‘environmental refugees’: key debates and the contributions of geographers

‘Environmental Refugees’: Key Debates and theContributions of Geographers

Nick Gill*Division of Geography, Lancaster Environment Centre, Lancaster University

Abstract

This article reviews the key current debates around the concept of environmental refugees, focus-ing on geography’s actual and potential contributions. First, although the most widely quoted esti-mate is between 200 and 250 million environmental refugees by 2050 (with some estimatesgreatly exceeding this), there is continuing disagreement about the scale of the challenge withnumerous authors questioning available evidence. Geographical discussions about the reification ofscale and the increasingly questioned division between nature and society might usefully informthese debates. Second, although the term ‘environmental refugees’ has achieved widespread usage,the degree to which ‘the environment’ can be singled out as a decisive cause of refugee move-ment has been questioned. Geographers have also provided some quantitative evidence that caststhe relationship between environmental processes and refugees into doubt. Third, an importantdebate is taking place regarding the suitability of existing political refugee law for extension intothe environmental domain. Many social scientists have expressed concern about the feasibility anddesirability of extending the remit of existing international refugee protection. The article con-cludes by offering a series of future research directions that will allow geographers to continue toengage innovatively with this field.

Introduction

The idea of accelerating environmental change provoking increasing human migrationhas been gaining in popularity since the 1970s (Black 2001). Perhaps most famously, in1990, the IPCC predicted that ‘Environmental Refugees’ would be one of the lastingconsequences of environmental change (IPCC 1990). Since then, a range of agencieshave variously debated, rejected and adopted the term. In the public sector the Sternreport (2006) into climate change estimated 200 million environmental refugees wouldbe produced by 2050. In the third sector Christian Aid (2007) offer an even more pessi-mistic estimate of just under one billion, and Conisbee and Simms (2003), writing for theNew Economics Foundation, press strongly for recognition of environmental refugees.Meanwhile in academic circles, Myers (2005), among others, has been highly vocal inwarning about the impending tide of such refugees.

Global warming is at the root of these concerns. By 2099, the world is expected to be1.8�–4.0� hotter than at present (IPCC 2007). This is expected to mean more land inconstant drought, significantly altered rainfall patterns, altered agricultural yields especiallycrop and fish stocks, glaciers melting and increased frequency and intensity of floodingresulting from sea level change and glacial lake outbursts. In particular, the number ofpeople flooded per year is expected to increase by up to 25 million per year by the 2050sand up to 140 million per year by the 2100s as many of the world’s low-lying coastal

Geography Compass 4/7 (2010): 861–871, 10.1111/j.1749-8198.2010.00336.x

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areas are disproportionately heavily populated (McGranahan et al. 2007; Nicholls andLowe 2004).

To analyse the demographic consequences of these developments, it has been arguedthat the ‘environmental refugees’ concept is appealing because it conveys urgency. Sup-porters of this phrase argue that any other terminology would downplay the seriousnessof the acute humanitarian consequences of environmentally induced migration. Yet thereare problems. Under existing law, a refugee is someone intentionally persecuted and it ishard to attribute intentionality to the environment. A refugee must also cross an interna-tional border, which environmentally displaced persons often do not. Moreover, thereare difficulties in separating out ‘the environment’ as a dominant causal factor when somany inter-related and contingent factors – political, economic and cultural – affect thedecision to migrate. For these reasons, a range of alternative phrases have been coined,which reflect the major fault-lines of disagreement about environmental refugees.

Alternative phrases include ‘Environmentally Induced Population Movements’ and‘Environmentally Displaced Persons’, which avoid the boundary crossing and persecu-tion-related connotations of the ‘refugee’ concept (Lonergan 1998; Piguet 2008). Otherauthors have argued for the concept of ‘eco-migrants’, which allows reference to eithereconomic or ecological migration (Wood 2001). Whereas agonism over the exact termi-nology used may appear pedantic, the importance of labels should not be under-esti-mated. The UNHCR is bound by the terms of its mandate, and if environmentalrefugees do not fall under this remit, it will not be allowed to provide aid or expendother resources in relation to them. In the past, the constraints imposed by labellingmigrants have meant that many thousands have not received aid (Swain 1996; Zetter1991).

With these controversies in mind, we can discern two positions on ‘environmental ref-ugees’. For those that accept the term relatively uncritically, connections between climatechange, human migration and wider social functioning have been widely cited. Myers(2005), for example, links migration as a result of climate change to political, social andeconomic turmoil ahead. The burden, he predicts, is most likely to fall upon the poorest,a hypothesis supported by existing inequalities in the ratio of deaths per natural disaster indeveloped and developing countries1. Other consequences of environmental migrationinclude, first, accelerated rural to urban migration as environmental factors act as a catalystto existing internal migration routes (Brown 2007). Moreover, further environmentaldegradation may be expected as poorly planned and rapidly growing slums and camps putenvironmental pressure on areas that have not previously hosted large populations (Suhrke1992). The UN Environment Programme’s (2007) report into post-conflict Sudan, forexample, linked refugee camps with deforestation, fuelwood crises, overharvesting, foodshortages and groundwater level reduction owing to a proliferation of boreholes in campareas. Furthermore, other authors have pointed out that coastal communities are at partic-ular risk from the developments associated with climate change. Kniveton et al. (2008),for example, outline the risks of sea level rise for deltas, especially Asian megadeltas suchas the Ganges-Brahmaputra, low lying coastal urban areas which are prone to human-induced subsidence and tropical storm landfall such as New Orleans and Shanghai, andsmall islands, especially low lying atolls such as the Maldives.

A more critical approach, however, can also be discerned, that focuses not uponenvironmental migration itself, but upon the consequences of the increasing currencyof the concept of ‘environmental refugees’. Although in its infancy, this more criticalschool is informed more regularly by social scientists than scientists. They argue that theconcept of environmental refugees may be damaging by allowing states to ‘blame the

862 Environmental refugees

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environment’ rather than recognising their own hand in producing migrants (Castles2002). Wood (2001) describes the use of the environment to reduce state responsibilityin terms of the erection of ‘green walls’ inhibiting migration and reducing migrant wel-fare.

This paper takes as its starting point the fact that there remains controversy around theconsequences of environmental migration both as an actually existing phenomena and aconcept. As the various terms adopted in the literature signal, there are at least two areasof disagreement, which form the first two sections of this paper. First, there is still scepti-cism about the degree to which environmental refugees will be the cataclysmic problemsuggested by some authors. Second, even if we accept the urgency of the issue, there arequestions about whether or not ‘the environment’ can be separated as a single cause ofthe decision to migrate. A third, related, debate concerns the feasibility and desirabilityof extending existing refugee law to cover environmental refugees. Geography is in astrong position to assess these debates because it spans both natural and social sciences,and geography’s actual and potential contributions to these debates will be discussedthroughout.

Scale of the issue

Dun and Gemenne (2008) identify the ‘alarmists’ and ‘sceptics’ in the debate and there iscertainly no shortage of alarmists. ‘Over the course of a few decades, if not sooner,hundreds of millions of people may be compelled to relocate because of environmentalpressures’ Sachs (2007, 607) writes, whereas Myers, the foremost academic writing aboutenvironmental refugees, warns in similar tones that ‘today’s stream will surely come to beregarded as a trickle when compared with the floods that will ensue in decades ahead’(Myers 2005, 4). For Myers, the environmental refugee issue ‘promises to rank as one ofthe foremost human crises of our times’ (Myers 2002, 611).

Yet, numerous ‘sceptical’ critical reviews have questioned the alarmists, drawing atten-tion to the paucity of reliable evidence indicating an impending catastrophe and to theunderlying assumption that migration is an unnatural, unusual or undesirable occurrence.For example, Brown (2007, 2), notes that ‘Whereas the scientific argument for climatechange is increasingly confident, the consequences of climate change for human popula-tion distribution are unclear and unpredictable’. Indeed, there are surprisingly few empiri-cal studies relating to environmental migration (Kniveton et al. 2008). Moreover, of thestudies that Kniveton et al. (2008) review, work on the migratory consequences of envi-ronmental phenomena tends to show that such migration is often temporary (Henry et al.2004) and often rural-to-rural, partly as a result of the expectation of return which under-mines the incentive to make long, rural-to-urban journeys. Perhaps most importantly,Kniveton et al. (2008) also question whether, in the presence of acute environmentalstress, would-be migrants have the capacity to migrate, irrespective of their desire to doso. If climatic events affect crop yields and livestocks, then migration might become moredifficult as more disposable income must buy essential consumables whose price has risenowing to scarcity (Findlay 1994; Haug 2002). Kniveton et al. (2008) conclude that migra-tion is not related in a linear way to climate variability.

Other ‘sceptical’ scholars are less concerned with questioning the link between envi-ronmental change and migration than with questioning why we might be averse to it.According to this school, migration is a natural part of human adaptation to climatechange, and has been for hundreds of years (McLeman and Smit 2006; Perch-Nielsen2004). ‘Shifts in migration patterns are strategies of adaptation to complex transformations,

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and recognising and accommodating this is key in policies for sustainable developmentand poverty reduction in the context of growing environmental stress’ Tacoli (2007, 1)writes (see also Pottier 1993). This view has received some criticism on the basis that thevast scale of expected human movement will dwarf anything in previous epochs, and thatmigration of this kind can be viewed as a symptom of environmental degradation andnot a solution (Hugo 1996). Nevertheless, it is also interesting to note, in support of themigration-as-adaptation argument, that large areas of the world also stand to benefit fromclimate change and global warming (Brown 2007): higher temperatures will extendgrowing seasons, more CO2 in the atmosphere will increase crop yields, and rainfall mayincrease in areas that previously experienced water stress (Hoerling et al. 2006; IPCC1990; US Global Change Research Program 2000).

In response to the sceptics, a number of counter-arguments have been raised. In rela-tion to the paucity of evidence, Lonergan (1998) argues that, although evidence for a linkbetween environmental change and migration is mixed, there is no compelling evidenceshowing that there is no link, concluding that we should be careful in ruling out thepossibility simply because the evidence is yet to emerge. In relation to the migration-as-adaptation argument, Brown (2007) rejects the view that forced migration should benormalised as part of an acceptable world system:

Forced migration hinders development in at least four ways; by increasing pressure on urbaninfrastructures and services, by undermining economic growth, by increasing the risk of conflictand by leading to worse health, educational and social indicators among migrants themselves.(Brown 2007, 2)

There are also a number of ways in which these issues connect with wider debates ingeography that have taken place around asylum seekers and refugees as well as aroundgeographical concepts and presuppositions such as ‘scale’. In the first instance, one of theabiding insights of the geographical literature critical of the treatment of asylum seekers isthe subjectifying use of language to overstate the number of migrants entering developedcountries (Finney and Robinson 2008). Turton (2003) discusses the effect of the use of avery common metaphor: that of being ‘flooded’. Among the popular press this recurs fre-quently and the use of related fluvial metaphors includes dams, torrents, trickles, streams,tidal waves and tsunamis. Turton (2003) makes the point that this terminology dehuma-nises and depersonalises refugees. The discourse about environmental refugees, however,seems to have taken little heed of these warnings. Academics such as Myers (2005) regu-larly employ such metaphors, illustrating in general the tendency towards over-exaggera-tion and over-simplification when discussing impending climatic disasters to whichgeographers have already loudly objected (Swyngedouw 2007).

In terms of a connection with scale, there is a clear parallel to be drawn between workcritical of the artificial production of scale, and the difficulties in transferring existing leg-islative refugee protection to environmental refugees. The reification of the national levelhas been identified by a series of geographers as a practise that flies in the face of theorganisation of economic, social and environmental systems. Cities, for example, repre-sent a more organic unit upon which to base administrative boundaries, but because ofthe recurring tendency to construct and privilege national level systems they are typicallyset at odds with national governance structures (Taylor 1994). In a very similar way, theinscribing of national boundaries within international refugee law, making border crossingnecessary for recognition as a refugee, illustrates precisely the sort of scale-fetishisationand scale-production of which geographers have been critical (Marston et al. 2005). Todefine the refugee in such a national-dependent way precludes the possibility of allowing



IDPs to benefit from the protection of organisations such as the UNHCR, and as envi-ronmentally displaced persons often migrate within-countries, this problem is reproducedin this context.

(In-)Separability of causes

A related debate concerns the feasibility of defining the environment as a primary or sin-gle cause of migration. Whereas legalistic modes of thought require there to be determi-nant causes in order to provide definitive answers to the question ‘why did a personleave?’ (Stavropoulou 2008), in reality

…there is too often an uncritical acceptance of a direct causal link between environmental de-gradation and population displacement. Implicit in these writings is the belief that environmen-tal degradation – as a possible cause of population displacement – can be separated from othersocial, economic or political causes.

(Longeran 1998, 8)

This sentiment is echoed by Castles, who is critical of Myers and Kent’s (1995) treatmentof specific cases, which they use to support the hypothesised link between migration andenvironmental change. ‘…where Myers and Kent go into detail’ Castles writes (2002, 5),‘they find a wealth of contributory factors: ethnic tensions, ineffective and mistakengovernment responses, economic problems and so on. On what basis are environmentalfactors assigned primacy in complex situations?’ In fact, Castles argues, environmentalevents are also political moments: the effectiveness of governments is important to thedetermination of the eventual consequences of the event, and political popularity is atstake during episodes of high environmental stress. Black (2001) similarly argues, reiterat-ing McGregor’s conclusion (1993, 58) that, ‘the use of the term ‘environmental’ canimply a false separation between overlapping and interrelated categories’.

Faced with the difficulty of distinguishing between environmental and socio-economiccontributory factors, numerous authors have offered conceptual tools that might providea way forward (see Piguet 2008). Prominent among these is the idea that the linkbetween environmental processes and migration is contingent, meaning that the link existsonly if certain other conditions are fulfilled (see Perch-Nielsen et al. 2008). Hugo (1996),for example, identifies

the existence or lack of escape routes not only in the form of transport networks but alsokinship and social networks which mean that some environmental migrants can move to an areawhere they have relatives and friends who can support them. The presence of such networksundoubtedly acts as a facilitator to such movement while their absence would constrain move-ment.

(Hugo 1996, 110)

Similarly, Blaikie et al. (2003) distinguishes between natural hazards and disasters, pointingout that poor adaptive capacity, (such as early warning systems, suitable housing andawareness of what to do in a storm ⁄flood) are necessary in order to make the former intothe latter. A community is only vulnerable, according to Brown (2007), if it is bothexposed to natural hazards and has poor adaptive capacity. This relates to another con-cept, namely that of community ‘resilience’ to climatic events. An equivalent climaticevent in an area that has experienced nothing of the sort before, in comparison to onewhere the population has, through experience, built up the social and cultural capital torespond quickly and effectively, may make the difference between the production of



environmental refugees or not. As part of this resilience, Castles (2002) identifies thecapacities of states to address consequences of climatic events: weak states may be seen asundermining a community’s resilience because they do not provide warning systems ordeliver aid. Interestingly, it is in this sense that states may be seen as culpable in theproduction of environmental refugees (not through persecution, but inadequacy),re-introducing the possibility of a legally coherent definition of an ‘environmentalrefugee’ that does not contradict existing refugee law (see next section).

Tacoli (2007) further argues that gender can be an important influence over the abilityto migrate, as well as complex inter-relations between wealth, insurance and migration.Certainly a degree of social and economic capital has been shown to be an importantdeterminant of the distance that asylum seekers travel, rendering many asylum seekers indeveloped countries some of the most wealthy and educated of those who leave (VanHear 2004). If anything, we can expect these sorts of contingent factors to become moreimportant in times of acute environmental stress.

Another response to the posited inseparability of push factors is to distinguish betweentypes of environmental change. Generalising broadly, it has been argued that slower ormore gradual processes of environmental change are more difficult to isolate in terms oftheir causal impact, whereas sudden climatic events can be more readily associated withpopulation movements. In the extreme case, it is difficult to deny the role of environ-mental factors in calamitous events such as hurricane Katrina, a category three storm thatcaused 1.5 million to move within 14 days (although it should be noted that the presenceof early warnings, serviceable roads and widespread car ownership were contingentlyfacilitative factors) (Knight 2009). Brown (2007) includes sea level rise, salinisation ofagricultural land, desertification and growing water scarcity under the category climate‘processes’, contrasting these with flooding, storms and glacial lake outbursts, which heterms climatic ‘events’. This correlates with the widely discussed ‘slow onset-’ and ‘acuteonset environmentally induced movement’ (see McCue 1993).

Geographers have long been sceptical of the division between natural and societalphenomena (Smith and O’Keefe 1989), although they have participated in both sides ofthis debate. On the one hand, Perch-Nielsen et al. (2008) use conceptual models basedon a variety of case studies to build a systematic picture of links between climate changeand migration, although they do not talk about statistically significant causation. Theypoint out that the strength of influences varies according to particular places and commu-nities but conclude that ‘a connection can be traced’ (p. 375) between sea level rise,floods and migration. On the contrary, Black (2001) argues not only that much of thesupposed evidence for a link between climate change and migration is questionable whenspecific cases are scrutinised in detail, and not only that environmental migration cannotbe separated from other complex background causes, but also that states have a vestedinterest in establishing the concept of environmental refugees, as opposed to politicallymotivated migration, precisely because they do not owe international protection toenvironmental refugees under existing law (see also Kibreab 1997). This relates toCambrezy’s (2001, 48) arguments, who warns of ‘over-playing the hand of nature’ if theenvironmental refugee concept is accepted, thereby assuaging states’ culpability. Inaddition, echoed by Castles (2002), this point underscores the political and strategicimportance of the debate around environmental refugees.

In terms of the separability of causes, another geographer, Neumayer (2005), hasapplied statistical analysis to the study of asylum push factors. The advantage of this analy-sis is that it is capable of assigning relative weights to different contributory factors,through the use of multiple regression modelling, thereby addressing the (in)separability



of causes problem. Neumayer examines flows of asylum seekers from 127 origin countriesto Western Europe and shows that, as might be expected, the number of previous asylummigrants in a destination country, the economic growth rate and income of destinationcountries, and the degree of political oppression in source countries are each significantdeterminants. Natural disasters and famines, however, are found to be consistentlyinsignificant. By way of explanation, Neumayer (2005) posits that either many of thosedisplaced by these events only travel a short distance and become IDPs rather than asylumseekers or that the suddenness of famines and natural disasters might deprive would-beinternational asylum seekers the opportunity to complete the requisite planning. Ofcourse, however, the correlation may improve if environmental factors were recognisedas legitimate grounds for claiming asylum.

To what extent can the concept of the refugee be transferred to the environment?

A third, related debate influencing how environmental refugees are understood concernsthe degree to which existing international law can be extended to accommodate environ-mental refugees. Numerous authors have stated the need to consider this. ‘We need toexpand our approach to refugees in general in order to include environmental refugees inparticular’ Myers (2005, 4) states. Both Cooper (1996) and Keane (2004) argue that it is arelatively straight-forward matter to extend the protection of existing law to include envi-ronmental refugees because the refugee convention was designed as a human rightsinstrument and, as everyone has the right to seek safety, there is a clear opportunity toimplement the convention in the protection of those whose safety is threatened byenvironmental factors. In support of this, there seems to be a trend towards making statesmore responsible for environmental issues in terms of the increased levels of preparednessrequired under international protocols. Moreover, as Stavropoulou (2008) discusses, thecategory of IDP was, 20 years ago, outside the remit of UNHCR protection and yet,after sustained pressure, has been included in their present remit, indicating the possibilityof altering international consensus.

One important difficulty with extending refugee law, however, is that the existingdefinition of a refugee requires that states are complicit in their persecution, either byactive intention or passive neglect2. Where states exist and are willing and able to protectthose affected by environmental factors their status as ‘refugees’ should therefore bequestioned. Yet, although this appears to constitute a challenge to the extension ofrefugee protection, Castles (2002, 8) notes that in some cases states use the environmentitself to persecute individuals. Examples are limited but include US use of Agent Orangein the Vietnam War and the actions of the Iraqi government against the Marsh Arabs inthe first Gulf War. More generally, Conisbee and Simms (2003) make a case for extend-ing recognition, based upon what they term ‘environmental persecution’. Governmentsof home countries may be direct and intentional causes of displacement. This is particu-larly the case when considering dam projects such as the Aswan and Merowe dams inSudan, which have displaced many thousands of people with government backing (seeUN Environment Programme 2007). Christian Aid (2007) have estimated that 645million people will be displaced by 2050 as a result of development projects, more thandouble their prediction of environmental refugees produced by natural processes andevents.

Yet there are more objections to both the feasibility and desirability of extending thelaw to cover environmental refugees. In terms of feasibility, aside from the objection thatenvironmental causes of migration may not constitute intentional persecution, there are



other technical matters that might be preventative. First, by defining the refugee assomeone outside their country of origin, the definition implies that people go a long wayfor a relatively long time. Environmental displacement, however, is often characterised byshort distance movement (Knight 2009) and circular migration involving frequent returnand re-return (Tacoli 2007), although, as geographers Barnett and Webber point out, thisdepends upon the nature of the environmental change in question (Barnett and Webber2009). Another difficulty is that the definition of a refugee requires that persecution isexperienced on the basis of membership of a particular social group. Yet the fact that acollection of individuals may have experienced a common environmental event orprocess does not guarantee that they have anything more in common, rendering theircohesiveness as a social group questionable (Falstrom 2002).

From a different direction, Hong (2001, 339) expresses concern that extending therefugee definition would ‘open the door to a flood of refugees far beyond what theinternational community is able to manage’. In fact, it is difficult to see how a claim forrefugee protection on an environmental basis would work in practise. Presently, theprovision of documentary evidence of persecution is required. The difficulty of demon-strating environmental persecution, and the fact that the burden of proof is presently onthe applicant, may encourage and allow states to put in place legal systems that aredifficult to navigate in order to reduce the number of applications as well as the numberof acceptances (a practise of which many states are already guilty in the political refugeecontext).

This leads us to question the desirability of extending existing refugee law. Somecommentators are optimistic about the effectiveness of the international political refugeeregime to protect refugees. Zetter (1991, 40), for example, writes that ‘forced migrantsare categorized – labelled – as refugees with an internationally recognised legal status,given credibility by an international agency specifically charged to safeguard theirinterests, endorsed most powerfully of all by spontaneous philanthropy’, whereas, morerecently, Conisbee and Simms (2003, 33) argue that ‘granting environmental refugeessuch status would provide them with internationally assured protection’.

Schuster (2003) forcefully argues, however, that it is possible to view the internationalrefugee regime as an instrument designed to safeguard receiving states’ collective interestsrather than migrants’. This, coupled with the fact that the Geneva Convention is notbinding, causes us to question whether the international refugee regime is a suitableinstrument to extend. This points towards a lack of input into the environmental refugeedebate from existing refugee experts (Piguet 2008) who may be expected to raise furtherquestions about the desirability of existing refugee systems of governance. Masters (2001)is concerned that expanding the definition would devalue the position of politicalrefugees, a line that has yet to be taken up more broadly. In particular, if the UNHCRwere to have its mandate expanded, to what extent would this set political and environ-mental refugees in competition for scarce resources? Second, Hugo (1996) is concernedthat the notion of ‘involuntary movement’, which underpins the refugee definition,underestimates the agency of the mover, even in extreme situations. Again, do we wantto reproduce this deficiency in a different context? Third, Koser (2008) draws attentionto the fact that existing refugee law often struggles to accommodate migration triggeredby economic factors but set against a context of long-term environmental concerns. Howmight the appetite for single determinant causes under existing law be curbed toaccommodate the complex, multi-causal reasons for migrating that more accurately reflectpeople’s decisions?



Conclusion

This article has argued that geographers have contributed to the debates surroundingenvironmental refugees in at least two ways. First, a healthy scepticism about the strengthof the connection between environmental processes and events, and migration has beenevident (Neumayer 2005). This is not to write off the possibility of such links, but, asPerch-Nielson et al. (2008) argue, to be aware of the myriad contingencies that structurethe relationship. A second contribution involves scepticism over the possibility of separat-ing out environmental factors from other background factors. Geographers have drawnupon their penchant for detailed case studies, empirically rich research and a fascinationwith place to enable them to provide a counter-weight to simplistic, one-dimensionalviews of migration (Black 2001).

There remain areas in which geography could engage more productively with theenvironmental refugee debates, however. In particular, there is room for more theoreticalengagement, centring upon at least three insights presently popular in geography. First,whereas purely scientific approaches offer one perspective on the relationship betweenenvironmental change and human mobility, geographers with a social scientific back-ground are often better placed to assess the social and economic dimensions of develop-ments, for example, in terms of labour market outcomes and remittances. Second, theproduction of scale, and the ways in which the concept of scale produces the geographi-cal arrangements imagined, seems pertinent in this context. In particular the inscription ofthe national scale, and the privileging of national borders, within the definition of therefugee itself is producing patterns of aid that threaten to preclude environmental refu-gees. Third, the possibility of a separation between nature and society has been undercritical scrutiny among geographers for some considerable time (Smith and O’Keefe1989). Extending geographers’ arguments about the social production of ‘nature’ (seeSwyngedouw 2007) will help to establish the contingency of the consequences of naturalprocesses and events upon political and economic considerations.

Short Biography

Nick Gill’s research is located at the intersection of geographic state theory, governmen-tality and migration studies, with a specific focus on forced migration. He has authoredor co-authored papers in these areas for Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers,Progress in human Geography, Political Geography, Environment and Planning A, World Devel-opment, Regional Studies, and Antipode. He is currently engaged in both theoretical andempirical research on geographies of activism in a migration context (ERSC funded),place-making among migrants (Nuffield foundation funded), and the relationship betweengeographies and judgment. Before coming to Lancaster University, UK, where he pres-ently teaches, Nick taught and studied at the London School of Economics and PoliticalScience, UK, and Bristol University, UK. He holds a BSc in Geography with Economics(LSE), an MSc in Management (LSE), an MSc in Society and Space (Bristol) and a PhDin Geography (Bristol).

Notes

* Correspondence address: Nick Gill, Division of Geography, Lancaster Environment Centre, Lancaster University,Lancaster LA1 4YQ, UK. E-mail: [email protected]



1 From 1994 to 2003 natural disasters in countries of high human development killed an average of 44 per eventversus 300 in low development countries (IFRC 2004).2 The Geneva Convention (United Nations, 1951) describes a refugee as a person outside of his or her country ofnationality who is unable or unwilling to return because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution onaccount of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.

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‘environmental refugees’: key debates and the contributions of geographers

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