***Evrn Mgmt K*** **1NCThe resolution addresses the ocean as an object for human management- McWhorter 92Prof of Philosophy and Women, Gender & Sexuality studies @ Univ. of Richmond(Ladelle, Guilt as Management Technology: A Call to Heideggerian Reflection Heidegger and the Earth, pg. 5-7)

The noted physicist Stephen Hawking, in his popular book A Brief History of Time, writes, The eventual goal of science is to provide a single theory that describes the whole universe.5 Such a theory, many people would assert, would be a systematic arrangement of all knowledge both already acquired and theoretically possible. It would be a theory to end all theories, outside of which no information, no revelation could, or would need to, occur. And the advent of such a theory would be as the shining of a light into every corner of being. Nothing would remain concealed. This dream of Hawkings is a dream of power; in fact, it is a dream of absolute power, absolute control. It is a dream of the ultimate managerial utopia. This, Heidegger would contend, is the dream of technological thought in the modern age. We dream of knowing, grasping everything, for then we can control, then we can manage, everything. But it is only a dream, itself predicated, ironically enough, upon concealment, the self-concealing of the mystery. We can never control the mystery, the belonging together of revealing and concealing. In order to approach the world in a manner exclusively technological, calculative, mathematical, scientific, we must already have given up (or lost, or been expelled by, or perhaps ways of being such as we are even impossible within) other approaches or modes of revealing that would unfold into knowledges of other sorts. Those other approaches or paths of thinking must already have been obliterated; those other knowledges must already have concealed themselves in order for technological or scientific revelation to occur. The danger of a managerial approach to the world lies not, then, in what it knows not in its penetration into the secrets of galactic emergence or nuclear fission but in what it forgets, what it itself conceals. It forgets that any other truths are possible, and it forgets that the belonging together of revealing with concealing is forever beyond the power of human management. We can never have, or know, it all; we can never manage everything. What is now especially dangerous about this sense of our own managerial power, born of forgetfulness, is that it results in our viewing the world as mere resources to be stored or consumed. Managerial or technological thinkers, Heidegger says, view the earth, the world, all things as mere Bestand, standing-reserve. All is here simply for human use. No plant, no animal, no ecosystem has a life of its own, has any significance, apart from human desire and need. Nothing, we say, other than human beings, has any intrinsic value. All things are instruments for the working out of human will. Whether we believe that God gave Man dominion or simply that human might (sometimes called intelligence or rationality) in the face of ecological fragility makes us always right, we managerial, technological thinkers tend to believe that the earth is only a stockpile or a set of commodities to be managed, bought, and sold. The forest is timber; the river, a power source. Even people have become resources, human resources, personnel to be managed, or populations to be controlled. This managerial, technological mode of revealing, Heidegger says, is embedded in and constitutive of Western culture and has been gathering strength for centuries. Now it is well on its way to extinguishing all other modes of revealing, all other ways of being human and being earth. It will take tremendous effort to think through this danger, to think past it and beyond, tremendous courage and resolve to allow thought of the mystery to come forth; thought of the inevitability, along with revealing, of concealment, of loss, of ignorance; thought of the occurring of things and their passage as events not ultimately under human control. And of course even the call to allow this thinking couched as it so often must be in a grammatical imperative appealing to an agent is itself a paradox, the first that must be faced and allowed to speak to us and to shatter us as it scatters thinking in new directions, directions of which we have not yet dreamed, directions of which we may never dream. Development of the ocean space is rooted in destructive management ontologies. Deuchars 2013Deuchars, Robert. "Governmentality and Risk: Managing Ocean Space."Research Paper International Environmental Law (LAWS 530)(2013): n. pag. Web.Faculty of Law Victoria University of WellingtonThe majority of the literature on international environmental law does not consider any of the above to be anything other than part of the lexicon of terms that are used to describe and to analyse environmental problems. Similarly ocean space is now increasingly divided up by regional bodies, established by conventions to oversee the management of (usually) labelled species that are to be managed and or protected by these bodies that have a series of measures that have been designed to ensure the survivability of the resources under our gaze. Ernst Haas asked the provocative question in the 1970s Why ocean space rather than the human environment, the ecosystem, atmospheric space or outer space?1 What Haas did was to ground the concept ocean space as materiality giving that space a territorial function for the purposes of regime construction. In that sense Haas made a valuable early contribution to thinking about the vastness of the oceans and of the living things that constitute ocean space by attributing to it the same ontological status as territory. It is, of course a double-edged sword contribution as once the oceans are perceived on the same plane of reality as land a twofold effect occurs. Firstly, there is the recognition that the ocean space is not limitless; it has boundaries.2 And secondly, once boundaries are concretised, there is ample room for territorial disputes over the space itself and increasingly the resources contained within those boundaries. Ocean space and the ecosystem which is used in the legal definition of the methodological approach to the management of ocean space in fisheries are described as complex adaptive systems and the behaviour of the parts or individual scale-entities has a co-evolutionary effect on the behaviour of all the other agents. In other words nonlinearity represents a clear break with Cartesian certainty and opens up theoretical space for uncertainty, irreducible indeterminism and exposes the weaknesses of our fondness for reductionist forms of analysis. Breaking things down into their smallest constituent parts seems to have much appeal but when we reveal the objects of our enquiries are more often than not repeated practices and processes situated in irreversible time we are confronted with the in-built limitation of both static analysis and reductive analysis.3 This is not an entirely new idea and has been well explained in other texts. Karl Mannheim in his classic work Ideology and Utopia exposes our tendencies to attempt to make rigid and fixed practices and processes to give the illusory appearance of spatiotemporal stability. Again, this situation may make for a certain utility of analysis, but covers up critical areas of experience such as complexity, emergence and the inherent instability of identities. He notes: The world of external objects and of psychic experience appears to be in a state of continuous flux. Verbs are more adequate symbols for this situation than nouns. The fact that we give names to things which are in flux implies inevitably certain stabilization oriented along the lines of collective activity. The derivation of our meanings emphasizes and stabilizes that aspect of things which is relevant to activity and covers up, in the interest of collective action, the perpetually fluid process underlying all things.4 Mannheim published this work in the 1930s, not so long after the establishment of quantum mechanics, which had revealed a number of fundamental problems for physics but which also became germane to the study of social systems too. However Mannheim appears to be acutely aware of the functional reasons why we do not, in most cases, attempt to designate things as they really are. He acknowledges that the interest of collective action serves to simplify and solidify unstable entities for the explicit purpose of functional activity. This logic gives impetus for us to problematise the fluid concepts of nation-states, the system of nation-states and the myriad conventions that constitute most aspects of global governance, including international environmental law. The nation-state and the international system of states are on-going projects and can never be said to be fully complete. There is a continuous ebbing and flowing of people, information, laws and norms, and the transportation of matter-energy flows. When Mannheim mentions the the perpetually fluid process underlying all things we should be careful to place this phrase in context. It can be taken too far thus disabling our attempts to analyse any given phenomenon. The stabilization of things is often required for us to make any meaningful statements about them. Although Mannheims statement may be correct, stability is often required for analytical convenience even when we know that it merely represents an approximation of the real. In this essay I will consider one body that has been established to manage the ocean space within set geographic boundaries. As stated in article 2 of its convention the objective of this body is to act through the application of the precautionary approach and an ecosystem approach to fisheries management, to ensure the long-term conservation and sustainable use of fishery resources and, in so doing, to safeguard the marine ecosystems in which these resources occur. This body is the South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organization (SPRFMO), which was instituted after years of negotiation under the Convention on the Conservation and Management of High Seas Fishery Resources in the South Pacific Ocean in November 2009 and entered into force in December 2012.5 The Convention itself falls under the auspices of United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)6 which was established the 1982, although many similar regional regimes predate the present framework for ocean governance. In the pages that follow I will outline a critique that takes the terms mentioned at the very beginning of this essay into account and suggest that far from being reasonable and unproblematic, it is more reasonable to suggest that these words and terms, and others similar to them, and the framework of thinking in which they inhabit, are indicative of the culturally modernist ontology and predominantly positivist epistemology that tend to dominate the discourse of so-called advanced industrialised societies. In doing so I will have to open up the scope of my enquiry well beyond environmental law and into areas of philosophy and in particular the question of the relationship humans have with nature, the international political economy of industries beyond fishing techniques and accepted practice, and the great uncertainties and gaps in scientific knowledge7 in general and of the deep seas in particular. Furthermore, my point of departure necessitates a questioning of the use and abuse of technology to pursue questionable ends in general8 and technological practices in particular, especially those practices that have enabled humans to fish in deeper waters using techniques that do not discriminate between fish, marine mammals, other life-forms and the ocean space.

Planetary destruction is inevitable absent a reconceptualization of our relationship with the earthMcWhorter 92 (Ladelle, Asst Prof of Philosophy @ Northeast Missouri State Univ., Heidegger and the Earth, p. x)In "Earth-Thinking and Transformation," Kenneth Maly shows us ways in which Heideggerian reflection upon the fact of our being as earth-dwellers can be transformative of our thinking at its very core and therefore transformative of our world. Maly believes that our culture's insistence upon a divorce between rationality and other ways of thinking and knowing has resulted in an impoverishment of our being and a destructive distancing from the earth that gives rise to, shelters, and sustains us. When we take ourselves and the earth as fixed entities to be comprehended by rational observation and theoretical constructs we lose sight of earth and being-human as process, as forever unfixed, as changing, growing, outgrowing, as living and therefore dying. It is only when we begin to think human being and earth as unfixed, as always undergoing transformation in a living unfolding of our/its being that a new, less destructive understanding of humanity-in/on-earth can come into being. And such understanding, Maly would argue, is absolutely necessary if we are to avoid destroying the earth.

Alterative: Vote Negative to do nothing. Rejecting Managerial relations with the ocean is critical to reforge our understanding of humanity inside of nature. Irwin 2008Irwin, Ruth. "Technological Enframing." Heidegger, Politics, Climate Change and Risking It All. New York: ContinuumInternational Group, 2008. N. pag. Print.By thinking back through the horizion of technology and the origins and unfolding of metaphysics, Heidegger brings to light the potential for constructive change from the seeming boundedness of the consummation of Nihilism. Ereignis, or Event at Work, emerging in its own most way. Perhaps because we are ever increasingly aware of the zone of the line, we are increasingly enabled and ready for a more ordinary (as Heidegger would put it) comprehension of what makes it meaningful to be human and what is meaningful to apprehend in earthiness. Heidegger is no technophobe and the saving power is present within the nihilism of the consummation of metaphysis. In other words, we forget to attune ourselves to being during the period while calculating logic dominates our relation with the earth; but at the same time, living in the zone of consummate nihilism increases our readiness for genuine enquiry into the beingness of being. Being in the zone of the consummation of nihilism is not, however enough. What is necessary is for humanity to remember the attunement and care, or love that will enable alternative ways of knowing, and a new epoch of earthly habitation to energy: the responsibility of whoever participates in this matter must in a responsive word that springs from a persistent questioning within the great possible worthiness of question that nihilism displays, and which assumed and sustained as responsive to such worthiness. (Heidegger, 1119a: 294). That is the ereignis, or the ownmost potential of humanity itself. Without this attuned caring attitude, the capability of inquisitive intuition, human beings are just blind existences and that we mite continue over the line, to the extinction of nothingness and the unabsorable. We can never be there (da sein) so the import of what is over the line can never matter. The philosophical works of Heidegger and junger on technology are some of the most important contributions made to philosophy in the last century . The significance It has for cultural change is not being felt yet but ideas are circulating and it will be interesting to see how they shape and influence future approaches to culture, politics, and particularly our ability to adapt to climate change as a boundary of possibility.

**LinksEnviromental Crisis Modernity recreates environmental crises by conceptualizing the environment as a resource to manage- fundamentally reducing our relationship to the environment as standing reserve Ross, 07 [Andrew Peter, PhD candidate Queens University department of philosophy, September "Rethinking Environmental Responsibility: Heidegger, Profound Boredom and the Alterity of Nature https://qspace.library.queensu.ca/bitstream/1974/866/1/Ross_ Andrew_P_200709_MA.pdf]

In order to capture the full importance of concepts such as physis and primordial nature, it is necessary to introduce, very briefly, the background theory to which such concepts are largely a response. In particular, Heideggers conception of technological modernity offers an understanding of our current environmental crisis that makes notions such as primordial nature and physis particularly relevant to the focus of this thesis. Technology for Heidegger does not refer to a particular device or mechanism but to the grounding of modernity, a ground that Heidegger calls Enframing (das Gestell) (QCT 19). As the ground of modernity, the Gestell defines how beings show uphow they presence or disclose themselvesfor modern Dasein. The Gestell does not refer to an occasional way of viewing beings, but instead refers to the modern understanding of Being itself; in other words, it is the dominant epoch-defining world-understanding of modernity. In it beings show up as, and only as, stock or standing- reserve (Bestand) (17). Within the Gestell, beings show up as pure resource: the earth is disclosed as a coal mining district, and its soil as mineral deposit (14). To clarify, we might ask what it means to be disclosed as Bestand. Significantly, Heidegger is not intending to argue, as might be supposed, that natural beings are simply encountered as a collection of tools, beings that are ready-to-hand for our various human projects. The influence of the Gestell extends somewhat deeper: the Gestell is actually the way in which the real reveals itself as standing-reserve (23). Modern technology, then, involves more than the use of beings as means-to-an-end; rather, it entails a particular way of conceptualizing reality or the real and all of the beings encountered in it. Consequently, what is unconcealed no longer concerns man even as object, but does so, rather, exclusively as resource (26-27 emphasis added). What is unique about modernity, then, is not the fact that beings show up as resources the world of work in all epochs requires that beings occasionally show up as subsumable in some mannerbut that they show up as nothing but resource. Thus in being disclosed as Bestand, the very Being of beingsthe way in which they are disclosed in the worldbecomes entirely fixed. Heidegger confirms this one-dimensional disclosure to be the plight of the natural world in his assertion that within the Gestell, [ N]ature becomes a gigantic gasoline station, an energy source for modern technology and industry (MA 50). In comparing nature to a gasoline station, Heidegger is not simply arguing that nature shows up as a resource, but that nature shows up as nothing but a resource: gasoline stations cannot appear as anything other than a resource. Natural beings, then, like gasoline stations, are disclosed as entirely one-dimensional in their being. In this manner, Heidegger offers a somewhat different interpretation of our current environmental crisis. For Heidegger, humanitys assault upon the earth lies not in our plundering of resources or the eradication of species, but in the one-dimensional disclosure of natural beings as nothing other than Bestand.

The affirmative immediate call to remedy our current environmental crisis lock in managerial human action which replicates causes of ecological catastrophe McWhorter 92, Professor of Philosophy and Women's Studies Department of Philosophy University of Richmond, 92 [LaDelle, Heidegger and the Earth: Essays in Environmental Ethics, page vii-viii]

When we attempt to think ecologically and within Heidegger's discourse (or"perhaps better: when we attempt to think Heideggerly within ecological concerns), the paradoxical unfolds at the site of the question of human action. Thinking ecologically - that is, thinking the earth in our time -means thinking death; it means thinking catastrophe; it means thinking the possibility of utter annihilation not just for human being but for all that lives on this planet and for the living planet itself. Thinking the earth in our time means thinking what presents itself as that which must not be allowed to go on, as that which must be controlled, as that which must be stopped. Such thinking seems to call for immediate action. There is no time to lose. We must work for change, seek solutions, curb appetites, reduce expectations, find cures now, before the problems become greater than anyone's ability to solve them - if they have not already done so. However, in the midst of this urgency, thinking ecologically, thinking Heideggerly, means rethinking the very notion of human action. It means placing in question our typical Western managerial approach to problems, our propensity for technological intervention, our belief in human cognitive power, our commitment to a metaphysics that places active human being over against passive nature. For it is the thoughtless deployment of these approaches and notions that has brought us to the point of ecological catastrophe in the first place. Thinking with Heidegger, thinking Heideggerly and ecologically, means, paradoxically, acting to place in question the acting subject, willing a displacing of our will to action; it means calling ourselves as selves to rethink our very selves, insofar as selfhood in the West is constituted as agent, as actor, as controlling ego, as knowing consciousness. Heidegger's work calls us not to rush in with quick solutions, not to act decisively to put an end to deliberation, but rather to think, to tarry with thinking unfolding itself, to release ourselves to thinking without provision or predetermined aim.

Ocean

Development of the ocean space is rooted in destructive management ontologies. Deuchars 2013Deuchars, Robert. "Governmentality and Risk: Managing Ocean Space."Research Paper International Environmental Law (LAWS 530)(2013): n. pag. Web.Faculty of Law Victoria University of WellingtonThe majority of the literature on international environmental law does not consider any of the above to be anything other than part of the lexicon of terms that are used to describe and to analyse environmental problems. Similarly ocean space is now increasingly divided up by regional bodies, established by conventions to oversee the management of (usually) labelled species that are to be managed and or protected by these bodies that have a series of measures that have been designed to ensure the survivability of the resources under our gaze. Ernst Haas asked the provocative question in the 1970s Why ocean space rather than the human environment, the ecosystem, atmospheric space or outer space?1 What Haas did was to ground the concept ocean space as materiality giving that space a territorial function for the purposes of regime construction. In that sense Haas made a valuable early contribution to thinking about the vastness of the oceans and of the living things that constitute ocean space by attributing to it the same ontological status as territory. It is, of course a double-edged sword contribution as once the oceans are perceived on the same plane of reality as land a twofold effect occurs. Firstly, there is the recognition that the ocean space is not limitless; it has boundaries.2 And secondly, once boundaries are concretised, there is ample room for territorial disputes over the space itself and increasingly the resources contained within those boundaries. Ocean space and the ecosystem which is used in the legal definition of the methodological approach to the management of ocean space in fisheries are described as complex adaptive systems and the behaviour of the parts or individual scale-entities has a co-evolutionary effect on the behaviour of all the other agents. In other words nonlinearity represents a clear break with Cartesian certainty and opens up theoretical space for uncertainty, irreducible indeterminism and exposes the weaknesses of our fondness for reductionist forms of analysis. Breaking things down into their smallest constituent parts seems to have much appeal but when we reveal the objects of our enquiries are more often than not repeated practices and processes situated in irreversible time we are confronted with the in-built limitation of both static analysis and reductive analysis.3 This is not an entirely new idea and has been well explained in other texts. Karl Mannheim in his classic work Ideology and Utopia exposes our tendencies to attempt to make rigid and fixed practices and processes to give the illusory appearance of spatiotemporal stability. Again, this situation may make for a certain utility of analysis, but covers up critical areas of experience such as complexity, emergence and the inherent instability of identities. He notes: The world of external objects and of psychic experience appears to be in a state of continuous flux. Verbs are more adequate symbols for this situation than nouns. The fact that we give names to things which are in flux implies inevitably certain stabilization oriented along the lines of collective activity. The derivation of our meanings emphasizes and stabilizes that aspect of things which is relevant to activity and covers up, in the interest of collective action, the perpetually fluid process underlying all things.4 Mannheim published this work in the 1930s, not so long after the establishment of quantum mechanics, which had revealed a number of fundamental problems for physics but which also became germane to the study of social systems too. However Mannheim appears to be acutely aware of the functional reasons why we do not, in most cases, attempt to designate things as they really are. He acknowledges that the interest of collective action serves to simplify and solidify unstable entities for the explicit purpose of functional activity. This logic gives impetus for us to problematise the fluid concepts of nation-states, the system of nation-states and the myriad conventions that constitute most aspects of global governance, including international environmental law. The nation-state and the international system of states are on-going projects and can never be said to be fully complete. There is a continuous ebbing and flowing of people, information, laws and norms, and the transportation of matter-energy flows. When Mannheim mentions the the perpetually fluid process underlying all things we should be careful to place this phrase in context. It can be taken too far thus disabling our attempts to analyse any given phenomenon. The stabilization of things is often required for us to make any meaningful statements about them. Although Mannheims statement may be correct, stability is often required for analytical convenience even when we know that it merely represents an approximation of the real. In this essay I will consider one body that has been established to manage the ocean space within set geographic boundaries. As stated in article 2 of its convention the objective of this body is to act through the application of the precautionary approach and an ecosystem approach to fisheries management, to ensure the long-term conservation and sustainable use of fishery resources and, in so doing, to safeguard the marine ecosystems in which these resources occur. This body is the South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organization (SPRFMO), which was instituted after years of negotiation under the Convention on the Conservation and Management of High Seas Fishery Resources in the South Pacific Ocean in November 2009 and entered into force in December 2012.5 The Convention itself falls under the auspices of United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)6 which was established the 1982, although many similar regional regimes predate the present framework for ocean governance. In the pages that follow I will outline a critique that takes the terms mentioned at the very beginning of this essay into account and suggest that far from being reasonable and unproblematic, it is more reasonable to suggest that these words and terms, and others similar to them, and the framework of thinking in which they inhabit, are indicative of the culturally modernist ontology and predominantly positivist epistemology that tend to dominate the discourse of so-called advanced industrialised societies. In doing so I will have to open up the scope of my enquiry well beyond environmental law and into areas of philosophy and in particular the question of the relationship humans have with nature, the international political economy of industries beyond fishing techniques and accepted practice, and the great uncertainties and gaps in scientific knowledge7 in general and of the deep seas in particular. Furthermore, my point of departure necessitates a questioning of the use and abuse of technology to pursue questionable ends in general8 and technological practices in particular, especially those practices that have enabled humans to fish in deeper waters using techniques that do not discriminate between fish, marine mammals, other life-forms and the ocean space.Development Oceanic development enframes ecology as resources it reduces the environment to a resource base, terraforming it through networks of consumption like highways and airports that ensures separation from nature and produces new strategies of social controlLuke 97, dept of poly sci @ Virginia Polytechnic institute(Timothy W., The (Un)Wise (Ab)Use of Nature: Environmentalism as Globalized Consumerism http://www.cddc.vt.edu/tim/tims/Tim528.PDF)An environmental act, even though the connotations of most contemporary greenspeak suggests otherwise, is a disciplinary move.33 Environmentalism in these terms strategically polices space in order to encircle sites and subjects captured within these enveloping maneuvers, guarding them, standing watch over them, or even besieging them. And, each of these actions aptly express the terraforming programs of sustainable development. Seen from the astropanopticon, Earth is enveloped in the managerial designs of global commerce, which environmentalize once wild Nature as now controllable ecosystems. Terraforming the wild biophysical excesses and unoptimized geophysical wastes of the Earth necessitates the mobilization of a worldwatch to maintain nature conservancies and husband the worldwide funds of wildlife. Of course, Earth must be put first; the fully rational potentials of second nature's terraformations can be neither fabricated nor administered unless and until earth first is infrastructuralized.34 This is our time's Copernican revolution: the anthropogenic demands of terraforming require a biocentric worldview in which the alienated objectivity of natural subjectivity resurfaces objectively in managerial theory and practice as "ecosystem" and "resource base" in "the environment." Terraforming the Earth environmentalizes a once wild piece of the cosmos, domesticating it as "humanity's home" or "our environment." From narratives of world pandemics, global warming, or planetary pollution, global governance from the astropanopticon now runs its risk analyses and threat scenarios to protect Mother Earth from home-grown and foreign threats, as the latest security panics over asteroid impacts or X-File extraterrestrials in the United States express in the domains of popular culture. Whether it is space locusts from Independence Day or space rocks snuffing out Dallas in Asteroid, new security threats are casting their shadows over our homes, cities, and biomes for those thinking geo-economically in the astropanopticon. From such sites of supervision, environmentalists see from above and from without, like the NASA-eyed view of Earth from Apollo spacecraft, through the enveloping astropanoptic designs of administratively controllable terraformed systems.35 Encircled by enclosures of alarm, environments can be disassembled, recombined, and subjected to expert managers' disciplinary designs. Beset and beleaguered by these all-encompassing interventions, environments as ecosystems and terraformations can be redirected to fulfill the ends of new economic scripts, managerial directives or administrative writs.36 How various environmentalists might embed different instrumental rationalities into the policing of ecosystems is an intriguing question, which will be explored below.

Warming Global warming drives continual geo-engineering and locks our understanding the environment as an object to manage.Joronen, 2k10 (Mikko, Dept of Geography and Faculty of Mathematics and Natural Sciences, U of Turku, The Age of Planetary Space: On Heidegger, Being, and Metaphysics of Globalization, pg 224-5)

Perhaps one of the most striking examples of the need for non-violent resistance and power-free following of the abyssal earth is the contemporary event of global warming. While this devastating change is affecting all parts of the earth, even the atmosphere, some of the most vulgar solutions, especially the geo-engineering proposals, aim at intentional, even global scale, climate modification either by reducing the incoming radiation from the sun for instance, by using the refractive screens or sunshade of autonomous spacecrafts installed in space (Angel 2006), and by spraying cooling sulphate particle concentrations in the stratosphere (Crutzen 2006) or by removing CO2 from the atmosphere for instance, by increasing carbon sequestration with iron fertilization pumped at oceans (Buesseler&Boyd 2003). These various potential geoengineering implementations seem to do nothing but follow the baseline of the gigantic machination, the subjugation of things into orderable reserve commanded to stand by so that they may be manipulated by the operations of calculation. Even though such geo-engineering may eventually mitigate the negative consequences of climate change, it offers a calculative moulding of even more complex systems of orderings as a solution to the problem of global warming, which is by itself subordinate to, as well as an outcome of, this manipulative and calculative subjugation of earth, the logic of circular self-overcoming in the ever greater modalities of exploitative power. As Malpas writes, although it is evident that more complex systems of orderings also increase the possibilities of their failure, machination always presents itself as a source for continuous improvements by simply viewing these failures as an indication of a further need for technological perfection (2006:298). In other words, machination does not implicate an achievement of total ordering, but a drive toward total ordering where this drive itself is never under suspicion. Nevertheless, as contemporary climate change indicates, earth never allows itself to become captured, completely controlled, or emptied into unfolding that frames it in terms of orderable and exploitable standing-reserve. Earth rather resists all attempts to capture it: it resists by pointing out the lack that leads to the failure of all systems of orderings. It is precisely this lack, the line of failure that has always already started to flee the perfect rationalization and total capture of things, which presents the earth aspect of Heidegger. Instead of the calculative engineering of technical solutions, the non-violent resistance allows the earth to become a source of abyssal being, a source of self-emerging things that always retains a hidden element since the earth never allows itself to become completely secured though particular world-disclosures (see Harrison 2007:628; Peters&Irwin 2002:8). In other words, instead of mere calculative manipulation, we can resist the manipulative machination of earth and thus let the living earth become a source of abyssal being, an earth-site for our dwelling.

Alternative Energy The affirmative attempts to develop energy production posits the earth standing reserves- dominates nature Beckman 2000Beckman, Emeritus Professor of Philosophy, 2000 [Tad, Harvey Mudd College, Martin Heidegger and Environnmental Ethics, page @ http://www2.hmc.edu/~tbeckman/personal/HEIDART.HTML]

Heidegger clearly saw the development of "energy resources" as symbolic of this evolutionary path; while the transformation into modern technology undoubtedly began early, the first definitive signs of its new character began with the harnessing of energy resources, as we would say. (7) As a representative of the old technology, the windmill took energy from the wind but converted it immediately into other manifestations such as the grinding of grain; the windmill did not unlock energy from the wind in order to store it for later arbitrary distribution. Modern wind-generators, on the other hand, convert the energy of wind into electrical power which can be stored in batteries or otherwise. The significance of storage is that it places the energy at our disposal; and because of this storage the powers of nature can be turned back upon itself. The storing of energy is, in this sense, the symbol of our over-coming of nature as a potent object. "...a tract of land is challenged into the putting out of coal and ore. The earth now reveals itself as a coal mining district, the soil as a mineral deposit." {[7], p. 14} This and other examples that Heidegger used throughout this essay illustrate the difference between a technology that diverts the natural course cooperatively and modern technology that achieves the unnatural by force. Not only is this achieved by force but it is achieved by placing nature in our subjective context, setting aside natural processes entirely, and conceiving of all revealing as being relevant only to human subjective needs. The essence of technology originally was a revealing of life and nature in which human intervention deflected the natural course while still regarding nature as the teacher and, for that matter, the keeper. The essence of modern technology is a revealing of phenomena, often far removed from anything that resembles "life and nature," in which human intrusion not only diverts nature but fundamentally changes it. As a mode of revealing, technology today is a challenging-forth of nature so that the technologically altered nature of things is always a situation in which nature and objects wait, standing in reserve for our use. We pump crude oil from the ground and we ship it to refineries where it is fractionally distilled into volatile substances and we ship these to gas stations around the world where they reside in huge underground tanks, standing ready to power our automobiles or airplanes. Technology has intruded upon nature in a far more active mode that represents a consistent direction of domination. Everything is viewed as "standing-reserve" and, in that, loses its natural objective identity. The river, for instance, is not seen as a river; it is seen as a source of hydro-electric power, as a water supply, or as an avenue of navigation through which to contact inland markets. In the era of techne humans were relationally involved with other objects in the coming to presence; in the era of modern technology, humans challenge-forth the subjectively valued elements of the universe so that, within this new form of revealing, objects lose their significance to anything but their subjective status of standing-ready for human design. (8)

The aff mindset leads us to view nature as a standing reserve of resources placed solely for our benefitBeckman, 00 (Emeritus Professor of Philosophy, Humanities and Social Sciences at Harvey Mudd CollegeTad Beckman, Martin Heidegger and Environmental Ethics. http://www2.hmc.edu/~tbeckman/personal/Heidart.html)

The essence of technology originally was a revealing of life and nature in which human intervention deflected the natural course while still regarding nature as the teacher and, for that matter, the keeper. The essence ofmoderntechnology is a revealing of phenomena, often far removed from anything that resembles "life and nature," in which human intrusion not only diverts nature but fundamentally changes it. As a mode of revealing, technology today is a challenging-forth of nature so that the technologically altered nature of things is always a situation in which nature and objects wait, standing in reserve for our use. We pump crude oil from the ground and we ship it to refineries where it is fractionally distilled into volatile substances and we ship these to gas stations around the world where they reside in huge underground tanks, standing ready to power our automobiles or airplanes. Technology has intruded upon nature in a far more active mode that represents a consistent direction of domination. Everything is viewed as "standing-reserve" and, in that, loses its natural objective identity. The river, for instance, is not seen as a river; it is seen as a source of hydro-electric power, as a water supply, or as an avenue of navigation through which to contact inland markets. In the era oftechnehumans were relationally involved with other objects in the coming to presence; in the era of modern technology, humans challenge-forth the subjectively valued elements of the universe so that, within this new form of revealing, objects lose their significance to anything but their subjective status of standing-ready for human design.Wind Farms Wind farms appropriate the ocean as a object for continual extraction- reliance on consumptive politics turns the aff. Brittain 2 professor of philosophy(Gordon G. Jr. , Fitting Wind Power to landscape: a place-based wind turbine) Borgmanns interpretation of technology and the character of contemporary life can be criticized in a number of ways. Still, the distinction between things and devices reveals, I think, the essence of our inability to develop a landscape aesthetic on which contemporary wind turbines are or might be beautiful and thereby explains the widespread resistance to placing them where they might be seen. The fact of the matter is that contemporary wind turbines are for most of us merely devices. There is therefore no way to go beyond or beneath their conventionally uncomfortable appearance to the discovery of a latent mechanical or organic or what-have-you beauty. The attempt to do so is blocked from the outset by the character of the machine.Think about it for a moment: Except for the blades, virtually everything is shielded, including the towers of many turbines, hidden from view behind the same sort of stainless steel that sheathes many electronic devices. Moreover, the machinery is located a great distance away from anyone, save the mechanic who must first don climbing gear to access it and often, for liability reasons, behind chain-link fences and locked gates.The lack of disclosure goes together with the fact that the turbines are merely producers of a commodity, electrical energy, and interchangeable in this respect with any other technology that produces the same commodity at least as cheaply and reliably. The only important differences between wind turbines and other energy generating technologies are not intrinsic to what might be called their design philosophies. That is, while they differ with respect to their inputs, their fuels, and with respect to their environmental impacts, the same sort of description can be given of each. There is, as a result, but a single standard on the basis of which wind turbines are to be evaluatedefficiency. It is not to be wondered that they are, with only small modifications among them, so uniform. In terms of this uniformity, wind turbines are very much unlike other architectural arrivalsfor example, houses and traditional windmills. Different styles of architecture developed in different parts of the world in response to local geological and climatic conditions, to the availability of local materials, to the spiritual and philosophical patterns of the local culture. As a result, these buildings create a context. In Heideggers wonderful, dark expression, these buildings gather. But there is nothing local or gathering about contemporary wind turbines. They are everywhere and anonymously the same, whether produced in Denmark or Japan, placed in India or Spainalien objects impressed on a region and in no deeper way connected to it. They have nothing to say to us, nothing to express, no inside. They conceal rather than reveal. The sense of place that they might eventually engender cannot, therefore, be unique.In addition, wind turbines are quintessential devices in that they preclude engagement. Or rather, the only way in which the vast majority of people can engage with them is visually (and occasionally by ear). People cannot climb over and around them, they cannot get inside them, they cannot tinker with them. They cannot even get close to them. There is no larger and non-trivial physical or biological way in which they can be appropriated or their beauty grasped. The irony, of course, is that, precluded from any other sort of engagement with wind turbines, most people find them visually objectionable, though they might be willing to countenance their existence as the lesser of evils.

Managerialism Technological approaches to ocean management separates humanity from nature creating an inauthentic relationship the perpetuates environmental destruction. Irwin 2008Irwin, Ruth. "Technological Enframing." Heidegger, Politics, Climate Change and Risking It All. New York: ContinuumInternational Group, 2008. N. pag. Print.The narrow perception of technology as tools to be skillfully wielded sets humanity up as the master of nature and encourages the forgetting of our own objectification as standing reserve and potential resources under the enframing of technology. In the desire for universal calculation of more and more efficient means of production and consumption, humanity, Heidegger argues, has lost the focus on enquiry and meaning fullness that are the particular and most important aspects of what it is to be human. Rational calculation might enhance technological innovation but it also reinforces the illusory view that humanity is in control and mastery over nature. This chapter aims to analyze the limitations of subjectivity, language and machine, particularly our transmission of meaning and understanding from and between one another, whether pedagogical or merely coexistence. What collides in Heideggers philosophy is the culture of individualisms and consumerism that characterizes modernity and the change in nature of technology in scale, efficiency and long-term mass storage. With special attention to information communication technologies I wish to examine what elements of technology enframe or subjective experiences of the world as distinct from the interpolation of people into the modern paradigm. Computer programmers, institutional set ups, approaches to materialism; curriculum and pedagogical relationships are dominated by modern capitalist concepts of subjectivity, society and the environment. It is impossible to bracket technology out of modern culture as the two are so intertwined; yet technology and modernity are not exactly synonymous. Technological equipment affects our subjective phenomelogical experiences of our environment. Distinguishing technology from modernity as two interlinked but separate elements make it possible to forge a new Unsprung or origin, which begins new modes of social and environmental interaction with a deeper commitment to ecological, equable and ethical living arrangements. It opens the possibility of an ecological fut-ure that includes technological innovation rather than assuming the moderation of consumerism is inevitably backwards looking, utopian romanticism. It is often argued that humanity is unique among living beings because we are capable of self-reflection and thinking about the world that we live in. While individualism has been co-opted by a surveillance regime and governance style based on consumer choices. it is very difficult to abandon the notion that we each have personal, active agency that is a result of reflective thinking and from which we might influence predominate world-views and instigate change. The determinism of Jungers Gestalt and the usurping of all aspects of nature and character into the war machine closes down the possibility of anything more than swallowing and willing consumerist culture. Heidegger describes emphasis on master as creating the illusion that each individual has more choices than ever before. However, These choices are circumscribed the technological horizon of disclosure which obscures any other ways of knowing or enquiring into the meanifullness of being alive. Yet, these kinds of discussion make the narrow limitations of the technological gestell, or horizon, more visible and, paradoxically, introduce a window into a new paradigm. The environment has been in sore need of reflection and requires a commensurate change in the attitudes and lifestyle that dominates Western culture and is increasingly becoming a global phenomenon. The global phenomenon of modernity has become a victim of its own success. Modernity and change that will result in new philosophies, new attitudes, new narratives and interests and new lifestyles. How the transformation might take place is difficult to forsee. It has been to the detriment of the entire plane that consumerism has become the right of people everywhere. The ability to think our way of the enframing of technology has some potential, although the impossible dreaming often sidelines such thinking, or it is co-opted into ever-increasing science of govermentality (Foucault, 1979). Aff locks in Managerial subject object dichotomy with earth- destroys the environment. DeLuca 5 (Kevin Michael DeLuca, Associate Professor of Speech Communication and adjunct in the Institute of Ecology at the University of Georgia, Thinking With Heidegger: Rethinking Environmental Theory and Practice, Ethics & the Environment 10.1 (2005) 67-87, Project Muse)

The first stasis point revolves around humanity's relation to nature. To put it plainly, in environmental circles it is still a Cartesian world, wherein the founding act is human thinking (cogito ergo sum) and the [End Page 71] earth is object to humanity's subject. This position is clear in mainstream environmentalism, where humans act to save the object earth and, fundamentally, this action is motivated by the subject's self-interest. So, we must save the rain forests because they contain potential medical resources and because they alleviate global warming. Now certainly this base anthropocentrism has come under attack from various radical environmentalisms that posit biocentrism or ecocentrism. I would argue, however, that these anti-anthropocentric positions have not escaped the gravity of Cartesianism. This is evident at both theoretical and practical levels. Theoretically, in the effort to avoid the stain of anthropocentrism all beings are posited as having equal intrinsic worth/value and difference is leveled. The banana slug is equal to homo sapiens. There are problems with this. Most obviously, the concept of intrinsic worth/value is philosophically incoherentworth/value by definition is always relational. More significantly for this discussion, to posit intrinsic worth/value is to deny the ecological insight that all beings are constituted in relation to other beings and their environment. Further, to deny difference is to blunt analysis of our current situation and to deny the differential levels of effects different species have. Homo sapiens is not another type of slug and must be analyzed with that awareness. In practice, radical groups, most notably Earth First!, often demonize humans as a cancer on the planet. As the metaphor suggests, humans are seen as somehow different from all other forms of life, an alien other, not a part but apart. Even more significantly, the metaphor of cancer suggests humans to be active subjects preying on the object earth. Indeed, the problem with humanity, as with the cancer cell, is that it is too active. Although radical groups offer a different valuation, note that this position does not trouble the terms of Cartesianism. The dichotomies subject-object, human-animal, culture-nature, civilization-wilderness, remain intact. The active subject humanity threatens the object earth. The statsis point in actual environmental debates revolves around reform and radical environmental groups dismissing each other's seemingly oppositional positions as, respectively, anthropocentic and compromised versus misanthropic and unrealistic, while remaining oblivious to the underlying Cartesian presuppositions they both share. In other words, reform environmentalists privilege humanity while radical environmentalists demonize humanity. In this morality play on the fate of the [End Page 72]planet, humanity, whether hero or villain, is the actor. Heidegger's thinking on the subject-object dichotomy, Descartes, and the phenomenology of the structure of reality offer a useful lever with which to displace these dichotomies and challenge the traditional ontology that undergirds and girdles environmental thinking. Citing the Cartesian ontology of the world as dominant, Heidegger in Being and Time works to "demonstrate explicitly not only that Descartes' conception of the world is ontologically defective, but that his Interpretation and the foundations on which it is based have led him to pass over both the phenomenon of the world and the Being of those entities within-the-world which are proximally ready-to-hand" (1962, 128). Briefly, Heidegger critiques Descartes for positing a "bare subject without a world" (1962, 192) and for relying on mathematics, which produces the sort of Reality it can grasp, thus "the kind of Being which belongs to sensuous perception is obliterated, and so is any possibility that the entities encountered in such perception should be grasped in their Being" (1962, 130). Descartes' ontology presumes the dynamic of an isolated subject grasping mathematically world as object. Arguably, it is this perspective that is at the root of the environmental crisis, for the world is reduced to an object laid out before me and I am reduced to a detached subject that has only a use-relation to a dead world.Sustainability The aff enframes the earth through sustainability their desperate calls for action are guided by belief in an ideal environmental equilibrium to which we can return, organizing consumption and movement around an ecological center be suspicious of their data because their metaphysical assumptions structure their authors researchSwyngedouw 6Erik Swyngedouw [Professor of Environment and Development at the University of Manchester] Impossible Sustainability and the Post-Political Condition September 2006

Environmentalists (whether activists or scientists) invariably invoke the global physical processes that threaten our existence, and insist on the need to re-engineer nature, so that it can return to a sustainable path. Armed with their charts, formulas, models, numbers, and grant applications, to which activists usually add the inevitable pictures of scorched land, factories or cars emitting carbon fumes, dying animals and plants, suffering humans, apocalyptic rhetoric, and calls for subsidies and financial support, scientists, activists, and all manner of assorted other human and non-human actants enter the domain of the social, the public, and, most importantly, the political. Thus natures enter the political. A particular and symbolically enshrined nature enters the parliament of politics, but does so in a duplicitous manner. It is a treacherously deceitful Nature that enters politics, one that is packaged, numbered, calculated, coded, modelled, represented by those who claim to possess, know, understand, speak for the real Nature. In other words, what enters the domain of politics is the coded and symbolised versions of nature mobilised by scientists, activists, industrialists and the like. This is particularly evident in examples such as the debate over GMOs, global climate change, BSE, biodiversity loss, and other equally pressing issues. Invariably, the acting of Nature -- as scripted by the bearers of natures knowledge enters the political machinery as coded language that also already posits its political and social solution and does not tolerate, in the name of Nature, dissent other than that framed by its own formulations. It is in this sense of course that the argument about climate change is exclusively formulated in terms of believers and non-believers, as a quasi-religious faith, but the weapons of the struggle in this case are matters of fact like data, models, and physico-chemical analysis. And the solutions to the question of sustainability are already pre-figured by the way in which nature is made to speak. Creeping increases in long term global temperatures, which will cause untold suffering and damage, are caused by CO2 output. Hence, the solution to future climate ills resides in cutting back on CO2 emissions. Notwithstanding the validity of the role of CO2 in co-constituting the process of climate change, the problematic of the future calamities the world faces is posited primarily in terms of the physical acting of one of natures components, CO2 as is its solution found in bringing CO2 within our symbolic (socio-economic) order, futilely attempted with the Kyoto agreement or other neo-liberal market-based mechanisms. Questioning the politics of climate change in itself is already seen as an act of treachery, as an unlawful activity, banned by Nature itself.

Sustainable technology doesnt resolve any problems but perpetuates a history of management ontology recreating the quick fix mentality. G. Goeminne 2010Published online: 26 September 2010 Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010 Centre Leo Apostel for Interdisciplinary Studies, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Krijsgkundestraat 33, 1160 Brussels, BelgiumEntering sustainable technology in the Google search bar today yields over 800,000 hits, most of them readily answering the question What is sustainable technology? Answers range from bio-fuels over electric vehicles and recycling to waste management and they all imply a not explicitated understanding of what both technology and what sustainability is. In congruence with Heideggers forgottenness of the question of being, I tend to suggest the presence of a forgottenness of the question of sustainable technology in societal discourse. Just as Heidegger argued that our first and main interest with the question of being should not be in straightforwardly answering it in terms of beings (implying an understanding of what it is to be) but rather in getting a proper access to the very question itself, I will argue that it is timely and necessary to develop an adequate perspective from which the question of sustainable technology can be raised again. For more than 20 years, sustainable development has been advocated as a way of tackling deeply intertwined global environmental problems and human development issues such as climate change and poverty. While the broad goals have been widely embraced and sustainable development is now a much quoted policy objective, its implementation seems further away than ever: the cooperative global environmental governance regime envisioned at the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio is still in an institutional incubator while neo-liberal economic globalization has become fully operational with environmental degradation and global poverty still burgeoning. It is my view that the crux of this impasse lies in sustainability politics finding itself trapped in a socio-technical divide: sustainability is regarded either a technical or a social project and there seems to be no space, political nor conceptual, to think out of this two-tiered framework.1 What ties most sustainability approaches together is their common way of framing and representing the root problems. Science being regarded as themirror of nature, sustainability issues are indifferently framed in terms of hard natural science issues and their soft social consequences. Although the social and the technical side of the divide differ in the degree of importance they ascribe to the soft social aspects of sustainability issues [see also Paredis (this volume)], both regard the hard fact based problem analysis as foundational. Basically, our lifeworld is threatened by too much CO2 in the air, too much nitrates in the water, too little biodiversity, etc. Whereas both sides agree on this aspect of problem framing, they fundamentally differ in terms of solution thinking. In the mainstream technical approach, the concept of sustainability is embedded in a techno-scientific discourse both in framing the problem as well as in architecting solutions. Here, technology is seen as a neutral instrument, a fix, which can be employed to solve -scientifically framed- sustainability problems. This approach typically argues for an eco-efficiency strategy in which a technology push boosts efficiency levels of natural resource use by a factor 10 and more. Situated on the opposite side of the socio-technical divide, the social approach calls for a socio-cultural lifestyle switch, relying on new values, downsizing and sufficiency strategies instead of on technology. In this substantive account of technology, the industrial megamachine (e.g.Mumford) is an autonomous driver of social change and the specific characteristics of technology and artefacts are hardly recognized.

**Impacts Turns CaseCritisim is a prior question to engage productive politics- Attempts to solve the environment lead to error replication Irwin 2008Irwin, Ruth. "Technological Enframing." Heidegger, Politics, Climate Change and Risking It All. New York: ContinuumInternational Group, 2008. N. pag. Print.technological enframing is at play (in a completely unreflexive manner) in McKitricks understanding of climate change, where the calculations necessary for the technological intervention are still needed. The blind assumption is that humanity can ascertain the underlying, fixed and essential mathematical formula for understanding and predicting the circulation of weather, and then humanity can invent, or reproduce, technological devices for correcting the imbalance of the weather (and thus the climate). Unfortunately, it looks increasingly likely that it is the alienation from the natural tempo and the intricate interweavings of the ecology that has caused climate change in the first place. The illusion that technology lent humanity mastery over nature is beginning to show up as a trick, not a truth. With all our best efforts, with the best political will in the world, we can only keep trundling along the same path that has caused the problem in the first place, umbrellad as we are, by the enframing of technology. To this end, Heidegger keeps delving back, to the Ursprung the original springing off place of philosophical ideas that have shaped up the assumptions and world-view of modernity, of Being and of truth.

Extinction Management causes extinction reduction of the environment to resources flattens the earth, enframing it within a single way of knowing that produces Eurocentric environmental approaches that end in extinctionLander 2, (Edgardo, Prof. of Sociology and Latin American studies at the Venezuelan Central University in Caracas, Eurocentrism, Modern Knowledges, and the Natural Order of Global Capital, Nepantla: Views from South 3.2, muse)

The freedom of commerce that the interests of these transnational companies increasingly impose on peasants throughout the world is leading to a reduction in the genetic variety of many staple food crops. This reduction in genetic diversity, associated with a engineering view of agriculture and based on an extreme, industrial type of control over each phase of the productive processwith genetically modified seeds and the intensive use of agrochemicalsdrastically reduces the auto-adaptive and regenerative ability of ecological systems. And nevertheless, the conservation of biodiversity requires the existence of diverse communities with diverse agricultural and medical systems that utilize diverse species in situ. Economic decentralization and diversification are necessary conditions for biodiversity conservation. (Shiva 1997, 88) Agricultural biodiversity has been conserved only when farmers have total control over their seeds. Monopoly rights regimens for seeds, either in the form of breeders rights or patents, will have the same impact on in situ conservation of plant genetic resources as the alienation of rights of local communities has had on the erosion of tree cover and grasslands in Ethiopia, India and other biodiversity-rich regions. (99)12 As much as for preserving genetic diversityan indispensable condition of lifeas for the survival of rural and indigenous peoples and cultures all over the planeta plurality of ways of knowing must coexist, democratically. Current colonial trends toward an intensified, totalitarian monoculture of Eurocentric knowledge only lead to destruction and death.

Eco-Management BadEnvironmental management causes ecological degradation disengagement from the natural world and alternative modes of revealing create ontological diversity necessary for environmental resilienceKatz 00 (Eric Katz, associate professor of philosophy and director of the Science, Technology, and Society Program, New Jersey Institute of Technology; recognized pioneer, environmental ethics, 2K, Nature as Subject: Human Obligation and Natural Community)

Even more important, the question arises whether or not Nature can heal these wounds of human oppression. Consider the reverse process, the human attempt to heal the wounds of Nature. We often tend to clean up natural areas polluted or damaged by human activity, such as the Alaskan coast harmed by the Exxon Valdez oil spill. But we also attempt to improve natural areas dramatically altered by natural events, such as a forest damaged by a massive brush fire, or a beach suffering severe natural erosion. In most of these kinds of cases, human science and technology are capable of making a significant change in the appearance and processes of the natural area. Forests can be replanted, oil is removed from the surface of bays and estuaries, sand and dune vegetation replenish a beach. But are these activities the healing of Nature? Has human activityscience and technologyrestored Nature to a healthy state? No. When humans modify a natural area they create an artifact, a product of human labor and human design. 12 This restored natural area may resemble a wild and unmodified natural system, but it is, in actuality, a product of human thought, the result of human desires and interests. All humanly created artifacts are manifestations of human interestsfrom computer screens to rice pudding. An ecosystem restored by human activity may appear to be in a different categoryit may appear to be an autonomous living system uncontrolled by human thoughtbut it nonetheless exhibits characteristics of human design and intentionality: it is created to meet human interests, to satisfy human desires, and to maximize human good. Consider again my examples of human attempts to heal damaged natural areas. A forest is replanted to correct the damage of a fire because humans want the benefits of the forestwhether these be timber, a habitat for wildlife, or protection of a watershed. The replanting of the forest by humans is different from a natural re-growth of the forest vegetation, which would take much longer. The forest is replanted because humans want the beneficial results of the mature forest in a shorter time. Similarly, the eroded beach is replenishedwith sand pumped from the ocean floor several miles offshorebecause the human community does not want to maintain the natural status of the beach. The eroded beach threatens oceanfront homes and recreational beaches. Humanity prefers to restore the human benefits of a fully protected beach. The restored beach will resemble the original, but it will be the product of human technology, a humanly designed artifact for the promotion of human interests. After these actions of human restoration and modification, what emerges is a Nature with a different character than the original. This is an ontological difference, a difference in the essential qualities of the restored area. A beach that is replenished by human technology possesses a different essence than a beach created by natural forces such as wind and tides. A savanna replanted from wildflower seeds and weeds collected by human hands has a different essence than grassland that develops on its own. The source of these new areas is differentmanmade, technological, artificial. The restored Nature is not really Nature at all. A Nature healed by human action is thus not Nature. As an artifact, it is designed to meet human purposes and needsperhaps even the need for areas that look like a pristine, untouched Nature. In using our scientific and technological knowledge to restore natural areas, we actually practice another form of domination. We use our power to mold the natural world into a shape that is more amenable to our desires. We oppress the natural processes that function independent of human power; we prevent the autonomous development of the natural world. To believe that we heal or restore the natural world by the exercise of our technological power is, at best, a self-deception and, at worst, a rationalization for the continued degradation of Nature for if we can heal the damage we inflict we will face no limits to our activities. This conclusion has serious implications for the idea that Nature can repair human destruction, that Nature can somehow heal the evil that humans perpetuate on the earth. Just as a restored human landscape has a different causal history than the original natural system, the reemergence of Nature in a place of human genocide and destruction is based on a series of human events that cannot be erased. The natural vegetation that covers the mass grave in the Warsaw cemetery is not the same as the vegetation that would have grown there if the mass grave had never been dug. The grass and trees in the cemetery have a different cause, a different history, that is inextricably linked to the history of the Holocaust. The grassy field in the Majdanek parade ground does not cover and heal the mud and desolation of the death campit rather grows from the dirt and ashes of the site's victims. For anyone who has an understanding of the Holocaust, of the innumerable evils heaped upon an oppressed people by the Nazi regime, the richness of Nature cannot obliterate nor heal the horror. In this essay I question the environmentalists' concern for the restoration of nature and argue against the optimistic view that humanity has the obligation and ability to repair or reconstruct damaged natural systems. This conception of environmental policy and environmental ethics is based on a misperception of natural reality and a misguided understanding of the human place in the natural environment. On a simple level, it is the same kind of "technological fix" that has engendered the environmental crisis. Human science and technology will fix, repair, and improve natural processes.

Enviormental Destruction Absent a reorientation modernity recreates environmental crises by conceptualizing the environment as a resource to consume. Ross, 07 [Andrew Peter, PhD candidate Queens University department of philosophy, September "Rethinking Environmental Responsibility: Heidegger, Profound Boredom and the Alterity of Nature https://qspace.library.queensu.ca/bitstream/1974/866/1/Ross_ Andrew_P_200709_MA.pdf]

In order to capture the full importance of concepts such as physis and primordial nature, it is necessary to introduce, very briefly, the background theory to which such concepts are largely a response. In particular, Heideggers conception of technological modernity offers an understanding of our current environmental crisis that makes notions such as primordial nature and physis particularly relevant to the focus of this thesis. Technology for Heidegger does not refer to a particular device or mechanism but to the grounding of modernity, a ground that Heidegger calls Enframing (das Gestell) (QCT 19). As the ground of modernity, the Gestell defines how beings show uphow they presence or disclose themselvesfor modern Dasein. The Gestell does not refer to an occasional way of viewing beings, but instead refers to the modern understanding of Being itself; in other words, it is the dominant epoch-defining world-understanding of modernity. In it beings show up as, and only as, stock or standing- reserve (Bestand) (17). Within the Gestell, beings show up as pure resource: the earth is disclosed as a coal mining district, and its soil as mineral deposit (14). To clarify, we might ask what it means to be disclosed as Bestand. Significantly, Heidegger is not intending to argue, as might be supposed, that natural beings are simply encountered as a collection of tools, beings that are ready-to-hand for our various human projects. The influence of the Gestell extends somewhat deeper: the Gestell is actually the way in which the real reveals itself as standing-reserve (23). Modern technology, then, involves more than the use of beings as means-to-an-end; rather, it entails a particular way of conceptualizing reality or the real and all of the beings encountered in it. Consequently, what is unconcealed no longer concerns man even as object, but does so, rather, exclusively as resource (26-27 emphasis added). What is unique about modernity, then, is not the fact that beings show up as resources the world of work in all epochs requires that beings occasionally show up as subsumable in some mannerbut that they show up as nothing but resource. Thus in being disclosed as Bestand, the very Being of beingsthe way in which they are disclosed in the worldbecomes entirely fixed. Heidegger confirms this one-dimensional disclosure to be the plight of the natural world in his assertion that within the Gestell, [ N]ature becomes a gigantic gasoline station, an energy source for modern technology and industry (MA 50). In comparing nature to a gasoline station, Heidegger is not simply arguing that nature shows up as a resource, but that nature shows up as nothing but a resource: gasoline stations cannot appear as anything other than a resource. Natural beings, then, like gasoline stations, are disclosed as entirely one-dimensional in their being. In this manner, Heidegger offers a somewhat different interpretation of our current environmental crisis. For Heidegger, humanitys assault upon the earth lies not in our plundering of resources or the eradication of species, but in the one-dimensional disclosure of natural beings as nothing other than Bestand.

Managerial ontologies only attempt to reorder to the world around human centric dynamics- Reapplications of scientific theory only legitimizes continual manipulation and destruction of the environment. Katz 00 (Eric Katz, associate professor of philosophy and director of the Science, Technology, and Society Program, New Jersey Institute of Technology; recognized pioneer, environmental ethics, 2K, Nature as Subject: Human Obligation and Natural Community)

Even more important, the question arises whether or not Nature can heal these wounds of human oppression. Consider the reverse process, the human attempt to heal the wounds of Nature. We often tend to clean up natural areas polluted or damaged by human activity, such as the Alaskan coast harmed by the Exxon Valdez oil spill. But we also attempt to improve natural areas dramatically altered by natural events, such as a forest damaged by a massive brush fire, or a beach suffering severe natural erosion. In most of these kinds of cases, human science and technology are capable of making a significant change in the appearance and processes of the natural area. Forests can be replanted, oil is removed from the surface of bays and estuaries, sand and dune vegetation replenish a beach. But are these activities the healing of Nature? Has human activityscience and technologyrestored Nature to a healthy state? No. When humans modify a natural area they create an artifact, a product of human labor and human design. 12 This restored natural area may resemble a wild and unmodified natural system, but it is, in actuality, a product of human thought, the result of human desires and interests. All humanly created artifacts are manifestations of human interestsfrom computer screens to rice pudding. An ecosystem restored by human activity may appear to be in a different categoryit may appear to be an autonomous living system uncontrolled by human thoughtbut it nonetheless exhibits characteristics of human design and intentionality: it is created to meet human interests, to satisfy human desires, and to maximize human good. Consider again my examples of human attempts to heal damaged natural areas. A forest is replanted to correct the damage of a fire because humans want the benefits of the forestwhether these be timber, a habitat for wildlife, or protection of a watershed. The replanting of the forest by humans is different from a natural re-growth of the forest vegetation, which would take much longer. The forest is replanted because humans want the beneficial results of the mature forest in a shorter time. Similarly, the eroded beach is replenishedwith sand pumped from the ocean floor several miles offshorebecause the human community does not want to maintain the natural status of the beach. The eroded beach threatens oceanfront homes and recreational beaches. Humanity prefers to restore the human benefits of a fully protected beach. The restored beach will resemble the original, but it will be the product of human technology, a humanly designed artifact for the promotion of human interests. After these actions of human restoration and modification, what emerges is a Nature with a different character than the original. This is an ontological difference, a difference in the essential qualities of the restored area. A beach that is replenished by human technology possesses a different essence than a beach created by natural forces such as wind and tides. A savanna replanted from wildflower seeds and weeds collected by human hands has a different essence than grassland that develops on its own. The source of these new areas is differentmanmade, technological, artificial. The restored Nature is not really Nature at all. A Nature healed by human action is thus not Nature. As an artifact, it is designed to meet human purposes and needsperhaps even the need for areas that look like a pristine, untouched Nature. In using our scientific and technological knowledge to restore natural areas, we actually practice another form of domination. We use our power to mold the natural world into a shape that is more amenable to our desires. We oppress the natural processes that function independent of human power; we prevent the autonomous development of the natural world. To believe that we heal or restore the natural world by the exercise of our technological power is, at best, a self-deception and, at worst, a rationalization for the continued degradation of Nature for if we can heal the damage we inflict we will face no limits to our activities. This conclusion has serious implications for the idea that Nature can repair human destruction, that Nature can somehow heal the evil that humans perpetuate on the earth. Just as a restored human landscape has a different causal history than the original natural system, the reemergence of Nature in a place of human genocide and destruction is based on a series of human events that cannot be erased. The natural vegetation that covers the mass grave in the Warsaw cemetery is not the same as the vegetation that would have grown there if the mass grave had never been dug. The grass and trees in the cemetery have a different cause, a different history, that is inextricably linked to the history of the Holocaust. The grassy field in the Majdanek parade ground does not cover and heal the mud and desolation of the death campit rather grows from the dirt and ashes of the site's victims. For anyone who has an understanding of the Holocaust, of the innumerable evils heaped upon an oppressed people by the Nazi regime, the richness of Nature cannot obliterate nor heal the horror. In this essay I question the environmentalists' concern for the restoration of nature and argue against the optimistic view that humanity has the obligation and ability to repair or reconstruct damaged natural systems. This conception of environmental policy and environmental ethics is based on a misperception of natural reality and a misguided understanding of the human place in the natural environment. On a simple level, it is the same kind of "technological fix" that has engendered the environmental crisis. Human science and technology will fix, repair, and improve natural processes.

Economic Enframing Economic enframing reduces the world to self-interest and monetary value, enabling structural violence, environmental destruction, and collapse of value to lifeNhanenge 7 [Jytte Masters @ U South Africa, paper submitted in part fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of master of arts in the subject Development Studies, ECOFEMINSM: TOWARDS INTEGRATING THE CONCERNS OF WOMEN, POOR PEOPLE AND NATURE INTO DEVELOPMENT]

Generation of wealth was an important part of the Scientific Revolution and its modem society. The scientific discipline of economics therefore became a significant means for wealth creation. However, since it is founded on similar dualised premises as science, also economics became a system of domination and exploitation of women, Others and nature. The following discussion is intended to show that. The way in which economics, with its priority on masculine forces, becomes dominant relates to web-like, inter-connected and complex processes, which are not always clearly perceived. The below discussions try to show how the dualised priority of the individual over society, reason over emotion, self-interest over community-interest, competition over cooperation, and more pairs, generate domination that leads to the four crises of violence and war, poverty, human oppression and environmental degradation. The aim in sum is to show how the current perspective of economics is destroying society (women and Others) and nature. The following discussion is consequently a critique of economics. It is meant to highlight some elements that make economics a dominant ideology, rather than a system of knowledge. It adopts a feministic view and it is therefore seen from the side of women, poor people and nature. The critique is extensive, but not exhaustive. It is extensive because economics is the single most important tool used by mainstream institutions for development in the South. Thus if we want to understand why development does not alleviate poverty, then we first need to comprehend why its main instrument, economics, cannot alleviate poverty. A critical analysis of economics and its influence in development is therefore important as an introduction to next chapter, which discusses ecofeminism and development. However, the critique is not exhaustive because it focuses only on the dualised elements in economics. It is highly likely that there are many more critical issues in economics, which should be analyzed in addition to the below mentioned. However, it would exceed this scope. Each of the following 10 sections discusses a specific issue in economics that relates to its dualised nature. Thus, each can as such be read on its own. However, all sections are systemically interconnected. Therefore each re-enforces the others and integrated, they are meant to show the web of masculine forces that make economics dominant towards women, Others and nature. The first three sections intend to show that economics sees itself as a neutral, objective, quantitative and universal science, which does not need to be integrated in social and natural reality. The outcome of this is, however, that economics cannot value social and environmental needs. Hence, a few individuals become very rich from capitalising on free social and natural resources, while the health of the public and the environment is degraded. It also is shown that the exaggerated focus on monetary wealth does not increase human happiness. It rather leads to a deteriorating quality of life. Thus, the false belief in eternal economic growth may eventually destroy life on planet Earth. The next section shows that economics is based on dualism, with a focus solely on yang forces. This has serious consequences for all yin issues: For example, the priority on individualism over community may in its extreme form lead to self-destruction. Similarly, the priority on rationality while excluding human emotions may end in greed, domination, poverty, violence and war. The next section is important as a means to understanding rational economics. Its aim is to clarify the psychological meaning of money. In reality, reason and emotion are interrelated parts of the human mind; they cannot be separated. Thus, economic rationality and its focus on eternal wealth generation are based on personal emotions like fears and inadequacies, rather than reason. The false belief in dualism means that human beings are lying to themselves, which results in disturbed minds, stupid actions with disastrous consequences. The focus on masculine forces is consequently psychologically unhealthy; it leads to domination of society and nature, and will eventually destroy the world. Standing Reserve Technological enframing of the environment commodifies the world into a standing reserve for human consumption. This logic reappropriates the world around the intrinsic notion of disposability. The reclaimed cites become areas of availability for production, reproduction, commodification- replicating logics of consumability on the ontological level of being. Ziarek 12(Krzysztof, Professor of Comparative Literature at SUNY-Buffalo, "The Global Unworld: A Meditative Manifesto", Impasses of the Post-Global: Theory in the era of Climate Change, Vol. 2, Alcibiades and Lenny)The remarks cited above prepare the way for Heideggers later reflection on the essence of technology, or technicity, as the Ge-stell, which indicates the multiply gathered ways (the prefix Ge-) in which what is actual comes to be as such through being posited (Darstellen), emplaced (Stellen), produced (Herstellen), represented (Vorstellen), ordered (Bestellen), disfigured (Verstellen), etc. To say that the Ge-stell is the modus operandi of reality today is to point to how all unfolds into a standing-reserve (Bestand) of resources, always already at hand, intrinsically available and disposable. The availability to be accessed, processed, manipulated, or engineered constitutes the very being of what comes to exist today. In other words, to be means to be in essence, in how something comes to be, available. This availability explains itself in(to) the terms of power, which means that being available stands for availability to and for power; not only for power to colonize, conquer, or empower, but also to spread and increase in complexity and magnitude. In short, availability means the intrinsic capacity of power to transpower itself. The key characteristic of the technicist operations of modern power is its tendency to increasingly challenge and provoke (Herausfordern), force, and enforce being into unfolding as ever more intensely and thoroughly available. What we seem to be witnessing almost daily is the intensification of the degree of availability, in which anything and everything comes to be as already suffused with power and open to further over-powering. Whether we think of the rapidly advancing genetic technologies, the increasingly pervasive susceptibility to and flow of information, or the crises precipitated by electronic operations of financial capital, they all testify to the availability to and for power in its flexible operations of producing, empowering, dominating, coding, decoding, etc. One of the key vectors of this planetary availability which Heidegger diagnoses, running always in parallel to the availability of the planet as a total reserve standing at the ready, is availability for consumption, that is, availability to be capitalized for production, reproduction, commodification, and consumption. In his timely Lindemne: Heidegger et la destruction du monde, Frdric Neyrat proposes to think of Heideggers explanation of the generalizedglobal or planetaryconsumability on the ontological level, which suggests precisely that to be in modernity comes to mean to be consumable: not just provided for consumption but in essence open to being consumed and, as such, replacable: whether as resource, product, commodity, service, etc. In order to be consumable, . The narrower sense of consumption associated with the consumption of commod