environmental justice and the difference principle

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Environmental Justice andRawls’ Difference Principle

Derek Bell*

* Department of Politics, School of Geography, Politics, and Sociology, University of Newcastle,40–42 Great North Road, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE1 7RU, UK. Bell thanks the Leverhulme Trustfor financial support for the project on “Political Liberalism and the Environment” of which thispaper is part. An early draft of this paper was presented to the Political Theory Group at theUniversity of York. The author thanks the participants for their comments. He also thanks SimonCaney for several helpful discussions of these issues and Peter Jones, Tim Gray and twoanonymous referees, Kerry H. Whiteside and John S. Dryzek, for very helpful written comments.

1 Carolyn Stephens, Simon Bullock, and Alister Scott, Environmental Justice: Rights andMeans to a Healthy Environment for All, ESRC Briefing Paper No. 7 (London: Economic andSocial Research Council, 2001).

It is widely acknowledged that low-income and minority communities in liberaldemocratic societies suffer a disproportionate burden of environmental hazards.Is “environmental injustice” a necessary feature of liberal societies or is its preva-lence due to the failure of existing liberal democracies to live up to liberal principlesof justice? One leading version of liberalism, John Rawls’ “justice as fairness,”can be “extended” to accommodate the concerns expressed by advocates of environ-mental justice. Moreover, Rawlsian environmental justice has some significant advan-tages over existing conceptions of environmental justice.

INTRODUCTION

It is widely acknowledged that low-income and minority communities suffera disproportionate burden of environmental hazards. Recent research has foundthat “of 11,400 tonnes of carcinogenic chemicals emitted to air from largefactories in England in 1999, eighty-two percent were from factories locatedin the most deprived twenty percent of local authority wards.”1 U.K. researchinto environmental injustice is in its early stages but initial indications suggestthat it is no less prevalent in the U.K. than it is elsewhere. However, it is onlyvery recently that the idea of environmental justice has been “imported” fromthe United States into social justice and environmental discourses in the U.K.Importing ideas into new sociopolitical contexts is rarely a passive process andthe fledgling U.K. discourse has added its own particular nuances to the coreidea of environmental justice.

As the idea of environmental justice spreads and develops, its generalrelevance for contemporary liberal democratic societies becomes increasinglyevident. For critics of liberalism, environmental injustice is just anotherinstantiation of the intrinsic injustice of liberalism and the economic systemthat it endorses. The solution to the problem of environmental injustice is the

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2 See, for example, Russ Manning, “Environmental Ethics and John Rawls’ Theory of Justice,”Environmental Ethics 3 (1981): 155–66; Brent Singer, “An Extension of Rawls’ Theory of Justiceto Environmental Ethics,” Environmental Ethics 10 (1988): 217–31; Peter Wenz, EnvironmentalJustice (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988), pp. 232–53; Daniel Thero, “Rawlsand Environmental Ethics: A Critical Examination of the Literature,” Environmental Ethics 17(1995): 93–106 (which provides a useful review of previous attempts to develop Rawls’ work);Andrew Dobson, Justice and the Environment: Conceptions of Environmental Sustainability andTheories of Distributive Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 166–72.

3 There are many respects in which these accounts diverge from Rawls’ idea of politicalliberalism—typically, by extending the “community of justice” beyond citizens to includenonhumans. Indeed, many of these accounts are concerned with something closer to “ecologicaljustice” (rather than “environmental justice”) or with “intergenerational justice” (rather than“intragenerational justice”). See the text below for explanation and discussion of these distinctions.

same as the solution to the problem of economic and social injustice, namely,replace liberalism with a better alternative. For liberals, the idea of environ-mental injustice and its prevalence in contemporary liberal democratic societ-ies is more problematic. Is it a feature of contemporary liberal democracies justbecause—and insofar as—those societies fail to live up to liberal principles ofjustice? We might hope that we could answer this question simply by consult-ing the writings of key liberal thinkers. Of course, it would probably be unrealisticto expect the canonical thinkers of the liberal tradition to have consideredenvironmental justice but we might expect that contemporary liberal theoristswould have something to say on the topic. In fact, “mainstream” contemporaryliberal political theory has shown little or no interest in environmental issues.

Contemporary liberal political theorists have devoted their attention tosocial and economic justice but they have not considered the possibility of anenvironmental dimension to the distributive issues that have dominated liberalpolitical theory since John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice introduced the “differ-ence principle.” Indeed, Rawls seems to be a prime example of a leading liberalthinker who has ignored the idea of environmental justice. Of course, therehave been some “green” political theorists who have attempted to defend moreenvironmentally aware theories of justice beginning from an immanent cri-tique of Rawls’ theory.2 However, it has not always been clear that these “immanent”critiques of Rawls’ theory have remained true to Rawlsian liberalism (espe-cially, the “political liberalism” of Rawls’ later work).3

In this paper, I adopt a different approach to developing a Rawlsian concep-tion of environmental justice. Building on Rawls’ recent discussion of “justicein health care” as a “problem of extension” for his standard theory of justice,I defend a Rawlsian conception of environmental justice that is not dependentupon an immanent critique of Rawls’ theory. Instead, I argue that the proposedconception of environmental justice is utterly consistent with Rawls’ own ap-proach to issues of this kind. If I am correct, there is (at least) one importantversion of liberalism that has a conception of environmental justice. Moreover, Iargue that the Rawlsian conception of environmental justice compares favorably

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4 See, for example, Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Office of Federal Activities,Final Guidance for Incorporating Environmental Justice Concerns in EPA’s NEPA ComplianceAnalysis (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,1998), p. 2; Richard Hofrichter,“Introduction” in Richard Hofrichter, ed., Toxic Struggles: The Theory and Practice of Environ-mental Justice (Philadelphia: New Society Publishers, 1993), p. 5.

5 EPA, Final Guidance, p. 2.

with the conceptions of environmental justice in the existing literature. TheRawlsian approach not only offers a “mainstream” liberal defence of environ-mental justice; it also provides a much-needed theoretical framework forassessing environmental justice claims and identifying the limits of ourjustice-based environmental obligations.

I begin by distinguishing substantive and procedural environmental justice.The focus of this paper is substantive environmental justice—the distributionof environmental benefits and burdens. The early part of the paper analyzesconceptions of environmental justice in the existing literature, paying particu-lar attention to recent developments in U.K. discussions of environmentaljustice. Four conceptions of environmental justice—each more demandingthan the previous conception—are identified. The remainder of the paper attemptsto develop a Rawlsian conception of environmental justice that can be com-pared to the existing conceptions. I argue that Rawls’ recent discussion of“justice in health care” as a “problem of extension” provides the basis for anaccount of environmental justice. The Rawlsian conception of environmentaljustice can accommodate the concerns expressed in even the most demandingof the four conceptions identified from the existing literature. Moreover, aRawlsian approach to environmental justice firmly locates environmentalissues within a broader theory of social justice—providing a clear rationale forenvironmental justice and a framework for assessing the relative importance ofparticular environmental issues in the context of competition for publicspending. Rawls and most other liberal political theorists may not have paidsufficient attention to the environment but Rawlsian liberalism is equipped toaddress the issues identified in the environmental justice literature. Indeed, itis precisely by addressing this kind of issue that liberals might begin to correctthe impression that liberalism is concerned only with personal income andwealth while ignoring public goods.

WHAT IS ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE?

Environmental justice has both procedural and substantive components.4

Typically, procedural environmental justice is understood to require the oppor-tunity for “all people regardless of race, ethnicity, income, national origin oreducational level” to have “meaningful involvement” in environmental deci-sion making.5 Procedural environmental justice, like democracy more gener-ally, may be considered intrinsically valuable. However, the principal value of


6 This is the assumption behind the “Aarhus Convention,” the recent United Nations EconomicCouncil for Europe (UNECE) Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation inDecision Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (Brussels: UNECE, 1998), art.1 (available at http://www.unece.org/env/pp/documents/cep43e/pdf).

7 For discussion of procedural environmental justice, see Derek R. Bell, “Sustainabilitythrough Democratization? The Aarhus Convention and the Future of Environmental DecisionMaking in Europe,” in John Barry, Brian Baxter, and Richard Dunphy, eds, Europe, Globaliza-tion and Sustainable Development (London: Routledge, 2004).

8 See Dobson, Justice, p. 63. One aspect of the environmental justice debate that is not capturedby this approach is the question of intent—i.e., is the disproportionate distribution of environ-mental hazards intentional? This is an issue that has been much discussed in the context of legalargument and discussions of racial discrimination in the U.S. but increasingly environmentaljustice advocates have rejected the focus on intent. See, for example, Robert Bullard, “DecisionMaking,” in Laura Westra and Peter Wenz, eds., Faces of Environmental Racism (London:Rowman and Littlefield, 1995), p. 18; Laura Pulido, “A Critical Review of the Methodology ofEnvironmental Racism Research,” Antipode 28, no. 2 (1996): 142–59, pp. 146–48; JulianAgyeman, “Constructing Environmental (In)Justice: Transatlantic Tales,” Environmental Poli-tics 11, no. 3 (2002): 31–53, pp. 40–41. Instead, they argue that the distribution is unjust whetheror not it is the outcome of intentional discrimination. It is this kind of pure distributive concernthat interests me (and which, I argue, can be accommodated by Rawlsian liberalism).

9 See Dobson, Justice, p. 63.10 See Stephens et al., Environmental Justice, sec. 1. The “narrow” focus of the U.S. literature

is clear in William Bowen’s recent critical discussion of environmental justice research. SeeWilliam Bowen, Environmental Justice through Research-Based Decision Making (New York:Garland Publishing, 2001). Of course, there are exceptions—ie., for example, First NationalPeople of Color Environmental Leadership Summit, Principles of Environmental Justice,principles 10, 13, 14, and 17, in Hofrichter, Toxic Struggles.

procedural environmental justice is often assumed to lie in the contribution itcan make to substantive environmental justice. If everyone has the opportunityto participate in environmental decision making, each person has the opportu-nity to defend her own and everyone else’s substantive environmental rights.6

Prima facie, it is more difficult to perpetrate a substantive injustice through ajust procedure than it is through an unjust procedure. In this paper, I proposeto focus exclusively on substantive environmental justice.7

Any conception of substantive environmental justice must provide answersto three key questions: who are the “recipients” of environmental justice? Whatis distributed? What is the principle of distribution?8 The aim of this section isto identify some of the common answers offered to these questions and thedifferences between them.

The first question—“Who are the recipients of environmental justice?”—has a number of possible answers ranging from only current citizens of a singlestate to all current and future generations of living (sentient and nonsentient)beings.9 The “scope” of our “community of justice” will determine whether ourconception of environmental justice is anthropocentric or nonanthropocentric,intergenerational or merely intragenerational, and international or merelydomestic. Historically, the U.S. environmental justice movement has focused ona narrow community: current U.S. citizens.10 This focus is reflected in current

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11 See EPA, Final Guidance, p. 2; The White House, Federal Actions to Address Environmen-tal Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations: Executive Order 12898(1994); available at http://www.epa.gov/swerosps/ej/html-doc/execordr.htm.

12 See, for example, Westra and Wenz, Faces of Environmental Racism, pt. 3; Hofrichter, ToxicStruggles, chapters 19–23; Stephens et al., Environmental Justice, sec. 1.

13 I have discussed international environmental justice in Derek R. Bell, “EnvironmentalRefugees: What Rights? Which Duties?” Res Publica (forthcoming, 2004) and intergenerationalenvironmental justice in Derek Bell, “How can Political Liberals be Environmentalists?”Political Studies 50 (2002): 703–24.

14 See, for example, P. Stretsky and M. Hogan, “Environmental Justice: An Analysis of SuperfundSites in Florida,” Social Problems 45, no. 2 (1998): 268–87, p. 268; Hofrichter, Toxic Struggles;Robert Bullard, “Introduction” in Robert Bullard, ed., Unequal Protection: EnvironmentalJustice and Communities of Color (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1994), pp. xv–xvi.

15 Friends of the Earth, Pollution and Poverty: Breaking the Link (London: Friends of theEarth, 2001), p. 1.

16 Bullard, “Introduction,” in Bullard, Unequal Protection, p. xv. Of course, a longer historybrings with it more opportunity for dissent and debate. For a thorough—albeit skeptical andsomewhat dubiously constructed—survey of U.S. environmental justice research see Bowen,Environmental Justice, chap. 6. For an alternative perspective on the debate see BenjaminGoldman, “What is the Future of Environmental Justice?” Antipode 28, no. 2 (1996): 122–41; pp.131–37.

17 See Agyeman, “Constructing Environmental (In)Justice,” p. 34.

U.S. environmental law and policy.11 More recent definitions of environmentaljustice in the U.S. and the U.K. have expanded the community of justice toinclude the citizens of other states and future generations.12 In this paper, Ipropose to restrict my attention to the earlier, narrower conception of thecommunity of environmental justice as citizens of a single state.13

The second question for a conception of substantive environmental justice is“What is distributed?” Historically, the U.S. environmental justice movementhas concentrated on “environmental hazards,” “toxics,” or “pollution.”14 Ifeconomic justice is about the distribution of a “good,” environmental justicehas usually been about the distribution of a “bad” (or “bads”). Advocates ofenvironmental justice have argued that the distribution of environmental“bads” is not fair. Some social groups—notably low income groups and ethnicminorities—are more likely to be exposed to environmental hazards. Forexample, recent research in the U.K. found that “66% of carcinogen emissions[in England] are in the most deprived 10% of [local authority] wards.”15 In theU.S. there is a much longer history of research that shows a correlation betweenlow-income groups and pollution. Many studies have claimed that “low-income communities and communities of color bear a disproportionate burdenof the nation’s pollution problems.”16

More recently, the idea of environmental justice has been extended beyond“bads” to include “goods.”17 In one sense, “goods” were always part of theenvironmental justice debate. For example, air pollution is only a “bad”because clean air is a “good.” However, the new focus on “goods” is ratherdifferent. The emphasis is not on the basic goods (clean air, clean water, uncon-taminated land) that are undermined by environmental hazards but rather on a

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18 Ibid., p. 34.19 Kate Burningham and Diana Thrush, “Rainforests are a Long Way from Here”: The Environ-

mental Concerns of Disadvantaged Groups (York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2001), p.20.20 Ibid., pp. 21–22.21 Ibid., p. 20.22 Agyeman, “Constructing Environmental (In)Justice,” p. 38. He is quoting from I. Pollard,

“Pastoral Interludes,” Third Text: Third World Perspectives on Contemporary Art and Culture7 (1989): 41–46.

23 Agyeman, “Constructing Environmental (In)Justice,” p. 38.

more general idea of “environmental quality” and “being able to experiencequality environments.”18 This idea of experiencing environmental quality hastwo aspects: the quality of the “home” environment and access to other qualityenvironments.

The quality of a community’s “home” environment is dependent on morethan levels of pollution. In fact, the primary environmental concerns of “disad-vantaged groups” are often more mundane:

Dog mess in streets and parks, human excrement and spit in blocks of flats, litterand waste . . . derelict buildings, waste ground, rat infestation, blocked drains andbroken sewers, and vandalism . . . dirt and dereliction.19

Burningham and Thrush’s research also emphasized the “need for safe playspaces for children” and the problems of local parks “surrounded by busyroads,” fouled by dogs, vandalized and associated with threats of violence andintimidation.20 On this conception of environmental justice, it is unjust that lowincome and ethnic minority communities live in a “dirty and degraded environ-ment” while other communities do not.21 Similarly, it is unjust that the membersof low income and ethnic minority communities do not have genuine access toquality environments away from home. For example, Agyeman argues thatethnic minority groups are excluded from the countryside in the U.K.:

The reality is that the English countryside represents an exclusive, ecological orwhite space, which invokes a sense of fear, of “dread.”22

Ethnic minorities lack both “‘mental’ access (that is, ‘yes, it’s for me, I can gothere’) and ‘physical’ access (that is, actually getting there, knowing where togo, and feeling safe).”23 It is important to note that this is an extension of theearlier concern about pollution. It is not intended to replace or displace theconcern about the distribution of toxics but rather to supplement that originalfocus.

Finally, a third conception seems to be present in some of the most recentdiscussions of environmental justice in the U.K. An Economic and SocialResearch Council Briefing Paper on “Environmental Justice” uses the heading,

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24 Stephens et al., Environmental Justice, sec. 2.25 Ibid.26 Ibid.27 Ibid.28 Ibid.

“Access to environmental resources: cold and hungry” to introduce the ideathat:


Environmental justice provides a new way of viewing access to resources,including resources not traditionally associated with “environmental” thinking.24

In particular, it draws attention to “fuel poverty”—“the lack of affordablewarmth”—and “food poverty”—not being able to “afford healthy food.”25 Onfuel poverty, the authors point out that:

Millions of homes are energy inefficient and have poor heating systems, and theiroccupants cannot afford to make improvements or keep their homes warm. Dampand cold homes increase the likelihood of lung and heart illnesses. Fuel povertyis linked to higher rates of winter mortality, and there are an average of over30,000 unnecessary extra winter deaths each year.26

On food poverty, they say:

20 per cent of the population cannot afford healthy food. . . . This situation isexacerbated by lack of access to shops selling healthy food. Again, it tends to bepoorer areas which are further from shops selling fresh fruit and vegetables, andgovernmental analysis shows that this is partly because of the growth of out-of-town superstores which has caused many inner-city food stores to close. People inpoorer communities are less likely to have transport options to enable them toaccess more distant shops.27

In both cases, the central concern is that some people lack “environmentalresources,” namely, “heat,” and “food,” that are necessary to meet their “physicalneeds.”28

Again, it is important to realize that Stephens, Bullock, and Scott are notrejecting the earlier conceptions of what should be distributed but rather addingto them. In summary, I have identified three conceptions of what should bedistributed. In an important sense, the three conceptions are not competitors.Instead, they represent a broadening of the conception of environmentaljustice, which has been particularly evident in attempts by U.K. advocates ofenvironmental justice to go beyond the early U.S. formulations and make theidea of environmental justice their own.

The third question that any conception of substantive environmental justicemust answer is “What is the principle of distribution?” Theoretically, many


29 See, for example, Dobson, Justice, p. 63.30 Stretsky and Hogan, “Environmental Justice,” p. 268.31 The first quotation is from Michael Heiman, “Race, Waste, and Class: New Perspectives on

Environmental Justice,” Antipode 28, no. 2 (1996): 111–21; p. 114. The second is from Stretskyand Hogan, “Environmental Justice,” p. 268.

32 Agyeman, “Constructing Environmental (In)Justice,” p. 38 (emphasis in the original).

principles of distribution are possible.29 In practice, advocates of environmen-tal justice have employed three principles of distribution:

(1) equality;(2) equality plus a guaranteed standard;(3) a guaranteed minimum with variation above that minimum according

to personal income and spending choices.

The early conceptions of environmental justice stressed the unequal distribu-tion of pollution. The complaint was that low-income and minority communi-ties suffered “a disproportionate burden from this type of health threat.”30 Theburden of environmental hazards should be equally shared.

In time, the ideal of “an equal opportunity to be polluted” was replaced bythe idea that “no one should be forced to suffer from the adverse effects ofenvironmental hazards.”31 More precisely, the commitment to an equal distri-bution of pollution was supplemented by a specification that the level of pollutionshould be reduced to zero. It is not enough that the inequality in exposure toenvironmental hazards is removed. In addition, it is necessary to ensure that noone suffers exposure to environmental hazards. The requirement of guaranteedstandards shifts attention from “bads,” such as pollution, to “basic goods” suchas clean air and potable water. The focus moves from equal burdens to equalrights to the basic environmental goods necessary for health. These first twoaccounts of the principle of distribution are most readily associated with thefirst conception of what should be distributed.

The second conception of what should be distributed—the “experience ofquality environments”—has also been expressed in terms of equal rights. Forexample, Agyeman describes “access to the countryside” as “an environmentalright: the right to roam in public areas.”32 Again, we have a guaranteed standard—a quality environment—for everyone. However, there is a sense in which the“equality” in this case differs from the equal right not to be polluted. The rightto access quality environments away from home does not imply that everyonelives the same distance from quality environments or can afford to visit qualityenvironments with the same frequency. Instead, it requires that everyone havethe real opportunity (transport, money, knowledge, confidence) to visit qualityenvironments—e.g., to access the countryside—at reasonably frequent inter-vals. Similarly, the “right” to live in a quality environment does not imply thateverywhere is the same or even that every area is as ‘desirable’ as every other

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area but rather that the “least desirable” areas meet certain standards. It is notinequality per se that is the problem but the failure to ensure that minimumstandards are met for everyone. The principle of distribution is that everyonehas a right to a certain minimum standard but beyond that standard there isroom for variation. The same principle of distribution seems to be connectedto the third conception of what should be distributed—“environmental re-sources.” The emphasis is on the elimination of food and fuel poverty so thateveryone has sufficient heat and food.

In summary, I have suggested that if we exclude questions about the “commu-nity of justice” and focus on the questions, “What is distributed?” and “Whatis the principle of distribution?” we can distinguish four major conceptions ofenvironmental justice:


Under conception one, the answer to the question “What is distributed?“ istoxics, environmental hazards, and pollution and the distributive principle is“equality.” Under conception two, the answer to the question is still toxics,environmental hazards, and pollution, but the distributive principle is “guaran-teed zero.” In addition, the answer to the question can be alternativelyformulated as clean air and other basic environmental goods such that thedistributive principle is “an equal right to a guaranteed standard.” Conceptionthree includes conception two plus quality environments at home and accessaway from home. The distributive principle is “a guaranteed minimum.” Finally,conception four includes conception three plus environmental resources (espe-cially food and heat) also with “a guaranteed minimum.” In the final twosections of this paper, I consider the compatibility of these four conceptions ofenvironmental justice with Rawls’ difference principle.

CONCEPTION WHAT IS DISTRIBUTED? DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLE

toxics, environmental hazards, pollution equality1

2

toxics, environmental hazards, pollution

alternatively formulated as:

guaranteed zero

clean air and other basic environmentalgoods

equal right to guaranteedstandard

3conception 2 plus: quality environments(at home and access away from home)

guaranteed minimum

4conception 3 plus: environmental resources(especially food and heat)

guaranteed minimum


33 John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,2001), pp. 42–43.

34 Ibid., p. 4.35 Ibid., p. 43.36 Ibid., pp. 57–59.37 Ibid., p. 123.

RAWLS AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE

Rawls defends two principles of justice:

(a) Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme ofequal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme ofliberties for all; and

(b) Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they areto be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fairequality of opportunity; and, second, they are to be to the greatest benefit ofthe least-advantaged members of society (the difference principle).33

The role of these principles is to regulate the “basic structure” of society: “themain political and social institutions and the way they fit together as onescheme of cooperation.”34 A society should aim to have a “basic structure”—a set of political, economic and social institutions, including a constitution,laws and property rules—that consistently satisfies the two principles ofjustice better than any alternative arrangement.

In this paper, I concentrate on the difference principle. The difference prin-ciple allows inequalities only if they are to the “greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of society.”35 We “measure” advantage in terms of whatRawls calls “primary goods,” which are “all-purpose means” including “basicrights and liberties,” “income and wealth,” and “the social bases of self-respect.”36

Typically, Rawls uses “income and wealth” as the standard measure ofadvantage (given that “basic rights and liberties” and many of “the social basesof self-respect” are secured by the first principle and the requirement of fairequality of opportunity). The least advantaged are those occupying socialpositions with the lowest expectations of income and wealth over the course ofa complete life. For Rawls, we cannot maintain social and economic equalitybecause labor specialization is unavoidable and citizens should not be expectedto be pure altruists willing to accept equal rewards for unequal contributionsto the overall level of society’s resources. However, unequal division can onlyreflect the equality of citizens if it is to everyone’s advantage. The differenceprinciple “selects a natural focal point between the claims of efficiency andequality” where “efficiency” is understood to be constrained by citizens’legitimate self-interest and the disincentive effects of equal division.37

As it stands, the difference principle says nothing about the distribution of

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38 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 244–45.

39 John Rawls, “The Law of Peoples,” in John Rawls: Collected Papers (Cambridge: HarvardUniversity Press, 1999), p. 531.

40 See, for example, Committee on Environmental Justice, Toward Environmental Justice:Research, Education, and Health Policy Needs (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press,1999).

41 In his earlier work, Rawls had referred readers to the “Rawlsian” account of justice in healthcare developed at length by Norman Daniels (e.g., Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 184, n. 14). SeeNorman Daniels, Just Health Care (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), chaps. 1–3.In Justice as Fairness, Rawls continues to refer readers to Daniels’ “instructive discussion” (p.175, n. 58). In this paper, I try to develop a position that draws primarily on Rawls’ account. Primafacie, there are some important differences between Rawls’ approach and Daniels’s approach.However, these differences may have little practical significance once Rawls’ theory has beenmore fully worked out (see n. 60 below).

environmental goods or “bads.`” Rawls’ answer to the question, “What shouldbe distributed?” is “primary goods” but the list of primary goods does not includeenvironmental goods. However, Rawls makes it clear that the theory of justiceas he sets it out is incomplete. In particular, he notes four “problems of extension”:


One is extending justice to cover our duties to future generations. . . . Another isthe problem of extending it to the concepts and principles that apply to interna-tional law and political relations between peoples. . . . A third problem ofextension is that of setting out the principles of normal health care; and finally, wemay ask whether justice can be extended to our relations to animals and the orderof nature.38

Rawls suggests that his theory can be successfully extended to cover the firstthree problems—future generations, international law, and health care—but hedoes not seem to believe that it can be extended to cover the fourth problem—“the problem of what is owed to animals and the rest of nature.”39 If he iscorrect, his theory cannot be extended to provide a theory of ecological justice—justice between species. However, it may still be possible to extend histheory to provide a theory of environmental justice—justice among humanswith respect to the distribution of environmental “goods” and “bads.” In par-ticular, an extension to cover duties to future generations might reasonably beexpected to include principles of intergenerational environmental justice. Morepertinently, an extension to cover health care might introduce principles ofintragenerational environmental justice.

A key concern of environmental justice discussions is the effect of environ-mental pollution and degradation on health.40 Would an extension of Rawls’theory to cover health care introduce principles of environmental justice? InRawls’ most recent work, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, he offers a briefoutline of such an “extension.”41 He begins by relaxing the assumption thatcitizens are never ill:


The index of primary goods should include medical care and basic environ-mental goods as well as “personal income and private wealth.”47 In other words,Rawls’ extended answer to the question, “What should be distributed?” includesbasic environmental goods. In this respect, Rawls’ theory of justice appearscompatible with the second conception of environmental justice discussedearlier.

The inclusion of basic environmental goods on the list of primary goods isjustified by their role in maintaining the “minimum essential capacities forbeing [a] normal and fully cooperating [member] of society.”48 For example,without clean air many people will suffer debilitating respiratory illnesses that

42 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, p. 172.43 Ibid., pp. 171–72.44 Ibid., p. 173. See also Daniels, Just Health Care, p. 32.45 See Rawls, Justice as Fairness, p. 172; Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 245. See also Daniels,

Just Health Care, p. 2.46 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, p. 172.47 Ibid. Rawls is not suggesting that “health” is a primary good. More accurately, he is not

suggesting that health is a “social primary good” as opposed to a “natural primary good.” See JohnRawls, A Theory of Justice, rev. ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 54. In this paper,I follow Rawls’ common practice of using “primary goods” to mean “social primary goods.” ForRawls, health is a natural primary good. While natural primary goods may be “influenced by thebasic structure, they are not so directly under its control” (ibid.). Therefore, it cannot be healthbut only health care that is distributed by the state. In this respect, Russ Manning’s attempt toderive environmental conclusions from Rawls’ theory of justice by arguing that health should beconceived as a social primary good is misguided (Manning, “Environmental Ethics,” pp. 158–60).

48 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, pp. 171–72.

To attempt this extension we interpret the assumption that citizens are normallycooperating members of society over a complete life to allow that they may beseriously ill or suffer from severe accidents from time to time.42

The aim of health care is to maintain and restore the “minimum essential capacitiesfor being [a] normal and fully cooperating [member] of society.”43 For Rawls,health care includes “policies to protect public health and to provide medicalcare.”44 Among the “policies to protect public health,” we might reasonablyexpect to find some environmental policies.45

Rawls’ first step toward developing a theory of justice in health care is toextend the list of primary goods. He suggests that the list of primary goodsshould be understood to include “in-kind” benefits provided by the govern-ment:

As citizens we are also the beneficiaries of the government’s providing variouspersonal goods and services to which we are entitled, as in the case of health care,or of its providing public goods (in the economist’s sense), as in the case ofmeasures ensuring public health (clean air and unpolluted water, and the like).46

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49 Ibid., p. 19.50 Rawls, Theory of Justice, p. 80.51 Ibid.52 Ibid.53 Ibid.54 Ibid., p. 84.

prevent them from engaging in “mutually beneficial social cooperation” (e.g.,working) and from pursuing their conception of the good.49 However, therecognition that basic environmental goods should be part of the index ofprimary goods does not tell us how they should be weighed against otherprimary goods.

The problem of weighing primary goods—or, constructing an index ofprimary goods—is not new. In A Theory of Justice Rawls recognizes theproblem but suggests that the structure of the two principles simplifies it. Thepriority of the first principle (basic liberties) and the fair equality of opportu-nity principle over the difference principle mean that “one does not need tobalance these liberties and rights against other values.”50 Moreover, the differ-ence principle is concerned only with the position of the least advantagedgroup. Therefore, “[the] index problem largely reduces . . . to that of weightingprimary goods for the least advantaged.”51 How do we do that?


We try to do [it] by taking up the standpoint of the representative individual from[the least advantaged] group and asking which combination of primary socialgoods it would be rational for him to prefer. In doing this we admittedly rely uponintuitive estimates. But this cannot be avoided entirely.52

There are two immediate problems here. First, how do we identify the leastadvantaged group? Second, how do we “intuitively estimate” the combinationof primary goods preferred by the representative member of the least advantagedgroup?

Because the least advantaged group is the one that has the least primarygoods—or, more accurately, the lowest index of primary goods—we must beable to compare bundles of primary goods to identify the least advantagedgroup. However, as Rawls points out, the least advantaged will often have lessof “each primary good that is distributed unequally.”53 Moreover, Rawlsrecognizes that there are limits to the precision with which we can identify theleast advantaged group:

[It] seems impossible to avoid a certain arbitrariness in actually identifying theleast favored group. One possibility is to choose a particular social position, saythat of unskilled worker, and then to count as the least favored all those withapproximately the income and wealth of those in this position, or less. Anothercriterion is one in terms of relative income and wealth with no reference to socialpositions. For example, all persons with less than half of the median may beregarded as the least advantaged segment.54


55 Contrast the interpretation of Rawls’ position offered by Ralph Perhac, “EnvironmentalJustice: The Issue of Disproportionality,” Environmental Ethics 21 (1999): pp. 81–92; p. 90.

56 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, pp. 171–72.57 Ibid., pp. 173 and 171–72.

The least advantaged group is not a small or fine-grained category but rathera significant social group, roughly identified in terms of some easy-to-measureprimary goods (i.e., income and wealth). In this respect, Rawls’ approach mapsreadily onto discussions of environmental justice that emphasize the unequaldistribution of environmental goods and bads between “rich” and “poor.”55

Advocates of environmental justice are specifically concerned about theenvironmental plight of the least advantaged group (in terms of income andwealth).

We may be able to offer a rough-and-ready definition of the least advantagedgroup but how do we “intuitively estimate” the combination of primary goodspreferred by the representative member of the least advantaged group? Howshould basic environmental goods be placed in the index of primary goods?Environmental protection or the provision of basic environmental goods hasopportunity costs. If a society devotes resources to cleaning up pollution, imposesand enforces regulations on potentially polluting industries or promotes cleanertechnology, it uses taxpayers’ money that could have been used for otherpurposes (e.g., education, training, infrastructure development, medical care)or could have been redistributed as income. The index of primary goods mustreflect the relative priority to the “representative” member of the least advantagedgroup of a range of public services and personal income.

But how do we determine the priorities of the “representative” individual?The representative individual’s priorities are defined by his concern to be a“normal and fully cooperating [member] of society.”56 We do not know hisparticular vulnerabilities to illness or his talents. We do not know the physicalor mental demands of his job or what capacities he needs to pursue hisconception of the good life. However, we do know the range and distributionof vulnerabilities of the least advantaged group and the cost of variousmeasures that address those vulnerabilities in different ways and to differentdegrees. We may also be assumed to know the character and distribution ofemployment opportunities and conceptions of the good life in our society andthe physical and mental capacities required to pursue them. Our knowledge ofthe “aggregate” needs of the least advantaged group allows us to work out theimpact of various policy packages—and their associated distributions ofprimary goods—on the many physical and mental capacities needed to be a“normal and fully cooperating [member] of society.”57

If the goal is to ensure that all members of the least advantaged group arenormal and fully cooperating members of society, the “basic structure” ofsociety must be designed (as far as possible) to maintain (and restore) for

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58 The cost of acquiring and distributing information must be considered as part of the policypackages and its “effectiveness” assessed in terms of the two principles of justice.

59 See Committee on Environmental Justice, Toward Environmental Justice, p. 21. Few doubtthat land and water contamination (e.g., at Love Canal), air pollution (e.g., in Southeast Asia), andnuclear radiation (e.g., from Chernobyl) can all have debilitating (and, indeed, lethal) healtheffects. See, for example, Center for Health, Environment and Justice, Love Canal: The Start ofa Movement at http://www.chej.org/lovecanal.html; F. Pearce and R. Edwards, “Forest fires fuelpollution crisis,” New Scientist, 17 August 2002, pp. 8–9; Kristin Shrader-Frechette, “Chernobyl,Global Environmental Injustice and Mutagenic Threats” in Nicholas Low, ed., Global Ethics andEnvironment (London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 70–74.

everyone a complex of physical and mental capacities that equips them tofunction (e.g., work, pursue a conception of the good) in their society. Whenwe consider the priorities of the representative individual we are judging whatcombination of guaranteed primary goods is most likely to maintain theessential capacities of all (or as many as possible) of the least advantagedgroup. In effect, we are choosing among alternative policy packages (availableat any particular level of resources) and their guarantees of primary goods tomembers of the least advantaged group by considering their likely effects onthe essential capacities of the members of the least advantaged group.

For example, imagine we are asked to choose among two policy packages,A and B, which are identical except that A guarantees higher air quality standardsin low-income communities by devoting resources to targeted pollution pre-vention while B devotes the equivalent resources to supplementing the incomeof poorly paid workers. Both policies improve the position—measured inprimary goods—of members of the least advantaged group. However, it seemsplausible that there will be some circumstances in which package A will domore to maintain or restore the essential capacities of more members of theleast advantaged group than B. If existing levels of air pollution are highenough to make serious respiratory illnesses common, a significant reductionin air pollution can be achieved at relatively modest cost, and a small increasein personal income will not radically alter the opportunity range of mostmembers of the least advantaged group, we might legitimately choose A overB. It is this kind of choice that informs our judgment about the priorities of therepresentative individual.

We should judge the place of particular environmental primary goods in theindex of primary goods on the basis of as much empirical information about theeffects of alternative policy packages on citizens’ essential capacities as it iscost-effective for us (as a society) to acquire.58 However, we can confidentlysay that the provision of some basic environmental goods will be part of anyplausible policy package. Connections between environmental pollution andillness are often controversial but there is little doubt that severe pollution cancause life-threatening and debilitating illnesses.59 It is such severe illnessesthat can compromise a person’s capacity to work and to pursue a reasonable



60 It is at this point that the Rawlsian position appears to come close to Daniels’ prima faciemore demanding claim that we should seek to maintain and restore the “normal opportunityrange” for citizens (Daniels, Just Health Care, p. 33). On Rawls’ account, we are aiming tomaintain and restore only the capacities necessary to be a fully cooperating member of society.One of those capacities is the capacity to revise and pursue one’s conception of the good. If it isnecessary to have the “normal opportunity range”—“the array of life plans reasonable persons in[a society] are likely to construct for themselves”—to have the capacity to revise one’sconception of the good, Rawls’ position may be equivalent to Daniels’s position (ibid.). If onecan be said to have the capacity to revise one’s conception of the good with less than the “normalopportunity range” (but a “reasonable opportunity range”), Rawls’ position may be less demand-ing than Daniels’s position.

61 Preventing illness and the (temporary) loss of essential capacities seems preferable totreating illness to restore essential capacities. However, there will be limits to the claim that“prevention is better (i.e., more effective and efficient) than cure.” For example, if a fewvulnerable people can be protected from illness only by very expensive environmental improve-ments, we might reasonably choose to spend the money on other policies (perhaps, includingtreatment for them) that will do more to maintain or restore the essential capacities of moremembers of the least advantaged group.

range of conceptions of the good.60 Moreover, environmental protection seemslikely to be much more effective and efficient than remedial medical treatmentas a response to many environment-related illnesses.61 Thus, Rawls’ liberalismnot only allows that basic environmental goods can be regarded as primarygoods but also appears to require that we adopt a policy package that providesbasic environmental goods as part of the social minimum for the least advantagedgroup. Rawls’ theory of justice includes a conception of environmental justice.

COMPARING CONCEPTIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE

How does Rawls’ conception of environmental justice compare with our otherfour conceptions of environmental justice? The emphasis on basic environmen-tal goods appears to point us in the direction of the second conception—equalrights to basic environmental goods. However, there are two differencesbetween Rawls’ position and the second conception. First, a considered Rawlsianposition (despite his own references to “clean air and unpolluted water”) is nottied to the idea of zero pollution. As we have seen, the (maximum) level ofpollution that should be guaranteed as part of the social minimum depends onthe relative importance of the impact of pollution on the capacity to be a fullycooperating member of society. Rawls’ position allows that there may begrounds for allowing higher than zero pollution so that resources that couldhave been spent further reducing pollution can be used in other ways that areof greater benefit to the least advantaged group. In this respect, Rawls’ concep-tion of environmental justice seems more plausible than the idealistic commit-ment to zero pollution.

Second, Rawls’ position is not tied to equal pollution. In this respect, his

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position differs from both the first and second conceptions of environmentaljustice. Rawls’ position is that the social minimum provided for the leastadvantaged should include a guarantee of certain environmental standards. Heis not committed to the idea that levels of pollution should be the sameeverywhere. For a Rawlsian, “environmental equality” is not important be-cause guaranteed environmental standards are part of an index of primarygoods and the difference principle allows for the unequal distribution ofprimary goods. Again, the Rawlsian liberal position seems more plausible thanthe standard conceptions of environmental justice. If some people are fortunateenough to live in areas with levels of pollution that are lower than is requiredby the guaranteed standards, why should we object? Prima facie, we have nomore reason to complain about environmental inequalities than we do aboutincome or wealth inequalities as long as those inequalities are to the benefit ofthe least advantaged group. Our real concern is that existing levels of pollutionin some poor communities do not meet reasonable environmental standardsand have a significant adverse effect on the health of people in those commu-nities. If environmental standards in those communities are raised so that thehealth effects of pollution are significantly reduced (as we might imagine thedifference principle requires), it is difficult to see why we should be concernedabout any remaining inequalities.

So far, I have argued that Rawlsian environmental justice is committed toneither environmental equality nor zero pollution. Instead, it is committed tothe idea of guaranteed minimum environmental standards as part of the socialminimum for the least advantaged group. I have suggested that Rawlsianenvironmental justice may be more plausible than either of the first twoconceptions of environmental justice. In our discussion of the four conceptionsof environmental justice, we saw that the four conceptions were cumulative—each demanding the same as the previous conception plus something extra. Isthe Rawlsian conception of environmental justice able to accommodate theadditional concerns raised by the third and fourth conceptions?

Recall, the third conception requires guaranteed standards with respect to thequality of one’s “home” environment and access to “quality environments”away from home. The acceptance of a principle of distribution that refers to aguaranteed (minimum) standard rather than equality seems more consistentwith the Rawlsian approach. Insofar as experiencing “quality environments” isconnected to physical and mental health, it may be appropriate to build it intothe index of primary goods. For example, a policy package that subsidizesaccess to the countryside for inner city families or devotes resources to creatingsafe “green” spaces in urban areas may contribute more to the physical andmental health of (many members of) the least advantaged group than devotingthe same resources to medical care. If providing the opportunity to experiencequality environments is an effective and efficient means of maintaining and



restoring the “minimum essential capacities for being [a] normal and fullycooperating [member] of society,” a Rawlsian state has reason to devoteresources to it.62

However, insofar as the value of experiencing quality environments lies intheir contribution to “quality of life,” Rawlsian liberals seem bound to resistthe idea that this is a matter of justice. For Rawlsian liberals, each person hasthe capacity to choose their own conception of the good life in the context ofa just basic structure. What is just is independent of each person’s conceptionof the good life—the good to be distributed is not welfare. Moreover, there isno objective (or true) conception of the good life on which political agreementcan be reached—the good to be distributed is not (someone’s conception of)well-being.63 Therefore, Rawlsian justice cannot be about fairly distributing“quality of life” or the experiences that are constitutive of it. The guarantee of“quality environments” cannot be a matter of justice insofar as the value ofexperiencing quality environments does not lie in the contribution of suchexperiences to the maintenance or restoration of the essential capacities forbeing a fully cooperating member of society.

I have argued that the difference principle might deliver a commitment toguaranteed standards of environmental quality and access to quality environ-ments insofar as such standards contribute efficiently to the physical andmental health of the least advantaged group. Of course, the level at which thesestandards should be set must be determined in the context of choices amongpolicy packages aimed at providing various combinations of primary goods tothe least advantaged group. The commitment to quality environments is notunconditional. Instead, Rawlsian environmental justice offers a clearly limitedrationale for going beyond guaranteed basic environmental goods to guaran-teed standards of environmental quality and access to quality environments.

The fourth conception of environmental justice introduced the idea of aguaranteed minimum to prevent food and fuel poverty. At first sight, this ideaseems to add the least to the Rawlsian position. The social minimum shouldprovide the least advantaged group with sufficient income to meet their foodand fuel needs. If the social minimum is high enough, we should not need toprovide those goods in-kind. Unlike the environmental goods we have dis-cussed so far, such as guaranteed basic environmental standards and qualityenvironments, food and fuel are not public goods (in the economist’s sense).Therefore, the grounds for providing food and fuel in-kind rather than provid-ing more income to the least advantaged group do not seem to be present. In amodern market economy, income can be readily exchanged for food and fuelwhereas a range of problems make it much more difficult to exchange incomefor guaranteed environmental standards. If this assessment is correct, the

62 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, pp. 171–72.63 See Rawls on the “fact of reasonable pluralism.” Ibid., pp. 33–34.

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fourth conception of environmental justice does not provide a useful “new wayof viewing access to resources.”64

However, we should not be so quick to dismiss the fourth conception of environ-mental justice because it highlights some problems of an overly narrow focuson income redistribution as the means of improving the position of the leastadvantaged group. On fuel poverty, Stephens, Bullock, and Scott emphasizethat a major contributory factor is that

Millions of homes are energy inefficient and have poor heating systems, and theiroccupants cannot afford to make improvements or keep their homes warm.65

It may be that in a just society the least advantaged group would be able toafford to “keep their homes warm.” However, the position of the least advantagedgroup might be more efficiently and effectively protected by regulating thebuilding industry (and the rented accommodation sector) and providing in-kind benefits to improve the energy efficiency of existing properties. Aninvestment in energy-efficient property is—in an important sense—an invest-ment in a public good even if much of that property is privately owned. If asociety’s housing “stock” is energy efficient, the resources that it will need todevote (or that members of the least advantaged group will need to devote) tofuel will be reduced. In a sense, the fourth conception of “environmental”justice brings the “environment” home in a very literal sense by focusing ourattention on the built environment in which we spend much of our lives—ourown homes.

The second concern highlighted by the fourth conception, food poverty, alsoraises interesting issues about the most effective method of improving theposition of the least advantaged. Again, higher income for the least advantagedshould enable them to afford healthy food. Moreover, higher income shouldensure better access to “out-of-town superstores” because of increased “trans-port options” for the least advantaged. However, in the overall context of ourdiscussion of environmental justice, more cars might not be the answer.Increased traffic is unlikely to make a positive contribution to achieving guaran-teed environmental standards or providing quality environments. A bettersolution may be a more thoughtful approach to planning combined with regularand reliable public transport systems. A more complex policy package thatprovides public goods such as an excellent public transport system integratedinto a thoughtfully planned town (or city or region) may do more to increasethe primary goods index of the least advantaged than (slightly) higher income.So, while a high social minimum should provide sufficient income to solve theproblems of food and fuel poverty, the environmental justice perspective

64 Stephens et al., Environmental Justice, sec. 2.65 Ibid.


suggests that looking at policies concerning the built environment and thetransport infrastructure of our towns and cities might be an indispensable partof satisfying the difference principle.

In summary, I have argued that Rawls’ difference principle can be extendedin ways that he suggests to address the issues raised by advocates of environ-mental justice. Rawlsian justice can and does have an environmental dimen-sion. However, it is important to remember that while Rawlsian liberalism mayhave the capacity to address these issues, Rawls and most other mainstreamliberals have (more or less) completely ignored them. Typically, liberals (andmany of their critics) have oversimplified by concentrating on income andwealth while ignoring public goods. Personal income and private wealth areimportant primary goods but they are not the only important primary goods.Public goods provide the context in which we live our lives and the presenceor absence of public goods can have a profound influence on the lives and lifechances of everyone. A complete liberal theory of justice must recognize theimportance of public goods and must build them into an index of primarygoods.

environmental justice and the difference principle

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