empowering local peacebuilders: strategies for effective engagement of local actors in peace...

7/30/2019 Empowering Local Peacebuilders: Strategies for Effective Engagement of Local Actors in Peace Operations

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Building PeacePractical Innovations from USIP

Building Peace no. 2 March 2012

Empowering Local PeacebuildersStrategies for Effective Engagement of Local Actors

in Peace Operations


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Building PeacePractical Innovations from USIP

Building Peace no. 2March 2012

Empowering Local PeacebuildersStrategies for Effective Engagement of Local Actors in

Peace Operations

Problem Identied

Peacebuilding operations in conict and post-conict societies often undermine localcapacity, ownership, and sustainability. Theacknowledgedremedyistoempowerlocalactorstotaketheleadinplanningandimplementingprograms,but few empowermentstrategies that work in practice have been documented and explained.

Action Taken

Several organizations have recongured empowerment techniques traditionally used forpeacetime development to work in societies emerging from conict.

Local actors have seized the chance presented by these new approaches to develop and

implement their own creative solutions to conict. Localownershiphasinturnenabledtheintegrationofothersectorsofsocietyandgovernmentintopeacebuildingactivities.

Lessons Learned

Focus on facilitating processes instead of trying to achieve specic outcomes. Successfulinterventionshelpparticipantsopenchannelstodefendtheirowninterests,withtheparticipantsdeterminingthenaldecisionsandoutcomes.

Design programs to promote learning rather than to yield specic results. Eectiveprogramscreateopportunitiesforparticipantstoseekoutandabsorbknowledge

criticaltogooddecisionmaking. Dont be deected by political pressures. Evenwell-knownempowermentprinciples(suchasrespectinglocalcounterparts)canbesidelinedifintervenersdonotprioritizethemabovethekindsofpoliticalpressurestypicallyencounteredinconictzones.

The full text of this report is available at

http://www.usip.org/publications/empowering-local-peacebuilders

United States Institute of Peace, 2301 Constitution Avenue, Washington, DC 20037


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Contents

Introduction,A. Heather Coyne 7 CaseStudy1GeingtheRightPeopleintotheRoom:

TheBurundiLeadershipTrainingProgram15Howard Wolpe and Steve McDonald

Advising Ministries: A Co-analysis Strategy 24NadiaGerspacher

CaseStudy2Research-BasedDialogue:Guatemalan

DialogueonSecuritySectorReform 25Bernardo Arvalo de Lon

Culturally Sensitive Engagement inBougainville 34

IainCampbellSmith

CaseStudy3MobilizingCommunityDecisionMaking:TheIraqCommunityActionProgram 37Sally Iadarola and Lindsey Jones

Peer Mentoring: Training for Entrepreneursin Southeast Europe 48

PeterRighi

CaseStudy4BuildingCollaborativeNetworks: IndependentRadioNetworkin SierraLeone 49 Ambrose James

The Exchange of Skills: USIP Conict

Management Training in Pakisistan 57 NinaSughrue


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Main cover photo: Data collectors conduct a womens focus group in the Niger Deltaas part of a 2008 participatory stakeholder evaluation of community developmentagreements. Photograph by Paulinus Okoro. Used with permission by the AfricaCentre for Corporate Responsibility.

Photo on page 5: Howard Wolpe, in Bakavu in eastern DRC, where he was aendinga training for provincial and military faction leaders in Congo. Photograph by MichelKassa. Used with permission by Michael Kassa.

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors alone. They do not necessarily

reect views of the United States Institute of Peace.

2012 by the Endowment of the United States Institute of Peace. All rightsreserved.

The Building Peace series reports on innovative work by USIP that has practical

applications for peacemakers and peacebuilders. The goal is to get useful knowledge

into the hands of practitioners promptly. Some of the work reported in Building

Peace is recent, some is ongoing. All of it has been tested, usually in the eld, but

this is work in progress and feedback is warmly welcomed. Please send all comments

on this report to Nadia Gerspacher, a senior program ofcer in USIPs Academy of

International Conict Management and Peacemaking, at [email protected].

CaseStudy5ParticipatoryStakeholderEvaluation:EvaluationoftheChevron,StateGovernment,andCommunityCompactsintheNigerDelta 59David Plumb

Adversarial Capacity Building 68 A.HeatherCoyne

Conclusion:KeystoEngagement 69 A. Heather Coyne

The Participatory Strategic Planning Index 82GaryBland

Acknowledgments 83

AbouttheAuthors 84USIPExperts 87

AboutUSIP 88


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Inmemoryofoneoftheleadersintheeldofcapacitybuildingforconictmanagement,HowardWolpe.

Theresultsofhisinnovativestrategiesandpracticescanbeseeninmanyplacesacrosstheworld.


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Capacitybuilding,localownership,andsustainabilitylooselycapturedinthealmostclichtermofempowermenthavelongbeencoretenetsforengaginglocalactorsintraditionaldevelopmentprogramming.Theseconceptshavereceivedprominenceinthediscussionofinterventionstopreventorresolveconictandtorebuildsocietiesemergingfromconict.Acrossthespectrumoforganizationsinvolvedinsuchpeaceoperations,fromnongovernmentalorganizations(NGOs)tociviliangovernmentagenciestothemilitary,itisvirtuallyimpossibletondanyonewhodoesnotclaimthattheseconceptsarecentraltothedesignandimplementationandsuccessofinterventions.Butforalltheaentionpaidtotheconceptsofempowerment,therecord

ofsuccessfullyintegratingthemintointerventionsinconictzonesisdistressinglypoor.

Inmanycases,thatfailureisduetotheuniquecharacteristicsofconictoperations:conictenvironmentsarenotconducivetotraditionalempowermentapproaches;agenciesleadingconictoperationsoftenlackexperiencewithempowermentprinciples;andtheintensescrutinyofhighlypoliticizedoperationscreatesintensepressureforimmediateresultsthatunderminesempowermentstrategies.

Inlargepart,however,thefailuretointegrateempowermentintointerventionsisduenottoalackofappreciationoftheprinciplesortotheconstraintsofworkingin

conictzones,butsimplytoalackofunderstandingofhowtoputthemintopractice.Howcanintervenersengagelocalactorsinconictzonesinwaysthatpromoteownership,capacitybuilding,andsustainability?Whatarethetechniquesforselectingparticipants,establishingtrust,encouragingawarenessofcommoninterests,buildingcollaborativenetworks,andfacilitatingparticipationindecision-makingprocesses,giventhechallengesandgoalsofpeaceoperations?Thelackofpracticalguidelinesiscompoundedbyanincentivestructurethatrewardsdisempoweringactivities,soevenwheregoodstrategiesareknown,theyoftenarenotadopted.

ThisBuildingPeacereportspotlightspracticalstrategiesforengaginglocalactors

especiallystrategiesthataddresstheuniqueconstraintsofconictoperations.Byexaminingaseriesofcasestudiesoncreativeengagementmethodologiesthatseektoempowerlocalactors,thisreportdrawsoutcommonthemesandelementsofeectiveengagement.Althoughallpractitionersknowthatinterventionsmustbedesignedforaspeciccontext,basicelementsaswellasrespectfortheseelementsinincentive

Introduction

A. Heather Coyne

7


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8 Empowering Local Peacebuilders

Building Peace No. 2

structurescanbeincorporatedintoavarietyofinterventions.Suchinclusionwillstrengthentheabilityofinterventionstofreethepotentialoflocalactorstodrive,manage,andsustaintheirownsolutionstoconict.

The Challenge of Effective Engagement

TheoperationsinIraqandAfghanistanhavehighlightedtheweaknessesinengagementmethodologiesandpractice.Itisamaerofargumentwhetherinternationalintervenershaveemployedoperationseectivelyevenintraditionaldevelopmentcontexts,butresultshavebeenundeniablypoorinIraqandAfghanistan.Inthevastmajorityofactivitiesinthesecounties,programminghasnotpromotedlocalownership,capacity,orsustainabilitybutratherthereverse.Theconsequenttollonresources,credibility,andpublicsupportforoperationshasthreatenedthepotentialforsuccess.Lookingbackatotherpeaceoperations(abroadtermthatincludesconictmanagement,peacemaking,andstabilityandreconstructioneorts),onecanseesimilarshortcomings.

Theineectivenessofpeaceoperationsispartlyexplainedbythedynamicsofworkinginconictzones.Afundamentalcharacteristicofempowermentisconsultation.Butrelianceonconsultationischallenginginsituationswhereinteractionorassociationwithinternationalintervenersputsparticipantsindanger.Inaddition,insituationswherepowerstructuresareviolentlycontested,empowermentoflocalactorsrisksstrengtheningonewarringpartytothedetrimentofanother,feedingconict,withtheinterventionitselfbecominganotherresourceoverwhichtoght.

Empowermentconceptshaveprovendicultforcertainorganizationalcultures

particularlythemilitarytoadoptandimplement.PeaceoperationsinIraqandAfghanistan,andearlierinterventionsintheBalkansandelsewhere,havereliedheavilyonmilitaryforce,withmilitaryactorstakingtheleadevenoneconomicandsocialdevelopmentactivities.Thisdependenceonmilitaryforcehasputempowermentatriskbecausemilitaryorganizationalcultureisoftenatoddswiththerequirementsofcapacitybuilding,localownership,andsustainability.Militaryorganizationsvalueswiftactionandresults,valuesthatconictwiththeneedtobuildprocessesandtoallowforindividualandinstitutionallearningovertime.TheU.S.militaryinparticularencouragescandoandtakechargeaitudes.Acandoaitudedictatesndingwaystoachievespeciedoutcomes,oftentothedetrimentoflonger-termeortstobuildlocalsupportanddecision-makingprocesses,whereasatakechargeaitudecan

interruptlocalleadershipandunderminelocalownershipwhenmilitarypersonnelstrivetogetthingsdonetheirway.

Thismindsetisnotlimitedtothemilitary;itissharedbycivilianagencieseagerforimmediate,reportableresultsinpost-conictreconstructionoperations.Manyagenciesinvolvedinpeacekeepingeortshaveextensiverelevantsubjectmaerexpertisebut


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Empowering Local Peacebuilders 9

lessfamiliaritywiththeimperativesofsustainableknowledgetransfer.Castintheroleofadvisersandtrainers,intervenersoftenfallbackonwhattheyknowbest:activeinvolvementinshapinganddirectingpolicyoutcomesattheexpenseofcapacitybuilding.

Eventhosewithextensiveexpertiseindevelopmentandknowledgetransferandwhoshouldknowbeerfeelthepressureinhighlypoliticizedoperationstoshowinstant,easilyvisibleprogress.Thispressuretoshowresultsisnotabadthinginitself;theproblemispressuretoshowmoreresultsthancanbeachievedorresultsthatareultimatelycounterproductive.Forexample,theU.S.AgencyforInternationalDevelopment(USAID)faceddemandstochangeitstraditionaloperatingprocedurestoaccommodatethepoliticalexigenciesofIraqandAfghanistanandpassedthosepressuresontoitsimplementingpartners.Thescrutinyandpressureaectedtheabilityoforganizationstoconductprogrammingthatsupportslocalempowerment,withamateursandexpertsalikeforcedtoshort-circuittime-provenapproachesand

principles.ThesepressuresarenotconnedtoAfghanistanandIraq.Evenoutsidesuchhighlypoliticized,high-pressureenvironments,conict-relatedprogrammingincludingconictmanagement,development,humanrights,anddemocracyinitiativesstrugglestoavoidthetemptationofanexcessiveemphasisondeliveringspeedy,superciallyquantiableresultsattheexpenseofsustainableempowerment.

Imposing solutions: U.S. soldiers in Baghdad explain a plan for relocatingdisplaced persons. Photograph by A. Heather Coyne, 2003. Used withpermission by A. Heather Coyne.


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Toward More Effective Engagement

Practitionerscoulddebateendlesslywhetherthefailuresineectiveengagementareaributabletocircumstances,organizationalculture,orpoliticalwill.Butanother,morepracticalfactorisatworkthatpractitionerscanmoreconstructivelyaddress:howdoes

oneactuallyengageeectively?Howdoesonefosterprocessesanddynamicsthatwillallowlocalactorstomakeandsustaintheirowndecisions?Giventhechallengesofconictenvironments,thelackoffamiliarityofsomeorganizationswithempowermentprinciples,andtheconstraintsofthepoliticizedoperations,aretherepracticalstrategiesthatpractitionerscanadopttoadvanceempowerment?

Plentyofinformationisavailableonhownottoengageandwhatpitfallstoavoid;forexample,Dontassumethatifyoubuildit,theywillcome.Dontswaylocalprioritizationbyindicatingwhichtypesofprojectsyouwanttofund.Dontassumethatagreementwithyourproposalindicatescommitment.Muchlessexistsintheway

ofconcreteguidanceonhow toengagelocalactorsinwaysthatpromoteempowerment.

ThisBuildingPeacereportaemptstomovethedebatebeyondarecitationoftheimportanceofempowermentbyexploringpracticalmethodologiesforcapacitybuilding,localownership,andsustainability.Inincludescasestudiesthatdescribeparticularmethodsofengagement,documentingprogrammaticapproachesforselectingparticipants,establishingtrust,encouragingawarenessofcommoninterests,buildingrelationshipsandcollaborativenetworks,andfacilitatingparticipationinandownershipofdecision-makingprocesses.Thecasespresenteddemonstratetechniquestointegratelocalactorsintoeveryphaseofaproject,frominitialconceptiontoplanning,implementation,andevaluation.

Thisreportdoesnotprovideanexhaustivelistofapproaches;thevecasesfeaturedhereareillustrativeofthevarietyofengagementtechniquesthatbuildcapacity,ownership,andsustainability.Thecaseswereselectedbasedoneachimplementersconsciousdecisiontoprioritizeactiveleadershipoflocalactorsaboveanyotherfactorssuchasspeed,eciency,orreachoftheproject.Theseimplementersarticulatedamethodologyfordeliberateempowermentandcantraceoutcomesandeectsbacktotheengagementtechniques.Althoughallthecasesuseacombinationofmethodstoempowerlocalactors,eachcaseillustratesakeyengagementmethodology,summarizedbelow.Thecasestudiesareintendednottoassesstheoverallimpactorsuccessoftheinitiativebuttodescribeapproachestoengagementthatbuildlocalownership.

Thecasesaremostlylimitedtoaparticulartypeofengagement:thatofinternationalthirdpartiesbringingdedicatedresourcesforsocialprojects.Itishopedthatthis


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descriptionofafewcreativestrategieswillinspirefurtherinnovationforawiderrangeofinitiativetypes,includingtraining,mentoring,andadvising,technicalassistance,andgrantmaking.

Case Study 1. Geing the Right People into the Room: The Burundi Leadership TrainingProgram. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

HowardWolpeandSteveMcDonaldexaminethestrategicselectionandrecruitmentofparticipantstodevelopbuy-intoaninitiativefromthestartaswellastoensurethatparticipantscametotheprogramwiththemindsetnecessaryforittosucceed.ThegoaloftheWoodrowWilsonCentersBurundiprojectwastobuildthecollaborativecapacityofandtrustbetweenkeyleaderswhohadtheabilitytodirectorinuenceBurundisrecoveryanddemocratictransition,helpingtocreateanetworkthatcouldworktogetheracrossethnicandpoliticaldivides.

Case Study 2. Research-Based Dialogue: Guatemalan Dialogue on Security Sector Reform.Interpeace

BernardoArvalodeLonpresentsaresearch-baseddialogueapproachtocreatinganenvironmentthatallowsforrelationshipbuildingandforcommonintereststoemerge.Immediatelyafterthecivilwar,theenvironmentinGuatemalawasantitheticaltoatraditionaldialoguebetweenstakeholders.Interpeaceorganizedaresearchprojectonsecuritysectorreformthatcreatedanew,neutralspaceinsocietywhereconstructiveengagementbetweenthepartiescouldtakeplace.

Case Study 3. Mobilizing Community Decision Making: The Iraq Community Action Program.ACDI/VOCA

SallyIadarolaandLindseyJonesdescribeacommunitymobilizationprocessthatenablescitizenstoprioritize,select,andimplementinfrastructureprojectstoaddressunderlyingdriversofconict.Usinglocalstaasmobilizersandinvolvinglocalleadersandgovernmentocialsthroughouttheprocess,theIraqCommunityActionProgram(ICAP)engagesIraqicommunitiesinadecision-makingprocessonwhattheycandoforthemselves,buildingontheirownstrengthsandcontributingtheirownresources.Outsidesupport,althoughnecessary,isstructuredinawaythatdoesnotdominatetheprocess.

Creative strategies will inspire further innovation.


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Case Study 4. Building Collaborative Networks: Independent Radio Network in Sierra Leone.Search for Common Ground

AmbroseJamestellsthestoryoftheevolutionofasuccessful,collaborativenetworkof

localradiostationsthroughthefacilitationandgradualtransferofcapacity.SearchforCommonGroundsupportedthedevelopmentofthenetworknotthroughadirectiveinterventionbutthroughcontinualencouragement,facilitationofcommunicationamongmembers,andcarefulapplicationofresourcesotherwiseinaccessibletothenascentgroup.

Unliketheothercasestudies,thisexampledoesnotdemonstrateaformalized,articulatedmethodologyasmuchasitvalidatesastyleofinteractionmostlyhands-o,notdirective,butcontinuousengagementwithandencouragementofanorganicdevelopmentprocessdrivenbylocalactors.

Case Study 5. Participatory Stakeholder Evaluation: Evaluation of the Chevron, StateGovernment, and Community Compacts in the Niger Delta. Consensus Building Institute

DavidPlumbpresentsaparticipatorystakeholderevaluationdesignedtobuildthecapacityofstakeholderstoshapeandparticipateindecisionmakingoncommunitydevelopmentfundsprovidedbyChevronNigeriaLtd.TheConsensusBuildingInstituteusedahighlyparticipatoryapproachinwhichstakeholdersweredirectlyinvolvedinandresponsibleforthedesignandimplementationoftheevaluationaswellastheanalysisofresults.

ThisBuildingPeacereportalsoincludessixfeatureboxeshighlightingcreativetechniquesforengagement:

A Co-analysis Approach.Aco-analysisapproachcanenhanceatrainingandmentoringstrategyinafragilestate.

Culturally Sensitive Engagement.TheBougainvillePeaceMonitoringGroupbuilttrustthroughmusicintheaftermathofcivilwarinPapuaNewGuinea.

Peer Mentoring.TheCenterforEntrepreneurshipandExecutiveDevelopmentprovideslocalmentorstotrainentrepreneursinpost-conictareasofSoutheastEurope.

The Exchange of Skills.TheUnitedStatesInstituteofPeaces(USIP)conictmanagementtrainingprograminPakistanfosteredanenvironmentinwhichlocalactorscoulddrawonexpertisefromexternalactors.


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Adversarial Capacity Building.CoalitionforcesinIraqusedroutineinteractionswithlocalactorstostrengthenlocalcapacitytodealwithauthoritiesandcreateasafespaceforlocalactorstoexperimentwithnewrolesandskills.

The Participatory Strategic Planning Index.RTIInternationalsindexisatoolfor

evaluatingtheleveloflocalparticipationinaninitiative.

Thiscollectionofcasespresentsanopportunitytoidentifycommonthemesandelementsthatcharacterizeeectiveengagement.ThisBuildingPeacereportthussummarizesthemesforpractitionerstoincorporateintofutureinterventiondesign.Alltheprogramspresentedherearecharacterizedbyanemphasisonprocessoverproducts:theyenablethedevelopmentofinstitutionsandrelationshipsoverappropriatetimeframesratherthantryingtoproduceapredeterminedresult.Localactorsshapetheoutcomeandoftendeterminethenatureofanynalproductthemselves.Thestudiesalsoillustratetheimportanceofinvestmentinlearningbyparticipants,buildingrespectfulpartnerships,andgivingprimacytothelocalcontext.

Toward More Effective Institutions

Mostofthecasespresentedherereectaninstitutionalcommitmenttotheprinciplesofempowermentbytheorganizationsbehindtheinterventions.Themethodologiesdescribedwerenotadhoctacticsbutemergedoutoflongexperienceandgradualrecognitionandincorporationofstrategiesthatenhancethoseprinciples.Eachinterventionwasdesignedconsciouslyandspecicallytodrawoutlocalleadershiporanopportunitywascapitalizedonbyindividualswhowerewelltrainedintheprinciplesandappliedthemasamaerofcourse.

Thereisareasonforthis.Sustainableapproachesthatbuildlocalownershipandcapacityarelonger,harder,andlesstangibleintheirresultsthanshort-term,unsustainableapproaches.Therefore,anorganizationalmindsetandstructurearerequiredthatacceptthisfact;intervenersmustbewillingtoprovidethesustainedandrestrainedsupportnecessarytolettheprocessreachitspotential.

Thisdoesnotmeanthatindividualscannotuseempowermentstrategieseveniftheirorganizationsdonotfullygrasporadheretoempowermentprinciples.Itdoesmean,though,thatwithoutaninstitutionalcommitmentbehindthem,practitionersarelikelytoencounterresistance,impatience,orconfusionaboutwhattheyareachieving.They

riskbeinghijackedorpressuredtospeeduportakemoreactiveroles.Ultimately,eectiveempowermentdependsnotonlyontheindividualsincorporatingorinventing

All the programs presented here are characterized by anemphasis on process over products


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engagementstrategies,butalsoontheirhomeorganizationschangingthewaytheyincentivize,measure,andjudgesuccess.

Takingthisargumentfurther,successinpeaceoperationsdependsonchangingthe

mindsetbehindinterventions.Althoughthedebateonwhetherandhowtoundertakemajorstabilizationandreconstructionoperationscontinues,mostpractitionerswouldagreethatinterventioninconictzonestopromotegovernance,development,andreconciliationislikelytobeastandardfeatureofforeignpolicyintheforeseeablefuture.Governmentsarethereforedevotingmoreaentiontobuildingtheirowncapacitytoconductsuchoperations.Buttheseeortstendtofocusonthesubstanceofstatebuildingratherthanontechniquesforfacilitatinglocallyownedandmanagedprocesses.Insteadoftrainingpersonneltoreforminstitutionsandmakenewpolicyforconictcountries,eortsshouldbefocusedontrainingintervenerstobecatalystsforchange.Intervenersshouldbeadviserswhocanfacilitateprocessesinwhichlocalactorstakeresponsibilityforchangingtheirownsystemsinwaysthattheydene

themselves;eectivelybuildcoalitionswithotherlike-mindedpeople;takeadvantageoffair,inclusiveforumstodebateandpursuecompetingagendas;anddrawonoutsideexpertiseandbestpracticesbecausetheythemselvesseethevalueinusingandreningthatknowledgefortheirownpurposes.Theroleofintervenersinpeaceoperationsshouldnotbetolead;itshouldbetoempowerthelocalpopulationtakethelead.


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Case Study 1

Getting the Right People into the Room

The Burundi Leadership Training Program

Howard Wolpe and Steve McDonald

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Burundioersagraphicillustrationofacountrywhoseleadershave,fordecades,seenthemselvesinthegripofalife-and-deathstruggle.Ahistoryofintercommunalmassacres,includinggenocide,combinedwiththepostindependencedominationofasubsetoftheTutsiminorityoverthemajorityHutupopulation,haveproduceddeep-seatedsuspicionsandmistrustamongelites.Moreover,thecountrymustcontendnotonlywithanethnicallypolarizedurbanleadershipclass,butalsowithahuge

gulfbetweenthecountryspoliticalclassandadeeplyalienated,largelyrural,population.1

Attheonsetofthethree-yearpoliticaltransitionestablishedbytheArushaPeaceAccordofAugust2000,allfourofthekeypoliticalimperativesforasustainableBurundianpeaceandsuccessfulpostwarreconstructionanewinterdependence-armingparadigm,trustamongkeyplayers,cooperativepoliticalrhetoric,andconsensusontherulesofthegamewerelargelyabsent.Althoughtherewereplentifulexamplesofgrassrootsreconciliation,attheleadershipleveltherewaslilesenseofcommongroundamongTutsi,Hutu,andTwa.Trustinginterethnicrelationshipsweretheexception

ratherthanthenorm;notwithstandingtheirformalacceptanceofpower-sharingarrangementsnegotiatedinArushaandafterward,theprincipalpartiesseemedtoagreethattherulesgoverningthemanagementoftheirinteractionswereexceedinglyfragile.

UnderthedirectionoftheWoodrowWilsonInternationalCenterforScholarsandwiththesupportoftheWorldBanksPost-ConictFundandsupplementaryassistancefromUSAIDsOceofTransitionInitiatives,theBritishDepartmentforInternationalDevelopmentandtheEuropeanCommunity,theBurundiLeadershipTrainingProgram(BLTP)wasdesignedandestablishedtoassistinBurundisfragilepeaceprocess.Thecapacity-buildingprogram,originallyfundedforeighteenmonths,wasanationaltrainingprogramexplicitlydesignedtobuildacohesive,sustainablenetworkofleaders

whocouldworktogetheracrossallethnicandpoliticaldividesinordertoadvanceBurundisreconstruction.Ratherthanfocusingontheacquisitionoftechnicalskills,asothercapacity-buildingprogramstendtodo,thisprogramsoughttobuildthecollaborativecapacityofleaders.BLTPworkshopsfeaturedtrainingininterest-basednegotiations,communications,mediation,conictanalysis,strategicplanning,andthemanagementoforganizationalchange.


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The Strategic Challenge

ThekeytobuildingcollaborativecapacityandtheprimarychallengefortheWilsonCenteranditslocalpartner,theBLTPistogettherightpeopleintotheroom,thatis,keyleaderswithinallsocialandinstitutionalsectorswho,byvirtueoftheirformalroles

ortheirinformalinuence,couldstrategicallyimpact,forbeerorworse,thecourseofdemocratizationanddevelopment.

SometimesasinglecountryoraninternationalinstitutionsuchastheUnitedNationsortheWorldBankwillhavesucientleveragetosecuretheparticipationofkeyleaders.Inothersituations,aparticularlycredibleneutralpersonorinstitutionwithinthesocietymaykick-starttheprocess.Onoccasion,however,itmaybenearlyimpossibletondaneutralthirdparty,eitherwithinthecountryorwithintheinternationalcommunity,withsucientcredibilityandgravitas.

Atthesametime,theprocessusedtoidentifyandrecruitkeyleadersmustbeseennotasaprocessmanipulatedbyexternalactorsbutasaprocessthatisanaccuratereectionoftheviewsoftheprotagoniststotheconict.InBurundi,thetrainingprogramcametobeseenasownedbytheindigenouspartiesandasagenuinepartnershipbetweenthepartiesandtheinternationalteammountingtheleadershiptrainingprogram.Withoutsuchlocalcommitment,peacebuildingandconicttransformationeortscannotbesustainable.

TheWilsonCenterBurundiprojectcreatedastrategicselectionprocesstogettherightpeopleintotheroominamannerthatbuiltownershipoverthetrainingprogrambythepartiesandensuredthattheselectedleadersparticipatedintheworkshops,not

tonegotiateorposture,buttobuildtheirowncapacitiesandrelationshipstomovetheprocessforward.

Securing Burundian Buy-In

TwomethodswereusedtoobtainthebroadestpossibleBurundianbuy-intotheproject.First,theWilsonCenterprojectmanagersheldalmostonehundredmeetingsovertwomonthswithBurundiansfromallpoliticalperspectivesgovernmentandcivilsociety,aswellasthemilitaryandrebelgroups.TheseriousnessandcredibilityoftheproposedventurewereenhancedinBurundianeyesbytheprojectdirectorsve-yearinvolvementwiththeBurundianpeaceprocessasaspecialenvoy,bytheWorldBanksnancialsponsorshipoftheinitiative,andbytheneutralityandstatureoftheimplementingpartner,theWashington-basedWilsonCenter.TheseconsultativemeetingsresultedintheendorsementoftheBLTPbyvirtuallyallBurundianstakeholders.


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Second,twoBurundianswerebroughtintotheprojectmanagementteamattheprojectsinceptionbothhighlyrespectedandtrustedindividualswhoenjoyedthecondenceofvirtuallyallBurundianinstitutionsandpoliticalfactionsandlentimmediatecredibilitytotheinitiative.IndependentconsultantEugeneNindorera,

aformerministerofhumanrights,broughttotheprojectnotonlyhisconsiderablepersonalstatureandaccesstoallfactionalleaders,butalsoexceptionalpoliticalinstinctsandananalyticgraspofBurundianpoliticaldynamics.BLTPocemanagerFabienNsengimana,aformerteacherandcivilservantwithextensiveexperienceintheoceofthepresidency,is,likeNindorera,oneoftherareBurundianswhohastranscendedhissocietysethnicpolarityandisacceptedasanhonestandtrustedinterlocutorbyall.

Selecting Leaders Strategically

Toachievemaximumpossibleimpactintheshortestamountoftime,theonehundredleaderswhowereinitiallyinvitedtoparticipateinthisinitiativewerestrategically

selected.InthecourseoftheprojectmanagersmeetingswithabroadrangeofBurundianstakeholders,asdescribedabove,eachinstitutional,faction,orconstituencyleader,afterhearingafullexplanationoftheprojectandtheworkshopmethodology,wasrequestedtodrawuphisorherownlistofleaderswhoheorshewouldmostliketoseeinvolvedintherstworkshopofthetrainingprogram.Membersoftheinitialgroupwereaskedtonominateonlypersonswho,byvirtueofthepositionstheyheldortheinuencetheywieldedintheirrespectivegroups,hadthecapacitytoshapeBurundisfuture.BecauseoftheneedtoaddresssimultaneouslynotonlytheethniccleavagedividingBurundianelitesbutalsothehugechasmbetweenelitesandthecountryspopulation,halftheparticipantsweredrawnfromthepoliticalclassthe

governmentandthepoliticalparties,thearmy,andalltherebelorganizationswhiletheotherhalfcamefromcivilsociety(churches,womensorganizations,academia,media,youth,laborunions,andthebusinesscommunity).TheWilsonCentermanagersaskedtheinitialgrouptosuggestnamesofpoliticalelitesandcivilsocietyleadersfromacrossthepoliticalspectrumandtoensureanethnic,geographic,andgenderbalanceaswell.

Membersoftheinitialgroupwereassuredthattheirsubmissionswouldbetreatedcondentially,sharedonlywiththemanagementteam.Thenalresponsibilityforparticipantselectionwouldliewiththeprojectmanagers,whowouldensurethatthecompositionofeveryworkshopgroupsatisedtheneedforethnic,regional,and

genderbalanceaswellassectoralinclusivity.ButthesubmissionswouldserveasanimportantguideastowhoBurundiansbelievedweremostcapableofsignicantlyinuencingtheircountrysfuture.Theprojectmanagersreceivedalargenumberofresponsestothisrequestthatwhichallowedthemtodrawupadatabaseofalmostfour

The key to bulding collaborative capacity . . .is to get the right people into the room


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hundredpersons.Aquickperusalshowedindividualswhowerenamedrepeatedlyascriticalplayers,forbeerorworse.Includedweresomespoilers,individualsseenbytheinternationalcommunityascomplicitinpastnegativeactionsorresistanttochange.Whentheprojectmanagerssawthesenamesappearoverandoveragain,

theydecidedtoincludethem.Theseindividualswereamongthosewhoweremosttransformedbythetraining.

Framing the Invitations to Prospective Participants

Invitationstoparticipateintheprojectemphasizedfourthemes:

TheinviteeisoneofaselectgroupofaroundonehundredleadersidentiedbyotherBurundiansasindividualswhoseinuenceandstaturearesuchthattheyhavetheabilitytoshapethefutureoftheircountry.Participantsreportedthatthisframingunderlinedtheimportanceoftheeortandimbuedtheleaderswithasenseofresponsibilitytocommittotheprogram.

Leadersareinvitedtoparticipateintheirpersonalcapacities,notasrepresentativesoforganizationsorinstitutions.Thisenabledparticipantstofeelfreerandmoreopenwitheachotherwithintheworkshopseventhoughtheyknewwhotheotherparticipantswereandwhattheiraliationswere.

Thetrainingworkshopsarenotnegotiatingvenues;rather,theyarepartofaleadershipcapacity-buildinginitiativedesignedtostrengthentheindividualleadershipskillsofBurundianleaders.Thisformulationhelpedtodepoliticizetheproject,makingiteasierforpeoplewhohadbeendemonizedinthecourseoftheirconicttobegintore-engagewithoneanotherandprovidinganexcuseforthosewhoresistedearlieropportunitiesforintergroupdialoguetoparticipate.

Theworkshopswillbeprivate,withnopublicityorpresscoverage.(Muchlaterintheprocess,participantsdecidedtomaketheprojectpublic,butthiswasaftertheyhaddevelopedcooperativeworkingrelationshipsandwantedtoreassurethepublicthattheirleaderswereworkingacrosspoliticalandethniclines.)

Securing International and Regional Buy-In

Consultationswereheldwithalldonorgovernmentsandtheregionalgovernmentsthat

wereresponsibleforthetransitionestablishedbytheArushaPeaceAgreement.ItwasimportanttoensuretheirfullunderstandingoftheobjectivesoftheBurundiprojectandtoreceivetheiranalysesofevolvingpeaceprocessdynamics.Ontheinternationalfront,Europeanpowersinparticularhadbeenkeyplayersinthepeaceprocessandwere,


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ofcourse,potentialdonorsdownthelineforexpandingthework.TheregionalstateswerestillspearheadingtheapplicationofthepeaceagreementparticularlyTanzania,Uganda,andSouthAfricaorgivingsanctuarytorebelgroupstheDemocraticRepublicofCongo,Kenya,andTanzaniasoitwasimportantthatallplayers

understoodthecomplementarynatureoftheprojectandthattheBLTPworkshopswouldneverbecomeanalternativenegotiatingvenue.Theprojectmanagersmetwiththepresidentsofeachofthosecountries,aswellasotherkeydiplomatsandocialsintheirfacilitationteams,andfoundtheSouthAfricansparticularlyenthusiasticaboutthetraininginitiative,believingthatthisworkwithadiversegroupofBurundianleaderswouldcomplementandstrengthentheireortsatfacilitatingfurthernegotiatedagreements.TheTanzaniansandUgandansweresimilarlyreceptive.

Ensuring Program Sustainability

Burundianshadextensiveexperiencewithwell-intendedtraininginitiativesthatlacked

anyfollow-throughorsustainability.ProjectmanagersemphasizedthattheBurundiprocesswasdesignednotasaseriesofdiscretetrainingsessionsbutasacontinuingprocessdirectedtothedevelopmentofasustainable,cohesivenetworkofBurundianleaders.Thisissuewasdiscussedopenlywithalltheleadersandwasoftenmetwithacynicalresponsethatleadershadseendonorscomeandgobutneverstayinvolved.Theprojectmanagersverballyassuredtheleadersotherwise,andtheinvitationstoparticipantsunderscoredthefactthatthiswasnottobeaone-oeventbutratherpartofaprocessofleadershipdevelopmentandnetworkingthatwouldbringtheparticipantstogethereverytwoorthreemonthsforexercisesmeanttobroadentheirleadershipskillsanddeepentheirpersonalrelationships.Overtime,threegroupsof

participatingleaderswouldundergoaseriesofworkshopsandthenbemergedintoasingleleadershipnetworkwithreinforcingsocialandprofessionalinteractions.Theparticipantsprobablywerenotsanguinethatthistransitionwouldhappen,butafterthesecondandthirdworkshops,theprojectmanagersandtrainingteamscouldseeadramaticchangeincomfortoftheparticipantsandcondencethattheWilsonCenterandBLTPwereinitforthelonghaul.

Toensurethatthetransitiontoaleadershipnetworkwasarealisticobjective,theWorldBanksPost-ConictFundprovidedstart-upfundingforaseriesofworkshopsthatwouldbeorganizedoveraneighteen-monthperiod.Inaddition,projectmanagersreceivedassurancesfromanumberofdonorswhowereinvolvedinBurundithat,

astheleader-participantsbegantodevelopconcreteprojectsofeconomicrecoveryorothersector-speciccapacitybuilding(suchassecuritysectorreformorelectionspreparations),additionalfundswouldbemadeavailableforfurthertrainingortomeetotherprojectresourcerequirements.

Invitations . . . underscored the fact that this was notto be a one-o event but rather part of a process


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Results of the Strategic Selection Process

TheBurundiprojectsucceededinaractinganethnicallybalancedanddiversegroupofkeyleadersfromvirtuallyeverysocialandinstitutionalsector,governmentandnongovernment,civilianandmilitary.Becauseoftheprojectsintentiontoaddress

simultaneouslyboththeethnicdividewithinthepoliticaleliteandthewidegulfbetweenthecountryspoliticalclassandtherestofthepopulation,BLTPparticipantsweredrawninalmostequalmeasurefromthepoliticalclassandcivilsociety.Participantsfromthepoliticalclassincludedanumberofhigh-rankingmilitaryandpoliticalleaders,suchasaminister,thearmychiefofsta,atopgeneral,thepresidentoftheConstitutionalCourt,therstvice-presidentoftheSenate,aformervicepresidentofthecountry,aprovincialgovernor,andanumberofparliamentarians.Sixofthesevenrebelgroupswererepresented,aswerealltheprincipalpoliticalparties.EventheNationalLiberationFront,theonearmedgroupstilloutsidethepeaceprocess,saidthatitwelcomedtheBLTPandhopedtojoinitoncesecurityconditionspermied.Civilsocietyrepresentatives

weredrawnfromacademia,themedia,theyouth,business,laborunions,andseveralgrassrootsrelief,humanrightsandwomensorganizations.BoththeCatholicandthePentecostalchurcheswererepresented.Catholicparticipantsincludedabishop,apriest,anun,andthesecretary-generaloftheBurundiCatholicPeaceandJusticeCommission.

Creating a Climate for Participation

AlthoughtheBurundiprojectsucceededingeingtherightpeopleintheroom,italsohadthegoaloffosteringownershipofandinterestinthetraining,andthustherstfewdayswerecriticalforcementingeectiveengagementoftheparticipantsintheprocess.

Aprincipaltrainingobjectivewastoformaclimateofmutualtrust.Sustainableagreementsamongcompetingpartiesrequirenotonlyasenseofsharedinterestsbutalsoasetofworkinghumanrelationships.Thismeansparticipantsmustconsideroneanotherdiscreteindividuals,notmerelymembersofhostilegroups;italsomeansthateachparticipantisabletoputhimselforherselfintotheshoesoftheother.Inpost-conictsocieties,protagonistsarefamiliarwitheachotheroftentheyhavebeenschooledtogether,servedinpastgovernments,havefamilialconnections,andmeetatthesameclubfordrinks.Butinreality,thesepeopledontreallyknoweachotherandassumecharacteristicsormotivationsaboutothersthatarebornofdistortedperceptions,stereotypes,andknownpastaliations.

DuringtherstfewdaysoftheinitialBLTPretreatworkshop,virtuallynoreferencewasmadetoreal-worldBurundiortocurrentpoliticalissues.Thiswasintentional.TobeginwithadiscussionofBurundianproblemsandconictswouldbetoinvitetheparticipantstoseeeachotherintermsoftheiradversarialidentities,aviewthatwouldbecounterproductivetothetrainingobjectiveofenablingtheparticipantstorelatetooneanotherasindividuals,notsimplyasactorsinanethnicallydened


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politicalconict.Theworkshopwouldbeasafeenvironmentinwhichindividualsfeltcomfortabletakingcertainrisks,openinguptoeachother,andexploringnewwaysofrelatingtooneanother.Afterafewdaysofinteractivecommunicationsandnegotiationexercises,includingSIMSOC(simulatedsocietyexercise),therewasaperceptible

lesseningofethnicsensitivities.Asparticipantsdevelopedskillsinactivelisteningandexpandedtheirunderstandingoftheconditionednatureofaitudesandperceptions,theybegantorelatetoeachotherasindividualsandtoidentifycommoninterestsandaspirationsofwhichtheywerepreviouslyunaware.Theywerenowabletoturntotherealworldandtocollaborateinanalyzingcommonproblemsandidentifyingpossiblesolutions.Towardthisend,aportionofeveryworkshopwasdevotedtoexamininganalytictoolsthatcouldassistparticipantsindevelopingeectivedecision-makingprocesses,diagnosingproblems,anddevelopingandimplementinggroupprojects.

Thereisnoquickxfortheaitudinalandperceptualbarriersthatpreventleadersofdividedsocietiesfromworkingtogethereectively.Trainingforcollaborativecapacity

mustbeconceivedofnotasasingle,one-otrainingeventbut,rather,asalong-termprocess.Nomaerhowmuchimpactisfeltintheinitialtrainingexperienceandoftenthetransformationalimpactofafewdaysoftrainingisdramaticparticipantsinevitablyreturntotherealworld,inwhichothershavenothadsuchtrainingandhavedicultycomprehendingthealteredmindsetsofworkshopparticipants.Moreover,likealllearning,thelearningofcollaborativedecisionmakingmustbeconstantlyreinforcedbythepracticeofskillslearned,bythestrengtheningofrelationships,andbyactualcollaborativeinitiatives.Otherwise,thenewcollaborativecapacitywillerodewithtime.

A training for teachers on conict resolution in schools in Ngozi,Burundi. Photograph by Elizabeth McClintock. Used withpermission by Elizabeth McClintock.


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Conclusion

Accordingtoboththosewhoobservedandthosewhotookpart,theBurundiprojecthashadremarkablesuccessinbreakingdownethnicandpoliticalbarriers,buildingsocialcohesionamongtrainingparticipants,strengtheningcollaborativecapacities,and

boostinginstitutionaltransformation.SincetheoriginalWorldBankgrant,theWilsonCenterandBLTPhavebeenaskedtoexpandtheirworktoencompassawidevarietyofsecuritysector,parliamentary,andothergovernmentactors.Nearly600nationalleadersfromallthesesectionshavenowreceivedtheWilsonCenterprocesstraining,ashaveover7,000localformalandinformalleaders.Themembersoftheoriginalnetworkofninety-vecontinuetomeetandworktogether,tosocialize,andtocollaborateonanumberofprojectsandactivities.Theyhaveappliedthelessonstheylearnedandthepotentexampleoftheirowncollaborationtotheinstitutionswithwhichtheyareinvolvedaswellastothebroadersociety.In2008,theMinistryofEducationbegantodevelopacurriculuminconictresolutionforinclusioninthenationalsecondaryschoolscivicscurriculum.Thisproject,fundedbyUSAID,hasengagedthepedagogy

bureauoftheministry,teachers,unions,andoutsideexpertstodevelopandtestthecurriculum,trainteachers,evaluateimpact,andprepareplansforanationalimplementation.AsofDecember2010,thecurriculumwasfullytestedinpilotschools.

More about the Wilson Centers Burundi Project Methodology

The Burundi projects strategic selection methodology and subsequent stepsto engage participants in the training was just the beginning of a comprehensive

program designed to effectively engage local actors in capacity building. The trainingmethodology for building collaborative capacity continued this emphasis on processrather than substance. The initial focus of the workshops was on strengtheningparticipants understanding of the advantages of collaboration and the dangers ofa winner take all mentality; building a degree of trust among participants; andstrengthening participants communications and negotiations skills. The workshopsused experiential learning methodssimulations, interactive exercises, mocknegotiations, and role-playingthat were all designed to enable participants toacquire insight, through their own experience of reacting to a series of hypotheticalsituations, into the attitudes and perceptions that condition their behavior and thatof others. In order to build collaborative capacity, participants, rather than being thepassive recipients of knowledge, learned primarily by doing, by being immersed

in hypothetical situations that confronted them with the same kinds of dilemmasand conicts they would face in the real world. This methodology is a case studyfor engagement unto itself, and is presented in more depth in articles by Wolpe andMcDonald in the Round Table and the Journal of Democracy.


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Theimportanceofmoreholisticpeacebuildinginterventionsthatdirectlyengagethemind-setsandaitudesofkeyleadersisbeginningtoberecognizedinseveralpost-conictinitiativesbeyondBurundiinsuchwar-tornsocietiesastheDemocraticRepublicoftheCongoandLiberia.Intheseplaces,theWilsonCenterwasinvitedby

diplomatsandinternationalinstitutionstoemployitsneutrality,leverage,andBurundi-basedexperienceinsecuringtheparticipationofkeynationalleadersfromdiversesocialandinstitutionalsectorsintraininginitiativesdesignedtobuild(orrebuild)cohesionandcollaborativecapacity.TheseinternationallyfacilitatedeortshavebeendirectednotasinIraqatimposingconstitutionalorpoliticalxesconceivedbyexternalinterests,butratheratprovidingthekeyleadersofthesedividedsocietiesthetoolswithwhichtheycouldthemselvescollaborativelybuildtheirownfuture.InBurundi,theWilsonCentersprojectandthecreationoftheBLTP,whichisnowdoingindependentpeacebuildingwork,yieldedquantiableandrewardingresultsthatcontributedtothedemocratizationprocess.Althoughtooliletimehaselapsedtomakedenitiveconclusionsaboutthisapproachtopost-conictreconstructioninthe

DemocraticRepublicoftheCongoorLiberia,theinitialindicationsareencouraging,somuchsothattheleadershiptrainingmodelwasextendedtoTimor-LesteattherequestoftheWorldBankandisnowbeingconsideredforextensiontootherconictzones.

Note

1. Thiscasestudyisbasedonthreepublications:HowardWolpeandSteveMcDonald,BurundisTransition:TrainingLeadersforPeace,Journal of Democracy17,no.1(January2006);HowardWolpeandSteveMcDonald,DemocracyandPeace-Building:Re-ThinkingtheConventionalWisdom,Round Table97,no.394(February2008):13745;andHowardWolpewithSteveMcDonald,EugeneNindorera,ElizabethMcClintock,AlainLempereur,FabienNsengimana,

NicoleRumeau,andAlliBlair,RebuildingPeaceandStateCapacityinWar-TornBurundi,Round Table93,no.375(July2004):45767.


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Advising Ministries: A Co-analysis Strategy

Nadia Gerspacher

If you dont utilize the local capacity, it doesnt matter how much you add from the outside.

This was how a senior Afghan ministry ofcial summed up his experience with the international

advisers sent to build his capacity to manage a ministry. The ofcial had literally grown up in the

ministry, working as an assistant to his father in the ministry when he was a child and holding

several posts there over the years. But when the international advisers arrived, they never asked

about his previous experience or his views on the challenges of building capacity; instead, they

dictated an agenda that was in many respects inappropriate for the needs of the advisees, their

ministries, and the country itself.

A former Iraqi minister registered similar complaints about the advising process, saying it lacked

understanding, compassion, and respect for what we went through and what we already

know. She felt that the technical support offered was too general and theoretical, as if advisers

were assuming that Iraqis knew nothing about engineering. She believes that advisers should

have talked with their Iraqi counterparts to learn what kind of engineering practice they used,

identied weaknesses together, and created a team of advisers to address those specic issues.

Of course, ministerial advisers have their own side of the story, explaining that the ministries

are often fundamentally awed in ways that must be changed if they are to operate effectively

and fairly, and that previous staff and leaders, with vested interests in the old approaches orwho are unable to adapt to necessary changes, are obstacles to improving the system. Even if

they are willing, local ofcials often may not have the skills and competencies to reach a desired

outcome for their organization.

Co-analysis is a strategy for starting an advising, training, or mentoring process in a way that

draws on local knowledge and skills, putting the advisee in an active role in shaping the transfer

of expertise. This approach builds rapport with advisees and increases their willingness to

participate in the mentoring process and accept new approaches, increasing the likelihood

that they will take responsibility for implementing reforms in the ministry. At the same time,

it improves the quality and relevance of the reform agenda and more efciently aligns outside

expertise with critical needs.

Co-analysis involves three steps. First, the adviser identies the existing capacity of the

counterpart by asking questions to identify necessary skills and assessing existing capacity. Thisis the equivalent of a training needs assessment, conducted in interview style. The adviser is

trying to nd out who does what, with what means, what the counterpart understands about the

necessary processes, and how sophisticated the current approach is. Second, the adviser and the

counterpart identify together the function and associated tasks required for a system to function

properly. This conversation requires the adviser and the counterpart to come to some agreement

about what proper functioning entails. Third, the adviser and the counterpart identify the

specic knowledge and skills necessary for the learner to perform his or her function to the

desired effect.

After or as part of co-analysis, the adviser frames what he or she has to offer in terms of

expertise and support, allowing the counterpart to draw on the resources he or she considers

valuable.

Co-analysis has not been used systematically as an approach to advising local ministry ofcials,but many advisers have integrated some of its concepts into their interactions with ministries.

Both advisers and their local counterparts see a signicant improvement in relationships and

results when this approach is used.

Nadia Gerspacher is a program ofcer in the Academy for International Conict Managementand Peacebuilding at the United States Institute of Peace. She developed the concept of co-analysis for the course Strengthening Local Capacity: Training, Mentoring, Advising taught bythe Academy.


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Case Study 2

Research-Based Dialogue

Guatemalan Dialogue on Security Sector Reform

Bernardo Arvalo de Lon

25

TheGuatemalanPeaceAccords,signedbetweenthegovernmentandguerrillaforcesinDecember1996,establishedanambitiousandwide-rangingprogramforreformaimedataddressingtherootcausesofthethirty-six-yearviolentconict.AspecicagreementwithintheaccordstheAgreementontheStrengtheningofCivilSocietyandthefunctionoftheMilitaryinDemocraticSocietywasdevotedtotheestablishment

ofaseriesofreformsnecessaryfortheeectivetransformationoftheauthoritarianandcounterinsurgentstatesecurityapparatus.By1999,though,itwasevidentthatimplementationofthisagreementwaslacking.Thepoliciesnecessarytotransformitintoarealitywerelacking,inparticularthoserelatingtomilitaryreformanddemilitarizationofthesecurityapparatus.1

Aseriesoffactorsproducedthisstalemate:

Weaknessandinconsistencyofthecivilianpoliticalleadershipgovernmentauthoritiesandpoliticalpartiesinthedesign,negotiation,andimplementationofthenecessarypolicies

Mistrust,disorientation,disinformation,andvaryingdegreesofresistancetoreformwithinthemilitary

Dicultiesinthedevelopmentofaconstructivedialoguebetweenauthoritiesandsocietyandbetweenthemilitaryandcivilsociety,duetoalegacyofmistrust,polarization,andfragmentationandtheinabilityofpoliticalpartiestoplayamediatingrole

Limitedunderstandingandcommandbyciviliansinstateandinsocietyofthetechnicalaspectsofsecurityissues,whichhadbeenmonopolizedbythemilitaryinthepreviousfourdecades

Toovercomethestalemate,advisersrecognizedtheneedforaprocessthatwouldaddressthesefactors,fosteringproductiveinteractionbetweenstateandsocietyandachievingconcreterecommendationsthatwouldbetechnicallysoundandlegitimate.


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A Research-Based Dialogue Strategy

Recognizingthatsocialtensionspreventedatraditionaldialogueamongstakeholders,apartnershipofGuatemalanandinternationalactorsdecidedtolauncharesearch-baseddialogueinitiativetoaddressthesechallenges.Thisapproachhadbeenused

successfullyintheaftermathoftheGuatemalanPeaceAccords,whentheUNhadimplementedaresearch-baseddialogueaspartofitsWar-TornSocietiesProject,whichbecameinstitutionalizedasanautonomousorganizationknownasWSPInternationalandlaterchangeditsnametoInterpeace.Theresearch-baseddialogueapproachaimstocreateanew,neutralspaceinsocietysothatconstructiveengagementcantakeplaceeveninthecontextofprevailing,reciprocalmistrust.

Theresearch-baseddialogueapproachintegratesaresearchmethodologycalledparticipatoryactionresearch(PAR).Designedinthe1960stomakecommunitiesactiveparticipantsinsocialresearchinsteadoftargetsofresearch,PARusesresearch

activitiestoempowercommunitiestoengageinpoliticalactivityandtransformation.Theresearchiscollectivelyownedbytheparticipants,notbytheresearcher,whoeventuallybecomesanexecutingagentofthecollectivewillofthegroup.WSP(Interpeace)renedthismethodologytosupportreconciliationbyfocusingoninclusivenessandconsensusandtobuilditintoawiderapproachofparticipatoryresearch-baseddialogue.Suchdialogueachievesnotonlyconsensus-basedconcreterecommendationsforoutstandingproblemsbutalsotransformationsinaitudesandperceptionsthatbecomethefoundationforfurthercollaborativeinteractionamongparticipants.

Aresearch-baseddialogueapproachtoGuatemalansecuritysectorreformrequired

threemajorelements.First,toenablediscussionofhighlycontentiousissues,theeortwouldhavetobedepoliticizedasmuchaspossible.Thiscouldbeaccomplishedbystressingtheeortsacademicnatureandfocusingonmid-tolong-termissues.Second,theapproachwouldneedtocreateandsustainaperceptionofimpartialitybyemphasizingproceduralaspects.Third,theapproachwouldneedtomakepolicyrecommendationsnonbinding,preventingpoliticalposturing.

Toachievethesegoals,theprojecthadtofunctionasanautonomousspace,establishedbycredibleandtrustedlocalinstitutions,endowedwithitsownrulesandregulationsandsubjecttothecollectiveauthorityofparticipants.ThisrealityreectstheguidingprincipleofInterpeaceinpeacebuildinginterventions:thatalocalprojectteamratherthananinternationalNGOplayathird-partyrole.Thelocalprojectteam,and,moreimportanttheprocessitputsinplace,thenbecomesthetrustedneutralinsteadoftheoutsider.(Thedynamicsofbuildingthecapacityofthatlocalteamisthereforean


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engagementstrategyinitself,butthisstrategyisnotexploredinthisstudy,whichfocusesinsteadontherolethatthelocalprojectteamcanplayinfacilitatingstakeholderdialogue.)

InGuatemala,tworesearchinstitutions,thelocalchapteroftheLatinAmericaFacultyforSocialSciences(FLACSO)andtheGuatemalanInstituteforPeaceandDevelopment(IGEDEP),hadparticipatedinanearliereorttofosterconsensusaroundanagendaforpost-conictreconstructionandreconciliationbasedonthepeaceaccords.Theywerefamiliarwiththeresearch-baseddialogueapproachandinvitedWSP(Interpeace)toadaptitsparticipatorypeacebuildingapproachtothechallengeofsecurityreform.TogetherwithWSP(Interpeace),theseinstitutionscreatedaprojectteamtomanagetheprocessandinterfacewiththeparticipants.Thetwolocalorganizationsprovidedstaandinstitutionalsupportfortheprojectteam,whileWSP(Interpeace)providedmethodologicalsupport:advisingonprocessmaers,raisingpossiblealternatives,andprovidingexperiencefromotherprojects.

Thenatureoftheinstitutionswascriticalinestablishingthedepoliticized,academicnatureoftheprocess.EvenifnotconsideredneutralinthecontextofthepolarizedpoliticallifeofGuatemala,FLACSOwasrecognizedasoneofthemostseriousresearchcentersinthecountry,withanactiveandprolicacademicprogramdealingwithsecurityanddefenseissuesandareputationforacademicobjectivityandexcellence.IGEDEPwasarecentlyestablishedthinktankwithaboardofdirectorsofhighlyreputedpersonalitiesfromdierentideologicalorientationssocialscientists,lawyers,diplomatsinterestedincombatingpolarizationandovercomingideologicalentrenchment.WSPInternationalhadareputationofimpartialityandobjectivity

fromitsroleintheearlierresearch-baseddialogue.TheseorganizationsrequestedthesupportoftheUNDevelopmentProgrammeinoperationalizingtheproject,thereforeprovidingfurtherguaranteesofimpartialityandresponsibility.2

ButeveninthecontextofapartnershipwithforeigninstitutionssuchasWSPInternationalandtheUnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme,3theprojectfunctionedasawhollyGuatemalaneort.FLACSOandIGDEPwerefullyincontroloftheprocess,anddesignandimplementationoftheinitiativewereentrustedtotheGuatemalanprojectteam.Emphasisonlocalownershipwasstrategicandaddressedtwoissues:ontheonehand,itrelatedtoquestionsofimpact,capacitybuilding,andsustainabilitythatarepertinenttoanypeacebuildingintervention.Ontheotherhand,itaddressed

concernsofdierentparticipantsparticularlythemilitaryaboutdiscussingcontentiousnationalsecurityissuesinanenvironmentcontrolledbyoutsiders,orevenincludingforeignparticipation.4Thelocallycontrollednatureoftheprojectwasmoreacceptabletothoseactors.

Even in the context of a partnership with foreign institutions. . . the project functioned as a wholly Guatemalan eort


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Mobilizing and Balancing Participation

Tobeviable,theprojectneededtorespondtothekeyinterestsandconcernsofallparticipatingsectors.Themilitarywasconcernedthattheprocesswouldbeturnedintoaninstitutionallynchingofthearmybyrevenge-thirstyideologicaladversaries,

butwasinterestedinlegitimatingitsfunctioninthenewcontext.Thegovernmentwasconcernedthattheprocesscouldupsetthedelicatebalanceithadachievedinitsrelationshipwiththearmyanditsfactions,butwasinterestedinadvancingintheimplementationofthepeaceagendaandcurtailingincreasingcriticisminthisrespect.Civilsocietyinstitutionsandindividualshadarangeofdieringconcernsandinterests,dependingontheirparticularactivityandsociopoliticaloutlook,butingeneralwereinterestedinturningthepageonconictandconcernedaboutthecontinuationofauthoritarianpracticesbysecurityforces.

FLASCOandIGDEPhelddiscussionswithnationalauthoritiesandcivilsociety

actorsthatmobilizedstrongsupportfortheinitiative.Themilitarywasapproachedincoordinationwithnationalauthoritiesinordertomobilizetheirwilltoparticipatebeyondformalcompliancewithexecutivedirectivesbycivilianauthorities,agoalachievedaftereightintensemeetingsinwhichtheaims,theprinciples,andthemethodoftheprojectwereexamined.

Animportantelementinestablishingtheprojectsobjectivityandimpartialitywasthedevelopmentofaperceptionamongparticipantsthatrepresentationwasbalanced,thatis,thatthedierentlegitimatesectorswithastakeinthisissuehadarightfulplaceinthediscussionandnosectorhadbeenarticiallyinatedinordertoachieveprefabricatedcoalitions.Anotherimperativeinthisrespectwastoreachouttodierent

sectors,includinghardlinersandspoilers,intheproceedings.Theprojectteamstartedbydoingacarefulactor-mappingprocessinitialdeskresearchfollowedbyextensiveindividualandcollectiveinterviewsthatidentiedtheissues,positions,andactorsaroundtheagendaoftransformationestablishedintheagreement.Theprojectintentionallyavoidedlimitingparticipationtothosealreadyconvincedoftheneedtoagreeortopoliticallycorrectindividualswhowouldensuretherightrecommendations.Theprojectteamenlistedparticipationfromkeyactorsinstateandsocietygradually,sothatbythetimehardlinersandspoilerswereinterviewedandinvited,theprojectwasafactandimportantgureshadalreadycommiedtoparticipate,makingmissingoutontheexerciseundesirable.5

Invitationswereextendedonaninstitutionalbasistogovernmentalagencies(securitysectordependenciesintheexecutivebranch,congressionalcommiees,andthepresidentialsecretariatresponsibleforimplementationofthepeaceaccords)andcivilsocietyorganizations(academicinstitutionsandNGOs,includingthehumanrightscommunityandorganizationsestablishedbytheformerguerrillamovements).


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Individualinvitationswereextendedtoagroupofpersonalitiesrepresentativeofsocialsectorsthatdidnothaveanyinstitutionalengagementwithsecurityissuestheindigenousmovementandtheprivatesectorandtoretiredmilitaryocerswhorepresenteddierentpositionswithintheinstitutionthatcouldnotbeexpressedbyits

ocialrepresentation.6

Thismechanismwasalessonlearnedfromanearlierexperiencewithnationaldialogueinwhichsomegroupswereunabletoparticipatebecausetherewasnoalternativetoocialinstitutionalrepresentation.

Using Procedures to Build Legitimacy and Capacity

Theprojectteamapproachedtheproceduralaspectsofthedialoguenotastechnicalissuesbutaspoliticalcomponentsthatconsciouslyaimedtoenhancethelegitimacyoftheprojectandbuildthetechnicalandconceptualcapacityoftheparticipants.Theoverallmethodologicalapproachwassharedwithallintervieweesatthemomentofinvitation.Thisapproachincludedthereasonforanacademicemphasisandthe

nonbindingnatureoftheresultingproducts;itsinclusivenessandparticipatorynature;thestructuringoftechnicalworkinggroupsandtheplenary,includingdecisionmakingprocedures;andtheusethroughoutofPARprinciples.Theimpactofeachoftheseelementsisexploredbrieybelow.

Civil society and government representatives from several Latin American countriesgather for a seminar on comparative experiences on security sector reform processes.Photograph by Alejandro Morales. Used with permission by Interpeace.


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Theresearch-baseddialogueapproachwasusedtopreventpoliticizationoftheprocessandtofosteranoncompetitivedynamic.Theacademicnatureoftheexerciseandthenonbindingnatureofitsrecommendationsallowedextensiveexplorationoftheconceptualfoundationsoftheissuesbeforeconsiderationonwhathadhappenedinthe

pastcouldtakeplaceorrecommendationsforthefuturecouldbecontemplated,bothareasinwhichpositionswerehighlypoliticized.Decisionmakingonalternativepolicyrecommendationsbytheworkinggroupswasdelayeduntilacommonlanguagehadbeenestablished,sucientagreementhadbeenforgedonbasicprinciplesandgoalsandanew,collectiveidentityhademergedthatunitedparticipantsbehindacommonpurpose.

Theselectionanduseofresearchersandmoderatorsfortheworkinggroupswasanimportantaspectofbuildinglegitimacyandcapacity,andanotherlessonlearnedfromproblemswiththeearlierdialogues.Theprojectteamselectedresearchersfromdierentsectorssothatallparticipantscouldseethemselvesrepresentedsomewhere

intheresearchteam.Aresearcherclosetothemilitarywasselectedforoneofthegroups,whileavocalhumanrightsNGOwasaskedtoundertaketheresearchforanother.Theassignmentofresearcherstoeachworkinggrouphelpedaddressthechallengeofconceptualandtechnicalasymmetriesbetweentheparticipantsregardingtheworkingsofsecurityinstitutionsinademocraticcontext.Researcherswereabletosetanappropriatepaceforthelearninganddecision-makingprocesssothatacollectiveidentitycouldevolve,andensuredthattherewasasharedlevelofunderstandingbeforedecisionsweremade.Thegroupsbeganbydiscussingthemostbasicnotionsofeachsubjectinaneorttoestablishacommonlanguageandframework.The

researchersalsoservedtovalidatenontechnicalinputandknowledgefromtheparticipantssothatallparticipantsfelttheyhadsomethingtocontribute.

Theprojectteamorganizedconferencesandseminarsstrategicallytoensurethattheinputarrivedatamomentwhenitcouldbeabsorbedbytheparticipants.Forinstance,aseminaronintelligencereformtookplacewhentheworkinggroupondemocraticcontrolswasconsideringdierentoptionsforexecutive,judiciary,andparliamentaryoversightandcouldengageinsubstantivedialogueinsteadofjustpassivelylistening.Manyoftheseeventswereintendedtobringrsthandexperiencesfromothercountriesthathadalreadyreformed.Carewastakentoincludedierentperspectivespolitical,military,andacademicineachcase,thusensuringthatthedierentparticipants

couldempathizewiththepresenters.

Theworkinggroupswereaskedtoselectbyconsensusamemberasamoderatortofacilitatediscussions.Theintentionwastochallengethegrouptoengageincollective


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decisionmakingfromtheoutset.Althoughmostworkinggroupswereabletoagreeonasinglemoderator,onegroupresolvedastalematebetweentwocandidateswithadecisiontoturnthemintoamoderationteam.7ThemoderatorsbecamecriticalelementsinthefunctioningofthegroupinthecontextofthePARapproach,representingthe

collectivewilloftheworkinggroupsvis--vistheresearchersandtheprojectteam.

Rulesofprocedurewereimportantincreatingandmaintainingcommitmentfromtheparticipants.Byconsensus,theplenaryapprovedspecicproceduralrulesduringitsrstsessions,afterdiscussionofdraftrulesofprocedurepreparedbytheprojectteam.Theserulesincludedhowissuesweretabledfordiscussion;howresearchwasdevelopedintheworkinggroups;howproposalsmovedbetweenthetechnicalandthepoliticallevel;howtoproceedincaseoflackofconsensus;andhowinstitutionsandindividualspresentedtheircommentsandmakesuggestions.Anyproposedchangesoradditionstotheruleshadtobereferredtotheplenaryforapproval.Inoneexampleofitsexibleapproachtowardmaintainingconsensus,theplenarycreatedanadhoc

workinggroupasamechanismtocontinueresearchinganissuethatlackedsucientconsensusforthefullplenarytomoveforward.

Theadoptionofconsensualdecisionmakingwassignicant.Themilitaryfearedthatmajority-basedvotingwouldputitatadisadvantagebecauseasaninstitution,itwouldalwaysbelimitedtoasinglevotevis--visanindeterminatenumberofcivilsocietyorganizations.Therefore,thedialogueadoptedaconsensualdecision-makingprocess.Thisprocessforcedtheproceedingstolong,sometimesexhaustingdiscussions,bothatthetechnicalandthedecision-makinglevels.Italsolimitedthescopeoftheproposalstoaspectsinwhichrealconsensushadbeenachievedamongparticipants,whichinsome

casesmeantanagreementonprinciplesmorethanonoperationaldetail.

8

Inaddition,theprocessenabledasenseofsharedownershipovertheresultstoemerge;thissensebecameacommonasset,akeyelementintermsofthesustainabilityoftheprocessanditsrecommendations.

Conclusions and Lessons Learned

By2003,theprojecthadachievedconcreteresultsintermsofthepolicyrecommendationsitwaspursuing,aswellasinthedevelopmentofconditionsforsustainedengagementbeyondthelifespanoftheproject.Severalrecommendationswentdirectlyintopolicy-formulationprocesses.Evenmoreimportantly,the

dialogueonsecurityissuescontinuedinavarietyofforums:anocialprocessforthedevelopmentofawhitepaperondefense,anoceliaisingbetweencivilsocietyorganizationsandparliamentarycommissions,acivilsocietysecurityadvisorycounciltothepresident,anationalsecuritysystemlaw.

The moderators . . . [came to represent] thecollective will of the working group


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Theteamlearnedlessonsfromfailureaswellassuccess.Althoughinvitedtoengageintheprocess,politicalpartieschosenottodoso,therebylimitingtheprojectsabilitytoinuencetheirpoliticalagendas.Consultationswithpartyactivistsrevealedthatthemainreasonforthepartiesnonparticipationwasincompatibilitybetweenthe

paceandrhythmoftheprojectandthedemandsofpoliticaldebateandlegislativework:politiciansneededtechnicalinputforlegislativeworkprovidedinamoreagilemanner.ThisproblemwasresolvedbydesigninganewprojectthatincludedanocialagreementbetweenCongressandInterpeace;bythetermsofthisagreement,participantcivilsocietyorganizationsprovidedtechnicalsupporttoparliamentarycommissionsworkingonsecurity-sectorlegislationbetween2004and2010.

Severalconclusionscanbederivedfromthisexperience:

Theprojectsacademicnature,itslowpublicprole,anditsfocusonmid-tolong-termpoliciescreatedaframeworkinwhichparticipantswereabletoovercomepoliticalandideologicalpositioningandengageinarationalanalysisoftheissues.

Theprojectsneutralitytowardthedierentinstitutionalinterestsinstateandsociety,thebalanceachievedamongparticipants,andamethodologyforincrementalconsensusbuildingmadepossiblethediscussionofpoliticallysensitiveissuesandtheformulationofconcreterecommendations.

ThePARapproachmitigatedtheasymmetryinknowledgeamongthegroupmembersandencouragedhands-oncapacitybuilding.

Directinvolvementofgovernmentocialsintheprocess,attheworkinggroupandplenarylevel,facilitatedthechannelingoftherecommendationsintothe

publicpolicyformulationprocesses,andillustratedforgovernmentocersthevalueofcollaborationwithacademicandothercivilsocietyorganizations.

Thedevelopmentofsharedinterestsandthehands-onexperienceofcollaborativeactionconstitutedacondence-buildingprocessthatallowedincrementalprogress,thedevelopmentofnewalignmentsandalliances,andtheformulationofanewconsensus.

Theunobtrusiveroleadoptedbytheinternationalactorsthatsupportedtheproject(byprovidingmethodological,nancial,andpoliticalsupporttoalocallydriveninitiative)allowedarealsenseofownershiptoemergeamongparticipantsandfacilitatedtheinternalizationoftheprocessanditsproducts.

Notes

1.Foracompleteanalysisoftheproject,includingperspectivesfromparticipants,seeBernardoArvalodeLon,JoseBeltranandDoa,andPhilipH.Fluri,eds.,Hacia una Poltica de Seguridad para laDemocracia en Guatemala. Investigacin-Accin Participativa para la Reforma del Sector Seguridad (Geneva:DCAF-LitVerlag,2005).


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2.FundingfortheprojectwasprovidedbytheUnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme,USAID,thegovernmentoftheNetherlands,andthegovernmentofNorway.

3.ForananalysisoftheinteractionbetweentheprojectandUNeortstosupportimplementationofthepeaceaccords,seeJoseGiupponi,DevelopingNationalCapacitiestoManageDemocraticSecurity:RelevanceofWSPInternationalProjectsforMINUGUAsVericationMandateandTheirImpactsontheImplementationoftheGuatemalaPeaceAccords(WSPInternational,March2006),availableonlineat.

4.Hardlinerelementsinthemilitarybelievedthatinternationalinterventioninnationalpoliticshadpreventedoutrightvictoryovertheinsurgencyanddictatedthetermsofthepeaceaccords.

5.Invitationsweremadeinthecontextofinterviewswithidentiedcandidatesonthenatureoftheproblem,thechallenges,andsimilartopics.

6.Representingthepoliticalsensitivityofthemoment,thegovernmentrequestedthatanorganizationofmilitaryveteransthatwasoutspokenlyaackingthepeaceprocessandtheaccordsnotparticipateintheprocess.Thearmystatedfortherecordthattheorganizationshouldbeinvitedbecauseitrepresentedveterans,butotherecord,thearmyaskedtheprojectnottoinvitetheorganizationforfearofendangeringthedelicateinternalbalancebetweencompetingarmyfactions.Theprojectteamsubsequentlyinvitedretiredarmyocerswhoweremembersoftheorganizationonanindividualbasistoensurethattheviewsofthissectorwouldbeconsidered,andinvitedtheorganizationtoparticipateinitsopenevents.

7.Theprojectteamprovidedtrainingandtechnicalsupporttothemoderators,whoalsoparticipatedinprojectteamplanningandreviewmeetings.

8.Thescopeoftherecommendationswasdierentineachcase,rangingfrommaersofprinciplesinthecaseofmilitarydoctrinetoorganizationaldetailsinthecaseofintelligencereform.ForthefulltextoftherecommendationsinSpanish,see.


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Culturally Sensitive Engagement in BougainvilleIain Campbell Smith

Peace talks between Bougainville rebels and the government of Papua New Guinea brought an

eight-year war of independence to an end. The agreement invited Pacic countries to send in

a monitoring force to oversee the cease-re on the condition that the force come unarmed.

With soldiers and civilians from Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, and Vanuata, the Peace Monitoring

Group, established and deployed to Bougainville in December 1997, was the worlds rst

unarmed peacekeeping intervention.

Iain Fred Smith, working part time in the Australian Foreign Affairs Department while

beginning a career as a singer-songwriter, was deployed to Bougainville in early 1999. Although

he was sent to Bougainville to monitor, report, and translate, he discovered, quite by accident,that his musical talents could be of service to the peace process. One evening, he was picking

his guitar on the porch of the Peace Monitoring Groups outpost in southwest Bougainville

underneath the only light bulb in the village. Soon two hundred people had gathered out of the

darkness to listen. He made up a song in the local pidgin language to engage the group; and over

the subsequent weeks, he wrote more, until he had a repertoire.

In the early phases of the peace process, the groups main objective was to be present and

visible on the island and to project positive messages about the peace process. The captain of

Smiths patrol team thought that a concert would be a useful excuse for the presence of the

team in the villages, so he developed a patrol structure around Smith, his guitar, some stories,

and a quartet of soldiers singing backup vocals. (Smith notes that the soldiers initially were

wretched singers but improved with time.) The staff at headquarters were persuaded that

these songs might be used to promote positive messages about the peace process and so sentover a recording desk and microphones. Working with local sound engineers and musicians,

Smith recorded his songs and songs written by local musicians reecting on their experiences

of the conict and the peace. These recordings were mastered onto Songs of Peace, a cassetteof which twenty thousand copies were distributed around the island. The music became very

popular, and the concept of using music to promote peace was integrated into Bougainvilles new

community radio station, which featured reconciliation programming.

In the aftermath of the atrocious civil war, Bougainvilleans preferred to address reconciliation

through traditional local processes rather than through the truth and reconciliation commissions

commonly used in post-conict situations. The international intervention force, partly because

of its unarmed status, partly because of its leadership and mindset of the participating

institutions, had assumed a facilitative and non-dominating role and was eager to encourage

local reconciliation mechanisms. Recognition of the role that music played in the Bougainville

culture allowed the Peace Monitoring Group to develop a channel that engaged local actors in away that resonated with their own traditions.

In 2005, a documentary lm called Bougainville Skywas released celebrating the role of music inwhat became an unusually successful peace process. The lm pointed out that the music served


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Fred Smith sings to schoolchildren in Bougainville. Photo by Corporal Troy Rodgers,licenced to and courtesy of the Australian Department of Defence.

a number of functions: it reached disaffected youth otherwise immune to messages smacking

of didacticism; it contributed to a mood of mirth and optimism around the peace process; and

it bolstered the image of the peace monitors and therefore the credibility of the peace process

by breaking the ice between and among peace monitors, former combatants, and otherwise

wary villagers. A successful peace process is ultimately about changing hearts and minds; in

Bougainville, music was a major component of the triumph of that process.

Fred Smiths songs about Bougainville are on a CD calledBagarap Empires, which is availablethrough . Bougainville Sky is distributed by Ronin Films.


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Case Study 3

Mobilizing Community Decision Making

The Iraq Community Action Program

Sally Iadarola and Lindsey Jones

37

Peaceisneversuccessfullyimposedbyoutsiders.However,outsiderscanhelpcreateacultureofpeacethroughlocalempowermentprocesses;thisfacthasbeensuccessfullydemonstratedbyacontextualizedcommunity-drivendevelopmentmethodologyappliedineightprovincesincentralandnorthernIraq.

In2003,USAIDawardedACDI/VOCAtherstphaseofacommunity-drivendevelopmentprojectinnorthernIraq,theIraqCommunityActionProgram(ICAP).1Nowinitsthirdphase,thegoalofICAPistoenhancelocalgovernmentsabilitytoidentify,articulate,andbeermeettheneedsofitsconstituency.Bypromotingdemocracyandgoodgovernance,theprogramsultimateobjectiveispreventingandmitigatingconictwhileenhancinglocalcapacity.In2008,theWorldBankawardedACDI/VOCAthepilotConsultativeServicesDeliveryInitiative,followedin2010bytheConsultativeServicesDeliveryProjectIandin2011bytheConsultativeServicesDeliveryProjectII,2whicharegenerallyconsistentwiththeICAPprocessdescribedbelow.ThecurrentphasefocusesheavilyonembeddingtheprocesswithingovernmentministriessuchastheMinistryofPlanning.

The ICAP Process

ICAPisbasedonastructuredprocessofcommunitymobilizationinwhichcitizenadvocategroupsjointlyworkwithlocalgovernmentrepresentativesonco-implementingactivitiessuchasprojects,trainings,andpublicmeetings.Thisprocessbuildsonlessonslearnedinwar-tornpartsoftheworld,contextualizingarelativelystandardcommunity-drivendevelopmentmethodologywithinalargegeographicregioncharacterizedbyhighlydiversesecurity,cultural,political,ethnic,religious,andlinguisticenvironments.

WhatmakestheICAPprocessdierentfromothercommunity-drivendevelopmentapproachesisthecreationofcommunityvolunteercommiees,calledcommunityactiongroups(CAGs).Thesenonregistered,volunteer,nonpoliticallocalactiongroupswereanewphenomenoninIraq.CAGmembersaredemocraticallyelectedrepresentativesoftheircommunitiesandincludeordinarycitizensaswellaslocalgovernmentrepresentatives.Membersworktogetherto(1)identifycommunity


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resourcesandgapsinresources;(2)prioritizelocalprojectstollresourcegaps;(3)planandmonitorprojectimplementation;and(4)formalizegovernmentsupportforprojectoperationsandmaintenance.

ICAP Results 200311

153 community groups mobilized in eight provinces More than 2,600 community projects completed Community projects valued at more than $75.5 million Community/local government contributions of over $29 million to total

project costs More than 13,400 long-termjobs created

InIraq,community-ledprojectsspandiversesectors,includingeducation,health,waterandsewerage,irrigation,electricity,business,andservices,aswellasyouth-and

women-focusedservices.Eachcommunityconstruction,rehabilitationorsupplyprojectcosts,onaverage,$60,000.Toencouragebuy-inforsustainability,ICAPnowrequiresacost-sharecontributiontowardthecostofprojects.Combinedcontributions,perproject,fromlocalgovernment,theprivatesector,andindividualshaverangedfrom20to43percent.

TheICAPprocessappliesteachingandlearningmethodsthatstressparticipation,jointproblemsolving,localmanagement,transparency,accountability,andrespectfordierences.Communitymembersandlocalgovernmentocialsareabletoputpeacemakingintopracticewhentheyusethesestrategiestoimplementlocalprojects

forcommonbenet.Iraqisseeforthemselvesthepositiveresultsofjointgovernment-citizenactivities.

Thismethodologyiseectivebecauseitiseasytocomprehend,isbasedonvolunteerism,andreliesonempoweredlocalactorsastheprimaryagentsofchange.

Throughoutmorethaneightyearsofrenementsandsignicantscale-upoftheprogram,thecoreprinciplesofthestandardmethodologyremainunchanged.

How Local Actors Are Engaged

Therststepincommunityengagementisselectingtargetcommunitiesbasedoncriteriathatcorrespondwiththegoalsoftheprogram.Forexample,communitiespronetoconictwasoneoftheinitialselectioncriteriaforICAP.AsICAPgoalschangedtofocusmoreonlocalgovernmentdecisionmaking,criteriawereexpandedtoincludethepresenceofbasiclocalgovernmentcapacity.


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ICAP Initial Community Selection Criteria

Criteria Justication

High population of impoverishedor vulnerable citizens

Reaches the most vulnerablepeople

Access to economic and naturalresources (agriculture, oil,minerals)

Achieves meaningful results towardself-sufciency

Area comprising heterogeneoussocial, cultural, or religiousmix and with a history orpotential for conict

Targets areas with greatestpotential peacebuilding impact andchallenges; targets those whoseopinions are likely or important tobe positively inuenced; targetsthose living within Transfer

Disputed Territories (TDTs)

Communities within closeproximity to others or servingas a transportation hub

Facilitates potential clusteringof projects and enables smoothimplementation

Activities and programs ofother donor organizations

Provides complementary andnot overlapping benets to thecommunities

Oncecommunityselectioncriteriaareidentied,ACDI/VOCAstacreateaninitialprole,basedoninputofsta,governmentrepresentatives,civilsocietyorganizations,aswellasfromthedonor,ofpotentialtargetcommunitiestodeterminewhichcommunitiesbestttheselectioncriteria.Basedonthis,ACDI/VOCAstaselectthecommunitieswithwhichtopartner.

ACDI/VOCAprojectstathenimprovecommunityprolesbyconductingsitevisits,assessments,anddatacollectionusingelementsofaparticipatoryrural(orurban)assessmentmethodology.Theseexpandedprolesincludeinformationonaccesstobasicpublicservicesandemploymentand,insecurity-permissiveareas,localgovernancecharacteristics,socialcapital/trustcharacteristics,andconict

characteristics.

Communityprolesareperiodicallyupdatedincoordinationwithlocalgovernmentoces,whoseinvolvementiscritical.Public-privateinvolvementinthisprocessplaysakeyroleinimprovingrelationsbetweencommunitymembersandgovernmentandlinkingcommunityprioritieswithpublicfunding,politicalsupport,government


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strategies,andlocaldevelopmentplans.AlthoughACDI/VOCAstainthepastsolicitedinformationfromlocalgovernmentrepresentativesfortheseproles,underICAPphasethree,stanowencourageCAGrepresentativestoconductcommunityassessmentsthemselvesinconsultationwithcommunitymembers,governmentsources,

andotherdonorstoupdatetheproles.

Directengagementofthebroadercommunitybeginsbygainingthesupportandassistancefromthecommunitiesmostinuentialnaturalandelectedorappointedleaders.InICAP,thisisoftenthemayoranddistrictorsubdistrictcouncilchairperson/otherlocalcouncilor.Leadersaregenerallymotivatedbythepossibilityofdonorfundingtosupportservicesandinfrastructureimprovementsfortheircommunitiesandtheprospectofenhancedcitizensupportfortheirleadership.

OncesupportforICAPparticipationisassured,ACDI/VOCAstaandtheinitialcontactsagreeonatimeandplacetoholdacommunity-widemeeting,duringwhich

communitymemberselectavolunteercommieeorCAG,composedofninepeople.UnderthecurrentphaseofICAP,CAGsincludeatleasttwowomenandtwomemberswhoarealsopartofthelocalcouncil.Carefulaentionisdevotedtoensuringthatcommunitymeetingsrepresentthemajordemographicgroupsinthecommunity,withstaexplainingtheneedforbroadrepresentation.Themayorand/orotherleadersinvitecommunitymemberstothismeeting.Insomecases,themayororotherleaderaskseachstamembertoinviteseveralpeoplefromdierentrepresentativegroups,includingtribalgroups.

Thepresenceoflocaltriballeadersattheinitialmeetingisimportanttogainthetrust

ofthebroadercommunity.TheACDI/VOCAstaintroducestheprogram,CAGconcept,andthecommunityprojectprocess,afterwhichaparticipatoryresource-mappingexerciseisintroduced.Resourcemappingisanasset-basedasopposedtoaneeds-basedtool.Theexercisebeginswithdrawingamapofthecommunity.Thecommunitymembersarethenaskedtoidentifywhichresourcesareavailable,rare,andmissingornonexistentintheircommunity.Resourcesmayincludeelectricity,water,schools,hospitalsorhealthclinics,irrigationsystem,communityhalls,playgrounds,andveterinaryservices;theyarenormallyidentiedbysector(e.g.,education,health)andaredrawnonthemapintheapproximatelocation.Toconcludethisexercise,communitymembersareaskedtoprioritizetheseresourcesbyneed.Theythenelectanine-memberCAG.

Theresource-mappingexerciseisusedtogainandmaintainmomentumtotriggercommunityprideinexistingcommunityassetsasabasisforidentifyinggapsandtoconveythetangiblepositivebenetsthatthecommunityactionprogramparticipatoryprocess,withitsassociatedcommunityprojects,canbringtothecommunity.Themappingexercisealsoprovidesaplatformforidentifyingandplanningprojectslaterintheprocess.


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Duringtheactivitiesoftheinitialcommunitymeeting,projectstaplayakeyroleinbuildingthemotivationofcommunitymembers-at-largetoactivelyparticipateintheprocessonavolunteerbasis.ICAPisaprogramprimarilyimplementedbyIraqisforIraqis.Theratioofexpatriatestatonationalstaatanygiventimeisapproximately

oneexpatriateforthirty-venationalsta.Stamembersknownascommunitymobilizersareselected,inpartfortheiroutgoingandenergeticpersonalitiesbutalsofortheirunderstandingofgovernmentprocessesandmanagementexperience.Mobilizersmustbeperceivedassincereinordertoconnectwithandsecuretheparticipationofothercommunitymembers.ACDI/VOCAselectsmobilizersfromwithinthecommunityinwhichtheywillbeworking,wherepossible.Afactorforsuccessfullymobilizingcommunitiesisthemessagethattherewillbetangiblebenetsfromtheprojectsselectedthroughactiveparticipationofcommunitymemberswithlocalcouncils.ACDI/VOCAoersexamplesofsuccessfulprojectsledbyotherCAGs.Theresource-mappingexercise,inwhichcitizensvoicetheirconcerns,identifyproblems,andsuggestsolutions,alsoencouragesactiveparticipationandbolstersenthusiasmforsustainedengagement.

How Local Actors Are Empowered

TheICAPapproachtoCAGcapacitybuildingincludescommunitydevelopmentorientationandformaltrainingcomplementedbyalearning-by-doingapproachthroughparticipationinthecommunityprojectplanning,implementation,andmonitoring/evaluationcycle.Throughouttheprojectcycle,CAGmembersparticipateinasteppedprogramoftrainingpackagesdesignedtoequipthemto(1)participateinprojectproposalreviews;(2)eectivelycommunicateprojectstatustothecommunity;

Ramla Al Obaidi (third from left), a member of the Kirkuk Community ActionGroup, discusses community priorities during training on advocacy andcoalition building. Used with permission by ACDI/VOCA.


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(3)workwiththecommunityandlocalgovernmenttoensurethatlocalcontributioncommitmentstototalprojectcostsaremetanddocumented;(4)ensurethatprojectsareproperlyimplemented,used,andmaintained;and(5)understandgovernmentfundingprocessesandhowlocalgovernment-citizencoalitionscanworkstrategicallywith

higherlevelsofgovernment.

Specicskillsetsinw

empowering local peacebuilders: strategies for effective engagement of local actors in peace...

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