energy and reality. i-is experience self-supporting (july 2, 1908)

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VOL. V. No. 14. JULY 2, 1908.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHYPSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODSENERGY AND REALITY.'

I. Is EXPERIENCE SELF-SUPPORTING ?TrHE toryof the concept of beingis a long one and constitutesprettymuch the whole storyof philosophy. But whatevermaybe our opinionof Urstoff,pon one thingwe are now agreed,that experiencestuff, s revealed in our immediate feelings andsensations, n theonehand,and our ideal construction,n the other,mustbe thestarting-pointf all our investigations. In terms f thiswe must differentiatend express the problemsof the universe nso faras theycan be expressed. But is reality hrough nd throughexperienceIt has been maintainedfrom time to time,and recentlyby sobrilliantan advocate as Professor James,that experience s self-sufficient;hat it "leans on nothingbut itself"; and thatwe haveno need, therefore,f any reference utsideof experience. If weexamine theproblems f experiencemoreclosely,however,we shallfindthat experience n manyways seemsto depend upon an extra-experiential constitution. I shall mention a few cases in whichexperience mpliessuch a constitution.For one thing,experiencedoes not account for its own conti-nuity, ither s involved n intersubjectiveelationsn space or as in-volved in bridging over frommomentto moment n time. Tospeak of the former ontinuity irst: n order fortwoegos or sub-jects to come to an understandingwith each other,or to communi-cate theirfeelingsand ideas by means of "winged words, some-thingmore s necessary han theirrespective ieldsof consciousness.Certainprocessesmustbe interpolated,uch as physiologicalmove-mentson the part of the speaker,air-waves which take up thesemovements,nd end-organs,with a nervous ystem, eacting othese

1 This paper is the fifth nd last in a series of studies on the attributes ofreality. The first tudy appeared as a monograph, ntitled" Time and Reality,"Psychological Review, Monograph Series, No. 26, 1904; "Space and Reality,"this JOURNAL, ol. III., pp. 533, 589; " The Ought and Reality," InternationalJournal of Ethics, Vol. XVII., p. 454; and "Consciousness and Reality," thisJOURNAL,VOl. V., pp. 169, 225. 365


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366 THE JO URNAL OF PHILOSOPHYstimuli on the part of the listener. Now these intermediateprocessescan not be regarded as experiencein their own right.Unlesswe go back to the breathingworldof A-naximenes e wouldnot be likely to regard air-waves as themselves xperience. Eventhe immediatist, nless he is a solipsist,would have to admit thatotherpeople's immediacys not his immediacy, ut is communicatedby the help of intermediaryrocesses. This wouldbe true even ona telepathichypothesis. How it is possible,by means of such non-conscious intermediaries, or consciousegos to meet in a commonworld,we can not discusshere.

But, in the secondplace, we can not account forthe continuityof experience n time, any more than in space, as leaning uponnothing but experience. To use ProfessorJames's illustration:Peter and Paul go to sleep in the same bed; and whilenot consciousin themeantime, o far as evidenceproves,each one,on wakingup,is immediatelyonscious f hisown past,and one doesnot get mixedup withthe other. Such continuity etweenour waking moments,bridgingover the intervals of experience,must require somethingbesides experience. The reasonthat experience n waking up con-nects withexperiencebefore going to sleep is that both lean upona worldof processeswhichis not experiential. The machinery fassociation,upon which iving-overxperiencedepends, s not itselfexperience. Nor couldwe invokeherea permanent xperience s asolutionof theproblem;forthepermanent xperience urelycouldnot accountfor the coming nd goingof experience s we know t.The same idea might be illustratedequally well with reference osocial experience r the fundedknowledge f therace. Clay tabletsconstitutingibrariesof ancient ore have been unearthed n recentyears in the Orient. Were the ancient librariesof Nineveh andBabylonexperiencewhile buriedin theruins? Did theynot ratherbecome experience gain, after thousandsof years,whentheywereunearthed and deciphered by recent discoverers? Perhaps youretort hat theywerepossibleexperiencen themeantime. But whatdoes possibleexperiencemean in such a case exceptthattheywerenot experienceuntil theybecamecontinuous, s perception nd in-terpretation, ith humanbeingswho stumbledupon the libraries?The phrase "possible experience"onlyhidestheproblem;and if itmeans anythingwhenpressedhome, t is that experience ometimesleans on processesthat are not experience. Possible experience,which is not experience, s no more experiencethan possible elec-tricity,without all the conditions for electricity, s electricity.Whetherwithin ndividualhistory, herefore,r withinthehistoryoftherace, t is evident hat,when youtryto explain its continuity,experience eans upon an extra-experientialonstitution.


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PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 367What I have shown with reference to continuity might beshown qually well with reference o interest. Take, first, case of

primary interest. Why do brilliant things,moving things, oudthings, things to suck, etc., fascinate the infant? Why does thechicken peck at certain things on the ground and shy away atcertainmovements,tc.? Not because ofexperience, urely,becauseit has no past experience o bank on. If we wouldfind he explana-tion for such interest,we must go to biologicalstructure nd not topsychological ssociation. We sum it up by saying that the childand the chicken re so constituted s to feel thisway in the presenceof such stimuli. Evidently experience eans upon what is not ex-perience, s regardsprimary nterest.And if you take into account the more general demands orpostulates that underlie psychological ctivities, hey, too, seem tocarryus beyond experience. Why is consistency leasingand con-tradiction isagreeable otheculturedman Whydo certainformsand combinations f colorsand of sounds stimulatehimto appre-ciation and excitethe feelingforthe beautiful? Why do certainthings provoke disgust and other things approval Partly, nodoubt,on accountof experience; but if certain nstinctive ualifica-tionswere lacking,or if the instinctive onstitutionwere different,the same situationsmightproduce entirely ppositefeelingson thepart of individual experience, s is exemplifiedven now in dif-ferent aces.But not only is thewoofof experience n themakingthus con-ditioned by an instinctivewarp whichexperience an not make orexplain,but cultureand meaning, he net resultof experience ndtendency, re fundedin a way which, o a large extentat least, isunavailable as experience. Physiological endency omes to do thework of memory. It is preciouslittle that a man out of collegetwentyyears, nd engaged n newpursuits, an recall of his collegecurriculum. And yet he feels differentlynd acts differentlye-cause of his collegecourse. Here, again, in the verydefinition fculture,we comeupon a subtle relationto a realitywhichis notexperience. The ego, therefore,whateverelse it may be, is notmerely "bundle of perceptions"or of any other conscious tates.They are notthe whole story, t least.Anotherroad mighthave been chosento showthe insufficiencyof experience s an accountof reality. If we take the immediatistpoint of view, what realitycan we accord to nature? Is naturemerely "bundle of perceptions"'? We havealready found uch anaccount inadequate to the ego; on closer scrutinywe shall find tequally inadequate to nature. If we insist that the objects ofnature are statable merely s our perceptions,we must be prepared


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368 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHYto answer several questions. Does reality consistmerely in theperceptualdifferenceshat things do make, or does it also includethedifferences hichthey can or will make under otherconditionsthanthe present.? But if we admituwillnd can, have we not ad-mitted largerconstitutionhanexperience? And,then,what aboutthe constanciesor uniformitiesn our perceptions, pon which allour expectancies r scientificaws are based? Is it part of percep-tion that perceptions hall.repeat themselves n certaindescribableand definiteways? But ifperceptions o not exist n the meantime,it is hard to see how this uniformity r repetition an be a char-acter of the perceptions. If esse is percipi, t is hard to see whatrealitytherecan be when there s no percipi. In theprediction fan eclipsea thousandyearsfromnow,or thereadingof an eclipsea thousandyears ago, theresurely is no presentperceptionof thefact; and absentperception s hardlyperception. If therecan besuch a thing, hen,as futureperceptions r the readingoffof pastperceptions, xperiencemust lean upon a non-experientialonstitu-tion.

But this s not thewholedifficultyf thephenomenalisticheoryof nature. A deeper problemconfrontsus. Can an individual,whether onsciousorunconscious, e resolved nto relations'? Can athingbe regardedas havingmerely n outside and no inside'? Bythusregarding twe shall, ndeed,avoid theknotty roblem f "thething tself"; but is our accountof realityfair and complete'? Isa thingmerelywhat it does, as Lotze and Plato's Eleatic Strangertellus, waiving for thetimebeingthedifficultyf what it maydo?In the case of one sort of thingat least, namelythepurposive ego,we must admit thathe is notmerelywhathe does, his external on-tinuities, n the senseoftheperceptions e produces n us; but he isalso something n his own account,a center of appreciation andwilling. This is the real core of theego, not thesight-touch-motorcomplex. The latter is the clothes,or part of them; and an indi-vidual consistingmerelyof clothes would be a funnysort of anindividual. The ego, to use a good Hegelian distinction,must besomething ilrsich and not merely n sich,something n its ownaccountas well as something orothers. If onlypurposivebeingshave an inside, s the baby merelyan outside,merelyclothes? Itseems to have a core of feelingof its own,howevercrude. Andwhat about animals? Are they merely n outsidewithno inside?No, they,too, seem to have a core of appetite and feelingwhichwe mustacknowledge. And while we know ittleabout the simplerformsof nature,at least theyare notmerelyfictions f ours. Ouragreementsboutthem are fcofced greements; heyare not createdbyconvention; ndwemust earntoadjust ourselves o these impler


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PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 369realities n order to control hemand realize our purposes. If wewould keepdry in the rain-storm, e must bring our umbrellaandother togs along. Approachingthe problem, hen,fromthe pointof view of the will or our activepurposes,we can notresolvereality,whether onscious r unconscious,ntobundlesof perception, r intoexperienceof any form, ltogether.But how shall we conceive this extra-experientialonstitution?Two importanthypotheseshave become classical, one that of in-dependentand immutable substances,and the other that of theabsolute. First, a word as regardsthe hypothesisof substances.The realistic ubstancesmaybe materialor spiritual; they maybethe atoms of Democritusor the monads of Leibniz. It is quitewrong, hen,to accuse theolder realismof beingmaterialistic. Onthe other hand,thesubstanceswhich have counted n sciencehave,until recent imes t least,been of the extended rmaterialistic rder.Themonadsof Leibnizand thequalitiesofHerbarthave not countedin the development f science,interesting houghthey have beenas metaphysical curiosities. The atomic theory of Democritus,adoptedby modernchemistrynd made exact throughBerzelius'sconception fweightproportions, as, on accountof its conveniencefor modern cience,cometo stand for our ideal of realism.In theolder conception f atomicrealism, he geometrical roper-ties, dependingupon extension, re the important nes; even afterthe idea of energy,n thesenseof doing work,becamea permanentconcept nphysical cience, heconcept fextensionwas longallowedto rank with the concept of energy. This gives rise to HerbertSpencer's antinomy s regards xtension nd force. This antinomy,however,s losingmuchof itsrelevancy y the fact thatextension rmass is relegated o at least a secondplace in thescientific oncep-tion of physicalnature.If thephysicists ad consulted he philosophersnd psychologists,theycould have learnedlong ago that extension s a confused deaand has no reality outside of individual experience. Berkeleypointedout,withhispsychological eenness,hat thesize of a thingvarieswith thedistanceand that the formvarieswith the angle ofthe perspective. He concluded,therefore, hat mattercould notbe real. Modernpsychology, ith ess ofmetaphysicalnterest, utwith superior experimental ools,has likewisepointedout the rela-tive characterof extension. Thus it is shownthat the extensionseems longerwhen the intervening pace is filled than when it isempty,whetheryou take tactual extensionor visual extension.Where the area is too small fortwo points to be discriminated stwo,theystill have thefeelingof a biggerpoint than either of thepointspreviously iscriminated.When a number fpoints remade


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370 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHYto stimulate he skin cells or the retinal cells successively, heexten-sion seems arger than if the stimulation s simultaneous. Even asregards sound, we find an interesting elation betweenthe rate ofsuccession of physical stimuli and the sense of volume. Soundssucceeding ach other t the rate of 1/500 of a second can notbe dis-criminated s distinct sounds, and probably we can not here dis-tinguish he durationof the successive fromthe simultaneous, utthe successive feel bigger than the simultaneous. Not only thevelocity f certain electric urrents, herefore, ut a certainvelocityof nerve currents roducesan apparent mass.

But modernphysical science has been quite untouchedby psy-chological nvestigation. What modern ciencehas been concernedwith has notbeenperceptualextensionwithvaryingconditions, utan artificial nit of extensionor perceptionunder standard condi-tions, as, forexample,the steel-yardkept at a certaintemperatureand otheruniform onditions n the British Museum. As long asthis conventionalunit could be applied under definite onditions,mass still maintained ts hold as an ultimate attribute f physicalreality. I say physical realitybecause the field of investigation,wheremass units have been applied, has been narrowed down tothis. Philosophy since Descartes has recognizedthat there is nosense in speakingof an extendedwill. However,even in physicalscience, erious doubtshave arisen,thoughon experimental nd nota priori grounds,as regardsthe realityof extension nd even ofweight. What has givenrise to thisdoubt in recent cience is thedemonstrationhat neithermass nor even weightcan be regardedas an absoluteconstant, nd that, therefore, ecoursemustbe had,fordescriptivepurposes,to a moreultimateconcept. It has beenshownby Lorentz that even mechanicalmass in motionmustvarywith the electrodynamic ield, nd so is not constant. Mass, more-over,does not seem to apply with equal force to all energy: thereseems obe littlerelevancynspeakingofelectricitys havingeithermass or weight.

The greatest lowto the conception fmass has comefrom ecentinvestigationsnto the nature of electricity. It has been shownthatmass can actually be produced through velocity. Kaufmann, J.J. Thomson, nd othershave demonstrated that if the velocityofa charged body is comparablewith that of light, the mass of thebodywill increasewiththe velocity.2 And not only that,but theexperiments nd calculations, ccording to Thomson, support theview that the whole mass of these electrified articlesarises from2J. J. Thomson, "Electricity and Matter," p. 34.


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PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 371theircharge. s As a numberof brilliantphysicists,ncludingJ. J.Thomson,Rutherford, trutt,etc., take theview thatthe atomcanbe resolved nto negativeelectricchargesheld togetherby positiveelectricity pread overa widervolume, t is only a shortdistancetothe view that there s "no mass otherthan electrodynamicnertia.But, in this case, themass can no longerbe constant; it augmentswiththevelocity nd it dependson the direction, nd a bodymain-tained by a notable velocitywill not oppose the same inertiato theforceswhichtendto deflectt from ts routeas to thosewhichtendto exhilarateor to retard ts progress.4

Such a theory,for mathematicalreasons if for no other,willbe slow in gaining acceptanceamongordinarychemists;but it isnot any the less interestingheoretically n that account. Possiblythe seventy reighty lements fmodern hemistrymay be simplifiedby means of such a theory,but of such a simplificationwe haveonlyhintsat present. The recurrent imilarity n the geometricalgroupingswhich freemagnetsspontaneously ssume in an electro-magneticfieldas you increasetheirnumber, s shownby Mayer'sexperiments, urnishes directanalogy to the periodic law of thechemicalelements nd to the recurrent haracteristics f these ele-ments as shown by spectral analysis. The positive or negativechargeabilityof various elements hows at least an intimate con-nectionbetween hem and electrical nergy. This theory rieswithwonderful lausibilityto account alike forthe stabilityof the ordi-nary chemicalelements nd the unstability f the radioactive ub-stances; but its most nteresting spect to us is that, ike the earliermetaphysical heoriesof ILeibniz nd Boscovich, t reducesmass toenergeticterms. Thus in modernphysical science we have passedfrom a physical world which is made up of mere geometricalfigures nclosingextension, s in the case of the Cartesians,to onethat s non-extended,r whereextensions merely secondaryfunc-tion of energy. How far this hypothesis an be adopted for all

8 t is only fair to say that Thomson in more recentpublications has modi-fiedhis view. As I understand it, he does not now regard it proven that thesum of the apparent masses of the negative charges equals the total mass ofthe atom. There is a residium of gravitational mass which must be accountedfor in other ways. This is now a matter of controversy. But in any case theCartesian idea of atoms as rigid,mathematical figureshas been exploded. Boththe shape and the magnitude of the atom vary with the velocity and themagnetic field. They can be changed by pressure. Energy,not mass, becomes,therefore, he primary physical reality. The atom, Thomson has shown, canbe stated as the sum of its internal energyand the energy of translation.4M. H. Poincare on "The Value of Science," Popular Science Monthly,Vol. LXX., p. 349. For the electrical theory of matter see the lucid expositionby Hon. R. J. Strutt, in his work entitled " The Becquerel Rays and the Prop-erties of Radium," especially pp. 184-193.


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372 THE JO URNAL OF PHILOSOPHYphysical purposes, conveniencemust decide. Whether it can beregardedalso as an ultimatehypothesis oldinggood forthe wholeof reality,we shall discusslater.The motivefor inventing ealisticsubstanceswas no doubt theneed of accountingforthe seemingly otential characterof things,or, to express the same idea in otherwords,to meet the need ofsocial expectancy. But it has always been difficulto make clearwhat potentialmeans. Where are themanifestations f light andheatwhenthey are notmanifestations? Where is the storehouse four ideas whenwe do not thinkof them'? What does the potentialmea-nxcepting hat onesetofchangescan, under certain onditions,give rise to anotherset of changes; that, perhaps,what is not ex-periencecan,under certainother onditions, iverise to experienceThus chemical hangescan giverise toelectricalor nervouschanges.Physical energy, s light rays, is possible light in the sense thatphysicalenergymay give rise to chemical hanges n theretinaandtheseagain to nerve changes n the optic nerveand occipital obes,and these changes again to psychicprocesss. Thus you have thesensationof light. But physical energy, s such, is neitherpoten-tiallynor actually light; it is itself. The potential, herefore,oesnotneed tomeanthe static; it simplymeansthat oneset of changesis the occasionforanother et of changesunderoertaindescribableconditions. And that,failingthese conditions, he changesdo nottake place. This is the meaning of the termspossible and im-possible n nature.The most consistent ttemptto state the potential is that ofAnaxagoras. Accordingto him, the fruit of Demeterwhich weeat and thewaterwhichwe drinkmustcontainthe germsof bloodand tissue and bone and hair whichtheyserve to build up. Thereason that thingscan produce such different esults in differentcombinationss thateverythingontains portion feverything. Itis only the proportion ftheelementswhichvariesand whichdeter-mines he character ftheparticular hing. If pain is present n allstimuliof a great intensity, hen it must really be a propertyofthose timuli at any intensity. On such a theory, s well as accord-ing to its moremodern uccessor, hequalitativetheory f Herbart,everyeffect an be said to be potentiallypresent n the sense ofactuallyexisting n the conditionswhichgive rise to it; and recentcommon-senseheoriesas to the realityof qualities seem to pointin the same direction. The difficulty ith all of these theories sthat we have no evidencethat the brightand the dark, the dryand the moist,the heavy and the light, or any otherperceptualqualities exist until they appear under certain conditions. Thepotential, therefore, s merelya hypothetical tatementof whateffects ill appear,givenall theconditions r thedefinite omplex.


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PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 373The need for constancy r uniformity,owever, oes not requireabsoluteuniformity r absolute constancy. Afterall, we have no

right to assume any more constancy han we find. The chemicalelementsdo, indeed,possess a high degreeof constancy, xcepting,perhaps, hemorerecently iscovered nes, uch as radium; and yetwe haveno right o assume thatthey re absolutely onstant. Whenwe come to the moreplastic organic and psychologicalprocesses,constancy ecomesmuch morerelative. According o the pragmatictest,generally tated, here s just as muchstability r substantialityas thereseems to be or as we must acknowledge. What is the useof assuminga stabilitywhichcan not be verified. No doubtPlatoand Aristotle re right, hat the "science of those thingswhicharein a state of fluxhas no existence.5 But our world furnishes tleast such a degreeof uniformitys makesa reasonableadjustmentto thefuturepossible.The weakness n the statement f themetaphysical ealisticsub-stances,whichthe idealistic criticshave not been slow to pointout,is that, inasmuchas these substancesare independentand indif-ferentto the various combinationsn which they enter, they cannot account for the apparent processes,whetherphysical or per-ceptual. The materialatomsbecomeas useless to accountforthephysical changes as the soul substancesbecomesuperfluousn ac-countingforthe streamof consciousprocesses. The substances, notherwords,mustbe knownthrough heiractivity; and, therefore,activity, nd not substance,becomesthe fundamentalthing; sub-stances o called are a merehypostatizationftherelativeuniformi-ites and constancies, hysicaland psychological, hichwe observe.The other venerablehypothesiswhichtriesto furnish settingforour finite xperienceand to accountfor its comingand goingand its relativity,s thatof absoluteidealism. The history f thistheory s easy enoughto trace; and one can nothelp regrettinghatthe unityof apperceptionof Kant, whichmerelyemphasizesthatthe world is coherent f we are sane, should have been convertedinto a cosmic unity,a unityof nature,by Kant's successors. Tothembeing strungon the unityof our social interests r purposesmeans that nature herselfmustbe thus strung,must be an onto-logical and reflective hole. This theoryhas, indeed,done a greatservice n emphasizing part of reality,neglectedon thewholebythe old realism, namely,that of ideals and institutions. Its in-sistence upon an ideal of systematicunityhas had its great im-portance,too, as an ideal of knowledge. Even if realitycan notbe regardedas such a systematic nityof experience, he dreamofsciencemust be toweavetogether ur humanpurposesand interests"Aristotle, "Metaphysics," Book XII., Chap. 4, ? 3.


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374 THE JO URNVAL OF PHILOSOPHYinto sucha unity. Epistemologically,herefore,hetheory as donegreat service,whatevermay be its one-sidedness. It has also ful-filled nd will always fulfill n important eligiousfunction n manylives n which he esthetic nd intellectual raving s moreprominentthan theethical and practical.But, in spite of the historical importanceof this venerablehypothesis,t has strikingweaknesses. It is not at all clear howan eternaland complete ystemof experiencecan account in anyway forthe comingand going, the tragedies and successes,of ourexperience. The absolute as an hypothesis ails as completely,ndfor the same reason, s the realistic ubstances n meeting heworldof process; and we must go to work,therefore,ndependently fsuchan hypothesis, eautiful nd estheticallyatisfying s it may be,to meet the problems f our finiteworldof change.Moreover,s Plato has long ago pointedout n the" Parmenides,"not only could not such a systemof ideals meet the problemsofchange,but the absolute could notknowour finiteworld,nor couldweknow t. Thatwe couldnot know t must eem apparentenough,for if we knew what an absolute experience s, we should alreadynow possess such an absolute experience, s, indeed, the absoluteidealistshave not been slow to claim; but, even in that case, we,after all, know only what we know. The absolute itself becomesmerelyour construction r our definition f our finite xperience;and we have failed to reach the permanent nd eternalforwhichthe absolutewas supposedto stand. Our absolutesmustvarywiththe growing nsightof the individualand the race,with the evolu-tionaryprocessofhumanexperience.If we can notknowthe absolute,neither an the absoluteknowus. It could not know our failures, ur ignorance, nd our despairsas these failures and ignorance and despairs are for us. Thevery fragmentarinessf these human experiences romtheabsolutepoint of view would convertour despairs intohopes,our tragediesinto comedies,and our failures into successes. Such an absolute,then,even if it existed,could not account for theworld of change,withits adjustments nd maladjustmentsnd its differentevels ofappreciation. Like the realistic substances, t is a hypostatizationand possesses ll therelativity hat the unityoffinite umanexperi-ence,whichcreatedit,mustpossess. That whichexplains processmustmanifest tselfin the process, and, therefore,must itself beprocess. The meaningwe can snatch from he fluxof thingspos-sesses, ndeed,a certaineternitywhile t lasts; it aids us to preparefor the future,as propheticof the larger insight and the largerexperience o come. But as forabsolute permanence,we knowthiseven less in the field of human experiencethan in the case of


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PSYCHlOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHIODS 375chemical lements. The old staticviewof being, herefore,as givenplace to the view of dynamic processes, whether as regards theatoms of the physical sciences or the images and concepts of psy-chology. Being = energy.

JOHN E. BOODIN.UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS.

DISCUSSIONTHE LOGICAL CHARACTER OF IDEASS AID JohnStuartMill: "To draw inferences as been said to bethe great business of life.... It is the only occupationinwhichthemindneverceasesto be engaged." If thisbe so, it seemsa pitythatMill did not recognize hat thisbusiness dentifieswhatwemeanwhenwesay "mind." If he had recognized his,he wouldhave cast the weightof his immensenfluence ot only against theconception hatmindis itselfa substance, ut also against the con-

ceptionthat it is a collection f existential tatesor attributeswith-out any substance n whichto inhere;and wouldthereby ave donemuchto free ogic from epistemologicalmetaphysics. In any case,an accountof intellectual perations nd conditions rom hestand-point of the role played and positionoccupied in the business ofdrawing inferences s a differentort of thing from that whichregardsthem s havingan existence er se, and whichtreatsthem smarking ome sort of existentialmaterial distinctfromthe thingswhichfiguren inference-drawing.This lattertypeof treatmentsthat which underliesthe psychologywhichitself has adopted un-criticallythe remnantsof the metaphysics f soul substance: theidea of accidentswithoutthe substance.1 This assumptionfrommetaphysicalpsychology-the assumptionof consciousness s anexistent tuff r existentprocess-is then carried over into an ex-aminationofknowledge, o as to make the theory f knowledgenotlogic (an account of the ways in which valid inferences r con-clusionsfrom hings o other hings re made), but epistemology.We have, therefore,he result (so unfortunate or logic) thatlogic is not freeto go its ownway,but is compromisedy the as-sumptionthat knowledge goes on not in termsof things (I use

1This conception of "consciousness" as a sort of reduplicate world ofthings comes to us, I think,chieflyfromHume's conceptionthat the " mind isnothing but a heap, a collection of differentperceptions,united together bycertain relations." " Treatise of Human Nature," Bk. I., Pt. IV., Section 2.For the evolutionof this sort of notion out of the immaterial substance notion,see Bush, "A Factor in the Genesis of Idealism," in the James Festschrift.

energy and reality. i-is experience self-supporting (july 2, 1908)

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