employment of the tank destroyer battalion with the infantry division

8/6/2019 Employment of the Tank Destroyer Battalion With the Infantry Division

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Tho Employr.tcnt of tho Tr:.nk Destroyor B:'..ttc'liont vrith thoInfant ry Division

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Freder ick H. Pr,rkin, cap t .8-3 813th T.D. Bn.,with tho 79th Inf Division.

12th r ~ r c h 1945. Somowhoro in Frfl.nco

(Thi3 rlisc'ussi:m on TClnk Dostroynr ompl,oyl'10nt i s Bubuit to r1 by ~ ' . . n off icor withfour yet.r '8 cxporienco on thi::; subjoct . Lessons lon.rncr1, "'..re from parson', l obso'rv:o.tion r ~ n r r , c t u r ~ l c O r l b ~ t o : i ~ p o r i o n c o G in I . f r ica , Sic i ly , Norm .nrly, France ".nc1.Gorrlc.ny)

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The ro le of the Tank D e S l A ~ Bat ta l ion ininfantry has taken en many n e w " a ~ p e : ~ ~ 4 ~ B ~ i , , , s e n t Germany. A gu n an d w e a p o n ~ o r ~ ( o , n " r i ~ ~ , : e ' l J ~ l e f 1 ~ r o ~ ~ ~ ~ r . 1. ~ r- t r ,now f inds many new and vari.ed missi '" ' ~ ' ~ a:with the successes , mistakes and lessons lea 0 'cerned, . 0.1 though Gimilu.r lesso,ns ho.ve undoubtedlycombu.t expurioncu:,; by M-18 an d M-36 unit::: a lso .

The primary duty of the T ~ D . En with any divis ion i s tho dest ruct ionand u.nnihilat ion of the cnGmy's armor. Tho olimiw.., t ion of enemy tanks from anygivon sector o f tho combat zono w i l l usual ly pave tho way for a successfu linfant ry attr '.ck Oond [,dvanco. Tho s e c o n d c ~ r y 1"010 of tho tunk dest royors in combc,ti s well-known, for G..rtillory support (htll"'.:.:'sing," in te rd ic t ion , counterbat tery ,e t o . ) . A th i rd ro lo , but not th i rd in importance or pr ior i ty , the omploymont oftho T.D.s to neutrG..lize cnemy O.P.s , church s toeplos , p i l l boxes, machinE; gu nnosts , cnemy occupiod h o u s e s ~ an t i tank weapons, suspected anomy strong po in t s ,employmont of the naval s tar shol l to illumino.to any given poin t of onomy heldground a t n i ~ h t , retcing motors to fr ightun : ' ~ n d haro.ss cnemy nerves; thoce arcth o var iod uses t ha t the T.D. has becn put to in the prosent cnmpuign.

The purposo o f t h i s pC'.per, thrm, i s to discusD tho problem::; of the T.D.sin combat, tho i r support o f tho infn.ntry divis ion , thoir 1"010 on tho offenso,tho defonsc, o.nd c general surn..mc,ry o f genera l l essons In:-.:.rned.

TANK D ~ S T R O Y E R S ON TEB LINB ~ ~ I T H THE INFANTRY D I V I S I O N : ~ I n i t i ~ l l y , theT.D.s should-hG.vo bccnniQ"do iln-or!SZnIc-l::.nd-intogrcX po.rt -of each- info divis ion!This union should hetve tr.lkon place beforo the uni t:3 c:_,mn ovorsoas, oven a t thet ime of c.c t ivat ion. (Thio st..ltomunt c,lso c,pplics to our tcmks.) And what i stho reason for th i s stu.tument? It's t h i s . Any un i t s , working toguthor , t r r t ining together , muneuvering together , YOG, ovon rclrlxing togothor on o f f houro wil l know ::md undor s t ~ ' , n d octeh othGr ' s prob10ms bot ter J Tact ics [,nd t0chniqunscan bo worked out f.tnd th e "bugs" discov8r,.)d. Officors ctnd en l i s ted men wi l lgrcin l1. working knowledgo of oach other ' s wr):.pons, f i ro powers, Qbil i t ins a.ndl i rnitn. t ions. In o thor words, 0. sotup such QS t h i s would he,vo rolL;vod mcmy T ~ D . Ens from th; ; i r "orphccn ro lo ll pr ior to c o m b ~ t or prior to boing assigned to 0.divis ion . Fetr too .mo.ny T.D,s he,vo becn plrtced with Ct divis ion n. few dCtys beforecombat, or ovon o.ct'Uc.lly during combnt, ttnd l ives Ctro loo t while 1 ( ; ~ 0 o n ~ ['r()leQrnoClJ Too mClny T.D. Bns ho.vo t ruinod [ ~ l o n o (and donn n good job of it too) ,but thuy hr.ve boun compelled to vvork out t he i r ovm problemR, tho i r oWn tccctics: : : ~ n d tochniques, only to bo Q.s3igned o.t the h t s t minuto to D. divis ion which mn.yhG.ve difforrJnt idoCi.S 0.3 to tho: j . , rcorroct uscaF;o. Sarno divi s ions , fer ex;.mple,plD.cod tho T.D,s compl,otoly undor tho cont rol of tho o.r t i l lory soction; othorsundor th e i n f ~ n t r y ru le , others ho.lf wo.y betwoonS' C o o r d i n ~ t i o n , coopcro.tion,closo l i a i son , rtnd ( t thorough u n d Q r s t ' ~ n d i n g of T .D.s ~ , n d tho infcmtry areo b t ~ i n o d ONLY by long months of t r u i n i n ~ togethor - or long wooks of ~ c t u a l combi-,t. During thuGO wock::; of b ~ t t l D f i ~ , l d condi t ions , (When in i t i r . l ly the T.D.s' ~ r e "strf lngcrc" to the i r now parent un i t ) , m:\ny l essons w i l l be lo[',rned thohard wc,y; 1

One lcc'..rn8 to u n d ( ) r s t ~ ' c h d n.nd respect thn. ' t b i l i t i cs of others o n l ~ r through comb:,',t oxpc;rioncos An off icor w i l l learn the tr ' ' . i t ,; and hc ...bib o f thoinfant ry b o . t t ~ l i o n C . O . - genora l ly 8 p o ~ k i n g - undor combat condi t ions , I t i squito n problom for noW T.D. Buttn.l ion to jo in now divis ion - both thun gointo b" t t le - ~ t n d cxpoct :1.11 to oparat,,; r.;moothly r i gh t fJ,.y,::,_y. I t won' t vlorkJ 1You must l ea rn yqur l essons quickly, ' work out problums of to.ct ics o.nd handlingirnmedio.tuly, or men an d mntoriul wil l bo los t J

Of course , it in quickly admittud ~ l n d Q c l c n o w l ( ) d ~ o d t h a t the \ ' lUI" o . g ~ , i n s t tho Gonlcms i s wol l a l o n ~ , an d probttbly most divis ions have t he i r normt .. l T.D.support now ''lnd hc.ve CI. good working; k n o ~ i l e d g e of OCLch o t he r ' s ~ ' l b i l i t i o s . SomediviBions did ontoI' comb',t with 0. well tru.ined T .D , Bn (ono which hLcd becn withthorn for some t imo) - an d b e t t ~ r reflul ts must have boon obto.inod in i t i< . l ly l Butoth()rs mot th0 i r new divis ion comm::l.ndnr, stc.ff ~ t n d in f"n t ry regimunts whileelction vr,D going on, ):1.urriod in t roduct ions took plc,ce, ~ , n d o ff to combe-.tIl Thisprob18m of course i s noW "wu te r ovor th e d8.m." And very possib ly tho - , i ~ ~ r Dupc.rtmcmt had dofin i to rv'.. sons for kooping m;\ny TCl.nk Dostroyor BC1.tto.l ions s o p ~ ~ r c , t c . But thoro .,.foro many h ( ) ~ . d C l c h o s , l I b u ~ G , " misundorstu.ndingu in Frc,nco - boc::. U( ) O ofth i s condit ion .
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Each infantry rogimont ho.d on e T.D. C o m p L ~ n y in support (not at tached) .The dis t inc t ion betwoon "support" and "c,tto.chod" i s f inoly div'idod, but ~ B.T.O.order sevoro.l m o n t h ~ , ago co.lled f o r a s . , ~ ) : ' m o r t only" from the T .D .s . Each rogt . ,then , hCed 12 T.D.s in suppor t , [md ' s b ~ l l . C', : ' lottod a platoon o f four f.;uns to ertehb o . t t c ~ l i o n of i n f ~ , n t r y . Thus, undor ' ~ ; 1 ~ ~ ~ q , 'cYn 'J.. io s 8.nd 1lrith the T.D. Platoonsup to s t r ~ n g t h , on a office:- und four ~ . f - : ' i a - l i ! J r , ' ~ . . r ~ ~ 9 n ~ l t ~ tho plc,ns ['endma.neuvers of en.ch of the m,ne Inf , Bo.ttG.l1.on N ~ t 5 9 ' ;pp,rm1-. ted , f ~ n d th es i tU8. t ion WG.S such thf'.t illire could be lc,id, or.ch .Wq.n. n c. telophonewire into tho nefLre'st In f . compf:. ny.commfmd post , which in J .vo it communico.tions with th e b::tttfl.lion, r eg t . , ').nd tho rumaindnr of tho divis ion signe,l net work. Ee-,ch platoon, in ord(jr to keep well up on o.ny r;ivon situo.t ion, wouldplaco one enl is ted mc,n (prGforably un NCO - thoru nCVl,r ware enough of f ice r s l)a t tho Inf . Bn C.P.

In th o next higher echelon o f commo.nd, tho T.D. CompQny plnced i t scommand pos t in the so.me town or ncnrby the rog t t l C.P. , an d always la id in bywiro. Tho T.D. Bn conuno.nd centor , by divis ion ordor, r,lways s e t up in thu sremoplc,cc f' .S did tho divis ion u.nd, in addi t ion , 8. l i a i son of f i cer romC'.ined ret th i sC,P. [,t i , l l t imes . Company of f i cer s chocked in from time to timo with thoi rrosj)Octive higher heO-dqu0..rters, Lnd tho T.D. staf"f (O.Oa, exec off . 8-2, 8-3,an d th8 other Lie,.ison off icer ) , mude continu0..1 "rounds" of the gun posi t ions o.ndtho infr;.ntry command pos ts .

Vfuc..t '.lll th i s roprosent,:: is th i s : - tho closont o.nd keonent lL.:,ison cendcontO-ct betweun infc,ntry flnd tc.nk destroyers (r'.nd it's up to tho "junior" un i tto m a i n t ~ i n th i s ef for t ) , i s nona too good, c..nd must a l v ~ ~ y s bo improved! A lackof proper lin.ison ~ , n d cooporo.tion is nothing '3hort of criminn.l J

T A ! K Y ~ S ! R 2 . Y b ' R ~ Q N ' - - : f ! ! . l ' ~ _ O ! : . F g N g : : - T.D.s on tho f' .ttack with the info.ntrybn, can prove helpful [ ~ n d effec t ivo in mCLny wnys. Of course the i n i tb . l ro lo i sto got tho enemy tr,nks! A ll suspocted enemy to.nk posi t ions , routes of D.pproachan d r e t r ea t , suspected and knovm hideouts , must bo constcmtly w'itchod. On theo.ttn.ck, tho T .D.s must NEVER operate as one gun! ' They must work in pc.irs ormoral Time o.nd time 0.e;cdn th i s fac t WlS driven homo to us in Frc..nco - one T.D.or one tank - on n stronuous a ttn.ck - wil l oventu(ll ly fClll proy to a Gormcm rmtit".nk gunner, bo.zook;(, or Jor ry to.nk. (A ms..rkod incren.se in th o uGeo.ge of thoanomy of bfl.zooko.s and an t i tc..nk w e ~ p o n s showed h is ho.nd in o.n e f fo r t to stopour ~ r m o r l ) In our : 'pcrflt ions, onoT .D. (or tn,nk), must o.lwo.ys covor o.nd protec tc,n adjoining T .D., both work togother , move a l ternntely cmd keep in mind tha t twoc: m l ive : l lo t longer them ONJi: u..'1der bC'.t t lofiold condi t ions . Thi s theory ofsupporting eo.ch other i s well known o.nd Very Old - but Americo.n gunners on to.nksand T.D.s s t i l l , witrro. lapse of momory - Will bo suckod in by ONE G E R ~ ~ N TANK only to f ind another hidden avmy to cu t thom dovvnl Nevar u n d o r e s t i m [ ~ t G yourenemy - ~ ~ n d never U : ; ~ i u m e ho wil l operate one tn.nk only - he knows be t t e r J

No plc'.toon should over bo sp l i t up by th o parent uni t (tho in f ) , so thcetit cannot opero.te in "twos" or "fours ." Throe porhc.ps working together i s cellr igh t , but never ONE ALONEI

Another v i t a l point which wil l prolong the l i f e of the T .D.s (f.nd i t sgcnoro.lsupport to tho infl ' ,ntry) - close in in f support! It is most importo.ntt h c ~ t a plD.toon of info.ntry be cLs3igned to the T.D.s, work together , slooptogother , f i gh t together - an d both wil l l ive D. lo t longer . If the infnntrycommander co.nnot c.tto.ch o.ny infantry di rec t ly to the T.D.s, then make sure t ha tcloso l io . ison . is mo.intainod, tha t tho in f an d T,D.s wil l movo in o.ny direc t ionTOGETHER, and not leD.vo one or tho othor "st randed. II

On tho o.tt:lck, the T.D.s "ill do wel l to remain back a b i t , c.nd ye tcloso enough to bo n. good supporting WOflpon. 500 to 800 ycn.rds behind an cettack,an d rol l ing nlong with it - wi l l f ind the T.D.s porforming of fec t ive ly - andyet not running tho chance of meeting '.In onomy A-T r;un, bazookc. or mines. Thoinfcmtry must cmcounter th o so obstD.clos FIRST - lo t tho T .D.s know v.rherethey are ..o.nct a id thom in tho neutraliz[\ . t ion processJ Info.ntry protocting the T.D.s 8.Sthey movo forwo.rd) o.nd tho doughhoys out in f ront ( l o o k i n ~ fo r the G e r ~ n dof8nse3 '.lgo.ins t o u r o.rmor), and you should ho.ye 0. s f l . t i G f ~ . ~ c t o r y working o.rr".ngomont. Tho t r ~ ~ des troyer gunner cfl.n lend 0. lo t of moro.le support to our doughboys by f i r ing o.t A 1 ~ H I N G which mo.y rosomblo tho onenyl Throwing 0. throe inchshe l l a t suspected onemy hidoouts) strong points , occupied homos t:mel so on wil lo.id great ly in got t ing the o.tto.ck underwo.y, fr ightoning tho enemy, [end bols ter ingou r oV'.'l1 men. Time and timo agCdni j" rovon i !! l combort the sound of c rc.cingmotor, tho -vvild and promiscuous sh,o;t.ing of> nIl! t ~ &trwrfir powor he,d ctdovastc\t ing e f f ec t on tho enomy, " ,1 t: w _ . ~ p 'his method ofc.ttackl I t ' s h'1.rd on the nerves, ere s no wo ways about it, an d the doughboysup f ront know th i s 0.11 too wel l l
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Pr ior to r.,ny c.ttn.ck , another S.O.P. was t, car()ful study of the ground ~ l n d te r r : , in over which we pLLnned to press. An undor:3tcmding of the terrr-


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This i s a l l in 11newith the following thought - if the T.D.s a re keptback a b i t , (but s t i l l iIi a posi t ion to aid the infantry) - the crews and vehicleswil l l a s t a lo t longer . The danger of ar ty shel l s and fragments in jur ing thevehicles wil l be lessened. The crew wi l l be able to operate longer - and beof more value to the doughboys ahead. (Our bat t a l ion had ~ cases where directh i t s were scored by long rrmge enemy' arty-on the f ront of the T.D.s - in ei__ chcase none were in jurod and only a s h ~ M ~ ~ g , ~ m W ~ $ tDe rosul t - to the nerves ofthe crews. I \ ' ~ . , . l O s wero not dumuged to I U , c ~ e n t thfvt thpy OG1,l-ld not be back on

.. tha l ine in a few hours . )I t should be S.O.P. for the T.D.s to bo dug in ( i f time permits) in a

s table defonsive posi t ion . Bngineer bulldozers C2n be of grea t assi8tanco inth i s respoct . (Evon with dug in posi t ions , it i s s t i l l possible for an accurn.teGerman t::mk gunner to pick a T.D. of f ) . Our b:ittc.lion had two M-108 knocked outWhile defending posi t ions in tho Maginot Lino (Seventh Army Sector north ofH::.:.g[lneu). l ~ l l defunsive posi t ions , i t should go without :3nying, must h ~ \ v G m u t u ~ , l ,,,nd supporting f i re from n.nother T .D. , t ank, or n. noc,rby n.nti t::,nk gun.

Two typos of defensive setups (thlJru ure many morc) proved to po themost benefici':".l. Whon defending n town, vi l lago or ci ty - [,nd tho n.ction i frc.thor s tabi l izod - we adopted the fol,lovling pol icy : - Each T.D". vms plowed inposi t ion behind the f ron t l ines AND behind house, th ick wal l , or some type ofgood p r o t ~ c t i v e cover . Tho crew then more or loss took up rosidc)nce in th0 hOUGo,rosted, s lopt fa i r ly vloll , stayed out of tho inclement ,;,!Oather. Ono mf".n from thecrew (or ' ~ E . r , ~ . from tho Bnt ta l ion ' s R,oonn Compcmy) establ ishod ['. "soeing oye lO.P. nOQrby .., rend wo.tched the enemy t o r r i t o ry . From th iu O.P. c,ny enemy tr.nkmovemonts could bo spot ted o.nd quickly o:;,llod (phoned) to the wCli t ing gun crows.Tho observc:r could then - on tho r : . D p O f l r c ~ n c e of enemy armor - leCld tho T.D. (overprevious ly rcconnoi tnrod roc,ds) to a. f i r ing point cmd engClge the tc..nk. ..s areBul t of th i s simpi'., method, [tIl str: ' , in of combn.t e x h ( ~ u s t i o n , bc:ttlo fCltiguo :endthci,r l ike wore reduced to near ly zorol For tho f i r s t t ime in c-.ny dofonsive se t up i t gave the cr01i" Cl brec.k - n ohance to ge t out of the vehiclu , rolnx, eelt "ndsleep wel l - ~ t n d s t i l l be r eadi ly nVCliL.,bl,) for any Gormcm th rus t : Undor th i GplCln, [ ~ l l T .D . s were 1iJirod into the i r O ~ P . s , Li.S ,,'fell n.s to the i n f ~ m t r y . So n.vlCll devoloped tf,nk warning system VI.o..S developed. No T,D.s were l o s t to th0onomy w h ~ l o ros t ing ~ t h i s setup - and yet wero n.lwo..ys p r e p ~ r e d for ~ at tackby tho Hun, "

The other type of 0. dofensive sotup, in more or l ess open oountry c.nd[ ~ v n ~ y from ;..:.ny v i l l : , g , ~ s . - i s tho st8.ndard S ~ O . P . nrrClngomcnt. Hull down pos i t ions ,good camouflo.ge, cono::;nlment behind woods) brush end so on - were offuctod. Onedis t inc t e , d V f m t [ ~ ~ o here wn.s the ab i l i ty of the, T ~ D gunner to wntch th0 tcrrc..in~ n be rec.dy to f i re n t the enemy n.rmor without moving h is weapon. Howover,the crows were compelled to oo.t:, sleep, l ivo o.nd f i gh t inuido tho cold bodios ofthe armorod vohicleG. Physico.l c ~ i l m c n t f ; , colds, const ipat ion Clnd other t roublesdid show up undor t h i s typo of "forced l iv ing" condi t ions. One gunner f i r ed on0. German t e ~ n k a t loss thnn two hundred yards rc.ngo ... for tho simple r ( ) [ ~ s o n thcltthe co.moufl,.ge wo.n 3 0 thorOUGh nnd complete - tho Jer ry tr.nk nevor knevl whereth e shot Cf.mo from. Tho T .D . VID,S I i t e r " l ly "buried" in [ l mo.ss 0 f wrock'-'go,rubblo ".nd shrubbery (only the tube [',nd s ight could be noticed by the cc.suCllobservor) . Tho Jer ry tank didn ' t oven seo th is much of the decept ionl l

T.D,s, l ike n.ny one elso on tho f ront l ine , must know r. good "escaper aute" in ' lddit ion to 0.11 t he other pL'.ns, schomo S Clnd so on Which :::-.re vror kedout . A gront de ' , l of plnnning goos into :.my def(1nsive sotup - it's c.. 24 hourjob (\nd no sloop for tho VlOQry if tho job i s , to be done succos8ful ly .

I t ' s vrise and Q timo honorod idcft n.nyway, on tho dofensive - to koop8. sect ion or plr.:toon back in reSOrV(i, Qn " L C O in tho halo . I No me:. t t o r howc r i t i c a l tho s i t u ~ t i o n may bo nt the f ront , 0. fow oxt ra T.D.s on hn.nd wil l usufl,lly prove 0. godnend 'ilhen f\ ser ious nt tack i s throw'n by the Je r r i e s .

Tl-.IIJ1C DSTROY@ REACTIONS IN GENER.L TO TEg FIGHTING IN FRl ..NCE: - 1 ~ 1 l l eurn quickly thr.t-FB ..1ill is-a-nor!iillI ' ~ n nc,turaI' I'nstTnct---r,md-notTiing-to beashamed of . In fr,lct, fOQr, coupled with. extra. cnro [',nd c o u r c ~ g o , m ~ _ k l J s fo r 0.bot ter fightinR; mrm. The crD,ck of G e r m , ~ ~ n c. .r t i l lor :nel s , the i r mortrer bc,rrCLges,tho cl'l.ttr;r of t h , ~ ; m"chine pis to ls and " b ~ p I l A s ~ i l l v\Ork on tho so ld i e r ' snerves ftnd got him tonso Qnd stra.inod. Ne1jn:nfon f l ' o ~ n combc,t for tho f i r s ttime should b0 lecturod on t h i s subjo ' t c..nd knQw iB c..fre:.id the best of them n.re (oxporienced to c.. do.-ugh,b'oys) ..

Confur-ion in combc.t, thei changes of ordors ,counter 0rdors , [md so O n ['.11 m',..., be r0cognized n.s S.O.P. in b a t t l u , Thore i sQlv,mys 0. certu,in amount of confusion in n.n : , ttr ,ck by oi thor side - ft11, shouldrocognizo th is :::-nd learn to koop e. cool he:,d, when it ',ppectrs thf.'.t tho) wholesituf. '.tion i s Ilbawlcd up."
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Rumors rend f:llse ropJ r t s in combat h'eve 8. deo.dIy ' , f fcct on mori',le '_endp l [ ~ n s J 1 They must be chocked, doublcchocked o.nrl woiGhod cc, roful ly b,;foro Goin:;to hil;hur he''. .dqunrters. NevI uni t s in combc.t SO,)11 to repor t too quickly ( ~ , n d without cc.roful invostigo. t ion) , "onumy tcmks "Lre ovorrunninf, us," "tho town isc l ( ) . ' ~ r , " "'im Iro surrounded by Jor r ioG," trwo ,ere f : , l l ing b ~ , c k , " c ~ n d hundreds ofother s . In mr.ny c['.sos one or tw o individual ,s get rumors c.nd incorroc t repor tss t ~ : . r t o d - t h e y ' l l run through 0. command l ike wildf i reS I One cO.GO i s horebygiVOn to qu ' , l i fy thiG point fu r ther

.. now regiment w:'s 0 am in th o her:ct of0. strong Gormr.n l , t t o . c l (design th (:.rmy ou t o f H c , r : ; ~ t n e u ) the S...3 phoned our commc.nd post Y crows hnvo o.b,mdonedthe i r guns [md o.rc running; r . W ( ~ y n , " he, s t ~ , t e d . The etuty of f i cor t ~ the T.D. C.P.c\.skod fo r fur ther informrttion on the subjec t - f'.nd promisod to chock up on it'from h is encl t "o . I t f inr . l ly CCi.mO eut th'i.t the T .D. crew,", hnr1, becomo cm,':!;c.gerl inD. f i r e f L ~ h t with tho anomy, beth T.D.s 'iV"rc knockod out , so tho repor t "runt ['.nel t ho i r crOYIS forced to locl.ve tho Guns undor prossure of onomy inf: :mtry sur r o u n d i n ; ~ th,M 0 Tho 3-3 cClll,od up lc;tH,r' (nd npnlogizec1 for the incorr0c t ropor t ~ l m ~ f o r ~ i v o n . One erroneous rupor t l ike t h i ~ h ~ t iud up the telophono wirosfor over ' ,n hour (durinG ~ ' , n CLtto'ck) t ryini ; to prove or di"provc i tU F:urthorproof thCLt tho mind wil l bocome confusod in bt. , t t lo: - tho T .D o CrOVfS suffurcdct-esuulties, b';Jlicved thei r ~ u n s wero burnin:; up c,nrl got out . I n s p e c t i o n ~ , dc'.yor t,'fO 1 ~ . t e r , Ylhcn t h0 ilttilck hild c1 iod da.-In, showed t h c ~ t NEITHER of the T.D. shild boon knockod out - but th;:,t o n e r ~ y fL\ru nom'by lad the crow to bel iove thoythomsulves wore f'.flC'.J:lO 1U - ilnd D. mort 0.r f r ~ - l ; m e n t he,d VTounded Q creW Dember ...GO th e r e s t f i ~ u r c c 1 t hey h ~ been h i t ~ n Go t out l In other words, both tho crewCLnn, t h i s p r , r t i c u l ' ~ r 8-3 hild, ruportod f :Lctsorronoously - CLn(l t i ed up c, lo t ofpersonnel :cnd TIH]!; t ryinG to lI unt iu l thu r . lOS$J Don' t mo.kc reportc} especio. l lyin the h u ~ , t o f b".t t le - unlos:} you C,ru vnry corb' . in of th o sourCCJ :cnd thecorrectness of thomll

Thuro i s " Good b it of I1buck p".ssing" in cOfllbi\t in :::..n ef for t to " t ~ , g " someono for mistr,kos. Wc,tch out fo r it - ('lclmit your er ro r s rc\.ther them w',.stet ime t ryinG to !!,ot out o f t h o m ~

11. fo . t ' l l is t ic O,ttitueto c\s res' :rrls r ;e t t ins in jurod or k i l lod in combt,t i sBoon c1eve:lopod. ""'\. miss i s CLG good C.S :,1 milell ntt i tudo goos Cl long 'dt,y tow'.ro.keeping on e ' s mcmt:,l bnlc.ncol Amoric:,cn soldierr:: are r e m c ~ r k n . b l e Ci.nyvmy ,.. thoyo.lwr.'.ys l ike to fi;rure: it wi l l bo the one noxt to thom who wi l l llr:ot i t , " not..l L)themselvesln It's CL r;00'1 [ , t t i tudo to hCLve, CLbout tho only one to koop !\, mo.ngoing over z" period of fllonths. Thore:i, S f', :;ood b i t of feolin;:; thQt one 1 s l ' luckwil l run out" - ::,.wl c ~ f t o r qui te a ' lh i lo in comb8.t th o f'Verc.:;c en l i s ted Dc-.n Qndof f ice r 'VlOn


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C O i . ~ C L U S I O N S : 1 . Tho T .D. hilG p r ( ) v e ( ~ a very of foct i vo vvonpon in tho cf.Lmp'.1.i:::;n o.r;a.inetthe Gorrn(tns. I t s orL::inal dosL;m\.ticm, as a t'.!.nk d o s t r ) y i n : ~ wOLlpon, h c ~ s boen

fu l ly Qxploited an d cxpD.ndorl fa r b o : . r o n r ~ ono t ina pro-war daysl 'r .D.s aro cL,11edupon to do o.lraost ovary job there is n.c;n:i:nst tho ol1ony. Vfuon no Jorry tanks aron.round, o.laost u.l'iJ;,ys tho infccntry colonols wil l finll cmothqr job for thcn-:1,8.nothor 8is8ion - to me'.ko usc of thoir trcr.1ondous f iro pm'TO '6.n

employment of the tank destroyer battalion with the infantry division

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