engine nacelle halon replacement, faa, wj hughes technical center
DESCRIPTION
International Aircraft Systems Fire Protection Working Group Atlantic City, NJ USA 30-31 October 2002. Federal Aviation Administration WJ Hughes Technical Center, Fire Safety Section, AAR-440 Atlantic City Int'l Airport, NJ 08405 USA. - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
Engine Nacelle Halon Replacement,FAA, WJ Hughes Technical Center
Point of Contact : Doug Ingerson
Department of Transportation
Federal Aviation Administration
WJ Hughes Technical Center
Fire Safety Branch, AAR-440
Bldg 205
Atlantic City Int'l Airport, NJ 08405 USA
tel: 609-485-4945
fax: 609-485-7074
email: [email protected]
web page: http://www.fire.tc.faa.gov/
International Aircraft Systems Fire Protection Working GroupAtlantic City, NJ USA 30-31 October 2002
Federal Aviation AdministrationWJ Hughes Technical Center, Fire Safety Section, AAR-440
Atlantic City Int'l Airport, NJ 08405 USA
Major Topics for Review :
brief overview
revision to minimum performance standard for engine/apu (mpse)
foundation test plans and results
near term plans
International Aircraft Systems Fire Protection Working GroupAtlantic City, NJ USA 30-31 October 2002
Federal Aviation AdministrationWJ Hughes Technical Center, Fire Safety Section, AAR-440
Atlantic City Int'l Airport, NJ 08405 USA
BRIEF OVERVIEW April - July 2002, Testing
Encountered difficulty with hot surface ignition (HSI) during initial MPSE tests
Ran series of tests and observed HSI behavior - determined phenomena is unreliable
Reviewed a sample of reported HSI behaviors
Results indicated current version of the MPSE was faulted by HSI unreliability
Ran 100+ plus tests to find a way to circumvent HSI unreliability
23 & 24 July 2002, Task Group Meeting
Convened and discussed issues involving MPSE and HSI
Agreed MPSE required revision
Conceived method to track Halon 1301 suppression performance using HSI reliably
Formulated rough revision of MPSE (revision 3)
Planned foundation testing to resolve potentially complicating issues
August 2002 - Present
Produced a crude flowchart of MPSE revision 3
Partially completed the foundation testingInternational Aircraft Systems Fire Protection Working Group
Atlantic City, NJ USA 30-31 October 2002
Federal Aviation AdministrationWJ Hughes Technical Center, Fire Safety Section, AAR-440
Atlantic City Int'l Airport, NJ 08405 USA
REVISION OF THE MPSE Evaluating the Basis for the Agent Comparison in the MPSE
MPSE process will have error in results due to environmental behaviors observed to date - conservatism is required, yet error must be minimized where possible
Experienced/reported difficulty with reliable HSI behavior would lead to greater expected error in final results
Equivalence method must represent the associated application in a reliable manner
Equivalence method relies on the occurrence of HSI as it is a threat in this application
Testing during :
April - June 2002; the continually operating electrodes (COE) or a tube array of particular geometry reliably reignited JP-8
June - July 2002; primary ignition difficulty with low volatility fuel (oil) in the spray fire scenario - suspected impact on HSI behavior using the COE alone
July - August 2002; a combination of the COE and the tube array provided reliable HSI behavior for any fuel type evaluated
International Aircraft Systems Fire Protection Working GroupAtlantic City, NJ USA 30-31 October 2002
Federal Aviation AdministrationWJ Hughes Technical Center, Fire Safety Section, AAR-440
Atlantic City Int'l Airport, NJ 08405 USA
REVISION OF THE MPSE The Significant Change to the MPSE
Former version of the MPSE
reliance upon the definition of a “robust” fire
equivalence process required finding a minimum of 3 robust fires
the robust fire was a mixture of test conditions that would be extinguished by Halon 1301 for a portion of a fixed number of duplicate tests (80-90%)
a successful quantity of the replacement candidate was to repeat Halon 1301 behavior against the same conditions
HSI in this geometry is an imprecise behavior and was “buried” in the robust fire
Version 3 of the MPSE
robust fire eliminated
changed performance measure to “Reignition Time Delay” - the time between fire extinguishment and reignition which is based on a video review of the test
“Reignition Time Delay” (RTD) is based on a minimum of 5 tests at like condition
a successful quantity of a replacement candidate will be required to repeat or exceed the RTD for Halon 1301 at the same test conditions
HSI is provided for with intentional secondary ignition sourcesInternational Aircraft Systems Fire Protection Working Group
Atlantic City, NJ USA 30-31 October 2002
Federal Aviation AdministrationWJ Hughes Technical Center, Fire Safety Section, AAR-440
Atlantic City Int'l Airport, NJ 08405 USA
REVISION OF THE MPSE Items of Concern for MPSE revision 3
Concerns are included for consideration in MPSE revision 3 to improve on the body of work to date
Concerns are reasoned as impacts on the credibility of the final results
compartment ventilation conditions
agent storage, release, and distribution
sufficient severity of the fire threat
variation in the RTD must be observed and understood
Concerns will be addressed with foundation testing and review of others’ work
Retain portions of previous MPSE revision to minimize loss of time
International Aircraft Systems Fire Protection Working GroupAtlantic City, NJ USA 30-31 October 2002
Federal Aviation AdministrationWJ Hughes Technical Center, Fire Safety Section, AAR-440
Atlantic City Int'l Airport, NJ 08405 USA
REVISION OF THE MPSE Spray Fire Zone Configuration, MPSE revision 3
FUEL NOZZLES
2” TALL FLAME
STABILIZATION
RIB
TUBE ARRAY
AIRFLOW
FWD
UP
CORE
Section A-A
AIRFLOW
SURFACE TEMPERATURE
MEASUREMENT POINT
FWD
UPSection A-A
International Aircraft Systems Fire Protection Working GroupAtlantic City, NJ USA 30-31 October 2002
Federal Aviation AdministrationWJ Hughes Technical Center, Fire Safety Section, AAR-440
Atlantic City Int'l Airport, NJ 08405 USA
REVISION OF THE MPSE Spray Fire Zone Configuration, MPSE revision 3
AIRFLOW
FWD
UP
FUEL NOZZLES
2” TALL FLAME
STABILIZATION
RIB
TUBE ARRAYCORE
ELECTRODES
sta
502
sta
510
International Aircraft Systems Fire Protection Working GroupAtlantic City, NJ USA 30-31 October 2002
Federal Aviation AdministrationWJ Hughes Technical Center, Fire Safety Section, AAR-440
Atlantic City Int'l Airport, NJ 08405 USA
REVISION OF THE MPSE Process Overview
Parameter for comparing agent suppression performances is RTD; not robust fire
RTD is the duration of time between fire extinguishment and reignition
RTD requires a test fixture which includes RELIABLE secondary ignition sources
Primarily, a single RTD will represent a group of duplicate agent suppression tests
Basis for success : RTD Halon 1301 RTD Candidate replacement
Testing will account for representative :
ventilation conditions
agent storage and discharge considerations
fuels types in a nacelle/APU
fire scenarios
Process will allow for rational test planning
test against the most challenging condition(s)
run verification tests against conditions not explicitly evaluated
attempting to separate fire suppression and agent distribution performancesInternational Aircraft Systems Fire Protection Working Group
Atlantic City, NJ USA 30-31 October 2002
Federal Aviation AdministrationWJ Hughes Technical Center, Fire Safety Section, AAR-440
Atlantic City Int'l Airport, NJ 08405 USA
REVISION OF THE MPSE Process Overview (continued)
FIND CERTIFICATIONDISTRIBUTION FOR
HALON 1301 IN SIMULATOR
SELECT FIRECONDITIONS IN
SIMULATOR
RUN SPECIFIEDNUMBER OF FIRE
EXTINGUISHMENT TESTS
CALCULATE RTD FORHALON 1301 FIRE
EXTINGUISHMENT TESTS
RUN FIREEXTINGUISHMENT
TESTS
CALCULATE RTDFOR REPLACEMENT
CANDIDATE
CHANGETO REPLACEMENT
CANDIDATE
CONTINUE
START
END
CHARACTERIZEDISTRIBUTION OF THE
REPLACEMENT CANDIDATE
IS RTDACCEPTABLE
?
ALTER QUANTITYOF REPLACEMENT
CANDIDATE
SELECT VENTILATIONCONDITIONS
IN SIMULATOR
NO YES
International Aircraft Systems Fire Protection Working GroupAtlantic City, NJ USA 30-31 October 2002
Federal Aviation AdministrationWJ Hughes Technical Center, Fire Safety Section, AAR-440
Atlantic City Int'l Airport, NJ 08405 USA
FOUNDATION TESTING Test Results - Purpose and General Comments
Testing to :
answer questions conceived during initial discussions of MPSE revision 3
provide data to observe behaviors and uncover issues not initially recognized
Focused on previously stated concerns
List of issues to be addressed by this testing
verify the fire threats are sufficiently severe
minimize/understand varying RTD behavior
fuel type - observe/compare combustion behaviors
agent discharge - consistent preburn or tube array temperature
material changes in the tube array - determine its life span
explore residual fire scenario - determine :
which fuel types can burn in this configuration
the significance of HSI phenomena
the effect of the orientation of the pan geometry on fire intensity
International Aircraft Systems Fire Protection Working GroupAtlantic City, NJ USA 30-31 October 2002
Federal Aviation AdministrationWJ Hughes Technical Center, Fire Safety Section, AAR-440
Atlantic City Int'l Airport, NJ 08405 USA
FOUNDATION TESTING Test Results (continued) - Spray Fire Zone Orientation
AIRFLOW
FWD
UP
TUBE ARRAY
STA
527
STA
510
STA
518
STA
532
STA
532
International Aircraft Systems Fire Protection Working GroupAtlantic City, NJ USA 30-31 October 2002
Federal Aviation AdministrationWJ Hughes Technical Center, Fire Safety Section, AAR-440
Atlantic City Int'l Airport, NJ 08405 USA
FOUNDATION TESTING Test Results (continued) - Varying RTD/Decision to Release Agent
Run a series of spray fire tests and evaluate resulting RTDs
Purposes :
determine if RTD variation can be better controlled by releasing the agent after :
a consistent preburn duration expires
a consistent temperature in the tube array is attained
use results to refine MPSE version 3
Current test procedure relies on preburn duration
Control of the test article changed for the trials involving tube array temperature
Conditions :
air flow 2.2 lbm/s @ 100°F
JP-8 0.25 gpm
agent HFC-125 @ 5.2 lbm
Fixed preburn duration 45 seconds
Fixed tube array temperature 1440°F
International Aircraft Systems Fire Protection Working GroupAtlantic City, NJ USA 30-31 October 2002
Federal Aviation AdministrationWJ Hughes Technical Center, Fire Safety Section, AAR-440
Atlantic City Int'l Airport, NJ 08405 USA
FOUNDATION TESTING Test Results (continued) - Varying RTD/Fuel-Spray Fire Intensity
Ran spray fire tests and recorded temperature profiles
Purposes :
observe fire behaviors
compare energy signature for each fuel type/ventilation condition
use data in refining MPSE revision 3
Thermocouples spaced longitudinally in the flame path to provide representative picture of combustion behavior
Each individual test condition was repeated 3 times
Fixture cooled down to near ambient condition between tests
Test conditions :
fuels : JP-8, oil (Mobil Jet Oil II), & hydraulic fluid (Skydrol LD-4)
fuel flow rates : 0.25 gpm +/- 0.03gpm
ventilation conditions : 2.2 lbm/s@100°F & 1.0 lbm/s@300°F
no fire suppression agent released
International Aircraft Systems Fire Protection Working GroupAtlantic City, NJ USA 30-31 October 2002
Federal Aviation AdministrationWJ Hughes Technical Center, Fire Safety Section, AAR-440
Atlantic City Int'l Airport, NJ 08405 USA
FOUNDATION TESTING Test Results (continued) - Varying RTD/Fuel-Spray Fire Intensity
Created averaged temperature profile from data for each set of 3 tests
8 thermocouples, sta 453, 4” (102 mm) & 8” (204 mm) above core, 2@01:30, 04:30, 07:30, & 10:30
1 thermocouple buried in tube array, approximately sta 510 (“515”), 12:00
1 thermocouple mounted on door exterior, sta 514, 11:30
2 thermocouples, sta 518, 4” & 8” above core, 12:00
4 thermocouples, sta 532, 4” & 8” above core, 2@01:00, 11:00
6 thermocouples, sta 551 upper, 4” & 8” above core, 2@01:30, 10:30, 12:00
Calculated a relative “heat” production reference to compare combustion intensity
calculated areas under the averaged temperature traces from 30 to 80 seconds
summed all areas for thermocouples affected by fire (sta’s 510, 514, 518, 532, 551)
subtracted area for sta 453 thermocouples to remove “heat” present in air stream
International Aircraft Systems Fire Protection Working GroupAtlantic City, NJ USA 30-31 October 2002
Federal Aviation AdministrationWJ Hughes Technical Center, Fire Safety Section, AAR-440
Atlantic City Int'l Airport, NJ 08405 USA
FOUNDATION TESTING Test Results (continued) - Residual Fire Investigation/Fuel Ignition
Ran pool fire tests and recorded temperature profiles
Purposes
determine which fuels can be ignited in the residual fire scenario
use data to refine MPSE revision 3
Fixture geometry :
master fuel pan in the simulator filled to make a water bath
smaller stainless steel fuel pan located in the water bath
Test conditions :
fuels : JP-8, oil (Mobil Jet Oil II), & hydraulic fluid (Skydrol LD-4)
fuel quantity : 0.47 gallon (1” deep puddle) in 10.5” x 10.3” x 1.5” deep pan
fuel temperature prior to test : 150°F+ (by thermocouple submerged in fuel)
ignition exposure : 10 - 30 seconds intermittently for 3 minutes
ventilation conditions : 2.2 lbm/s@100°F & 1.0 lbm/s@300°F
no fire suppression agent released
International Aircraft Systems Fire Protection Working GroupAtlantic City, NJ USA 30-31 October 2002
Federal Aviation AdministrationWJ Hughes Technical Center, Fire Safety Section, AAR-440
Atlantic City Int'l Airport, NJ 08405 USA
FOUNDATION TESTING Test Results (continued) - Residual Fire Orientation
AIRFLOW
FWD
UP
These assemblies not
present during testing
STA 502
MASTER
FUEL PAN
CH4 NOZZLE & ELECTRODES
(shown out of position)
INSERT FOR FUEL PAN
S
TA
527
CORE
International Aircraft Systems Fire Protection Working GroupAtlantic City, NJ USA 30-31 October 2002
Federal Aviation AdministrationWJ Hughes Technical Center, Fire Safety Section, AAR-440
Atlantic City Int'l Airport, NJ 08405 USA
FOUNDATION TESTING Test Results - Conclusions
Fire intensity
clean simulator cross section was an insufficient threat
secondary ignition elements required to maintain sufficient threat
Varying RTD
no significant difference noted between releasing agent based on consistent preburn or tube array temperature
fuel types have varying energy signatures - expect impact on RTD to be noticeable
JP-8 worst case for 2.2 lbm/s air flow@100°F
oil selected as worst case for 1.0 lbm/s air flow@300°F
tube array has a life span of 10 fire tests
variation in environmental conditions observed as a noticeable impact
Residual fire scenario
JP8 was the only fuel ignited - oil and hydraulic fluid were not
remaining tests are incompleteInternational Aircraft Systems Fire Protection Working Group
Atlantic City, NJ USA 30-31 October 2002
Federal Aviation AdministrationWJ Hughes Technical Center, Fire Safety Section, AAR-440
Atlantic City Int'l Airport, NJ 08405 USA
NEAR TERM PLANS Complete foundation testing
Determine the impact/relevance of HSI on the residual fire scenario
Determine the impact of altering the fuel surface geometry in the residual fire scenario on combustion intensity
Ultimately, need to “bench-mark” Halon 1301 in this scenario in some manner
Finalize MPSE revision 3
Discuss/resolve issues
incorporate results of foundation testing completed to date
agent - storage/distribution criteria
final process - need to methodically evaluate replacement candidates without excessive test counts
Commit process to paper
Complete Testing for the replacement candidates by Jun 2003
International Aircraft Systems Fire Protection Working GroupAtlantic City, NJ USA 30-31 October 2002
Federal Aviation AdministrationWJ Hughes Technical Center, Fire Safety Section, AAR-440
Atlantic City Int'l Airport, NJ 08405 USA