Epistemic Reasons: Their Structure & Nature

Kareem KhalifaDepartment of Philosophy

Middlebury College

Overview

I. JustificationII. Agrippa’s TrilemmaIII. Three Theories of

JustificationIV. Epistemic

RationalityV. Internalism vs.

Externalism

I. Justification: Reminders

• A theory of justification should provide a general recipe for answering the following question:– How do you know?

• Gettier cases show that justified true belief is not sufficient for knowledge

• However, perhaps justified true belief is still necessary for knowledge

II. Agrippa’s Trilemma

A. No Free LunchB. The Set-UpC. The Three Horns

II.A.

If q is S’s justification for believing that p, then S must be justified in believing that q.

II.B. Setting up the Trilemma• Suppose that you claim

to know that p• How do you know that p?• If q is your justification,

then you should answer, “Because q”

• However, because there are no free lunches, we must be able to answer the question, “How do you that q?”

II.C. The Three Horns

• This line of questioning has only three possible outcomes:1. An infinite regress: I know that p because of q, I know that q

because of r…2. A vicious circle: I know that p because of q, I know that q

because of p3. An arbitrary stopping point: I know that p because of q, and I

know that q just because.• But we don’t possess infinite reasons, and neither

viciously circular reasoning nor arbitrary stopping points seem to provide justification.

• Hence we aren’t justified in believing in anything!!

III. Three Theories of Justification

A. InfinitismB. CoherentismC. Foundationalism

A. Infinitism

• S is justified in believing that p if and only if S possesses an infinite, non-repeating chain of reasons for believing that p

• Objection:– Nobody possesses an infinite, non-repeating chain of

reasons for her beliefs.– So, if infinitism is true, then nobody is justified in any

of her beliefs.– Somebody is justified in some of her beliefs.– So infinitism is not true.

B. Coherentism

• S is justified in believing that p if and only if S possesses a finite, repeating chain of reasons for believing that p

• No single proposition q justifies p; rather p is justified by its fit with one’s overall system of beliefs.

C. Foundationalism• S is justified in believing that

p if and only if S possesses a finite, non-repeating chain of reasons for believing that p.

• Some beliefs are justified in themselves.– Called “self-justifying,” “basic,”

or “foundational” beliefs.• Problem:

– Hard to to have a criterion of self-justification that is: (a) defensible, and (b) rich enough to justify the remaining, non-basic beliefs.

IV. Epistemic Rationality

A. What is epistemic rationality?

B. Different epistemic goals

C. Pointless truths

A. What is Epistemic Rationality?

• Rationality aimed at gaining true belief.

• Other kinds of rationality are aimed at achieving other goals.

B. Different epistemic goals

1. We should maximize our true beliefs.– Problem: gullibility

2. We should minimize our false beliefs.– Problem: Stingy belief

3. We should provide the best balance of seeking true beliefs and avoiding false beliefs.– Problem: what’s the right balance?

C. Pointless truths

• Suppose that I come to have many true beliefs about insignificant things.

• I seem to have met some epistemic goal, but I don’t seem very epistemically rational.

• 1st Response: You are epistemically rational, but perhaps non-epistemically irrational.– Problem: this trivializes epistemic rationality

• 2nd Response: You are epistemically irrational, since pointless truths will not help you find other truths and avoid other falsehoods.

V. Internalism vs. Externalism

A. Rationality & responsibility

B. Two conceptions of rationality

A. Rationality & responsibility

• The R&R thesis: S is epistemically rational in believing that p if and only if S is intellectually responsible in believing that p.

B. Problems with the R&R Thesis

1. Control Objection2. Bad Norm Objection

1. Control Objection

1. If S is responsible for doing X, then S has some voluntary control over X.

2. We lack voluntary control over some of our beliefs.

3. So we are not responsible for some of our rational beliefs.

4. So epistemic rationality intellectual responsibility

2. Bad Norm Objection

1. If S doesn’t know better than to accept a bad epistemic norm N, then :a. S is epistemically irrational;b. S can’t be blamed for any belief p licensed by N.

2. If S can’t be blamed for doing X, then S is being responsible in doing X.

3. So, epistemic rationality intellectual responsibility.

C. Two conceptions of rationality

1. Internalism (deontic, egocentric)2. Externalism (non-deontic, non-egocentric)

1. Internalism

• S is internally justified in believing that p if and only if, from S’s perspective, it is intellectually responsible to believe that p.

• 1st Objection: Appears insufficient as a theory of justification, since one can be internally justified on the basis of bad epistemic norms.

• 2nd Objection: Appears unnecessary as a theory of justification, since babies & animals form their beliefs in the right way though without being responsible.

2. Externalism

• S is externally justified in believing that p if and only if S’s belief that p was formed in a truth-conducive manner.

• Objection: severs the connection between epistemic rationality and intellectual responsibility

Recap

I. Agrippa’s Trilemma forces a choice between infinitism, coherentism, and foundationalism.

II. Although epistemic rationality and justification seem as if they should be closely entwined, they also differ in important ways.

III. Internalists try to minimize these differences; externalists embrace them.