VoVoyage Monitoringyage Monitoring

Step 6Voyage Monitoring

TASK 13 - Continuously monitor progress along the planned track

The voyage monitoring process starts simultaneously with the voyage execution and will continue until the ship will reach the destination berth.– The voyage monitoring process consists in a continuos

comparation of the OS position with the planned route leg;

– The Master should be always alerted by the OOW when he has a problem related with the planned route;

– During the navigation watch, the OOW (including the N.O.) has no right to modify the planned route without the Master approval.

• All nautical publications and documents related to the voyage planning should be available on the bridge for:– The easy use of the OOW during the voyage;

– The use of the N.O. which can add new notes and remarks on the chart or in the Voyage Planning book.

• All the available navigation equipment should be used for voyage monitoring and

For Voyage Monitoring

For Voyage Monitoring

The following rules should be applied: – Give highest priority to position fixing by visual bearings– Use at least 2- 3 position lines (a combination of ranges

and bearings) to fix the ship's position if properly planned,

– Parallel indexing and clearing bearings ranges are useful position fixers. But, if parallel indexing is used, OOWs must still plot positions on the chart

– Where possible, use transit bearings to calculate compass error

– Do not use floating objects (buoys or beacons) for position fixing, unless their positions have been accurately established

For Voyage Monitoring

The following rules should be applied: – Allow for errors of compass, sextant and other

navigational aids or equipment. – Use the echo sounder to verify the UKC and the position

of the vessel.– When using GPS for position fixing, the datum on the

chart must match that in the GPS. If the datums are different, modify the GPS reading according to the note given on the chart

– The interval between fixes should be pre agreed and consistent. This will help you to estimate the future position of the vessel.

Grounding of Grounding of M/V BeritM/V Berit

Trindelen Bank, DenmarkTrindelen Bank, Denmark5 January 20065 January 2006

Narrative• The container feeder vessel M/V Berit departed St

Petersburg on 3 January 2006. • At 2345 on 4 January the 00.00-04.00 lookout

reported to the bridge. • The 2/O arrived shortly after and there was a brief

handover between the second and 3/Os. • The sea and weather conditions were good, with

little other vessel traffic to cause concern.• At 00.30 the 2/O sent the lookout down below to

stand-by in the crew mess.

Narrative (continue)• Just after passing the next buoy, DW76, the 2/O

overheard some conversation between other ships on VHF in his native Ukrainian tongue.

• When the conversation ended the 2/O spent 2-3 minutes on the VHF asking for news from the Ukraine.

• A short while later, he received two text messages on his mobile telephone, which started a long text message dialogue.

DW 76

DW 74

M/V Berit planned

route

Narrative (continue)• At some point in the exchange of text messages

the 2/O walked from the starboard to the port bridge wing to obtain a stronger signal on his mobile telephone.

• As he did so, he observed from the ECDIS display that the ship still had some distance to run before reaching the next course alteration.

• This alteration, at buoy DW74, would take the ship into the Kadetrenden TSS.

Narrative (continue)• Over 40 minutes later, the 2/O felt the ship vibrate,

and he rushed to the centre console. • Noticing the ship’s speed over the ground indicated

the ship was stationary, he immediately reduced the pitch on the CPP to zero and called the master.

• At 01.47, the ship had run aground on the Trindelen bank at 54° 31.17 N 012° 03.31 E.

• After a diver survey revealed two breaches of the hull into water ballast tanks, Berit sail on to Rotterdam for temporary repair.

DW 76

DW 74

M/V Berit planned

route

M/V Berit grounding position

CAUSE OF ACCIDENT

• The grounding of Berit occurred because the 2/O failed to make an alteration of course in accordance with the navigational plan.

• The 2/O was distracted for over 40 minutes prior to the grounding, missing the required waypoint.

• The distraction of the mobile telephone,and its consequent use, led to the 2/O neglecting his duties and not keeping a safe navigational watch for over 40 minutes

• A text ‘conversation’ that lasted 40 minutes, during which the telephone operator did nothing else significant, despite having demanding duties to perform, would be highly unusual.

• The investigation therefore considered whether the OOW was engaged in something more engrossing, such as playing a computer game on a mobile telephone, gaming machine or personal computer.

TIME OUT

Grounding of U.S. Passenger VesselEmpress of the North

Icy Strait - AlaskaMay 14, 2007

The Accident• Carrying 206 passengers and 75 crewmembers, the

Empress of the North left Skagway the evening of May 13 and traveled south on Lynn Canal at about 12 knots.

• The bridge team consisted of the helmsman, who was an experienced AB, and the junior 3rd mate, who was on his first underway watch as a licensed officer.

• To make the westward turn into Icy Strait, the vessel could take either a route that ran between Rocky Island and the mainland at Point Couverden or one that went around Rocky Island to the south before turning west.

• The decision, according to the master and the chief mate, was left to the individual watch officer.

• Both routes were marked on the vessel’s navigation charts.

• About 3 minutes before the accident, the helmsman initiated an 80° turn to the west, indicating that he intended to pass between Rocky Island and Point Couverden.

• Shortly thereafter, without informing the junior 3rd mate, the helmsman altered his course to the left. He then told the junior third mate that he did not think the vessel was turning fast enough.

• The junior 3rd mate observed the helmsman increase the rate of turn and looked for the flashing green light on Rocky Island but could not see it.

• When he saw rocks, he issued his first steering order, “Hard left,” but it was too late to prevent the vessel from hitting the rocks.

• The Safety Board therefore concludes that the Empress of the North bridge team was attempting to negotiate an 80° turn at Rocky Island, a charted navigation hazard, but the vessel’s rate of turn was insufficient to prevent it from grounding on the rocks.

Junior 3rd Mate’s Actions• As OOW, the junior 3rd mate failed to avoid a

navigation hazard that was clearly marked on the navigation chart and whose flashing green light both he and the helmsman had seen from less than a mile away.

• The charted rock was clearly marked and conspicuous, and both men on watch were aware of its location.

• The grounding therefore was the result of a gross navigation error.

• The junior 3rd mate was unfamiliar with the route and during the accident voyage, relied on the helmsman for navigation and steering.

• Thus, the junior 3rd mate ceded his authority to make navigation decisions to the helmsman.

• The helmsman did not inform the junior 3rd mate of his intentions, and the officer did little to direct the helmsman until just before the accident.

• 3 minutes before the accident, the junior 3rd mate gave his first indication of a maneuvering intention when he stated, “We’ll pass inside of that,” referring to the flashing green light on Rocky Island that he had just seen.

• By “pass inside” he presumably meant pass between Rocky Island and Point Couverden.

• The junior 3rd mate had no experience with the ship and was in no position to judge how it would handle during an 80° turn while traveling at 12 knots at night.

Inadequate Voyage Plan• ……• Aids to navigation, such as the navigation light on

Rocky Island, should be listed and described. • Local information from the Coast Pilot should also be

noted on the plan. • If a voyage plan had been available that contained the

information found in the Coast Pilot:– “As currents are erratic in the channel between Rocky

Island and Point Couverden, the slight saving in distance this channel offers does not warrant its use”,

the junior 3rd mate would have been warned not to attempt to pass north of Rocky Island.

ConclusionsConclusions

• The Empress of the North bridge team was attempting to negotiate an 80° turn at Rocky Island, a charted navigation hazard, but the vessel’s rate of turn was insufficient to prevent it from grounding on the rocks.

• The master jeopardized the vessel’s safety by allowing the junior 3rd mate to stand a bridge watch before he was familiar with the route and the bridge equipment.

• The master’s watch assignment created a poorly functioning bridge team in which an inexperienced officer in charge (the junior 3rd mate) did not exercise authority and an experienced subordinate (the helmsman) exceeded his authority.

• The junior 3rd mate’s failure to navigate the Empress of the North past Rocky Island did not result from deficiencies in his maritime training.

• The junior 3rd mate failed to understand and fulfill his responsibilities as a licensed officer on an underway navigation watch.

• Maritime academy cadets would benefit from learning about the circumstances of this accident, particularly their responsibility as newly licensed officers to prepare themselves for assigned duties and to express their concerns if placed in situations for which they are unprepared.