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51st Annual Convention of the International Studies Association

February 17-20, 2010 New Orleans (EUA)

ESDP missions and the promotion of international security

Maria Raquel Freire1 (rfreire@fe.uc.pt)

Paula Duarte Lopes2 (pdl@fe.uc.pt)

University of Coimbra - Portugal

Work in progress, please do not cite without authors permission.

Abstract

The European Union has assumed part of the responsibility for the maintenance and

promotion of international security through the creation of ESDP Missions. These

have been deployed both near and far from EU borders, suggesting an unequivocal

concern with international security beyond EU's closer sphere of influence. This

paper argues that these have, so far, complied with the UN normative framework,

although reflecting an increasing regional European logic towards the understanding

of international security and the path to secure it.

1 Maria Raquel Freire acknowledges the support provided by the Centre for Social Studies, University of Coimbra (Portugal) and the International Studies Association. 2 Paula Duarte Lopes acknowledges the support provided by Fundao Calouste Gulbenkian, the Centre for Social Studies, University of Coimbra (Portugal) and the International Studies Association.

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in our present world and into the foreseeable future, there is no such

thing as international noninvolvement in violent conflicts. There is, rather,

a choice between legitimate involvement and other, more ominous forms

of intervention. (Kofi Annan, 1996)

Introduction

The concept of security in a post-post-cold war period has not only broadened but

also deepened, beyond the mere existence of threats to a state. Its broadness is

reflected in the consideration of distinct dimensions of security beyond territorial

integrity, such as economic or environmental security (Homer-Dixon, 1994). The

concept of security has also deepened in the sense that it includes actors as subjects

of security besides the state, such as the individual (human security) (UNDP, 1994) or

society (societal security) (Weaver, Buzan and Wilde, 1997). Additionally, the

strategies to pursue peace and security have also evolved and currently peace missions

have become a central stabilizing element, recurrently employed towards the

promotion of international peace and security. International security is here

understood in the terms of the United Nations (UN) Charter (UN, 1945), i.e.

international peaceful stability. The UN approach has been informed by Peace

Studies in its commitment to promote peace not only through keeping peace

(negative peace), but also through promoting structural conditions for peace (positive

peace) (Galtung, 1969).

The UN security framework has become the underlying reference to worldwide peace

and security strategies. Article 24 of the UN Charter confers on the Security Council

primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and

UN peace missions have become a strategy for this effect. However, the United

Nations Charter does not foresee peace missions as such, although it contains

elements and principles that reflect the spirit within which these are envisaged. The

reasoning agreed to frame peace missions has been somewhat between Chapter VI

(pacific resolution of disputes) and Chapter VII (peace enforcement measures when

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peace is threatened or violated or when there are acts of aggression), being called

Chapter VI .

As the world changed, so did the roles different actors played in this type of peace

and security strategies. In fact, not only individual states, regional arrangements and

international organizations have participated in peace missions with or without the

UN, but also, the UN has given a clear sign urging the involvement and initiative of

other parties, concerning the deployment of peace missions (UN, 2000). As a result,

the UN security regime has not only become the binding option for security

cooperation, but it also became a source of legitimacy for peace missions and an

accepted reference for regional and state behavior concerning (inter)national security.

And although the relation between the UN security framework and regional

arrangements is established in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, this relation has

become an uncertainty concerning their consisten[cy] with the Purposes and

Principles of the United Nations (Article 52). Chapter VIII emphasizes the role

regional arrangements may have on achieving pacific settlement of local disputes

() before referring them to the Security Council (Article 52). This already reflects a

concern with regional dynamics, recognizing roles and assigning accountability to

regional actors. Additionally, the UN Security Council shall, where appropriate,

utilize () regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its

authority (Article 53). If the initiative for this type of intervention originates with

regional actors, then formal Security Council authorization is required (Article 53).

Although peace missions are not explicitly envisaged in the UN Charter, they fit with

its purposes and principles. Consequently, as peace missions gained new dynamics,

including regional actors and ad-hoc arrangements, Chapter VIII constitutes the basis

for framing regional participation in these missions. Still, the variety of peace missions

(mandates and leading actors) as well as the inter-institutional cooperation results in a

complex articulation of different interests and procedures creating a dynamics of

variable geometry concerning who, how, when and where. The who and the how are

addressed in Chapter VIII, although the complexity of different actors with

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concurrent missions on the field might end up questioning UN purposes and

principles. The when is ideally decided on a needs-base and the where depends on a

conjugation of different variables. Chapter VIII seems to explicitly envision regional

involvement concerning local disputes, almost as a subsidiarity principle. However,

current trends include an increasing number of regional arrangements involved

beyond local dynamics (out-of-area missions). Regionalization is here, therefore,

understood as missions constituted at a regional level, and not necessarily geared to

their own region.

Regional peace missions have emerged as an alternative to an overburdened UN, by

allowing an increase in human and material resources beyond the UN strained budget

and human-power framework. Certain European Common Security and Defence

Policy (CSDP) missions constitute a clear example of this dynamics. On the one

hand, the European Union (EU) deploys missions within its neighborhood (e.g.

mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo or Moldova/Ukraine), but also out-of-area,

such as those in Somalia, Guinea-Bissau, Afghanistan or Indonesia (Aceh).

This paper argues that the European Union has assumed part of the responsibility for

the maintenance and promotion of international peace and security through the

creation of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) missions. And although

the EU has deployed both near and far from its borders, it is argued that these

missions have, so far, been framed within the UN peace and security normative

framework. The argument is sustained by the EUs political commitment to this

peace and security strategy as well as by the EU and its member states participation in

CSDP missions. Through the analysis of EUs political commitment and

participation, the paper concludes that CSDP missions have been contributing to the

UN security framework. Additionally, it is becoming visible a specific European

approach to international peace and security strategies and interventions.

Note on methodology

It should be noted that the information used in this paper is based exclusively on

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available data from official documents. The remaining information was not available

in the official sources remotely accessed. Consequently, this paper provides the first

brushes of a much more complex and intricate picture to be further analyzed. Most

of the analysis is based only on the 12 CSDP ongoing missions on December 31,

2009.

Table 1 CSDP missions active on December 31, 2009

CSDP Mission Date of

Decision

info on

HR?*

info on

FR?**

EUPM/BiH March 2002 yes yes

EUFOR ALTHEA/BiH July 2004 yes no

EUJUST LEX/Iraq March 2005 no yes

EUSEC RD Congo May 2005 no no

EUPOL COPPS/Palestinian Territories November 2005 no yes

EUBAM Moldova/Ukraine November 2005 no yes

EUPOL AGHANISTAN May 2007 yes no

EUPOL RD Congo June 2007 yes no

EU SSR Guinea-Bissau February 2008 yes no

EULEX Kosovo February 2008 no no

EUMM Georgia September 2008 yes yes

EUNAVFOR Somalia November 2008 no yes

* Human Resources ** Financial Resources

Source: Based on information collected from each missions associated Council Joint Action.

Additionally, it should be noted that the information available for each mission is

most of the times not fully comparable, since the documents do not follow the same

template and detail level. Consequently, this paper only focuses on the number of

missions as its analytical variable, e.g., the number of missions deployed in Africa, the

number of missions Portugal participated with human resources, the number of

missions Malta participated with financial resources, and so on. Furthermore, it was

only possible to obtain human and financial resources information on two CSDP

ongoing missions: EUPM/BiH (Council Joint Action, 2002) and EUMM Georgia

(Council Joint Action, 2008/736). As a result, the analysis always refers to the group

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of missions for which there was data available, i.e., when referring to the number of

missions Cyprus participated financially and the number of missions it participated

with human resources, the reference group of missions is not the same. This

constitutes a methodological problem which will be overcome in the next phase of

this research project. The information gathered does, however, provide, as mentioned

above, a first take at a complex, multi-layered and intricate dynamics.

Political commitment

The European Unions interventions towards the promotion of international peace

and security reflect its political commitment to the UN security framework. This is

visible in relation to the fundamental guidelines underlying UN peace missions,

including horizontal and vertical cooperation,3 multi-dimensionality (Secretary-

General, 1992), consent of the parties, impartiality concerning the dispute, and

refraining from the use of force.4 Additionally, the EU incorporates in its missions a

normative dimension associated with the UNs liberal peace project (rule of law,

democracy, good governance, transparency) (Richmond, 2009, 2005; Chandler, 2006).

Institutionally, the EUs role in international peace and security has undergone several

consolidating phases within the UNs Chapter VIII spirit starting with the integration

efforts in the 1940s, which included a security concern, up to the Treaty of Lisbon.

The European Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) has its direct roots in

the Second World War. Western European governments developed efforts to replace

age-old rivalries between their countries with dialogue, and revisionism with

compromise, setting up new international institutions. The first attempt to prevent

violent conflict through European integration was evident in the Brussels Treaty

(1948), which established the Western European Union (WEU).5 The main idea

underlying WEU was the commitment to mutual defence should any of the

3 Horizontal cooperation with both other states and missions; vertical cooperation with local agents as well as under the UN aegis. 4 For more on the holy trinity see Bellamy, Williams and Griffin, 2007). 5 The Treaty on Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence, or the Brussels Treaty for short, was agreed by Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.

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signatories be the victim of an armed attack in Europe.6 The efforts to create a

reliable security community were not circumscribed to Europe. The United States of

America (USA) were very much involved from the beginning, conferring the

negotiations a transatlantic approach. As a result, the North Atlantic Treaty (1949)

was signed in Washington, D.C., between the Brussels Treaty signatories, the USA

and Canada.7 The basic idea underlying the WEU was maintained: the signatories

agreed that an armed attack against one or more of them () shall be considered an

attack against them all and () each of them () [will take] such action as it deems

necessary (...) to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area

(NATO, 1949: Art. 5). The need to provide military and political structures to uphold

the Washington Treaty led to the creation, in 1950, of the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO).

Germany, however, was not a signatory of either the Brussels (WEU) or the

Washington (NATO) treaties. Its importance towards international peace and

security, however, led to the signing of the European Defence Community Treaty

(1952) by the six founding members of the European Coal and Steel Community

(later founders of the European Community, 1957). However, France did not ratify

the Paris Treaty due to domestic political opposition and the project was aborted.

Instead, a more traditional military alliance was consolidated. The North Atlantic

Treaty Organization (NATO), created in 1949, pooled the military capabilities of its

members rather than integrating them, and it centered on the USA. Germany joined

in 1954.

It was only in the 1970s that a first cautious step towards a common European

foreign policy was taken. The Luxembourg Report (October, 1970) established the

European Political Cooperation to allow member states of the European

Community to discuss and co-ordinate their positions on foreign affairs and, where

appropriate, act in concert (White, 2001: 71). The EPC, which somewhat belatedly

6 From the WEU website www.weu.int, accessed January 15, 2010. 7 Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway and Portugal were also invited and agreed to join the Washington Treaty.

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translated Western Europes desire to define a common identity on the world stage

and to play an active role on it, evolved at the time when East-West negotiations in

the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)

were ongoing. In October 1987, the Hague Platform on European Security

recognized the coexistence of the European and Atlantic vectors while affirming that

the European identity in security matters was complementary to NATO.

The end of the Cold War engendered profound transformations in international

politics by allowing the emergence of several new states in Europe and eliminating

the Soviet threat. The new more permissive international environment, together with

the declining geopolitical importance of Europe for the sole remaining superpower,

created an opening for a more autonomous EU security and defence policy. The

Treaty on European Union (TEU) of 1992 contributed to the reinvigoration of the

security dimension within the EU. It transformed the European Political Cooperation

into the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), with an intergovernmental

character, and envisaging the option to resort to the WEU to implement the defence

tasks decided within the EU framework.

However, this institutional framework revealed its limits in regards to the Balkans. Its

failure to stop the bloodshed in Croatia and Bosnia brought into focus a sequence of

serious security-related shortfalls of the EU. Its defence institutions, founded on the

priority of territorial defence, were inadequate for the new intra-state wars. In

addition, it lacked deployable, professional armed forces, had no common strategic

culture and, above all, was incapable of projecting significant forces abroad (Haine,

2006). The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997), finally, gave the EU a recognisable foreign

policy for the first time (Keane, 2005: 91), incorporating the Petersberg Tasks of the

WEU humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat

forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.8 Moreover, it established the

post of High Representative for the CFSP to give greater coherence to EUs foreign

policy. 8 These had been set out in the Petersberg Declaration adopted at the Ministerial Council of the Western European Union in June 1992.

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Washington supported the strengthening of the CFSP because the process was

expected to be confined to the formation of a European Security and Defence

Identity (ESDI) within NATO.9 Consequently, the Atlantic Alliance agreed, at the

Berlin Summit (1996), to give the WEU access to its capabilities should the EU

decide to avail itself of the institution to carry out military operations in which

NATO as a whole was not involved. It seemed at the time that the WEU would

become the somewhat loosely attached defence arm of the EU and the European

pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.

Yet, these institutional arrangements failed to inject noticeable dynamism into EU

security policy. Brussels inability to secure a diplomatic solution to the onslaught of

Serbian forces against Albanians in Kosovo, in the late 1990s, once again showed up

the dependency of the Europeans on American war-fighting capabilities. The

breakthrough in this process came at the St. Malo Franco-British Summit in

December 1998. Both governments declared their support for the development of an

autonomous European defence capacity as long as it would not put in jeopardy the

relationship with NATO.

At the Helsinki European Council in December 1999, the basic ESDP institutional

infrastructure was created. It was further agreed a headline goal for the establishment

of a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF), which was to have 60,000 troops deployable within

60 days for at least one year (Helsinki Presidency, 1999). Already in the lead-up to the

Summit, NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana was appointed as High

Representative for the CFSP, and the WEU was incorporated into the EU.10 Taken

9 ESDI was a careful two-way bargain by which the US agreed to support European efforts to gain greater military credibility in exchange for which Europeans committed to pursue their military ambitions inside NATO, thereby granting an element of US political control. (Sangiovanni, 2003: 196; see also Webber et al. 2002) 10 According to the WEU decisions in Marseille in November 2000, the WEU maintained its collective defence obligations as well as minimal structures and residual functions to support the transition process (WEU Council of Ministers, Marseille Declaration, November 13, 2000: paragraph 1).

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together, these decisions promised to give the EU the hammer and anvil necessary

to help forge the implementation of the Petersberg tasks (Keane, 2005: 91).

Despite the Helsinki breakthrough, civilian crisis management capabilities were still

missing. Smaller member states, such as Sweden and Finland, insisted on balancing

the militarization of the EU with the creation of civilian instruments designed to

allow the Union to play a constructive role in peacebuilding. Hence, the June 2000

Santa Maria da Feira European Council concentrated on ESDP interventions in the

areas of rule of law, civil administration, civil protection and policing. With the

establishment of the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management

(CIVCOM), the EU created a civilian counterpart to the military working parties

created at the Helsinki summit. The civilian profile of European foreign policy was

further strengthened by the adoption, one year later, of the EU Programme for the

Prevention of Violent Conflicts. Its main rationale is to complement the reactive

ESDP centered on crisis management and post-violent conflict stabilization with

proactive violent conflict prevention (Keane, 2005: 92).

The Treaty of Nice (2000) specifies provisions on the participation of non-European

NATO members and EU candidate countries in ESDP operations and spells out

permanent arrangements for EU-NATO consultation and cooperation (European

Council, 2000: Annex VI, titles III and IV). More generally, the Treaty reaffirms the

EUs determination to develop a coherent and effective approach to crisis

management. At the end of 2002, the Berlin Plus arrangements were concluded,

institutionalizing a strategic partnership between NATO and the EU concerning crisis

management.11 The ESDP, finally, had access to NATO assets, notably its planning

capabilities. Soon after, the EU sought the support of the Alliance to put European

soldiers on the ground in Macedonia in its first-ever military operation (Concordia).

11 It should be noted, however that the Berlin Plus agreement is not a public document and has never been ratified by national parliaments. (ESDA, 2009: 1)

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As the EU takes the first steps on the field with peace missions, it also feels the need

to have a coherent and structured strategy concerning security issues as an anchor to

its role in building peace. Consequently, in 2003, the EU member states agree on a

European Security Strategy, which sets the general guidelines for common external

action (Haine, 2003), expanding the Petersberg Tasks by adding joint disarmament

operations, support for third countries in combating terrorism and security sector

reform to the task list of the ESDP. Furthermore, following this consolidation effort,

the EU defence ministers also created, in 2004, the European Defence Agency

(EDA), aiming to support the member states and the Council in their effort to

improve European defence capabilities in the field of crisis management and to

sustain the ESDP as it stands now and develops in the future (Joint Action, 2004).

The EDA also plays the role of systems integrator, assisting in the definition of

defence requirements and the coordination of procurement across the EU (Witney,

2004).

These developments have culminated in the Treaty of Lisbon (2007), which replaces

the ESDP by the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), enhancing

institutional prerogatives that seek to overcome the EUs inter-institutional

limitations concerning consistency and cohesion. The creation of the post of High

Representative, who accumulates the functions of the former High Representative for

CFSP and of the Commissioner for External Relations, is such an example.

Additionally, the Treaty of Lisbon institutionalizes the scope of the previous peace

missions, further extending the so-called Petersberg tasks, including military advice

and assistance task, peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation; conflict prevention

and post-conflict stabilization missions (ToL, 2007: Article 28 B, paragraph 1).

Further, the European Defence Agency is now included within the legal framework

of the CSDP (ToL, 2007: Article 28 D), demonstrating a bigger commitment by EUs

member states, regarding the development of EU operational capabilities (Dagand,

2008).

The EUs institutionalization of its role concerning peace and security has been

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gradual but consistent, demonstrating a firm commitment both from the individual

member states and from the EUs institutions, resulting in the enhancement of

human and material capabilities. This has allowed the EU to take more

responsibilities within the framework of Chapter VIII of the UN, including its direct

involvement in out of area dynamics.

Commitment and participation

To date, the EU deployed a total of 23 ESDP/CSDP missions (fourteen civilian, six

military and three civilian-military). On December 31, 2009, eleven missions had been

completed.12 In a short period of time, the EU has gained considerable experience in

international crisis management.

On January 1, 2003, the first EU civilian crisis management operation under ESDP,

the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) was deployed in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It

had initially about 500 police officers and was mandated to improve local law

enforcement (European Council, 2002). Code-named Concordia, the EUs first

military mission replaced the NATO operation Allied Harmony. On March 31, 2003,

350 EU soldiers arrived in the former-Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (European

Council, 2003a). The then NATO Secretary-General, Lord Robertson (2003: 512)

described the transition from NATO to the ESDP mission in Macedonia as an

example of successful cooperation between Europes two leading security institutions,

illustrating that transatlantic relations were a positive sum game. In December 2003,

Concordia was followed by PROXIMA, the EUs second police mission.

In June of the same year, following a request by the United Nations (UN), the EU

sent 1,500 troops to the Democratic Republic of Congo with the aim of preventing a

large-scale humanitarian and civil crisis in the North-eastern region of the country

(European Council, 2003b; Council Joint Action, 2003). Operation ARTEMIS, which

12 CONCORDIA (2003), EUPOL PROXIMA (2003-2005) and EUPAT (2005-2006) in Macedonia; ARTEMIS 2003), EUPOL Kinshasa (2004-2007) and EUFOR (2006) in RD Congo; EUJUST THEMIS (2004-2005) in Georgia; EU support to AMIS (2005-2007) in Sudan, Darfur; Aceh Monitoring Mission (2005-2006) in Indonesia; EUBAM Rafah (2005-2007) in Palestinian Territories (suspended); and EUFOR Tchad/RCA (2007-2009).

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lasted until September, was an autonomous European mission, i.e., it was not

dependent on NATO assets. In addition, it was the first EU military operation

outside Europe and, thus, the first concrete step towards implementing the European

Security Strategy. It demonstrated that the ESDP had evolved from a regional crisis

manager confined to Europe to an actor with the ambition to become a global

security player. The significance of ARTEMIS for the EU was described by the then

High Representative for the CFSP, Javier Solana, as when there is political will,

things get done (Solana, 2003: 11).

Within a year, the EU deployed both civilian and military operations in Europe and

beyond, in coordination with NATO, the UN or autonomously. It was the beginning

of what became an enlarged EU presence in different areas around the globe, with its

involvement stretching from the Balkans to the Middle East, Africa and South-East

Asia. In the process, the EU managed to make good progress in translating its

ambitions into reality and in matching commitments with capabilities without over-

stretching itself. However, resources are not unlimited and decisions and actions are

not unrestrained.

It should be noted that the first ESDP mission (EUPM B-H) followed from the UNs

International Police Task Force, illustrative of UNs regionalization trend of its peace

operations. In fact, EU missions have mostly been deployed in parallel to other

international organizations missions, such as the UN, NATO, the Organisation for

Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the African Union. Moreover, the

EU has also included a transnational approach to its missions, beyond its member

states. For instance, Canada, Croatia, Norway, Switzerland and Turkey are recurrent

partners in ESDP/CSDP ongoing missions. Additionally, Iceland in Bosnia-

Herzegovina, Montenegro in Somalia and New Zealand in Afghanistan have also

partnered with the EU. It should also be highlighted that on previous EU missions in

Africa, countries such as Albania, Brazil and Russia have also been partners.

The EU has deployed essentially civilian missions (fourteen, six of which have already

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been concluded). These civilian missions mandates focus essentially on police

training and advisory, border monitoring and rule of law. The EU military missions,

mostly concentrated in Africa with the exception of ALTHEA and CONCORDIA

(Balkans), have been to date six, with two still ongoing.13 From 2005, the EU has also

deployed civilian-military missions, one in Darfur (already concluded), one in Guinea-

Bissau (2008) and another in RD Congo (2005). The military dimension of civilian-

military missions has mainly focused on security sector reform and military advisory,

thus not involving hard military human and material resources. It is also interesting to

note that the budgets of civilian-military missions are not fundamentally higher than

those of civilian missions, further confirming the non-militarized nature of the

former.

Based on the information available, all EU member states participate, at one time or

another, financially or with human resources, in different ESDP/CSDP missions. It is

clear, however, that this participation is not homogenous. For instance, for the two

missions with information on human and financial resources breakdown EUPM

(Council Joint Action, 2002) in Bosnia-Herzegovina and EUMM Georgia (Council

Joint Action, 2008/736) in the first case, all member states contribute financially

but four do not match this contribution with human resources; in the second, the 22

contributing countries coincide in both human and financial resources. This draws

attention to the disparities found regarding the ways different member states decide

to get involved. Although ESDP/CSDP missions are a result of an inter-

governmental decision, influenced by national interests, the actual characteristics of

each mission headline goals, lessons learnt, and enhanced capabilities also have a

bearing on each members decision to participate or not and how this participation is

put in practice.

Thus, the individual countries do not all participate in the same type of missions, in

the same time frames, with the same resources, in the same geographical areas. For

instance, regarding missions with information concerning human resources deployed, 13 Of the six EU military missions, three have been in collaboration with NATO and the other three with the UN.

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most EU member states participate in EUMM (Council Joint Action, 2008/736) in

Georgia and EUPM BiH (Council Joint Action, 2002) and EUFOR ALTHEA BiH

(Council Joint Action, 2004) in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In Georgia, this number reaches

81% and in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 85% of EU member states are involved in EUPM

and 74% in EUFOR ALTHEA.14 On the contrary, most EU member states do not

participate in EU SSR Guinea-Bissau (Council Action, 2008/112) or EUPOL RD

Congo (Council Joint Action, 2007). Only 22% participate in the former and 33% in

the latter.

Regarding information available concerning who contributes financially, the missions

with most countries contributing are EUPM BiH (100%) and EUMM Georgia and

EUBAM Moldova and Ukraine (2005) with 81%. On the contrary, only 56% and

63% of EU member countries contribute financially towards EUPOL COPPS (2005)

in the Palestinian Territories and EUJUST LEX (2005) in Iraq, respectively.

Nevertheless, it seems that more than 50% of EU members usually contribute

financially to ESDP/CSDP missions, reflecting the individual commitment towards

EUs international role in peace and security.

Despite this aggregated picture, some states are clearly bigger contributors than

others, concerning the number of missions they get involved in.15 For instance,

regarding human resources, France, Germany, Italy and Spain are involved in all

missions considered here whereas Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Latvia, Luxemburg,

Malta, Slovakia and Slovenia only participate in one or two missions. Concerning the

missions for which there is financial information, France, Germany and Italy also

contribute towards all missions, but so do Great Britain and The Netherlands.

Additionally, Belgium and Denmark contribute financially to all but one of these

missions. This crude image of ESDP/CSDP missions reveals a clear heterogeneity of

EU member states participation, both in terms of human resources and financial

contributions. This heterogeneity will be further researched, testing the hypothesis

14 All the numbers used in this analysis are based on information available by December 31, 2009. 15 An analysis of this nature begs a further breakdown concerning persons deployed and euros made available. This will be developed at a later stage of the Project.

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that the type of human resources and amount of financial contributions also vary

across the EU member states spectrum.

Triangulating commitment, politics and participation

Since the end of the 1990s, there has been a trend towards regionalization, mostly

visible by the increased number of peace missions led by regional organizations (e.g.

European Union, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, African Union); by ad hoc

coalitions; by key states in the region taking the political and military lead of UN

operations (e.g. Brazil in Haiti); and by leading regional powers assuming the burden

within their own regions (e.g. Australia in the South Pacific) (Cottey, 2008). In the

European Union case, this trend is visible, as discussed above, through the number of

ESDP/CSDP missions deployed near and far European borders as well as through

the number of member states involved in these missions. This process has

strengthened the possibility for these actors to establish peace missions solely with

their own contributions, besides creating the conditions for hybrid missions.16

The relation between UN peace interventions framework and regional arrangements,

be them a state, a group of states or ad hoc coalitions is not clear. This suggests that

non-UN-led peace missions, instead of acting in a complementary way to the UN

collective security system, may become local agents of the regional hegemon in

question (Bellamy and Williams, 2004: 194). This does not necessarily impair,

however, the level of success of these missions; what it does impair is the way these

missions inter-relate with the UN, clearly running the risk of challenging the UN

international security framework.17 As a result, regionalization has the potential to

distort the UN principles and purposes for which peace missions were created in the

first place. Regionalization may easily contribute to the military robustness envisaged,

but it may also imply the instrumentalization of peace forces, undermining the

legitimacy of the UN. This instrumentalization can facilitate the regional and/or

16 Hybrid missions refer to UN missions in collaboration with other regional organisations or arrangements (Pugh, 2008: 418). 17 For concrete examples see Bellamy and Williams, 2004: 196.

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national appropriation of UN language and practice in order to pursue narrower and

self-interests.

The EU clearly illustrates this dynamics of regionalization; however, there are

indicators suggesting that its role in international peace and security, despite its

regional and individual member states interests, has been contributing to the UN

purposes and principles. This contribution is illustrated by the EUs political

commitment towards international peace and security; the EUs commitment to

participation, including its individual member states records; the articulation with

other non-EU countries and international organizations, including the UN; and also

by the level of commitment intrinsic to CSDP mandates and the way they closely

accompany the evolution of the situation in the field.

Concerning political commitment, as analyzed above, the EU has equipped itself with

institutional, legal and operational capabilities to better respond to crises situations on

its own, with allies or in articulation with other international organizations. The

European Security Strategy, the European Defence Agency, the High Representative

and the European Common Security and Defence Policy are but the most relevant

examples of this institutionalized commitment. As well, the increasing number of

missions deployed by the EU and its member states human and financial

commitment reveals that the political commitment is being matched by actual

participation. These demonstrate the resolve of the EU to actively participate and

contribute towards international peace and security, beyond its own borders and

neighborhood.

This role is also clearly acknowledged by other international organizations, such as

NATO and AU, and by the UN itself. For instance, CONCORDIA (FYROM) has

been led by the EU after NATO and currently in Bosnia-Herzegovina, NATO and

the EU are collaborating under the Berlin Plus arrangements in EUFOR ALTHEA

BiH. It should be noted that the first ESDP mission was actually followed from the

UN in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Further, Operation ARTEMIS in RD Congo and

18

EUFOR Tchad/RCA, both military missions, are articulated with UN missions on

the field. Still in cooperation with the UN, the EUBMM Moldova/Ukraine is in

collaboration with United Nations Development Program and, in Georgia, the EU

collaborates with UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) and OSCE. These

varying inter-institutional relations constitute a clear example of the international

recognition and legitimacy conferred to the EU by other international organizations.

Moreover, individual states also have recognized the EUs role in building peace, by

partnering with the EU in various peace missions, such as Brazil, Canada, New

Zealand, Norway or Russia.

Additionally, the dynamics associated to EUs involvement in different crisis

management scenarios indicates awareness and flexibility in regards to rendering EUs

commitment operational. This is reflected in the subsequent and/or concurrent

missions deployed in the same geographical area and their respective mandates. For

instance, the first ever ESDP mission deployed in Bosnia-Herzegovina (EUPM), a

civilian mission, was two years later complemented by a military one (EUFOR

ALTHEA), both still operational. In neighboring FYROM, there were different

missions and mandates, mostly sequential, though overlapping between them for a

short period of time. Consequently, the EU presence adopted a clear concern with

continuity and stability, easing the transitions between military (CONCORDIA) and

civilian missions, EUPOL PROXIMA followed by EUPAT. The latter two are

related to police issues, but the change of mandates reflects willingness to better

respond to the needs in the field. In RD Congo, the EU is present since 2003 with

both civilian and military mandates. The first mission (ARTEMIS) was a military one,

which was followed a year later by EUPOL Kinshasa (civilian), this coincided with a

seven month long military mission (EUFOR RD Congo) as well as with EUSEC RD

Congo, which is still ongoing and has a civilian-military mandate. Also ongoing is

EUPOL RD Congo with just a civilian nature. It is interesting to notice that there has

been an alternate approach between military and civilian means, but acknowledging

the need for a combination of these approaches whenever needed. This is clearly

reflected in the civilian-military EUSEC RD Congo mission, still ongoing.

19

Concluding remarks

This analysis clearly demonstrates the international role the EU plays in the

promotion of international peace and security. Although it does not provide a

definitive conclusion regarding its contribution towards the UN peace and security

framework, it unquestionably provides a solid basis towards future research on this

matter. This should be pursued through a multi-level (UN, EU and member states)

and multi-track (articulation between missions, independently of actors or mandates)

approach in order to grasp the complexity of these dynamics. In the case of the EU,

it is fundamental to further analyze the type of contributions by member states,

regarding human and financial resources, since the inter-governmental decision

making procedure prevails. This unpacking allows for a better understanding of the

European regionalization dynamics within Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. This

analysis suggests that the EUs role in promoting international peace and security

constitutes a building block towards the UN framework, rather than a stumbling

stone. Nevertheless, there is an indication that the EU has been shaping its own

approach towards crisis management. This approach denotes a clear intention to

combine forces to play an enhanced role in the promotion of international peace and

security, focusing on preventive action and crisis management, in civilian and military

missions. It thus comes as no surprise that civilian crisis management has proven

fertile ground for the affirmation of the CSDP.

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