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22 Sep 2018
f
Emerging Issues on the Bayanihan Draft Constitution:
A Critique using the Institutional Design Literature
in Political Science
“A Forum on the Economic, Social, and Political Viability
of Federalism in the Philippines”Pinnacle Hotel, Davao City
22 September 2018
Gene Lacza Pilapil
Assistant Professor of Political Science
University of the Philippines-Diliman
22 Sep 2018
This lecture is part of my ongoing research project entitled
“A Critical Review of the Federalism Project
of the Duterte Administration”
funded by the Office of the Chancellor
of the University of the Philippines Diliman,
through the Office of the Vice Chancellor for Research
and Development’s Outright Research Grant.
Acknowledgements
22 Sep 2018
I would like to thank
the Brotherhood of Christian Businessmen
and Professionals (BCBP)
22 Sep 2018
I would like to thank
the Brotherhood of Christian Businessmen
and Professionals (BCBP)
and
the Ateneo School of Government
22 Sep 2018
I would like to thank
the Brotherhood of Christian Businessmen
and Professionals (BCBP)
and
the Ateneo School of Government
for inviting me to lecture in their forum here in Davao City
I would also like to thank everyone in the audience
listening to my lecture this morning.
Main Aim of the Lecture
22 Sep 2018
Main Aim:
Assert the importance
of the institutional design literature in political science,
the expert literature that specializes
on the design and re-design of political institutions,
in assessing
(a) directly: the Bayanihan Federal Constitution
(b) indirectly: the other proposed federal constitutions
and
(c) by implication: the overall federalism project in the Philippines.
Outline of the Lecture
22 Sep 2018
Outline
I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature
II. Critique of the “Bayanihan Draft Constitution”
(henceforth: “Con-com constitution”)
using the institutional design literature.
I. Short Introduction
to the Institutional Design Literature
22 Sep 2018
If separated = presidential
one basic example: form of government
relation between the executive and legislative
differences in the arrangement of formal rules
If fused = parliamentaryinstitutional design of a
country’s form of government
horizontal
If hybrid = semi-presidential
I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature
system of government
relationship between the
central government
local government
Unitary
system of
government
vertical
single
central
source of authority
“makes
final decisions”
Another basic example:
22 Sep 2018
system of government
relationship between the
central government
local government
Unitary
system of
government
vertical
single
central
source of authority
subordinate
to the central
powers
can be
delegated
single sovereignrecognized by the constitution
“makes
final decisions”
Another basic example:
“constitutional sovereignty”
22 Sep 2018
system of government
relationship between the
central government
local government
Unitary
system of
government
vertical
single
central
source of authority
subordinate
to the central
powers
can be
delegated
“makes
final decisions”
a unitary system can range
from highly centralized
(ex. Singapore)
Another basic example:
single sovereignrecognized by the constitution
system of government
relationship between the
central government
local government
Unitary
system of
government
vertical
single
central
source of authority
subordinate
to the central
No
powers
are
delegated
“makes
final decisions”
a unitary system can range
from highly centralized
(ex. Singapore)
single sovereignrecognized by the constitution
Another basic example:
22 Sep 2018
system of government
relationship between the
central government
local government
Unitary
system of
government
vertical
single
central
source of authority
subordinate
to the central
“makes
final decisions”
a unitary system can range
to highly decentralized
(ex. Norway)
No
powers
are
delegated
single sovereignrecognized by the constitution
Another basic example:
system of government
relationship between the
central government
local government
Unitary
system of
government
vertical
single
central
source of authority
subordinate
to the central
“makes
final decisions”
a unitary system can range
to highly decentralized
(ex. Norway)
Many
powers
are
delegated
single sovereignrecognized by the constitution
Another basic example:
22 Sep 2018
system of government
relationship between the
central government
local government
Unitary
system of
government
vertical
single
central
source of authority
subordinate
to the central
“makes
final decisions”
a unitary system can range
to highly decentralized
(ex. Norway)
Many
powers
are
delegated
single sovereignrecognized by the constitution
Another basic example:
system of government
relationship between the
central government
local government
Unitary
system of
government
vertical
single
central
source of authority
subordinate
to the central
“makes
final decisions”
a unitary system can be more
decentralized than some
centralized federal countries
(ex. Indonesia over Malaysia)
Many
powers
are
delegated
single sovereignrecognized by the constitution
Another basic example:
22 Sep 2018
system of government
relationship between the
central government
local government
Unitary
system of
government
vertical
single
central
source of authority
subordinate
to the central
“makes
final decisions”
a unitary system can be more
decentralized than some
centralized federal countries
(ex. Indonesia over Malaysia)may
also be revoked
Many
powers
are
delegated
single sovereignrecognized by the constitution
Another basic example:
system of government
relationship between the
central government
local government
Federal
system of
government
vertical
in certain policy
areas where central
government has
exclusive jurisdiction
sovereign
Another basic example:
“makes
final decisions”
22 Sep 2018
system of government
relationship between the
central government
local government
Federal
system of
government
sovereign
in certain policy
areas where local
government has
exclusive jurisdiction
vertical
Another basic example:
second sovereign
recognized by the constitution
hence, another
level of government
also enjoys
constitutional sovereignty
“makes
final decisions”
system of government
relationship between the
central government
local government
Federal
system of
government
sovereign
in certain policy
areas where local
government has
exclusive jurisdiction
powers cannot be
revoked because
� they are not delegated
by the central government
� but guaranteed
by the constitution
Another basic example:
hence, another
level of government
also enjoys
constitutional sovereignty
second sovereign
recognized by the constitution
“makes
final decisions”
22 Sep 2018
system of government
relationship between the
central government
local government
Federal
system of
government
verticalfederalism can be
highly centralized(ex. Venezuela)
Another basic example:
system of government
relationship between the
central government
local government
Federal
system of
government
verticalfederalism can be
highly centralized(ex. Venezuela)
Another basic example:
22 Sep 2018
system of government
relationship between the
central government
local government
Federal
system of
government
verticalfederalism to
highly decentralized(ex. United States)
Another basic example:
system of government
relationship between the
central government
local government
Federal
system of
government
verticalfederalism to
highly decentralized(ex. United States)
Another basic example:
22 Sep 2018
system of government
relationship between the
central government
local government
Federal
system of
government
vertical
Another basic example:
in certain
policy areas
where both
governments
have
jurisdiction
(concurrent/shared)
system of government
relationship between the
Federal
system of
government
vertical
in certain
policy areas
where both
governments
have
jurisdiction
(concurrent/shared)
local
government
central
government
“federal
paramountcy”
Another basic example:
22 Sep 2018
studies how the design
(or redesign) of a country’s
political institutions
such as the
form of government,
I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature
such as the
form of government,
system of government
I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature
studies how the design
(or redesign) of a country’s
political institutions
22 Sep 2018
such as the
form of government,
system of government
electoral system,
I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature
studies how the design
(or redesign) of a country’s
political institutions
such as the
form of government,
system of government
electoral system,
party system,
I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature
studies how the design
(or redesign) of a country’s
political institutions
22 Sep 2018
such as the
form of government,
system of government
electoral system,
party system,
legislative structure,
I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature
studies how the design
(or redesign) of a country’s
political institutions
such as the
form of government,
system of government
electoral system,
party system,
legislative structure,
judicial system,
I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature
studies how the design
(or redesign) of a country’s
political institutions
22 Sep 2018
such as the
form of government,
system of government
electoral system,
party system,
legislative structure,
judicial system,
and
constitutional bodies
I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature
studies how the design
(or redesign) of a country’s
political institutions
such as the
form of government,
system of government
electoral system,
party system,
legislative structure,
judicial system,
and
constitutional bodies
I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature
studies how the design
(or redesign) of a country’s
political institutions
22 Sep 2018
such as the
form of government,
system of government
electoral system,
party system,
legislative structure,
judicial system,
and
constitutional bodies
I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature
affects or will affect, among others,
studies how the design
(or redesign) of a country’s
political institutions
such as the
form of government,
system of government
electoral system,
party system,
legislative structure,
judicial system,
and
constitutional bodies
I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature
affects or will affect, among others,
the accountability,
studies how the design
(or redesign) of a country’s
political institutions
22 Sep 2018
such as the
form of government,
system of government
electoral system,
party system,
legislative structure,
judicial system,
and
constitutional bodies
I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature
affects or will affect, among others,
the accountability,
representation,
studies how the design
(or redesign) of a country’s
political institutions
such as the
form of government,
system of government
electoral system,
party system,
legislative structure,
judicial system,
and
constitutional bodies
I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature
affects or will affect, among others,
the accountability,
representation,
popular empowerment,
studies how the design
(or redesign) of a country’s
political institutions
22 Sep 2018
such as the
form of government,
system of government
electoral system,
party system,
legislative structure,
judicial system,
and
constitutional bodies
I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature
affects or will affect, among others,
the accountability,
representation,
popular empowerment,
elite capture,
studies how the design
(or redesign) of a country’s
political institutions
such as the
form of government,
system of government
electoral system,
party system,
legislative structure,
judicial system,
and
constitutional bodies
I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature
affects or will affect, among others,
the accountability,
representation,
popular empowerment,
elite capture,
and coherent policymaking
of the state
studies how the design
(or redesign) of a country’s
political institutions
22 Sep 2018
I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature
“constitutional engineering literature”
other terms
“constitutional design literature”
“institutional approach”
“new institutionalism”
I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature
counts some of the biggest names
in the political science discipline
including winners of the Johan Skytte Prize in Political Science
22 Sep 2018
"to the scholar who in the view of the Foundation has made the most valuable contribution to political science”
I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature
counts some of the biggest names
in the political science discipline
including winners of the Johan Skytte Prize in Political Science
represents the best minds that have studied
similar institutional issues that Filipinos now face
(and are the real experts on these issues)
22 Sep 2018
II. Critique of the “Con-com constitution”
using the institutional design literature
1. Third federal constitution
22 Sep 2018
Three proposed federal constitutions have been submitted to Congress under the Duterte Administration
Eugene De Vera and Aurelio Gonzales, Jr. (Resolution of Both Houses 008) in August 2016
22 Sep 2018
Three proposed federal constitutions have been submitted to Congress under the Duterte Administration
Eugene De Vera and Aurelio Gonzales, Jr. (Resolution of Both Houses 008) in August 2016
Federalism Study Group of the PDP Laban Federalism Institute in August 2017
22 Sep 2018
Three proposed federal constitutions have been submitted to Congress under the Duterte Administration
Eugene De Vera and Aurelio Gonzales, Jr. (Resolution of Both Houses 008) in August 2016
Federalism Study Group of the PDP Laban Federalism Institute in August 2017
Consultative Committee to Review the 1987 Constitution last July 2018
22 Sep 2018
Three proposed federal constitutions have been submitted to Congress under the Duterte Administration
Eugene De Vera and Aurelio Gonzales, Jr. (Resolution of Both Houses 008) in August 2016
Federalism Study Group of the PDP Laban Federalism Institute in August 2017
Consultative Committee to Review the 1987 Constitution last July 2018
only one created by an Executive Order from President Duterte
22 Sep 2018
2. Con-com constitution is now dead politically
First thing that needs to be said is that this constitution is already dead politically
1. Lukewarm support by the President
22 Sep 2018
First thing that needs to be said is that this constitution is already dead politically
2. Too few senators supporting it
1. Lukewarm support by the President
22 Sep 2018
ARTICLE XVII
AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS
Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or
(2) A constitutional convention.
22 Sep 2018
First thing that needs to be said is that this constitution is already dead politically
2. Too few senators supporting it
3. Lower House under Speaker Arroyo has returned to “voting separately” for Con-Ass
1. Lukewarm support by the President
ARTICLE XVII
AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS
Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or
(2) A constitutional convention.
voting separately or jointly?
22 Sep 2018
22 Sep 2018
First thing that needs to be said is that this constitution is already dead politically
2. Too few senators supporting it
3. Lower House under Speaker Arroyo has returned to “voting separately” for Con-Ass
4. Key economic managers of Duterte oppose it
1. Lukewarm support by the President
22 Sep 2018
22 Sep 2018
First thing that needs to be said is that this constitution is already dead politically
2. Too few senators supporting it
3. Lower House under Speaker Arroyo has returned to “voting separately” for Con-Ass
4. Key economic managers of Duterte oppose it
1. Lukewarm support by the President
5. Time has run out on it
22 Sep 2018
So please consider
my critique
of this Con-com constitution
more as an
autopsy
22 Sep 2018
3. Contravenes institutional design principles
Written as if it was confined in an
intellectual vacuum
where it has remained untouched
by the critical insights of the
institutional design literature
22 Sep 2018
Its explicit provisions on
federalism,
22 Sep 2018
22 Sep 2018
Its explicit provisions on
federalism,
political dynasties, political parties,
22 Sep 2018
Its explicit provisions on
federalism,
political dynasties, political parties,
judiciary,
22 Sep 2018
Its explicit provisions on
federalism,
political dynasties, political parties,
judiciary, transitory provisions,
22 Sep 2018
Its explicit provisions on
federalism,
political dynasties, political parties,
judiciary, transitory provisions, etc.
22 Sep 2018
Its explicit provisions on
federalism,
political dynasties, political parties,
judiciary, transitory provisions, etc.
and the-all important implicit
assumptions that underlie them –
seem to ignore, undermine, contradict,
or are simply blissfully unaware
of many basic principles and serious
concerns of institutional design
and re-design,
especially if you are tinkering with an
already functioning democratic
constitution.
Among the most important of these critical
insights
contravened throughout by the Con-com
constitution
in its grand constitutional vision for the Phils,
I list only eight:
1. the folly of “hyperrationality”
(the mistaken belief that just because
the formal rules are changed,
the old behavior of politicians will also
change);
22 Sep 2018
Among the most important of these critical
insights
contravened throughout by the Con-com
constitution
in its grand constitutional vision for the Phils,
I list only eight:
2. the importance of sequencing of reforms
based on the “un-simultaneous time
horizons” of different reforms for them to
work
(as against “big bang,” “grand bargain,” or
long list of reforms
introduced as one simultaneous package);
Among the most important of these critical
insights
contravened throughout by the Con-com
constitution
in its grand constitutional vision for the Phils,
I list only eight:
3. the principle “reform only in the face of
manifest flaws”
(a. the problems must be clearly identified
for the reforms to be credible
and
b. a reform constituency must exist backing
up the reforms);
22 Sep 2018
Among the most important of these critical
insights
contravened throughout by the Con-com
constitution
in its grand constitutional vision for the Phils,
I list only eight:
4. the danger of “overreforming”
(because reforms introduce new problems
and at times can be worse than the
problems initially being addressed;
related terms are “reform should correct
those flaws as specifically as possible,”
and “better the devil you know than the
devil you do not know”);
Among the most important of these critical
insights
contravened throughout by the Con-com
constitution
in its grand constitutional vision for the Phils,
I list only eight:
5. underestimating “the law of
unintended consequences”
(where new institutions do not function the
way the designers originally intended;
in fact, they can even function opposite of
the framers’ intention; plain English
translation is “the road to hell is paved
with the best of intentions”);
22 Sep 2018
Among the most important of these critical
insights
contravened throughout by the Con-com
constitution
in its grand constitutional vision for the Phils,
I list only eight:
5. underestimating “the law of
unintended consequences”
(where new institutions do not function the
way the designers originally intended;
in fact, they can even function opposite of
the framers’ intention; plain English
translation is “the road to hell is paved
with the best of intentions”);
Among the most important of these critical
insights
contravened throughout by the Con-com
constitution
in its grand constitutional vision for the Phils,
I list only eight:
6. the crucial role of “path dependency”
(basically, who are first empowered by the
introduction of the new constitution that
would determine the manner how the
reforms are later shaped;
hence, the overwhelming importance of the
transitory provisions of the new
constitution);
22 Sep 2018
Among the most important of these critical
insights
contravened throughout by the Con-com
constitution
in its grand constitutional vision for the Phils,
I list only eight:
7. the important distinctions among
“macro-level” (e.g., system of government),
“meso-level” (e.g., electoral system),
and
“micro-level” (e.g., legislative sub-rules)
institutional reforms,
and their implication for constitutional
engineering; and
Among the most important of these critical
insights
contravened throughout by the Con-com
constitution
in its grand constitutional vision for the Phils,
I list only eight:
8. the danger of “excessive optimism”
in reforms
(because it can easily lead to
“excessive disillusionment” afterwards
as what would most likely happen with reforms with exaggerated promises).
22 Sep 2018
4. Did not do its most important homework
But even as it ended up being longer
than the 1987 Constitution
and identified sweeping revisions of the
current constitution it was tasked to
review,
it still failed to do what for me is its
most important homework.
write a constitution that has a believable
transition plan on how to move from the current unitary to the new federal system
the most institutionally complex
experiment this country will undertake
under democratic conditions
22 Sep 2018
Has the temerity to eternally lock the
country and all future generations of
Filipinos to federalism
by constitutionally entrenching federalism
through an “eternity clause” (Section 4,
Article XXI)
22 Sep 2018
Has the temerity to eternally lock the
country and all future generations of
Filipinos to federalism
by constitutionally entrenching federalism
through an “eternity clause” (Section 4,
Article XXI)
where no constitutional amendment or
revision can change its federal character,
it is nevertheless willing to leave the country
to wander indefinitely
in an institutional wilderness as it lacked a map for the transition itself.
Instead of a credible map,
it creates an all-powerful
Federal Transition Commission
that will not simply oversee the transition
but would do the task that the
consultative committee,
after being given almost five months and
funded millions of pesos,
should have done in the first place: the actual plan for the transition.
22 Sep 2018
That it fails to provide a crucial
transition plan is not surprising
given that both the RBH no. 8 and
the PDP-Laban constitution
also failed to give the country
the all-important plan
on how to get from point A to point B.
The PDP-Laban constitution best
manifested this failure by leaving its
article “Transitory Provisions” (Article XVIII) empty,
22 Sep 2018
The PDP-Laban constitution best
manifested this failure by leaving its
article “Transitory Provisions” (Article XVIII) empty,
22 Sep 2018
The PDP-Laban constitution best
manifested this failure by leaving its
article “Transitory Provisions” (Article
XVIII) empty, with the footnote carrying the lamest of excuses.
22 Sep 2018
It also bestows the Transition
Commission with all-encompassing,
powers for its vague transition process
(see Section 2, Article XXII of the
original version, especially Section 2-d).
22 Sep 2018
Its initial plan was to have the incumbent president
also as the transition president by heading the
eleven-person Federal Transition Commission.
thus giving the
President full control
of both the search
committee and the
Federal Transition
Commission.
the ten other
members are to be
chosen by a
search committee
whose members
are to be chosen
by the President
himself
Because the Con-com initially refused the
call to explicitly ban the incumbent
president from running for president in their
new constitution,
what happens is a double bonanza for the
incumbent president:
1.) he is allowed to run in the new
constitution; and
2.) as transition president with additional
powers,
he enjoys a grossly advantageous position
over his opponents if he eventually
chooses to run under the new constitution.
22 Sep 2018
Note that in this sense,
the institutional design of the Con-com
transition,
underneath its more polished language,
is similar to the quasi-revolutionary
powers of both RBH 08
22 Sep 2018
Note that in this sense,
the institutional design of the Con-com
transition,
underneath its more polished language,
is similar to the quasi-revolutionary
powers of both RBH 08
and of the January 16, 2018 House
Concurrent Resolution (HCR) no. 9,
22 Sep 2018
22 Sep 2018
Note that in this sense,
the institutional design of the Con-com
transition,
underneath its more polished language,
is similar to the quasi-revolutionary
powers of both RBH 08
and of the January 16, 2018 House
Concurrent Resolution (HCR) no. 9,
powers that were all tailor-made for
President Duterte as incumbent
president and reelectionist candidate.
The original Con-com idea was on June 30,
2022,
the Federal Transition Commission would not
have only come up with the plan for the
transition
but also have implemented it
(Section 2-c, Article XXII, of the original version).
22 Sep 2018
Since the Con-com members in their
public statements specifically target
the May 2019 local and national elections
as also the time of the plebiscite for their
constitution,
this means the transition from plan to
execution is to be done in just three years.
22 Sep 2018
Since the Con-com members in their
public statements specifically target
the May 2019 local and national elections
as also the time of the plebiscite for their
constitution,
this means the transition from plan to
execution is to be done in just three years.
The rush results in twin
horrors in constitutional
engineering and are
classic cases of brute
political factors
overriding any
institutional design logic
Since the Con-com members in their
public statements specifically target
the May 2019 local and national elections
as also the time of the plebiscite for their
constitution,
this means the transition from plan to
execution is to be done in just three years.
The rush results in twin
horrors in constitutional
engineering and are
classic cases of brute
political factors
overriding any
institutional design logic
First, the plebiscite campaign will have to compete with the noise of the
campaign of thousands of local and senatorial candidates.
This will definitely drown out
the needed careful deliberation
of the most fundamental
decision a citizen can make
which is a yes or no decision on whether
to accept a new constitution
that will now serve as the most basic institutional framework of his/her existence.
22 Sep 2018
Since the Con-com members in their
public statements specifically target
the May 2019 local and national elections
as also the time of the plebiscite for their
constitution,
this means the transition from plan to
execution is to be done in just three years.
The rush results in twin
horrors in constitutional
engineering and are
classic cases of brute
political factors
overriding any
institutional design logic
First, the plebiscite campaign will have to compete with the noise of the
campaign of thousands of local and senatorial candidates.
This piggybacking is sheer folly considering that the March 2018 Social
Weather Stations survey showed only 1 out of 4 Filipinos has a minimalist
awareness of what federalism is.
Government
propaganda will
not significantly
increase that
percentage in
the sixty- or
ninety-day
campaign period
even if that was
the only thing
that will be
discussed, which
will not even be the case.
22 Sep 2018
Since the Con-com members in their
public statements specifically target
the May 2019 local and national elections
as also the time of the plebiscite for their
constitution,
this means the transition from plan to
execution is to be done in just three years.
The rush results in twin
horrors in constitutional
engineering and are
classic cases of brute
political factors
overriding any
institutional design logic
Second, if the Con-com constitution were approved and implemented in just 3 years,
there is a very high risk of bringing the country
� not into a dizzying pace of change
but, as institutional design literature has warned in terms of unintended consequences,
� into near standstill
because of the chaos of the enormity of the tasks needed to create all the new institutions of the Con-com constitution
But this initial transition plan of the Con-com has
been revised by the intervention of the very hand
that created it.
After receiving the Con-com constitution,
22 Sep 2018
But this initial transition plan of the Con-com has
been revised by the intervention of the very hand
that created it.
After receiving the Con-com constitution,
President Duterte responds to the challenge of
the critics to include a “ban Duterte” provision
by asking the Con-com to write down the
provision barring him from running in 2022.
He raises the ante even more as he asked his
Con-com to write down another provision calling
for presidential and vice-presidential elections
next year because he promises to resign once
the constitution is ratified in 2019,
22 Sep 2018
But this initial transition plan of the Con-com has
been revised by the intervention of the very hand
that created it.
After receiving the Con-com constitution,
President Duterte responds to the challenge of
the critics to include a “ban Duterte” provision
by asking the Con-com to write down the
provision barring him from running in 2022.
He raises the ante even more as he asked his
Con-com to write down another provision calling
for presidential and vice-presidential elections
next year because he promises to resign once
the constitution is ratified in 2019,
But this initial transition plan of the Con-com has
been revised by the intervention of the very hand
that created it.
After receiving the Con-com constitution,
President Duterte responds to the challenge of
the critics to include a “ban Duterte” provision
by asking the Con-com to write down the
provision barring him from running in 2022.
He raises the ante even more as he asked his
Con-com to write down another provision calling
for presidential and vice-presidential elections
next year because he promises to resign once
the constitution is ratified in 2019,
and thereby creating a
supposed vacancy on
who will be the transition
president to oversee the shift to federalism.
Ban on his reelection is a
significant step in the right
democratic direction
(as changing constitutions
to skirt term limits is a classic “power grab”)
22 Sep 2018
But this initial transition plan of the Con-com has
been revised by the intervention of the very hand
that created it.
After receiving the Con-com constitution,
President Duterte responds to the challenge of
the critics to include a “ban Duterte” provision
by asking the Con-com to write down the
provision barring him from running in 2022.
He raises the ante even more as he asked his
Con-com to write down another provision calling
for presidential and vice-presidential elections
next year because he promises to resign once
the constitution is ratified in 2019,
and thereby creating a
supposed vacancy on
who will be the transition
president to oversee the shift to federalism.
Ban on his reelection is a
significant step in the right
democratic direction
(as changing constitutions
to skirt term limits is a classic “power grab”)
But this initial transition plan of the Con-com has
been revised by the intervention of the very hand
that created it.
After receiving the Con-com constitution,
President Duterte responds to the challenge of
the critics to include a “ban Duterte” provision
by asking the Con-com to write down the
provision barring him from running in 2022.
He raises the ante even more as he asked his
Con-com to write down another provision calling
for presidential and vice-presidential elections
next year because he promises to resign once
the constitution is ratified in 2019,
However, cutting short his
term is clearly retrogressive
because this undermines the
electoral mandate given by
the 16.6 million voters who
voted for him.
(including 96.6% of voters in Davao City)
Ban on his reelection is a
significant step in the right
democratic direction
(as changing constitutions
to skirt term limits is a classic “power grab”)
22 Sep 2018
But this initial transition plan of the Con-com has
been revised by the intervention of the very hand
that created it.
After receiving the Con-com constitution,
President Duterte responds to the challenge of
the critics to include a “ban Duterte” provision
by asking the Con-com to write down the
provision barring him from running in 2022.
He raises the ante even more as he asked his
Con-com to write down another provision calling
for presidential and vice-presidential elections
next year because he promises to resign once
the constitution is ratified in 2019,
However, cutting short his
term is clearly retrogressive
because this undermines the
electoral mandate given by
the 16.6 million voters who
voted for him.
(including 96.6% of voters in Davao City)
Ban on his reelection is a
significant step in the right
democratic direction
(as changing constitutions
to skirt term limits is a classic “power grab”)
But this initial transition plan of the Con-com has
been revised by the intervention of the very hand
that created it.
After receiving the Con-com constitution,
President Duterte responds to the challenge of
the critics to include a “ban Duterte” provision
by asking the Con-com to write down the
provision barring him from running in 2022.
He raises the ante even more as he asked his
Con-com to write down another provision calling
for presidential and vice-presidential elections
next year because he promises to resign once
the constitution is ratified in 2019,
22 Sep 2018
But this initial transition plan of the Con-com has
been revised by the intervention of the very hand
that created it.
After receiving the Con-com constitution,
President Duterte responds to the challenge of
the critics to include a “ban Duterte” provision
by asking the Con-com to write down the
provision barring him from running in 2022.
He raises the ante even more as he asked his
Con-com to write down another provision calling
for presidential and vice-presidential elections
next year because he promises to resign once
the constitution is ratified in 2019,
Worse, in the case of Vice President
Robredo, it is not just the 14.4 million
voters who voted her who would be
disenfranchised of their vote but she of her office,
But this initial transition plan of the Con-com has
been revised by the intervention of the very hand
that created it.
After receiving the Con-com constitution,
President Duterte responds to the challenge of
the critics to include a “ban Duterte” provision
by asking the Con-com to write down the
provision barring him from running in 2022.
He raises the ante even more as he asked his
Con-com to write down another provision calling
for presidential and vice-presidential elections
next year because he promises to resign once
the constitution is ratified in 2019,
Worse, in the case of Vice President
Robredo, it is not just the 14.4 million
voters who voted her who would be
disenfranchised of their vote
but she of her office, who has no plan to abandon her mandate
22 Sep 2018
But this initial transition plan of the Con-com has
been revised by the intervention of the very hand
that created it.
After receiving the Con-com constitution,
President Duterte responds to the challenge of
the critics to include a “ban Duterte” provision
by asking the Con-com to write down the
provision barring him from running in 2022.
He raises the ante even more as he asked his
Con-com to write down another provision calling
for presidential and vice-presidential elections
next year because he promises to resign once
the constitution is ratified in 2019,
Worse, in the case of Vice President
Robredo, it is not just the 14.4 million
voters who voted her who would be
disenfranchised of their vote
but she of her office, who has no plan to abandon her mandate and in fact,
But this initial transition plan of the Con-com has
been revised by the intervention of the very hand
that created it.
After receiving the Con-com constitution,
President Duterte responds to the challenge of
the critics to include a “ban Duterte” provision
by asking the Con-com to write down the
provision barring him from running in 2022.
He raises the ante even more as he asked his
Con-com to write down another provision calling
for presidential and vice-presidential elections
next year because he promises to resign once
the constitution is ratified in 2019,
Worse, in the case of Vice President
Robredo, it is not just the 14.4 million
voters who voted her who would be
disenfranchised of their vote
but she of her office, who has no plan
to abandon her mandate and in fact,
should be the constitutional
successor of the 1987 Constitution if the president decides to resign.
This could be described as a
“reverse power grab,” or a sort of
impeachment-via-new-constitution,
and is utterly contemptuous of the
electoral, hence democratic, mandate
bestowed on her by the 1987
Constitution.
22 Sep 2018
But this initial transition plan of the Con-com has
been revised by the intervention of the very hand
that created it.
After receiving the Con-com constitution,
President Duterte responds to the challenge of
the critics to include a “ban Duterte” provision
by asking the Con-com to write down the
provision barring him from running in 2022.
He raises the ante even more as he asked his
Con-com to write down another provision calling
for presidential and vice-presidential elections
next year because he promises to resign once
the constitution is ratified in 2019,
Worse, in the case of Vice President
Robredo, it is not just the 14.4 million
voters who voted her who would be
disenfranchised of their vote
but she of her office, who has no plan
to abandon her mandate and in fact,
should be the constitutional
successor of the 1987 Constitution if the president decides to resign.
This could be described as a
“reverse power grab,” or a sort of
“impeachment-via-new-constitution,”
and is utterly contemptuous of the
electoral, hence democratic, mandate
bestowed on her by the 1987
Constitution.
But this initial transition plan of the Con-com has
been revised by the intervention of the very hand
that created it.
After receiving the Con-com constitution,
President Duterte responds to the challenge of
the critics to include a “ban Duterte” provision
by asking the Con-com to write down the
provision barring him from running in 2022.
He raises the ante even more as he asked his
Con-com to write down another provision calling
for presidential and vice-presidential elections
next year because he promises to resign once
the constitution is ratified in 2019,
Worse, in the case of Vice President
Robredo, it is not just the 14.4 million
voters who voted her who would be
disenfranchised of their vote
but she of her office, who has no plan
to abandon her mandate and in fact,
should be the constitutional
successor of the 1987 Constitution if the president decides to resign.
This could be described as a
“reverse power grab,” or a sort of
“impeachment-via-new-constitution,”
and is utterly contemptuous of the
electoral, hence democratic, mandate
22 Sep 2018
But this initial transition plan of the Con-com has
been revised by the intervention of the very hand
that created it.
After receiving the Con-com constitution,
President Duterte responds to the challenge of
the critics to include a “ban Duterte” provision
by asking the Con-com to write down the
provision barring him from running in 2022.
He raises the ante even more as he asked his
Con-com to write down another provision calling
for presidential and vice-presidential elections
next year because he promises to resign once
the constitution is ratified in 2019,
Worse, in the case of Vice President
Robredo, it is not just the 14.4 million
voters who voted her who would be
disenfranchised of their vote
but she of her office, who has no plan
to abandon her mandate and in fact,
should be the constitutional
successor of the 1987 Constitution if the president decides to resign.
This could be described as a
“reverse power grab,” or a sort of
“impeachment-via-new-constitution,”
and is utterly contemptuous of the
electoral, hence democratic, mandate
bestowed on her by the 1987
Constitution.
Mad as this stand of the president,
especially on the vice president,
madder still is the Con-com
who readily agreed to this cavalier
suggestion of constitutional
strangulation of democratic mandates.
22 Sep 2018
5. Conclusion
22 Sep 2018
To conclude,
the institutional design of the Con-com
constitution does not move us far from
the two other proposed federal
constitutions.
All three are failures as federal constitutions.
All three constitutions illustrate how
complex, problematic, elusive, mindboggling, and risky
the institutional design overhaul needed to effect a transition
from a unitary to a federal system of government in a democracy
22 Sep 2018
This federal constitution-making becomes even more problematic,
if we consider two general insights that can be drawn from the institutional design literature in political science:
1. There is no consensus in the literature on the superiority of federal to unitary systems of government (or vice versa)
2. The recommendation of top scholars for democratic countries with already functioning systems or forms of government is toreform rather than overhaul their systems or forms of government.
Thank you.
22 Sep 2018
Emerging Issues on the Bayanihan Draft Constitution:
A Critique using the Institutional Design Literature
in Political Science
“A Forum on the Economic, Social, and Political Viability
of Federalism in the Philippines”Pinnacle Hotel, Davao City
22 September 2018
Gene Lacza Pilapil
Assistant Professor of Political Science
University of the Philippines-Diliman