equity: effects of input and outcome orientation on taking, giving, and dividing money

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Social Justice Research [sjr] PL166-303 May 24, 2000 15:14 Style file version Nov. 19th, 1999

Social Justice Research, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2000

Equity: Effects of Input and Outcome Orientationon Taking, Giving, and Dividing Money

Jef Syroit1,3 and Matthijs Poppe2

Participants who were more inclined to consider ambiguous work elements asinputs (input-oriented or Type-I persons) or as outcomes (outcome-oriented orType-O persons) were presented with situations in which they had delivered ahigher or lower work performance than another person. They were asked to takemoney for themselves, give money to the other person, and divide a fixed sum ofmoney between themselves and the other as reward for the performances. Thespecific combination of (input or outcome) orientation of the participant and thetype of transfer (giving, taking, or dividing) determined the reward the participantallocated to him- or herself and/or to the other person. Type-I persons showedan egocentric bias in their allocation behavior, whereas Type-O persons allocatedaccording to a maximin strategy.

KEY WORDS: equity; give–take; input–outcome orientation; egocentric bias.

In studies on distributive justice,equityis conceived as the perceived equalityof relative inputs of a person and an other person on one hand and relative outcomesof this person and the other person on the other hand.Inputsare all contributions(such as effort, time, or abilities) the person perceives and considers as relevant to anexchange.Outcomesare the perceived relevant positive or negative consequences(such as money, goods, or punishment) a person incurs for contributing to theexchange (Adams, 1965; Walster, Berscheid, and Walster, 1973; Syroit, 1984). Inaccordance with the equity rule, inputs are the basis for allocating outcomes.

A large number of studies on justice (e.g., Leventhal, 1976; Mikula, 1980)addressed the question whether people in fact follow the equity rule in allocating

1Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands.2Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands.3All correspondence should be addressed to Jef Syroit, Department of Social and OrganizationalPsychology, Utrecht University, Heidelberglaan 1, 3584 CS Utrecht, The Netherlands (e-mail:[email protected]).

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0885-7466/00/0300-0041$18.00/0C© 2000 Plenum Publishing Corporation

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outcomes. These studies differ, however, in the participants’ role in the decisionmaking about outcomes. In some studies (e.g., Leventhal and Whiteside, 1973),the participant is only an allocator and not a recipient of outcomes. In other studies(e.g., Lane and Mess´e, 1971), the participant is at the same time the allocatorand a corecipient of outcomes. Usually in the latter studies, the allocator dividesoutcomes between him- or herself and another person. It is clear that in the act ofdividing giving outcomes (to an other person) and taking outcomes (for oneself )are inextricable. Although Heider (1958, pp. 10–12) already drew attention to thesubstantial distinction between concepts asgiveandtake, few researchers in thefield of equity and justice have paid attention to this difference.

Anderson (1976) distinguished between two methods for investigating allo-cation behavior that correspond to dividing and giving. In both cases, the allocatoris provided with information about the inputs of him- or herself and those of an-other person. One method consists of presenting the allocator with a fixed sumof outcomes that the allocator must divide between him- or herself and the otherrecipient. If the second method is used, the allocator knows his or her own out-comes and is asked to decide on the outcomes the other person should receive.This method can be referred to asgiving to the other. Messick and Sentis (1979)added a third method. In this case, the allocator is informed about the outcomesthe other person has already received and is asked to decide on the outcomes forhim- or herself. This method can be referred to astaking for oneself.

In their study, Messick and Sentis (1979) presented participants with threeallocation situations that differed with respect to kind of transfer. In situation 1,participants were told that their colleague had already received $25 for his/herwork, and they were asked to take money for themselves. In situation 2, partici-pants were told that they had already received $25, and they were asked to givemoney to their colleague. In situation 3, participants were asked to divide $50 be-tween themselves and their colleague. In half of the cases, participants had a higherperformance than their colleague; in the other half, participants had performed lessthan their colleague. Messick and Sentis were mainly interested in different equitymodels and in participants’ preferences for different allocation rules. With respectto giving and taking money, they found that participants took more money forthemselves than that they gave to others for similar relative inputs. More specif-ically, Messick and Sentis found that their subjects took significantly more thana proportionate share for themselves when they had performed less hours thantheir fellow student. When subjects worked more hours than their colleague, theytook a proportionate share. In their allocations to themselves, subjects followedthe rule that was most profitable to them: equality in the low-input situation; equityin the high-input situation. This strategic use of equity aimed at own gain maxi-mization is also demonstrated in a study by Van Avermaet (1974). Evidence forthe egocentric bias can also be found in studies by Van Avermaet, McClintock,and Moskowitz (1978) and De Dreu (1996)—people prefer the justice rule that,

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Taking, Giving, and Dividing 43

in a given situation, is most profitable to them. Those with (relatively) high inputsprefer the equity rule; those with (relatively) low inputs prefer the equality rule. Inline with these findings, it is also expected in this study that people will take morethan a proportionate amount of outcomes when their inputs are lower than those ofanother person, and that they will take a proportionate amount of outcomes whentheir inputs are higher than those of another person (Hypothesis 1).

When the participants in the Messick and Sentis study were asked how muchmoney they intended to give to the other person whereas the outcomes for them-selves were fixed, they allocated an almost strictly proportionate amount of money.Overall, they intended to give almost 4% more than the proportionate amount tothe other person. When the other person worked less hours, they gave only slightlymore, whereas when the other person worked more hours, they gave only slightlyless than the equitable share. In the case that outcomes for oneself are fixed andpeople give money that is not their own to others, they cannot maximize their ownabsolute gains (or minimize their absolute losses). An egocentric bias in allocatingmoney, defined by Messick and Sentis (1983) as “a tendency for subjects to judgemore money to be fair for themselves than for another in the same situation” (p. 71),can only be shown in a competitive allocation decision—that is, by maximizingthe difference between their own and another’s outcomes, and thus by giving (far)less than a proportionate share to others. However, the results obtained by Messickand Sentis (1979) show that people do not exhibit this egocentric, competitiveresponse in giving money that is not their own to another. Therefore, we expectin this study that people will take more money for themselves than they give toanother person in conditions in which the participants and the other person havesimilar inputs (Hypothesis 2).

The way people allocate money to themselves and others depends not only onthe type of transfer (giving, taking, or dividing), but also on their interpretation ofthe exchange situation. Early in the formulation of equity theory (Adams, 1965), itwas clear that inputs and outcomes cannot be defined objectively (see also Weick,1966). Inputs and outcomes are what the people involved in the exchange perceiveas such. People differ with respect to their interpretation of ambiguous elementsas being inputs or outcomes (e.g., some people consider “having responsibility,”“performing complicated tasks,” or “taking courses” as inputs for which they claimextra outcomes, whereas others perceive the same job elements as outcomes).Tornow (1971) called persons who mainly focus on inputs or contributionsinput-oriented persons(Type-I persons), whereas persons who mainly focus on outcomesare termedoutcome-oriented persons(Type-O persons). Tornow (1971) describedthe two types of persons as follows:

Type Iresponds to such ambiguous elements in terms of what he must do. Rather than con-centrating on successful task accomplishment or problem solving, for instance, he focuseson their personal implications in terms of demands made on his time and effort. In contrast,the second kind of person—Type O—focuses on the task or problem without worrying about

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their personal implications. He sees aspects in the task which are valuable and motivatingin their own right. (p. 616, italics in original)

As compared to Type-O persons, Type-I persons perceive more elements in theexchange situation as inputs; therefore, they expect higher outcomes in return inorder to feel treated fairly. However, Type-O persons focus more on rewarding as-pects of the exchange situation, and perceive the same elements as being outcomes;therefore, they have a relatively high threshold for underpayment and they expectrelatively low outcomes in return in order to feel treated fairly. Indeed, Tornowfound that persons who perceived ambiguous job elements as inputs (Type-I per-sons) felt more underrewarded than persons who perceive the same elements asoutcomes (Type-O persons), whereas the reverse held for feeling overrewarded.In an experiment on noncontingency of rewards (Fossum, 1979), Type-I personsperceived the pay system less equitable than did Type-O persons. A translatedand adapted version of Tornow’s Input–Outcome Checklist has been used in sev-eral studies by Von Grumbkow (1980) and Von Grumbkow and Syroit (1975,1976). Their studies indicate that Type-I persons show a higher tendency to in-crease their outcomes than do Type-O persons, that Type-I persons are more inter-ested in information regarding others’ salaries than are Type-O persons, and thatType-I persons are less willing to put effort into their jobs than Type-O persons.These findings suggest that, in general, Type-I persons can be considered to bemore calculative than Type-O persons, that Type-I persons are more interestedin or sensitive to social comparison information about inputs and outcomes thanType-O persons, and that Type-I persons and Type-O persons have different thresh-olds for underpayment and overpayment. Therefore, it is expected that, in condi-tions of similar performances, Type-I persons will take a higher amount of moneythan Type-O persons (Hypothesis 3).

It is more difficult to make predictions with respect to giving money byType-I and Type-O persons. These predictions depend on the assumptions onemakes not only about the way Type-I and Type-O persons perceive and interprettheir own exchange situation, but also about the way they perceive and interpretthe situations of other people. There are two competing assumptions possible.The first assumption is that Type-I and Type-O orientations refer to an absoluteor general way of perceiving and interpreting ambiguous elements in everyone’sexchange situation. According to this view, Type-I persons perceive more ele-ments as inputs and Type-O persons perceive more elements as outcomes, both intheir own situation and in the situations of other people. Type-I persons consider notonly themselves but also other people as high contributors, and thus as deservinghigh outcomes. Type-O persons, however, consider themselves and other peopleas receivers of high outcomes, and thus as deserving less additional outcomes.This first assumption leads to the prediction that Type-I persons will give moreoutcomes to others than Type-O persons (Hypothesis 4A). So, the pattern of resultsfor giving will be similar to that for taking.

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If, however, Type-I and Type-O orientations refer to a relative way of inter-preting ambiguous elements in exchange situations, one can assume that Type-Ipersons perceive more inputs and Type-O persons more outcomes in their ownexchange situation than in the exchange situations of other people. In compari-son with others, Type-I persons perceive themselves as contributing more inputsthan others and therefore as deserving more outcomes. Type-O persons perceivethemselves as receiving more outcomes than others and, thus, as deserving less out-comes. On the basis of this second assumption, it is predicted that Type-I personswill give less outcomes to others than Type-O persons (Hypothesis 4B). So, fol-lowing this assumption, the pattern of results for giving outcomes is the oppositeto that for taking outcomes.

In order to get a clear insight into the essence of giving and taking, we mustknow whether the participants involved in an experiment are Type-I or Type-Opersons. In order to understand the input–outcome orientation, we must studyboth giving and taking by Type-I and Type-O persons. Therefore, both variablesare included in the following experiment.

METHOD

Participants

Thirty-five (35) male and 34 female second-year psychology students whohad not yet taken a course in social psychology participated voluntarily in thisstudy. They were assigned randomly to one of the two experimental conditions.The students participated anonymously. Data of three participants were incomplete,and therefore were not included in the analyses.

General Overview

The participants received a booklet containing a description of a hypotheticalwork situation. In about half of the descriptions, participants had been workingmore hours than a partner of the same sex (high-performance condition), whereasin the other half of the descriptions participants had been working less hoursthan a partner of the same sex (low-performance condition). Each participant waspresented with three questions: one about giving, one about taking, and one aboutdividing money. After responding to the three allocation questions, the participantsfilled out the adapted Dutch version of Tornow’s (1971) Input–Outcome Checklist.

Materials

The booklets started with a story (adapted from Messick and Sentis, 1979)describing two students (the participant and a highly comparable other student

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of the same sex) who had finished a job at the university library. Participantswere told that they had been working for 7 hours (low performance) or 10 hours(high performance), whereas the other student had been working for 10 hours or7 hours, respectively. The reason that one of the two students had been workingonly 7 hours was that this person had an appointment with his or her physician.Payment would take place on the next day. It was made clear that afterward thetwo students would not meet each other again (because the other student wouldcontinue his or her study at another university). The next pages in the bookletscontained the three questions dealing with the payments. The questions were asfollows:

Question 1(taking money): “You arrive late for the payment. On your way to thelibrary you meet the other student, who has received 60 guilders.4 How much do you intendto receive for your work? Every amount up to 100 guilders is allowed.”

Question 2(giving money): “The other student is late. You receive 60 guilders. Theperson who is in charge of the payment asks you how many guilders (up to 100) the otherstudent should receive.”

Question 3(dividing money): “The other student has called that (s)he could not cometo collect the money. The person who is in charge of the payment asks you how much youand how much the other student should receive. There are 160 guilders to be divided.”

Input–Outcome Orientation

The Input–Outcome Questionnaire used in this study is a translated andadapted version of Tornow’s (1971) Input–Outcome Checklist. The Dutch version(Von Grumbkow and Syroit, 1975, 1976) contains 33 aspects of work situationssuch as taking many decisions, working under time pressure, having challengingwork, and taking courses. Participants had to indicate whether a certain elementis an input or an outcome for them. They also had to rate on a 3-point scale (1=not important; 3= very important) how important they considered each elementas an input or as an outcome. The measurement of input–outcome orientationis based on each person’s labeling of ambiguous elements in an exchange situa-tion. Ambiguous elements are those elements that were perceived by 40% to 60%of the participants as an input or as an outcome. Eight items met this criterion.Examples of ambiguous job elements for our participants are following courses,demonstrating one’s abilities, feeling responsible for one’s work, and working ona complex assignment. For categorizing participants as either input-oriented oroutcome-oriented, only these eight most ambiguous elements were used, as wassuggested by Tornow (1971).

Each participant received an input score and an outcome score by summingthe importance ratings of their input items and of their outcome items, respectively(Von Grumbkow, 1980). Participants were categorized as Type-I persons when theirinput score was higher than the median input score of the group (MeI = 15) and

4One Dutch guilder equals about .45 Euro and about $.50 US.

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when their outcome score was lower than the median outcome score (MeO= 16).The reverse categorization rule held true for the classification of participants intothe Type-O group. Twenty-seven (27) participants were Type-I persons and 28 par-ticipants were Type-O persons. Eleven (11) participants could not be categorizedinto one of these two groups. Their data were discarded from further analyses. Theclassification of participants into Type I and Type O was unrelated to performanceconditions (high versus low performance) or gender.

Design

The study seems to have a 2 (input–outcome orientation)× 2 (low versushigh performance)× 3 (giving, taking, and dividing money) design. However,participants who were asked to consider themselves high performers took moneyas high performers but gave money to the low-performing other person. Thosewho were asked to consider themselves as low performers gave money to the high-performing other but took money for themselves, being low performers. Anothercomplication is caused by the third question (dividing money), because allocatingmoney to the high performer is complementary to allocating money to the lowperformer. Therefore, the answers to question 1 (taking money) and question 2(giving money) were rearranged such that within each performance level (high andlow), a 2 (input–outcome orientation)× 2 (taking versus giving) between-subjectsfactorial design was created. An identical design was constructed with respect toquestion 3 (dividing money). In this case, we arbitrarily chose the allocations tothe low performer. The dependent measure in the three separate designs is theamount of money the participants allocated to themselves or to the other student(coworker).

RESULTS

Three separate analyses were performed: one of the allocations (give/take)to the low performer, one of the allocations (give/take) to the high performer, andthe third allocation was the part given to or taken by the low performer whiledividing the fixed sum of money. All analyses reported were preceded by analysesin which the gender of the participants was treated as an independent variable.Because gender did not yield any significant main effect and was not involved inany significant interaction effect, we left gender out of consideration.

Proportionate Allocations

In order to test the hypothesis that people show an egocentric bias in tak-ing money for themselves (Hypothesis 1) and not in giving money to others, the

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Table I. Taking and Giving Money by Type-I andType-O persons (Low-Performance Situation)

Transfer Type I Type O

Taking 51.83ab 46.06ab

Giving 45.67a 52.58b

Note: Means with different superscripts are signif-icantly different from one another (p< .05). Italicmeans differ significantly (p< .05) from proportion-ality (=42.00).

allocations were tested against the strict proportional amounts by means of two-sided t-tests in the same manner as Messick and Sentis (1979). The propor-tional amount for persons with low inputs (7 h work) equals 42.00 guilders(=[60/10]× 7); for persons with high inputs (10 h work), the proportional amountequals 85.71 guilders (=[60/7]× 10). The proportional share for the low-perform-ing person after dividing the fixed sum of 160.00 guilders equals 65.88 guilders(=[7/(7+ 10)]× 160]). In computing the proportionate amounts, only the (objec-tive) numbers of hours worked were considered, not the perceived contributions.

The mean number of guilders that was taken by or given to the low-perform-ing person by Type-I and Type-O participants is presented in Table I. Theamount taken by low-performing persons is significantly larger than the propor-tional amount for both Type-I and Type-O participants (t(12)= 4.03, p< .01,andt(15)= 2.55, p< .05, respectively). Only Type-O participants gave more thana proportional amount of money to their low-performing colleagues (t(11)= 3.66,p< .01).

Table II presents the mean number of guilders taken by or given to high-performing persons. Here it is found that only Type-I persons give significantlyless than a proportionate share to others (t(11)=−2.89, p < .05).

The pattern of results for dividing a fixed amount of money (Table III) isthe same as that of allocating money to the low performers. Type-O persons giveand take a larger than proportionate number of guilders (t(15)= 2.45, p< .05,andt(11)= 2.98, p< .05, respectively). Type-I participants take more than a pro-portionate amount of money (t(12)= 2.51, p< .05), but the amount of money

Table II. Taking and Giving Money by Type-I andType-O persons (High-Performance Situation)


Taking 87.05b 83.75ab

Giving 73.75a 83.29ab

Note: Means with different superscripts are signif-icantly different from one another (p< .05). Italicmeans differ significantly (p< .05) from proportion-ality (=85.71).

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Table III. Taking and Giving Money by Type-I andType-O persons (Dividing a Fixed Sum)


Share for self 70.50b 68.89ab

Share for other 66.33a 72.24b

Note:Means with different superscripts are significantly dif-ferent from one another (p< .05). Italic means differ signif-icantly (p< .05) from proportionality (=65.88).

they give to their low-performing colleague does not differ significantly from theproportionate share (t(14)< 1.0).

On the basis of an assumed egocentric bias, it was predicted (Hypothesis 1)that persons with low inputs would take a more than proportionate amount ofmoney and that high-performing persons would take a proportionate share, ir-respective of their input–outcome orientation. The results with respect to takingmoney for oneself largely support this hypothesis.

Hypothesis 2 states that participants take more for themselves than that theygive to others. According to this hypothesis, a significant main effect for type oftransfer (giving versus taking) is expected. According to Hypotheses 3 and 4A,which state that Type-I persons take and give more outcomes than Type-O persons,a significant main effect for input–outcome orientation is expected. However, ifinput–outcome orientation should be interpreted not in an absolute but in a rela-tive way and Hypothesis 4B is correct, then we should find a significant type oftransfer× input–outcome orientation interaction effect. After presenting the re-sults of the separate analyses of variance (ANOVA), we relate these results to thethree hypotheses.

Taking by or Giving to the Person with Low Inputs

ANOVAs performed on the allocations to or by the low-performing per-son with type of transfer (giving versus taking) and input–outcome orientation(Type I versus Type O) as independent variables (see Table I) does not yield sig-nificant main effects (F’s< 1.0). A significant interaction effect has been found(F(1,51)= 7.72,p< .01). Tests of the differences between condition means revealthat only the difference between Type-I and Type-O persons with respect to givingmoney to others is significant. Type-I persons give significantly less to others thanType-O persons.

Taking by or Giving to the Person with High Inputs

ANOVAs performed on the allocations to or by the high-performing persons(see Table II) yields a significant main effect for type of transfer (F(1,51)= 4.70,

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p< .05) and a significant interaction effect (F(1,51)= 4.21, p< .05). High-performing participants take more money for themselves than low-performingparticipants give to their high-performing colleagues. Testing the differences be-tween condition means shows that only Type-I persons take more than they giveto others.

Dividing a Fixed Amount of Money: Taking by or Givingto the Person with Low Inputs

ANOVAs performed on the allocations to or by the low-performing personin dividing a fixed amount of money (see Table III) yielded only a significantinteraction effect (F(1,51)= 5.34, p< .05). Type-I participants take significantlymore money for themselves than they give to others, and Type-O participants givemore to others than Type-I participants do.

Hypothesis 2 (taking versus giving) is supported in only one of the threeallocation situations: more money is taken than given only in the case of highperformance. However, even this result must be qualified in view of the significantinteraction effect: The egocentric bias is found only among Type-I participants.Type-I participants take more for themselves than they give to others when highperformers are dealt with (Table II) and in a situation in which they must divide afixed amount of money (Table III).

Type-I persons do not take significantly more money than Type-O persons,as was expected according to Hypothesis 3. The absolute interpretation of input–outcome orientation, on which the expectation was based that Type-I participantswould also give more outcomes than Type-O participants (Hypothesis 4A), isrefuted. The relative interpretation of the input–outcome orientation, which led toHypothesis 4B, is supported in two out of the three allocation situations. Type-Ipersons give significantly less outcomes to others than Type-O persons when highperformance is dealt with (Table II) and when a fixed amount of outcomes isdivided (Table III).

DISCUSSION

Before we conclude whether the results negates or supported the hypotheses,we should point at three limitations of the experiment. The first limitation concernsthe hypothetical nature of the work situation. Although the students who took part inthe study could easily imagine themselves in the situation, we did not observe actualallocation behavior of the participants in a real setting. This does not account forthe differences found, but it might affect the ecological validity of our conclusions.A second issue is a matter of computation. In the low-performance condition, thecalculation of the proportionality point ([60/10]× 7= 42.00) is less complicatedthan in the high-performance condition ([60/7]× 100= 85.71). Although the ease

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of calculating the proportionality point might explain differences in the occurrenceof any bias between the low- and high-performance groups, it does not explainwhy the input- or outcome-oriented participants responded differently when givingor taking was dealt with. A third weakness concerns the fixed order of the threequestions: taking, giving, and dividing. We do not see how this order might haveaffected the results, but in future research it is better to vary the order of thequestions.

A bias toward egocentrism means that people take more than proportionateoutcomes when they provide lower inputs than another person, and take outcomesthat do not differ from a proportionate amount when they provide higher inputsthan another person. As was expected (Hypothesis 1), the participants allocatedmoney to themselves in this way. Also, when the participants had to divide a fixedsum of money between themselves and their coworkers, they took more than anequitable share when they had performed less than the other. Type-O as well asType-I persons showed this tendency.

In two of the three allocation situations, Type-I persons took significantlymore money for themselves than that they gave to their coworker if he or shehad provided similar inputs (Hypothesis 2). However, the allocations of Type-Opersons were quite different. In the situation with high contributions, the averageamount of money the Type-O participants gave to their coworkers did not differsignificantly from an equitable reward and was almost equal to what they tookfor themselves. In the situation with low contributions and in the situation with afixed sum of money to divide, the Type-O participants gave the coworkers evenmore (although not significantly more) money than they took for themselves. Also,the amounts of money the Type-O participants allocated to their coworkers werehigher than proportionate in these situations. So, the hypothesis that people takemore money for themselves than they give to others in comparable circumstances(Hypothesis 2) should be rejected for Type-O persons but not for Type-I persons.

If no distinction is made between taking and giving, no effect of the input–outcome orientation of the participants is found. This orientation has only an effectin interaction with giving and taking. As expected (Hypothesis 3), in all three allo-cation situations, Type-I participants took more money for themselves than Type-Oparticipants did. However, the differences were not significant. Giving is dealt within Hypotheses 4A and 4B. According to Hypothesis 4A, Type-I participants areexpected to give more to others than Type-O participants (absolute or generalinterpretation of input–outcome orientation). According to Hypothesis 4B, the re-verse is expected. The results in two of the three situations are in accordance withHypothesis 4B, whereas in the third situation the pattern of means is the same, butnot significantly. Therefore, Hypothesis 4A should be rejected and Hypothesis 4Bshould not. The fact that Hypothesis 4A and not Hypothesis 4B should be rejectedindicates that Type-I and Type-O persons do not consider specific elements in anexchange situation as inputs or outcomes in a general or absolute way, but that itdepends on whether they themselves or another person is the contributor of inputs

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and receiver of outcomes. So, the input–outcome orientation should be consideredin a more relative or even instrumental way. As is shown in research on social valueorientations (Messick and McClintock, 1968; McClintock, Messick, Kuhlman, andCampos, 1973; Kuhlman and Marshello, 1975), people differ in their preferencesfor outcomes to themselves and/or another person regardless of the inputs. Consid-ering specific elements in the exchange situation as inputs or outcomes for oneselfand not for another person can be a good reason for allocating outcomes in a pre-ferred way or for justifying such an allocation. The input–outcome orientation isindicative of the way in which a person transforms the input side of an exchangesituation. Input- and outcome-oriented persons construe their contributions to anexchange in different ways, and consequently they have different standards of whatconstitutes an equitable amount of outcomes.

When Type-O participants allocate money to their coworkers, they show asimilar bias to when they allocate money to themselves. So, it seems that theyhave an altruistic bias as well as an egoistic one. However, if someone must dividea fixed sum of money between him- or herself and another person, then the twobiases are conflicting. It turns out that in this case, Type-O persons give more thanthe proportionate share to the person who, according to an equity rule, would getthe smallest share of outcomes. So, Type-O persons are maximin oriented, whichmeans that they strive toward maximizing the outcomes for the person who wouldget least (Schulz and May, 1989).

The results can be interpreted such that if one considers a proportionateallocation as a baseline, Type-O participants give the advantage to both themselvesand the other person when the equality rule makes this possible, whereas Type-Iparticipants give the advantage to themselves and the disadvantage to the otherperson. So, Type-I participants seem to be competitively or even aggressivelyoriented.

In the study by Messick and Sentis (1979), an egocentric bias in taking moneyand no or a less-strong altruistic bias in giving money was found. One couldspeculate that most of their participants were Type-I persons. Our study showsthat it is important to take into account not only whether people allocate outcomesto themselves or to other persons in return for inputs, but also whether they considerspecific elements predominantly in the exchange situation as inputs or outcomes.

In both the Messick and Sentis (1979) study and in our experiment, the partic-ipants were anonymous and were told that the persons in the situations describedwould not meet each other again. These are important aspects of the experiment.Shapiro (1975) showed that an egocentric bias is less likely when the allocatorexpects future interaction with the other recipient of the reward. According toSchwinger (1980), people perform a politeness ritual when allocating rewards notin private (as in this study), but in public. Such a ritual results in a less egocentricallocation or even its opposite. The supposedly more competitive or aggressivestyle of behaving of input-oriented people is more counternormative or less politethan the maximin allocation strategy of outcome-oriented persons. Considering

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this interpretation of the input–outcome orientation, one can expect that it makesmore difference to input-oriented than for outcome-oriented people whether allo-cations are made in public or in private. Therefore, in future allocation studies itmakes sense to include the distinction between private and public allocation, aswell as the type of transfer (giving, taking, and dividing) and the input–outcomeorientation of participants.

REFERENCES

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Social PsychologyVol. 2. New York: Academic Press, pp. 267–299.Aderson, N. H. (1976). Equity judgments as information integration.J. Person. Soc. Psychol.33:

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