Федеральное бюджетное учреждение

“Научно-технический центр по ядерной и радиационной безопасности”

Emergency zones setting in order to control the

spread of contamination and for monitoring the

contamination levels of vehicles, personnel and

territories

Albert Shapovalov

Vienna, 2013

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Post-Fukushima issues

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•due to Fukushima accident the process of strengthening and developing of emergency

preparedness and response regulations and guides, including those related to post-

accident phase, was considerably enhanced by Russian nuclear regulatory body

(Rostechnadzor) and its technical support organization SEC NRS;

•as a part of this process in the year 2013 the safety guide “Minimization of cross-

contamination of areas, traffic routes and vehicles during post-accident phase”

(further – RB-084-13), have been developed and issued;

•the RB-084-13 contains guidelines on post-accident zoning and applicable in case of

accident on facilities (including NPPs). This guidelines should be used to control the

spread of contamination.

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Division of competence

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Competence Rostechnadzor Social welfare

service

Establishment of

reference levels or

generic

intervention levels

- +

Emergency zoning + -

Establishment of

OILs

- +

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Approaches for planning protective actions

Generic criteria for planning

protective actions

Residual dose concept as recommended by:

•IAEA General Safety Guide GSG-2 (2011)

•ICRP Publication №103 (2007)

Avertable dose concept partially in accordance

with:

• the IAEA Basic Safety Standards SS-115

(1996).

•ICRP Publication № 63 Principles for

intervention for protection of public in a

radiological emergency

In Russia the concept of avertable dose for urgent protective

actions established

by NRB-99/2009 (sanitary norms & rules)4

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Russian regulatory basis. Intervention levels for urgent protective

actions according to NRB-99/2009.

Protective

measures

Intervention level of averted dose, mSv

Whole body Thyroid

А-level B-level А-level B-level

Sheltering 5 50 50 500

Stable iodine

administration:

adults

children

-

-

-

-

250

100

2500

1000

Evacuation 50 500 500 5000

• if the avertable dose less than A-level, then no protective actions required;

• if avertable dose less than B-level and exceeds A-level, then decision are to be made according to

optimization principle;

• in case the avertable dose exceeds B-level, then protective action shall be undertaken under any

circumstances.

There is no commonly accepted procedures on how to make a decision based on optimisation principle

5Reference level for post accident phase is 10 mSv/2months

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Accident threat categories (as established in regulatory

requirements NP-004-08 (applicable for NPPs)

Category characteristic

А01

Following consequences are expected:

•Deterministic effects

•Transboundary transfer

А02 Public exposure that higher than B-level according to NRB-99/2009

А03

Public exposure that higher than A-level according to

NRB-99/2009

А04Public exposure over 5 mSv/a

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Russian regulatory basis. Buffer zone concept.

Inside Buffer zone following are

prohibited

permanent or

temporary dwelling

of members of public

deployment of child-

care facilitiesdeployment of industrial and auxiliary facilities not related to

facility

Buffer zone – off-site area (area around facility fence) beyond which in normal operation

conditions, exposure of member of public shall not exceed dose constraint set for this NPP

(OSPORB-99/2010, SANPiN 2.6.1.07-03)

Buffer zone concept are used for facility threat category determining

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Facility threat categories classification

I category If worst-case accident can lead to exposure that exceeding 1 mSv for member of public

(beyond the buffer zone) than this facility is I category

II category If facility not related to I category and worst-case accident can lead to exposure of

personnel that exceeding 5 mSv (in area that between buffer zone and facility site boundary)

than this facility is II category

III category If facility are neither related to I category nor to II category and if there is a possibility of

workers exposure that exceeding 5mSv than this facility is III category facility

IV category remainder

1. OSPORB-99/2010

2. A guide for establishment of facility threat category MU 2.6.1.2005—05

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IAEA documents used for developing of RB-084-13

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Point 4.91 Preparedness and response for a

nuclear or radiological emergency GS-R-2:

“For the emergency zones, arrangements

shall be made for monitoring the

contamination levels of vehicles, personnel

and goods moving into and out of

contaminated areas in order to control the

spread of contamination”.

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IAEA documents used for developing of RB-084-13 (contd.)

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As a basis for defining sizes of zones in RB-084-13

used recommendations of IAEA EPR series

document “Method for Developing Arrangements

for Response to a Nuclear or Radiological

Emergency (EPR Method-2003)”, concerning

predefined emergency zones and radius sizes for

threat category I and II facilities.

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IAEA documents used for developing of RB-084-13 (contd.).

Emergency zones and radius sizes for threat category I and II facilities, suggested

by EPR Method-2003.

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Scope of RB-084-13

I category If worst-case accident can lead to exposure that exceeding 1 mSv for member of public

(beyond the buffer zone) than this facility is I category

II category If facility not related to I category and worst-case accident can lead to exposure of

personnel that exceeding 5 mSv (in area that between buffer zone and facility site boundary)

than this facility is II category

According to guide for establishment of facility threat category MU 2.6.1.2005—05 threat

categories I and II defined as:

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RB-084-13 applicable for such facilities of threat category I and II as:

•NPPs and research reactors;

•Spent nuclear fuel storage facilities;

•Spent nuclear fuel reprocessing plants;

•Radwaste storage facilities.

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Two- and three-zone system

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•In RB-084-13 is recommended to set two- or three-zone system depending on emergency class

or projected doses.

•Three-zone system in case of accident on NPP are to be set in case if accident classified as A01

according to NP-004-08

•Three-zone system in case of accident on facility different from NPP are to be set in case if

accident classified as a category similar to A01 from NP-004-08 (for these facilities documents

other than NP-004-08 define appropriate threat categories)

Three-zone system consists of following zones:

�nearby zone;

�intermediate zone;

�common use zone.

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Two- and three-zone system (contd.)

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•two-zone system are to be set in case if radionuclide release could result in exceeding of generic

intervention level (effective dose 50 mSv) for evacuation, established in Russian basic safety

standard NRB-99/2009 and adopted from ICRP Publication № 63 Principles for intervention for

protection of public in a radiological emergency;

•In case of accident on NPP two-zone system are to be set in case if accident classified as A02 –

A03 according to NP-004-08;

•Two-zone system in case of accident on facility different from NPP are to be set in case if

accident classified as a category similar to A02 – A03 from NP-004-08 (for these facilities

documents other than NP-004-08 define appropriate threat categories)

Two-zone system consists of following zones:

�nearby zone;

�common use zone.

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Recommended zones’ radii for various facilities

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Examples of protective actions to be fulfilled upon setting of three-zone

system

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•Prevent traffic from nearby zone to intermediate zone

•Implementation of following measures in nearby zone:

�Traffic speed should not exceed 30 km/h;

�Sediments should be washed-off from traffic routes to roadside and immobilized with

special reagents

�Radioactive sediments which are result of washing-off of sediments from transport

routes should be relocated far away from routes;

�Caution signs, which prohibit crossing of roadside and staying on it, should be set

along the traffic routes;

�Those vehicles, used by responders, which couldn’t be used anymore due to

contamination, should kept in nearby zone and substituted by “clear” vehicles from

outside of nearby zone;

•Arrange a transfer of personnel between vehicles when entering from nearby zone to

intermediate zone and from intermediate zone to nearby zone.

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Thank you for your attention!