STAR 2006 CONFERENCE�INVITED ARTICLE

The case for positive emotions in the stress process*

SUSAN FOLKMAN

UCSF Osher Center for Integrative Medicine, University of California San Francisco, San Francisco,

CA, USA

AbstractFor many decades, the stress process was described primarily in terms of negative emotions. However,robust evidence that positive emotions co-occurred with negative emotions during intensely stressfulsituations suggested the need to consider the possible roles of positive emotions in the stress process.About 10 years ago, these possibilities were incorporated into a revision of stress and coping theory(Folkman, 1997). This article summarizes the research reported during the intervening 10 years thatpertains to the revised model. Evidence has accumulated regarding the co-occurrence of positive andnegative emotions during stressful periods; the restorative function of positive emotions with respectto physiological, psychological, and social coping resources; and the kinds of coping processes thatgenerate positive emotions including benefit finding and reminding, adaptive goal processes,reordering priorities, and infusing ordinary events with positive meaning. Overall, the evidencesupports the propositions set forth in the revised model. Contrary to earlier tendencies to dismisspositive emotions, the evidence indicates they have important functions in the stress process and arerelated to coping processes that are distinct from those that regulate distress. Including positiveemotions in future studies will help address an imbalance between research and clinical practice due todecades of nearly exclusive concern with the negative emotions.

Keywords: Stress, meaning-focused coping, positive emotion, coping theory, benefit finding, adaptive

goal processes, reordering priorities, positive meaningful events

One of the most exhilarating aspects of research is coming upon an unexpected finding that

prompts a new direction in thinking. In my case, the unexpected finding was the

observation that positive emotions and negative emotions co-occurred during the intensely

stressful experiences of caring for a dying loved one and then actually losing that person.

This finding first appeared in our longitudinal study of gay men who were the caregivers of

life partners dying of AIDS. The study took place in the 1990s, when AIDS was basically an

untreatable terminal illness with a horrific clinical course. I published these findings in 1997

(Folkman, 1997) and suggested revisions to the stress and coping theoretical model to

*This article was invited by the editors following Professor Folkman’s address at the 27th Stress and Anxiety

Research Conference held in July 2006 in Rethymnon, Crete, Greece

Correspondence: Susan Folkman, UCSF Osher Center for Integrative Medicine, Box 1726, UCSF, San Francisco,

CA 94143, USA. Tel: �1 415 353 7719. Fax: �1 415 353 7554. E-mail: folkman@ocim.ucsf.edu

ISSN 1061-5806 print/ISSN 1477-2205 online # 2008 Taylor & Francis

DOI: 10.1080/10615800701740457

Anxiety, Stress, & Coping,

January 2008; 21(1): 3�14

incorporate positive emotions. In the interim, a number of studies produced findings that

are relevant to the revised model. In this article, I revisit the propositions set forth in the

model in light of these findings. My overall goal in this is to advance stress and coping

theory and help establish directions for research and clinical care.

Positive and Negative Emotions Co-occur During Stressful Periods

Some may still question whether our observation that positive emotions co-occur with

negative ones during intensely stressful periods was anomalous. It was not. As noted in

Folkman (1997), positive emotions during stressful periods were observed in earlier studies

(Viney, 1986; Wortman & Silver, 1987), and others have since observed the same

phenomenon (e.g., Bonanno & Keltner, 1997; Larsen, McGraw, & Cacioppo, 2001;

Zautra, Affleck, Tennen, Reich, & Davis, 2005).

Stress researchers’ lack of attention to the occurrence of positive emotions may have

stemmed from an assumption that positive emotions do not have adaptational significance,

as opposed to negative emotions, which are well known for mobilizing the fight/flight

response (Cannon, 1939) and focusing attention on the problem at hand (Frijda, 1988).

Interest in negative emotions has also been motivated by the accumulating body of research

showing their deleterious effects on health and well-being over the life span.

Fredrickson’s (1998) ground-breaking ‘‘Broaden and Build Model’’ of positive emotions

has done a great deal to stimulate interest in the positive emotions. Her model provided the

framework for studies showing that positive emotions broaden the individual’s attentional

focus and behavioral repertoire, thereby replenishing the person’s social, intellectual,

and physical resources. The recent interest in positive psychology (e.g., Seligman &

Csikszentmihalyi, 2000) has also fuelled interest in positive emotions, with many reports

about their benefits now in the literature.

A major review by Pressman and Cohen (2005) shows that positive emotions matter with

respect to morbidity, independent of negative affect. Positive emotions also matter with

respect to risk of mortality with several studies showing positive affect, and not negative

affect, predicting survival (e.g., Moskowitz, 2003; Ostir, Markides, Black, & Goodwin,

2000). In a series of six studies, King, Hicks, Krull, and Del Gaiso (2006) demonstrated

that positive moods may predispose people to feel that life is meaningful and increase their

sensitivity to the meaning relevance of a situation. Steptoe, Gibson, Hamer, and Wardle

(2007) found that positive affect is related to biological responses, including diurnal cortisol

patterns and systolic pressure. They concluded that ‘‘positive affect is related to biological

responses in the laboratory and everyday life that may be health protective’’ (p. 56).

In contrast to the above studies, the revised stress and coping theoretical model focused

the question about positive emotions on their role in the stress process. That positive emotions

might have something to do with the stress process is an idea that has intrigued me for many

years. I remember posing this possibility to Richard Lazarus when I was a new graduate

student at Berkeley in the 1970s. His first response was surprise, and perhaps puzzlement.

However, Dick Lazarus was always ready to explore ideas, and in 1980, Lazarus, Kanner,

and I published a chapter in which we speculated that positive emotions might serve as

‘‘sustainers’’ that help motivate coping, ‘‘breathers’’ that provide momentary respite from

distress, and ‘‘restorers’’ that replenish coping resources (Lazarus, Kanner, & Folkman,

1980). This long standing interest in positive emotions in the stress process led to the

inclusion of measures of positive affect in the longitudinal studies of caregivers that we

conducted at UCSF during the 1990s.

4 S. Folkman

Studies about the beneficial effects of positive emotion in the context of stress are still few

in number and found mainly in the resilience literature. Fredrickson and her colleagues

found that positive emotions buffered resilient people against depression and fuelled

thriving in the aftermath of 9/11 (Fredrickson, Tugade, Waugh, & Larkin, 2003),

accelerated cardiovascular recovery from laboratory-induced negative emotional arousal

in people high and low in trait resilience, and helped individuals find positive meaning in

negative situations (Tugade & Fredrickson, 2004). Bonanno and his colleagues (Bonanno &

Keltner, 1997; Keltner & Bonanno, 1997) found that bereaved individuals who showed

laughter at least once during a narration about their lost relationship also reported better

adjustment. Interestingly, when untrained observers viewed video tapes of the narrations

with the sound off, the observers experienced more positive emotion and less frustration in

response to bereaved participants who laughed compared with bereaved participants who

did not laugh.

Stress and Coping Model

The Cognitive Theory of Stress and Coping (Lazarus, 1966; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984)

has always been and continues to be an appraisal-based model. In its earlier formulation,

the appraisal process was most heavily implicated during the outset of an event in the

evaluation of its personal significance (primary appraisal) and the evaluation of options for

coping (secondary appraisal). Together, the two forms of appraisal were said to determine

the extent to which the transaction was appraised as a harm, threat, or challenge. Harm

appraisals were accompanied by negative emotions such as sadness or anger and threat

appraisals were accompanied by negative emotions such as anxiety or fear. Positive

emotions such as excitement, eagerness, and confidence appeared in relation to challenge

appraisals (Folkman & Lazarus, 1985). Coping processes were initiated in response to the

appraised demands of the specific situation. Ideally, instrumental kinds of problem-focused

coping were used more in situations where something could be done, and emotion-focused

coping to regulate distress was used more in situations that had to be accepted. Positive

emotions such as happiness, relief, or pride also appeared when a situation was resolved

favorably (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984).

The original model had little to say about what happened when the outcome was

unfavorable except that the appraisal�emotion�coping�reappraisal process would repeat

itself, thus producing the conditions of chronic stress. It was at this unlikely point � when

situations are not favorably resolved � that the revised model introduced a new category of

coping, meaning-focused coping, and positive emotions. The model hypothesizes that

following a failed resolution, the need to try again triggers meaning-focused coping.

Meaning-focused coping is said in turn to generate positive emotions and their underlying

appraisals, and these emotions and appraisals influence the stress process by restoring

coping resources and providing motivation needed in order to sustain problem-focused

coping over the long term. In addition, positive emotions were hypothesized to provide

relief from distress. The original model is shown in Figure 1 and the revised model is shown

in Figure 2.

How have these propositions fared since 1997? What evidence is there for meaning-

focused coping in terms of its content, its timing in the stress process, and its relation to

positive emotions; do these coping processes and emotions have salubrious effects on

resources, appraisal, and well-being during stressful periods? To the extent possible in a

Positive emotions in the stress process 5

brief review that covers diverse topics, I try to highlight what has been found and some of

the key issues that need to be considered.

Coping and Positive Emotions

One of the first questions we addressed in our caregiver research asked whether positive

emotions were associated with the same coping strategies people use to regulate distress.

The first inkling that some of the coping processes associated with the generation of positive

emotion were different from those associated with the regulation of distress came from an

analysis of positive and negative moods before and after bereavement in our study of AIDS

Appraisal Coping EventOutcome

EmotionOutcome

Harm

Threat

Challenge

Problem-focused

Emotion-focused

Favorable

Unfavorable

Positive emotion

Mean-ing

focusedCoping

Event

SustainsCoping

Positive EmotionRestores

Resources

POSITIVE EMOTIONNegative Emotion

Distress

Figure 2. Revised stress and coping model (adapted from Folkman, 1997).

Appraisal Coping EventOutcome

EmotionOutcome

Problem-focused

Emotion-focused

Favorable

Unfavorable

Event

Positive emotion

Person:

DispositionsBeliefsGoals

Situation:

Demands

Resources

Harm

Threat

ChallengeDistress

Negative Emotion

Figure 1. Original stress and coping model (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984).

6 S. Folkman

caregivers. Moskowitz, Folkman, Collette, and Vittinghoff (1996) found that some kinds of

coping were associated with negative and positive moods pre and post-bereavement, but

other kinds were associated primarily with either positive mood or negative mood. Problem-

focused coping and positive reappraisal, for example, were consistently associated with

positive mood, but inconsistently and more weakly associated with negative mood. It was

our qualitative analyses of narratives of stressful events, however, that took us to the next

level of understanding about coping and positive emotion and to our decision to define a

category of ‘‘meaning-focused’’ coping.

Meaning-focused Coping

Meaning-focused coping is, in its essence, appraisal-based coping in which the person

draws on his or her beliefs (e.g., religious, spiritual, or beliefs about justice), values (e.g.,

‘‘mattering’’), and existential goals (e.g., purpose in life or guiding principles) to motivate

and sustain coping and well-being during a difficult time (Park & Folkman, 1997; see also

Aldwin, 2007 for her discussion of transformational coping).

In general, meaning-focused coping tends to be less situation-specific than both problem

and emotion-focused coping. In our first effort to distinguish among types of meaning-

focused coping, we identified four categories based on analyses of both quantitative data

from the Ways of Coping (Folkman & Lazarus, 1988) and qualitative data drawn from

nearly 2000 interviews about recently experienced stressful events. These categories were

positive reappraisal, revision of goals, spiritual beliefs, and the infusion of ordinary events

with positive meaning (Folkman, 1997; Folkman, Moskowitz, Ozer, & Park, 1997). We

later modified the list to include findings from reports in the rapidly expanding literature

and our own subsequent work, resulting in five categories: benefit finding, benefit

reminding, adaptive goal processes, reordering priorities, and infusing ordinary events

with positive meaning (Folkman & Moskowitz, 2007). Here, I briefly summarize what has

been learned by other researchers as well as our own research group about each of these

ways of generating positive emotion.

Benefit Finding

Affleck and Tennen’s seminal research on benefit finding (see Tennen & Affleck, 2002 for

review) and the growing interest of others in the related topic of stress-related growth

(Tedeschi, Park, & Calhoun, 1998; Park & Ai, 2006) has resulted in a substantial literature

(for reviews see Linley & Joseph, 2004; Helgeson, Reynolds, & Tomich, 2006). Benefit

finding is often assessed in terms of growth in wisdom, patience, and competence; greater

appreciation for life, greater clarity about what matters, strengthened faith or spirituality;

and improved quality of social relationships. It is by far the most commonly reported kind

of meaning-focused coping.

Helgeson et al. (2006) published a meta-analysis of the relationship of benefit finding to

mental and physical health. Their definition of benefit finding was quite broad: ‘‘the

positive effects that result from a traumatic event’’ (p. 797). Within this broad definition

they make an important distinction between benefit finding as coping that reduces distress,

which refers to an ongoing difficult situation, and benefit finding as an outcome, which

refers to ‘‘actual change or growth’’ (p. 798).

The meta-analysis showed that the only effect that approached a moderate size was the

relationship between benefit finding and positive well-being. At the level of small effect

size, benefit finding was associated with some negative states as well as some positive

Positive emotions in the stress process 7

ones. This is consistent with other reports, indicating a consistent association with

positive affect and an inconsistent and usually weaker association with negative affect

(Linley & Joseph, 2004).

Helgeson et al.’s (2006) review also provided intriguing findings regarding the timing of

benefit finding and its effects. The beneficial effects were greater when the time since the

traumatic event was more than 2 years. In contrast, when the event was less than 2 years in

the past, benefit finding was associated with increased distress. Based on this observation,

one could conclude that benefit finding caused distress. Another explanation suggested by

the revised stress and coping model is that meaning-focused coping such as benefit finding

comes into play when things are going badly. What we would expect to see when the

situation continues to be unresolved over time is a co-occurrence of positive emotions

generated by benefit finding and the negative emotions associated with the unwanted

outcome. In major stressful events, such as loss of a loved one, distress is likely to remain

elevated for several years (Carnelley, Wortman, Bolger, & Burke, 2006). Over time, we

would expect to see negative emotions decline and positive emotions get stronger.

A clear sign that the literature on benefit finding is maturing is the controversies that are

appearing in the literature. Butler (2007) summarizes some of the key issues, namely,

whether to conceptualize the report of benefits as a means of coping as an adaptive

mechanism or a defensive, self-protective maneuver, as an outcome in and of itself

representing true change, or as something else altogether.

Whether or not benefit finding is a defensive, self-protective maneuver is a question that

is asked more generally with respect to research on positive aspects of psychology. ‘‘Even

when positive aspects of human functioning are studied, negative motives are frequently

ascribed to them, resulting in some fundamental misunderstandings of positive phenom-

ena’’ (Aspinwall & MacNamara, 2005, p. 2549). Benefit finding could be maladaptive if it

impedes important problem-focused coping such as information gathering and evaluating,

decision-making, or relationship repair. However, research by Aspinwall and her colleagues

indicates that positive beliefs and states serve as resources that actually facilitate these

processes, allowing people to consider negative information appropriately, and further,

fostering greater selectivity in the allocation of effort to problems, based on whether the

problems are controllable (Aspinwall & MacNamara, 2005).

The question about whether the benefits that are appraised at the outcome are actual also

seems to reflect many psychologists’ general suspicion about positive states of mind in

the stress process. Whether or not the benefits are actual, which is probably difficult to

determine in many instances, seems less important than whether the person believes

the benefits are actual, especially when such benefits relate to psychosocial resources. The

perception of benefit, for example, can restore self-confidence, which is an important

resource for both appraisal and coping. An inaccurate estimate of some perceived benefits,

however, such as the acquisition of skill, could prove detrimental in future outcomes. An

overestimation of one’s medical knowledge following extensive caregiving, for example,

could result in harm to another person.

Benefit Reminding

Tennen and Affleck (2002) distinguish benefit reminding from benefit finding as effortful

cognitions in which the individual reminds himself/herself of the possible benefits stemming

from the stressful experience. Benefit reminding is a form of meaning-focused coping that

occurs during the stressful situation. Tennen and Affleck’s research on benefit reminding

involved patients suffering from fibromyalgia who were asked to keep a daily diary and to

8 S. Folkman

indicate how much that day they had reminded themselves of the benefits of their chronic

pain. On days when these patients made greater efforts to remind themselves of the benefits

that had come from their illness, they were more likely to experience pleasurable mood,

regardless of the pain they had experienced that day.

The distinction between benefit reminding and benefit finding becomes blurred unless

benefit finding is labelled as an outcome. However, as noted above, the distinction may be

arbitrary and depends on where in the stress process the variable is measured.

Adaptive Goal Processes

Goals are involved in many meaning-focused functions. As noted in Folkman (1997), the

simple act of creating a to-do list when things feel completely out of control is not only

useful for instrumental coping, but it also creates a sense of mastery and control, even if

only for a few moments. Higher order goals provide a sense of meaning and purpose

(Baumeister, 1991; Park & Folkman, 1997) and structure and unity to people’s lives

(Baumeister, 1991; Emmons, Colby, & Kaiser, 1998). Goals motivate choices people make,

and reminding oneself of these higher order goals can help sustain efforts to achieve them,

even when those goals are threatened.

Under ordinary circumstances, the pursuit of meaningful, realistic goals is a basis of

the appraisal of challenge, flavored with positive emotions. However, stressful situations

are often stressful precisely because they threaten or harm valued goals. Elsewhere we

have stated that a central tenet of effective coping is the ability to determine when a goal

is no longer tenable, relinquish that goal, and substitute a new goal that is both

meaningful and realistic (Stein, Folkman, Trabasso, & Richards, 1997). Carver and

Scheier (1998) and their colleagues speak of adaptive self-regulation, which they have

explored in a series of fascinating studies (e.g., Wrosch, Scheier, Miller, Schulz, &

Carver, 2003). Wrosch et al. proposed ‘‘that in situations in which people are confronted

with unattainable goals, benefits accrue from the capacities to abandon goal-directed

activities and to reengage in valued alternative goals. By having new goals available

and reengaging in those new goals, a person can reduce the distress that arises from the

desire to attain the unattainable while continuing to derive a sense of purpose in life by

finding other pursuits of value’’ (pp. 1494�1495). In a series of studies, they found that

disengagement from unattainable goals was independently associated with high levels of

self-mastery and low levels of depressive symptoms, and the tendencies to reengage in

new goals predicted subjective well-being beyond what was explained by relinquishing

unattainable goals.

Wrosch et al. (2003) stated that the key to maintaining well-being comes not just from

giving up goals that do not work, but in substituting new ones that are meaningful, or

‘‘valuable’’ to use their word, which closely parallels our concept of adaptive goal processes.

In both cases, the meaning attached to the new goal is motivational. Brunstein and

Gollwitzer (1996), for example, found that failure on tasks that involved a self-defining goal

led to enhanced performance on a subsequent task as long as that task also involved a self-

defining (i.e., meaningful or valued) goal, but if the goal was not self-defining (i.e., not

meaningful), the performance was inferior.

While the concept of adaptive self-regulation is very pertinent to the discussion of coping

that sustains people when situations go badly, it does raise some interesting and provocative

questions. The focus on relinquishing untenable goals glosses over the often profoundly

difficult question: How do we know when to give up? Sometimes information is so clear that

there is no question about whether a goal is tenable: ‘‘You are fired’’ usually means that you

Positive emotions in the stress process 9

need to give up the goal that you had with respect to having that particular job. However,

what about ‘‘You need to improve your work’’ or ‘‘I am not happy in this marriage.’’ The

evaluation of threats to goals involves a psychological calculus that weighs odds of success

and failure; the value attached to the goal (e.g., where threatened goal sits in the goal

hierarchy), which affects the costs of giving up or persisting; and the availability of goals that

can be substituted for the one that is threatened. Giving up a goal prematurely can be as

damaging as persisting too long.

A rich and well-established literature on goals originally focused largely on the structure

of goal hierarchies, substitutability, and complexity (e.g., Miller, Galanter, & Pribram,

1960). Although more recently, goals have been examined in relation to their motivational

(e.g., Kruglanski, Shah, Fischbach, Friedman, & Chun, 2002) and self-regulatory proper-

ties (Carver & Scheier, 1998), the issue of when to give up a valued goal in real life involves

a complex calculus that probably eludes neat, structural models.

A second issue has to do with what happens after a goal is in fact appraised as unrealistic

and the decision is made to relinquish it. Yielding goals that were previously valued is a

stressful process that involves loss and the distress associated with that loss (Klinger, 1977).

The process of disengaging is analogous to the process of coming to terms with the loss of a

loved one. In their dual process model of coping with bereavement, Stroebe and Schut

(2001) described a process of oscillation between loss-oriented coping and restoration-

oriented coping. The oscillatory pattern of coping is also consistent with Carver and

Scheier’s (1998) self-regulatory theory. The process of goal revision is obviously complex

and as a consequence we should expect it to generate a complex and dynamic picture of

positive and negative emotions. The oscillation described by Stroebe and Schut, as well as

Carver and Scheier can explain variability in the mix of positive and negative emotions while

the disengagement process is still underway.

Sometimes goals are tied to fundamental beliefs that shape the person’s way of viewing

himself or herself and the world around. To give up a goal also means giving up the belief.

Consider decisions to emigrate from one’s country because one is no longer safe there, or

making the decision to stop seeking treatment for cancer. Relinquishing the goal of

remaining in one’s country or giving up the goal of finding an effective treatment for cancer

each involves changing beliefs about oneself and the world (Park & Folkman, 1997), and

this can be a shattering experience (Janoff-Bulman, 1992). Fascinating questions concern

how positive emotions help a person navigate the recovery from shattered beliefs and the

movement toward new goals.

Reordering Priorities

The recognition that priorities need to be reordered is one of the more common responses

to serious stressful events, both acute and chronic. Comments such as ‘‘my perspective

changed’’ or ‘‘I focused on what really matters’’ reflect the coping response to a changed

reality.

The reordering of priorities is a value-based process. Things that now matter more move

up the ladder; things that now matter less move down. This reordering process can be

deliberate or it can seemingly ‘‘just happen.’’

The reordering of priorities can be a very stressful process in itself. To acknowledge that

priorities need to be reordered involves an acceptance by the individual that his/her world

has changed, that things are not as they were or as they were expected to be. The person

appraises his or her world differently now than before.

10 S. Folkman

However, the process should also provide the basis for a renewed sense of purpose

(Stroebe & Schut, 2001). Knowing what matters most now, in this changed reality, is an

essential ingredient for formulating goals, allocating resources, and determining strategies

for moving forward.

The reordering process can also lead to increased coping efficiency by narrowing the

person’s focus: ‘‘I decided that the most important thing in my life was to get better, and

that is what I am concentrating on.’’ For example, in a study of maternal caregivers of

children with chronic conditions, there was evidence of a major shift in priorities: 47% of

the maternal caregivers quit working outside the home in order to care for their child

(Wilson et al., 2005)

Similar to the process of giving up meaningful goals, the reordering of priorities can exact

a toll. A decision to quit work in order to take care of a sick child, for example, can lead to

loss of income and increased financial strain. Thus, in real life, the reordering of priorities

may improve well-being because values and goals are aligned meaningfully for the

individual, but at the same time, the realignment process can lead to secondary stressors

and negative emotions. Accordingly, we would expect to see both negative and positive

emotions.

Infusing Ordinary Events with Positive Meaning

We first observed this form of coping in the study of gay caregivers mentioned earlier.

Participants requested that we interview them about positive aspects of their lives as well as

the stressful aspects, and so we inserted a question in the interview that asked for an

account of a positive event that helped the person get through the day (Folkman et al.,

1997). What struck us was not the content of the events, which were just ordinary events

such as receiving a word of gratitude or praise, taking care of business, enjoying a good

movie, or watching a beautiful sunrise, but that these events were reported even under the

most dire circumstances. It was as if people took ordinary events and deliberately infused

them with positive meaning in order to experience a positive moment, providing the

‘‘breather’’ hypothesized by Lazarus et al. (1980).

The creation of positive moments out of ordinary events is consistent with Tugade and

Fredrickson’s (2006) observation that people generally want to feel good. Tugade and

Fredrickson also pointed out that it is common for people to try to prolong pleasant feelings

by, for example, sharing their news with close friends and loved ones (for review, see Isen,

2000) or by savoring (Bryant, 1989). Our studies indicate that the same motive is operative

when times are difficult, and in fact I suggest that the desire to feel good takes on critical

importance for maintaining mental and physical well-being during difficult times.

Where We Are Now

The revised stress and coping model (Folkman, 1997) made a place for positive emotions in

the stress process. There is now substantial evidence that positive emotions are a normative

aspect of the stress process and that they help restore physiological and psychosocial coping

resources. Less is known about the full range of coping processes, including their content,

timing, and duration, which are associated with the regulation of positive as opposed to

negative emotions. However, what evidence we do have suggests that underlying beliefs,

values, and goals are heavily implicated in these coping processes and that the regulation of

meaning is the key common theme.

Positive emotions in the stress process 11

We have only begun the work of defining and systematizing meaning-focused coping. It

is important to be more comprehensive in its exploration than studies have been thus far.

For example, in addition to the types of coping summarized in this article, religious and

spiritual coping processes are involved in meaning-based coping, as are strategies related

to forgiveness and gratitude. Which of these are related primarily to positive emotions?

What coping processes have we overlooked? What is the best way to classify these

meaning-focused strategies? And, of course, what is the best way to measure them? The

difficulties in measuring coping are well known (for review, see Folkman & Moskowitz,

2004; Schwarzer & Schwarzer, 1996) and there is no reason to think the measurement of

meaning-based coping will be different.

For both researchers and clinicians, it is important to maintain a balanced perspective

regarding the role of positive emotions in the stress process. This stress process is

strongly characterized by negative emotions and the inclusion of positive emotions in the

model is just that, inclusion. However, the evidence suggests that the positive emotions

have important adaptational significance and that these emotions are generated by

identifiable coping processes. Stress researchers need to include positive emotions in their

studies to learn more about how people generate and sustain them and to further explore

their adaptational significance in relation to physiological, psychological, and social

outcomes. Clinicians need to give attention to positive emotions with their clients, and

explore the sources of such emotions and how to generate and sustain them. This

attention to positive emotions will address the imbalance between stress research and

clinical practice that has resulted from decades of nearly exclusive concern with the

negative emotions.

Acknowledgements

The writing of this article was supported in part by NIH PO1 AT2024. I thank Judy

Moskowitz for her comments on a previous version of this article.

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