Department of Economics

Umeå School of Business and Economics

Umeå University

Umeå 2014

Essays on Temporary Work Agencies and the Economic Analysis of Law

Morgan Westéus

Akademisk avhandling

som med vederbörligt tillstånd av Rektor vid Umeå universitet för avläggande av filosofie doktorsexamen framläggs till offentligt försvar i sal S213h, Samhällsvetarhuset, Umeå universitet, fredagen den 21:a november 2014, kl. 13:15. Avhandlingen kommer att försvaras på engelska.

Fakultetsopponent: Docent, Per Skedinger, IFN, Stockholm, Sweden.

Organization Document type Date of publication Umeå University Doctoral thesis November 21st., 2014 Department of Economics SE-901 87 Umeå

Author Morgan Westéus

Title Essays on Temporary Work Agencies and the Economic Analysis of Law

Abstract

Paper [I] adds to the theoretical literature on the incentives of Temporary Work Agencies (TWAs).

Using a principal-agent model with hidden action to model two main types of contracts between a

TWA and a Client Firm (CF), the TWA is shown to potentially act against the best interest of the CF

when helping to fill a vacant position. The results also suggest that the adverse effect of the incentive

misalignment is larger when the worker is going to be leased instead of hired by the CF. However,

this effect could potentially be offset by introducing a sufficient level of competition among the

TWAs.

Paper [II] uses individual-level data on young adults to estimate how the probability of being

employed in the Swedish temporary agency sector is affected by whether a partner or other family

member has experience of temporary agency work. The results show a significant effect from all

peer groups of a magnitude that correspond to the other most influential control variables. We also

find that this cohort of the agency sector has a relatively high education level compared to the

regular sector, and that there are predominately men working in this sector.

Paper [III] analyses possible effects on total employment, and the distribution between agency

work and regular contracts as a consequence of the implementation of the EU Temporary and

Agency Workers Directive in Sweden. The analysis is based on changes in the compensation to

agency workers in a calibrated extension of a Mortensen-Pissarides search model. Even though the

results suggest a negative net effect on total employment, the implementation is shown to increase

(utilitarian) welfare, and an increased transition probability from the agency sector into regular

employment will increase welfare even further.

Paper [IV] focuses on settlement probabilities for different types of representation within the

Swedish Labour Court. Empirical estimates on a set of unjust dismissal cases show that private

representatives are generally less likely to reach a settlement than their union counterparts. The

settlement probabilities converge following court-mandated information disclosure, which suggests

that information asymmetry is an important factor in explaining differences in settlement

behaviour. Privately instigated negotiations are therefore in general insufficient for making cases

with non-union representation reach the same settlement rate as cases with union representation.

Keywords Temporary work agency, family work experience, young adults, Sweden, labour law, EU directive, unemployment, unjust dismissals, negotiations, settlements, labour unions

Language ISBN ISSN Number of pages English 978-91-7601-152-2 0348-1018 23 + 4 papers

Department of Economics Umeå School of Business and Economics Umeå University, Sweden 2014

Department of Economics Umeå School of Business and Economics Umeå University, SE-901 87 Umeå, Swedenwww.econ.umu.se

Essays on Temporary Work Agencies and the Economic Analysis of Law

Morgan Westéus

Mo

rgan W

estéus Essays on Temporary W

ork Agencies and the Econom

ic Analysis of Law

Um

eå University 20

14

ISBN 978-91-7601-152-2ISSN 0348-1018

Essays on Temporary Work Agencies and the Economic Analysis of Law

Morgan Westéus

Department of Economics

Umeå School of Business and Economics

SE-901 87 Umeå

Umeå 2014

Copyright © Morgan Westéus

This work is protected by the Swedish Copyright Legislation (Act 1960:729)

ISBN: 978-91-7601-152-2

ISSN: 0348-1018

Electronic version available at http://umu.diva-portal.org/

Printed by Print & Media at Umeå University

Umeå, Sweden 2014

To my family

AbstractThis thesis consists of an introductory chapter and four self-contained papers on temporary work agenciesand the economic analysis of law.

Paper [I] adds to the theoretical literature on the incentives of Temporary Work Agencies (TWAs). Using aprincipal-agent model with hidden action to model two main types of contracts between a TWA and a ClientFirm (CF), the TWA is shown to potentially act against the best interest of the CF when helping to fill avacant position. The results also suggest that the adverse effect of the incentive misalignment is larger whenthe worker is going to be leased instead of hired by the CF. However, this effect could potentially be offsetby introducing a sufficient level of competition among the TWAs.

Paper [II] uses individual-level data on young adults to estimate how the probability of being employed inthe Swedish temporary agency sector is affected by whether a partner or other family member has experienceof temporary agency work. The results show a significant effect from all peer groups of a magnitude thatcorrespond to the other most influential control variables. We also find that this cohort of the agency sectorhas a relatively high education level compared to the regular sector, and that there are predominately menworking in thissector.

Paper [III] analyses possible effects on total employment, and the distribution between agency work andregular contracts as a consequence of the implementation of the EU Temporary and Agency Workers Di-rective in Sweden. The analysis is based on changes in the compensation to agency workers in a calibratedextension of a Mortensen-Pissarides search model. Even though the results suggest a negative net effect ontotal employment, the implementation is shown to increase (utilitarian) welfare, and an increased transitionprobability from the agency sector into regular employment will increase welfare even further.

Paper [IV] focuses on settlement probabilities for different types of representation within the Swedish LabourCourt. Empirical estimates on a set of unjust dismissal cases show that private representatives are generallyless likely to reach a settlement than their union counterparts. The settlement probabilities converge fol-lowing court-mandated information disclosure, which suggests that information asymmetry is an importantfactor in explaining differences in settlement behaviour. Privately instigated negotiations are therefore ingeneral insufficient for making cases with non-union representation reach the same settlement rate as caseswith union representation.

Keywords: Temporary work agency, family work experience, young adults, Sweden, labour law, EU direc-tive, unemployment, unjust dismissals, negotiations, settlements, labour unions

AcknowledgementsThere are many individuals whom I would like to thank for their support and for providing interestingdiscussions and comments which have greatly contributed to the completion of this thesis. In this section Iwould like to make an effort to show my gratitude to a couple of persons specifically, even though doing socarries an inherent risk of potentially excluding someone.

First and foremost, I would like to thank my wife Margita and my family. It is difficult for me to expresshow truly grateful I am for their unconditional love and the unwavering support that they have shown methroughout this process. I will be forever thankful for having them in my life and by my side, and I willalways be indebted to them for keeping me on the right track and allowing me the peace of mind to completethis thesis.

This also goes for my parents, my sister and her family, as well as my wifes family, who have all contributedto the completion of this thesis in one way or another – sometimes by allowing me to work long hours whennecessary, but also by not allowing me to do so at other times. Some problems are best solved by doingsomething completely different.

I would of course also like to direct a special thanks to colleagues at the Department of Economics fortheir flexibility and willingness to accommodate my somewhat unorthodox situation. My supervisors ThomasAronsson and Karl-Gustaf Löfgren have both contributed greatly in this aspect. They have consistently goneabove and beyond any expectations, and for that I am truly thankful. In this respect my co-author UrbanLindgren also deserves special credit.

In addition to the faculty at the university, I would also like acknowledge the support from Nils Karlsonand the rest of the staff at the RATIO institute for their support and for providing a stimulating environmentwith many interesting conferences and seminars.

The person who sparked my interest in economic research and encouraged me to pursue a post-graduatedegree was Daniel Halvarsson. His energy and great knowledge (on many different topics) has always been asource of inspiration whenever my own has been in need of replenishment.

Finally, I would naturally also like to thank the local think tank of doctoral candidate colleagues; ErikGeijer (SLU/CERE), Christian Lundström and Tomas Raattamaa, for our late night sessions which undoubt-edly have yielded great contributions to the field of economics and basically every other aspect of humanlife. I have especially appreciated the collaboration with Tomas Raattamaa on one of the included papers,with a constantly increasing rate of return over time. He has also been an excellent sounding board for manyperipheral issues and he has always contributed generously with his time and knowledge at all hours of theday.

All of you, and many others, deserve a great deal of recognition for your part in the completion of thisthesis, and as always – any errors are my own.

Stockholm, October 2014Morgan

This thesis consists of an introductory chapter and the following papers on temporary work agencies and theeconomic analysis of law:

[I] Westéus, M. & Raattamaa, T., (2014), “The Misaligned Incentives of Temporary Work Agenciesand their Client Firms”, Umeå Economic Studies, No. 896.

[II] Westéus, M. & Lindgren, U., (2014), “Young Adults in the Swedish Temporary Agency Sector:Implications of Family Experience”, Umeå Economic Studies, No. 888 (revised).

[III] Westéus, M., (2014), “Employment Effects of the EU Temporary and Agency Workers Directivein Sweden”, Umeå Economic Studies, No. 887 (revised).

[IV] Westéus, M., (2013), “Settlement Probability Asymmetries in the Swedish Labour Court”, Euro-pean Journal of Law and Economics, (forthcoming).

Paper [IV] is reproduced with permission from Springer Science+Business Media New York, European Journalof Law and Economics.

“Essentially, all models are wrong, but some are useful”

Box & Draper (1987, p. 424)

“Everything should be made as simple as possible, but no simpler”Paraphrased from “It can scarcely be denied that the supreme goal of all theory is to make the irreducible

basic elements as simple and as few as possible without having to surrender the adequate representation of asingle datum of experience”. Einstein (1934, p. 165)

1 IntroductionLabour and capital are the two essential inputs in most production processes, and how to allocate labourconstitute one of the fundamental fields in economics. In an influential paper, Atkinson (1984) defined the dif-ferent types of workforce flexibility that constitute the Flexible Firm: numerical flexibility (both internal andexternal), functional flexibility, and financial flexibility. However, as financial flexibility could be impeded bycollectively negotiated wage agreements that stretch over several years, the employer may primarily respondto changes in the demand for the produced goods through either functional and/or numerical flexibility.

The former type of flexibility implies that the employer should be able to continuously reassign workers totheir (marginally) most productive position, and the scope for functional flexibility is arguably quite extensivein Sweden (cf. Section 4.1). The latter flexibility type suggests that the workforce should be partitionedinto a core of skilled and motivated workers on long-term contracts that are central to the firm’s production,while keeping a separate buffer of peripheral workers at different levels of commitment to the firm1.

Swedish employers in search of numerical flexibility were in the past required to use external independentcontractors, part-time contracts, and/or workers hired on either probationary or fixed-term employmentagreements. The introduction of temporary work agencies (TWAs) has created additional possibilities for anemployer wanting to obtain numerical flexibility (and arguably also some additional financial flexibility).

Whether employers actually adhere to the Flexible Firm theory and consciously utilise core-peripherallabour management strategies has been both debated and criticised (see e.g. Kalleberg, 2001). Other studieshave also identified and emphasised several adverse effects from the use of similar flexibility strategies, andeven challenged their alleged cost-effectiveness – especially with regard to the use of workers supplied througha TWA (see e.g. Nollen, 1996; Gibelman, 2005; Forde & Slater, 2005; Thommes & Weiland, 2010; Håkansson& Isidorsson, 2012; Walter, 2012).

The first three articles of this thesis add to the literature on TWAs. The analysis focuses on the potentiallyhidden costs associated with their incentive structure relative to their client firms (CFs), the composition oftheir workforce, and the effects from mitigating one of their comparative advantages: the wage paid to theTWA worker. The fourth article analyses the settlement behaviour in the Swedish Labour Court, particularlywhether the settlement probability differs depending on the legal representation of the parties. Articles threeand four directly apply economic methods to the study of how law, and the change in law, affects economicagents. Law constitutes an intuitive area of economic analysis as most economic issues are subjected toseveral institutional constraints2.

1This is sometimes also referred to as the core-periphery model (cf. also to Handy’s, 1989, shamrock organization). Theseworkers generally experience lower autonomy and lower employment protection (Kalleberg, 2001; However, cf. also Van Dyne& Ang, 1998, and Allvin et al., 2003).

2Indeed, Mackaay (2000, p. 89) states that “[e]conomic regulation denotes legal restraints upon market actors’ behaviour”.

1

Furthermore, as new technologies evolve and economic agents find new uses for old products, new marketsare continuously created. On this note, Mackaay (2000), referencing Heiner (1983), argues that althoughfixed rules might be both optimal and help facilitate the interaction between economic agents by allowingpredictability at the time of their formation, the same permanence may also entail a sub-optimal result ata future point in time. The inherent dynamics of the economic systems thereby also require the law to becontinuously evolving as well.

The notion in the introductory quotes by Box & Draper (1987) and Einstein (1934) captures an impor-tant inherent issue whenever modelling complex issues, such as legal analysis (with its traditional focus onthe individual case study where the devil is often in the details), using economic methods (i.e. based onassumption on the relative level of information, costs and rationality of the involved agents; see e.g. Heiner,1983)3. Following Einstein (1934), the necessity of adding an additional component to a model should beevaluated according to whether the marginal benefit of the inclusion outweighs its marginal cost. The notioncarried by Box & Draper (1987) thereby becomes its logic consequence, and the results should always beinterpreted with the underlying model and evaluation criteria in mind.

The introductory chapter of this thesis initially aims to provide a background to the evolution of theSwedish Model of regulating the labour market, and thereafter the emergence of the Swedish TWA sector.The following sections contain a brief summary of the sector’s main characteristics – primarily based onresults from European studies. It also reviews the stated rationales for working in the sector, and why CFsutilise TWAs to either find matches to vacancies or to continuously lease workers.

The subsequent section focuses on the later aspect and discusses what liabilities the CF may be able tohedge by renting labour from an external agent – as the CF thereby, either directly or indirectly, utilise theTWA as a type of redundancy insurance. This is used as a segue into the settlement behaviour of differenttypes of representation in the Swedish labour court analysed in paper four. The introductory chapter isthereafter concluded with a summary of the included articles.

2 The Swedish Model of Labour Market RelationsFollowing in the wake of the early stages of liberalisation and industrialisation in Sweden, the nineteenthcentury saw a large number of work stoppages, lockouts, and threats of such actions. The employmentagreement was at that time negotiated between the employer and the individual worker, which often put theindividual at a significant disadvantage, and the workers realised the need to collectively organise in order toform a counterweight towards the employer.

The first labour unions were formed in the 1870s, and in 1898 four organisations joined together in thenational Swedish Trade Union Confederation (Landsorganisationen, LO). The employers formed the SwedishEmployers Association (Svenska Arbetsgivareföreningen, SAF) four years later and the first national collectiveagreements were negotiated in the early 1900s (e.g. verkstadsavtalet, 1905)4.

The negotiated agreement in 1906 is an important milestone where SAF and LO, in what has beenknown as the December compromise, reached an agreement that among other provisions established twocentral aspects of what has become known as the employer prerogative (also referred to as the employers 32§ authority): the right to manage and employment at will. The labour unions conversely obtained the rightto organise and collectively bargain over wages and working conditions (Glavå, 2011; Andersson et al., 2013).

The function and status of the collective agreement, as well as a general right of negotiation and association(mainly applicable for white-collar workers), was established by law in 1928 and 1936 respectively. Eventhough Numhauser-Henning (2001) suggests that this was mostly a legislation of an already established codeof conduct between the labour market parties, it still established the main rules necessary for continuouslyregulating the labour market through treaties and other (collective) agreements (Glavå, 2011).

3See e.g. Miceli (2009) for a discussion of some of the critiques of economic analysis of law.4See Eklund in Schmidt et al. (1997) and Nycander (2008) for an overview of the political climate and the ties between the

political parties and the labour market parties during the emergence and evolution of the Swedish model and the wage formationprocess. For an economic perspective see e.g. Anxo & Niklasson (2006) or Fregert & Jonung (2010). Delsen & van Veen (1992)and Elvander (2002) provide a comparative view.

2

Thereafter when the Swedish government initiated public investigations and pressed the labour marketparties to limit collective actions under the threat that the labour market would otherwise be regulated bylaw, the parties chose to sign the Saltsjöbaden agreement in December of 1938. This was the first principaltreaty (huvudavtal) on the labour market and facilitated (among other things) complements and adaptationsto the rules on collective action.

More importantly is that it showed that the labour market parties were willing to accept responsibilityand negotiate applicable rules and restrictions without interference or guidance by the government, whichthereby ushered a new era of cooperation and consensus (Numhauser-Henning, 2001; Sigeman, 2010; Glavå,2011; Andersson et al., 2013; Källström & Malmberg, 2013).

With some exceptions (see Glavå, 2011) the legislator refrained from additional interventions, and whathas become known as the spirit of Saltsjöbaden prevailed until the late 1960s. Arguably, the most importantissue from the viewpoint of this thesis was restricting the employer prerogative through the implementationof a limited employment protection in the April settlement in 1964 (a just-cause, see Section 4.2, requirementfor dismissal on personal reasons), and that the parties engaged in centralised wage negotiations (Glavå,2011, Andersson et al., 2013).

Both Sigeman (2008) and Glavå (2011) note that wage negotiations have become less centralised overtime, and that today negotiations are carried out on an industry level with minor local amendments andadaptations. A continuous negotiation process nevertheless makes the Nash bargaining solution (where theparties divide any surplus according to their relative bargaining power, see e.g. Binmore et al., 1986) anintuitive choice for the (collective) wage formation process in paper [III]. It is also reasonable to attributeany real bargaining power to the collective of workers rather than the individual worker in most cases.

The somewhat laissez faire attitude of the legislator changed in the 1970s following an increased demandfor democratising the workplace and facilitating a higher degree of employee influence. This led to that morerestrictions of the employer prerogative became codified through the Employment (Co-Determination in theWorkplace) Act (SFS 1976:580, cit CWA), and the first Employment Protection Act (SFS 1974:12, followedby the current SFS 1982:80; cit EPA).

The CWA provides the signing labour union (and to a lesser extent the minority unions) the right toinformation and continuous negotiations. It also allows the signing union the mandate to interpret theworkers scope of employment, and even in some instances to veto the decisions by the employer (see e.g.38-39 §§ CWA). Even though having been continuously weakened over time, the EPA ended the notion ofemployment at will by introducing a legislated just-cause requirement for the employer to unilaterally end theemployment. It also introduced an associated seniority principle, as well as adding provisions for fixed-termemployment and re-hire clauses (Glavå, 2011)5.

However, the legislator did not abandon the established procedural order and allowed the labour marketparties to deviate from some of these provisions through a centrally negotiated collective agreement (seee.g. 4 § CWA and 2 § EPA). Sweden’s membership in ESS, and later the EG/EU, has required Swedento implement some directives through legislation while at the same time often utilising similar deviationsthrough collective agreements, when applicable, in order to maintain the Swedish model.

The flexibility obtained through a central agreement with local addendums is suggested to not only safe-guard the interest of the exposed worker but also gain legitimacy as the decisions are allowed to take localconditions into consideration (Glavå, 2011)6.

The evolution of Swedish labour law has been argued by Glavå (2011) and Sigeman (2010) to constitutea series of infringements on the employment at will part of the employer prerogative – except for the rightto dismiss workers due to the lack of work-principle (Section 4.2) which has remained relatively unaltered.Glavå (2011) nevertheless also argues that the same provisions have in fact also strengthened the employer’sright to manage within the employer prerogative.

5Legislation requiring equal treatment of men and women in the workplace (SFS 1979:1118) further restricted parts of theprerogative. The current act (SFS 2008:567) prohibits discrimination due to gender, ethnicity, religious belief (or lack thereof),sexual orientation, transgender identity, disabilities and/or age. It applies to a wide range of situations related to the labourmarket; e.g. when hiring, managing or dismissing, but also with regard to promotion, wages, and fringe benefits.

6This is analogous to the argument that no central authority may accumulate and interpret the same amount of informationand complex relations as efficient as a continuously negotiating market.

3

The Swedish model today is characterised by (i) a high degree of organisation among both employers andemployees with a low degree of inter-organisational competition, and (ii) that just-cause is required for theemployer to unilaterally end the employment relationship, as well as (iii) a relatively high degree of autonomythrough contractual freedom with the collective agreement as the main regulatory and normative document.This implies that many issues, even though regulated by law, may be deviated from in a negotiated collectiveagreement.

Other notable features are (iv) the absence of legislated minimum wages, and that (v) collective agreementscannot be made generally applicable (allmängiltigförklaras) for an entire industry. (Numhauser-Henning,2001; Sigeman, 2010; Glavå, 2011) These characteristics constitute a base for the remainder of the introduc-tory chapter, as well as providing an important framework for the contained articles.

3 The Temporary Work Agency SectorThe Swedish state monopoly on employment mediation (enforced by the 1935 Employment Mediation Act;SFS 1935:113, with amendment SFS 1942:209 that explicitly prohibited the leasing of workers to anothercompany) was ended through two reforms in the wake of the economic downturn if the early 1990s.7 Sincethen the market for leasing workers to a CF through a TWA has grown considerably (Andersson-Joona &Wadensjö, 2010; Walter, 2012).

The first reform came through the first private mediation act (SFS 1991:746; enforced from Jan 1st 1992)which allowed temporary wok agencies by disassociating the leasing of workers to another employee from theconcept of mediated employment. There was nevertheless significant restrictions in that mediation requiredboth permission (awarded for a maximum of one year by the erstwhile Swedish National Labour MarketBoard; Arbetsmarknadsstyrelsen AMS), and stated that it couldn’t be conducted for profit – although themediator was allowed to charge some fees. There were also provisions stating that the activity should beacceptable from a broader labour marker perspective, and that the tasks should be of a temporary naturethat couldn’t stretch for more than a total of four months. (Prop. 1990/91:124)

The second reform came in 1993 (Prop. 1992/93:218), one year after Sweden had revoked their 1950ratification of ILO convention no. 96 (Fee-Charging Employment Agencies Convention, C096; through Prop.1991/92:89). The reform replaced the previous act and removed the need to obtain permission from AMS toprovide employment mediation services. It also allowed employment mediation to be conducted commercially,as well as removing the four month maximum duration requisite and the necessity of an underlying need fortemporary labour.

The mediating company however was prohibited from requesting, negotiating, contracting or accept-ing compensation from the individual worker. The rules regarding the CF’s obligation to negotiate (whenapplicable) with the labour union before utilising a TWA (38-40 §§ CWA) was also left intact.

The introduction of TWAs on the labour market created a tripartite arrangement by disassociating theworker from the employee-employer concept. The worker carries out tasks under the supervision and guidanceof the CF without being regarded as an employee of that CF (see also Spattini, 2012). The explicit employeris the TWA which thereby carries most of the associated labour law liabilities towards the worker. Therelationship between the CF and the TWA is based on the written contract and thereby regulated throughgeneral contract law statutes. The result could be that the leased TWA workers may work on terms thatdo not apply to the workers directly employed by the CF (unless a collective agreement between the labourunion and the CF includes specific provisions on the equal treatment of these two types of workers. However,see also Forde & Slater, 2005; Håkansson & Isidorsson, 2014).

The political opposition raised concerns about the hasty deregulation procedure, and they stated thatthere was a number of issues that had not been analysed in the proposition nor referenced to any precedingresearch. Specifically mentioned was the possibility of hollowing-out employment protection due to thetripartite arrangement, and the effects from any increased precariousness for the individual worker. Alsobrought up was the effects on the overall labour market dynamics; the impact on the matching and wageformation process, as well as the asserted efficiency gains in general. (Report 1992/93:AU16)

7See also Bergström et al. (2007), Berg (2008), Johnson (2010) and Walter (2012).

4

3.1 RationalesThe studies by Spermann (2011), Thommes & Weiland (2010), Tijdens et al. (2006) and ECORYS-NEI(2002) include surveys of a number of mainly European studies on both supply and demand side rationalesfor choosing labour supplied through a TWA8. CFs (demand side) state that their rationales are to recruitand screen workers both for open-ended and fixed-term contracts, and both for anticipated and unanticipatedincreases in production demand, (see also Den Reijer, 2007, and Pfeifer, 2005), and replace absent workersas well as increasing flexibility by supplementing and adding buffer capacity.

The above aspects correspond well to the flexibility aspects in Atkinson’s (1984) model. The first typesof rationales may be summarised into that a TWA is utilised for matching purposes when the supply of therequired labour is uncertain (see Milner & Pinker, 2001, for a theoretical approach), as well as acting asa type of insurance that allows for short-term flexibility (see Koene et al., 2004). Other rationales includestrategic cost-shifting in publicly traded companies and reducing human resource management costs.

Worker (supply side) motivations include hoping to increase the probability of finding a non-TWA job bybeing directly exposed to potential employers, while at the same time being a part of a flexible and dynamicenvironment through which they gain experience that could increase their overall employability. Other statedreasons are being able to better combine working life with leisure and also having a (complementary) sourceof income.

The supply side rationales could be summarised into two main categories: either the workers utilise TWAemployment as a stepping-stone into regular employment and/or as a source of income (i.e. accepting ratherthan choosing). Other workers view this type of employment as a way of combining a dynamic professionalworking life with their preferences for leisure activities (i.e. choosing rather than accepting).

3.2 MatchingPermitting private employment mediation was assumed to allow vacancies to be filled with the right workeras soon as possible and that the employer would regularly benefit from having a larger pool of candidates tochoose from (Report 1992/93:AU16). However, this is only true if candidates are defined as workers with atleast sufficient characteristics, and not the overall sample of applicants – as that could arguably increase thecost of identifying and sorting the subset of eligible workers.

It is nevertheless reasonable to assume that the TWAs role as a specialised labour market intermediaryallows it to benefit from technological advantages (such as specialised IT-systems, matching algorithms andclassification systems; Walter, 2005) and economies of scale (Hevenstone, 2008) in order to quickly match aworker to a vacant position.

The TWA could thereby be regarded as helping to reduce any information deficit in the coordinationbetween workers looking for employment and employers looking for workers. The notion of a relatively highmatching speed is also a recurring theme in the literature (Houseman, 2001; Autor, 2001 & 2003; Neugart &Storrie, 2002 & 2006; Den Reijer, 2007; De Graaf-Zijl & Berkhout, 2007; Mitlacher, 2007; Peck & Theodore,2007; Hevenstone, 2008; Baumann et al., 2011; Walter, 2012).

On the other hand, any possibility for the CF to capture nuances or unique qualities by continuouslyadapting the worker demand specification as a response to private information shared by the prospectiveworker during a personal interview could also be lost when outsourcing the recruitment process to an externalagent (cf. Walter, 2005 & 2012). What constitutes the right worker could also depend on what point of viewthat is taken: the TWA, the worker, or the CF – unless they all have equivalent incentives and/or goalfunctions (cf. to the problem of over-education and mismatched TWA workers in De Graaf-Zijl, 2012, andHåkansson, Isaksson & Strauss-Raats, 2013).

In paper [I] we outline a principal-agent model with asymmetric information and hidden action where aTWA is tasked by a CF to supply a worker with an exogenously determined (i.e. true) minimum productivityfor a vacancy that pays a certain wage. Our framework shows that the TWA most often will provide thefirst (random) match that fulfils the minimum productivity – regardless of any remaining time and resourcesavailable for carrying out additional searches.

8These rationales also correspond to those from the U.S. market (Houseman, 2001; Autor, 2001 & 2003). See also Gibelman(2005) or Forde & Slater (2005) for a review of both CF and worker rationales along with a critical discussion of the merits andpotential hidden costs of using temporary agency workers.

5

We argue that these differing incentives could be a sufficient requirement to allow for a quicker matchingprocedure. However, we also show that the TWA may sometimes even have incentives to actively search for,and supply, the worker with the lowest (although still sufficient) productivity.

This type of search behaviour is furthermore not necessarily inconsistent with a desire to secure repeatedbusiness (see e.g. Neugart & Storrie, 2002), since it implies that a sufficient worker is indeed suppliedwhenever a match is found. The match is therefore, by definition, not a bad match per se and should nothave a negative effect on their reputation, especially if the CF is unable to assess the matched worker’srelative productivity due to that they have little to no information on the foregone alternatives (i.e. theproductivity distribution of the remaining workers in the sample).

Studies based on data from the late 1990s and early 2000s have found that workers in the Swedishtemporary agency sector were often from groups that traditionally held a more marginal position on thelabour market: youths, women, less educated people and immigrants (Andersson-Joona & Wadensjö, 2008,2010; cf. also Forde & Slater, 2005). More recent studies however suggest an increased use of more skilledworkers within the sector (Andersson-Joona & Wadensjö, 2012; Petersson, 2013; cf. also Tijdens et al., 2006)

Although not being its primary purpose, the results in Paper [II] similarly suggests that the educationlevel among young adults in the Swedish temporary agency sector in 2007 has increased compared to theestimates for the entire sector in 1999 (Andersson-Joona & Wadensjö, 2008). Moreover, we also find thatwithin our sample of young adults there are now more men than women employed by TWAs.

Paper [I] discusses the possibility that the increased education level could be demand side driven due tothe CFs exaggerating their worker demand profile in order to compensate for any differing search-incentivesbetween them and the TWA. Walter (2012) offers a (complementary) supply side explanation by suggestingthat supplying (too) highly educated personnel could be a consequence of the TWA’s need to continuouslyemphasise their superior matching ability.

3.3 CharacteristicsIn their survey of the relatively scarce literature on temporary agency workers’ physical work environmentand work-related injuries, Håkansson, Isaksson & Strauss-Raats (2013) found that temporary agency workersperform riskier tasks and experience poorer working conditions than other types of employees (cf. Tijdenset al., 2006; MacEachen et al., 2012). Fabiano et al. (2008) find similar differences with regard to workingconditions for Italian TWA workers who suffer more work-related injuries which also causes them to be absentfrom work for longer periods of time.

Håkansson, Isaksson & Strauss-Raats (2013) also concluded that temporary agency workers often receivean insufficient amount of training, safety information, and work place introduction at the CF. There are twomain reasons mentioned: unclear responsibilities between the TWA and the CF for such education, and thatthe imminent and/or short-term demand for a worker might not leave sufficient time for similar informationand training.

The theory of compensating wage differentials (see e.g. Rosen, 1986) suggests that workers will acceptnegative aspects in their occupation and work environment if they perceive that they are being compensatedwithin other areas (usually wages). However, a number of European studies on the wage differentials betweenTWA workers and those employed directly by the CF find that there is a significant wage penalty for workerswithin the TWA sector (Forde & Slater, 2005; Tijdens et al., 2006; Böheim & Cardoso, 2009; Jahn, 2010;Andersson-Joona & Wadensjö, 2010, 2012; Jahn & Pozzoli, 2013). Most of the studies also find that thewage differences have been growing over time and cannot be fully explained by controlling for personalcharacteristics. There is also research suggesting that these differences exist even in the presence of nationalstatutes compelling non-discrimination of TWA workers with regard to wages (Nienhüser & Matiaske, 2006;see also Jahn & Bentzen, 2012).

Therefore as TWA workers may be required to suffer even a negative wage difference, one factor thatmay possibly account for why an individual would choose TWA work, apart from being compelled to do sofor pressing financial reasons or a lack of other options, is the view that temporary agency work serves as astepping-stone into regular employment (ECORYS-NEI, 2002, Tijdens et al., 2006; and Spermann, 2011)9.

9See also the agency sector dynamics in Neugart & Storrie (2002, 2006), and Baumann et al. (2011). Connell & Burgess(2002) similarly found that temporary agency workers will leave the current assignment if they are offered a better deal elsewhere,even if it too is temporary

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Amuedo-Dorantes, Malo & Muñoz-Bullón (2008) argue that the probability of transitioning into employ-ment directly at the CF is conditional on (or at the very least indicative of) the CF’s underlying rationalefor utilising this type of flexible labour. If the main rationale is to save on variable labour costs the CF mayvery well continuously maintain a pool of temporary agency workers indefinitely.

Forde & Slater (2005) similarly caution that as either entire operations or specific types of jobs are sub-contracted to TWAs (instead of being carried out side-by-side with direct-hire employees), the temporaryagency workers’ accumulation of CF-specific capital will also be reduced as compared to the direct-hires (seealso Håkansson & Isidorsson, 2012). This could arguably reduce the probability that the temporary agencyworker will transition into employment directly at the CF. However, if hiring a temporary agency workeris seen as a way for the CF to screen a candidate before offering a more typical type of employment, thentemporary agency employment might indeed be a stepping-stone into a more sought after employment role.

Whether or not different types of temporary employment actually has an effect on the transition proba-bility into regular employment has been surveyed by Zijl and van Leeuwen (2005) who established that thereare considerable differences between the European countries. They concluded that there seems to be a strongpositive effect on the transition probability in some parts of Italy. However, one of the referenced studies(Ichino et al., 2005) note that the positive effect from temporary agency work is conditional on the referencegroup including both atypically employed workers and unemployed individuals, and that the effect disappearswhen only comparing temporary agency workers to other workers on atypical contracts. It is therefore notcertain that temporary agency work has a more pronounced stepping-stone effect compared to other typesof non-standard employment in Italy.

Results based on data for the Netherlands show a strong positive effect on the transition probability fromhaving temporary employment. A recent study by de Graaf-Zijl, Van den Berg & Heyma (2011) found thatDutch temporary workers (incl. temporary agency workers) have a slightly lower initial transition rate thanunemployed workers, but that the transition rate increases over time. They also found that ethnic minoritiesbenefit more than natives from temporary employment (cf. the surveyed studies in Tijdens et al., 2006).The authors suggest that larger personal networks or the accumulation of human capital might be the reasonbehind the increased transition rate.

The surveyed results in Zijl & van Leeuwen (2005) suggest a strong negative effect for the sample of severaltypes of temporary workers in Spain (cf. García-Pérez & Muñoz Bullón, 2011, who found that tenure increasesthe transition probability for young workers, but also that repeated spells of temporary employment reducesit). Amuedo-Dorantes, Malo & Muñoz-Bullón (2008) even found that Spanish temporary agency workershave a lower likelihood of becoming hired on a permanent basis than similar direct-hire temporary workers.Similarly, while Zijl and van Leeuwen (2005) reported a moderate positive effect from temporary employmentin Germany, more recent studies that target temporary agency work specifically (surveyed in Spermann, 2011)found either no evidence of a positive effect, or only so for the long-term unemployed10.

In a Scandinavian setting, Jahn & Rosholm (2010) found a significant positive effect from temporaryagency work in Denmark, especially for first- and second generation non-western immigrants and less educatedworkers. In the few available studies of the Swedish TWA sector, Andersson & Wadensjö (2004) found (weak)statistical evidence of a stepping-stone effect for workers with a specific type of immigration background.However, Hveem (2013) found a negative effect on the probability of obtaining a regular job if starting towork for a TWA compared to remaining unemployed (but not so for non-western immigrants).11

It should be noted that both Andersson & Wadensjö (2004) and Hveem (2013) estimate the stepping-stoneeffect from TWA employment at the turn of the millennia. At that time the composition of the workers in theTWA sector was disproportionally comprised of youths, immigrants, less educated individuals and women(Andersson-Joona & Wadensjö, 2008).

10The different results for temporary agency workers and other types of atypical employees further strengthen the notion thatnot all non-standard work arrangements share the same traits and impacts on the worker (De Cuyper et al., 2009. However cf.also De Witte & Näswall, 2003)

11In comparison, Liljeberg et al. (2010) found an internal stepping-stone effect for fixed-term employees hired directly at the(client) firm in Sweden.

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Since then, Andersson-Joona & Wadensjö (2012) found that the negative wage differential between workersin the agency sector compared to other workers has been growing. This has occurred during the same timethat paper [II] suggests that there has been a change in the composition of the TWA workforce to includesignificantly more men and also individuals with a higher education level (cf. also Petersson, 2013). To myknowledge, there is unfortunately no research on any associated changes in the transition rate.

The psychological impact and subjective perception of atypical employment is however not merely basedon differences in wages, working conditions and the possibility to transition out of the sector. Rather, thoseaspects are theorised to be the result of the workers’ prior expectations and the realised outcome. Differencestherein could constitute a breach of what is referred to in the literature as a psychological contract (seee.g. Rousseau, 1989; Isaksson et al., 2003; Guest, 2004) that a worker implicitly forms with the employerregarding the job’s expected characteristics.

Data from Statistics Sweden suggests that over half of the Swedish TWA workers (private sector, 1st qtr.2014) are employed on what is defined as an open-ended contract. However the subjectively perceived levelof precariousness is not necessarily determined by the underlying type of employment either. Employmentprotection in Sweden in some aspects is stricter for fixed-term employees compared to open-ended employees(Källström & Malmberg, 2013), each assignment at a CF is still (relatively) temporary (see also Forde &Slater, 2005; Spattini, 2012) and lack of work constitutes a just-cause to end an open-ended employment inSweden (Glavå, 2011).

The relatively short duration aspect could potentially be quite strenuous in of itself, regardless of anunderlying open-ended contract with the TWA, as it requires the individual to continuously adapt to newenvironments and co-workers (see the concept of job strain vs. employment uncertainty as a stressor inLewchuk et al., 2003). It could arguably also negatively affect the development of intra-workplace socialconnections, while at the same time facilitating a wider inter-workplace network. Both of these aspects couldinfluence the job satisfaction and productivity of the worker (cf. the arguments in Gibelman, 2005, andBöheim & Cardoso, 2009).

Håkansson, Isaksson & Strauss-Raats (2013) also surveyed the literature on the psychosocial environmentof temporary agency workers and found clear evidence that temporary agency workers experience significantlyless employment protection and employability (cf. Forde & Slater, 2005). Temporary agency workers arealso found to be utilised primarily in jobs with either low expectations and low self-monitoring, or withhigh expectations and low self-monitoring (the authors use the terms passive and tense jobs to refer to therespective job types), as well as in jobs with a relatively high degree of repetitiveness.

They similarly concluded that temporary agency workers experience the lowest degree of autonomy (com-pared to fixed-term, open-ended, probationary and on-call workers), exhibit the highest incidences of feelingdepressed (significantly more often than open-ended and on-call workers), and the lowest degree of overall jobsatisfaction (cf. Wilkin, 2013). The stress experienced by temporary agency workers is found to be alleviatedthrough feeling supported socially. However, the surveyed studies also suggest that the TWA may not befulfilling its expected role in this aspect either (cf. Kantelius, 2010).

It should be noted that temporary (agency) work is not necessarily experienced as something inevitablynegative for all workers. Some individuals actively chose different types of temporary or agency employmentdue to their personal preferences (Loughlin & Barling, 1999; ECORYS-NEI, 2002; Guest, 2004; Tijdens etal., 2006). European temporary agency workers overall are e.g. seemingly quite happy with their workinghours – with some of the surveyed studies in Håkansson, Isaksson & Strauss-Raats (2013) even suggestingthat better control over working hours was a key rationale for choosing temporary agency work over the moreregular types of employment.

Rogers (2000), De Cuyper & De Witte (2007), and De Cuyper et al. (2008) noted that factors suchas culture, norms and individual expectations could influence the subjective perception of the individualworker and potentially mitigate some of the negative aspects (relating to the aforementioned literature onpsychological contracts). Similarly, Koene et al. (2004) highlighted the importance of what they refer toas sociocultural dynamics; i.e. changes in attitudes, practices and national normative (work-related) values,when discussing the evolution of temporary agency work throughout Europe.

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That TWA workers are heterogeneous with respect to skills and preferences (cf. Wilkin, 2013), and alsotoward other atypical employees (De Cuyper et al., 2009. However cf. also De Witte & Näswall, 2003) impliesthat some caution should be taken when making generalisations. Håkansson, Isaksson & Strauss-Raats (2013)nevertheless concluded that the psychosocial work environment for temporary agency workers is generallyworse-off than for other types of atypical workers – even on-call workers.

Job content and the matching of the worker’s skills to the work tasks12 are especially important factorsfor reducing the strain on the worker, as well as the worker having a feeling of integration and support in theworkplace (cf. Forde & Slater, 2005; Salvatori, 2009; Håkansson & Isidorsson, 2014). The surveyed literaturefurther suggests that the sector does indeed share many of the traits that are regularly associated with aprecarious job situation for the worker (see Sverke et al., 2004).

The results in Paper [II] show that, irrespective of the surveyed negative aspects and adverse workingconditions, the Swedish TWA sector has a strong over-representation of workers with parents, siblings and/orpartners that have had previous experience of working in the sector. We suggest some different rationales forthese results, but the theory of compensating wage differentials suggests that working for a TWA is at thevery least still preferable to remaining unemployed (cf. Skans et al., 2004), and that each possible recruitmentchannel is utilised to exit unemployment.

These results follow the previous findings that family and other reference groups do not only constitute oneof the main recruitment channels (irrespective of contract type: fixed-term or open-ended), but will also havean impact on the outcome and career development of their younger peers due to their conveyed labour marketexperience (Dickinson & Emler, 1992; Penick & Jepsen, 1992; Young & Friesen, 1992; Morningstar, 1997;Barling el al., 1998; Loughlin & Barling, 2001; Whinston & Keller, 2004; Greg et al., 2012; Haisken-DeNew& Kind, 2012).

With regard to the negative wage difference for the workers in the TWA sector, and following the har-monised legislation for other exposed groups on the European labour market, the EU Temporary and AgencyWorkers Directive (2008/104/EC)13 was enacted on November 19th 2008. The directive was implementedinto Swedish law (through SFS 2012:854) on January 1st 2013. The directive emphasises the exposed positionof the TWA worker (Article 2 of the directive; see also Böheim & Cardoso, 2009, and Spattini, 2012) andimplements a principle of equal treatment – implying that not only the wage, but also other working- andemployment conditions, should correspond to those of a comparable worker employed directly at the CF.

The Swedish implementation of the directive utilises the provision to make exemptions from the principleof equal treatment through collective agreement (Article 5.3, and for workers on open-ended contracts that arereceiving wages between assignments; Article 5.214). Exemptions are however only allowed through collectiveagreements as long as it does not deteriorate the overall level of protection for the worker intended by thedirective (SOU 2011:5). Collective agreements also have both a normative effect on the rest of the labourmarket and are even deemed applicable when only the CF has a valid collective agreement (SOU 2011:5).In Paper [III] I therefore argue that the wage determination in the two largest collective agreements15 andtheir extensive coverage (together with associated substitute agreements; hängavtal) differ sufficiently fromthe wage setting of TWA workers in previous studies (Neugart & Storrie, 2006; Baumann et al. 2011)16 tomodel the theoretical effects of an implied principle of equal treatment with regard to wages.

12Cf. to the results and discussion in Paper [I] and Paper [II]. See also the issue of over-education in De Graaf-Zijl, 2012, andPetersson, 2013.

13See Spattini (2012) for an extensive review of the content of the directive and a comparative analysis of temporary agencywork characteristics throughout Europe.

14This exemption only applies to the nominal wage and not the real wage. The exemption is motivated by that it is considereda legislated minimum wage that does not belong in the Swedish model, but also that it should convince more workers to organisein labour unions (SOU 2011:5). The authors do however raise some concerns with the sufficiency of the Swedish implementationwith regard to the exemptions when neither the TWA, nor the CF, have a collective agreement. This view is also shared byMalmberg (2010).

15The blue-collar (LO; 2012-2015) collective agreement states that the wage paid to the TWA worker should correspondto the average compensation for similar work at the CF, including performance pay, piece work pay, bonuses and provisions.The white-collar (Unionen/SSR; 2013-2016) collective agreement requires individual and differentiated wages that are to benegotiated in the same manner as elsewhere on the Swedish labour market. Both agreements contain minimum wages paid toworkers currently not assigned to a CF. There are also some more specialised collective agreements, e.g. in the healthcare sectorand for journalists.

16These two studies assume that the TWA may unilaterally determine the wage paid to the temporary agency worker. Thewage is therefore set so that the worker becomes indifferent between being either unemployed, kept on retention, or being leasedto a CF.

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The results correspond to the review in Thommes & Weiland (2010) which stated that even though amajority of CFs, prior to a reform in Germany in 2004, indicated that even a marginal increase in the wagespaid to TWA workers would make the use of TWAs unprofitable, the sector nevertheless continued to growextensively following the reform’s implementation of an equal wages-regime17.

A history of poor compliance of similar national statutes in Europe, that were implemented prior to thedirective and also requiring analogous non-discriminatory practises, further suggests that the real effects onTWA workers’ wages might be limited (Nienhüser & Matiaske, 2006) – especially since the labour marketparties, which mainly monitor the compliance of the directive in Sweden, requested that exemptions were tobe allowed (SOU 2011:5, cf. Jahn, 2010).

3.4 The Relative Cost and Insurance AspectThe previously reviewed studies show temporary agency workers’ wages to be significantly lower than thewages paid to similar workers outside of the sector. However, the wage is only of indirect concern for theCF (apart from the argument of strategic cost shifting in Spermann, 2011; from fixed labour costs to flexiblecapital costs). The main issue is rather the fee charged by the TWA for finding and leasing the worker relativeto the cost that the CF would have to incur if it had done the recruitment through another channel. Severalauthors have noted this and also questioned the perceived cost-effectiveness of utilising TWAs (e.g. Nollen,1996; Kalleberg, 2000; Gibelman, 2005; Thommes & Weiland, 2010).

When a CF is leasing a worker, the TWA assumes the role as the de facto employer and thereby assumesmost of the uncertainties and liabilities associated with the contingent need for the worker (cf. Forde &Slater, 2005). Consequently, it serves much the same purpose as redundancy insurance for the CF if thedemand for the produced goods would decline and the services of the worker would become redundant. Theutilisation of TWAs has correspondingly also been shown to closely follow the business cycle (Tijdens et al.,2006; De Graaf-Zijl & Berkhout, 2007; Den Reijer, 2007; Antoni & Jahn, 2009; Spermann, 2011; Jahn &Bentzen, 2012). Neugart and Storrie (2002, 2006) and Baumann et al. (2011) also captured the insuranceaspect in the way that they model the temporary agency market and their determination of the fee paid tothe TWA.

However, as data on the size and structure of the fee are unfortunately not readily available, the existenceof an assumed efficient price must rely on a qualitative analysis of the three main comparative advantagesthat the TWA might have relative to the CF (not including the possibility of paying lower relative wages);lower search costs, a more advanced matching technology, and reduced severance liabilities.

It is reasonable to assume that while having a vacancy the search-cost is lower for the TWA than the CFas the former arguably does not suffer foregone production to the same extent. The product of the TWAis the created match – regardless of whether the worker is to be continuously leased to the CF or merelymatched before being employed directly by the CF, which only implies a difference w.r.t. the implied paymentscheme. The TWA may as previously mentioned also invest in specialised software to keep databases withpotential candidates, utilise specific and recurring advertisement channels, and streamline the recruitmentprocess workflow which help to keep average costs low (Hevenstone, 2008).

With regard to alleviating the information deficit between firms with vacant positions, unemployed work-ers, workers kept on retention by the TWA, and already employed workers looking for a new opportunity,the TWA fills a similar role as the Swedish Public Employment Service (Arbetsförmedlingen; cit SPES).The costs and benefits of utilising a TWA to find a match must thereby arguably be seen in relation tothe alternative of recruiting through the SPES which offers similar services for free. These services include,but are not limited to: advertising a vacant position (which in many instances will also show up in theTWAs’ vacancy databases), active matching by professional recruiters, recruitment events, and access to thecandidate database as well as providing the client access to information, screening tools and forecasts.

17Other studies on the sector’s response to policy changes found that more liberal labour market policies increased the use oftemporary workers (incl. temporary agency workers) in Canada (MacPhail & Bowles, 2008). However, Jahn & Bentzen (2012)argued that liberalisation of the rules regulating the TWA sector have on the contrary not been responsible for the sector’sgrowth in Germany.

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The SPES arguably has the most comprehensive sample of unemployed workers as a requirement forobtaining unemployment benefits, and some types of social security benefits, is having to be registered withthe SPES while also actively applying for jobs. However, the TWAs could potentially have an advantage inthat those who already have a job might not be registered with the SPES to the same extent that they haveregistered with other intermediaries while performing on-the-job search.

Unlike the SPES, the TWA may furthermore choose to specialise and mainly offer a certain type of worker(within construction, IT, cleaning, etc.). Candidates could thereby self-select with the employment mediatorthat most closely corresponds to their characteristics and preferences. The business interest of the TWAfurther incentivises their recruiters to more actively create matches and may even offer a screened applicanta different position than what was originally applied for. Arguably, this effect may not be as prominentat the SPES where the responsibility of finding and applying for a job is regarded to be the responsibilityof the individual prospective worker (although the SPES do offer similar services). These differences couldpotentially also correspond to a superior matching technology.

However, as highlighted in paper [I], the business interest could also entail some negative aspects forthe CF with regard to the type of worker that is matched (cf. also Walter, 2012). Furthermore, any costeffectiveness in creating a match does not in itself justify the CF’s subsequent decision to continuously rentthe worker from the TWA. Given that TWAs would be considered to produce better (and not just quicker)matches than other recruitment channels this decision is especially noteworthy.

Basic economic theory states that the CF will only continuously lease the worker if the expected benefitfrom this arrangement is deemed at least as profitable as employing the worker directly. This implies that theCF must consider not only the cost and the probability of being able to make match, but also the associatedliabilities of employing the worker directly and then risk being stuck with unproductive labour or having topay severance payments (corresponding to the dynamics in Neugart & Storrie, 2002 & 2006; Baumann et al.,2011). The demand for the services of a TWA (especially to continuously lease the worker) must thereforebe seen in relation to the other possibilities of achieving flexibility that are available for the CF.

Based on the concepts of functional and numerical flexibility in Atkinson (1984), the final part of thisintroductory chapter contains a non-exhaustive review of the main provisions in the Swedish EPA (SFS1982:80) concerning the employer’s ability to meet changes in the demand for its produced goods or services18

and the associated liability structure.This provides a hint of the comparative advantages that a TWA could have relative to CFs by emphasising

instances when the EPA allows for negotiated deviations and adaptations through a collective agreement19.I also discuss the economic risks carried by any firm when utilising certain types of employment contractswhich serves as segue into paper [IV] and the rationales of pursuing settlements rather than seeking a courtverdict when disputes arise.

4 Flexibility and Liabilities4.1 Functional FlexibilityThe delimitation of a worker’s obligation towards the employer is regulated by what has come to be knownas the 29/29 principle (referencing to verdict no 29 in the Swedish Labour Court, Arbetsdomstolen; cit AD,in the year 1929; i.e. AD 1929 no 29). Since then the principle has been upheld in a number of subsequentverdicts through which its scope and restrictions has been defined (see e.g. AD 1978 no 89, AD 1980 no 51,AD 1993 no 160, AD 1998 no 39, AD 2008 no 40 and AD 2010 no 51).

A worker in Sweden is in summary generally obliged, within the applicable collective agreement area andin reciprocity of the wage, to carry out any task within the employer’s natural scope of business for whichthe worker is qualified (Andersson et al., 2013; Glavå, 2011). A written job description thereby only weaklylimits an employee’s obligations towards the employer (see AD 2002 no 134).

18It is also possible that the employer wants to either change the orientation or scope of the business – or even discontinue allproduction.

19See e.g. 2 § EPA which allows deviations with regard to the types of fixed-term employment and terms for the probationaryemployment, dismissal priority principles, re-hire agreements, when to give due-notice etc. This follows Håkansson & Isidorsson(2014) in that labour unions could allow the use of TWAs to protect their members with more standard types of direct-hirecontracts with the CF (see also Nollen, 1996; Erickcek et al., 2002; Jahn, 2010; Thommes & Weiland, 2010).

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The principle, originating in the employer prerogative, constitutes a hidden and implicit clause withinevery collective agreement (unless explicitly stated otherwise, see AD 1933 no 159, AD 1986 no 127). Althoughnot explicitly included in any codified law, it is also regarded as a core legal principle (rättsgrundsats) inSwedish labour law (see AD 1930 no 52, and AD 1932 no 100). This allows the principle to be applicable evenif the affected worker is not a member of the labour union with whom the employer has signed a collectiveagreement (AD 2003 no 20).

The interpretation of the principle is more restrictive for white collar workers than blue collar workers(AD 1983 no 174, 1995 no 31), and even more so for public servants (AD 1980 no 51, AD 1995 no 101).There is however a trend in that the obligation for public servants approaches that of white collar workers(AD 2002 no 134).

The scope is also limited in that it cannot be discriminatory (see the Swedish Discrimination Act, SFS2008:567), and cannot fundamentally alter the employment agreement in such a way that it constitutes acompletely new employment altogether (Källström & Malmberg, 2013; see also AD 2000 no 76). It alsocannot put the worker’s life and/or health at risk, or be impossible to carry out.

This establishes a rather far-reaching obligation for the worker to perform a large range of services for theemployer – even outside of the written job description. The employer thereby has a correspondingly largedegree of discretion on how to utilise the employees if there would be an unexpected change in demand for theproduced goods or services. Källström and Malmberg (2013) summarises the overall notion well by statingthat just because a worker has committed themself to carry out some specific task does not give him/her theright to do so.

4.2 Numerical FlexibilityOther than reaching a mutual (often economic) agreement with the worker, the employer may unilaterallyend an employment agreement by either dismissing the worker (uppsägning; 7 § EPA), or terminating theagreement (avsked; 18 § EPA). Swedish labour law requires just-cause (7 § EPA) for both types – exceptin the case of probationary employment and with some restrictions for fixed-term contracts (both reviewedbelow).

Termination is always based on the former cause whereas a worker may be dismissed due to either cause.Termination regularly ends the relationship directly as a consequence of the employee grossly neglectinghis duties towards the employer and thereby does not require the aforementioned review of less interveningactions.

Just-cause relates to either personal reasons (personliga skäl) or the concept of lack of work (arbetsbrist)and also requires that the employer following a relocation investigation has not been able to offer anotherjob, adapting the workplace or help to increase the worker’s knowledge, skill or expertise (where applicableand within certain limits; Andersson et al., 2013).

Personal reasons relate to the individual worker and an array of factors interplay in the court’s verdict:e.g. misconduct, criminal actions, cooperation difficulties and/or insufficient knowledge, skill or expertise. Itis also important as to whether the behaviour is recurrent, and if the worker has been made aware of thatthe behaviour is not accepted. Other factors include the size of the firm, documentation, proportionality,and the worker’s position, seniority and prognosis. (Glavå, 2011)

Lack of work is regularly, but not limited to, cases where the employee is deemed redundant due to theemployer not having any tasks to be carried out. It also includes any other reason (i.e. reasons relating tothe employer prerogative to organise and manage the company: e.g. AD 1993 no 101, AD 1994 no 122) todismiss a worker that is not attributable to personal reasons.

The preparatory documents to the 1974 EPA (Prop. 1973:129) state that it regularly does not fall on theSwedish Labour Court to challenge the financial assessment of the firm when claiming lack of work20. Theemployer is nevertheless required to present a basis for the underlying changes that is not too arbitrary orwhich mainly rely on highly uncertain appraisals (AD 2006 no 92).

20This notion has since then been consistently reiterated and upheld by the Swedish Labour Court (e.g. AD 1984 no 26, AD1997 no 121, AD 2009 no 6, and AD 2009 no 7. See also Andersson et al. (2013) and Glavå (2011).

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A proper account of the factors that underlie the decision to reduce the number of employees may inprinciple not be challenged, and the employees are regarded as safeguarded primarily through the applicablestatues regulating due-notice periods (11 § EPA), dismissal priority principles (cf. seniority rules; 22 § EPA),and re-hire agreements (25-27 §§ EPA). (AD 1993 no 101)

The provisions in all of these statutes could however be adapted through a collective agreement (2 §EPA).This implies a relatively large scope of discretion for the employer to (re)arrange the organisation and itsstaff to fit the current and future needs of the firm (see Glavå, 2011, for an elaborated discussion on thesubject).

The dismissal notice period could thereby be seen as the soft liability of the firm as it defines a periodduring which the firm has an obligation to remunerate the worker, but cannot unconditionally expect thesame productivity. The worker is nevertheless expected to remain loyal to the employer and carry out theassigned tasks as the employment agreement persists during the entire dismissal notice period. (Glavå, 2011)The employer may however reduce these liabilities even further by choosing the appropriate employment typedepending on the underlying situation.

The probationary employment (6 § EPA) allows the employer to test the presumptive worker at theworkplace with the applicable tasks and colleagues during a pre-specified probationary period that normallycannot surpass six months. This allows the employer to assess the matched worker over several dimensionsboth work related and social.

A probationary employment nevertheless presupposes that such a need actually exists (cf. AD 1991no 40 to AD 1991 no 92). This employment type is characterised by its limited liability since a dismissaldoes not require just-cause, and the dismissal notice period is limited to two weeks unless stated otherwisein a collective agreement. However, if the probationary period is not ended prematurely, the employmentautomatically transitions to an open-ended employment.

The probationary period leaves both parties in a state of relative uncertainty as to the other party’sintention of fulfilment. However, the employer is arguably the superior risk bearer (Posner & Rosenfield,1977) through being able to reduce its risk of losing the worker by offering another employment type (e.g.a fixed-term employment) that guarantees the employer the services and productivity of the worker for theexpected duration of the contract.

Fixed-term employment (5 § EPA) in Sweden is a collective term for: general fixed-term employment,substitute employment, seasonal employment and special rules regarding the employment of older workers(>67 years), but a collective agreement could contain provisions for other types as well. The fixed-termcontract is often associated with the completion of some project, assignment or, similar to the probationaryemployment, with some pre-specified period of time. This employment type resembles a general contractwhere one party is compensated for carrying out a specific service for another party. The contract normallyends on the pre-determined date and there is usually no need for either party to give due notice.

The specific nature of the fixed-term contract generally precludes lack of work as a just cause, and eitherparty might be entitled to economic compensation if the other party wants to end the employment relationshipprematurely (Källström & Malmberg, 2013)21. This basically translates this employment type into a fixedcost for labour during a certain period.

The firm may also offer the same worker several sequential (or even non-sequential) fixed-term contractsover an extended period of time through which the associated liability is always bounded by the obligationto pay wages during the current assignment. The frequency which repeated fixed-term employment with thesame worker may be used by a firm has been reviewed both by the Swedish Labour Court and the EuropeanCourt of Justice (CURIA), and has seemingly been left to the discretion of the employer as long as someobjective reasons have been put forth22.

21It is possible to phrase the agreement so that both parties may end the employment prematurely following a notice period(see 11 § EPA, if nothing else has been negotiated) but also requires the employer to show just-cause. The notice periodmay however not stretch past the final date in the employment agreement which still limits the firm’s liability. (Källström &Malmberg, 2013)

22See e.g. AD 1984 no 66 and AD 2002 no 3 for the national perspective, and C-53/04 (Marrosu and Sardino v. AziendaOspedaliera Ospedale San Martino di Genova e Cliniche Universitarie Convenzionate), C-180/04 (Andrea Vassallo v. AziendaOspedaliera Ospedale San Martino di Genova e Cliniche Universitarie Convenzionate), C-212/04 (Konstantinos Adeneler andOthers v. Ellinikos Organismos Galaktos) or C-586/10 (Bianca Kücük v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen) for the perspective of theCURIA.

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A fixed-term employment automatically transitions into an open-ended employment if an employee hasworked for the same employer for a total of two years during the previous five years (5.2 § EPA, unless statedotherwise in a collective agreement; 2 § EPA, or other legislation). The transition rule is however interpretedas being type dependent, i.e. implying that a mix of e.g. general fixed-term employment and substituteemployment (where each type has a cumulated duration of less than two years) with the same employer doesnot trigger the transition rule. (Källström & Malmberg, 2013)

The open-ended employment constitutes the norm in Sweden (4 § EPA) and all employment contracts arepresumed to be of this type unless explicitly stated otherwise. It is potentially also associated with the highestrisk for the employer since the employment status remains intact for the duration of the conflict wheneveran employee challenges a dismissal decision as being invalid and calls for an annulment (34 § EPA)23. Theobligation for the employer to pay wages and for the employee to perform the assigned tasks thereby alsoremains until the conflict is resolved.

On the other hand, a termination regularly dissolves the relationship immediately, and thereby also cancelsthe reciprocate obligations. The termination decision can be invalidated in two ways. Either the court findsthat there is not just-cause for a termination, although it’s still sufficient for a dismissal. In this case theworker is entitled to retroactively obtain economic damages corresponding to wages during the dismissalperiod and potentially additional economic and punitive damages. If the court would fully invalidate thedecision to terminate the worker (stated reasons are not sufficient even for a dismissal), then the employmentrelationship is revived and the employer must pay the full retroactive wages from the time of the termination,and punitive damages as well. (Källström & Malmberg, 2013)

There are however some checks and balances to this system. During an ongoing dismissal validity dispute,the employer may request a preliminary injunction for the employment to end after the applicable dismissalnotice period (34 § EPA, although not retroactively; AD 1984 no 7). The employer could similarly be foundliable to pay wages during a termination validity dispute if the worker requests a preliminary injunction andthe court assesses that the circumstances are such that there is not even resonable just-cause for a dismissal(35 § EPA; see also AD 1974 no 57).

43 § EPA states that these types of disputes should be dealt with promptly, and the time from dis-missal/termination until a verdict during 2005-2010 for cases where the worker has claimed invalidity hasbeen reviewed in SOU 2012:62. The review suggested that these cases take on average just over one year (15months) in the district courts, whereas the process in the Swedish Labour Court takes an average of almosttwo years (23 months). It should however be noted that the procedure in the Swedish Labour Court requiresformal settlement negotiations, both prior to the actual court process and during this process, which couldhelp explain the longer duration – at least in part.

However, the worker may never force an employer to actually reinstate him or her, which relates to thesentiment of the employer prerogative. An employer that is not willing to comply with the court’s verdictstating that the dismissal or termination is not valid may always end the employment relationship by payingthe worker normative damages based on the preceding employment duration (39 § EPA). This possibilityrequires there to be a legally binding verdict to oppose, and the employer may therefore not pre-emptivelypay the normative damages to unilaterally resolve the conflict.

Although non-exhaustive24, this overview gives some indication of the monetary costs that may accumu-late during a conflict – along with the cost of legal representation. This is presumably why the vast majorityof disputes also become settled out of court (SOU 2012:26). Although there is a vast literature on litigationand settlement, there is very little research on the settlement process and behaviour in these types of casesin a Swedish setting (SOU 2012:62). Paper [IV] adds to this scarce literature by estimating a model onhow the relative settlement probability evolves over time conditional on the type of representation based ona theoretical model initially developed by Spier (1992) and subsequently applied in different variations tosettlement behaviour.

23Invalidity cannot be claimed if the decision only violates the ordering of the affected workers (34 § EPA).24The employer could also be liable for not following the applicable procedural requirements: e.g. failing to negotiating/inform

according to the provisions in the CWA or related paragraphs in the collective agreement, or be in violation of the provisions inthe Discrimination Act, or even interfering with the workers freedom of association (7-9 §§ and 54, 55 §§ CWA).

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5 Summary of PapersPaper [I]: The Misaligned Incentives of Temporary Work Agencies and Their Client FirmsIn this paper we analyse the search behaviour of a TWA in a principal-agent model with hidden action andasymmetric information between the TWA (agent) and the CF (principal). The productivity distribution ofthe applicants is known by the TWA, but not by the CF, as a consequence of the formers specialisation increating vacancy/worker matches. Hidden action is an intuitive corollary to the CF minimising its involvementwhen outsourcing the recruitment process, and the CF is assumed to only be able to observe the actual outputof the TWA (i.e. the supplied worker), but not the forgone alternatives.

The TWA screens the distribution of applicants in discrete time in search of a worker that fulfils some(exogenous) minimum productivity level and the remuneration to both the worker and the TWA is modelledas independent of the (marginal) productivity of the match. Instead, the wage paid to the worker is relatedto the vacant position whereas the fee paid to the TWA differs depending on the contract type.

The case where the TWA is tasked with identifying a candidate who then becomes employed directly atthe CF is referred to as a Recruitment Contract. This contract type is modelled using three different paymenttypes to the TWA: continuous payment throughout the search process, payment on delivery and payment ata predetermined point in time (conditional on a match being delivered). The results show that conditioningpayment on delivery is a necessary condition for any search to be carried out. The TWA will also alwayssupply the first sufficient match regardless of any remaining resources, and potentially even defer the searchrather than utilising all available time.

The second contract type is a Recruit-and-Rent Contract where the fee to the TWA is determined by thetime the TWA expects to be able to lease the worker to the CF. The duration of the lease is modelled to benegatively related to the productivity of the match as a more productive match is assumed to be employedby the CF, or will transition to another type of employment, quicker than a less productive worker. Thisgives the TWA incentives to perform additional search, but always for a less productive (but still sufficient)worker.

We thereafter show that the CF may potentially offset this search behaviour by increasing the number ofTWAs competing for the contract. However, the CF might be unable to attract a sufficiently large numberof competing TWAs as their expected payoff for any given match will also decrease with the degree ofcompetition.

Paper [II]: Young Adults in the Swedish Temporary Agency Sector: Implications of FamilyExperienceFamily (including friends and relatives) constitutes one of the most important channels for obtaining employ-ment. Family is also regarded as the peer group that has the strongest influence on youth career developmentthrough an array of structural- and process variables, while also being one of the strongest identity deter-minants (second only to labour market affiliation). A person’s first exposure to working life is furthermorenot considered to be the individual’s first job, but rather the experience and opinions conveyed by his or herfamily and other reference groups.

The reviewed literature on the working- and employment conditions for temporary agency workers suggeststhat this type of worker suffers lower wages and worse working conditions while carrying out primarilyrepetitive jobs with a low degree of autonomy and short average durations. The survey also shows that thetemporary agency worker experiences notable adverse psychosocial effects such as a relatively high degree ofdepression syndromes and a very low degree of job satisfaction. Although some workers might actively chooseagency employment, the associated precariousness could still arguably impact the information conveyed tothe worker’s peer groups, either directly or indirectly.

In this paper we estimate the impact of immediate family members’ and the current partner’s previouswork experience from the TWA sector on the observed individual’s relative probability of working in thesector. We focus on young individuals (age 18-34) not only because this cohort constitutes the largest subsetof the Swedish agency sector, but also due to that the sector has only been deregulated for a relatively shortperiod of time which directly affects the possibility of having (preferably older) peers with previous experiencefrom the sector.

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The focus on the younger cohorts also allows us to acknowledge the need to differentiate between thosewho are primarily gainfully employed and those we define as students. Not only could these two groupspotentially differ greatly in their motives for accepting temporary agency work, but the student group hasalso been largely excluded in previous studies on the Swedish temporary agency sector.

The main results show that there is not only a highly significant impact from the work experience variablesof all included peer groups, but the relative size of these effects also suggests that they are among the mostinfluential determinants. Their importance and size is furthermore consistent for both the gainfully employedworkers and the student group.

Other results show that even though the sector is primarily comprised of workers born in Sweden, animmigration background is still an influential determinant as the sector has a disproportionally large numberof second-generation immigrant workers, and workers born in other countries. The transitory characteristicof the sector, either as a strive for employment outside of the sector (supply side) or that younger individualsmight be favoured by the TWAs (demand side), could be discerned in the steadily declining relative numberof TWA workers in the older cohorts.

The relatively high level of education in the sector, for both the gainfully employed and the student group,although individuals in the latter group most likely have not yet attained their final level of education, is alsoa noteworthy result. This result, along with noting that it is predominately men employed within the sector,constitute two notable differences compared with the results of a previous study of the Swedish TWA sectoralmost a decade earlier.

Paper [III]: Employment Effects of the EU Temporary and Agency Workers Directive in SwedenSeveral statutes of European legislation are intended to protect the rights of certain groups on the labourmarket by guaranteeing them equal treatment in relation to their co-workers. The equal treatment conceptis not only limited to wages, but includes all aspects such as access to training and fringe benefits.

Having only been allowed in Sweden since the early 1990’s, TWAs constitute a relatively new phenomenonon the labour market. The TWA worker carries out the assigned tasks within a characteristic tripartiterelationship where the relationship between the worker and the agency is regulated by labour law, whereasthe agreement between the CF and the TWA is governed by specific contracts limited by the general contractlaw statutes.

This has resulted in significant wage differentials and adverse working conditions as compared to workerson more standard forms of employment. It has thereby also brought a need for legislation in order to regulatesome of the fundamental working conditions in the sector. The EU Temporary and Agency Worker Directive(2008/104/EC) ensures that the leased TWA worker should have the same wage and other benefits as thosedirectly employed at the CF, while also facilitating that the worker may transition into employment directlyat the CF.

The theoretical implications of the equal treatment principle is modelled using an augmented Mortensen-Pissarides search model with frictions and interacting (dual) labour markets: the regular labour marketand the market for temporary agency workers. Vacancies in the agency sector may only be filled withunemployed workers, whereas vacancies in the regular sector may be matched with both unemployed workersand temporary agency workers.

Initially the model is calibrated to the situation prior to the implementation by applying insights fromprevious research, after which the effects on unemployment and the distribution of employment between eachsector is estimated. This is done by increasing the compensation to the workers in the temporary agencysector until their valuation of working there corresponds with a job in the regular sector.

The results suggest that the overall wage rate in the labour market will increase both directly through theincreased compensation paid to the TWA workers, and also indirectly due to agency employment becoming analternative to regular employment rather than unemployment. This reduces the number of workers employedin the regular sector and the mark-up that the TWA is able to charge for their services. The reduced price ofthe TWAs’ services and the increased wage rate will nevertheless increase their market share through theirrelatively low search costs and the ability to hedge severance liabilities.

The positive impact on social welfare, modelled as the change to a utilitarian welfare function, suggeststhat the increased wage for temporary agency workers will nevertheless compensate for the reduced numberof employed workers in the regular sector.

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Paper [IV]: Information Asymmetries in the Swedish Labour CourtThis paper estimates a (non-proportional) Cox model with time-varying effects to empirically test for differentsettlement probabilities in a sample of unjust dismissal cases from the Swedish Labour Court with eitherunion representation or non-union (private) representation.

Underlying the hypotheses of potentially differing settlement probabilities is a sequential bargaining modelwhere the defendant is assumed to form a Bayesian subjective prior assessment of the plaintiff’s minimumacceptable settlement amount. The structure of the model allows the time until a (potential) settlement isreached to be expressed as a discrete hazard function, which is only influenced by the size of the assessmentand the costs associated with continued bargaining.

The cost structure, and its relation to the duration of the case, however is only discernible in casesthat have been resolved through an enforced verdict. An initial test is therefore carried out, and there areno statistically significant differences in the cost structures between the two types of representatives. Thisenables the relative settlement probability (i.e. hazard) rate to be estimated, and any statistical differenceattributed to a differing underlying liability assessment of that type of representation.

The relative hazard rate of the two types suggests that there are differences in the relative settlementprobability where cases with private representation are significantly less probable to reach a settlement.However, these differences become non-significant when controlling for the timing of court mandated sharingof information. This suggests that privately instigated negotiations and private sharing of information is notsufficient for making the settlement hazard rate of cases with non-union representation reach that of caseswith union representation.

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23

Avhandlingar framlagda vid Institutionen för nationalekonomi,

Umeå universitet

List of dissertations at the Department of Economics, Umeå

University

Holmström, Leif (1972) Teorin för företagens lokaliseringsval. UES 1. PhLic

thesis

Löfgren, Karl-Gustaf (1972) Studier i teorin för prisdiskriminering. UES 2. PhLic

thesis

Dahlberg, Åke (1972) Arbetsmarknadsutbildning - verkningar för den enskilde

och samhället. UES 3. PhD thesis

Stage, Jørn (1973) Verklighetsuppfattning och ekonomisk teori. UES 4. PhLic

thesis

Holmlund, Bertil (1976) Arbetslöshet och lönebildning - kvantitativa studier av

svensk arbetsmarknad. UES 25. PhD thesis

Löfgren, Karl-Gustaf (1977) En studie i neokeynesiansk arbetslöshets- och

inflationsteori. UES 34. PhD thesis

Lundberg, Lars (1976) Handelshinder och handelspolitik - Studier av verkningar

på svensk ekonomi. Industriens Utredningsinstitut, Stockholm. PhD thesis

Johansson, Per-Olof (1978) Sysselsättning och samhällsekonomi - En studie av

Algots etablering i Västerbotten. UES 53. PhD thesis

Wibe, Sören (1980) Teknik och aggregering i produktionsteorin. Svensk

järnhantering 1850-1975; en branschanalys. UES 63. PhD thesis

Ivarson, Lars (1980) Bankers portföljvalsbeteende. En teoretisk studie. UES 64.

PhD thesis

Batten, David (1981) Entropy, Information Theory and Spatial Input-output

Analysis. UES 92. PhD thesis

Hårsman, Björn (1982) Housing Demand Models and Housing Market Models for

Regional and Local Planning. Swedish Council for Building Research,

D13:1981. PhD thesis

Holm, Magnus (1983) Regionalekonomiska modeller för planering och

samordning i en decentraliserad ekonomi. Byggforskningsrådet, R118:1981

and R5:1983. PhD thesis

Ohlsson, Henry (1986) Cost-Benefit Analysis of Labor Market Programs -

Applied to a Temporary Program in Northern Sweden. UES 167. PhLic

thesis

Sarafoglou, Nikias (1987) A Contribution to Population Dynamics in Space. UES

179. PhD thesis

Ohlsson, Henry (1988) Cost-Benefit Analysis of Labor Market Programs -

Applied to a Temporary Program in Northern Sweden. UES 182. PhD thesis

Anderstig, Christer (1988) Applied Methods for Analysis of Economic Structure

and Change. CERUM 1988:2, Umeå University. PhD thesis

Karlsson, Charlie (1988) Innovation Adoption and a Product Life Cycle. UES 185.

PhD thesis

Löfström, Åsa (1989) Diskriminering på svensk arbetsmarknad - En analys av

löneskillnader mellan kvinnor och män. UES 196. PhD thesis

Axelsson, Roger (1989) Svensk arbetsmarknadsutbildning - En kvantitativ analys

av dess effekter. UES 197. PhD thesis

Zhang, Wei-Bin (1989) Theory of Economic Development - Nonlinearity,

Instability and Non-equilibrium. UES 198. PhD thesis

Hansson, Pär (1989) Intra-Industry Trade: Measurements, Determinants and

Growth - A study of Swedish Foreign Trade. UES 205. PhD thesis

Kriström, Bengt (1990) Valuing Environmental Benefits Using the Contingent

Valuation Method: An Econometric Analysis. UES 219. PhD thesis

Aronsson, Thomas (1990) The Short-Run Supply of Roundwood under Nonlinear

Income Taxation - Theory, Estimation Methods and Empirical Results

Based on Swedish Data. UES 220. PhD thesis

Westin, Lars (1990) Vintage Models of Spatial Structural Change. UES 227. PhD

thesis

Wikström, Magnus (1992) Four Papers on Wage Formation in a Unionized

Economy. UES 287. PhD thesis

Westerlund, Olle (1993) Internal Migration in Sweden - The Role of Fiscal

Variables and Labor Market Conditions. UES 293. PhLic thesis

Bergman, Mats A. (1993) Market Structure and Market Power. The Case of the

Swedish Forest Sector. UES 296. PhD thesis

Johansson, Per (1993) Count Data Models - Estimator Performance and

Applications. UES 315. PhD thesis

Roson, Roberto (1994) Transport Networks and the Spatial Economy - A General

Equilibrium Analysis. UES 340. PhD thesis

Li, Chuan-Zhong (1994) Welfare Evaluations in Contingent Valuation - An

Econometric Analysis. UES 341. PhD thesis

Østbye, Stein (1994) Regional Labour and Capital Subsidies - Theory and

Evidence of the Impact on Employment under Wage Bargaining. UES 344.

PhLic thesis

Westerlund, Olle (1995) Economic Influences on Migration in Sweden. UES 379.

PhD thesis

Mortazavi, Reza (1995) Three Papers on the Economics of Recreation, Tourism

and Property Rights. UES 396. PhLic thesis

Østbye, Stein (1995) Regional Labour and Capital Subsidies. UES 397. PhD

thesis

Hussain-Shahid, Imdad (1996) Benefits of Transport Infrastructure Investments:

A Spatial Computable General Equilibrium Approach. UES 409. PhD thesis

Eriksson, Maria (1996) Selektion till arbetsmarknadsutbildning. UES 410. PhLic

thesis

Karlsson, Niklas (1996) Testing and Estimation in Labour Supply and Duration

Models. UES 413. PhD thesis

Olsson, Christina (1996) Chernobyl Effects and Dental Insurance. UES 428.

PhLic thesis

Vredin, Maria (1997) The African Elephant - Existence Value and Determinants

of Willingness to Pay. UES 441. PhLic thesis

Eriksson, Maria (1997) To Choose or not to Choose: Choice and Choice Set

Models. UES 443. PhD thesis

Widerstedt, Barbro (1997) Employer Change and Migration. Two Papers on

Labour Mobility in Sweden. UES 444. PhLic thesis

Lundberg, Sofia (1997) The Economics of Child Auctions in 19th Century

Sweden. UES 445. PhLic thesis

Lundberg, Johan (1997) Two Papers on Revenue and Expenditure Decisions in

the Swedish Local Public Sector. UES 454. PhLic thesis

Widerstedt, Barbro (1998) Moving or Staying? Job Mobility as a Sorting Process.

UES 464. PhD thesis

Bask, Mikael (1998) Essays on Exchange Rates: Deterministic Chaos and

Technical Analysis. UES 465. PhD thesis

Löfgren, Curt (1998) Time to Study Students: Two Essays on Student

Achievement and Study Effort. UES 466. PhLic thesis

Sjögren, Tomas (1998) Union Wage Setting in a Dynamic Economy. UES 480.

PhD thesis

Mortazavi, Reza (1999) Essays on Economic Problems in Recreation, Tourism

and Transportation. UES 483. PhD thesis

Rudholm, Niklas (1999) Two Essays on Generic Competition in the Swedish

Pharmaceuticals Market. UES 485. PhLic thesis

Olsson, Christina (1999) Essays in the Economics of Dental Insurance and Dental

Health. UES 494. PhD thesis

Marklund, Per-Olov (1999) Environmental Regulation and Firm Efficiency. UES

504. PhLic thesis

Berglund, Elisabet (1999) Regional Entry and Exit of Firms. UES 506. PhD thesis

Hellström, Jörgen (1999) Count Data Autoregression Modelling. UES 507. PhLic

thesis

Nordström, Jonas (1999) Tourism and Travel: Accounts, Demand and Forecasts.

UES 509. PhD thesis

Johansson Vredin, Maria (1999) Economics Without Markets. Four papers on the

Contingent Valuation and Stated Preference Methods. UES 517. PhD thesis

Schei, Torbjørn (2000) Natural recreation resources: production and a diversity of

interests related to the management of grouse as an outfield resource in

Finnmark, Norway, in the Euro-Arctic Barents region. UES 523. PhLic

thesis

Backlund, Kenneth (2000) Welfare Measurement, Externalities and Pigouvian

Taxation in Dynamic Economies. UES 527. PhD thesis

Andersson, Linda (2000) Job Turnover, Productivity and International Trade.

UES 530. PhLic thesis

Ylvinger, Svante (2000) Essays on Production Performance Assessment. UES

531. PhD thesis

Bergkvist, Erik (2001) Freight Transportation. Valuation of Time and Forecasting

of Flows. UES 549. PhD thesis

Rudholm, Niklas (2001) The Swedish Pharmaceuticals Market - Essays on Entry,

Competition and Antibiotic Resistance. UES 552. PhD thesis

Lundberg, Johan (2001) Local Government Expenditures and Regional Growth in

Sweden. UES 554. PhD thesis

Lundberg, Sofia (2001) Going Once, Going Twice, SOLD! The Economics of

Past and Present Public Procurement in Sweden. UES 557. PhD thesis

Eliasson, Kent (2001) University Enrollment and Geographical Mobility: The

Case of Sweden. UES 558. PhLic thesis

Samakovlis, Eva (2001) Economics of Paper Recycling. Efficiency, policies, and

substitution possibilities. UES 563. PhD thesis

Daunfeldt, Sven-Olov (2001) Essays on Intra-Household Allocation and Policy

Regime Shifts. UES 570. PhD thesis

Hellström, Jörgen (2002) Count Data Modelling and Tourism Demand. UES 584.

PhD thesis

Andersson, Linda (2002) Essays on Job Turnover, Productivity and State-Local

Finance. UES 586. PhD thesis

Rashid, Saman (2002) Invandrarinkomster, förvärvsdeltagande och familj. UES

588. PhLic thesis

Hanes, Niklas (2003) Empirical Studies in Local Public Finance: Spillovers,

Amalgamations, and Tactical Redistributions. UES 604. PhD thesis

Stenberg, Anders (2003) An Evaluation of the Adult Education Initiative Relative

Labor Market Training. UES 609. PhD thesis

Stage, Jesper (2003) Mixing Oil and Water. Studies of the Namibian Economy.

UES 611. PhD thesis

Marklund, Per-Olov (2004) Essays on Productive Efficiency, Shadow Prices, and

Human Capital. UES 621. PhD thesis

Rashid, Saman (2004) Immigrants' Income and Family Migration. UES 625. PhD

thesis

Sandberg, Krister (2004) Hedonic Prices, Economic Growth, and Spatial

Dependence. UES 631. PhD thesis

Sjöström, Magnus (2004) Factor Demand and Market Power. UES 633. PhD

thesis

Nilsson, William (2005) Equality of Opportunity, Heterogeneity and Poverty.

UES 652. PhD thesis

Quoreshi, Shahiduzzaman (2005) Modelling High Frequency Financial Count

Data. UES 656. Ph Lic thesis

Ankarhem, Mattias (2005) Bioenergy, Pollution, and Economic Growth. UES

661. PhD thesis

Quoreshi, Shahiduzzaman (2006) Time Series Modelling of High Frequency

Stock Transaction Data. UES 675. PhD thesis

Ghalwash, Tarek (2006) Income, Energy Taxation, and the Environment. An

Econometric Analysis. UES 678. PhD thesis

Westerberg, Thomas (2006) Two Papers on Fertility – The Case of Sweden. UES

683. Ph Lic thesis

Simonsen, Ola (2006) Stock Data, Trade Durations, and Limit Order Book

Information. UES 689. PhD thesis

Eliasson, Kent (2006) College Choice and Earnings among University Graduates

in Sweden. UES 693. PhD thesis

Selander, Carina (2006) Chartist Trading in Exchange Rate Theory. UES 698.

PhD thesis

Humavindu, Michael N (2007) Essays on Public Finance and Environmental

Economics in Namibia. UES 705. Ph Lic thesis

Norberg-Schönfeldt, Magdalena (2007) The Phase-Out of the Nuclear Family?

Empirical Studies on the Economics and Structure of Modern Swedish

Families. UES 708. PhD thesis

Granlund, David (2007) Economic Policy in Health Care: Sickness Absence and

Pharmaceutical Costs. UES 710. PhD thesis

Jonsson, Thomas (2007) Essays on Agricultural and Environmental Policy. UES

719. PhD thesis

Broberg, Thomas (2007) The Value of Preserving Nature – Preference

Uncertainty and Distributional Effects. UES 720. PhD thesis

Witterblad, Mikael (2008) Essays on Redistribution and Local Public

Expenditures. UES 731. PhD thesis

Thunström, Linda (2008) Food Consumption, Paternalism and Economic Policy.

UES 739. PhD thesis

Humavindu, Michael N (2008) Essays on the Namibian Economy. UES 745. PhD

thesis

Persson, Lars (2008) Environmental Policy and Transboundary Externalities -

Coordination and Commitment in Open Economies. UES 755. PhD thesis

Sahlén, Linda (2008) Essays on Environmental and Development Economics -

Public Policy, Resource Prices and Global Warming. UES 762. PhD thesis

Lönnbark, Carl (2009) On Risk Prediction. UES 770. PhD thesis

Norin, Anna (2009) Worker Safety and Market Dynamics. UES 772. PhLic thesis

Holmlund, Linda (2009) Essays on Child Care and Higher Education. UES 783.

PhD thesis

Landström, Mats (2009) Two essays on Central Bank Independence Reforms.

UES 792. PhLic thesis

Åström, Johanna (2009) Marriage, Money and Migration. UES 790. PhD thesis

Birkelöf, Lena (2009) Spatial Interaction and Local Government Expenditures for

Functionally Impaired in Sweden. UES 798. PhD thesis

Mannberg, Andrea (2010) Risk and Rationality – Effects of contextual risk and

cognitive dissonance on (sexual) incentives. UES 806. PhD thesis

Andersson, Camilla (2010) Changing the Risk at the Margin: Smallholder

Farming and Public Policy in Developing Countries. UES 810. PhD thesis

Sörensson, Robert (2010) Marshallian Sources of Growth and Interdependent

Location of Swedish Firms and Households. UES 815. PhD thesis

Soultanaeva, Albina (2011) Back on the Map - Essays on the Financial Markets in

the three Baltic States. UES 820. PhD thesis

Holmberg, Ulf (2012) Essays on Credit Markets and Banking. UES 840. PhD

thesis

Lundgren, Jens (2012) Market Liberalization and Market Integration - Essays on

the Nordic Electricity Market. UES 852. PhD thesis

Karimu, Amin (2013) Essays on Energy Demand and Household Energy Choice.

UES 864. PhD Thesis

Landström, Mats (2013) Determinants and Effects of Central Bank Independence

Reforms. UES 869. PhD Thesis

Cialani, Catia (2014) Essays on Growth and Environment. UES 875. PhD thesis

Tano, Sofia (2014) Migration and Regional Sorting of Skills. UES 882. PhD

Thesis

Hakobyan, Lilit (2014) Essays on Growth and Political Transition. UES 893. PhD

Thesis

Brockwell, Erik (2014) State and Industrial Actions to Influence Consumer

Behavior. UES 894. PhD Thesis

Westéus, Morgan (2014) Essays on Temporary Work Agencies and the Economic

Analysis of Law. UES 897. PhD Thesis