaders, and i n t roduc e d

a new, more democra t i c , cons t i tu t ion . Whi ls t the re w o u l d still be a s t rong President , he w o u l d again be l imi ted to a single t e rm in office, this t ime of five years. Roh

duly w o n the ensuing Pres ident ia l e lect ion.

This cons t i tu t ion has r ema ined in force. It has the unhelpfu l c o n s e q u e n c e that an i n c u m b e n t Pres ident can neve r s tand for a s e c o n d te rm in office, and the re fo re

never be judged on his record; it also a l lows the oppos i t i on to sp read rumours that the Pres ident wan t s to do just that, and then d e n o u n c e h im for it. Al though there

w o u l d seem to be no th ing intr insicial ly u n d e m o c r a t i c in a Pres ident s tanding for re- e lec t ion , Koreans associa te it w i th the p rev ious p e r i o d of author i tar ian, ant i-demo- crat ic , rule, cha rac te r i zed by serf-serving cons t i tu t iona l changes . The one- te rm Presi-

d e n c y is n o w v i e w e d in Korea as a r e q u i r e m e n t of democracy . For the forseeable future, Korea seems locked into a sys tem of s t rong bu t relat ively t e m p o r a r y Presi-

dents . President ia l e lec t ions take p lace every five years; e lec t ions for the National

Assembly every four. Here again, the m e t h o d of e lec t ion is an adap ta t ion of past p rac t i ce (and malprac t ice) . The mil i tary g o v e r n m e n t s w a n t e d to make sure that they had a major i ty in the Nat ional Assembly; yet, whi l s t they w e r e a lmost cer ta in to be the largest single party, they w e r e unl ikely to gain a major i ty of the seats or votes. Hence in 1963 the g o v e r n m e n t p r o d u c e d an e x t r e m e l y c o m p l i c a t e d hybr id e lec tora l system: two- th i rds of the seats w e r e s ing le -member cons t i tuenc ie s as in the UK and US, bu t one- th i rd w e r e e l ec t ed f rom nat ional pa r ty lists. H o w e v e r (and here is thc ingenui ty) , the largest pa r ty was gua ran teed two- th i rds of the nat ional seats. ~ This

552 Notes on R ecen t Elect ions

system was scrapped in the 1970s (in favor of an equally unusual system), but brought back in the 1980s.

It was retained, in substance, in 1987. 4 The hybrid system remained: voters had only one vote, which went to electing the const i tuency's representative; the national seats were then allocated according to the propor t ion of the s e a t s (not votes) won by the parties. Further, the largest party (in terms of seats) was guaranteed half of the national seats, even if their propor t ion of seats was less. This ensured that there was still a bias in favour of the largest party (which has always been the ruling party). ~

In 1996, the hybrid system was retained, but the national seats were a l loca ted-- for the first t i m e - - i n a truly proport ional way: in propor t ion to the number of v o t e s

cast for the parties (not seats won), and with no extra benefit for the largest party. This was therefore a hybrid of the UK (or US) first-past-the-post system, and a national party-list system of proport ional representation. For the first time in over 30 years, the electoral system (although unusual) was not unfair.

Thus- - looking solely at the electoral sy s t em- -we can see that the democratization process has consisted of a gradual change towards a genuinely unbiased system. As we shall see, it is less clear how successful other changes have been.

Dramat i s P e r s o n a e

The main political leaders throughout the last 30 years or so are known collectively as the ' three Kims': Kim Young-Sam, Kim Dae-Jung, and Kim Jong-Pil. The first two Kims were for many years fervent opponents of the military and authoritarian regimes of Park Chung-Hee and Chun Doo-Hwan, but also fierce rivals of each other; the third Kim rose to prominence during President Park's rule, when he became Prime Minister. When President Chun appointed Roh Tae-Woo as his successor, all three Kims stood against him in the 1987 Presidential election (which Roh won).

In 1990 there was a realignment of forces, when Kim Young-Sam and Kim Jong- Pil merged their parties with that of President Roh, to form a 'super '-party with a massive majority in Parliament. This left Kim Dae-Jung as the sole opposi t ion leader, along with a few disgruntled members of Kim Young-Sam's party, who refused to follow him into collaboration with the ex-military ruler Roh, and eventually joined up with Kim Dae-Jung for want of anything else to do. When Roh Tae-Woo had to stand down in 1992, Kim Young-Sam became the candidate of the governing party, and duly won the election.

After his defeat in the 1992 election, Kim Dae-Jung announced his ret irement from politics, and it looked as if the decades dominated by the three Kims were now over. However, Kim Jong-Pil was finding life in Kim Young-Sam's party increasingly irksome, and eventually left in February 1995 to reform his own party in May (the United Liberal Democrats, or ULD). (Party names must not be taken as indicative of an ideological stance; they are chosen, like brand names, for their wholesome sound.) Kim Dae-Jung was likewise unhappy with retirement, and returned to his old party, only to leave them again in September with his loyal supporters to form his own party, with the grandiose name of the National Congress for New Politics (NCNP). The rump who were l e f t - -who had now been abandoned by both Kim Young-Sam and Kim Dae-Jung in less than six years - - re formed themselves into a new party (the Democratic Party or DP), one of the main platforms of w h i c h - - perhaps not supr is ingly--was that the three Kims should all retire and make way

N o t e s o n R e c e n t E l e c t i o n s S53

for a y o u n g e r gene ra t ion w h o w e r e no t still f ighting the pol i t ical bat t les of the 1970s and 1980s. Finally, in D e c e m b e r Kim Young-Sam r e l a unc he d his o w n party, chang-

ing its name to N e w Korea Party (NKP). Thus, the e lec t ion of 1996 was fought, once again, by th ree par t ies led by the th ree Kims and one o p p o s e d to all t h ree of them.

T h e Nature o f t h e Party S y s t e m in K o r e a

As can be ga the red f rom this account , pol i t ica l par t ies in Korea are little more than e lec tora l mach ines des igned to ensure the i r leaders ' e lect ion. As a c onse que nc e , Korean pa r ty pol i t ics largely consis ts of pe r sona l manoeuvr ings for power . This is a c c e n t u a t e d by t w o factors: the lack of re levant soc io -economic c leavages on w h i c h to base a pa r ty system, and having a s t rong Pres ident ia l sys tem and American-s tyle (nonpol i t i ca l ) cab ine t in a socie ty w h i c h is even more s t rongly cent ra l ized than the UK.

The a d o p t i o n of this pol i t ical sys tem makes Korean pol i t ics pecul ia r ly zero-sum, because the re is really only one pol i t ica l office w o r t h striving for, and that is the Pres idency. Unlike the British system, leading pol i t ic ians of the rul ing par ty in Korea do no t ho ld high offices of state; they canno t conso le themse lves that even if they missed out on the h ighes t office, at least t hey had several years s t rut t ing a round the wor ld as Fore ign Secretary, or in charge of the nat ional economy . Conversely , the pa r ty l eader canno t gain the s u p p o r t of fact ion leaders by offering t h e m such pos- itions: the only pos i t ion on offer w i th w h i c h to buy s u p p o r t is that of the nex t President ia l candida te . On the o the r hand, unl ike the USA, the legislature is weak, and has usual ly b e e n subserv ien t to the President : the re are no such p o w e r f u l pos- i t ions as c o m m i t t e e chairs or Senate leader. Fur ther , like the UK and unl ike the USA, Korea is a s t rongly cent ra l ized state, in w h i c h the re are no regional offices of any status, w h i c h cou ld p rov ide an office for an able pol i t ic ian and also an arena in w h i c h pol i t ic ians can demons t r a t e the i r exper t i se . ('

W h e n this is c o m b i n e d w i th the cer ta in ty of a one- te rm Pres idency, it is not surpr is ing if m u c h of pol i t ics consis ts of manoeuvr ing for the nex t President ia l election. It also fo l lows that w h e n the Pres ident ia l e lec t ion takes place, no cand ida te can ever be judged on the i r adminis t ra t ive record , for n o n e will have one. They will the re fo re d e p e n d on the i r pe r sona l s t a n d i n g - - a n d the al l iances and deals they can strike. This has two, related, undes i rab le consequences . The first is the impor- tance of m o n e y in the Korean e lec tora l p rocess ; the s e c o n d is regional ism.

It is, o f course , t rue that e lec tora l pol i t ics in any coun t ry is an expens ive business , and that this is a genera l w o r r y to those w h o take de moc ra t i c ideals seriously. It is also t rue that Koreans recogn ize that this is a p rob l em, and are t rying to do some- th ing abou t it. (Thus the 1996 e lec t ion laws p r e v e n t many activi t ies w h i c h are com- m o n and u n c o n t e n t i o u s p rac t ices e l sewhere , such as ho ld ing v ic tory par t ies . ) Never- thelcss, the scale of the p r o b l e m is fr ightening, bo th in the range of activit ies that involve money , and the sums of m o n e y invo lved7 I can only give a few examples , i l lustrative of the range wi th in w h i c h m o n e y opera tes . At e lec t ions for the legislature, it is (or was) c o m m o n p rac t i ce for po ten t i a l cand ida tes to be asked to buy the i r nomina t ions , par t icu lar ly for h igh p laces on the pa r ty lists. The sort of f igure involved is of the o r d e r of 2 -4 bi l l ion w o n ( approx . £1 .7 -£3 .5 mill ion), s Sums of a s imilar scale are es t ima ted to have b e e n spen t on e lec tora l campaigns , a l though the legal l imit that any one cand ida te cou ld s p e n d in the 1996 campa ign was 141 mil l ion


won (£120,000). The days now seem to be over when voters expected to be simply handed (or posted) an envelope containing £20, but nevertheless candidates (and incumbents) have to engage in a range of expensive glad-handing activities, and will be unsuccessful if they do not. Not only is it necessary to wine and dine local dignitaries and opinion-formers (and doing this in style in Korea is extraordinarily expensive), it is essential to be diligent in carrying out activities ranging from a useful but potentially corrupt service such as lending money to a small local business in ~lfficulties, through the quaint (such as sending flowers and gifts whenever there is a wedding or funeral in the constituency) to the farcical (for instance, paying hundreds--sometimes thousands--of people to attend electoral rallies to make it look as if the candidate has a lot of support). The role of money and gifts in Korean society is a wider topic that cannot be touched on here, 9 but it is not in doubt that money pervades the Korean electoral process, and that this is accentuated by politics being largely about jockeying for personal power.

The nature of South Korean politics as a zero-sum struggle for power is accentuated, and shaped, by the lack of relevant socio-economic cleavages which could provide the basis for party divisions. Korea is an ethnically homogenous society, probably the most ethnically homogenous in the world. None of the normal bases for group loyalties on which parties are based are present in Korea with the excep- tion of religious differences, which have not found any recent political expression (and, of course, everybody must be grateful for that). Class cannot be the basis of party division, partly because most Koreans in surveys describe themselves as middle-class, and, more importantly, because it is illegal for any trade union organiza- tion to engage in politics. So whilst trade unions are strong in the main industries, they cannot create a political party to look after their interests, along the lines of the creation of the British Labour Party at the beginning of the twentieth century. Class politics is therefore proscribed by law. It hardly needs saying that any expression of an ideology even slightly sympathetic to the North Korean system, or to communism in general, is quite illegal under the draconian National Security Act; hitherto, even a vague socialism has been politically suspect. The room for parties based purely on ideology is therefore small.

The division that used to govern Korean politics was that between rural (largely traditional) society and urban (more Western) areas. Up until the late 1980s the rural areas voted in strength for the (authoritarian and/or military) government, and the large cities for the (more democratic and liberal) opposition. But the very success that the authoritarian governments have had in bringing about economic development has largely destroyed this division, both because it is in the cities that the wealth now is (and therefore an economic interest in supporting the government) and because the traditional rural sector is now so small that no party could afford to appeal solely to it. The old traditional/liberal division could re-emerge as a purely ideological cleavage, based on support for or opposition to the heritage of the Park/Chun/Roh years; but, so far, this has not occurred.

It has not occurred in part because of the strength of regional voting. I should repeat that Korea has a highly centralized state in a highly homogenous society, so that the regions are neither a source of political power in themselves nor dis- tinguished by ethnic, linguistic or similar differences. Regional voting did not develop before the 1970s; it has grown rapidly since, a product both of economic development and democracy. ~o The spur to the continued growth of regional politics in the post-1987 democratic period is that it can support pork-barrel politics I

Notes on Recen t Elect ions 555

w h i c h c o m b i n e s pe r sona l and money-based pol i t ics on a nat ional stage. The most thr iving reg ion in Korea was that a round Taegu, w h i c h is w h e r e all the Pres idents w h o he ld office f rom 1961 to 1993 came from. By push ing d e v e l o p m e n t a l p ro jec t s in the i r region, t hey s e c u r e d - - a n d r e t a i n e d - - t h e loyalty of the i r suppor te r s . These p ro jec t s are n o w going to Pusan (Kim Young-Sam's pol i t ical base). Conversely , least g o v e r n m e n t m o n e y has gone into the Cholla provinces , and they have r eac ted by fanatically suppor t i ng the i r spokesman , Kim Dae-Jung, w h o regularly wins 8 5 - 9 0 p e r cen t of the reg ion ' s vote. I mus t emphas i ze that this n o w s t rong pa t t e rn of regional vot ing is a pol i t ical cons t ruc t , not a c o n s e q u e n c e of intr insic regional differences (a l though there are 1000 year o ld his tor ical gr ievances that can always be a p p e a l e d to). And it is a c c e n t u a t e d by democracy : by the leaders ' need to have a p o w e r base, on w h i c h they can rely for b o t h vo tes and money . In the absence of o t h e r soc io -economic cleavages, regional a t t achmen t s p rov ide a w a y for leaders to di f ferent ia te themselves , and a basis on w h i c h to appea l to the i r suppor te r s .

T h e 1996 E l e c t i o n

The results of the 1996 e lec t ion are s h o w n in Table 1. Before the e lect ions , each par ty a n n o u n c e d a target it was a iming for, and each pa r ty fell shor t of its o w n target . However , mos t c o m m e n t a t o r s cons i de r e d that the results w e r e g o o d for the NKP and also for Kim Jong-Pil 's ULD, whi l s t be ing bad for Kim Dae-Jung and disas- t rous for the DP.

At first g lance it is not c lear w h y this should be cons ide red a good result for the NKP. It lost its Nat ional Assembly majori ty, and its share of the vo te (34.5 p e r cen t ) was the s e c o n d lowes t by a rul ing pa r ty in South Korea ' s history, and the lowes t in any meaningfu l e lect ion. It says some th ing about the low e xpe c t a t i ons of this pa r ty that the resul t cou ld be cons ide red a good one. In t e rms of seats, howeve r , the NKP did not do too badly; whi ls t it d id not get the major i ty it des i red, it got near e n o u g h to qui te easily cobb le t o g e t h e r a major i ty wi th some of the Inde- penden t s . Thus w e s e e - - y e t a g a i n - - h o w p r e d o m i n a n t l y plural i ty systems benef i t the largest party. I shall look at this in m o r e detai l be low.

The e lec t ion d e m o n s t r a t e d once again the regional na ture of e lec tora l pol i t ics in

TABLE 1. Seats and votes

Seats

Party (C) (A) Total % of Seats % of Votes Votes/Scats

NKP 121 18 139 46.5 34.5 48,748 NCNP 66 13 79 26.4 25.3 62,926 ULD 41 9 50 16.7 16.2 63,530 I)P 9 6 15 ~.0 i 1.2 1 .t7,068 Other parties 0 0 0 0 0.9 Independents 16 - - 16 5.4 11.9 145,404

Total 253 46 299 100 100

(C) is the number of constituency seats won. (A) is the number of additional member seats allocated.

556 N o t e s o n R e c e n t E l e c t i o n s

Korea, apar t f rom Seoul and its environs. Table 2 shows the geograph ica l distri- bu t i on of the seats. (South Korea is d iv ided into 15 regions, cons is t ing of the six largest cities, e ight p rov inces and one island. I have p l aced the ci t ies wi th the i r su r round ing prov inces , to s h o w the e lec tora l g e o g r a p h y of Korea. W h e n I refer subsequen t ly to 'Grea te r Seoul ' , I m e a n the ci t ies of Seoul and Inchon and the sur- round ing Kyonggi Province, m u c h of w h i c h is n o w a c o m m u t e r bel t for Seoul.) It can be seen at a g lance that each of the ma in pa r ty leaders has a regional base, w h i c h he domina tes . This is mos t m a r k e d in Kim Dae-Jung's case: his pa r ty ob ta ined 71.6 p e r cen t of the vo te t h roughou t Kwangju and Nor th and South Cholla Provinces (and ove r 86 p e r cen t in Kwangju itself), bu t only 5.8 p e r cen t ou ts ide this par t of the coun t ry and Grea te r Seoul. Kim Young-Sam's base is Pusan and the su r round ing South Kyongsang Province; Kim Jong-Pil 's is Taejon and South Chungchong . The Democra t i c Party is a lone in having ne i t he r a p o w e r f u l l eader no r a regional power -base . 1 t

Disproportionality in the Korean Electoral System

It is ins t ruct ive to examine in s o m e w h a t more detai l h o w the a l locat ion of seats dev ia ted f rom propor t iona l i ty . As can be seen f rom Table 1, the largest pa r ty was advan taged by the e lec tora l system, and the smallest one disadvantaged. The reason that the Democra t i c Party was d i sadvan taged is familiar: it had relat ively l ow levels of suppor t , sp read thinly. But the very g o o d sea t s -vo tes rat io of the NKP is sl ightly more c o m p l i c a t e d to explain .

At first g lance the re is an obv ious exp lana t ion for the sys tem benef i t t ing the NKP: Korean cons t i tuenc ie s differ great ly in size, and this cou ld easily exp la in the differ-

TABLE 2. Seats by region

Seats won Region NKP NCNP ULD DP Ind. Total

Kyonggi Province 18 10 5 3 2 38 Seoul 27 18 1 1 47 Inchon 9 2 11

Kangwon Province 9 2 2 13

North Chungchong Province 2 5 1 8 South Chungchong Province 1 12 13

Taejon 7 7

North Kyongsang Province l 1 2 1 5 19 Taegu 2 8 3 13

South Kyongsang Province 17 2 4 23 Pusan 21 21

North Cholla Province 1 13 14 South Cholla Province 17 17

Kwangju 6 6

Cheju Island 3 3

Total 121 66 41 9 16 253

Notes on Recent Elections 557

ence in the par t ies ' s ea t s -vo te s ratios. Indeed , the e lec tora l law, passed by the

Nat ional Assembly in July 1995, was ru led uncons t i tu t iona l in late D e c e m b e r by the Const i tu t ional Cour t on the g rounds that it a l lowed too grea t a var ia t ion in the size of cons t i tuenc ies . (The largest cons t i t uency was near ly six t imes the size of the smal les t one" 361,500 against 61,500.) The Const i tu t ional Court ru led that the ratio b e t w e e n the size of the largest and smal les t seats should be no m o r e than 4:1. This left u n d e c i d e d w h e t h e r this should be ob t a ined by raising the size o f the smallest pe rmiss ib le cons t i tuency , o r l ower ing the size of the largest. The var ious par t ies each pu t fo rward a di f ferent so lu t ion to the p rob l em, seemingly based on calcu- la t ions of pa r ty advantage. The Nat ional Assembly was reca l led to resolve this dis- pute , and after two w e e k s of hea t ed beh ind- the-scenes negot ia t ions , a c o m p r o m i s e was eventua l ly r e ached at the end of January.~2

Obviously , this still w ide range in cons t i t uency size (and the appa ren t ly u n p r i n c i p l e d w a y in w h i c h the cons t i t uency sizes w e r e d e t e r m i n e d ) raises the ques- t ion of w h e t h e r this i n t roduced any bias into the eventua l result: the s imples t form of ge r rymande r ing in any cons t i tuency-based sys tem is to make o n e ' s o p p o n e n t s ' cons t i tuenc ies b igger than o n e ' s own , so that they win less seats w i th the same n u m b e r of votes. Usually, such d is tor t ions benef i t the rul ing party. Was this the case here?

Surprisingly, it w o u l d s eem not: in this e lec t ion the rul ing pa r ty ( the NKP) was d i sadvan taged by the var ia t ion in cons t i t uency size. The seats it w o n w e r e slightly larger than those w o n by its rivals. Indeed , as Table 3 shows, the seats w o n by the NKP were , on average, larger than average size, whi ls t those w o n by all o the r par t ies (and i n d e p e n d e n t s ) w e r e smaller. For a rul ing par ty to cons t ruc t (or acquiesce to) an e lec tora l sys tem that gives an advantage to all o t h e r par t ies must be a very unusual o c c u r r e n c e in e lec tora l history.

But this u n e x p e c t e d resul t is not due to e i ther s tupidi ty or magnan imi ty on the par t of the NKP leadership: it can be exp la ined by under s t and ing past a t t empt s to man ipu la t e the e lec tora l system. There is no d o u b t that the e lec tora l system of Korea was g e r r y m a n d e r e d in the 1970s and 1980s to s u p p o r t the mil i tary rulers ( inc luding such unsubt le dev ices as a l lowing the Pres ident to a ppo in t his o w n suppor t e r s to one- th i rd of the Nat ional Assembly seats). T h r o u g h o u t this per iod , suppo r t for the mil i tary g o v e r n m e n t was s t rong in the count rys ide , whi l s t o p p o s i t i o n was concen- t ra ted in the ci t ies (in par t icular , Seoul). Therefore , the coun t ry ' s rulers made sure that e lec tora l cons t i tuenc ies w e r e smal ler in rural areas, larger in cities, and larger still in Seoul. ~ This pa t t e rn has c o n t i n u e d after the 1987 reforms; indeed , it has b e e n conv inc ing ly a rgued that this d i s c r e p a n c y in cons t i t uency size was de l ibera te ly

TABLE 3. Index of size of constituencies won, by party

Party Index

NKP 103 NCNP 99 ULD 98 DP 80 Ind. 96

(Average) 100


re ta ined for the 1988 e lec t ions by the rul ing pa r ty wi th the aim of gaining an electoral advantage. 14

The same pa t t e rn r ema ined in 1996. The cons t i tuenc ies in the main conurba t ions were , on average, cons ide rab ly larger than the rest (by a rat io of 1.4:1), and those in Seoul w e r e larger still. However , whi l s t the d i s c r epancy in cons t i tuency size has b e e n re ta ined, vot ing pa t t e rns have changed dramatical ly. In 1996, the NKP po l l ed be t t e r in u rban than rural areas (35.4 p e r cen t against 33.1 p e r cent) , a l though the NCNP was sl ightly more urban-based still (27.4 p e r cen t against 21.8 p e r cent) . 1~ But w h a t was more surpr is ing was that the NKP did very wel l in Seoul, taking more votes the re than any of its rivals ( the first t ime a rul ing pa r ty has ever done that). The extra- large cons t i tuenc ie s in Seoul w e r e the re fo re a hand icap to the rul ing party, not a help.

I wil l no t e x p l o r e he re w h y the NKP should have done so wel l in Seoul. Rather, I w a n t to con t inue the hun t for the NKP's grea t success at turn ing votes into seats, even t hough it won , on the whole , la rger seats than a nybody else. The a n s w e r lies in Seoul. It was because the NKP did par t icu lar ly wel l in Seoul that it w o n larger seats; bu t it was also because it d id par t icular ly wel l in Seoul that it w o n more seats than w e w o u l d e x p e c t f rom its votes. To exp la in this pa radox , w e need to look s o m e w h a t c loser at h o w first-past-the-post sys tems work , and app ly this to the electoral g e o g r a p h y of Korea.

The r e spons iveness of a f irst-past-the-post e lec tora l sys tem d e p e n d s on the exist- ence of marginal seats: if t he re are very f ew marginal seats, a shift in vot ing pa t t e rns will not affect the result; if t he re are many marginals , a small change in vot ing can be magnif ied greatly. If, as a rough rule of thumb, w e def ine a marginal seat as one in w h i c h the w i n n e r ' s marg in over the runner -up is less than 10 p e r cen t of the total vote in that cons t i tuency , t hen 117 of the 253 seats w e r e marginal . These w e r e d i sp ropo r t i ona t e ly found in Grea te r Seoul: 60.7 p e r cen t of these marginals w e r e in Grea te r Seoul, w h i c h had only 37.9 p e r cen t of the seats.

There w e r e the re fo re really two different sorts of e lec t ions in Korea in 1996 (or, rather , two and a half). There was the e lec t ion in w h i c h par t ies p i led up votes in the i r hear t lands , w i th the results in t e rms of seats vir tual ly a fo regone conclus ion . (Since there w e r e the nat ional cons t i t uency seats, a l loca ted in p r o p o r t i o n to the overal l vote, the re was an incen t ive to max imize the vo te in safe seats that is absen t in a ' pu re ' p lural i ty sys tem such as the UK's, bu t this had only a m i n o r impac t on the final result . ) In this par t of the e lec t ion , the par t ies ' share of the seats differed little f rom the i r share of the votes (apart , o f course , f rom the Democra t i c Party, w h i c h had no hear t land) . There was litt le d i s tor t ion in seat size, and par t ies 'was ted ' vo tes to m u c h the same ex t en t (a l though the p a t t e r n of was t ed votes was sl ightly different: the NCNP ga ined huge major i t ies in the areas it won , but, conversely , po l l ed very few votes in the areas it lost).

The o t h e r e l e c t i o n - - w h i c h d e t e r m i n e d the r e s u l t - - w a s w h e r e the marginal seats were : in Grea te r Seoul. ~6 Here the NKP did amazingly well: no t only in te rms of vo tes w o n (35.4 p e r cent) , b u t - - m o r e s ign i f i can t ly - - in t e rms of seats (56.3 p e r cent) . In Seoul itself, the NKP's w inn ing margin over the NCNP in te rms of votes was very small (36.5 p e r cen t to 35.2 p e r cent) , but this t rans la ted into a large d ispar i ty of seats (27 to 18); in Grea te r Seoul the marg in of votes was hardly m u c h grea te r (35.4 p e r cen t to 31.7 p e r cent) , bu t the NKP w o n a lmost twice as many seats (54 to 30).

W h y was this? It is we l l k n o w n that a plural i ty e lec tora l sys tem gives the w i n n e r


of a largely two-party e lect ion a ' bonus ' of more seats than the votes would warrant ,

bu t not usually on this scale. I will suggest that there were two main reasons why the NKP w o n so many more seats in Greater Seoul than might have b e e n expec ted wi th their p ropor t ion of the vote.

The first reason follows from the electoral geography of first-past-the-post electoral systems. For a long t ime it was thought that what is called the ' cube law' applies in such systems: that (in a p redominan t ly two-party elect ion) the parties gain scats

in p ropor t ion to the cube of the p ropor t ion of votes they win, rather than in propor t ion to the votes themselves. ~7 This can be pu t more mathematically. It has b e e n shown that for the cube law to apply, the percentage of the (two-party) vote in the

individual cons t i tuencies should have a s tandard deviat ion from the mean of about

13.3. W h e n there is a h igher s tandard deviation, the w i n n e r benefi ts less (which was happen ing in the UK in the 1980s); a lower s tandard deviat ion leads to a higher "winner ' s bonus". The standard deviat ion in Greater Seoul in this e lect ion was 6.6, and in Seoul itself 5.7. Is With these low standard deviations, we would expect far

more of the seats to be wi th in a few percentage poin ts of the mean; that is to say, far more wou ld be marginal. If one party (whichever one it was) w o n a small majority of votes in Greater Seoul, it wou ld win a big majority of seats.

But w h y should the standard deviat ion be so m u c h smaller in the Korean capital

than in, say, the UK? We still have no t expla ined why there should bc so many marginal seats. It might, of course, be deliberate: it is possible to ger rymander con- s t i tuencies so that most of them are highly marginal or (as is more usually done) few of them arc. But I th ink there is a less manipulat ive explanat ion. Gudgin and

Taylor have shown that the so-called (I th ink mis-called) cube law applies ( w he n it does) because we can expec t party vot ing to bc based on some socio-economic

basis, and we can also expec t that same socio-economic basis to affect where people live. Thus, if parties are p redominan t ly class-based, and if class also affects where people live, then there will be geographical clusters of party voters. If there is com- plete segregation, there will be no (or very few) marginal scats, because each con- s t i tuency will be socially and politically homogenous , and all voters will suppor t

the same party. If there is no geographical segregation at all, then each cons t i tuency will b c a microcosm of the whole, and there will be no variation at all in party vote

across the const i tuencies; then, in a close election, all seats will be marginal, and a slight swing from one party to ano ther will p roduce a landslide victory.

Korea 's e lect ion outside Seoul was a case of near comple te segregation: regional

voting, by definition, involves largely h o m o g e n o u s const i tuencies , and few marginal seats. But the elect ion in Scoul was an ins tance of the second case. As I have suggested, Korean vot ing is no t (predominant ly) class-based, or based on any other significant socio-economic differences. The very low standard deviat ion b e t w e e n cons t i tuencies in Greater Scoul shows this. t9 So the seats in Greater Scoul arc highly sensitive to small f luctuations in the vote because there is little residential segregation b e t w e e n the parties, and this in turn is because there arc no impor tant socio- economic bases for vot ing in Korea. The very high p ropor t ion of marginal scats in Greater Seoul is then largely a consequence of Korea 's party politics not be ing based on socio-cconomic divisions. This is the main reason w hy Kim Young-Sam's nar row victory in Greater Scoul (measured in votes) w o n him such a large n u m b e r of seats.

But there is, I suggest, a second reason for this seats-to-votes distortion, which may expla in bo th why there are so many marginal scats in Seoul, and w hy Kim Young-Sam's party w o n many more of the really knife-edge seats than Kim Dae-

560 Notes on Recen t Elections

Jung ' s did. This rel ies on the no t ion o f a m a n u f a c t u r e d marginal seat. I have not seen this idea in the l i te ra ture on e lect ions , bu t it is l ikely to be significant in a coun t ry l ike Korea.

I mean the fo l lowing by a manufac tu red marginal seat. Let us s u p p o s e that w e have a cons t i t uency in w h i c h w e can e x p e c t the two-par ty vote to spli t (say) 60,000 to 40,000. That w o u l d no t be a marginal seat. But if the pa r ty that w o u l d o the rwise have lost can pu t up a very s t rong c a n d i d a t e - - a cand ida te w h o will a t t ract votes that w o u l d o the rwi se no t have gone to that p a r t y - - t h e n the vo te will be closer; a cand ida te w h o can d r a w 11,000 vo tes f rom the o t h e r pa r ty will win, albei t narrowly. Put t ing up such a cand ida te c rea tes a manufac tu red marginal seat.

In the UK (exc luding , pe rhaps , Nor the rn I re land) the re are very few candida tes w h o car ry many votes, and so w h e t h e r a seat is marginal d e p e n d s a lmost exc lus ive ly on the d i s t r ibu t ion of pa r ty suppor t . But in Korea a cons ide rab le p r o p o r t i o n of the vo tes are cast for the cand ida te ra ther than the party. Parties, as I have suggested, are w e a k c o m p a r e d to individuals, and largely ge t the i r s u p p o r t f rom the popu la r i t y of the i r leader. The success of i n d e p e n d e n t s ( w h o po l l ed near ly 12 p e r cen t of the nat ional vo te ) shows h o w wil l ing Koreans are to vo te for a p e r s o n i r respec t ive of party. The same effect appl ies w i t h i n part ies . A p o p u l a r cand ida te is w o r t h far m o r e vo tes in Korea than in m o r e pa r ty -domina ted count r ies such as the UK.

Fur ther , cand ida tes in Korea are c h o s e n by the par t ies ' cent ra l office and a l loca ted to cons t i tuencies ; t hey are no t c h o s e n by the pa r ty m e m b e r s in the individual con- s t i tuencies . N o w if you w e r e you r pa r ty ' s e lec t ion strategist , and you had a cand ida te you r e c k o n e d was w o r t h 10,000 votes, you w o u l d try to p lace h im or he r in a seat that you w o u l d o the rwi se lose by slightly f e w e r votes; you w o u l d n ' t was te this cand ida te on a seat you w o u l d win anyway. (In some par ts of the coun t ry local t ies w o u l d be very impor tan t , bu t in Seoul a cand ida te is l ikely to have m u c h the same appea l in a n u m b e r of po ten t i a l cons t i tuenc ies . ) Therefore , in a pol i t ical sys tem like this, one w o u l d e x p e c t to have m o r e marginal cons t i tuenc ies than w o u l d be normal in s o m e w h e r e like the UK, because the par t ies w o u l d be endeavour ing to max imize the n u m b e r of seats they w o n by manufac tu r ing marginal cons t i tuencies .

One might e x p e c t a c o m p l i c a t e d game of bluff and double-bluff , w i th each pa r ty wan t i ng to c h o o s e its candida tes after the o thers have revea led theirs, and so wai t ing unti l the last minute . In fact, the NKP a n n o u n c e d the i r list of candida tes first. I wil l suggest that, whi l s t this might s eem like a tact ical mistake, it actual ly r e b o u n d e d in the i r favour, at least in Seoul. (Elsewhere , some of the po ten t ia l candida tes w h o failed to ge t s e l ec t ed immedia t e ly s w i t c h e d to o the r par t ies w h o were wil l ing to offer t hem seats, and some such ca rpe tbagger s duly got e l ec t ed u n d e r the i r n e w label .) Wi th the NKP candida tes a l ready announced , the NCNP cou ld es t imate exac t ly w h o should be p l aced w h e r e in o r d e r to ensure that as many seats w e r e w o n as poss ib le , g iven the i r de ta i led k n o w l e d g e abou t the cons t i tuenc ies and the vo te -winn ing po ten t i a l of the i r candidates .

Clearly the NCNP guessed wrong , par t ly because the re was a late surge of s u p p o r t for the NKP, b rough t on mainly by Nor th Korea ' s a p p a r e n t sabre-rat t l ing in the DMZ. Nor th Korea ' s be l ige rence p r o b a b l y cou ld no t have b e e n p r e d i c t e d by the NCNP w h e n they chose the i r candidates . The danger of manufac tur ing marginals, of course , is that if t he re is a swing against you you might lose the lot. 2° And that is just abou t w h a t h a p p e n e d . There w e r e 23 cons t i tuenc ies in Grea te r Seoul that the NCNP lost on a 4 p e r cen t swing or less ( that is, w h e r e the two-par ty vote was 5 4 - 4 6 p e r cen t o r closer) , mos t of w h i c h the NCNP w o u l d have h o p e d to have


won. If they had, the distr ibut ion of seats in Greater Seoul w o u l d have b e e n 53-31

to the NCNP, instead of 54 -30 against.

On such calculat ions are e lec t ions w o n and lost in a plurality e lectoral system

w h e n there is bo th the ability to manufac tu re marginals and the e lectoral homogen-

eity that one finds in Seoul.

C o n c l u s i o n

I have tr ied to s h o w that e lectoral poli t ics in South Korea is bo th recognizably

democra t i c and subject to inheren t stresses. Some of these stresses are inheren t to

Korean society and culture; some are inevitable transitional p rob lems in a demo-

cratizing society; some are the p roduc t s of an e lectoral system that is (in my v iew)

not wel l sui ted to Korean realities and too o p e n to a t tempts at manipulat ion. All of

t h e m are difficult to resolve. But there is no w i s h - - a t least among the polit ical

e l i t e s - - t o abandon democracy , even if there is somet imes an incl inat ion (as

e v e r y w h e r e ) to avoid its more demand ing consequences . It is therefore unlikely that

these stresses will lead to the col lapse of the poli t ical system. It does seem that, for

the forseeable future, South Korean poli t ics will take place wi th in a more-or-less

democra t i c f ramework.

Notes and References

1. For a more detailed account of the constitutions see, for instance, Ahn Byong-man, Kil Soong-hoom and Kim Kwang-woong (1988) Elections in Korea (Seoul Computer Press, Seoul), Chapter 1; Dae-Kyu Yoon (1990) Law and Political Authority in South Korea (Kyungnam University Press, Seoul), Chapter 4; or Young O. Yoon (1991) Korean Legis- lative Behavior: A Longitudinal Analysis in Comparative Perspective (Kookmin Univer- sity Press, Seoul), Chapter 2.

2. For an account of these developments see Cotton, J. (1989) From Authoritarianism to democracy in South Korea. Political Studies 37, 244-259.

3. It was more complicated than this; but the complications do not matter here. 4. For an examination of the negotiations on the implementation of the 1987 electoral law,

see Brady, D. and Mo, J. (1992) Electoral systems and institutional choice: a case study of the 1988 Korean elections. Comparative Political Studies 24, 405-429.

5. On the 1992 election see Morriss, P. (1992/3) The South Korean National Assembly Elec- tions 1992. Representation 31, 60-62. On the 1988 election see Kim Hong-Nack (1993) The 1988 Parliamentary elections in South Korea. In Korea Under Rob Tae-Woo, ed., J. Cotton. Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, NSW, Australia.

6. This may be changing, now that local officials are at last being directly elected, rather than appointed from the centre. Being Mayor of Seoul may well come to be an important political position, and--if held by an opposition politician, as it usually will be- -a rival power base to the government. But, as yet, local politics is not a route into national politics at the top level.

7. For an excellent account, see Byeong-Seog Park (1995) Political corruption in South Korea: concentrating on the dynamics of party politics. Asian Perspective 19, 163-193. Most of my examples come from this article; others are from the national press and personal information.

8. Korea Herald 15 March 1996, reporting a claim by an incumbent NCNP assemblyman that 2 billion won was 'demanded' for a place on the National list, and that he was dropped when he refused to pay; and Park (1995) p. 185 (see Note 7).

9. For an attempt to do so, see Morriss, P. (1996) Roh regrets: corruption in South Korea. Corruption and Reform, forthcoming.

10. For a description of regionalism in Korea, see Lee, D. O. and Brunn, S. D. (1996) Politics and regions in Korea: an analysis of the recent presidential election. Political Geography 15, 99-119.


11. For a slightly fuller account of the 1996 election see Morriss, P. (1996) The National Assembly elections in South Korea, 1996. Representation, forthcoming.

12. It is perhaps worth mentioning here that, as candidates are chosen by the parties' central leadership, not by the local members, and campaigning in constituencies is restricted by law to the election period itself, of about three weeks, it is not a major practical impedi- ment to the electoral process in Korea if the constituency boundaries are not known until 74 days before the election date. Indeed, anybody with experience of life in Korea will know that Koreans do not decide on anything any further in advance than is absol- utely necessary. This late redrawing of constituency boundaries is simply the 'just-in-time' approach applied to the electoral system.

13. See, e.g., Ahn, Kil and Kim (1988) pp. 38-39 (see Note 1). 14. Brady, D. and Mo, J. (1992) pp. 419-423 (see Note 4). 15. I, rather crudely, group together the six large conurbations and Kyonggi Province as

'urban' and the rest as rural. 16. And also, to a lesser extent, in Taegu and North Kyongsang. I briefly discuss the election

results in these areas in my The National Assembly Elections in South Korea, 1996. 17. See Kendall, M. G. and Stuart, A. (1950) The law of cubic proportions in election results.

British Journal of Sociology 1, 183-197. For extensive discussions of the cube law see Gudgin, G. and Taylor, P. J. (1979) Seats, Votes, and the Spatial Organisation of Elec- tions (Pion, London) and Curtice, J. and Steed, M. (1982) Electoral choice and the pro- duction of government: the changing operation of the electoral system in the United Kingdom since 1955. British Journal of Political Science 12, 249-298.

18. This is calculated over just those seats in which the NCNP and NKP came first and second--which is the great majority in Greater Seoul (73 out of 96). Calculating over all seats, the standard deviations rise slightly to 9.1 and 6.6, respectively.

19. More accurately, it shows that if there are some socio-economic factors that influence voting, these socio-economic factors do not affect where people live. But my feeling is that where one resides in Seoul tends to be as affected by the usual socio-economic factors as in any other big city.

20. For a similar case--based on partisan redistricting rather than manufactured marginals-- see Gudgin and Taylor (1979) pp. 158-160 (see Note 17).

The Italian General Election of 1996

STEVEN WARNER

Nuffield College, Oxford OX1 1NF, UK

FEDERICO VARESE

Nuffield College, Oxford OX1 1N~. UK

On 21 April 1996, Italy c o n d u c t e d its s econd general e lec t ion since replacing the

p ropor t iona l represen ta t ion (PR) electoral system wi th a form of additional m e m b e r

system.* Despi te recur ren t express ions of dissatisfaction wi th this n e w system, and

repea ted demands for fur ther e lectoral reforms, the electoral system remained

u n c h a n g e d f rom the prev ious contest , w h i c h took place on 28 March 1994.

The character is t ics of this system have b e e n discussed in detail e l sewhere . 2 Here,

w e will s imply out l ine the electoral p rocedure . For the Camera dei Deputat i

(Chamber of Deputies) , 475 of the 630 seats are al located th rough a plurality system

(PS) e lec t ion c o n d u c t e d in s ing le-member const i tuencies , wi th the remaining 155

seats awarded on the basis of a regional PR contes t for w h i c h electors cast a separate

electoral politics in south korea

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