environmental law set 1

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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

Asticle II, 1987 Constitution

Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of thepeople and instill health consciousness among them.

Section 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the peopleto a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and

harmony of nature.

Oposa vs. Factoran

Oposa Law Office for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

DAVIDE, JR.,J.:

In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to abalanced and healthful ecology which the petitioners dramaticallyassociate with the twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility" and

"inter-generational justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue ofwhether the said petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent themisappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest theunabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems andcontinued rape of Mother Earth."

The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filedbefore Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial Court(RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs therein,now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joinedby their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is thePhilippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock andnon-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engagingin concerted action geared for the protection of our environment andnatural resources. The original defendant was the Honorable FulgencioS. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment andNatural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by the newSecretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently orderedupon proper motion by the petitioners. 1 The complaint2 was instituted asa taxpayers' class suit 3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens ofthe Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit,use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country'svirgin tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves and otherswho are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource butare "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before theCourt." The minors further asseverate that they "represent theirgeneration as well as generations yet unborn." 4Consequently, it isprayed for that judgment be rendered:

. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and otherpersons acting in his behalf to

(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in thecountry;

(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing,renewing or approving new timber license agreements.

and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable underthe premises." 5

The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippinearchipelago of 7,100 islands has a land area of thirty million (30,000,000)hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant rainforests in whichvaried, rare and unique species of flora and fauna may be found; theserainforests contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool which isirreplaceable; they are also the habitat of indigenous Philippine cultureswhich have existed, endured and flourished since time immemorial;scientific evidence reveals that in order to maintain a balanced and

healthful ecology, the country's land area should be utilized on the basisof a ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six per cent(46%) for agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and other uses;the distortion and disturbance of this balance as a consequence ofdeforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies, such as(a) water shortages resulting from drying up of the water table, otherwiseknown as the "aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks and streams, (b)salinization of the water table as a result of the intrusion therein of saltwater, incontrovertible examples of which may be found in the island ofCebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and the

consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural productivity, with thevolume of soil eroded estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000) cubicmeters per annum approximately the size of the entire island ofCatanduanes, (d) the endangering and extinction of the country's unique,rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the disturbance and dislocation ofcultural communities, including the disappearance of the Filipino'sindigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and seabeds andconsequential destruction of corals and other aquatic life leading to acritical reduction in marine resource productivity, (g) recurrent spells ofdrought as is presently experienced by the entire country, (h) increasingvelocity of typhoon winds which result from the absence of windbreakers,(i) the floodings of lowlands and agricultural plains arising from theabsence of the absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation andshortening of the lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed and

operated for the purpose of supplying water for domestic uses, irrigationand the generation of electric power, and (k) the reduction of the earth'scapacity to process carbon dioxide gases which has led to perplexingand catastrophic climatic changes such as the phenomenon of globalwarming, otherwise known as the "greenhouse effect."

Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequencesof continued and deforestation are so capable of unquestionabledemonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicialnotice. This notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to presentexpert witnesses as well as documentary, photographic and filmevidence in the course of the trial.

As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:

CAUSE OF ACTION

7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.

8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had somesixteen (16) million hectares of rainforests constituting roughly53% of the country's land mass.

9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remainedno more than 1.2 million hectares of said rainforests or fourper cent (4.0%) of the country's land area.

10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectaresof virgin old-growth rainforests are left, barely 2.8% of theentire land mass of the Philippine archipelago and about 3.0million hectares of immature and uneconomical secondarygrowth forests.

11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessorshave granted timber license agreements ('TLA's') to variouscorporations to cut the aggregate area of 3.89 million hectaresfor commercial logging purposes.

A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areascovered is hereto attached as Annex "A".

12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000hectares per annum or 25 hectares per hour nighttime,Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included the Philippineswill be bereft of forest resources after the end of this ensuingdecade, if not earlier.

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13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, seriousinjury and irreparable damage of this continued trend ofdeforestation to the plaintiff minor's generation and togenerations yet unborn are evident and incontrovertible. As amatter of fact, the environmental damages enumerated inparagraph 6 hereof are already being felt, experienced andsuffered by the generation of plaintiff adults.

14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders tocut and deforest the remaining forest stands will work great

damage and irreparable injury to plaintiffs especiallyplaintiff minors and their successors who may never see,use, benefit from and enjoy this rare and unique naturalresource treasure.

This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/orimpairment of the natural resource property he holds in trustfor the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.

15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to abalanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protectionby the State in its capacity as the parens patriae.

16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies withthe defendant's office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs servedupon defendant a final demand to cancel all logging permits inthe country.

A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is heretoattached as Annex "B".

17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel theexisting TLA's to the continuing serious damage and extremeprejudice of plaintiffs.

18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel

the TLA's is an act violative of the rights of plaintiffs, especiallyplaintiff minors who may be left with a country that isdesertified (sic), bare, barren and devoid of the wonderfulflora, fauna and indigenous cultures which the Philippines hadbeen abundantly blessed with.

19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's ismanifestly contrary to the public policy enunciated in thePhilippine Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part, statesthat it is the policy of the State

(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions underwhich man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyableharmony with each other;

(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements ofpresent and future generations of Filipinos and;

(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that isconductive to a life of dignity and well-being. (P.D. 1151, 6June 1977)

20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel theaforementioned TLA's is contradictory to the Constitutionalpolicy of the State to

a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities, incomeand wealth" and "make full and efficient use of naturalresources (sic)." (Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution);

b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);

c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage andresources (sic)" (Section 14, Article XIV,id.);

d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a balancedand healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmonyof nature." (Section 16, Article II, id.)

21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law ofhumankind the natural law and violative of plaintiffs' rightto self-preservation and perpetuation.

22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy inlaw other than the instant action to arrest the unabatedhemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems andcontinued rape of Mother Earth. 6

On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed aMotion to Dismiss the complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1)the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue raisedby the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to thelegislative or executive branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain that (1) the complaintshows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, (2) the motion isdilatory and (3) the action presents a justiciable question as it involvesthe defendant's abuse of discretion.

On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting theaforementioned motion to dismiss. 7 In the said order, not only was thedefendant's claim that the complaint states no cause of action againsthim and that it raises a political question sustained, the respondentJudge further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would resultin the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental lawof the land.

Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorariunder Rule65 of the Revised Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind and setaside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judgegravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parentsof the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have alsojoined the latter in this case. 8

On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition andrequired the parties to submit their respective Memoranda after theOffice of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of therespondents and the petitioners filed a reply thereto.

Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states acause of action as it contains sufficient allegations concerning their rightto a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the CivilCode (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151(Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and

healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Lawand the concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on therespondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, tosafeguard the people's right to a healthful environment.

It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's allegedgrave abuse of discretion in granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs)to cover more areas for logging than what is available involves a judicialquestion.

Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause, petitioners maintain that the same does not apply inthis case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit that

even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said clause, it is wellsettled that they may still be revoked by the State when the publicinterest so requires.

On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed toallege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the respondentSecretary for which any relief is provided by law. They see nothing in thecomplaint but vague and nebulous allegations concerning an

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"environmental right" which supposedly entitles the petitioners to the"protection by the state in its capacity as parens patriae." Suchallegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid cause of action.They then reiterate the theory that the question of whether loggingshould be permitted in the country is a political question which should beproperly addressed to the executive or legislative branches ofGovernment. They therefore assert that the petitioners' resources is notto file an action to court, but to lobby before Congress for the passage ofa bill that would ban logging totally.

As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit thatthe same cannot be done by the State without due process of law. Onceissued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time usually fortwenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same can neither berevised nor cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due noticeand hearing, to have violated the terms of the agreement or otherforestry laws and regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all theTLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing would beviolative of the requirements of due process.

Before going any further, We must first focus on some proceduralmatters. Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class suit. Theoriginal defendant and the present respondents did not take issue withthis matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil case isindeed a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of commonand general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of thePhilippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it,becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of thembefore the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein arenumerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of allconcerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid classsuit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are presentboth in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being butan incident to the former.

This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minorsassert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet

unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, forothers of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a classsuit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations canonly be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofaras the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such aright, as hereinafter expounded, considersthe "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world inits entirety. 9 Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia,the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal andconservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries,wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that theirexploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to thepresent as well as future generations. 10 Needless to say, everygeneration has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and

harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Puta little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a soundenvironment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of theirobligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations tocome.

The locus standiof the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shallnow proceed to the merits of the petition.

After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulousconsideration and evaluation of the issues raised and argumentsadduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to find for the petitioners andrule against the respondent Judge's challenged order for having beenissued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

The pertinent portions of the said order reads as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint,the Court cannot help but agree with the defendant. Foralthough we believe that plaintiffs have but the noblest of allintentions, it (sic) fell short of alleging, with sufficient

definiteness, a specific legal right they are seeking to enforceand protect, or a specific legal wrong they are seeking toprevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore, theCourt notes that the Complaint is replete with vagueassumptions and vague conclusions based on unverified data.In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action in its Complaintagainst the herein defendant.

Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it,being impressed with political color and involving a matter of

public policy, may not be taken cognizance of by this Courtwithout doing violence to the sacred principle of "Separation ofPowers" of the three (3) co-equal branches of theGovernment.

The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, nomatter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayedfor by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber licenseagreements in the country and to cease and desist fromreceiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving newtimber license agreements. For to do otherwise would amountto "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamentallaw. 11

We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failedto allege with sufficient definiteness a specific legal right involved or aspecific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is replete withvague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data. A readingof the complaint itself belies these conclusions.

The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right theright to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in ournation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in thefundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitlyprovides:

Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the

people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with therhythm and harmony of nature.

This right unites with the right to health which is provided for inthe preceding section of the same article:

Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right tohealth of the people and instill health consciousness amongthem.

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found underthe Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill ofRights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and

political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to adifferent category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less thanself-preservation and self-perpetuation aptly and fittingly stressed bythe petitioners the advancement of which may even be said topredate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, thesebasic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they areassumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are nowexplicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced andhealthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by theConstitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance andimposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first andprotect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when allelse would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those

to come generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earthincapable of sustaining life.

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it thecorrelative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. During thedebates on this right in one of the plenary sessions of the 1986Constitutional Commission, the following exchange transpired betweenCommissioner Wilfrido Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna whosponsored the section in question:

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MR. VILLACORTA:

Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctionsagainst all forms of pollution air, water and noise pollution?

MR. AZCUNA:

Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic)environment necessarily carries with it the correlative duty of

not impairing the same and, therefore, sanctions may beprovided for impairment of environmental balance. 12

The said right implies, among many other things, the judiciousmanagement and conservation of the country's forests.

Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balancewould be irreversiby disrupted.

Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthfulecology and the right to health, as well as the other related provisions ofthe Constitution concerning the conservation, development andutilization of the country's natural resources, 13 then President CorazonC. Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14Section 4 ofwhich expressly mandates that the Department of Environment andNatural Resources "shall be the primary government agency responsiblefor the conservation, management, development and proper use of thecountry's environment and natural resources, specifically forest andgrazing lands, mineral, resources, including those in reservation andwatershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensingand regulation of all natural resources as may be provided for by law inorder to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom forthe welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos." Section 3thereof makes the following statement of policy:

Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared thepolicy of the State to ensure the sustainable use,

development, management, renewal, and conservation of thecountry's forest, mineral, land, off-shore areas and othernatural resources, including the protection and enhancementof the quality of the environment, and equitable access of thedifferent segments of the population to the development andthe use of the country's natural resources, not only for thepresent generation but for future generations as well. It is alsothe policy of the state to recognize and apply a true valuesystem including social and environmental cost implicationsrelative to their utilization, development and conservation ofour natural resources.

This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV ofthe Administrative Code of 1987, 15specifically in Section 1 thereof which

reads:

Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. (1) The State shall ensure, forthe benefit of the Filipino people, the full exploration anddevelopment as well as the judicious disposition, utilization,management, renewal and conservation of the country'sforest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areasand other natural resources, consistent with the necessity ofmaintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting andenhancing the quality of the environment and the objective ofmaking the exploration, development and utilization of suchnatural resources equitably accessible to the differentsegments of the present as well as future generations.

(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true valuesystem that takes into account social and environmental costimplications relative to the utilization, development andconservation of our natural resources.

The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a soundecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of theenvironment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand, specifically

speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particularreference to the fact of the agency's being subject to law and higherauthority. Said section provides:

Sec. 2. Mandate. (1) The Department of Environment andNatural Resources shall be primarily responsible for theimplementation of the foregoing policy.

(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge ofcarrying out the State's constitutional mandate to control andsupervise the exploration, development, utilization, andconservation of the country's natural resources.

Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set theobjectives which will serve as the bases for policy formulation, and havedefined the powers and functions of the DENR.

It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987Constitution, specific statutes already paid special attention to the"environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6 June1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No.1152 (Philippine Environment Code) were issued. The former "declareda continuing policy of the State (a) to create, develop, maintain and

improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in productiveand enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to fulfill the social, economicand other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos,and (c) to insure the attainment of an environmental quality that isconducive to a life of dignity and well-being." 16 As its goal, it speaks ofthe "responsibilities of each generation as trustee and guardian of theenvironment for succeeding generations." 17The latter statute, on theother hand, gave flesh to the said policy.

Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to abalanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty underits mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192and the Administrative Code of 1987 to protect and advance the saidright.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative dutyor obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause ofaction. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which theyclaim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to abalanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereofrequires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.

A cause of action is defined as:

. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legalright or rights of the other; and its essential elements are legalright of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and

act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legalright. 18

It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on theground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, 19 the questionsubmitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the factsalleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should be considered;furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said allegations is beside the pointfor the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted. The only issue tobe resolved in such a case is: admitting such alleged facts to be true,may the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer inthe complaint? 20 In Militante vs. Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down therule that the judiciary should "exercise the utmost care andcircumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on the ground of the

absence thereof [cause of action] lest, by its failure to manifest a correctappreciation of the facts alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted,what the law grants or recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens,there is a blot on the legal order. The law itself stands in disrepute."

After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find thestatements under the introductory affirmative allegations, as well as thespecific averments under the sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be

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adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of theirrights. On the basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or partly,the reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing, however, that insofar as thecancellation of the TLAs is concerned, there is the need to implead, asparty defendants, the grantees thereof for they are indispensable parties.

The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise apolitical question. Policy formulation or determination by the executive orlegislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What isprincipally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already

formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, beemphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer, theinsurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or theimpenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions fromjudicial inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIIIof the Constitution states that:

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice tosettle actual controversies involving rights which are legallydemandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or notthere has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lackor excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch orinstrumentality of the Government.

Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, 22 Mr.Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished member of this Court, says:

The first part of the authority represents the traditional conceptof judicial power, involving the settlement of conflicting rightsas conferred as law. The second part of the authorityrepresents a broadening of judicial power to enable the courtsof justice to review what was before forbidden territory, to wit,the discretion of the political departments of the government.

As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, andparticularly the Supreme Court, the power to rule upon eventhe wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the

legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or excessof jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse of discretion.The catch, of course, is the meaning of "grave abuse ofdiscretion," which is a very elastic phrase that can expand orcontract according to the disposition of the judiciary.

In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court,noted:

In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objectionbecomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason is that,even if we were to assume that the issue presented before uswas political in nature, we would still not be precluded from

revolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon usthat now covers, in proper cases, even the political question.Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides: . . .

The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint isthe non-impairment of contracts clause found in the Constitution. Thecourt a quo declared that:

The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, nomatter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayedfor by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber licenseagreements in the country and to cease and desist fromreceiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving newtimber license agreements. For to do otherwise would amount

to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamentallaw. 24

We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if notshocked, by such a sweeping pronouncement. In the first place, therespondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in hismotion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so, hewould have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by providing

undue and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber licenseholders because he would have forever bound the Government to strictlyrespect the said licenses according to their terms and conditionsregardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest andwelfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners,into every timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry ReformCode (P.D. No. 705) which provides:

. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, thePresident may amend, modify, replace or rescind any

contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other form ofprivilege granted herein . . .

Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked orrescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property ora property right protested by the due process clause of theConstitution. In Tan vs. Director of Forestry, 25 this Court held:

. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the Stateregulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources tothe end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is nota contract within the purview of the due process clause; it isonly a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn

whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in thiscase.

A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwisewould be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority,federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whomit is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor doesit create a vested right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus,this Court held that the granting of license does not createirrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights(People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576).

We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs.Deputy Executive Secretary: 26

. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are theprincipal instruments by which the State regulates theutilization and disposition of forest resources to the end thatpublic welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid thatthey merely evidence a privilege granted by the State toqualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent orirrevocable right to the particular concession area and theforest products therein. They may be validly amended,modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive whennational interests so require. Thus, they are not deemedcontracts within the purview of the due process of law clause[See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, asamended.Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548,October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].

Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause,which reads:

Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall bepassed. 27

cannot be invoked.

In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same arecontracts, the instant case does not involve a law or even an executive

issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timberlicenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked.Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passedmandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still bestigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is becauseby its very nature and purpose, such as law could have only beenpassed in the exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose ofadvancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology,promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare. InAbe vs.

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Foster Wheeler Corp. 28 this Court stated:

The freedom of contract, under our system of government, isnot meant to be absolute. The same is understood to besubject to reasonable legislative regulation aimed at thepromotion of public health, moral, safety and welfare. In otherwords, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment ofobligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the policepower of the State, in the interest of public health, safety,

moral and general welfare.

The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. NewYork, 29 quoted in Philippine American Life Insurance Co. vs. AuditorGeneral, 30 to wit:

Under our form of government the use of property and themaking of contracts are normally matters of private and not ofpublic concern. The general rule is that both shall be free ofgovernmental interference. But neither property rights norcontract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if thecitizen may at will use his property to the detriment of hisfellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them

harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is that of thepublic to regulate it in the common interest.

In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of thestate. 31

Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could apply with respect to the prayer to enjoin therespondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing orapproving new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no contractwould have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, withrespect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of right.

WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is herebyGRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. Thepetitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead asdefendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber licenseagreements.

No pronouncement as to costs.

YSMAEL vs. DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Soon after the change of government in February 1986, petitioner sent aletter dated March 17, 1986 to the Office of the President, and anotherletter dated April 2, 1986 to Minister Ernesto Maceda of the Ministry ofNatural Resources [MNR], seeking: (1) the reinstatement of its timberlicense agreement which was cancelled in August 1983 during theMarcos administration; (2) the revocation of TLA No. 356 which wasissued to Twin Peaks Development and Realty Corporation withoutpublic bidding and in violation of forestry laws, rules and regulations;and, (3) the issuance of an order allowing petitioner to take possessionof all logs found in the concession area [Annexes "6" and "7" of thePetition; Rollo, pp. 54-63].

Petitioner made the following allegations:

(a) That on October 12, 1965, it entered into a timber license agreementdesignated as TLA No. 87 with the Department of Agriculture andNatural Resources, represented by then Secretary Jose Feliciano,wherein it was issued an exclusive license to cut, collect and removetimber except prohibited species within a specified portion of publicforest land with an area of 54,920 hectares located in the municipality ofMaddela, province of Nueva Vizcaya * from October 12, 1965 until June30, 1990;

(b) That on August 18, 1983, the Director of the Bureau of ForestDevelopment [hereinafter referred to as "Bureau"], Director EdmundoCortes, issued a memorandum order stopping all logging operations inNueva Vizcaya and Quirino provinces, and cancelling the loggingconcession of petitioner and nine other forest concessionaires, pursuantto presidential instructions and a memorandum order of the Minister ofNatural Resources Teodoro Pena [Annex "5" of the Petition; Rollo, p.49];

(c) that on August 25, 1983, petitioner received a telegram from the

Bureau, the contents of which were as follows:

PURSUANT TO THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE PRESIDENTYOU ARE REQUESTED TO STOP ALL LOGGINGOPERATIONS TO CONSERVE REMAINING FORESTSPLEASE CONDUCT THE ORDERLY PULL-OUT OFLOGGING MACHINERIES AND EQUIPMENT ANDCOORDINATE WITH THE RESPECTIVE DISTRICTFORESTERS FOR THE INVENTORY OF LOGS CUT PRIORTO THIS ORDER THE SUBMISSION OF A COMPLIANCEREPORT WITHIN THIRTY DAYS SHALL BE APPRECIATED [Annex "4" of the Petition; Rollo, p. 48];

(d) That after the cancellation of its timber license agreement, itimmediately sent a letter addressed to then President Ferdinand Marcoswhich sought reconsideration of the Bureau's directive, citing in supportthereof its contributions to alleging that it was not given the forestconservation and opportunity to be heard prior to the cancellation of itslogging 531, but no operations (Annex "6" of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 50favorable action was taken on this letter;

(e) That barely one year thereafter, approximately one-half or 26,000hectares of the area formerly covered by TLA No. 87 was re-awarded toTwin Peaks Development and Reality Corporation under TLA No. 356which was set to expire on July 31, 2009, while the other half wasallowed to be logged by Filipinas Loggers, Inc. without the benefit of aformal award or license; and,

(f) That the latter entities were controlled or owned by relatives or croniesof deposed President Ferdinand Marcos. Acting on petitioner's letter, theMNR through then Minister Ernesto Maceda issued an order dated July22, 1986 denying petitioner's request. The Ministry ruled that a timberlicense was not a contract within the due process clause of theConstitution, but only a privilege which could be withdrawn wheneverpublic interest or welfare so demands, and that petitioner was notdiscriminated against in view of the fact that it was among tenconcessionaires whose licenses were revoked in 1983. Moreover,emphasis was made of the total ban of logging operations in theprovinces of Nueva Ecija, Nueva Vizcaya, Quirino and Ifugao imposedon April 2, 1986, thus:

xxx xxx xxx

It should be recalled that [petitioner's] earlier request forreinstatement has been denied in view of the total ban of alllogging operations in the provinces of Nueva Ecija, NuevaVizcaya, Quirino and Ifugao which was imposed for reasons ofconservation and national security.

The Ministry imposed the ban because it realizes the greatresponsibility it bear [sic] in respect to forest t considers itselfthe trustee thereof. This being the case, it has to ensure theavailability of forest resources not only for the present, butalso for the future generations of Filipinos.

On the other hand, the activities of the insurgents in theseparts of the country are well documented. Their financialdemands on logging concessionaires are well known. Thegovernment, therefore, is well within its right to deprive itsenemy of sources of funds in order to preserve itself, itsestablished institutions and the liberty and democratic way oflife of its people.

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xxx xxx xxx

[Annex "9" of the Petition, pp. 2-4; Rollo, pp. 65-67.]

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the aforestated order reiterating,among others. its request that TLA No. 356 issued to private respondentbe declared null and void. The MNR however denied this motion in anorder dated September 15, 1986. stating in part:

xxx xxx xxx

Regarding [petitioner's] request that the award of a 26,000hectare portion of TLA No. 87 to Twin Peaks RealtyDevelopment Corporation under TLA No. 356 be declared nulland void, suffice it to say that the Ministry is now in theprocess of reviewing all contracts, permits or other form ofprivileges for the exploration, development, exploitation, orutilization of natural resources entered into, granted, issued oracquired before the issuance of Proclamation No. 3, otherwiseknown as the Freedom Constitution for the purpose ofamending, modifying or revoking them when the nationalinterest so requires.

xxx xxx xxx

The Ministry, through the Bureau of Forest Development, hasjurisdiction and authority over all forest lands. On the basis ofthis authority, the Ministry issued the order banning all loggingoperations/activities in Quirino province, among others, wheremovant's former concession area is located. Therefore, theissuance of an order disallowing any person or entity fromremoving cut or uncut logs from the portion of TLA No. 87,now under TLA No. 356, would constitute an unnecessary orsuperfluous act on the part of the Ministry.

xxx xxx xxx

[Annex "11" of the Petition, pp. 3-4; Rollo, pp. 77-78.]

On November 26, 1986, petitioner's supplemental motion forreconsideration was likewise denied. Meanwhile, per MNRAdministrative Order No. 54, series of 1986, issued on November 26,1986, the logging ban in the province of Quirino was lifted.

Petitioner subsequently appealed from the orders of the MNR to theOffice of the President. In a resolution dated July 6, 1987, the Office ofthe President, acting through then Deputy Executive Secretary CatalinoMacaraig, denied petitioner's appeal for lack of merit. The Office of thePresident ruled that the appeal of petitioner was prematurely filed, the

matter not having been terminated in the MNR. Petitioner's motion forreconsideration was denied on August 14, 1987.

Hence, petitioner filed directly with this Court a petition for certiorari, withprayer for the issuance of a restraining order or writ of preliminaryinjunction, on August 27, 1987. On October 13, 1987, it filed asupplement to its petition for certiorari. Thereafter, public and privaterespondents submitted their respective comments, and petitioner filed itsconsolidated reply thereto. In a resolution dated May 22, 1989, the Courtresolved to give due course to the petition.

After a careful study of the circumstances in the case at bar, the Courtfinds several factors which militate against the issuance of a writ ofcertiorari in favor of petitioner.

1. Firstly, the refusal of public respondents herein to reverse final andexecutory administrative orders does not constitute grave abuse ofdiscretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

It is an established doctrine in this jurisdiction that the decisions andorders of administrative agencies have upon their finality, the force andbinding effect of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res

judicata. These decisions and orders are as conclusive upon the rights ofthe affected parties as though the same had been rendered by a court ofgeneral jurisdiction. The rule of res judicata thus forbids the reopening ofa matter once determined by competent authority acting within theirexclusive jurisdiction [See Brillantes v. Castro, 99 Phil. 497 (1956);Ipekdjian Merchandising Co., Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals, G.R. No. L-15430, September 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 72; San Luis v. Court of Appeals,G.R. No. 80160, June 26, 1989].

In the case at bar, petitioner's letters to the Office of the President and

the MNR [now the Department of Environment and Natural Resources(DENR) dated March 17, 1986 and April 2, 1986, respectively, soughtthe reconsideration of a memorandum order issued by the Bureau ofForest Development which cancelled its timber license agreement in1983, as well as the revocation of TLA No. 356 subsequently issued bythe Bureau to private respondents in 1984.

But as gleaned from the record, petitioner did not avail of its remediesunder the law, i.e. Section 8 of Pres. Dec. No. 705 as amended, forattacking the validity of these administrative actions until after 1986. Bythe time petitioner sent its letter dated April 2, 1986 to the newlyappointed Minister of the MNR requesting reconsideration of the aboveBureau actions, these were already settled matters as far as petitionerwas concerned [See Rueda v. Court of Agrarian Relations, 106 Phil. 300(1959); Danan v. Aspillera G.R. No. L-17305, November 28, 1962, 6SCRA 609; Ocampo v. Arboleda G.R. No. L-48190, August 31, 1987,153 SCRA 374].

No particular significance can be attached to petitioner's letter datedSeptember 19, 1983 which petitioner claimed to have sent to thenPresident Marcos [Annex "6" of Petition, Rollo, pp. 50-53], seeking thereconsideration of the 1983 order issued by Director Cortes of theBureau. It must be pointed out that the averments in this letter areentirely different from the charges of fraud against officials under theprevious regime made by petitioner in its letters to public respondentsherein. In the letter to then President Marcos, petitioner simply contestedits inclusion in the list of concessionaires, whose licenses were

cancelled, by defending its record of selective logging and reforestationpractices in the subject concession area. Yet, no other administrativesteps appear to have been taken by petitioner until 1986, despite the factthat the alleged fraudulent scheme became apparent in 1984 asevidenced by the awarding of the subject timber concession area toother entities in that year.

2. Moreover, petitioner is precluded from availing of the benefits of a writof certiorari in the present case because he failed to file his petitionwithin a reasonable period.

The principal issue ostensibly presented for resolution in the instantpetition is whether or not public respondents herein acted with graveabuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in refusing

to overturn administrative orders issued by their predecessors in the pastregime. Yet, what the petition ultimately seeks is the nullification of theBureau orders cancelling TLA No. 87 and granting TLA No. 356 toprivate respondent, which were issued way back in 1983 and 1984,respectively.

Once again, the fact that petitioner failed to seasonably take judicialrecourse to have the earlier administrative actions reviewed by thecourts through a petition for certiorari is prejudicial to its cause. Foralthough no specific time frame is fixed for the institution of a special civilaction for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, thesame must nevertheless be done within a "reasonable time". Theyardstick to measure the timeliness of a petition for certiorari is the"reasonableness of the length of time that had expired from thecommission of the acts complained of up to the institution of theproceeding to annul the same" [Toledo v. Pardo, G.R. No. 56761,November 19, 1982, 118 SCRA 566, 571]. And failure to file the petitionfor certiorari within a reasonable period of time renders the petitionersusceptible to the adverse legal consequences of laches [Municipality ofCarcar v. Court of First Instance of Cebu, G.R. No. L-31628, December27, 1982, 119 SCRA 392).

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Laches is defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable andunexplained length of time to do that which by exercising due diligence,could or should have been done earlier, or to assert a right within areasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled theretohas either abandoned it or declined to assert it [Tijam v. Sibonghanoy,G.R. No. L-21450, April 15, 1968, 23 SCRA 29; Seno v. Mangubat, G.R.No. L-44339, December 2, 1987, 156 SCRA 113]. The rule is thatunreasonable delay on the part of a plaintiff in seeking to enforce analleged right may, depending upon the circumstances, be destructive ofthe right itself. Verily, the laws aid those who are vigilant, not those who

sleep upon their rights (Vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura subveniunt)[See Buenaventura v. David, 37 Phil. 435 (1918)].

In the case at bar, petitioner waited for at least three years before itfinally filed a petition for certiorari with the Court attacking the validity ofthe assailed Bureau actions in 1983 and 1984. Considering thatpetitioner, throughout the period of its inaction, was not deprived of theopportunity to seek relief from the courts which were normally operatingat the time, its delay constitutes unreasonable and inexcusable neglect,tantamount to laches. Accordingly, the writ of certiorari requiring thereversal of these orders will not lie.

3. Finally, there is a more significant factor which bars the issuance of awrit of certiorari in favor of petitioner and against public respondentsherein. It is precisely this for which prevents the Court from departingfrom the general application of the rules enunciated above.

A cursory reading of the assailed orders issued by public respondentMinister Maceda of the MNR which were ed by the Office of thePresident, will disclose public policy consideration which effectivelyforestall judicial interference in the case at bar,

Public respondents herein, upon whose shoulders rests the task ofimplementing the policy to develop and conserve the country's naturalresources, have indicated an ongoing department evaluation of all timberlicense agreements entered into, and permits or licenses issued, underthe previous dispensation. In fact, both the executive and legislative

departments of the incumbent administration are presently taking stockof its environmental policies with regard to the utilization of timber landsand developing an agenda for future programs for their conservation andrehabilitation.

The ongoing administrative reassessment is apparently in response tothe renewed and growing global concern over the despoliation of forestlands and the utter disregard of their crucial role in sustaining a balancedecological system. The legitimacy of such concern can hardly bedisputed, most especially in this country. The Court takes judicial noticeof the profligate waste of the country's forest resources which has notonly resulted in the irreversible loss of flora and fauna peculiar to theregion, but has produced even more disastrous and lasting economicand social effects. The delicate balance of nature having been upset, a

vicious cycle of floods and droughts has been triggered and the supply offood and energy resources required by the people seriously depleted.

While there is a desire to harness natural resources to amass profit andto meet the country's immediate financial requirements, the moreessential need to ensure future generations of Filipinos of their survivalin a viable environment demands effective and circumspect action fromthe government to check further denudation of whatever remains of theforest lands. Nothing less is expected of the government, in view of theclear constitutional command to maintain a balanced and healthfulecology. Section 16 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides:

SEC. 16. The State shall protect and promote the right of the

people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with therhythm and harmony of nature.

Thus, while the administration grapples with the complex andmultifarious problems caused by unbridled exploitation of theseresources, the judiciary will stand clear. A long line of cases establish thebasic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which areaddressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrustedwith the regulation of activities coming under the special technical

knowledge and training of such agencies [See Espinosa v. Makalintal, 79Phil. 134 (1947); Coloso v. Board of Accountancy, 92 Phil. 938 (1953);Pajo v. Ago, 108 Phil. 905 (1960); Suarez v. Reyes, G.R. No. L-19828,February 28, 1963, 7 SCRA 461; Ganitano v. Secretary of Agricultureand Natural Resources, G. R. No. L-21167, March 31, 1966, 16 SCRA543; Villegas v. Auditor General, G.R. No. L-21352, November 29, 1966,18 SCRA 877; Manuel v. Villena, G.R. No. L-28218, February 27, 1971,37 SCRA 745; Lacuesta v. Herrera, G.R. No. L-33646, January 28,1975, 62 SCRA 115; Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc. v. Enage, G.R. No. L-30637, July 16, 1987, 152 SCRA 80]. More so where, as in the present

case, the interests of a private logging company are pitted against that ofthe public at large on the pressing public policy issue of forestconservation. For this Court recognizes the wide latitude of discretionpossessed by the government in determining the appropriate actions tobe taken to preserve and manage natural resources, and the properparties who should enjoy the privilege of utilizing these resources[Director of Forestry v. Munoz, G.R. No. L-24796, June 28, 1968, 23SCRA 1183; Lim, Sr. v. The Secretary of Agriculture and NaturalResources, G.R. No. L-26990, August 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 751]. Timberlicenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instrumentsby which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forestresources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardlybe gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State toqualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable

right to the particular concession area and the forest products therein.They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by theChief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are notdeemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause[See Sections 3 (ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also,Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125SCRA 302].

In fine, the legal precepts highlighted in the foregoing discussion morethan suffice to justify the Court's refusal to interfere in the DENRevaluation of timber licenses and permits issued under the previousregime, or to pre-empt the adoption of appropriate corrective measuresby the department.

Nevertheless, the Court cannot help but express its concern regardingalleged irregularities in the issuance of timber license agreements to anumber of logging concessionaires.

The grant of licenses or permits to exploit the country's timber resources,if done in contravention of the procedure outlined in the law, or as aresult of fraud and undue influence exerted on department officials, isindicative of an arbitrary and whimsical exercise of the State's power toregulate the use and exploitation of forest resources. The allegedpractice of bestowing "special favors" to preferred individuals, regardlessof merit, would be an abuse of this power. And this Court will not be aparty to a flagrant mockery of the avowed public policy of conservationenshrined in the 1987 Constitution. Therefore, should the appropriate

case be brought showing a clear grave abuse of discretion on the part ofofficials in the DENR and related bureaus with respect to theimplementation of this public policy, the Court win not hesitate to step inand wield its authority, when invoked, in the exercise of judicial powersunder the Constitution [Section 1, Article VIII].

However, petitioner having failed to make out a case showing graveabuse of discretion on the part of public respondents herein, the Courtfinds no basis to issue a writ of certiorari and to grant any of theaffirmative reliefs sought.

WHEREFORE, the present petition is DISMISSED.

HERNARES vs. LTFRB

Petitioners challenge this Court to issue a writ of mandamuscommanding respondents Land Transportation Franchising andRegulatory Board (LTFRB) and the Department of Transportation andCommunications (DOTC) to require public utility vehicles (PUVs) to usecompressed natural gas (CNG) as alternative fuel.

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Citing statistics from the Metro Manila Transportation and TrafficSituation Study of 1996,1the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB)of the National Capital Region,2a study of the Asian DevelopmentBank,3the Manila Observatory4and the Department of Environment andNatural Resources5(DENR) on the high growth and low turnover invehicle ownership in the Philippines, including diesel-powered vehicles,two-stroke engine powered motorcycles and their concomitant emissionof air pollutants, petitioners attempt to present a compelling case forjudicial action against the bane of air pollution and related environmentalhazards.

Petitioners allege that the particulate matters (PM) complex mixtures ofdust, dirt, smoke, and liquid droplets, varying in sizes and compositionsemitted into the air from various engine combustions have causeddetrimental effects on health, productivity, infrastructure and the overallquality of life. Petitioners particularly cite the effects of certain fuelemissions from engine combustion when these react to other pollutants.For instance, petitioners aver, with hydrocarbons, oxide of nitrogen (NO x)creates smog; with sulfur dioxide, it creates acid rain; and with ammonia,moisture and other compounds, it reacts to form nitric acid and harmfulnitrates. Fuel emissions also cause retardation and leaf bleaching inplants. According to petitioner, another emission, carbon monoxide (CO),when not completely burned but emitted into the atmosphere and theninhaled can disrupt the necessary oxygen in blood. With prolonged

exposure, CO affects the nervous system and can be lethal to peoplewith weak hearts.6

Petitioners add that although much of the new power generated in thecountry will use natural gas while a number of oil and coal-fired fuelstations are being phased-out, still with the projected doubling of powergeneration over the next 10 years, and with the continuing high demandfor motor vehicles, the energy and transport sectors are likely to remainthe major sources of harmful emissions. Petitioners refer us to the studyof the Philippine Environment Monitor 2002 7, stating that in four of thecountry's major cities, Metro Manila, Davao, Cebu and Baguio, theexposure to PM10,a finer PM which can penetrate deep into the lungscausing serious health problems, is estimated at over US$430million.8The study also reports that the emissions of PMs have causedthe following:

Over 2,000 people die prematurely. This loss is valued atabout US$140 million.

Over 9,000 people suffer from chronic bronchitis, which isvalued at about US$120 million.

Nearly 51 million cases of respiratory symptom days in MetroManila (averaging twice a year in Davao and Cebu, and five tosix times in Metro Manila and Baguio), costs about US$170million. This is a 70 percent increase, over a decade, whencompared with the findings of a similar study done in 1992 for

Metro Manila, which reported 33 million cases.9

Petitioners likewise cite the University of the Philippines' studies in 1990-91 and 1994 showing that vehicular emissions in Metro Manila haveresulted to the prevalence of chronic obstructive pulmonary diseases(COPD); that pulmonary tuberculosis is highest among jeepney drivers;and there is a 4.8 to 27.5 percent prevalence of respiratory symptomsamong school children and 15.8 to 40.6 percent among child vendors.The studies also revealed that the children in Metro Manila showed morecompromised pulmonary function than their rural counterparts.Petitioners infer that these are mostly due to the emissions of PUVs.

To counter the aforementioned detrimental effects of emissions from

PUVs, petitioners propose the use of CNG. According to petitioners,CNG is a natural gas comprised mostly of methane which althoughcontaining small amounts of propane and butane,10 is colorless andodorless and considered the cleanest fossil fuel because it producesmuch less pollutants than coal and petroleum; produces up to 90 percentless CO compared to gasoline and diesel fuel; reduces NOx emissionsby 50 percent and cuts hydrocarbon emissions by half; emits 60 percentless PMs; and releases virtually no sulfur dioxide. Although, according to

petitioners, the only drawback of CNG is that it produces more methane,one of the gases blamed for global warming.11

Asserting their right to clean air, petitioners contend that the bases fortheir petition for a writ of mandamus to order the LTFRB to require PUVsto use CNG as an alternative fuel, lie in Section 16, 12Article II of the1987 Constitution, our ruling in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.,13and Section414of Republic Act No. 8749 otherwise known as the "Philippine CleanAir Act of 1999."

Meantime, following a subsequent motion, the Court granted petitioners'motion to implead the Department of Transportation andCommunications (DOTC) as additional respondent.

In his Comment for respondents LTFRB and DOTC, the SolicitorGeneral, cites Section 3, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules ofCourtandexplains that the writ of mandamus is not the correct remedysince the writ may be issued only to command a tribunal, corporation,board or person to do an act that is required to be done, when he or itunlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specificallyenjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, or unlawfullyexcludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to whichsuch other is entitled, there being no other plain, speedy and adequate

remedy in the ordinary course of law.

15

Further citing existingjurisprudence, the Solicitor General explains that in contrast to adiscretionary act, a ministerial act, which a mandamus is, is one in whichan officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribedmanner, in obedience to a mandate of legal authority, without regard toor the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety ofan act done.

The Solicitor General also notes that nothing in Rep. Act No. 8749 thatpetitioners invoke, prohibits the use of gasoline and diesel by owners ofmotor vehicles. Sadly too, according to the Solicitor General, Rep. ActNo. 8749 does not even mention the existence of CNG as alternativefuel and avers that unless this law is amended to provide CNG asalternative fuel for PUVs, the respondents cannot propose that PUVs

use CNG as alternative fuel.

The Solicitor General also adds that it is the DENR that is tasked toimplement Rep. Act No. 8749 and not the LTFRB nor the DOTC.Moreover, he says, it is the Department of Energy (DOE), under Section2616of Rep. Act No. 8749, that is required to set the specifications for alltypes of fuel and fuel-related products to improve fuel compositions forimproved efficiency and reduced emissions. He adds that under Section2117of the cited Republic Act, the DOTC is limited to implementing theemission standards for motor vehicles, and the herein respondentscannot alter, change or modify the emission standards. The SolicitorGeneral opines that the Court should declare the instant petition formandamus without merit.

Petitioners, in their Reply, insist that the respondents possess theadministrative and regulatory powers to implement measures inaccordance with the policies and principles mandated by Rep. Act No.8749, specifically Section 218 and Section 21.19Petitioners state thatunder these laws and with all the available information provided by theDOE on the benefits of CNG, respondents cannot ignore the existence ofCNG, and their failure to recognize CNG and compel its use by PUVs asalternative fuel while air pollution brought about by the emissions ofgasoline and diesel endanger the environment and the people, istantamount to neglect in the performance of a duty which the lawenjoins.

Lastly, petitioners aver that other than the writ applied for, they have no

other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.Petitioners insist that the writ in fact should be issued pursuant to thevery same Section 3, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court that theSolicitor General invokes.

In their Memorandum, petitioners phrase the issues before us as follows:

I. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS HAVE THEPERSONALITY TO BRING THE PRESENT ACTION

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II. WHETHER OR NOT THE PRESENT ACTION ISSUPPORTED BY LAW

III. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT IS THEAGENCY RESPONSIBLE TO IMPLEMENT THESUGGESTED ALTERNATIVE OF REQUIRING PUBLICUTILITY VEHICLES TO USE COMPRESSED NATURAL GAS(CNG)

IV. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT CAN BECOMPELLED TO REQUIRE PUBLIC UTILITY VEHICLES TOUSE COMPRESSED NATURAL GAS THROUGH A WRIT OFMANDAMUS20

Briefly put, the issues are two-fold. First, Do petitioners have legalpersonality to bring this petition before us? Second, Should mandamusissue against respondents to compel PUVs to use CNG as alternativefuel?

According to petitioners, Section 16,21 Article II of the 1987 Constitutionis the policy statement that bestows on the people the right to breatheclean air in a healthy environment. This policy is enunciatedin Oposa.22The implementation of this policy is articulated in Rep. Act

No. 8749. These, according to petitioners, are the bases for theirstanding to file the instant petition. They aver that when there is anomission by the government to safeguard a right, in this case their rightto clean air, then, the citizens can resort to and exhaust all remedies tochallenge this omission by the government. This, they say, is embodiedin Section 423of Rep. Act No. 8749.

Petitioners insist that since it is the LTFRB and the DOTC that are thegovernment agencies clothed with power to regulate and control motorvehicles, particularly PUVs, and with the same agencies' awareness andknowledge that the PUVs emit dangerous levels of air pollutants, then,the responsibility to see that these are curbed falls under respondents'functions and a writ of mandamus should issue against them.

The Solicitor General, for his part, reiterates his position that therespondent government agencies, the DOTC and the LTFRB, are not ina position to compel the PUVs to use CNG as alternative fuel. TheSolicitor General explains that the function of the DOTC is limited toimplementing the emission standards set forth in Rep. Act No. 8749 andthe said law only goes as far as setting the maximum limit for theemission of vehicles, but it does not recognize CNG as alternativeengine fuel. The Solicitor General avers that the petition should beaddressed to Congress for it to come up with a policy that would compelthe use of CNG as alternative fuel.

Patently, this Court is being asked to resolve issues that are not onlyprocedural. Petitioners challenge this Court to decide if what petitioners

propose could be done through a less circuitous, speedy andunchartered course in an issue that Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. inhisponencia in the Oposa case,24describes as "inter-generationalresponsibility" and "inter-generational justice."

Now, as to petitioners' standing. There is no dispute that petitioners havestanding to bring their case before this Court. Even respondents do notquestion their standing. This petition focuses on one fundamental legalright of petitioners, their right to clean air. Moreover, as held previously, aparty's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which may,in the exercise of the Court's discretion, be set aside in view of theimportance of the issue raised. We brush aside this issue of technicalityunder the principle of the transcendental importance to the public,especially so if these cases demand that they be settled promptly.

Undeniably, the right to clean air not only is an issue of paramountimportance to petitioners for it concerns the air they breathe, but it is alsoimpressed with public interest. The consequences of the counter-productive and retrogressive effects of a neglected environment due toemissions of motor vehicles immeasurably affect the well-being ofpetitioners. On these considerations, the legal standing of the petitionersdeserves recognition.

Our next concern is whether the writ of mandamus is the proper remedy,and if the writ could issue against respondents.

Under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, mandamus lies underany of the following cases: (1) against any tribunal which unlawfullyneglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins asa duty; (2) in case any corporation, board or person unlawfully neglectsthe performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting froman office, trust, or station; and (3) in case any tribunal, corporation, boardor person unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a

right or office to which such other is legally entitled; and there is no otherplain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

In University of San Agustin, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,25we said,

It is settled that mandamus is employed to compel theperformance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, this being itsmain objective. It does not lie to require anyone to fulfillcontractual obligations or to compel a course of conduct, norto control or review the exercise of discretion. On the part ofthe petitioner, it is essential to the issuance of a writ ofmandamus that he should have a clear legal rightto the thingdemanded and it must be the imperative duty of the

respondent to perform the act required. It never issues indoubtful cases. While it may not be necessary that the duty beabsolutely expressed, it must however, be clear. The writ willnot issue to compel an official to do anything which is not hisduty to do or which is his duty not to do, or give to theapplicant anything to which he is not entitled by law. The writneither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply acommand to exercise a power already possessed and toperform a duty already imposed. (Emphasis supplied.)

In this petition the legal right which is sought to be recognized andenforced hinges on a constitutional and a statutory policy alreadyarticulated in operational terms, e.g. in Rep. Act No. 8749, the PhilippineClean Air Act of 1999. Paragraph (a), Section 21 of the Act specifically

provides that when PUVs are concerned, the responsibility ofimplementing the policy falls on respondent DOTC. It provides asfollows:

SEC 21. Pollution from Motor Vehicles. - a) The DOTC shallimplement the emission standards for motor vehicles setpursuant to and as provided in this Act. To further improve theemission standards, the Department [DENR] shall review,revise and publish the standards every two (2) years, or as theneed arises. It shall consider the maximum limits for all majorpollutants to ensure substantial improvement in air quality forthe health, safety and welfare of the general public.

Paragraph (b) states:

b) The Department [DENR] in collaboration withthe DOTC, DTI and LGUs, shall develop an action plan forthe control and management of air pollution from motorvehicles consistent with the Integrated Air QualityFramework . . . . (Emphasis supplied.)

There is no dispute that under the Clean Air Act it is the DENR that istasked to set the emission standards for fuel use and the task ofdeveloping an action plan. As far as motor vehicles are concerned, itdevolves upon the DOTC and the line agency whose mandate is tooversee that motor vehicles prepare an action plan and implement theemission standards for motor vehicles, namely the LTFRB.

In Oposa26we said, the right to a balanced and healthful ecology carrieswith it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. Wealso said, it is clearly the duty of the responsible government agencies toadvance the said right.

Petitioners invoke the provisions of the Constitution and the Clean AirAct in their prayer for issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the

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respondents to require PUVs to use CNG as an alternative fuel.Although both are general mandates that do not specifically enjoin theuse of any kind of fuel, particularly the use of CNG, there is an executiveorder implementing a program on the use of CNG by public vehicles.Executive Order No. 290, entitledImplementing the Natural Gas VehicleProgram for Public Transport (NGVPPT), took effect on February 24,2004. The program recognized, among others, natural gas as a cleanburning alternative fuel for vehicle which has the potential to producesubstantially lower pollutants; and the Malampaya Gas-to-Power Projectas representing the beginning of the natural gas industry of the

Philippines. Paragraph 1.2, Section 1 of E.O. No. 290 cites as one of itsobjectives, the use of CNG as a clean alternative fuel for transport.Furthermore, one of the components of the program is the developmentof CNG refueling stations and all related facilities in strategic locations inthe country to serve the needs of CNG-powered PUVs. Section 3 of E.O.No. 290, consistent with E.O. No. 66, series of 2002, designated theDOE as the lead agency (a) in developing the natural gas industry of thecountry with the DENR, through the EMB and (b) in formulating emissionstandards for CNG. Most significantly, par. 4.5, Section 4 tasks theDOTC, working with the DOE, to develop an implementation plan for "agradual shift to CNG fuel utilization in PUVs and promote NGVs [naturalgas vehicles] in Metro Manila and Luzon through the issuance ofdirectives/orders providing preferential franchises in present day majorroutes and exclusive franchises to NGVs in newly opened routes" A

thorough reading of the executive order assures us that implementationfor a cleaner environment is being addressed. To a certain extent, theinstant petition had been mooted by the issuance of E.O. No. 290.

Regrettably, however, the plain, speedy and adequate remedy hereinsought by petitioners, i.e., a writ of mandamus commanding therespondents to require PUVs to use CNG, is unavailing. Mandamus isavailable only to compel the doing of an act specifically enjoined by lawas a duty. Here, there is no law that mandates the respondents LTFRBand the DOTC to order owners of motor vehicles to use CNG. At mostthe LTFRB has been tasked by E.O. No. 290 in par. 4.5 (ii), Section 4 "togrant preferential and exclusive Certificates of Public Convenience(CPC) or franchises to operators of NGVs based on the results of theDOTC surveys."

Further, mandamus will not generally lie from one branch of governmentto a coordinate branch, for the obvious reason that neither is inferior tothe other.27The need for future changes in both legislation and itsimplementation cannot be preempted by orders from this Court,especially when what is prayed for is procedurally infirm. Besides, comitywith and courtesy to a coequal branch dictate that we give sufficient timeand leeway for the coequal branches to address by themselves theenvironmental problems raised in this petition.

In the same manner that we have associated the fundamental right to abalanced and healthful ecology with the twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility" and "inter-generational justice"

in Oposa,

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where we upheld the right of future Filipinos to prevent thedestruction of the rainforests, so do we recognize, in this petition, theright of petitioners and the future generation to clean air. In Oposa wesaid that if the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is now explicitlyfound in the Constitution even if the right is "assumed to exist from theinception of humankind, it is because of the well-founded fear of itsframers [of the Constitution] that unless the rights to a balanced andhealthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by theConstitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance andimposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first andprotect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when allelse would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for thoseto come. . ."29

It is the firm belief of this Court that in this case, it is timely to reaffirm thepremium we have placed on the protection of the environment in thelandmark case of Oposa. Yet, as serious as the statistics are on airpollution, with the present fuels deemed toxic as they are to theenvironment, as fatal as these pollutants are to the health of the citizens,and urgently requiring resort to drastic measures to reduce air pollutantsemitted by motor vehicles, we must admit in particular that petitionersare unable to pinpoint the law that imposes an indubitable legal duty onrespondents that will justify a grant of the writ of mandamus compelling

the use of CNG for public utility vehicles. It appears to us that moreproperly, the legislature should provide first the specific statutory remedyto the complex environmental problems bared by herein petitionersbefore any judicial recourse by mandamus is taken.

WHEREFORE, the petition for the issuance of a writ of mandamusis DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SJS vs. ATIENZA

After we promulgated our decision in this case on March 7, 2007,Chevron Philippines Inc. (Chevron), Petron Corporation (Petron) andPilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Shell) (collectively, the oilcompanies) and the Republic of the Philippines, represented by theDepartment of Energy (DOE), filed their respective motions for leave tointervene and for reconsideration of the decision.

Chevron1 is engaged in the business of importing, distributing andmarketing of petroleum products in the Philippines while Shell andPetron are engaged in the business of manufacturing, refining andlikewise importing, distributing and marketing of petroleum products in

the Philippines.2 The DOE is a governmental agency created underRepublic Act (RA) No. 76383and tasked to prepare, integrate,coordinate, supervise and control all plans, programs, projects andactivities of the government relative to energy exploration, development,utilization, distribution and conservation.4

The facts are restated briefly as follows:

Petitioners Social Justice Societ

environmental law set 1

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