Civil Societyand Democratization in the Arab World

Ibn Khaldun Center forDevelopment Studies

HAS KIFAYA HAD ENOUGH?

Saad Eddin Ibrahim:On Hassan Nasrallah

February 2007 Vol. 13 No. 146

Plus: Freedom of Speech onthe Internet in Egypt

Internal Discord has Raised Doubts about theMovement’s Future

February 2007Vol. 13 No. 146

Senior ConsultantMoheb Zaki

Arabic-language EditorMokhtar Qassem

English-language EditorNeil Durnan

Contributing EditorsAlexander Bruce, Amanda Craig, MariaDayton, Matthew Devlin, Hussein Gaafar,Brent Giannotta, Matthew Hall, Bryce

Loildolt, Rachel Sekinger

ICDS Board of TrusteesDr. Saad Eddin Ibrahim

Chairman of the ICDS Board of Trustees andProfessor of Political Sociology at the American

University in CairoMr. Gamal El-Banna

Chairman, the International Islamic Federationfor Labor

Dr. Barbara IbrahimDirector, the Gerhart Center at the American

University in CairoMr. Bahie El-Din El-Ebrashi

LawyerAmb. Hassan Eissa

President, the Egyptian Diplomatic ClubDr. Mohtak Halouda

Former Chairman, the Central Agency forPublic Mobilization and StatisticsMohamed Farid HassaneinBusinessman and former MPMr. Hisham Kassem

Chairman, the Egyptian Organization forHuman Rights

Dr. Medhat KhafagyProfessor of Surgical Oncology, NationalCancer Institute at Cairo University

Mr. Mohamed NouhArtist and MusicianDr. Ayman Nour

Chairman of El Ghad Party and former MPAmb. Mohmoud Qassem

Chairman, Foreign Affairs Committee, WafdParty

Eng. Ahmed RezkBusinessman

Hassan ElsawafBusinessman

Morsy El SheikhCounsellor

Eng. Youssef SidhomChief Editor, Watani Newspaper

Contents

Regional News

Civil Society News From Around the Region ................. 1A round-up of important developments in democratization andhuman rights in the Arab World.Egypt’s Role in the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict ............. 2David Knoll profiles Egypt as a moderator of regional conflicts.The Devil is in the Details .................................................... 3Bryce Loidolt examines the Mecca Accords.Uncharted Territory ................................................................ 4In anticipation of next month’s presidential elections, Neil Durnanrecounts Mauritania’s startling progress towards democracy.

Ibn Khaldun Center News

A New Type of Cross-Cultural Civic Education ........... 5Nora Elmarzouky reports on The Ibn Khaldun Center and RatiuCenter for Democracy’s joint democracy education program.

Egypt News and Views

The Citizen Journalists .......................................................... 6In the first of a two-part series this month on weblogs in the Arabworld, Frederick Deknatel examines the relationship between bloggersand the Egyptian government.When Enough is Not Enough ............................................. 8Matthew Devlin reports on the current state of affairs within theEgyptian National Movement for Change (Kifaya).The Hijab on Television in Modern Egypt ..................... 10Rachel Sekinger details the row over headscarves on state televisionand its implications for Egyptian society.

Viewpoints

Between Hassan Nasrallah and Thomas Friedman ..... 12In a companion piece to last month’s column, Dr. Saad EddinIbrahim discusses his January meeting with Hassan Nasrallah.On Rulers and Gods ............................................................... 14Hassan Elsawaf on the mentality of authoritarianism.In the Arabic Issue .................................................................. 15Al-Rewaq .................................................................................... 16Mukhtar Qassem summarizes hot debates at the Ibn KhaldunCenter’s Open Forum.Arab Blogs Give Youth Venting Space .............................. 17In the second article of this month’s series on weblogs, MonaEltahawy discusses their influence and history in the Arab world atlarge.

Civil Societyand Democratization in the Arab World

iAlgeriaHuman Rights Watch reported onFebruary 7 that Algerian authoritiesprevented a confe rence ondisappearances and killings committedby the State and rebel groups duringthe civil war. The conference, entitled“Truth, Peace, and Conciliation,” hadapplied for a permit to hold theconference five weeks prior to itsscheduled start date and was onlynotified the night before its scheduledcommencement that its applicationhad been rejected. Several foreignspeakers were denied entry visas toenter Algeria and the police gatheredat the Mercure Hotel in Algiers themorning of the opening of theconference to prevent attendees fromholding the conference.

Farouk Ksentini, who heads Algeria’sstate human rights commission, wasquoted on February 11 in the French-language daily L’Expression as sayingthat banning the conference wasconsistent with the terms of theCharter for Peace and NationalReconciliation. Article 46 of theCharter prohibits raising the issue ofthose who disappeared during the civilwar.

i EgyptOn February 15, Egyptian securityservices detained 80 members of theMuslim Brotherhood in Cairo and theNile Delta on charges of “belongingto a banned group” and “possessingan t i-gover nment l i t e r a tu re.”Brotherhood officials have claimedthat the arrests are part of an effortto throw the party into disarray beforethe Shura Council elections in April.

These arrests come on the heels ofthe referral of 40 members of theMuslim Brotherhood, includingKhairat el-Shatir, the organization’sthird-in-command, to a military courton terrorism and money launderingcharges. These members were arrestedfollowing student protests at Al-AzharUniversity in December, and are thefirst Muslim Brothers to be put on trialin a military court since 2001.Defendants in military courts enjoyfar fewer rights than their counterpartsin the civilian justice system.

In an update from previous issues,

Egyptian blogger Abdel Kareem NabilSulaiman, aka Kareem Amer, wassentenced to prison for a total of fouryears on February 22. In a courtprocession that reportedly lasted amere five minutes, the judge sentencedKareem to three years in prison forinsulting Islam and an additional yearfor defaming Egypt’s president, HosniMubarak.

See page 6 for more information on the caseof Kareem Amer.

hLebanonDespite two bus bombings which killedthree and injured 18 northwest ofBeirut on February 13, thousandsturned in the center of the capital onthe following day to mark the secondanniversary of the assassination offormer Prime Minister Rafik Hariri.

Government supporters marking theanniversary were cordoned off fromopposition supporters who have beenstaging a sit-in in the center of the citysince December by troops andbarricades. The day’s demonstrationproceeded peacefully, with the gatheredcrowds observing a moment of silencethat coincided with the time whenHariri was killed.

On February 20 the cabinet passed ameasure extending the inquiry intoHariri’s assassination by one year.

i LibyaIn a bizarre turn of events, fiveBulgarian nurses and a Palestiniandoctor sentenced to death last year forinfecting Libyan children at a Benghazihospital with AIDS pled not guilty toslander charges on February 25. Thecharges stem from their trial defense

that their confessions had beenextracted under torture. In additionto criminal charges, which carry a six-year sentence, the defendants havebeen sued by a Libyan police officerand a doctor for $4 million inemotional damages caused by falseaccusations of torture. The plaintiffswere acquitted of torture charges in2005.

The defendants were originally takeninto custody in 1999 following anAIDS outbreak in the hospital wherethey worked. In addition to theassertion that their confessions weregiven under duress, the medics’ legaldefense has relied on expert testimonythat the unsanitary conditions that ledto the outbreak were present beforethe arrival of their clients. The casehas drawn intense internationalcriticism, and while the Libyangovernment has remained defiant, ithas allowed the defendants to appealtheir death sentence at a SupremeCourt hearing expected in May.

hMauritaniaOn February 19, the European Unionannounced that, at the invitation ofthe Mauritanian government, it wouldbe sending an Election ObservationMission (EOM) to monitor the March11 presidential elections. The EU sentprevious missions and has donated 6million euros ($7.9 million) to helpfund the Mauritanian elections.

See page 4 for more information on recentpolitical developments in Mauritania.

hPalestineFatah and Hamas reached anagreement February 8 at a summit inMecca. The summit was proposedand hosted by Saudi King Abdullah toend the fighting between the twofactions that had left dozens ofPalestinians dead.

Under the new unity government,Hamas will maintain more portfoliosthan Fatah with the key Finance,Foreign, and Interior Ministries goingto independent technocrats.

See page 3 for more information on the MeccaAccords.

Civil Society News From Around the RegionRegional news

February 2007 1

Civil Society2

i Saudi ArabiaWhile King Abdullah has garneredinternational praise for brokering theMecca Accords between Fatah andHamas, the number of people executedin the Kingdom in 2007 has grown to17, compared to 38 for all of 2006,with the execution on February 19 offour Sri Lankan migrant workers. Theworkers were convicted of armedrobbery in 2004, and lost an appealthe following year, which they enteredon the grounds that they were deniedlegal representation and that nosubstantial prosecution witnessestestified against them turning their trial.Two-thirds of those executed in theSaudi Arabia during 2006 wereforeigners.

In other news, on February 25, a 96-year-old Saudi man on death rowlaunched a campaign to raise 2.6 millionriyals ($700,000) necessary to begranted clemency. Under Saudi law,

murder is a capital offence, butconvicted murders will be grantedclemency if the victim’s family agreesto accept financial compensation. Thedetails of the murder have not beenreleased.

i SyriaThe President’s Office announced newand significantly more stringentguidelines for the renewal of visas forIraqis. While the new law has beenroundly criticized as discriminatoryagainst Iraqis and a possible catalystfor a humanitarian disaster, Syrianofficials have denied this, claiming thatthe restrictions apply to all Arabs, andtherefore do not const i tu tediscr iminat ion against Iraqis.

Syrian officials also vehemently deniedallegations that the new regulationswere linked to the recent visit of IraqiPresident Jalal Talabani. Allegedly thePresident asked his hosts to take

measures to restrict the movement ofIraqis, citing insurgents operating outof Syrian territory as a concern. OnFebruary 5, the Syrian daily Al-Madapublished a denial saying that“measures regarding the status of Iraqirefugees in Syria” were not discussedduring President Talabani’s visit.

i TunisiaOn February 7, Tunisian authoritiesdetained Tahar Ben Hassine, thedirector of Italian-based independentsatellite channel Al-Hiwar Tunisi, ashe was leaving the home of dissidentjournalist Taoufik Ben Brik. Mr.Hassine was held until February 12under the pretense of having beendriving under the influence of alcohol. While he was released without charge,human rights advocates have suggestedthat his detention was part of anongoing campaign to harass membersof the independent media.

By David Knoll

Egypt’s Role in the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict

ith the recent deal between the leaders of Hamasand Fatah, struck in Islam’s holiest city of Mecca,King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia seems to have

cemented the kingdom as a primary, if not as yet theforemost, mediator of conflict in the Middle East. As apart of the world with a long modern history of regionalconflicts, the Middle East has always needed propermediators. The rise of Saudi Arabia as a mediator in theregion immediately brings to mind another Arab nationthat has traditionally played this role, Egypt. Egypt’sconspicuous absence from the headlines of this most recentreconciliation begs the question: what is Egypt’s currentrole as a mediator of regional conflicts in the Middle East,particularly with regard to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict?

Under Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egypt was the dominantpolitical, economic and military power in the Middle East. The state had the biggest influence of any one country inthe region. Nasser’s 1956 political victory over Egypt’sformer colonial masters and Israel solidified this rise topower. Egypt was even able to engage in a war in Yementhat required the mobilization of 70,000 combat troops.Since then, Egypt’s influence has continued to decline,beginning in 1961, when Syria seceded from the UnitedArab Republic. As Mahmoud Qassem, Egypt’s formerAmbassador to Canada, notes, “a country that takessignificant grants and aid is not in good shape.”

So where does Egypt stand today? Certainly Egypt still hasmore sway over regional political happenings than most

states in the Gulf, North Africa, and the Levant. The sheersize of Egypt’s population makes it a demographic power,while its higher education and diplomatic institutions makeEgypt a force for stability in the region.

Egypt’s current role is not to be the primary mediator infinal status talks between the Israelis and Palestinians. Whilea lasting peace would be in Egypt’s interest, Egypt does nothave the political clout to bring the two parties to thenegotiating table. Professor of Government and ForeignAffairs William Quandt, of the University of Virginia,argues that Egypt’s role is limited to helping parties make“tactical adjustments”. For example, Egypt has enoughinfluence over the parties in the Palestinian-Israeli conflictto help call for a ceasefire (for example, the Feburary 2005ceasefire brokered in Sharm el-Sheikh).

Egypt’s special relationship with both parties allows it toplay an important role in soothing tempers and transmittingmessages from each side to the other. Amb. Qassem arguesthat Egypt has three potential roles in resolvingPalestinian/Israeli conflict. The first is to try to minimizeinternal discord between the Palestinians, thus permittingthem, as much as possible, to speak with one voice in orderto negotiate effectively with the Israelis. Second, Egypt hasan exceptional relationship with Israel as one of only twoArab countries with which it has signed a peace treaty.Since the signing of that historic document in 1978, Egypthas maintained an uninterrupted dialogue with Israel despiteoccasional periods of strain, thus it has (Cont’d page 15)

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Regional News

February 2007 3

eviating from its usual policy of behind the scenesdiplomacy, Saudi Arabia hosted peace negotiationsbetween rival Palestinian factions Hamas and Fatah

in the beginning of February. The talks were held in Islam’sholiest city, Mecca, under the auspices of King Abdullah.Within view of the Grand Mosque, Hamas and Fatahdelegations worked together to formulate an acceptablepeace agreement. Instead of focusing on the broader conflictwith neighboring Israel, the delegations concentrated onending the weeks of infighting in the West Bank and GazaStrip, which have claimed over 90 Palestinian lives. Whilethe agreement signifies both a new era of Saudi diplomacyand a positive step towards peace in the already-decimatedPalestinian territories, it falls short of meeting thequalifications for ending the international boycott of thePalestinian government.

On February 8, Khaled Meshal of Hamas and MahmoudAbbas, president of the Palestinian Authority and head ofFatah, signed the Mecca Accord, under which they agreedto a truce and to share power in a national unity governmentfor the first time. The agreement was greeted by cheeringcrowds of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, asHamas and Fatah militia members exuberantly fired theirguns into the air. This enthusiastic response was unsurprising,as the populationhas been sufferingf r o m a ni n t e r n a t i o n a lboycott since theelection of a Hamasm a j o r i t y i nparliament in 2005and, more recently,weeks of bloody confrontations between the factional rivals.

The Mecca Accords stipulate that Ismail Haniya of Hamaswill head the new government as its prime minister. He hasbeen granted five weeks by Mahmoud Abbas to form hiscabinet, within boundaries designed to prevent either partyfrom wielding excessive power or influence. As a result,Hamas will get nine posts, Fatah six, and independents four.The posts slated to be filled by independents include theinfluential Financial, Interior, and Foreign Ministries. Thus,while Hamas will retain a near-majority of cabinet positions,Fatah will control a large number, and independentPalestinians will be in charge of the more powerful posts.

Optimists have noted that the agreement demonstrates thewillingness of Hamas to work within a peaceful frameworkto achieve results. Indeed, the group’s willingness toparticipate in parliamentary elections, as well as theconcessions it granted in the recent Mecca Accords, revealits organizational pragmatism. The fact that Hamas hasallowed for three of the most powerful and sensitive poststo be filled by independents demonstrates that it is a flexibleorganization that is willing to compromise power for stability.

However, while the Accords pay close attention to thebalance of power in the new unity government, they remain

vague over other more pressing details. Instead of bindingHamas to past agreements made between the PLO andIsrael, the Accords only ask that Hamas “respect” pastagreements. The meaning of such ambiguous language hasyet to be defined, and may not be clarified until after thenew government is formed.

In order to reaffirm their position concerning Israel, Hamasmembers took to the airwaves mere hours after signing theagreement. Nizar Rayyan, a Hamas leader in Gaza, boldlydeclared to Reuters “We [Hamas] will never recognize Israel.There is nothing called Israel, neither in reality nor in theimagination,” reflecting the hard line taken by many membersof Hamas. Additionally, no overtures have been made byHamas towards renouncing violence and disarming itsmilitary wing. Thus, praise for Hamas’s deference tonegotiations may be premature.

Further details that went without mention in the new Accordinclude the integration of the various Palestinian securityforces into the Palestinian Authority. This step would involveeither disarming the multiple Palestinian militias that stillexist in the territories, or somehow including them in thePalestinian Authority security force. Similar challenges facethe integration of the 3,000-strong Hamas Executive Force

that the Hamas-ledgovernment formed afterit came to power.

The signing of the MeccaAccords has put themajor internat ionalpowers, namely America,in an awkward position.

It is clear that the agreement falls short of satisfying thethree conditions the international community has placedon Hamas before resuming aid to the Palestinian Authority:recognition of Israel, renunciation of violence, and adherenceto previous international agreements. However, Hamas’sagreement to “respect” past agreements purposely leavesmuch to the imagination, forcing the major powers tointerpret the meaning of this clause for themselves. IfAmerica recognizes the new Palestinian government andresumes aid, it runs the risk of both appearing weak in theface of Hamas’s defiance and insulting Israel, a key ally inthe region. However, if America completely rejects the ideaof resuming aid to the coalition government, it would notonly be neglecting the dire need of the Palestinians, butwould also be earning the contempt of its Saudi companion.This may not be in America’s best interest either, as SaudiArabia is key to the building of a stable, Sunni coalition inthe region, clearly a vital necessity to stabilizing Iraq andcurbing Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Thus, Saudi Arabia’sattempt to assert itself as a key regional power in order tocounter it’s shrinking role in the region has implicationsthat reach far beyond the violent Palestinian struggle.

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By Bryce Loidolt

The Devil is in the Details

Hamas will retain a near-majority of cabinetpositions, Fatah will control a large number,and independent Palestinians will be in chargeof the more powerful posts.

fter two decades in power, Mauritanian PresidentMaaouya Ould Sid’Ahmed Taya was deposed ina bloodless coup on August 3, 2005, while he was

abroad attending the funeral of King Fahd of Saudi Arabia. Since then, the junta that overthrew President Taya hasembarked on an unexpected drive towards politicalliberalization. These reforms are set to culminate with nextmonth’s presidential election. Colonel Ely Ould MohamedVall, who has acted as caretaker head of state since thecoup, will not be among the more than 20 candidates whohad registered as of January 28.

At the coup’s outset, promises of democratic reform weregreeted with understandable skepticism by the internationalcommunity; aid was suspended and official condemnationswere issued. However, the Military Council for Justice andDemocracy, as the junta is known, acted swiftly to allaysuch fears. In order to lend credence to its pledge to holdfree elections within two years, the new government grantedamnesty to all those imprisoned by the previous regimefor so-called “political crimes.”The election cycle itself began on June 25, 2006, when areferendum was held in order to amend the constitutionand establish an electoral commission. One of the keyamendments included in the referendum established a limitof two five-year terms in office for the president, as wellas a maximum age limit of 75. Mauritanians were extremelyenthusiastic about the proposed amendments, with 96percent of voters voting in favor, and turnout of 76.5percent, according to the Ministry of the Interior.

The referendum was followed by parliamentary andmunicipal elections on November 19. Nearly 30 partiescontested the elections, running the gamut from Nasseritesand Baathists to liberals, leftists and Black nationalists.Members of the current military regime were banned fromparticipation. While Islamist parties were banned fromparticipation as well, many ran as independents, as did anumber of popular tribal figures and members of theformer regime. Out of 95 seats, 52 were decided in runoffelections on December 3, as no candidate in those districtswas able to secure a simple majority owing to the widevariety of lists on offer.International monitors found the elections to be free andfair, with 70 percent of eligible voters participating. TheCoalition of Forces for Democratic Change (CFDC), agroup of parties opposed to the old regime, now forms thelargest parliamentary bloc, with 41 seats, followed by a blocof independents aligned with the former regime who won39 seats. The rest of the seats went to a combination ofIslamists, tribal figures, and members of smaller parties.

The next stage of the election cycle occurred on January21, when newly elected municipal council members elected53 members of the 56-seat Mauritanian Senate (the threeremaining senators, representing Mauritanians living abroad,will in turn be appointed by their colleagues). The moderateIslamist Al-Mithaq coalition came out on top with 37 seats,followed by the CFDC with 15 seats, with an independent

representing the old regime rounding out the field.

Despite Mauritania’s recent successes on the road todemocracy, concerns have been raised both by internationalobservers and domestic political parties. During thereferendum stage of the election cycle, EU observers noticedthat Mauritania’s high level of illiteracy was playing havocwith the voting process; in a referendum where a simpleyes or no vote was required, over seven percent of theballots were invalidated due to voter error. The electionsthat followed were considerably more complicated, and theupcoming presidential election, with over 20 candidates,may indeed confound a large segment of the voting public.

On the domestic side, members of the CFDC havecomplained that the interim government has systematicallyfavored independents, particularly those tied to the formerregime, at the expense of political parties. These reservationsare compounded by lingering disbelief that the leaders ofthe coup will give up power following the presidentialelections next month. (Cont’d page 16)

By Neil Durnan

Uncharted Territory

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Civil Society4

Col. Ely Ould Muhammad Vall

Protestors in Warsaw, Poland. Arab democrats stand tolearn a lot from their Eastern European counterparts.

ICDS NewsBy Nora Elmarzouky

A New Type of Cross-Cultural Civic Education

February 2007 5

here can Arab activists look for guidance in theirquest for democratic transition? Different wavesof democratic transition have arisen in history,

but one parallel that Arab activists can examine is theexperience of Eastern Europe during the late 1980s andearly 1990s. Civic education programs have grabbed thespotlight, as democracy advocates are beginning to realizethat it is easier to sow the seeds of a democratic mindsetearlier in life rather than attempt to change thoroughlyentrenched political understandings later in life. The goalis to encourage Arab youth to think about democracy notonly in terms of elections, but also as it pertains to theirrights and responsibilities as citizens.

In order to achieve these goals, the Ibn Khaldun Center incollaboration with the Romania-based Ratiu Center forDemocracy, is endeavoring to consolidate the lessons ofEastern Europe into an educational program for Arabyouth, through a cross-cultural civic education program inRomania. For two weeks in July, twenty students betweenthe ages of 16 and 21 from all over the Arab world willexperience a democratic living environment with EasternEuropean students. This is an important opportunity toencourage youth to think about what democracy means forthem, while comparing with and learning from theexperiences of Eastern Europe.

Arab students interested in the opportunity to develop theirpersonal understanding of democracy through this cross-cultural exchange will first participate in a mandatory eight-week web-based program beginning in the middle of April. In these eight weeks, students will be assigned weekly topicsand assignments exploring the intricacies of democratictheories and practices, including their sustainability, obstacles,and risks. The assignments will require each student toanalyze and apply the weekly topics to their own countriesand comparatively with the Eastern European experience. At the same time they will be able to connect with otherArab students through discussion forums, allowing themto reflect on the topic of the previous weeks and anythingelse related to their awareness of democratic principles, orlack thereof, in their personal lives. Twenty students willthen be chosen from those who participated in the initialstage of the program, based on their progress, performance,and enthusiasm during those eight weeks.

Leading up to the final phase, the Arab students will gatherfor a weeklong orientation in Cairo, before traveling toRomania. During the orientation period, students will havethe opportunity to meet and debate with leading Arabactivists. This will help to cement their understanding ofthe regional applicability of various democratic practices,as well as creating a sense of Arab camaraderie before theydepart for Romania.

Upon arriving in Romania, the twenty students will beimmersed into a democratic living arrangement in a ruralsetting with twenty Eastern European youth, where theydraft and ratify a set of rules, rights, and obligations that

will be abided by all participants and staff. During theprogram, the days will be divided into three portions: thestudent will participate in light physical volunteer workwithin the community in the morning, workshops ondemocracy related professions in the afternoon, and“democracy gatherings” in the evening. Students willexperience the benefits of community-building throughtheir morning volunteer work, while the afternoon workshopswill focus on the development of professional skills usefulin a variety of fields. The “democracy gatherings” in theevening will bring together local professionals and leadersof all backgrounds to present their experiences withdemocracy and its benefits in their lives. During this time,students will have the opportunity to debate and discusseverything they have learned and compare it to what theirdistinguished speakers bring to the table. The topics ofthese nightly forums range from “The Role of the FourthEstate” to “Experiencing Democracy from a MinorityPerspective.”

Going through these stages allows the participants to movebeyond theoretical discussions and learn how democraticideals can be applied in their own communities byexperiencing their application firsthand. In this regard, theprogram differs from other civic education programs;students are not lectured to about what democracy is, ratherthey critically explore it and create a definition for themselves. At the same time students will compare and contrast theArab experience with the Eastern European experience oftransition, in order to better assess the current situation intheir home countries and determine a course of action forfacilitating a transition to democracy.

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For further details about the program and how to get involved, contactNora Elmarzouky by email at nora.elmarzouky@gmail.com.

he February prison sentence of a student bloggerfor writings offensive to Islam and President HosniMubarak might suggest that things have come to

head in Egypt, as weblogs have exploded in number overthe past year to the chagrin of a government that rules viaemergency law.

A few, after all, sparked local and international press attentionin late 2006 by reporting on sexual harassments in downtownCairo, which occurred in front of police who did notintervene, and went unreported by the mainstream media,and by continually leaking cell phone video clips of policetorture and brutality.

But the conviction of Abdel Kareem Nabil, who was nota well-known blogger, should not be seen yet as a threatwhich will immeadiately silence all online political dissent,according to a number of leading political and activistbloggers in Egypt.

“What happened with Kareem was a direct message to theblogosphere, but it is wrong to think that it is precedent,”said Hossam el-Hamalawy, a Cairo-based journalist whohas been running his blog 3arabway (arabist.net/arabawy)since the judicial protests last May.

The Egyptian government has attempted to quiet “cyberdissidents” since 2002, when ShohdySurur was prosecuted and sentenced in absentia forpublishing a sexually explicit and socially critical poemwritten by his father, Naguib. Surur, then the webmasterfor Al-Ahram Weekly, was convicted under article 178 ofthe penal code, which forbids possession of material forsale or distribution "with intent to corrupt public morals."

In 2006 a number of bloggers were arrested either for theirwritings or political activity. At least six were arrested anddetained for participating in the judicial reform protests inApril and May, although all were later released. One ofthem, Mohammed el-Sharqawi, was abducted and sexuallyabused by police before his imprisonment, and while inprison he wrote a graphic account of it that was posted onthe blog the Arabist (arabist.net).

Weeks after Kareem’s arrest this past November, anotherblogger, Rami Siyam, was arrested as he was leaving el-Sharqawi’s house and held for five days for content deemedcritical of the government.

Some bloggers differentiate Kareem’s case and thegovernment’s response because Kareem addresses andcriticizes religion. “He was writing about religious issuesin pretty anti-Islamic terms, and amidst very intense sectarianissues in Alexandria,” said Issandr El-Amrani, a Moroccan-American journalist in Cairo who runs the Arabist site.Other bloggers echoed such an explanation for Nabil’ssentence, attributing it to the sensitive religious nature ofwhat he was writing.

“Blogging about religion in general is sensitive, and maybe

the government selected its target quite well because what[Nabil] wrote was quite blatant,” said el-Hamalawy, “andthe government can publicly appease the religious sentimentsin that regard.”

Yet a blogger who identifies himself as Sandmonkey(sandmonkey.org) described Nabil’s sentence as “an evilprecedent that they can use to arrest anyone,” while stressingthat the case grew out of charges filed by Al-Azhar Univeristyagainst Nabil, who was a former law student there.

Nabil’s sentence in Alexandria elicited speculation that hehad been easy ammunition for a government looking tofire a warning shot at the highly critical pocket of popularactivist bloggers within Egypt – the ones who earnedInterior Minister Habib el-Adly’s ire, as suggested duringa late January television appearance, when he declared thatcritical blogging was an “intentionally unpatriotic campaignstriking a national service that seeks stability in the country.”

El-Adly was referring, most of all, to the ballooning policescandal that began last year when cell phone video clips ofpolice slapping, beating, and most notoriously, sodomizingdetainees began appearing on Egyptian blogs.

Photojournal is t Wae l Abbas at Misr Digi ta l(misrdigital.blogspirit.com), who leaked nearly all of thevideo clips, said that “Blogging in the Middle East is harderthan in the rest of the world. You'll be followed. You'll seethat someone is watching you.”

While Abbas was used to being harassed at demonstrationsthat he covered as a journalist, he said the governmentresponse to his blogging and coverage of protests was moredirect, and more personal. He was notified that a warranthad been issued for his arrest on seven accusations, rangingfrom insulting the president to blocking public traffic andinciting unrest after the pro-judicial demonstrations lastspring. “All I did was take pictures with my camera,” hesaid.

“Lawyers told me you have to hide for awhile, to run away,which I did. I took my laptop and hard disk and went onthe run. During that time I received hidden phone callsfrom the government, either saying ‘you will join us and beour brother, or we will create a scandal. We know yourfamily.’”

Abbas then published an account of the threats on his blog.

“They stopped calling me,” he said.

But after the sexual harassments around Talat Harb Squareduring Eid al-Fitr last fall, Abbas said unidentified sourcesonce again contacted his family.

“They received weird phone calls at home from a man whowanted to locate me,” he said. “I had caller ID but theidentity was blocked. Each time he called he gave a differentname, using an overfriendly tone with my mother, insisting

By Frederick Deknatel

The Citizen Journalists

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to know where I work.”

Abbas described the stream of “direct and indirect threats”to his blogging activity:“they use the fact that you have comments on your blog towage a war against you.”

“There have been numerous campaigns of rumors spreadingon the Internet,” he said. “Once they said I converted toChristianity, first that I was Protestant, then Catholic, thenthat I was gay. All of this is either on blog comments, onmessage boards, or on other websites.”

According to Abbas, televised appearances by governmentofficials saying that he has a criminal record and is notcredible, as well as claims that blogging is a violation ofpress and communication laws, add up to public intimidation.He also lamented the fact that journalists working for statenewspapers joined in the campaign to discredit him.

“It was these journalists, during the sexual harassments lastfall, who accused us of instigating the incident, saying wehave sick imaginations, that the incidents were things ofour sexual fantasy.”

The threats, the stress and the increased attention onblogging in Egypt have worn down Abbas, he admitted.Last month, he fielded three to four interview requests aday, given his proximity to a police scandal exposed bybloggers that sparked the interest of the international press.He said in a phone conversation at the end of Februarythat he had decided “to take a vacation from blogging.”

Hossam el-Hamalawy was in his second stint with the LosAngeles Times when he resigned during last spring’s judicialprotests to start his blog, 3arabaway (arabist.net/arabawy).

“I started blogging to highlight the plight of detainees andthe government crackdown on dissidents,” he said, referringspecifically to his friend Sharqawi’s arrest and sexual abuse.

El-Hamalawy emphasized the strategy of blogging in Egypt,saying, “I think the difference between bloggers here andother places is that we do put a focus on what we describeas citizen journalism,” el-Hamalway said. “We are part ofthe event, we are there, and we are linked to the movementin the street, or we are trying to anyway.”

El-Hamalawy said he had never received any phone callsor threats from state security, and he was last arrested in2003, for participating in a demonstration.

“Of course they do cause me problems – up until todayI've been working as a journalist and state security is stillbanning me from having press credentials,” he said. “I’vebeen denied three times, as they say, for security reasons.”

Asked if he worries about how the government will respondto his online reporting of pro-democracy demonstrations,workers’ strikes and police torture tactics, given Nabil’s

recent sentence, el-Hamalawy replied quickly that “myworries started the day I became an activist,” long beforehe started blogging.

“I think even if you're not an activist, just an Egyptiancitizen, you still have daily worries with dealing with thepolice anyway.”

Government avenues against online political dissentexpanded with a court order last year that gave the Ministryof Telecommunications and Information legal authority toblock any website.

Abbas said his site went down briefly last fall during theclashes between plainclothes police and Muslim Brotherhoodstudents at Ain Shams University in Abbassiya.

“I was the one who published the photos of the violence,”he said.

The increased international media attention on a fewEgyptian bloggers ought to highlight the connectionsbetween an active reform movement building since contestedelections in 2005 and blogs commenting on and propellingthose developments.

Political blogs in Egypt, again stressed by el-Hamalawy, aredefined by “underground reporting of demonstrations [that]the mainstream media refers to with one line or not at all.The bloggers are there.”

As public faces of the government continue to condemncriticism of Nabil’s sentence – Foreign Minister AhmedAboul Gheit’s said in response to international outcries that"No one has the right to interfere with Egyptian legalmatters or comment on Egypt's decisions” – bloggerscontinue posting while expressing various degrees of concernfor their activity.

“I try not to think about it too much,” said El-Amrani ofthe Arabist, who is Moroccan-American. “Of course, I’ma guest in this country – they could throw me out orsomething like that.”

“I started my blog as a venting space more than anything,to basically express frustration I was having with the country,”said Sandmonkey, who explained that he blogs with apseudonym for family reasons.

On February 22, the day Nabil’s sentence was announcedand a few days after Abbas had said he needed a break fromblogging, another video clip, clearly showing officers slappingand beating detainees with sticks, appeared on his blog,Misr Digital.

In email later that day, Abbas wrote simply, “I decided totake a vacation from blogging, but obviously the vacationdoes not want to be taken by me.”

Egypt News and Views

February 2007 7

ormed in 2004, the Egyptian National Movementfor Change (Kifaya, or “Enough”) immediatelycaptured both domestic and international headlines.

Kifaya was, in many ways, sui generis. The first to ever stagepublic demonstrations explicitly targeting the personal ruleof President Hosni Mubarak, Kifaya mobilized a socialprotest movement that bridged the ideological divides ofEgyptian society in a way unequaled by any other group.Kifaya rallied a truly universal pool of supporters behindits drive both to legally proscribe the expansive powers ofthe executive and to harmonize the growing chorus ofdissent against perceived tawreeth (or the hereditary passingof presidential power from father to son). Devoid of aspec i f i c po l i t i c a lp l a t f o r m a n do v e r w h e l m i n g l yfocused on curtailingthe prerogatives of theexecut ive, Ki fayaemerged amongstEgyptian socio-politicalgroups as unique inboth the dynamism of its opposition and the breadth ofits support base.

Kifaya’s clout, however, is generally seen to have declinedsince its zenith during the run-up to the 2005 elections. Thenumber of its characteristic street protests has dwindled,and the movement seems to have found it increasingly

difficult to remain aloof from the divisive currents of thedomestic political fracas. Just such an imbroglio has recentlysparked a major reshuffling of Kifaya’s internal hierarchyand tactical orientation, a change that some say threatensthe efficacy of the movement, if not its very future as aviable vehicle for social dissension.

Soon after Minister of Culture Farouk Hosni’s controversialcomments on the veil stole the media limelight, an unnamedarticle, apparently endorsing Hosni’s anti-veil stance andattributed by some to then-General Coordinator GeorgeIshaq, surfaced on Kifaya’s website. Though the article wassoon removed from the site, it precipitated a schism within

the movement asm e m b e r s s o o ncoa l e s ced aroundhardened pol i t ica lpositions, formerlysubmerged within theoverarching anti-regimesentiment. The resultingpolarization has led

many onlookers to conclude that Kifaya has shed itscommitment to social transformation and descended intothe political fray. Indeed, some claim that the movement’searlier choice to weigh in on last summer’s war in Lebanonhad already signaled its loss of focus.

In the wake of the controversy, eight prominent members,

Civil Society8

By Matthew Devlin

When Enough is Not Enough

F

In the words of El-Qazzaz, Kifaya has“disappeared from the street and movedto closed rooms and satellite channels.”

February 2007 9

many representing solidly Islamic constituencies, withdrewfrom Kifaya. Yet the dissenters were at pains to make itclear that there was more to the dispute than simply theissue of the veil. Indeed, Magdi Ahmed Hussein, Secretary-General of the Labour Party, withdrew from the movement,calling the article “the straw that broke the camel’s back,causing hidden disputes to surface.”

It would seem that questions of personality were at thecore of these disputes. Yehia El-Qazzaz, another dissenter,explicitly acknowledged that his withdrawal was due tohis dissatisfaction with certain members of Kifaya’sleadership: “some of [the movement’s] members are notcommitted to its constitutional principles. There are threepeople who run the movement like dictators.” Thoughelements of the rift remain less than clear, one aspect thatseems to meet with general acknowledgement is thatformer General Coordinator George Ishaq no longerenjoyed the support necessary to continue in his positionas head of the movement.

General Coordinator since Kifaya’s foundation in 2004,Ishaq pointed to his January resignation as simply proofof Kifaya’s timely implementation of its own avowedprinciples of democracy and the rotation of power. Tellingly,however, Ishaq’s replacement, Abdel-Wahab El-Messiri,comes from amongst the ranks of Kifaya’s Islamicsupporters, the very group alienated by the troublesomeinternet article. Ishaq will join Abdel-Halim Qandil, KamalKhalil, and Magdi Qorqor as assistant general coordinators.

El-Messiri’s Islamic credentials should serve to reassurethose elements within Kifaya most ruffled by the recentspat. He pledges to retain Kifaya as an “umbrella bringingall political trends under one banner.” Combine this pledgewith the fact that Qorqor, one of the original wave ofwithdrawals, has returned to the fold and the prospectsfor full reconciliation begin to look brighter. Yet someremain unconvinced. Gamal Asaad, one of the disgruntledleaders, has been reported to have dismissed El-Messiri’staking the helm as simply “a cover-up for Ishaq and hisgroup to continue running the show.”

Regardless of whatever horse-trading continues at the higherlevels of the movement, an important reorientation ofKifaya’s tactics seems underway. Some within the movementare lamenting what they see as a shift away from the signaturevibrancy of Kifaya’s previous public demonstrations andtowards the more rigid procedures of a licensed politicalparty, replete with policy committees and research panels.In the words of El-Qazzaz, Kifaya has “disappeared fromthe street and moved to closed rooms and satellite channels.”Such fears are compounded by anxiety over El-Messiri’ssuitability for the General Coordinator position, a role thatis as much a matter of charisma as capability. Some worrythat, being an intellectual, El-Messiri will fail to reach outto the average man in the street.

Kifaya’s evident troubles are all the more sobering whenviewed against the broader backdrop of the current stateof Egyptian oppositional politics. If one agrees that ahealthy opposition is a crucial buttress to any democraticsystem, a cursory review of the political arena outside ofthe ruling National Democratic Party becomes quite a dire

exercise. The Arab Nasserist Party has cleaved in two sinceits general conference last December. The Wafd Party, forits part, has had a turbulent year with perhaps its mostnotable achievement being the April torching of its ownheadquarters following an extensive internal power struggle,in which twenty people were injured and one killed. Agrowing rift in the leftist Tagammu Party may threaten thecontrol of party chairman Rifaat El-Said, criticized for hisever-closer relationship with the regime.

Kifaya’s apparent stumbling comes, therefore, at anunfortunate time. Just how the movement will restructureitself, and whether it will prove able to regain the momentumit once enjoyed, remains to be seen. Regardless of theoutcome, however, Kifaya bequeathed Egyptian politics alegacy that can never be expunged. The movement providedan example of what was possible and broke through thelong-standing conceptual barrier to public demonstrationagainst the ruling regime. In both success and failure, Kifayawill continue to attest to the crucial need for a protestmovement that transcends political party lines.

Egypt news and Views

By Rachel Sekinger

The Hijab on Television in Modern Egyptn 2006, Egypt witnessed the heightening of anincreasingly controversial issue: how the image of amodern veiled Muslim woman should be projected and

perceived. From the inception of the modernist MuslimTV Network Al-Risala in March 2006, which encouragesthe careers of veiled Egyptian actresses and anchors, to thehighly publicized opinions of Egypt’s Minister of Culturein November 2006, stating the “backwardness” of the veil,the modernity of hijab in Egypt’s public sphere has becomea contentious issue with cultural, political and religiousimplications.

Traditionally, Muslim women who appear on television donot wear the hijab. From the 1970s to the 1990s, as Egyptianculture Islamicized,women who began todon the veil eitherdecided to quit acting orwere barred from theirwork. However, inrecent years, veiledEgyptian women havebegun to reclaim theirplace in the media andcu l t u r a l pu r su i t s,working as anchors oractresses in television forn o n - E g y p t i a nproductions. Despite therecent trend of veiledwomen on television,Eg ypt i an nat iona lnetworks continue intheir refusal to allowwomen with hijab ontheir channels.

Al-Risala (“The Message” in Arabic) is a Saudi-based TVnetwork that televises a number of programs supportinga Muslim perspective on modern life. Al-Risala has re-defined the traditional religious television programs in theMiddle East and has also been a landmark in a recentphenomenon that some are calling “air-conditioned Islam”—a new perspective on Muslim living in the 21st century. Ofparticular interest is Al-Risala’s televising of women, bothas actresses and anchors, wearing the veil. Its message isclear: a Muslim woman has the right to appear on televisionas she is—modern, career-driven, sophisticated and religiousin the 21st century.

When asked why Al-Risala supports veiled women ontelevision even though the Egyptian government refusesto televise them in a recent interview, Mr. Ahmed AbuHaiba, the Director of Al-Risala’s Cairo office, told CivilSociety, “Why can’t a woman who wears hijab be an anchor?You shouldn’t ask me why I’m putting a veiled woman onTV, you should ask the Egyptian network why they aren’tputting women wearing hijab on TV.” Mr. Abu Haibacontinued explaining that the issue of the veil for Al-Risalais not an issue of modernity; it is simply a reflection of

piety, which does not hinder a woman’s ability to work asan anchor or actress.

Abu Haiba also argued that it is absolutely acceptable inIslam for veiled women to appear on television, andregardless of tradition, it should not be considered forbidden.He makes an interesting comparison between ancientsermons and modern media: “Aisha, the wife of the prophet,used to give lectures on Islam as well as many women inIslamic history, and this is the kind of media that they hadat the time… so why can’t these women be anchors today?”

There are many who support the work of Al-Risala. EgyptianIslamic scholar and intellectual Gamal al-Banna says, “Of

course not allowing Egyptianwomen on Egyptian TVnetworks is a violation oftheir personal freedom…There is nothing wrong withhijab being on TV. It can bemodern, it doesn’t alwayshave to be perceived astraditional.” Abdel MoneimAbu Al-Fattouh, a membero f t h e M u s l i mBrotherhood’s GuidanceCouncil, echoed a similarsentiment: “A women shouldenter society not as a female,but as a human being. As shewants and as she is able, awoman should pursue theprofession she desires. Whatis important is for her to beefficient in her work—wearing or not wearing hijab.

Otherwise, it’s discrimination!”

Not only is the Egyptian government being accused ofdiscrimination, some suggest that the government isconsciously projecting a false Egyptian image to appeasethe West. On Egyptian television, Egyptian female programhosts are strictly unveiled—and they usually appear strikinglyWestern, a dramatically different perception of Egyptianwomen than one understands from walking down the streetsof Cairo, where the vast majority of women are veiled.Islamic feminist Nawara Nigm explains the inconsistencybetween the way Egyptian women are televised and the lifeof the common Egyptian woman by explaining that, “The[Egyptian] government is not secular. It is just seekingapproval of the West. They do not want to show that theyhave veiled women. It’s all political… The issue of hijab ispolitical.”

In November 2006, the Egyptian Minister of Culture FarouqHosni expressed his opinion on hijab, describing the veilas a sign of backwardness. Professor Moataz Fattah, of theAmerican University in Cairo and Cairo University, explainedthe comments of the Minister within the framework of thedichotomy between the Egyptian Ministry of Culture and

Civil Society10

I

Dr. Abdel-Moniem Abu Al-Fattouh

February 2007 11

Egypt news and views

the Egyptian Ministry of Information. He stated, “TheMinistry of Culture with its supporters (secular) and theMinistry of Endowments and Al-Azhar with their supporters(Islamists) are fighting over the other institutions, such asthe Ministries of Education, Mass Communication,newspapers, universities etc.” He continued, “I liken it toan intellectual civil war among different agencies ofsocialization.” Interestingly, despite not allowing veiledwomen on TV, members of the Egyptian NationalDemocratic Party (NDP) allied with the Muslim Brotherhoodcondemning Minister Hosni’s statement about the modernpresence of hijab in Egypt is a sign of “a step backwards.”

Although the Egyptian Minister of Culture has recentlyapologized, his statements have reignited the issue of thehijab and culture in Egypt. Nigm commented: “[The hijab]is an order from God in Islam and it has nothing to dowith backwardness.” Nigm continued, describing aninteresting Egyptian paradox: although veiled women arethe foundation of the female work force in Egypt, theirdesire to enter into certain careers is prohibited: “MostEgyptian women are veiled and they are very strong women,but the government does not allow them to present on TVbecause they are not allowed to be under the spotlight…These women want to work on TV, in airlines, as ministersand ambassadors, but they are not allowed to be shown.”In other words, veiled women can work in the official mediain Egypt, as long as they remain behind the scenes.

Veiled actresses have recently expressed public resentmentfor discrimination by unveiled actresses in the workforce.On December 7, 2006, a coalition of four veiled actressesdistributed a blacklist over the Internet stating that theyrefuse to put up with attacks and criticisms from unveiled

actresses. The veiled actresses, Soher Ramzi, Soher Il-Babliand Sabriin and Abir Sabry, two of whom are Egyptianswho host their own programs on Al-Risala, called theunveiled actresses “enemies of the veil” who try to persuadeveiled actresses to remove the veil. The unveiled actressesthat appear on the blacklist include five famous Egyptianactresses: Yosra, Leila Olwi, Nadia al-Goundi, Ilham Shaiinand Nebiila a-Behd. The blacklist is rumored to be, at leastin part, a reaction to unveiled actresses’ support for theEgyptian Minister of Culture’s November comments.Although the veiled actresses argued that hijab is an honor,the fact remains that although Egypt is a Muslim-majoritycountry, women with veils cannot be shown on Egyptiantelevision.

The answer to the question of “why aren’t veiled womenallowed to present on Egyptian networks?” can be answeredthrough a religious, political or cultural lens. Gamal al-Bannasees the root of the discussion as being primarily religious:“It is really difficult to change tradition, especially if it isabout a religious matter or attached to women—it becomesvery sensitive.” Muslim conservatives argue, in the nameof tradition, that women donning the hijab should be moremodest, and there are several other career possibilities thatare more suitable for a pious Muslim woman.

Others, such as Islamic feminist Nigm and Muslim BrotherAbu Al-Fattouh, argue that the reason why veiled Egyptianwomen cannot be broadcast on Egyptian networks ispolitical. Although both Nigm and Abu Al-Fattouh believethe question of hijab on television in Egypt is political,they disagree about the government’s intentions. Nigmbelieves that the government prohibits veiled actresses inan attempt to appeal to the West while Abu Al-Fattouhexplains the government does not allow veiled women onTV as an effort to limit Islamist influence within Egyptiansociety. “The government fears any Islamic behavior,”explained Abu Al-Fattouh.

Analyzing the question of hijab and television through acultural lens, one sees the great dichotomy between theEgyptian Ministry of Culture and the cultural orientationof the people of Egypt. Abu Haiba of Al-Risala commentedthat “Non-governmental media represents the people,national media doesn’t.” In other words, the Egyptiangovernment—whether it is seeking a way to appeal to theWest or to prevent Islamic mobilization in Egypt—refusesto support veiled women on television, despite the fact thatmost women in Egypt don the hijab.

As the issue of hijab in Egypt unfolds in 2007, the insistenceof government-mandated secular models will continue tochallenge the conservative Muslim population of Egypt.Will foreign programs that more accurately reflect the valuesof the Egyptian people, like Al-Risala, revive discussion onthe issue of hijab in the Egyptian media? In the wake ofthe Farouq Hosni controversty and the anti-hijab blacklist,one could infer that as differing opinions mount, the issueof hijab on television will continue to be a fight for differentperceptions of modern Egyptian identity.

Gamal al-Banna

By Dr. Saad Eddin Ibrahim, trans. Civil Society Staff

Between Hassan Nasrallah andThomas Friedman

uring my educational tour of Lebanon, Jordan,Palestine, and Israel, with students from theAmerican University in Cairo and researchers from

the Ibn Khaldun Center, we met with many public figuresas well as party officials and civil society leaders. Amongthose we met in Lebanon were President Emile Lahoud(on January 12, 2007), Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri,former Lebanese Prime Minister Selim Al-Hoss, formerFinance and Defense Minister Elias Saba, and Director ofthe Center for Arab Unity Studies, Dr. Khayr al-Din Haseeb.

The latter showed generosity and hospitality towards thedelegation and helped organize some of the most importantand sensitive meetings, particularly with Hizbollah leadersin the Dahiya suburb of South Beirut and in the borderregion between Lebanon and Israel. During these meetings,the students listened to stories of epic heroism and sacrifice,as well as the tragedies of displacement and misery. Theywere able to touch with their hands the barbed wire on theborder and witness firsthand the magnitude of thedestruction left by the sixth, and most ferocious, Arab-Israeli war.

T h e m o s tprominent meetingduring our tour ofLebanon was withHizbollah SecretaryGeneral HassanNasrallah, who ledthe battles of thats ix th war andbecame a legendaryhero in the eyes ofmillions of Arabs and Muslims. His standing was confirmedthrough public opinion polls, including one conducted bythe Ibn Khaldun Center, among a sample of Egyptians inthe summer of 2006. In this poll, he came ahead of 30other public figures in the Arab and Islamic worlds, includingheads of state, leaders of Islamist movements, scholars,and Nobel Laureates.

The security measures around Hassan Nasrallah were doublethose I had seen with heads of state I had met in the Eastand West over half a century, including Gamal Abd al-Nasser, Anwar al-Sadat, Hosni Mubarak, Saddam Hussein,and Hafiz al-Assad. These security measures were not taken

out of desire by the man or his aides to impart importanceto him, but rather because of his aides' fear for his life;according to a report published in the London-based Telegraphnewspaper on January 10, one day before our meeting, theWhite House authorized the CIA to eliminate him. This isin addition to the fact that he has been targeted by theIsraeli intelligence agency, Mossad. Unfortunately, there isno room here to detail the security measures and journeyto and from the meeting.

In spite of all the pressure that he endures and the battlesthat he fights both internationally and in Lebanon, the manwas extremely calm, friendly, and warm and never stoppedsmiling throughout the two-hour meeting. In fact, he mademany jokes during the conversation.

While Hassan Nasrallah did not hesitate to answer anyquestion, he requested on two occasions that I not quotehis statements until after he had consulted Hizbollah’s ShuraCouncil. Of course, I will keep my promise to him.

The biggest concern to us, the Arab members of thedelegation, was thepossibility of thesituation in Lebanondeteriorating. I hadexpressed these sameconcerns in an articlethat was published inAl-Hayat newspaperon December 14,200 6, en t i t l e d"Between HassanNasrallah and Abd

al-Nasser: Is History Repeating Itself ?" The article waspublished following an announcement by Hizbollah andits allies that it would stage an open-ended sit-in in downtownBeirut in order to bring down the Lebanese government,which is led by Fouad Siniora and enjoys almost a two-thirds majority in Parliament.

Not only had he read the article, he was willing to discussmuch of its content, and I will summarize our conversationin the following lines:

1. No, there is no room for comparison between him andNasser and the 1956 confrontation from which the latteremerged victorious, both politically and morally, after heheld out against the tripartite British-French-Israeliaggression. Nasrallah says with extreme and non-factitiousmodesty, "there is a great difference between Nasser andany contemporary person." He adds that at the time of theSuez battle, Nasser did indeed carry out an importantrevolution and became leader of the largest Arab state.With regard to himself, he says, his capabilities and ambitionsdo not go beyond Lebanon.

D

Our brothers in Egypt should not worry,because Hizbollah has only used force inthe past quarter of a century against theIsraeli occupiers, and it will follow thispolicy in the future.

Civil Society12

This is the first in a series of two articles by Saad Eddin Ibrahimon his delegation’s trip to the Levant.

This article was originally written in Arabic and translated intoEnglish. It was published in Al-Masry Al-Youm on February 3,2007. The first article in the series was published on January 27,and appeared in last month’s issue of Civil Society.

2. No, he has no ambitions for Islamic, Arab, or evenLebanese leadership. His entire agenda is limited to reversingthe injustice that has been done to the members of theShi'a sect in Lebanon. This statement contradicts the viewthat the Shi'a sect is an adversary and indicates that it seeksto share wealth, authority, and status with the rest of theLebanese people and liberate Lebanon from Israelioccupation.

3. If that is the case, why did Hizbollah fighters capturetwo Israeli soldiers,kill others, and giveIsrael a pretext tol a u n c h adevastating war onthe whole ofLebanon afterIsrael withdrewfrom southernLebanon in 2000?

Y e s , I s r a e lwithdrew frommost par ts ofsouthern Lebanonas a result ofarmed resistancethat lasted 18 years,but it held about1,000 Lebaneseprisoners in its jailsa nd ha s no treleased them todate. Also, ShebaaFarms remainsunder occupation,and many people outside of Lebanon do not know thatthere are many aquifers in this region. Shi'a farmers in thesouth depend on rivers originating in Shebaa Farms toirrigate their lands and provide water for their animals.

The aim behind capturing the two soldiers was to exchangethem for Lebanese prisoners held in Israeli jails. Hizbollahcarried out a similar action in the past. Yet, we might havemade a mistake in our calculations. Who doesn't? But weapologized for thatto the Lebanesepeople and paid aheavy price in termsof casualties. Wedid not hesitate tosacrifice our sonsfor the sake of ourcause.

4. But by doing so, do you not act as a state of your ownwithin the Lebanese state?

Yes, the situation may appear that way. However, when thestate is unable to carry out its duties in liberating the landand bringing the prisoners back, do the people or a sectionof them not have the right to attempt to achieve that goal?Was that not the reason why armed popular resistance to

foreign occupation and civil disobedience against internalinjustice came into being? Was this not what you yourselfwrote in the "Sociology of the Arab-Israeli Conflict" in theyear 1973? Was this not what other peoples from Vietnamto Algeria did?

5. Then why do you continue the sit-ins and demonstrationsagainst the government and exhaust a nation that onlyrecently emerged from a devastating war?

The sit-in is our peaceful means to secure our fair share ofpolitical authority.We do not want tou s e we a p o n sa g a i n s t t h egovernment or anyother Lebaneseparty. You, thestudents, and ourbrothers in Egyptshould not worry,because Hizbollahhas only used forcein the past quartero f a cen tu r yagainst the Israelioccupiers, and itwill follow thispolicy in the future.

Our grassrootsm emb e r s a r eedu c a t e d anddisciplined. Theybelieve in theirm i s s i o n a n dd emoc r a t i c a l l y

participate in the decision-making process. Therefore, weare confident of our ability to adhere to peaceful means inour domestic battles. If violence occurs, Hizbollah will nothave been the party to strike first. Indeed, even if violenceis carried out against us, we will not respond.

We set a precedent in the past in this respect. DuringHizbollah’s demonstration against the Oslo Accords in1992, six of our demonstrators were killed and more than

5 0 o t h e r swo u n d e d b yLebanese securityforces' gunfire. Yet,we did not returnfire even thoughwe were able to doso.

That is how the conversation went. It dealt with manyissues, and there is no room to record everything that wassaid. Nevertheless, Hassan Nasrallah seemed confident andin control of the situation. Yet, this does not mean that theman and his party can control all actions and reactions inLebanon, particularly if there are other players involved,such as the United States, France, Syria, Iran, and Israel.

In a similar vein, renowned journalist (Cont’d page 15)

February 2007 13

Viewpoints

Lebanon Victorious: Hizbollah’s summer confrontation withIsrael gained Hassan Nasrallah admirers the world over.

Hizbollah's agenda is clear: it seeks toliberate south Lebanon and set to right theinjustice done to members of the Shi'a sect.

s a child in the fifties, I remember being told thatAdolf Hitler’s corpse had never been found andthat he might still be alive somewhere. Because the

image painted of the man was that of a murdering monster,I did have some unpleasant dreams of him sneaking intomy room and attacking me in the middle of the night. Hewas, and still is, one of the most infamous incarnations ofevil ever.

Much later in life, I came across newspaper and magazinearticles questioning whether that kind of evil could ever bereproduced, in a way inferring that if a man with genessimilar to Hitler’s were to be born, another holocaust mightensue. Fortunately, my thinking process had improvedslightly by then and I regarded the inference as frivolous asmy childhood nightmares.

There must be hundreds of thousands, if not millions, ofmen and women roaming the planet with far more evil inthem than Hitler ever possessed. Then why haven’t we seenthousands of holocausts, or at least another world war ortwo? Simple! They never had the opportunity to be in aposition of power, sothe amount of damagethey were able to inflicti s large ly l imited.Therefore, bar r ingterrorism, the only killerswe hear about are thosewhose victims are fewin number. Few of uswould put our moneyon those criminalshesitating to do morekilling if they needed to.And there are more than the ones we hear of. For everykiller in custody, there is probably another who got awaywith it; which means our world is littered with evildoers onthe prowl, perhaps even more mean-spirited than Hitler.

It is painfully clear that Hitler was far from a uniquespecimen, in terms of what a human being can do to otherhuman beings. He simply had it all nicely set up: a countryin the doldrums, a disgruntled and hungry population anda national ethos poised to overlook widespread injustice toothers for the sake of restoring wealth, honour and power,thereby stretching the limits of national gullibility.

Under such circumstances, I can see many current worldleaders acting in a similar manner. Allow me to elaborate.

The way most of us see the world today is quite flawed.We imagine that a Tony Blair or a Jacques Chirac areendowed with better traits than a Mugabe or a Mubarak,as evidenced by the way their respective populations aretreated. Please humour me with an imaginary exercise inwhich Mr. Blair reverses roles with Mr. Mugabe and M.Chirac with Mr. Mubarak. Let’s try to imagine the outcome.Do you think Zimbabwe under Tony Blair would eventually

turn into a replica of British life with opposition tolerated,criticism accepted and a fully transparent and accountablegovernment? If you do, then you have a bit to learn abouthuman nature. My contention is that Mr. Blair will wasteno time in looking after his own interests and finding outhow far he can get away with looting, plundering andtormenting his people. If he doesn’t have to worry aboutfacing angry opposition leaders in parliament, or criminalcharges in the money-for-honours scam, acting in a morallyresponsible way will not be a top priority item on his agenda,I assure you. Nothing personal there, mind you.

Now, how about Mr. Mugabe in Downing Street? Do youbelieve he would be able to spurn his critics, force landownersout of their homes, round up all dissidents, frame theopposition leaders then send them to kangaroo trials, murderthousands of protestors and help himself to the nationalcoffers? Difficult to imagine, isn’t it? Great Britain has comea long way since the days of Henry the Eighth when suchthings could be done with impunity.

Naturally, the Chirac/Mubarak swap would produce similarresults.

Obviously, one oft h e m a i nachievements ofmodern civilisation isthe realisation thatrulers are not gods!They are as fallible asthe rest of us. Anypol i t i ca l sys temaiming to serve itspeople must, first and

foremost, be able to deal effectively with rulers gone astray.That has to be at the very top of the constitutionalrequirements of every nation on earth. Through nocoincidence, espousing that concept is unerringlysynonymous with a better life.

Sadly, we in Egypt have yet to come to terms with theconcept. We all fall into the trap of wondering what wouldhappen to us if Mr. Mubarak, may God prolong his lifeeven more, were to die or be incapacitated. The futilequestion we ask unfailingly when pondering the idea of freeand open elections for president, is who would be a goodsuccessor. What we ought to be concerned with is not theperson, but the system within which a ruler can be allowedto function. The looser the system, the more inclined theruler to do wrong.

When will we grow up and join the bandwagon of progress,clearly founded on treating the ruler as an ephemeral leader,not an eternal god?

Civil Society14

A

By Hassan Elsawaf

On Rulers and Gods

The futile question we ask unfailingly...is who would be a good successor. Whatwe ought to be concerned with is notthe person, but the system within whicha ruler can be allowed to function.

Viewpoints

February 2007 15

In the Arabic Edition

This month’s Arabic issue features a mix of articleson focusing on a number of regional issues as wellas domestic Egyptian politics, with a particular focuson constitutional reform.

1. The Spy, the Workers, and the Judges

2. Islam and Secularism

3. The Story of Article Two

4. Egyptian or Foreigner?

5. ICDS News

6. Is the Son of a Shepherd Going to be the NextPresident of the United States?

7. The Emigration of the Last Jerusalemites

8. A Discussion of Mauritanian Elections

9. Civil Society News from Around the Region

10. Riwaq Ibn Khaldun (full summary)

If you would like a copy of the Arabic issue, pleaseemail civilsocietyeditor@gmail.com.

often served as a go between. Egypt’s third role as a mediatorrests on its close relationship with the United States throughwhich it can exert some influence in attenuating America’sblanket support for Israel.

However, Egypt’s role as an ally of the United States isproblematic. While Egypt enjoyed a strong relationship withthe US under the Clinton administration, the current Bushadministration has been less communicative with PresidentMubarak, mainly as a result of Egypt’s critical stance towardsAmerican policy in the region and the regime’s stalled progresstowards political liberalization. The last time PresidentMubarak visited the United States was 2004 and it was notseen as an overly positive trip. This relationship makesEgyptian attempts to convince the United States to mediatethe Palestinian-Israeli conflict more difficult. US Secretaryof State Condolezza Rice’s recent visit to Palestine could bepartially the result of Egyptian prodding, but only time willtell if the Bush administration’s interest in the conflict is longterm and will prove beneficial.

In addition to the above, Egypt’s relationship with the UnitedStates does not allow it to publicly propose a recommendedfinal status that goes beyond the Palestinian Authority’s statedposition. If they were to do this, “someone in the Palestiniancamp will accuse them of being the cat’s paw of the Israelisor US”, according to Professor Quandt. This lack of flexibilitycompromises Egypt’s position as an effective mediator.

Despite these disadvantages, Egypt’s exceptional relationshipwith both camps ensures that it can play a useful supportingrole in ongoing negotiations. Egypt may no longer garnerthe regional prestige it enjoyed under Nasser, but it canarguably play a more constructive, if less glamorous, roleunder the current circumstances.

Thomas Friedman had telephoned me from New Yorkasking, among other questions, whether Hassan Nasrallahis a mere pawn used by Syria and Iran to carry out theirregional plans. The man did not hesitate to answerFriedman's question. Yes, Iran has been helping Hizbollahwith money, weapons, and training, proceeding from thesense of religious brotherhood and sectarian solidarity. Theassistance comes through Syria, and everyone knows thisfact.

However, while Hizbollah is grateful for this assistance andwould accept similar assistance from any Arab or Islamicparty, such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, Hizbollah's agendais clear and definitive: it seeks to liberate south Lebanonand set to right the injustice done to the members of theShi'a sect. The party will thankfully accept any material ormoral assistance to achieve these two specific goals.

Thomas Friedman also asked me to ask Hassan Nasrallahwhether he is ready to organize a one million-strong march,such as the ones he organized in the past, to stem thebloodshed between Sunnis and Shi'as in Iraq. During hislengthy telephone conversation from New York, Friedmanseemed concerned about the increasing fighting andbloodshed between members of the two sects in Iraq. Thisbrilliant journalist saw similarly ugly sectarian fighting inBeirut (from 1975 to 1990) at the beginning of his journalisticcareer.

Instead of directing this question to Hassan Nasrallah, Iasked Thomas Friedman to ask the same question in theNew York Times, and that is what my former student did inhis article, titled "Martin Luther Al-King" (New York Times,January 24, 2007). Friedman mentioned Hassan Nasrallahby name, but Nasrallah has not replied to date.

(Egypt’s Role, continued from page 2)

(Nasrallah, continued from page 13)

Despite misgivings about the caretaker regime, the fulfillmentof promises to step down on the part of caretaker regimesis not entirely without precedent in the Arab world. In1985, General Suwar Ad-Dahhab overthrew the rulingregime in Sudan, and made good on his promise to stepdown after presiding over the election of a civiliangovernment. Unfortunately, the general’s efforts were laidto waste three years later, when this civilian governmentwas overthrown by current Sudanese President Omar Bashir.

One finds more hopeful precedents among non-ArabAfrican countries. A number of West African nations havewitnessed similar transitions from autocracy to democracyunder the supervision of an interim military regime. Forexample, in 1999, Nigeria and Niger moved towardsdemocracy with the help of caretaker regimes. Since then,Niger has held free and fair presidential elections twice, in1999 and 2004. While Nigeria’s elections have been marredby allegations of tampering and intimidation, that nationnevertheless enjoys a level of electoral freedom hardly seenin the Arab world.

In addition, other nations in the region with a history ofdemocratic rule have taken steps to consolidate theirdemocracies by passing constitutional amendments similarto those ratified by Mauritania’s June referendum. Senegal,which is one of the region’s more developed democracies,is a case in point. In 2001, it adopted a new constitutionlimiting the president to two four-year terms.

On the eve of next month’s presidential election, oft-ignoredMauritania stands head and shoulders above fellow Arabnations in terms of its progress towards democracy. WhileMauritanians owe much to the extraordinary foresight ofan interim government whose true intentions are stillquestioned by many, they have been presented with a uniqueopportunity to serve as an exemplar of democratic practicefor the rest of the Arab world. Likewise, it would beunforgivable for advocates of political reform both withinthe Arab world and abroad to allow Mauritania to squanderits democratic windfall due to its erstwhile irrelevance inregional affairs.

Al-Rewaq

The Ibn Khaldun Center hosts a dicussion forum, open to the public, each Tuesday evening. The following is Mokhtar Qassem’ssummary, translated by Civil Society Staff, of the topics covered in February.

On February 6, Ambassador Mahmoud Qassem delivered a lecture entitled “International Relations in the WorldToday.” Amb. Qassem discussed the implications of American hegemony following the fall of the Soviet Union,and how it has manifested itself through a lack of respect for international laws and institutions. He went on toliken America’s foreign policy to that of an imperial power.

Amb. Qassem asserted that European weakness and the collusion of many Arab regimes were helping to furtherthese ambitions. He claimed that American designs on the Middle East were intended to subjugated the regionin light of larger global concerns, namely a future confrontation with enemies real or imagined, such as China.This strategy is flawed, however, as it serves only to increase resentment and Islamist fervor in the Arab world.

In order to truly improve its strategic position in the long-term, the United States must change its foreign policyin two ways. First of all, it must switch from a policy of containment, with nations such as Iran and Syria, to oneof dé'8etente. Iran proved useful in helping to stabilize Afghanistan in 2002, and could be similarly helpful ifengaged in constructive dialogue in the future. Secondly, the US could improve its image in the region by adoptingthe role of a genuine moderator in regional disputes, especially regarding the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Amb.Qassem stressed that while it is necessary to ensure Israel’s existence, it is unnecessary to support its expansion,as the US did during the 1982 invasion of Lebanon and as it continues to do through its acquiescence in the Israelioccupation of the West Bank.

On February 20, the Ibn Khaldun Center hosted a symposium entitled “Constitutional Amendments and ArticleTwo.” Dr. Saad Eddin Ibrahim began the evening’s discussion by reiterating the importance of amending theconstitution and highlighting the role of civil society in leading the way towards constitutional reform. He spokefurther on the necessity of a peaceful rotation of power in government and the protection of civil liberties.

The Egyptian Democracy Support Network (EDSN) has been coordinating a project to draft amendments to the34 articles of the constitution proposed by President Mubarak, as well as Articles 76 and 77, which were notincluded by the president and govern eligibility for presidential office as well as presidential term limits.

The subject of the discussion, Article Two, stipulates that shari’a is the primary source of legislation in Egypt.Liberal scholar Kamal Zakher asserted that Article Two would have to be amended or abandoned if Egypt wishesto modernize its political system. Mr. Zakher added that Article Two institutionalizes discrimination against Egypt’sCopts. Magdi Khalil, another liberal scholar, echoed these sentiments.

Civil Society16

(Mauritania, continued from page 4)

February 2006 17

hree recent events in Egypt highlight the growinginfluence of blogs in the Arab world:

One: the exposure by blogs of sexual assaults on womenin downtown Cairo by gangs of men during a religiousholiday in Cairo in October 2006. Bloggers forced the issueonto the national agenda, turning it into headlines everywherefrom satellite television channels to the Associated Press.

Two: the detention in December 2006 of a police officeraccused of sexually assaulting a prisoner. A month earlier,Egyptian blogs had circulated a video showing the prisoner,Imad el-Kabir, with hands bound behind his back and hislegs held in the air, being sodomized with a stick as thosearound him taunted him.

Three: the ongoing trial of 22-year-old blogger Abdul-Kareem Nabil, also known as Kareem Amer, after postingarticles critical of Islam on his blog. He is charged, amongother things, with insulting the president.

When the security services of President Hosni Mubarak,in power for a quarter of a century, arrest and put on triala blogger, then surely the phrase "David and Goliath"cannot even begin to explain it.So what is it about the bloggersthat can so threaten a regime?

It is the power of youth andtheir new-found ability tocommunicate after years ofbeing ignored. Al-Jazeera andits ilk might have pulled the rugout from under state-ownedmedia, but it was one old manchallenging another. The bloggers are mostly the youngand the excluded and it matters little to them who standson that rug and who pulls it. One young Egyptian told mehe started a blog because he felt he was going to explodeif he didn't tell the world how he felt.

In June 2005, there were around 280 blogs in Egypt. Bythe end of 2006, that number had more than tripled to1,000. Egyptian blogs were the epicenter of a little earthquakeI first felt a couple of time zones to the east at the start of2005. Bahraini and Saudi blogs were my first headyintroductions into the world of online agitprop. The Saudiblogs were particularly sweet for me personally because ofsix miserable years spent as a teenager in Jeddah. One,simply called Saudigirl, felt like the grown-up version ofmy latent teen-angst from those years.

At a conference on Arab media at the National Press Clubin Washington DC in 2005, I quoted Saudigirl describingherself as "young. Saudi chick. unveiled, unconservatized"who had never voted but who hoped one day "to walk inon a ballot box in jeans, t-shirt, and flip-flops so thateveryone can see my pretty toes while I express my freedom."I lost track of her blog for a while until, on a whim, Igoogled her earlier this year to see how Saudigirl was doing.And to my shock it turned out "she" had been a "he" allalong. It was a case of "rhetorical transvestism" confessedAli K, the man who invented and maintained Alia K.

What a bittersweet twist on the gender play of those writersof yore, those George Sands, George Eliots and otherswho adopted male names, persona and wardrobes to splintertaboos. Here was a Saudi man pretending to be a woman.

According to a recent Washington Post story on Saudiblogs, young women make up half the bloggers in thatkingdom today. There are around 2,000 blogs in SaudiArabia. Saudigirl has left the blogosphere in good hands.

Bahraini bloggers didn't coopt gender politics so much asthe politics of fear that had given birth to the color-coded

alert system in place in the USused to describe the "nationalthreat level". When theBahraini authorities arrestedth ree in t e r ne t fo r ummoderators in 2005, bloggerslaunched an appeal on theirbehalf, posted the times andlocations of demonstrationscalling for their release andmaintained an alert system

that used color to describe how close to freedom the menwere.

To appreciate such subversity is to appreciate the wonderof blogs.

No discussion of blogs in the Arab world would be completewithout mentioning the proto-blogger and cyber-dissidentZouhair Yahyaoui who died at the young age of 36 in March2005. Back in July 2001, Zouhair founded the websiteTUNeZINE using the pseudonym "Ettounsi," which meansTunisian in Arabic. He used the online newspaper not justto write about Tunisia's dismal human rights record butalso posted opposition statements on the site.

After his arrest in an internet cafe in 2002, he was sentencedto two years in prison, and actually served 16 months, for"disseminating inaccurate news"--a police state's euphemismfor the truth. It is not difficult to imagine that his earlydemise was precipitated by the torture he was subjected toduring interrogation.

Again, one man plus one website equals one very angrydictator.

By Mona Eltahawy

Arab Blogs Give Youth Venting Space

T

Viewpoints

When the security services ofPresident Hosni Mubarak... arrestand put on trial a blogger, thensurely the phrase “David andGoliath” cannot even begin toexplain it.

Mona Eltahawy is a New York-based commentator and internationallecturer on Arab and Muslim issues.

This article was originally published on February 15, 2007 onwww.bitterlemons-international.org and has been reprinted with theauthor’s permission.

Civil Society, founded in 1991, is published monthly by the Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Studies. The articles in Civil Society do notrepresent any consensus of beliefs. The editorial team does not expect that readers will agree with the arguments presented, but asks readers

to value the necessity of open debate. In order to further this objective, readers are invited to respond.Copyright 2006, all rights reserved.

No part of this publication may be used or reproduced in any form without prior written permission of the publisher. The Ibn KhaldunFoundation for Applied Research Limited is registered in Dublin, Ireland, under the Companies Act 1963-1990. Number: 192603.

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