embodied reflection and the epistemology of reflective practice

Embodied Reflection and the Epistemology

of Reflective Practice

ELIZABETH ANNE KINSELLA

Donald Schon’s theory of reflective practice has beenextensively referred to and has had enormous impact ineducation and related fields. Nonetheless, there continuesto be tremendous conceptual and practical confusionsurrounding interpretations of reflective practice andphilosophical assumptions underlying the theory. In thispaper, I argue that one of the original contributions ofreflective practice is the theory’s attention to an embodiedreflective dimension. In this regard, the influences of MichaelPolanyi and Gilbert Ryle, within Donald Schon’s classic work,are examined and shed light on a unique embodied reflectivedimension within the theory of reflective practice. This papersuggests that the notion of an embodied mode of reflectionis a useful way to conceive of the original contributions thatSchon brings to understandings of reflective processes inprofessional education. Such understanding is cruciallyimportant to practical applications of the theory amidstwidespread confusion in educational contexts.

INTRODUCTION

The Reflective Practitioner and Educating the Reflective Practitioner,Donald Schon’s classic works (1983, 1987), are widely quoted influencesin the field of education and in the study of expertise in the health andsocial science professions (Eraut, 1994). Schon’s writing on reflectivepractice has been hailed as canonical in educational theory, has beenextensively referred to and has had enormous impact in education andrelated fields (Erlandson, 2005). Nonetheless, there continues to betremendous conceptual and practical confusion surrounding whatreflective practice is and in what ways it is distinct from other modes ofreflective theorising (Clark, 2001; Fenstermacher, 1988; Procee, 2006).Despite the popularity of Schon’s reflective practice, little work hasexplored the major philosophical influences within his theory (Dunne,1993) or the implications for interpretation and application of reflectivepractice in educational contexts. Indeed, a number of recent critiques of

Journal of Philosophy of Education, Vol. 41, No. 3, 2007

r 2007 The AuthorJournal compilation r 2007 Journal of the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain. Published by BlackwellPublishing, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.

reflective practice fail to include a rigorous consideration of thephilosophical perspectives underlying Schon’s epistemology of practice(Bleakley, 1999; Erlandson, 2006; Procee, 2006). In this paper, I considertwo significant influences on Schon’s conception of reflective practice as astarting point for understanding the epistemological significance of anembodied mode of reflection in Schon’s theory. I argue that such anunderstanding has important practical implications for the application ofthe theory in educational contexts.

Schon frequently invokes the work of two philosophers, MichaelPolanyi and Gilbert Ryle, to highlight a mode of reflection that, I shallargue, is uniquely distinct from an emphasis on intentional cognitivereflection. This mode of reflection is what I shall call an embodied mode ofreflection, in that it arises through the bodily, lived experience of thepractitioner and is revealed in action. I suggest that an examination ofthe work of Michael Polanyi and Gilbert Ryle in light of Schon’s work caninform an understanding of Schon’s reflective practice and that it can inparticular draw attention to this embodied dimension and it’s relevance toconceptualisations of reflection in professional practice. This paper examinesthese influences and suggests that the notion of an embodied mode ofreflection is a useful way to conceive of the original contributions that Schonbrings to understandings of reflective processes in professional life, and thatcritics of reflective practice and those who apply the theory in educationalcontexts would do well to consider these epistemic roots in their analysis.

INFLUENCES OF MICHAEL POLANYI

A central theme in Schon’s theory of reflective practice is tacit knowledge,a concept introduced by Polanyi. Although Polanyi is known for a numberof works (Polanyi, 1958, 1967, 1969; Polanyi and Prosch, 1975), Schondraws on his classic book The Tacit Dimension (1967). In this work,Polanyi sets out to ‘reconsider human knowledge’ by starting from theassumption that ‘we can know more than we can tell’ (p. 4). In thefollowing section, I examine ways in which Polanyi’s notion of tacitknowledge infuses Schon’s writings about reflective practice. I suggestthat he is a significant influence and that tacit knowledge may be viewedas a mode of embodied reflection.

Tacit Knowledge

A famous example of tacit knowledge, frequently used as an example bySchon (1983, 1987), Argyris and Schon (1992), and others, is that of facerecognition. Polanyi (1967) observes that we can know a person’s face,that we can recognise that face among a million faces, yet we usuallycannot tell how we recognise a face we know. So most of this knowledgecannot be put into words. Polanyi uses a range of other examples of tacitknowledge, including the two below, which Schon also cites in hisdescriptions. For instance, Polanyi describes an experiment in which a

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participant learns to behave in particular ways to avoid electric shocks.The participant learned to forestall electric shocks by avoiding theutterances associated with them; however, upon questioning, the individualwas unaware of the strategies he had learned (p. 8). Thus, the learning wasof a tacit nature. As another example, Polanyi notes the tacit knowledgethat one develops as a result of using a probe (pp. 12–13). As we learn touse a probe or a stick for feeling our way, its impact upon our hand istransformed into a sense of its point touching the objects we are exploring.This is how meaningless feelings are transposed into meaningful ones. Webecome aware of the meaning located at the tip of the probe or stickthrough the feelings in our hands.

As well as providing examples of tacit knowledge, Polanyi (1967)describes its functional structure, phenomenal structure, semantic aspect,and ontological aspect. Such distinctions however are beyond the depthwith which Schon considers the term; rather, he uses the notion of tacitknowledge in a more general sense and applies Polanyi’s practicalexamples to highlight the tacit dimension of professional knowledge.

Although beyond the scope of this paper, it is interesting to note a recentproliferation of work in the field of cognitive psychology with respect toimplicit and tacit knowledge (Reber, 1993; Stadler and Frensch, 1998;Tirosh, 1994), and the considerable conceptual confusion surrounding theterms in this field (see Frensch, 1998). As opposed to cognitivepsychology, Polanyi works within a philosophical tradition (his work isnot generally cited in cognitive psychology), and Schon focuses on theimplications of tacit or implicit knowledge in the professions.

Tacit Knowledge and Theories-in-Use

Schon refers to tacit knowledge in his early work with Chris Argyris,where they begin to examine the implications of tacit knowledge forprofessional practice. In Theory in Practice, the terms ‘implicit knowl-edge’ and ‘tacit knowledge’ are used interchangeably and taken to meanthat ‘we know more that we can tell and more than our behaviourconsistently shows’ (Argyris and Schon, 1992, p. 10). Argyris and Schonfurther describe tacit knowledge as ‘what we display when we recognizeone face from thousands without being able to say how we do so, when wedemonstrate a skill for which we cannot state an explicit program, or whenwe experience the intimation of a discovery we cannot put into words’(ibid.). Interestingly, the three aspects of this description roughly parallelthe three examples of tacit knowledge offered by Polanyi (highlighted inthe previous section). Schon frequently cites these examples in his writing(Argyris and Schon, 1992; Schon, 1983; Schon, 1987). In this waypractical descriptions of tacit knowledge are emphasised, whereasPolanyi’s more theoretical exploration of tacit knowledge is not taken up.

Argyris and Schon suggest that tacit knowledge is particularly useful forunderstanding theories-in-use. In their view, each practitioner develops atheory of practice, whether he or she is aware of it or not. Such a theory is

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composed of both explicit knowledge, what one is able to say about whatone knows, and theories-in-use, which may be unconscious and arerevealed in behaviour. Theories-in-use tend to be tacit structures whoserelation to actions is comparable to the grammar-in-use of speech; theycontain assumptions about the self, others and the environment thatconstitute a microcosm of everyday life (pp. 29–30). Thus, Schon’s earlywork, undertaken in partnership with Argyris, draws on Polanyi’s accountof tacit knowledge in order to inform the notion of theories of practice andtheories-in-use they develop.

Explicating Tacit Knowledge and Frames

Argyris and Schon contend that it is important to make one’s tacit theories(theories-in-use) explicit and to be aware that one possesses such theories.They note that in an unstable and uncertain world, individuals place‘a normative template on reality’ (Argyris and Schon, 1992, p. 28). Such atemplate serves as a tacit ordering of the norms and expectations of reality.The ability to be conscious of taking such a stance has implications forpractice, as it allows practitioners to be freer to test their own theories.Furthermore, practitioners make tacit knowledge explicit by examiningactions in practice and by becoming aware of these ‘normative templates’that they place on reality (ibid.).

In The Reflective Practitioner, Schon elaborates on this theme; howeverhe changes the language by referring to frames rather than theories-in-useand normative templates. This inconsistency of language as well as afailure to refer back to the assumptions embedded in his earlier work withArgyris have, I suggest, contributed to some of the conceptual confusionsurrounding the theory of reflective practice. Nonetheless, Schon builds onthese earlier ideas in later work. He writes, ‘once practitioners notice thatthey actively construct the reality of their practice and become aware ofthe variety of frames available to them, they begin to see the need toreflect-in-action on their previously tacit frames’ (Schon, 1983, p. 311). Inother words, Schon notes that the constructivist orientation that hehighlights (using Nelson Goodman’s [1978] work) is often a tacit process,and that practitioners are constantly engaged in this tacit process ofworldmaking (see Kinsella, 2006). Further, he suggests that becomingaware of these tacit normative templates or frames contributes to what oneperceives in professional practice.

Schon takes stock of the various tacit frames that inform professionalpractice, noting that ‘at any given time in the life of a profession, certainways of framing problems and roles come into good currency’ (Schon,1983, p. 309). According to Schon, such professional frames are often tacitand determine the professionals’ strategies of attention, thereby setting thedirections in which they will try to change the situation and the values thatwill shape their practice. Yet many practitioners remain unaware of thetacit frames they bring to practice and unaware of the need to chooseamong them. This has implications for practice: ‘when practitioners areunaware of their frames for roles or problems, they do not experience the

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need to choose among them. They do not attend to the ways in which theyconstruct the reality in which they function; for them, it is simply a givenreality’ (p. 310). In contrast, Schon suggests, by making implicit framesexplicit the practitioner becomes aware of alternative ways of framing thereality of practice. The practitioner takes stock of the values and norms towhich he or she has given priority and of those that have been left outaltogether. Hence, becoming aware of tacit frames creates awareness ofmore possibilities for action (ibid.).

Later, Schon (1987) makes the constructivist underpinnings of these ideasmore explicit, fusing the ideas with Goodman’s notion of worldmaking andhighlighting the tacit processes within. He notes that practitioners holdreflective conversations with their practice situations, remaking theirpractice world and thereby revealing ‘the usually tacit processes ofworldmaking that underlie all of their practice’ (p. 36). Further, he notesthat within a reflective process lies the possibility for change: ‘Throughreflection, he can surface and criticise the tacit understandings that havegrown up around the repetitive experiences of a specialized practice, andcan make new sense of the situations of uncertainty and uniqueness whichhe may allow himself to experience’ (p. 61).

Through reflection then, Schon’s practitioner seeks to make thenormative templates or frames discussed earlier (his or her tacitunderstandings and constructions of the world) more explicit. Therefore,the practitioner’s role in setting the boundaries of the problems that will beattended to in practice becomes more visible. It is also through reflectionof this sort that the practitioner can become critical of ‘specialisedpractices’ handed down from within a particular professional discourse. Inseeing that a particular specialised practice does not work, the professionalcan begin to experiment with other ways of making sense of uncertain andunique situations. Thus, although some have criticised Schon (e.g. Taylorand White, 2000) for the lack of a critical dimension to his theory, thisexample demonstrates that Schon’s practitioner can become criticallyreflective with respect to the specialised practices that have becomenormative within his or her discipline.

Tacit Knowledge and Knowing-in-Action

Although Argyris and Schon rely on Polanyi’s notion of tacit knowledge,they also critique Polanyi (Argyris and Schon, 1992, pp. 202–203) for hisfailure to consider the difference between tacit knowledge that can bemade explicit simply by shifting one’s attention to the particulars and tacitknowledge that cannot. For instance, in the case of face recognition theparticulars of a face can be made explicit simply by shifting our attention,whereas, in the case of a problem whose solution we do not yet have, weare not able to specify the particulars of what we tacitly know. Accordingto Argyris and Schon, Polanyi does not explain what it means to be tacitlyaware of the relationship of particulars that we are not yet able to specify.

Such particulars are a point of fascination for Schon, and appear toinfluence his thinking with respect to what he refers to as knowing-in-action.



Schon (1987) uses knowing-in-action to refer to the sorts of know-howrevealed in intelligent action, as in publicly observable, physicalperformances such as riding a bicycle and private operations like instantanalysis of a balance sheet. In these situations, according to Schon, theknowing is in the action and is revealed by spontaneous, skilful executionof the performance, which one is characteristically unable to makeverbally explicit (Schon, 1987, p. 25). With respect to knowing-in-action,Schon points out that ‘although we sometimes think before acting, it isalso true that in much of the spontaneous behaviour of skillful practice wereveal a kind of knowing which does not stem from a prior intellectualoperation’ (Schon, 1983, p. 51). He notes that ‘once we put aside themodel of Technical Rationality, which leads us to think of intelligentpractice as an application of knowledge to instrumental decisions, there isnothing strange about the idea that a kind of knowing is inherent inintelligent action’ (p. 50). An example of this comes to mind from my ownexperience. In my mid-20s I was working at around 8.00 pm at night,catching up on paperwork in my office in an old wing of a hospital inNorthern Ontario. My office was located on the third floor, near the end ofa corridor, and no one else was working late, so the area was deserted. Aman knocked on my office door. When I opened it, he lunged into myoffice, and it was clear that he was in a psychotic state. I quickly steppedpast him out of my office, and when he followed, I donned the voice of anarmy officer, which I could see surprised him, and indeed surprisedmyself. I commanded that he follow me. I marched firmly (down acorridor and three flights of stairs), in a manner that commanded authority,to the hospital emergency department. He followed. The next day Idiscovered that the man had consumed hallucinogenic drugs, had a long-standing diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia and had spent time in jail fornumerous counts of sexual assault. Something intuitive in my being told mewhat to do and how to act in that moment, something outside of my usualway of being. This, I suggest, is an example, perhaps a dramatic one, of theknowing that is sometimes revealed in intelligent action within professionalpractice. There was no time to reflect, there was no time to ponder how toact; there was simply a ‘knowing’ that revealed itself in the moment.

Despite the tacit nature of knowing-in-action, Schon (1987) points outthat it is sometimes possible, by observing and reflecting, to describe thetacit knowing implicit in our actions. He cautions, however, thatdescriptions of knowing-in-action are always constructions:

They are always attempts to put into explicit, symbolic form a kind ofintelligence that begins by being tacit and spontaneous . . . descriptionsare conjectures that need to be tested against observation of theiroriginals—which, in at least one respect, they are bound to distort. Forknowing-in-action is dynamic, and ‘facts’, ‘procedures’, ‘rules’ andtheories are static (Schon, 1987, p. 25).

Schon, therefore, contends that we know more than we can say, that thisknowing is revealed in our actions and that by observing and reflecting on

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our actions we can sometimes formulate constructions that account for thetacit knowledge revealed in what we do. Yet he cautions that, asconstructions, such interpretations are partial and represent attempts toimpose stasis on the dynamic process of knowing-in-action.

Tacit Knowledge and Artistry

In The Reflective Practitioner, Schon highlights Polanyi’s reflectionsabout tacit knowledge as one example (among a number he cites on pp.238–9) of non-rational, intuitive knowledge. Such knowledge, he argues,is integrally tied to an artistry of practice. In the context of management,Schon writes, ‘Managers have remained aware of a dimension of ordinaryprofessional work, crucially important to effective performance, whichcannot be reduced to technique. Indeed, they are sometimes aware thateven management technique rests on a foundation of nonrational, intuitiveartistry’ (p. 239). He views the field of management as split into twocamps, one rooted in science and technique, and the other attentive to anartistry of practice. Schon explains:

At the same time that management science and technique have grownincreasingly in power and prestige, there has been a persistent andgrowing awareness of the importance of an art of managing which revealsitself both in crucially important situations of uncertainty, instability, anduniqueness, and in those dimensions of everyday practice which dependupon the spontaneous exercise of intuitive artistry (1983, p. 240).

Schon highlights the implications of this tension for practice, in that if oneconsiders rigorous management to be the application of managementscience and technique, then rigorous management must be selectivelyinattentive to the artistry that managers bring to day-to-day practice. Sucha definition of rigour, therefore, means that as managers we must avoidsituations in which we are confronted with uncertainty, instability oruniqueness—situations that frequently present themselves in practicesituations. Schon suggests that if attention to the art of practice, the tacitknowledge that managers do not usually pay attention to, can be shown tobe rigorous in itself, the dichotomy between the two sides and thedilemma of rigour versus relevance need not be so painful. Thus,Polanyi’s notion of tacit knowledge contributes to Schon’s conception ofan artistry of practice and informs his alternative epistemology ofprofessional knowledge in a significant manner.

A question that has been posed with respect to this notion is whether thepractitioner can acquire tacit knowledge in a field that they do not know:do they not require the foundational knowledge first before it can becometacit? The response that Schon (1987) offers is yes, in those domains ofpractice that require technical answers, the technical information isnecessary before it can become tacit. However, what Schon goes to greatlengths to point out is that much of practice takes place in what he calls theindeterminate zones of practice. Located in these indeterminate zones, the



majority of the complexities and problems of practice tend to fall outsideof the realms of technical knowledge, of clear black and white cases.For instance, Schon quotes a physician who suggests that only about15 percent of clinical problems are based on evidence alone, while theother 85 percent are not in the book (Schon, 1987, p. 16). In other words,for those cases of practice that respond to black and white solutions andtechnical knowledge, yes, it is important. However, for indeterminatesituations of practice, the practitioner requires a different approach tonegotiate challenges successfully. This is where Schon’s notion of anartistry of practice becomes relevant.

Polanyi and Schon: Tacit Knowledge, Artistry and Knowing-in-Action

In summary, Polanyi’s notion of tacit knowledge is reflected in a numberof ways in Schon’s theory. First, he uses general examples of tacitknowledge to convey an alternative dimension to traditional conceptionsof professional knowledge. Second, Argyris and Schon draw on tacitknowledge to discuss theories-in-use and normative templates, and Schonextends this to the notion of the frames that practitioners bring to practice.Further, Schon links the notion of tacit frames to the process ofworldmaking. Schon argues for the importance of making such tacitknowledge explicit and that it is in this way that practitioners can critiquespecialised practices and change their own practice. Schon argues furtherfor a type of knowing-in-action, a tacit knowing revealed in professionalaction. Finally, tacit knowledge contributes to Schon’s conception of anartistry of practice. An artistry of practice recognises that the majority ofpractice is comprised of indeterminate situations of practice, situationsthat are not in the book, and such indeterminate zones are not negotiableby simple application of science and technique. I argue that understandingPolanyi’s work and influence assists the field of education in formulatinginterpretations of Schon’s work. The philosophical underpinnings arerelevant for understanding reflective practice, and considerations withrespect to its practical application in practice contexts.

INFLUENCES OF GILBERT RYLE

Another philosopher whose ideas play an important role within Schon’stheory of reflective practice is Gilbert Ryle. The ideas raised by Ryle havecommonalities to those raised by Polanyi in the sense that bothphilosophers challenge conceptions of what it means to know, particularlyconceptions that only recognise propositional knowledge. Their emphasis,however, is slightly different; Polanyi focuses on what people are unableto say, that which is tacit, whereas Ryle is interested in overcomingdualities and the link between intelligence and action reflected in‘knowing-how’. For this part of the discussion their ideas are handledseparately because they emphasise subtly different points; however, it isimportant to note that there are parallels in their thinking and that both

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influence Schon’s conception of knowing-in-action, which reflects adistinct way of conceptualising professional knowledge.

Although Ryle is known for a number of works (1949, 1954, 1971), TheConcept of Mind is his most famous and influential, and a number of theideas within it are pivotal for Schon’s theory. Schon cites Ryle in both TheReflective Practitioner and Educating the Reflective Practitioner.

Ryle’s work has been compared to that of Ludwig Wittgenstein, thoughthere is debate and speculation about the nature of the influences anddifferences in their approaches. Both share an important aim with respectto philosophy of mind: to dispel the Cartesian notion of the mind as aprivate inner chamber (Sprague, 1999). They oppose the mind-bodydualist’s claim that the mind is an immaterial entity yoked to a materialbody, and the quite different claim that since everything is reducible tomatter, the mind must be identical with the brain.

In the terminology of Elmer Sprague’s analysis, Wittgenstein and Ryleare supporters of ‘personism’ as opposed to ‘mindism’. From thisperspective, they move away from the spectator stance in philosophy ofmind, a perspective that stems from Descartes and makes the mind thesubject of mentalistic verbs such as ‘know’, ‘think’ and ‘believe’. Rather,both approach philosophy of mind from an agent stance, in which theyplace the person at the centre. Personists refuse to regard the mind as anykind of object at all and direct their attention to persons; they find the mindin people’s capacities to say and do different things, and in the way peopleconduct their saying and doing. Although there are similarities, Spraguesuggests that if one reads carefully one can detect marked distinctionsbetween Wittgenstein’s and Ryle’s approaches to the Cartesian problem.Wittgenstein’s approach is via his analysis of language and meaning,whereas Ryle has mind-body dualism more directly as his target and findsmind in the doings of persons. It is appropriate to acknowledge thisconnection here because Schon has made reference to Wittgenstein as aninfluence in his work (see Newman, 1999a), and there is speculation aboutthe influence of Wittgenstein on Ryle. Nonetheless, discussion of thenature and degree of Wittgenstein’s influence on Ryle or Schon is beyondthis paper. I suggest that Wittgenstein’s influence on Schon’s theory is notas clear as that of the two philosophers discussed in this paper.Furthermore, the degree and coherence of Schon’s application ofWittgenstein’s ideas have been examined and challenged by StephenNewman. (For an extended consideration of this subject, see Newman,1999b.)

Bridging Mind-Body Dualism: The Relevance of Action

Ryle seeks to dispel what he refers to as ‘Cartesian dualism’ or ‘the mythof the ghost in the machine’. He argues, in a tone that he acknowledges aspolemical at times, that Descartes left, as one of his main philosophicallegacies, a distorting myth that has become the ‘official doctrine’ and that,therefore, continues to influence philosophical thinking. This official



doctrine, as is well known, sets up a dualism between body and mind.According to Ryle, it goes something like this. Every human being hasboth a body and a mind. Body and mind are ordinarily harnessed together;but after death the mind may continue to exist, whereas human bodies are inspace and subject to mechanical laws. Bodily processes and states can beinspected by external observers, but minds are not in space, nor are theiroperations subject to mechanical laws; the workings of one’s mind are notwitnessable by other observers, and only I can take direct cognizance ofmy own mind. A person, therefore, lives through two collateral histories,one consisting of what happens to the body and the other consisting ofwhat happens in and to the mind. The bifurcation of these two lives iscustomarily expressed by saying that the things and events that belong tothe physical world, including one’s own body are external, whereas theworkings of one’s own mind are internal (Ryle, 1949, pp. 11–12).

Ryle notes that The Concept of Mind was written to try to get some ofthe disorders resulting from this myth out of his system. According toRyle, the central principle of what he calls the Cartesian Myth is unsoundand is based on a category mistake. He argues that Descartes pressed histheory of mind into a logical mould and unwittingly adhered to thegrammar of mechanics in describing bodies and minds. Ryle suggests,therefore, that the traditional theory of mind made a category mistake thatresulted in the mythical bifurcation of unwitnessable mental causes andtheir witnessable physical effects. Given this antithesis, it follows,according to Ryle, that muscular doing cannot itself be a mental operation.He argues that this ‘intellectualist legend’ assumes that for an operation tobe intelligent it must be steered by a prior intellectual operation. In hiswords: ‘The absurd assumption made by the intellectualist legend is this,that a performance of any sort inherits all its title to intelligence fromsome anterior internal operation of planning what to do’ (p. 31). Rylestates that the exercise of intelligence cannot be analysed into such anenterprise of first considering operations with the mind and then executingthem with the body; rather the mind and body are much more integratedthan that. Ryle resists dualistic thinking with respect to the separation ofactivities of the mind and activities of the body by directing attention tothe ‘doings’ of persons—such as playing chess, knot-tying, car-driving,theorising and others. Ryle finds mind revealed in the doings of persons,doings that are explainable by the doer’s aims, not by ‘ghostly’ innercauses. He writes:

The statement ‘the mind is its own place’ as theorists might construe it, isnot true, for the mind is not even a metaphorical ‘place’. On the contrary,the chessboard, the platform, the scholar’s desk, the judge’s bench, thelorry-driver’s seat, the studio and the football field are among its places.These are where people work or play stupidly or intelligently. ‘Mind’ isnot the name of another person, working or frolicking behind animpenetrable screen; it is not the name of another place where work isdone or games are played; and it is not the name of another tool with whichwork is done, or another appliance with which games are played (p. 51).

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This challenge to dualistic thinking in relation to mind and body, and theresultant emphasis on doing as the place where minds are revealed, arekey dimensions of Ryle’s thinking.

Ryle (1949) further highlights, as is well known, the inappropriatenessof a dualistic position by distinguishing between what he refers to asknowing-how and knowing-that. The significance of this distinction andthe enlargement of what can be conceived of as knowledge, given such aperspective, cannot be overstated. Indeed, Sprague (1999) suggests thatRyle’s philosophy allows for the exercise of skills, knacks, talents,capacities, and abilities to be admitted to a philosophical respectabilityformerly reserved for propositional knowledge alone. He suggests alogical implication in that were it not for a base in knowing-how,propositional knowledge—knowing-that—would not be possible (p. 8).

At any rate, Ryle’s ideas are of particular relevance to Schon’s theory ofreflective practice. Ryle’s work supports, in a substantive manner, Schon’smove toward what he calls an alternative epistemology of practice, one thatbuilds on more than simply propositional knowledge, (i.e. knowing-that).Indeed, Schon’s general definition of reflective practice and his conceptionof knowing-in-action attempt to bridge the dualism noted by Ryle. Schondefines reflective practice as a ‘dialogue of thinking and doing throughwhich I become more skillful’ (Schon, 1987, p. 31). In this definition theintegration of mind and body activities is reflected in a manner that extendsbeyond a dualistic view. Furthermore, the focus on knowledge as revealedin doing is consistent with much of what Schon has to say aboutprofessional knowledge, and it is implicit in his writing. For instance,Schon (1983) notes that although practitioners sometimes think beforeacting, it is also true that in much of the spontaneous behaviour of skilfulpractice, practitioners reveal a kind of knowing that does not begin with aprior intellectual operation (or what Ryle calls ‘knowing-that’). In speakingof the unexamined dichotomy between thought and action, Schon argues:

Doing and thinking are complementary. Doing extends thinking in thetests, moves and probes of experimental action, and reflection feeds ondoing and its results. Each feeds the other, and each sets boundaries forthe other. It is the surprising result of action that triggers reflection, and itis the production of a satisfactory move that brings reflection temporarilyto a close (Schon, 1983, p. 280).

Schon notes further that the practitioner does not abstain from action inorder to sink into endless thought, but rather continuity in practice entailsa continual interweaving of thinking and doing. Thus he argues, in quitegeneral terms, for a continuity between thinking and doing, as opposed toviewing the two as dichotomous or dualistic entities. In this way he pointsout that the actions of practice often do not depend on a prior intellectualprocedure, but rather arise from a dialectic conversation between thinkingand doing. This analysis of Schon contradicts the critique posited byNewman (1999a, 1999b) and elaborated by Peter Erlandson (2005) thathis reasoning on reflection involves a dualistic, intellectualist problem.



Drawing on Ryle, he has worked to overcome a dualistic perspective withrespect to the reflective relationship between thinking and action.Furthermore, Schon’s position is distinct from John Dewey’s moreintentional orientation to reflective processes, in which the timing ofreflection is after the action, in such a way that he extends Dewey’sconception (Schon, 1992).

Knowing-How and Knowing-in-Action

More particularly, Schon invokes Ryle’s work whenever he introduces thenotion of ‘knowing-in-action’. He defines knowing-in-action as ‘the sortsof know-how revealed in our intelligent action’ (Schon, 1983, p. 50). Ofspecial relevance to this concept are Ryle’s distinction between knowing-how and knowing-that, and the relationship that he posits between doingand intelligence. The following quotation from Ryle is presented morethan once:

What distinguishes sensible from silly operations is not their parentagebut their procedure, and this holds no less for intellectual than forpractical performances. ‘Intelligent’ cannot be defined in terms of‘intellectual’ or ‘knowing how’ in terms of ‘knowing that’; ‘thinkingwhat I am doing’ does not connote ‘both thinking what to do and doingit’. When I do something intelligently . . . I am doing one thing and nottwo. My performance has a special procedure or manner, not specialantecedents (Ryle, 1949, p. 32; cited in Schon, 1983, p. 51; 1987, p. 22).

Schon applies Ryle’s argument to professional practice by arguing thatalthough practitioners sometimes think before acting, it is also true that inmuch of the spontaneous behaviour of skilful practice practitioners reveala kind of knowing, which does not stem from such a prior intellectualoperation. He writes:

Common sense admits the category of know-how, and it does not stretchcommon sense very much to say that the know-how is in the action—that atightrope walker’s know-how, for example, lies in, and is revealed by, theway he takes his trip across the wire, or that a big-league pitcher’s know-how is in his way of pitching to a batter’s weakness, changing his pace, ordistributing his energies over the course of a game. There is nothing incommon sense to make us say that know-how consists in rules or planswhich we entertain in the mind prior to action (Schon, 1983, pp. 50–51).

In his own theorising, Schon adopts knowing-in-action to refer to the sortof know-how revealed in intelligent action. He notes that in publiclyobservable, physical performances (like riding a bicycle) and privateoperations (like instant analysis of a balance sheet) the knowing is in theaction. According to Schon, in such instances, as in professional practice,we can reveal our knowing through spontaneous, skilful execution ofthe performance, and we are characteristically unable to make such

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knowledge verbally explicit. He explains: ‘Often we cannot say what it isthat we know. When we try to describe it we find ourselves at a loss, or weproduce descriptions that are obviously inappropriate. Our knowing isordinarily tacit, implicit in our patterns of action and in our feel for thestuff with which we are dealing. It seems right to say that our knowing isin our action’ (p. 49).

Thus, in contrast to traditional approaches to what it means to know inthe professions or within particular disciplinary forms of knowledge,which focus on content, Schon draws on Ryle to make the point that thereare other ways that practitioners know, and that such knowing is revealedin performance and action. In my previous practice as an occupationaltherapist, it was interesting for me to note that those who had the highestmarks in school did not always become those who were looked to as themost skilful of practitioners. Here the importance of the distinctionbetween knowing-that and knowing-how becomes all the more evident.

Ryle and Schon: Bridging Mind Body Dualities

Whereas Ryle uses Cartesianism as the counterpoint to his arguments,Schon asks his readers to put aside the dualities posed by the model ofwhat he calls ‘Technical Rationality’. Schon argues that technicalrationality leads one to think of intelligent practice as the application ofpropositional knowledge to instrumental decisions (see Kinsella, 2007).Once such a view is placed to the side, he notes that there is nothing strangeabout the idea that a kind of knowing is inherent in intelligent action. Thus,Ryle’s distinction between knowing-how and knowing-that, and his argumentthat intelligence is revealed in ways that extend beyond propositionalknowledge in such a way as to be embodied in the actions of persons, is amajor epistemological position reflected within Schon’s theory.

Schon recognises the intelligence inherent in skilful action in a mannerthat takes up Ryle’s (1949) notion of intelligence as revealed in a person’s‘doings’. This assumption underpins his notion of reflective practice andimplicitly informs his theory. Furthermore, Ryle’s distinction betweenknowing-how and knowing-that supports the pivotal construct ofknowing-in-action within Schon’s theory.

The implications of these assumptions for practice and for professionalcurricula are significant. If professional knowledge is revealed in doing,and if knowing-how takes its place alongside knowing-that, therequirement for actual experience and the importance of learning throughpracticum opportunities are magnified. The question of what is consideredprofessional knowledge becomes potent, as does the question of howprofessional knowledge is conveyed, transmitted and developed. What isthe role of doing in professional learning? Can professors, in an academicarena adequately prepare new professionals for future practice? What isthe role of mentorship and coaching in the professional developmentprocess? Why is it that most professional programmes, especially in thehealth professions, continue to design curricula steeped in the perspectiveof technical rationality? In what ways do current curriculum designs in



professional schools continue to perpetuate a dichotomy between theactivities of the mind and the activities of the body?

CONCLUSION: EMBODIED REFLECTION—MIND AND BODY,THOUGHT AND ACTION

Whereas Dewey highlights a link between intentional reflection andintelligent action, a theme also found in the work of Schon, Schon furthernotes that skilful practice may reveal a kind of knowing that does not stemfrom a prior intellectual operation (Schon, 1992).

Polanyi’s work (1967) and Ryle’s (1949) support him in taking this step.Drawing on Polanyi, he uses general examples of tacit knowledge toconvey an alternative to intentional, rational reflection. He highlights tacitknowledge as one example of the non-rational, intuitive knowledge that, heargues, is crucially important to effective performance. Ryle’s distinctionbetween knowing-how and knowing-that, and his argument that intelli-gence is revealed in ways that extend beyond propositional knowledge, arealso of major epistemological significance within Schon’s theory. Herecognises the intelligence inherent in skilful action in a manner that takesup Ryle’s notion of intelligence as revealed in a person’s ‘doings’.

As both tacit knowledge and knowing-how are tied to the bodily actionsof the individual practitioner, I suggest that they may be characterised asan ‘embodied’ mode of reflection, distinct from the ‘intentional’ modehighlighted through Schon’s engagement with Dewey’s ideas. In this waySchon attends to the duality that has frequently been re-inscribed,following Descartes, with respect to a separation of mind and body, orwhat Ryle has referred to as the ‘ghost in the machine’. In professionaleducation, if one assumes that the mind and body are separate, theneducation that appeals to cognitive understanding and knowing-that makessense. However, if mind and body are viewed as integrated, then theimplications for conceptions of education are profound. If the two areintertwined, professional education must incorporate this into itsconceptions. This paper has illuminated the influences of Polanyi andRyle within Schon’s conception of reflective practice, and it has suggestedthat the notion of an embodied mode of reflection is a useful way toconceive of the distinctions that Schon’s theory brings to the discussionsof reflective processes in professional life.

Correspondence: Elizabeth Anne Kinsella, Graduate Program in Healthand Rehabilitation Sciences, Faculty of Health Sciences, The Universityof Western Ontario, 1201 Western Road, Elborn College, London,Ontario, N6H 1H1, Canada.E-mail: [email protected]

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

The author gratefully acknowledges support for this work from the SocialSciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

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embodied reflection and the epistemology of reflective practice

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