estimated consequences fukushima nuclear disaster, castle meeting 2011 09

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1

Estimate of Consequences from the Fukushima Disaster

Jiřina Vitaacutezkovaacute

Vitaacutezkovaacute-Vitty

Slaacutedkovičova 24

900 28 Ivanka pri Dunaji

Errico Cazzoli

Cazzoli Consulting

Wiesenweg 14

CH-5415 Nussbaumen

Switzerland

Abstract

In the immediate aftermath of the Fukushima disaster the plants operator theJapanese authority and the IAEA insisted for a month that the accident would pose no(immediate) health consequences This work explores consequences that can beexpected using the USNRC code MACCS2 in order to assess the validity of thestatement All the data and information used are from available sources publishedduring the accident by the Japanese authorities and internet sites A range of possibleatmospheric source terms is estimated using three methods dosimetric measurementsat the plant simplified accident progression and aerial USDOE maps of surfacecontamination Estimates from other sources are also included to arrive at the rangesDetailed site population input for the code is constructed from current information on

population around the plant Japan Korea China and Siberia Evacuation models areconstructed to reflect the multi stage evacuation scheme adopted during the accidentAcute consequence models are then surrogated for in input to account for effects ofAcute Radiation Syndrome and chronic health effects are corrected for the lack ofreciprocity at low and intermediate doses For the range of source terms acuteconsequences are calculated as best as the code allows given the prolonged releasesfrom the accident together with chronic excess deaths and illnesses Since much ofthe radioactive releases are deposited in the ocean some assessment is also given ofthe environmental damage to the sea life Economic impact is assessed to some extentusing simplified rough data just to show also this aspect of the accident

The authors thank Mr Salih Guumlntay (Paul Scherrer Institut Switzerland) for havingreviewed this work and for his many useful suggestions



2

1 Introduction

In the immediate aftermath of the Fukushima disaster the plants operator theJapanese authority UNSCEAR WHO and the IAEA insisted for more than a monththat the accident would cause no (immediate) health consequences ([1] [2] and [3]

among others) The qualifier ldquoimmediaterdquo was often omitted Following the accidentevacuation was asked for but not enforced in a patchy and multi-stage fashion in aradius of 20 km The population probably trusted the official reports that ldquono health

threat is expectedrdquo and much more than 20 of the residents within the 20 km radiusremained in their homes and many returned after the end of April 2011 [26]Evacuation (better called relocation) from 20 to 30 km has been called for but there isno evidence that it has been enforced as of July 2011 The Japanese authority has

been praised by the IAEA (May 20th 2011) for their management of the aftermath ofthe accident despite all the disinformation and misinformation that came from theofficial channels ([4] and [5]) Since precise information on the events is notavailable this work explores critically the consequences that can be expected using

the USNRC code MACCS2 in order to elaborate to some extent how accurate theofficial statements were concerning the severity of the accidentThe emotion caused by the disaster should induce the nuclear community to lookmore carefully at the risks and not to ignore reality in order to preserve our corporateinterests All the data and information used are from available authoritative sources

published during the accident by the Japanese authorities and their technicalconsultants and from reputed international organizations

2 Estimate of releases of I131 and Cs137

A range of atmospheric releases is estimated using three methods dosimetricmeasurements at the plant simplified accident progression and assessment of groundcontamination from aerial maps Estimates from other sources are also included toarrive at the range Estimates of radioactive inventories for all the fuel present at thesite are also needed for the assessment from accident progression Note that manyassumptions are made to arrive at source terms in all three methods Theseassumptions are not critical because ranges of releases (ie considering uncertainties)are defined including the results of other independent assessments Moreover only asmall fraction of the overall releases has been dispersed over inhabited ground andthe results of the MACCS2 calculations for best estimates agree with the reported ormeasurable data (relocated population total areas with severe ground contamination

local dosimetric measurements)

21 Estimate of radioactive inventories

At the time of the accident the units and central storage facility contained the numberof fuel assemblies shown in Table 1 ([6]) The core in Unit 1 will be taken asldquoreference corerdquo in terms of number of assemblies for the estimate of releases from

accident progression for all units



3

Table 1 Reported number of fuel assemblies in Fukushima-Daichi

Location Unit

1

Unit

2

Unit

3

Unit

4

Unit

5

Unit

6

Central

Storage

Reactor Fuel

Assemblies

400 548 548 0 548 764 0

Spent FuelAssemblies

292 587 514 1331 946 876 6375

New Fuel

Assemblies

100 28 52 204 48 64 na

The total number of assemblies in-core is 1496 (units 1 through 4) and 2808 (units 1through 6) The total number of assemblies in the spent fuel pools is 2724 (units 1through 4) 4546 (units 1 through 6) and 10921 (including the central storage) Inaddition there are 384 fresh fuel assemblies (units 1 through 4) and 496 (units 1through 6) in the refueling poolsA typical core inventory for a BWR with GE-Hitachi end-of-cycle fuel ([7] [8] and[16]) isI131 38e15 BqassemblyCs137 125e15 BqassemblyLong lived Pu 11e15 BqassemblyFor spent fuel assuming gt 1 year residence in the spent fuel pools the inventories areI131 0 BqassemblyCS137 107E15 BqassemblyThe ratio of ICs inventories in spent fuel assemblies is therefore substantially lower(assumed conservatively by a factor of 15) New fuel assemblies need not be counted

Therefore the approximate total inventories at the time of the accident for Units 1through 4 are shown in Table 2

Table 2 Assessment of inventories at Fukushima-Daichi Units 1 through 4

RadionuclideInventory [Bq]

Core Fuel pools Total

I131 57e18 69e18 13e19

Cs137 19e18 71e18 90e18

Pu 16e18 60e18 76e18

22 Estimate of releases from dosimetric measurements

The integrated measured dose at the main West gate of the facility at a distance ofabout 1 km from the sources is estimated from the continuous measurements

published by MEXT and TEPCO ([5]) parts of which are shown in figure 1 (curve inred) together with the main events of the accidents From March 11th to March 30th(438 hours of available data) the integral dose is about 132 mSv The dose should beexpressed as 132 mGy because only energies delivered to surfaces are measured andnot biological effects (more misinformation and cause of confusion)



4

Figure 1 Measured dose rate at the main West Gate of Fukushima-Daichi togetherwith accident events [5]

Releases have not stopped after the events shown in the figure To arrive at an upper bound dosimetric estimate an extrapolated continuous release averaging a rate of~005 mSvhr for 60 days is added plus between 001 and 002 mSvhr to account for

the successive nine months until TEPCO promised to stop releases (announcementmade on April 16th) Therefore the projected integral dose for the period considered isabout 224 mGy for 7 months and about 300 mGy for 10 months Note that systematic

publication in English of the measurements at the site stopped after March 30th Eventhough the real measurements are for Gy for all practical purposes the discussionfrom now on will refer to Sv

The ldquodose ratesrdquo shown in Figure 1 are measured using equipment that collects thetotal energy concentration in air and transforms the energy (in Joules) to ldquodoserdquo (inSv which is Jouleskg see for instance the technical specifications of a fixeddosimetric station [13]) I131 equivalent radioactive concentrations in air can then be

back calculated on the basis of inhalation acute Dose Conversion Factors (DCF) ofI131 ([11]) Inhalation only is considered because it would be the major pathway foracute effective dose absorption from airborne radioactivity From the MACCS2ICRP60 database [11] the DCF for I131 inhalation acute dose is 8872e-9 SvBqwhole body The total inhaled activity of I131 equivalent over all the time of thereleases is

03 Sv 8872e-9 SvBq = 338E7 Bq

Assuming reciprocity (a concentrated release of short duration has the same effect asa small release of prolonged duration) and an average breathing rate of 1 m3 hour(2778e-4 m3s) the uptake then converts to an air concentration of 122e11 Bq-sm3

(in other words to inhale a total of 338E7 Bq the air concentration would have been122e11 Bq-sm3 for at least one second) Reciprocity can be safely assumed because



5

the estimate is based on I131 equivalency and therefore the decay time of I131 is notof importance

The release from the source spreads according to a Gaussian distribution with parameters (spreading sigmas in elevation and width) that are functions of distance

weather class and wind speed At the distance of the West gate (1000 m) the released plume during prevalent weather conditions (weather Class D wind speed 36 ms)would have a front (sigmas) of about 70 m in height and 120 m in width ([11]) andtherefore almost 70 of the release would be spread (carried) over a volume of

36 ms x 70 m x 120 m = 30240 m3 s

From this it follows that if we assume that the centerline of the plume was exactlyover the main West gate the absolute integral release of I131 (equivalent) would be

122e11 Bq-sm3 x 3024E4 m3s x (107) = 527e15 Bq

The factor 107 accounts for the attenuation of the assumed Gaussian distribution for

the centerline concentration However the weather conditions during the releasesshow that the prevalent weather was in the direction S-SW E and very rarely N-NE(National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration NOAA [15]) Therefore it can

be safely assumed that the main West gate received only about 1 to 5 of the totalrelease (the margins of the plume) Releases of I131 typically account for about halfof the total equivalent releases coming from all other radionuclides ([10])Considering uncertainties in weather conditions and the plusmn50 precision of theinstrumentation given by General Atomics ([14]) the activity of release is thenestimated as

I131 between 2e16 and 2e17 BqCS137 between 8e15 and 7 e16 Bq

The average of the bounding values is assumed as best estimate from dosimetricconsiderations

23 Estimate of releases from simplified accident progression

The exact sequence of events that led to the releases is not known Full access to thecores and probably fuel pools to assess damage is impossible now and it will remainimpossible until the units are buried Instrumentation was for the most part disabled

(certainly in unit 4 which was in shutdown reportedly in the other units because oftotal loss of power and severe damage) Therefore only the symptoms and the majorevents shown in figure 1 can be used to provide an assessment

231 Estimate of releases from Unit 3

A video of the explosion that destroyed the reactor building in Unit 3 shows that theconcrete roof was lifted to a height of about 30 to 40 m According to simplifiedassumptions based on the energy and volumes of material the assessment for theamount needed for the explosion is between 200 and 400 kg of hydrogen The Zrcladding mass for an entire core of Unit 1 (400 assemblies GE fuel) can release about

800 kg of hydrogen if the whole core is oxidized ([16]) Therefore the hydrogenrelease to the reactor building of unit 3 would correspond to complete oxidation of frac14



6

to frac12 of a full core with 400 fuel assemblies ie between 100 and 200 assemblies areassumed to take part in the releases It is not known whether the accident involvedcontainment failure (ie only the fuel in the reactor was involved) or involved failureof the spent fuel pool in the reactor building Separate assessments are thus provided

2311 Releases if the accident involves only the spent fuel pool

The full reference core (400 assemblies) has a content of about 18e18 Bq of I131 andabout 6e17 Bq of Cs137 If the accident progression continues after the start ofoxidation for another 15-20 minutes without being mitigated at the decay heat level(average) in the spent fuel pools at least 50 of the iodine and cesium in thedamaged rods will be released to the air space Of this amount about 80 can beassumed to be transported out of the pool (the rest depositing on the remaining waterand on the walls) and about 50 could be deposited in the reactor building prior tothe explosion Therefore the total release to the atmosphere from failure of 100 to 200assemblies would be

9e16 to 2e17 Bq of I131 and3e16 to 6e16 Bq of Cs137

2312 Releases if the accident involves only the reactor core

The release from the damaged rods within 10 minutes from the start of Zr oxidationwould be about 90 of the Iodine and Cesium inventories About 30 would bedeposited in the pressure vessel structures water surface and pipes About 90would be deposited in the saturated pool (all decay heat removal systems were not

working for some time) If the remaining aerosol is transported to the reactor buildingtogether with the hydrogen following containment failure about 50 can be assumedto deposit there prior to the explosion Therefore the total release to the atmospherewould be

14E16 to 3E16 Bq of I131 and5E15 to 9E15 Bq of Cesium137


The explosions that destroyed the reactor building in Unit 4 were less ldquospectacular

than those that occurred in Unit 3 It can be assumed that only about 200 kg ofhydrogen were involved in the combustions The accident only involved theassemblies in the fuel pools Although other analyses [60] claim that there was nodamage to the spent fuel there is no way to explain how so much hydrogen (200 kg ormore) was produced in the unit that was at shutdown and with all fuel unloaded to the

pool unless extensive damage occurred there Therefore following the discussiongiven in section 2311 the estimated release is

9E16 of I131 and3E16 Bq of Cs137



7


No explosion occurred in the reactor building but holes were drilled in the edifice toremove hydrogen in the building Symptoms of containment failure were observed itis therefore assumed that the releases from Unit 2 were only from the accident

progression in-vesselAlthough analysis of the water samples [60] would show that the release could only

be associated with the gap release of some assemblies that were mechanicallydamaged symptoms of containment failure in addition to the hydrogen present in thereactor building have been reported and therefore it must be conservatively assumedthat accident progression went well beyond mechanical cladding failure of a fewassemblies Following the discussion given in section 2312 the estimated release is

14E16 of I131 and5E15 Bq of Cesium137

These releases would correspond to an overall core damage of about 25 of the totalcore in Unit 2


The hydrogen explosion pulverized the top of the reactor building within 24 hoursfrom initiation of the accident From the cloud of smoke and debris the size of theexplosion was visually comparable to that in Unit 3 Given the time of occurrence itcan be inferred that the hydrogen was not originated from oxidation of the spent fuelsince it would take more than 24 hours to uncover the fuel and reach temperatures that

would cause extensive oxidation without makeup Therefore it can be assumed thatthe releases originated in the core and that about 50 of the core was damaged andcontainment failed Following the discussion given in section 2311 the estimatedrelease is

3E16 Bq of I131 and9E15 Bq of Cs137

235 Summary

The total estimated releases of I131 and Cs137 from the four units is shown in Table

3 The final overall estimate is given in Table 4 in the form of ranges that take intoconsideration all possible combinations It is recognized that large uncertainties affectthe estimate Nevertheless the result can be used in the comparison of all estimatesand they are in agreement with those obtained from dosimetric considerations Theaverage of the ranges is taken as best estimate

Table 3 Release estimates from accident progression

Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3 Unit 4

I131 Bq 14E16 3E16 14E16-2E17 9E16

Cs137 Bq 5E15 9E15 5E15-6E16 3E16



8

Table 4 Range of releases from all units

Minimum Maximum

I131 13E+17 20E+17

Cs137 38E+16 61E+16

24 Estimate of releases from aerial survey

The National Nuclear Security Administration NNSA (USDOE) has published anaerial map (Figure 2) of projected one year doses from contamination ([17]) Sincedoses are shown in rem it is to be remembered that 1 rem = 10 mSv The TotalEffective Dose Equivalent TEDE dose conversion factor (DCF) for Cs137 from theICRP60 ([11]) is used for the estimate of TEDE to 1 year as shown in the figure

7 days TEDE DCF(CS137)= 3085e-10 Sv(Bqm2)(7 days) = 1604e-8 Sv(Bqm2)

per year

Therefore the scale shown in the figure converts to

2000 mREM = gt 20 mSv = gt 125E6 Bqm2 assumed average 228E6 Bqm2 1000-2000 mREM = 623E5 Bqm2 average 500-1000 mREM = 312E5 Bqm2 average 100-500 mREM = 187E5 Bqm2 average lt 100 mREM = 312E4 Bqm2 assumed average

The concentration on the ground is consistent with a hot-spot reading of about33e6 Bqm2 of CS137 in the town of Iitate about 40 km NNW of the release point asconfirmed by JNES and the IAEA ([18]) The measured concentration at Iitate wouldconvert to a dose of about 30 mSv per year In addition the deposited Csconcentration per m2 is consistent with the dose measurements reported by MEXT [5]for other hot spots In particular monitoring posts 32 33 and 79 located a little over30 km from the release point and about 8-10 km South of Itate show integrated dosesto June 9th 2011 of about 39 22 and 19 mSv in 3 months (average between 021 and043 mSvday) respectively increasing at a projected average rate of 02 mSvday forthe remainder of the year Relocation of the localities beyond 30 km has been

ordered in May 2011 () more than two months after the data has been collected

and analyzed but to our knowledge it is not enforced

The assessed ground contamination and total release is shown in table 5 Theassessment takes into account symmetrical deposition on the ocean weather patternsas shown in [15] a correction for the remainder of activity in the cloud beyond100 km and a further correction for continuous low level releases for the rest of thetime that it will take TEPCO to stop them (9 more months after May 2011)



9

Table 5 Cs137 release assessed from aerial surveyZone km2 Bqm2 TotalRed 610 300E+06 183E+15

Yellow 260 650E+05 169E+14Brown 615 325E+05 200E+14Blue 4600 200E+05 920E+14

Purple 5332 325E+05 173E+15Less 300E+04 100E+04 300E+14

further(Hokkaido) 400E+04 500E+03 200E+14

Total 814E+03 535E+15



10

Figure 2 NNSAUSDOE Aerial Map of Ground Contamination



11

The following assumptions were made on the basis of Figure 2 to arrive at the totalrelease for all four plants

1 Aerial survey shows about half circle related to the contaminated land Thefull circle would correspond to (according to aerial survey assumptions) 107E+16 Bq of Cs137

2 10 of the time the wind direction would carry radioactivity over land(meteorological data see later for inputs to MACCS2) (107E17)

3 Only 75 were deposited in the first 100 km (143 E+17Bq)4 Release continues at low level for the next 9 months which gives the final

assumption for Cs137 release of 285 E+17 Bq

Note that the Japanese authorities should have intervened immediately upon beingnotified of the aerial survey (April 10th 2011) by enforcing relocation of the entirezone in red and yellow (~870 km2) as was done in Chernobyl (relocation at a groundcontamination of 555 kBqm2 corresponding to 350 mSv lifetime twice the

background dose [20]) and should have considered relocating the entire population

in the zones in red yellow brown and blue (~6000 km2) as suggested by the USNRCfor Chernobyl and also for Fukushima (intervention at projected dose of 70 mSvlifetime or 1 mSvyear) As of July 2011 no intervention in this direction has beenforthcoming except for an un-enforced call in May for ldquoevacuation in selected areasrdquo

to 30 km The four zones extend to almost 80 km from Fukushima-Daichi andcomprise an area of at least 6100 km2 No follow up on this action has been reported

Conservatively assuming that the release is from the core (higher content of I131Section 21) the release of I131 would be three times higher in terms of activity for atotal of 86e17 Bq Given all the conservatisms used and comparing this assessmentwith the other two methods used previously it could be assumed that the resultsobtained with this method can be interpreted as an upper bound of all estimates



12

25 Summary of estimates including other sources

Table 6 shows a comparison of the estimates from authoritative sources with thecurrent estimates The data accepted for the releases from the Chernobyl accident is

also shown for reference Other estimates for I131 alone from US sources based onair transport and measurements over the USA are not shown because theuncertainties on the method used to arrive at the assessment are deemed to be toowide

Table 6 Comparison of estimates of releases

Estimate I131 (Bq) Cs137 (Bq)

Chernobyl ([19][20]) 18E18 85E16

JNSC April 12th [21] 15E17 12E16

ZAMG [22] 4E17 33E16

TEPCO April 2011 [23] quoted also in [21] 6E16 7E15

NISA June 6th [9] 27E17 13E16

1 Current estimate accident progression and

fuel inventories17E17 50E16

2 Current estimate from radiological

measurements at the main West gate11E17 39E16

3 Current estimate from USDOE aerial

survey

86E17 29E17

Average of three estimates for Fukushima 38E17 13E17

TEPCOrsquos estimates are the lowest Further no update of their assessment has beenforthcoming as of the end of June 2011 All other Japanese organizations seem torevise their estimates upwards every other month Current (July 2011) estimates forI131 are in line with all other estimates except TEPCOrsquos The present estimation ofCs137 release on the other hand is much higher than all others This is probably

because all ldquoofficialrdquo assessments provide the data for Cs137 only as a byproduct ofcalculations for I131 equivalent This is a myth fostered by the IAEA in [10] wherethere is no consideration of specific core inventories the equivalency factors are notverifiable and especially no consideration seems to be given to inventories of spentfuel (inventory of I131 is almost the same as or less than for Cs137) Moreover no

preferential mechanisms for substantial retention of Cs could be invoked for theaccident progressions hypothesized for Fukushima

3 Inputs to MACCS2

The current version of the USNRC MACCS2 consequence code [11] part of the

MELCOR suite [24] is used for assessment of consequences This section describesthe major input parameters that have been used



13

31 Source terms inputs

Only absolute Bq releases of I131 and Cs137 are estimated (Table 6) The releasesmust be input to MACCS2 as fractions of total inventory for 60 radionuclides The

MACCS2 default data is chosen for the inventories and the release fraction ofthe Iodine group and Cs is calculated on the basis of the estimates in Table 6 withrespect to the default valueReleases for the other groups are conservatively based on scaling from the Cs

release fractions according to the relative release fractions used in the CORSOR-Booth model of the MELCOR code [24] and on estimates of BWR source terms

provided for one EU project [25] Four cases are going to be analyzed for the rangesthat can be defined from Table 6 These are

- Case 1 minimum assessed releases- Case 2 maximum assessed releases- Case 3 Best Estimate (BE) and

- Case 4 BE sensitivity analysis to MOX fuel respectivelyThe release fractions with respect to the default MACCS2 inputs are shown inTable 7

Table7 MACCS2 source terms inputs

Release Xe CsI Cs Te Sr-Ba Ru La Ce-PuCase 1

(Min)10E+00 19E-02 29E-02 15E-02 97E-03 29E-03 15E-04 29E-05

Case 2

(Max)10E+00 27E-01 12E+00 60E-01 40E-01 12E-01 60E-03 12E-03

Case 3

(B E)10E+00 12E-01 54E-01 27E-01 18E-01 54E-02 27E-03 54E-04

Case 4

(BEMOX)10E+00 12E-01 54E-01 27E-01 18E-01 54E-02 27E-03 54E-03

NOTE The source term for Case 4 ldquoBE MOXrdquo is the same as the Best Estimate

source term except that the release of the group Ce-Pu is very conservativelyassumed to be ten times as large In reality only a small fraction of the fuel in thecores and spent fuel pools of Units 1 through 4 is MOX

In each case the release is modeled in four phases approximately corresponding

to the major events shown in Figure 1 The release fractions are then divided in

10 for the first phase 40 for the second and third phase and 10 for thefourth phase Duration of the releases is assumed to be short (1000 s) for all releaseheight 10 m for all (because all reactor buildings were severely damaged or opened atlow elevation) The total energy of release is assumed to be 2 GJoules 4 GJoules 4GJoules and 2 GJoules respectively (see Section 231)

Separate calculations are also performed for the phase that is considered the largestcontributor to releases (Phase 2 destruction of reactor building for Unit 3) witha single weather in the northerly direction to assess local consequences reflecting thecontamination shown in Figure 2



14

32 Population data

Detailed site population input for the code is constructed from current information on population around the plant Japan Korea China and Siberia Within the 40 kmradius some attention has been given to properly locate the population of the areas

that are shown to have been particularly affected by the releases (Figure 2) Beyondthe 40 km zone only densities by district (or countries in the case of China S and NKorea and Siberia) are used The population file extends to 1000 miles (1609 km)The total population of Japan as of 2010 is accounted for in the site data file(127960000 persons) and the total population included in the analysis isapproximately 329450000 persons

33 Evacuation and relocation models

Evacuation models are constructed to reflect the multi stage evacuation schemeadopted during the accident The numerous references for the following discussion are

shown in [26] and the discussion is an elaboration of the corresponding textAfter the declaration of a nuclear emergency by the Government at 1903 on 11March the Fukushima prefecture ordered the evacuation of an estimated 1864 peoplewithin a distance of 2 km from the plant This was extended to 3 km (19 mi) and5800 people at 2123 by a directive to the local governor from the Prime Ministertogether with instructions for residents within 10 km (62 mi) of the plant to stayindoors The evacuation was expanded to a 10 km (62 mi) radius at 544 on 12March and then to 20 km (12 mi) at 1825 shortly before ordering use of seawater foremergency coolingOver 50000 people were evacuated during 12 March The figure increased to170000 ndash 200000 people on 13 March after officials voiced the possibility ofa meltdown (large delay) On the morning of 15 March the evacuation area wasagain extended Prime Minister Naoto Kan issued instructions that any remaining

people within a 20 km (12 mile) zone around the plant must leave and urged thatthose living between 20 km and 30 km from the site should stay indoors On 25March residents in the 30 kilometer circle were urged to leave their houses as wellOn 30 March the IAEA discovered 20 MBqm2 of Iodine-131 in samples taken from18 to 26 March in Iitate 40 km northwest of the Fukushima I reactor

The IAEA recommended expanding the evacuation area based on its criteria of

10 MBqm2 ( 20 times the contamination limit used for relocation after

Chernobyl) Japanese Secretary Yukio Edano stated the government would wait tosee if the high radiation continued()httpenwikipediaorgwikiEvacuations_and_Japanese_reaction_to_the_Fukushima_I_nuclear_accidents - cite_note-33cite_note-33 On 31 March the IAEA announced a new value of 7 MBqm2 in samples taken from19 to 29 March in Iitate On 11 April with ongoing concerns about the stability of thereactors Japan considered extending the evacuation zone around the Fukushima IThen on 21 April 2011 the Japanese government declared a 20-km zone aroundDaiichi as a no-go zone The new order affected 80000 residents Shortlythereafter on 22 April the Japanese government officially announced that theevacuation zone would be extended from the 20 km circular zone to an irregular

zone extending northwest of the Fukushima site



15

Then ONLY on 16 May the Japanese government began evacuating people fromoutside the official exclusion zones including the village of Iitate where high levelsof radiation had been repeatedly measured (no follow up on this action has beenreported)

In the meantime from [5] the resident population of the extended areas had alreadyreceived doses exceeding 35 mSv in the town of Namie (24 km) and 20 mSv in Iitate(gt 40 km) whereby the annual yearly dose limit (obviously not enforced) for all agesis 1 mSv following the recommendations of [35] and [36] As of July 29th 2011 the

population still living in the two locations had received a dose from groundcontamination alone of 57 and 31 mSv respectively

Figure 3 (from [26]) shows the pattern of evacuations to 20 km up to March 25th2011

Figure 3 Evacuation scheme to 20 km

More detailed information provided for all these patchy and in some casesoverlapping not-enforced actions including the fact that former residents startedreturning to their evacuated homes has led to the conclusion ([26]) that almost 27of the population was still in place in the entire area to 20 km as of July 2011 Themulti-stage evacuation and the population taking part are modeled in the MACCS2inputs as close as possible as is described above

From the information shown above it is estimated that about 260000 people were

evacuated within the first two months (to 20 km) and a further 120000 should

have been ldquorelocated rdquo after April 22nd when the government ldquourged the population

to leave selected areasrdquo [26] The estimate is based on the population living in theareas in red and brown shown in Figure 2 from 20 km to about 65 km The exact levelof intervention (if any) has not been made public



16

34 Meteorology

The input file METSURinp part of the MACCS2 sample input release has been

examined and found most suitable to describe statistically the meteorology during thefirst 12 days of the accident as shown in [15] The wind directions are shown in Table8 with respect to Japanese territory Therefore the default sample input meteorologicaldata is used for this analysis

Table 8 Wind direction in MACCS default meteorological input (Surry site)Wind direction Fraction of the timeN and NNW HonshuHokkaido 015

Ocean 071

Rest of Japan 014

For the single weather local consequences assessment the weather conditions for day73 of the meteorological data is used Wind direction is mostly N during the wholeday with a couple of hours N-NW wind speed between 3 and 6 ms and some lightrain during two of the hours (hot spots in the actual measurements can be ascribed to

precipitation) The dispersion shown in Figure 2 is consistent with an average windspeed of about 4 ms

35 Economic data

The MACCS2 code is accompanied by an example site input data file that contains

data for the economic models for all US states in 1980 US$ Some of the states in thelist have been chosen as surrogates for economic regions in Japan and the othercountries within the 1000 miles radius on the basis of similarities in farming andindustrialization status In particular the following zones have been defined (in

parenthesis the surrogate states)Pacific Islands (Louisiana) Hokkaido (Colorado) Southern and Western Japan (NewJersey) Fukushima area (New York) North Eastern ChinaNorth Korea (NorthCarolina) South Korea (Rhode Island) Siberia (Utah)

The MACCS models do not take into account a large component of costs derivingfrom an accident These are cost of replacing the power plants loss of revenues

during the outage cost of disposing of the plants actuarial costs for deaths andinjuries The following assumptions are made to arrive at a more complete estimate

Replacement cost of a single plant 4 billion US$

Loss of revenues 2 billion US$ per plant

Cost of disposal 4 billion US$ per plant

Actuarial cost of a death 4 million US$ per person and

Actuarial cost of an injury 150000 US$ per injury

The values have been suggested for [25] on the basis of European actuarial data and

are in 2005 US$ The other cost components in the site input file for the surrogateregions have been increased by a factor of 10 over the estimates from 1980



17

36 Health effect models

The MACCS2 models and suggested inputs for health effects models have beenextensively reviewed and found incomplete or outdated in several aspects This

section describes the modifications introduced in the input parameters that are used toeither surrogate for incompleteness or update the data to current understanding The

principles on which risks should be assessed are ([27] among others)- doses are cumulative (once exposed the human organism cannot dispose of

the dose)- reciprocity of doses at least at low and intermediate doses (a large dose in a

short time period has the same effects as a small dose in a long period ie theintegrated dose is what counts)

- intermediate doses are defined as less than 2 Sv- linearity of effects (there is no evidence that small doses have less probability

per Sv to induce health effects than large doses)

- No thresholds should be applied and the threshold for assured lethal dose is 6 Gy (~Sv) with or without medical attention ([28])

Work published by a European epidemiologist and mathematician fromForschungzentrum fuumlr Umwelt und Gesundheit [48] on the increased incidence ofthyroid cancers and of other syndromes connected with genetic effects in the 20 yearsafter Chernobyl throughout Europe confirms all the concerns raised in the presentwork and in [45] The OBSERVED effects are connected to contamination fromCs137 and Cs134 I131 IS NOT A MAJOR CONCERN Other recent work

performed by the European Committee on Radiation Risks ECRR [52] in partconfirmed by the IRSN [51] raises exactly the same concerns and proposes alternatemodels for responses to doses noting that the ICRP- BEIR- and UNSCEAR-approved models have deficiencies and are incomplete when internal exposures areconcerned One special point of interest in [52] is that doses are projected only frommeasurements of one radionuclide (either I131 or Cs137) without consideration to

the entire spectrum of radionuclides (see also concerns in [45]) Another point isthat the ICRP etc approved models do not take into consideration uncertainties inmeasurement and correlation of data to measurements Finally note also that evenwith all the corrections made to the inputs to MACCS2 health effect models that aredescribed below the code still will LARGELY under-estimate the number of longterm fatalities and injuries since it only takes into consideration the populationexposed at the time of the accident

361 Acute fatalities

Acute health effects are calculated in MACCS2 for ldquoimmediaterdquo (within 1 monthfrom exposure) and delayed fatalities and injuries The model for ldquoimmediaterdquo

fatalities allows for the assessment of deaths due to doses to lungs bone marrow andGastro-Intestinal (GI) tract only (ie through induced cancers)

The MACCS2 suggested hazard curves have as inputs a different lethal dose and anLD50 (dose at which there is a 50 probability of death) for each of the three organsIf the delivered dose is below LD50 the code assumes that there will be no deaths

but injuries only (with a separate model) The inputs have been tested and it has beenfound that the only chance that a death is predicted to occur with some probability is



18

that the dose to the lungs through inhalation exceeds its LD50 (10 Sv) By the timethe dose to the lungs exceeds the lethal dose (20 Sv) doses to the other organs havenot reached their respective LD50 and therefore neither GI nor bone marrow cancerscontribute to acute fatalities This would appear reasonable because development offulminating cancers in bone marrow and the GI tract would be slower and secondary

to doses incurred by the lungs which are the first organ exposed

However [28] shows a different picture the lethal dose is 8 Sv and not due to [45]cancers but to hematopoietic effects (known as Acute Radiation Syndrome ARS)The hazard curve for acute fatality extends to 1 Sv (Figure 4) unlike 4 Sv as isassumed in MACCS2 below which the code calculates zero probability for acutefatalities The residual probability of death is assigned by the code to acute injuriesand ARS is not modeled in MACCS2

In order to correct this inconsistency it would be recommended to use the lungs assurrogate organ and lower the LD50 and lethal dose for lungs to 4 and 8 Sv

respectively from the recommended values of 10 and 20 Sv It is not unreasonable tomake this assumptions because by definition of units (Sv = Joulekg) the dose to the

blood would not be much different from that to the lungs (by weight) Moreover theinhaled radiation would be transferred almost immediately to the circulatory systemfrom the lungs The net effect of this recommendation is not expected to be large

because semi-deterministic calculations based on the atmospheric transport modelsshow that only very large releases of radioactivity are conducive to lethal doses

beyond the exclusion zone of the plants Figure 5 shows the center line (highestconcentration of radionuclides) calculated mortality distance using the hazard curvesuggested in [28] and an average weather (class D wind speed 4 ms no

precipitation) The release in terms of I131 equivalent at Fukushima (with anexclusion zone of gt 12 km) deterministically must exceed 14e17 Bq under the worst

possible assumptions (center line no protection no evacuation etc) No acute deathsare therefore expected from MACCS2 calculations with the suggested hazard inputsgiven evacuation and the Fukushima windrose probabilities (see Table 8)The worst assumed source terms from Table 7 would result in a maximum mortalitydistance of about 5 km if the entire release was assumed to occur in a single and

concentrated puff lasting at least one hour



19

Figure 4 Hazard curve for Acute Radiation Syndrome with prompt medicalcare ([28])

Probability of death

0

20

40

60

80

100

0 2 4 6 8 10

Dose (Sv)

P r o b a b i l i t y ( )

Probability of

death

Figure 5 Mortality distance as a function of I131 equivalent release

Mortality distance

10E+17

60E+17

11E+18

16E+18

21E+18

0 2 4 6 8

Distance (km)

I - 1 3 1 E q

u i v a l e n t R e l e a s e ( B q )

Mortality distance

362 Chronic Health Effects

The area of assessment of chronic health effects is the most controversial becauseonly excess cancers are normally considered and the expected numbers of cancer

deaths due to radiation effects cannot be easily separated in the historical evidencefrom the background of cancer deaths due to other reasons In fact infectiousdiseases cardiovascular diseases other diseases due to genetic effects may be biggercauses of excess deaths due to radiation than cancers [45]In Japan alone cancer death rate for the entire population was about 23 per year in2004 [29] while excess cancer risk due to the accident at Fukushima see section 4 isexpected to be less than 01 per year for the most exposed population Thereforeany model developed to predict the effects of ionizing radiation (better said the hazardcurves) is as good as any other The incidence of thyroid cancers in the younger

population may be the only exception ([20] and [30])In any case long term health effects (chronic cancer deaths and injuries exclusive of

other related causes of death) are estimated through hazard curves which define the probability of death per Sv in a given number of years for a number of target organs



20

The following inconsistencies and problems in the MACCS2 modeling of chronichealth effects were encountered

1 Each type of cancer is treated separately (although the total probability ofdeath is the theoretical sum of the individual cancers) and the response of thewhole organism to a radiation dose is not taken into account (synergisticeffects are ignored)

2 The hazard curves are assessed without transparency and many times

with internal inconsistencies Examples of this practice can be found in [31]and [32] even though some of the data obtained in these publications can beused for the present assessment

3 As an example of inconsistencies the assessment of excess cancers from bomb tests [31] shows a much larger thyroid cancer rate than is used in theMACCS2 suggested input database (146e-3Sv instead of 72e-4Sv) yet lungcancers are not even considered separately in [31] even though in practice

they are shown to be the largest single contributor for radiation induced cancerdeaths (155e-2Sv see later for detailed results)4 As another example of inconsistencies one interesting conclusion in [32] is

that EPA would support linearity of consequences at low doses On the otherhand the authoritative publication [32] recommends reducing all individualchronic doses by a factor of up to 3 (a seemingly totally arbitrary factor calledDDREF Dose and Dose Rate Effectiveness in violation of the reciprocity

principle) for individual lifetime doses below 02 Sv simply because this is the practice in other sources (noticeably the seemingly even more authoritativeICRP60) and despite recognizing earlier that this would cause unphysicalresults and negative cancer rates for some cohorts of the population eg the

younger groups

In order to be consistent and follow the principles of linearity ([27]) reciprocityaccumulation of risks and no threshold as advocated by most of the contemporaryliterature the hazard parameters shown in Table 9 are then used

Table 9 Hazard parameters used for calculations of chronic health effects

CancerDeath Rate

SvInjury Rate Sv DDREF

LEUKEMIA 112E-02 112E-02 1

BONE 104E-03 104E-03 1

BREAST 621E-03 183E-02 1

LUNG 178E-02 199E-02 1

THYROID 146E-03 828E-03 1

GI 158E-02 661E-02 1

acuteWhole Bodyacute 113E-01 226E-01 1

NOTE The rate for ldquoWhole Bodyrdquo (in reality all ldquootherrdquo) cancers is about 0118deathsSv in [32] but as mentioned a reduction factor of 2 is recommended despitedescribing this as unphysical The value used here is derived assuming reciprocity toacute exposure (1 death per 8 Sv) linearity at low doses and a cumulative risk for alifetime of 80 years instead of 50 years as is assumed in MACCS2 The other cancerrates (and reduction factors) are consistent with data shown in [31] except that the

risks are adjusted upward by 15 due to the extension of estimates to 80 years insteadof the 50 years used in MACCS2 for calculation of chronic doses The 80 years period



21

is mentioned also for projections in the BNL study on cancers of the Marshall Island population following atomic tests [31]

363 Ingestion pathway

Ingestion of radioactivity from consumption of marine produce is not modeled inMACCS2 Since this is a very important part of the dietary habits of the Japanese

population a surrogate has been introduced by defining the fraction of radioactivityingested through water versus radioactivity deposited equal to 5e-5 (the suggestedvalue is 5e-6) It is felt that this is appropriate because the dietary habits of theJapanese would result in an annual ingestion of more than 200kBq of Cs137 andSr-90 corresponding to a dose greater than 2 mSvyear if the concentration of Cs137in the foodstuff and water were just under the allowed limits (200 Bqkg for drinkingwater milk and dairy products and 500 Bqkg for vegetables grains meat eggs andfish [33] and [34]) The dose is calculated using the DCF for Cs137 ingestion fromthe database in [11] which is 1355e-08 SvBq

4 Results

All results that are discussed are mean values of MACCS2 Latin Hypercube Sampling(LHS) Monte Carlo calculations [11] with the exception of results for single weatherevaluations Four analyses have been performed for the assessed Fukushima sourceterms

- minimum- maximum- best estimate and- best estimate with conservative releases from MOX fuel respectively)

In addition five sensitivity studies were performeda) The first was performed to show the effects of the Chernobyl source terms

directly compared to those of Fukushima source terms (ie simulating theChernobyl releases at Fukushima)

b) The second was performed to show what results the code would have produced if all the default input values for health effects had been kept assuggested by the code developers (ICRP USNRC experts recommendations)

c) The third was performed to show what the consequences of the accidentwould have been if the operators had succeeded to terminate all four

accidents after core or fuel damage and the release would have been at the

lower level of INES5 scale corresponding to 200TBq I131 equivalentd) The fourth was performed to show the significance of I131 release for theFukushima accident and the impact of use of KI tablets as prophylacticmeasure in the aftermath

e) The fifth was performed using as source terms for Fukushima the estimatedfallout releases from the atomic test ldquoCastle Bravordquo (1954) the detonation of a

15 MT hydrogen bomb This test was followed by ldquoProject 41rdquo which forms

the basis for much of the data used for dose conversion factors and modelsused for assessment of consequences The final work of project 41 is in manyrespects the BNL report [31]



22

41 Acute health effects

Table 10 summarizes the results for acute health effects assuming no evacuationMinor injuries that are prodromal to ARS (vomiting and skin erythema) are notincluded because it is very unlikely that they would be reported if they were to occur

under normal circumstances As anticipated ARS is not a concern under anyassumption for the Fukushima accident except if the releases had been extremelylarge (Case 2) No ARS fatalities have been reported and this shows that the totalrelease must have been smaller than the one assumed for Case 2 and that the concernabout I131 and I131 equivalent is a myth Note that no ARS effects have been

reported among the civilian population also in Chernobyl [20] The ldquoexpertsrdquo byluck only (ie because the accident did not escalate more than it did) were correct instating that the accident would not have posed ldquoIMMEDIATErdquo health concer nhowever the context of the declarations was ambiguous and unqualified and verylikely led a large part of the population to remain in their homes Early injuries wouldnot have been apparent in any case given the general state of mayhem that followed

the tsunami

Table 10 Expected Acute Health Effects without EvacuationCase 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4

Early Fatalities 000E+00 300E+00 000E+00 000E+00

Major Early Injuries 000E+00 250E+01 400E+00 500E+00

42 Long term health effects

Table 11 shows the chronic health effects predicted by the Monte Carlo analysis Allcalculations have been extended to 80 years Results for the cohort that was not

evacuated are separated The result shown for this cohort refers ONLY to the doseincurred during the first day after passage of the radioactive clouds ldquoLocalrdquo average

Monte Carlo results for the zones including the townships of Namie and Iitate [5]shown to be very contaminated by all reports are also separated Indicative results forthe City of Tokyo are provided Table 12 shows the individual societal risks for the

populations at various distances from the site

Table 11 Chronic Health Effects to 80 yearsCase 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4

All excess Fatalities to 1609 km in 80years

263E+04 427E+05 281E+05 349E+05

Thyroid Cancer Fatalities 221E+02 358E+03 235E+03 204E+03Lungs Cancer Fatalities 319E+03 511E+04 338E+04 522E+04

All excess deaths to 20 km (evacuatedarea)

753E+02 320E+03 230E+03 261E+03

All excess deaths 20-30 km (NamieTownship)

242E+02 138E+03 100E+03 110E+02

All excess deaths 30-40 km (IitateTownship)

188E+02 109E+03 795E+02 838E+02

All excess deaths Tokyo 885E+03 169E+05 120E+05 150E+05

Fatalities for non-evacuated peoplewithin 20 km

400E+01 200E+02 200E+02 200E+02

Hospitalizations total 536E+04 813E+05 544E+05 630E+05

Collective Ingestion Dose (Sv) 130E+04 370E+05 190E+05 190E+05



23

Table 12 Individual lifetime risk of excess deathCase 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4

risk to 20 km 200E-03 510E-03 450E-03 540E-03

risk 20-30 km 200E-03 650E-03 600E-03 710E-03

risk 30-40 km 210E-03 720E-03 670E-03 720E-03

risk Tokyo 170E-04 320E-03 230E-03 290E-03

It is obvious from all results that the IAEA the Japanese authority and their expertswere not telling the whole truth The declarations which as noted probably inducedan unusually large part of the population (estimated 27) to remain in their

homes will probably result in an additional 200 cancer deaths or in a few monthsmore than 20 of the total lifetime incurred dose for that population even thoughthey may have been forcibly removed at a later dateThe large number of cancer fatalities predicted for the City of Tokyo results for agood part from ingestion of food and water contaminated up to the legal limitsIndividual lifetime (societal) risks of death are shown in Table 12 Obviously the

target of 1e-4year as ldquolevel of acceptable individual risk ldquo or ldquodose limited to 1mSv per annumrdquo regardless of frequency of occurrence [45] is well exceeded for

an accident such as happened at Fukushima for a very large number of peopleIndividual risk for the area almost promptly evacuated to 20 km is smaller because the73 of the people who are removed disappear from the calculations for some time

but they are still counted to arrive at the statistical averages

It should be noted that a preliminary study was performed by the EuropeanCommittee on Radiation Risk ECRR [52] which estimated health effect within a 50years time period following the Fukushima accident The estimates were performedon the basis of measurements provided by MEXT as well as on mean dose rates at

various distances from the site and population data from the latest Japanese census ordensities in particular prefectures The results for predicted cancer yields in the 100km zone around Fukushima with a comparison of ICRP and two ECRR models are

provided in table 13 reproduced from [52] Results for two different models areshow For details please see [52]

Table 13 ECRR Predicted cancer yield in the 100 km zone

The results for predicted cancer yields in the 200 km zone around Fukushima with acomparison of ICRP and two ECRR models are shown in table 14



24


The methods used for the ECRR estimates are different and performedindependently from those used in the present work however they are in goodagreement when comparing the predicted victims of the catastrophe The conclusionis that the results obtained within the framework of the present study are

reasonable and it is obvious that the results originated from the inputs

recommended by the ICRP highly under-estimate consequences

43 Economic impact

Most economic models in keeping with the philosophy of quick profit only considershort term risks The figures that are estimated here include long term (80 years)societal expenses that are admitted only very reluctantly and are only indicative ofthe real costs that can be expected (ie they are very likely an under-estimate)

Table 15 shows the estimates for the immediate and long term costs The firstcomponent (MACCS2 costs) includes the data that MACCS2 calculates These data

are a mix of short term and long term expected costs These are- costs of evacuation- costs of ALARP decontamination of people and land- costs of short and long term relocation- costs of disposal of crops and livestock- costs of replacement of some infrastructure- actuarial costs of excess cancer deaths are added- actuarial costs of hospitalization due to radiation injuries and- costs of replacement of the plants

The figures are staggering and given all uncertainties a figure around 1 Trillion 2005US$ seems to be the minimum to be expected

Table 15 Short and long term costs Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4

MACCS2 Costs Total 2005US$ 536E+09 451E+11 222E+11 317E+11

Actuarial deaths 789E+10 128E+12 843E+11 105E+12

Actuarial Injuries 804E+09 122E+11 816E+10 945E+10

Plants 400E+10 400E+10 400E+10 400E+10

Total 132E+11 189E+12 119E+12 150E+12

Table 16 shows some details of assessed consequences related to costs which also

depict to some extent the misery to which many people are condemned due to theaccident These are data on relocation and crop and livestock disposal The term



25

ldquointerdictionrdquo means that the land and houses are not permitted to be resettled up to30 years after which time the population is allowed to return The termldquocondemnationrdquo refers to land and houses to which the population will never beallowed to return in their lifetimeIn June 2011 a report from the World Bank appeared (reported by the British

newspaper ldquoThe Guardianrdquo [54]) showing an initial estimate of immediate costs forthe accident of 235E11 US$ This should be compared with the MACCS2 calculatedcosts for Case 3 (Best estimate) plus costs for the loss of and dismantling the four

plants The World Bank is not equipped to evaluate the other cost components

Table 16 Other Societal and Environmental Consequences Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4

Interdicted area to 80 km km2 276E+02 323E+02 439E+02 373E+02

Condemned to 80 km km2 120E+01 657E+02 452E+02 547E+02

Relocated population to 80 km 126E+04 153E+05 140E+05 157E+05

Condemned population to 80 km 377E+02 251E+04 981E+03 547E+04

Interdicted area km2 667E+02 636E+03 524E+03 512E+03Total Condemned population 377E+02 353E+04 130E+04 130E+04

Crop disposal area km2 989E+02 712E+03 489E+03 510E+03

Milk disposal area km2 663E+02 778E+03 570E+03 588E+03

The criterion for relocation used is 350 mSv lifetime This translates to the zones inred and yellow in Figure 2 and the total area for these is about 870 km2 which is invery good agreement with the MACCS2 results for all cases except Case 1 Case 3(the best estimate from the current work) is the closest The total number of

population that is reported in Section 33 to have been relocated (above the populationthat has been evacuated and which is not included in the MACCS2 results) is over

80000 This figure too is in substantial agreement with the MACCS2 results for Case3 even though the criterion for relocation has not been disclosed

44 Local consequences

Some results for the semi-deterministic single weather calculations are shown inTable 17 The weather simulates very well the weather conditions that can be deducedfrom the pattern of contamination shown in Figure 2 The calculations are semi-deterministic because the code still calculates consequences rotating the singleweather through the entire windrose and then weighting the results by an equal

probability for each of the 16 sections of the windrose Therefore the absolute (deaths

and injuries) numbers have been hand calculated from the actual population and risksthat are population-independent



26

Table 17 Semi-deterministic consequences resulting from the actual weatherduring the accident

Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4

Acute Fatalities 000E+00 000E+00 000E+00 000E+00

Acute Injuries (no minor) 000E+00 850E+01 000E+00 000E+00Chronic Fatalities to 20 km 159E+03 637E+03 391E+03 446E+03

Chronic Fatalities 20-30 km (Namie) 354E+02 327E+03 152E+03 171E+03

Chronic Fatalities 30-40 km (Iitate) 189E+02 121E+03 588E+02 658E+02Chronic Fatalities for non-evacuatedpeople within 20 km 500E+01 300E+02 200E+02 300E+02Individual risk of lifetime excess death to20 km 440E-03 960E-03 940E-03 110E-02Individual risk of lifetime excess death 20-30 km (Namie) 290E-03 100E-02 100E-02 122E-02Individual risk of lifetime excess death 30-40 km (Iitate) 210E-03 180E-03 500E-03 590E-03

The results show that the single unlucky weather that carried the contamination overland in the Northerly direction simulated in this work by phase 3 is expected to beresponsible for the majority of health effects that MACCS2 calculates for the entiretyof the releases This agrees with all the assumptions that have been made whileassessing the source terms (ie that less than about 10 of the time the winddirection would carry radioactivity over land) Assuming that the release modeled forCase 3 is the closest to the actual release at Fukushima (see previous section) the wayevacuation was carried out is responsible for almost 4000 lifetime excess deaths(BE) and the tardiness in the decision to relocate the population from the vicinity ofthe Namie and Iitate townships (if the population were ever relocated indeed of

which there are no news) is responsible for more than 2000 lifetime excess cancer inthose townships alone

45 Sensitivity Study 1 Chernobyl at Fukushima

This analysis intends to compare the impact of the Fukushima accident to that ofChernobyl with the assumption that the accident in Chernobyl would have occurredin Japan (that is direct comparison of consequences from the two source terms) Thesource terms for the Chernobyl accident are taken from [20] [49] and [50] In

particular Table 1 page 35 of [50] provides estimates of releases in Bq for all majorradionuclides This source terms is translated into MACCS2 release fractions of a

reference core as done for the Fukushima source terms The release is simulated intwo phases one short phase (1000 s) starting almost immediately containing about50 of all releases highly energetic (1e10 W) and occurring at 50 m The second

phase is delayed by two days is relatively low in energy (40 MW) occurs at almostground elevation (10m) and lasts for almost one day All other boundary conditions(emergency response population response etc) are the same as discussed inSection 3 Tables 18 through 21 show the comparison between the results for thisanalysis and those for Case 3 (BE source term) for the Fukushima accident



27

Table 18 Comparison of Chernobyl versus Fukushima source terms health

effects

Health EffectFukushima

Case 3(BE)

ChernobylSource Term

Acute fatalities 000E+00 000E+00

Acute injuries (no minor) 400E+00 890E+01

Lifetime excess deaths total 281E+05 193E+05

Thyroid cancer deaths 235E+03 114E+03

Lungs cancer death 338E+04 402E+04

Lifetime excess deaths to 20 km 230E+03 180E+03

Lifetime excess deaths 20-30 km 100E+03 550E+02


Lifetime excess deaths Tokyo 120E+05 921E+04Lifetime excess deaths for non-evacuated people within 20 km 200E+02 300E+02

Hospitalizations total 544E+05 335E+05

Collective Ingestion Dose (Sv) 190E+05 593E+04 Best Estimate Up to 15 fatalities are predicted for extreme very unlikely

weather conditions (high wind speed with precipitation)

Table 19 Comparison of Chernobyl versus Fukushima source terms societal

risks (individual risks of lifetime death)Individual risk of lifetimeexcess death

FukushimaCase 3

Chernobyl SourceTerm

Risk to 20 km 450E-03 430E-03

Risk 20-30 600E-03 420E-03

Risk 30-40 670E-03 440E-03

Risk Tokyo 230E-03 180E-03

Table 20 Comparison of Chernobyl versus Fukushima source terms costs

Costs (2005 US$)Fukushima

Case 3Chernobyl

Source Term

MACCS2 costs total 2005 US$ 222E+11 100E+11

Actuarial deaths 843E+11 579E+11

Actuarial Injuries 816E+10 503E+10

Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 119E+12 769E+11

Table 21 Comparison of Chernobyl versus Fukushima source terms othersocietal and environmental consequences

ConsequenceFukushima

Case 3Chernobyl

Source Term

Interdicted area to 80 km km2 439E+02 253E+02

Condemned area to 80 km km2 452E+02 271E+02

Relocated population to 80 km 140E+05 830E+04

Condemned population to 80 km 981E+03 300E+03

Interdicted area km2 524E+03 321E+03

Condemned area km2 113E+03 598E+02

Relocated population 203E+06 870E+05

Condemned population 130E+04 300E+03

Crop disposal area km2 489E+03 513E+02Milk disposal area km2 570E+03 520E+02



28

Despite a much larger estimate of immediate initial release of I131 and Cs137 fromthe Chernobyl accident the predicted number of acute fatalities is zero even withmodified inputs to surrogate for the lack of models related to Acute RadiationSickness (ARS) Therefore both in the case of the enormous Fukushima source

term and equally enormous Chernobyl source terms there is no reason why anyrisk measure should be based on I131 or acute consequences These arecompletely insensitive to almost any release However in case that an ldquoextremerdquo weather occurs some of the population that would not participate in the evacuation isaffected This shows the danger to which the unaware population around Fukushimawas exposed given the response of the plant operators and authorities This is shown

by the predicted number of major acute injuries due to radiation exposureAlmost all results for the BE Fukushima source term are much larger than for theChernobyl source term This would indicate that in term of societal impact theaccident at Fukushima is globally much worse than that which occurred at Chernobyl

46 Sensitivity Study 2 Impact of inputs to health effects models

This sensitivity analysis shows the impact of the modified inputs to the health effectsmodels in MACCS2 (See Section 36) All inputs used are as suggested by the codedevelopers (based on ICRPs ACRPs and EPA recommendations [11]) Tables 22through 24 show the comparison of results for the BE Fukushima source term(Case 3) Results for measures that depend only on radioactive contamination (ierelocation data) are not shown because they are the same for the two cases For thisobservation please compare the results for the MACCS2-calculated costs which arethe same (ie the costs are based only on ground contamination)

Table 22 Comparison of results for the BE Fukushima source terms usingdefault MACCS2 inputs to health effects models

Health EffectsFukushima

Case 3(BE)

Case 3MACCS2Defaults




Thyroid cancers 235E+03 584E+02

Lungs cancers 338E+04 294E+04

Lifetime excess deaths to 20 km 230E+03 890E+02Lifetime excess deaths 20-30 km 100E+03 384E+02




Collective Ingestion Dose (Sv) 190E+05 180E+05



29

Table 23 Comparison of results for the BE Fukushima source terms usingdefault MACCS2 inputs to health effects models societal risks (individual risks of lifetime death)

Individual risk of lifetime excess deathFukushima

Case 3(BE)


Risk to 20 km 450E-03 170E-03

Risk 20-30 600E-03 220E-03

Risk 30-40 670E-03 240E-03


Table 24 Comparison of results for the BE Fukushima source terms usingdefault MACCS2 inputs to health effects models costs

CostsFukushima

Case 3


MACCS2 Costs total 2005 US$ 222E+11 222E+11

Actuarial deaths 843E+11 306E+11 Actuarial Injuries 816E+10 236E+10

Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 119E+12 592E+11

It must be pointed out that the results for excess lifetime deaths using the defaulthazard parameters largely under-estimate health effects The average individualTEDE dose for death is gt 22 Sv This actually corresponds roughly only to the

lethal lung dose (long term and short term) Obviously this contradicts the principlesof linearity and reciprocity The results obtained with the modified inputs give one

death (from any cause) per 82 Sv individual TEDE dose in agreement with the

MERCK data [28]

47 Sensitivity Study 3 Releases limited to 200 TBq I131 equivalent

This analysis fulfills two purposes

- To test the safety target for ldquolargerdquo release of 200 TBq of I131-equivalent

suggested in [45] corresponding to lower level of INES5 scale- To show what the consequences of the accident would have been if the

operators had ldquoproperlyrdquo used resources and proper SAM guidance (SAG) to

terminate the accidents after core or fuel damageIt is assumed that each of the four accidents (each unit from Fukushima 1 through 4)would have resulted in the release of 100TBq of I131 about 50 TBq of Cs137 10TBq of SR90 and about 10 TBq of other radionuclides including Ba Ru La Ce andPu The total makeup of such a release is approximately 200 TBq of I131-equivalentAll other boundary conditions for releases are assumed to be the same as for Case 3(BE) Tables 25 through 28 show the results In Tables 25 26 and 27 results areshown for the MACCS2 calculations and for the same adjusted by projecting healtheffects into future generations (not born before the accident) and following [48] toestimate excess still-births



30

Table 25 Fukushima accident with a total release of 200 TBq of I131-equivalenthealth effects

MACCS2Results

Adjusted for futuregenerations


Acute injuries (no minor) 000E+00 000E+00Excess lifetime deaths total 258E+03 645E+03


Lungs cancer deaths 241E+02 603E+02

Excess lifetime deaths to 20 km 848E+02 212E+03

Excess lifetime deaths 20-30 km 113E+02 283E+02


Excess lifetime deaths Tokyo 411E+02 103E+03

Excess lifetime hospitalizations total 539E+03 108E+04


Table 26 Fukushima accident with a total release of 200 TBq of I131-equivalent

individual risks of lifetime excess death Individual lifetime risk of excessdeath

Risk person

risk to 20 km 234E-03

risk 20-30 950E-04

risk 30-40 410E-04

Risk Tokyo 790E-06

Table 27 Fukushima accident with a total release of 200 TBq of I131-equivalentcosts

MACCS2

Results

Adjusted for future

generationsCosts Total 2005 US$ 940E+08 940E+08



Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 495E+10 619E+10

Table 28 Fukushima accident with a total release of 200 TBq of I131-equivalentother societal risks Interdicted area to 80 km km2 500E+01

Condemned to 80 km km2 340E+00

Relocated population to 80 km 703E+03Condemned population to 80 km 120E+01

Interdicted area km2 510E+01

Crop disposal area km2 390E+01

Milk disposal area km2 500E+01

The overall societal risk of death is in good agreement with the conservative estimateassumed in [45] and shows that the proposed risk target of 200 TBq I131-equivalentfor definition of release limit in [45] would be reasonable and defensible from thetechnical point of view even assuming the actual event (common cause failure of fourunits) and not a single accident and making some conservative assumptions on the

projection of excess fatalities beyond the models implemented in MACCS2



31

The results show that if after the accident the operators had succeeded to terminatethe accident with fuelcore damage resulting in releases ldquoonlyrdquo at the 4 x INES5 lowerlevel all expected consequences (ie acute and delayed health effects long termsocietal risks and costs) would be lower at least two orders of magnitude incomparison to estimated consequences of the real accident

This sensitivity study shows also the impact of SAM measures on result of aREAL accident In case of the Fukushima disaster it is obvious from the records

that the operators followed existing SAGs and tried first to recover

measurement devices according to the accident management procedure L-AM-

II01 Step 1 etc [53] However these apparently did not have procedures for

recoveries from loss of power supply and cooling of more than one or all units

including cooling of all spent fuel pools at the same time

48 Sensitivity Study 4 Impact of the release of I131 on the consequences

of the Fukushima accident

The Best Estimate Case 3 source term was used for this sensitivity study assumingthat no Iodine release occurred during the entire accident Tables 29 through 32show the results compared to those of the BE analysis Case 3

Table 29 Impact of the release of Iodine on the consequences of the Fukushimaaccident health effects

Case 3 (BE) No I



Excess lifetime deaths total 281E+05 281E+05


Lungs cancer deaths 338E+04 339E+04Excess lifetime deaths to 20 km 230E+03 228E+03





Thyroid injuries to 40 km 200E+02 181E+02

Thyroid cancer fatalities to 40 km 350E+01 320E+01


Table 30 Impact of the release of Iodine on the consequences of the Fukushima

accident health effectsIndividual lifetime risk ofexcess death

Case 3 (BE)Risk person

No IRisk person

risk to 20 km 450E-03 440E-03

risk 20-30 600E-03 597E-03

risk 30-40 670E-03 660E-03

Risk Tokio 230E-03 230E-03



32

Table 31 Impact of the release of Iodine on the consequences of the Fukushimaaccident costs

Case 3 (BE) No I

Costs Total 2005 US$ 222E+11 220E+11


Actuarial Injuries 816E+10 819E+10Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 119E+12 118E+12

Table 32 Impact of the release of Iodine on the consequences of the Fukushimaaccident other societal risks

Case 3 (BE) No I


Condemned to 80 km km2 452E+02 452E+02




The results show that despite the very large release of I131 the impact onconsequences is VERY marginal This is due to two factors

- The substantial part of the releases occurred between one and four days afterscram The absolute release of I131 was therefore reduced due to decay inaddition the weather pattern during those four days changed and mostreleases did not impact the Japanese territory

- The health effects of I131 are not larger than for any other radionuclide (except Noble Gases) if one compares the dose conversion factors suggested

by the ICRP [11] The one exception is for dose to the thyroid from inhalationacute which is about one order of magnitude higher than that for Cs137 forinstance (due to affinity of Iodine with the thyroid gland) However inhalationin the acute phase cannot expose the thyroid to large doses unless the local airconcentration of iodine exceeds 10 Cim3 for a number of hours acircumstance that is very unlikely Moreover more than 80 Sv are needed

to cause death in the long term (not acute)

The results put in doubt whether the use of KI tablets should be recommended or notif a severe accident at an NPP were to occur All medical literature highlyrecommends this prophylactic practice ([55] through [57]) citing also recent data

from the Chernobyl experience Only [57] quantifies the risks of uptake of KI tablets

First of all all side effects show the same symptoms as radiation sickness (nauseavomiting depilation hyperthyroidism hypothyroidism)Second the risks are at the so called ldquoacceptable levelrdquo ie 1 in 1000 occurrence of

mild symptoms less frequently for more severe symptoms If one is to extrapolate

the risk of ldquomild symptomsrdquo linearly just as for the effects of radiation then

acute sicknesses would occur with probability 1e-4 and death with probability

1e-5 (just as for all other drugs and pharmacopeias which are ldquoapprovedrdquo for

safe use) Table 33 shows a comparison between the expected number of excess injuries anddeaths due to intake of KI tablets for the entire population to 40 km from FukushimaDaichi (408270 people) and those caused by the I131 release These results put into



33

serious doubt the conclusions from the analysis of the data on thyroid cancersdiscussed in [55]As repeatedly stressed thyroid cancers are most likely caused by prolonged

exposure to all radionuclides released from a severe accident not just I131 In fact as discussed above exposure to I131 is marginal unless just about the

entire core inventory is released and the release occurs almost immediately afterscram and is of short duration Due to decay and changes in weather patternsthere cannot be prolonged exposure to I131

Table 33 Comparison between the expected number of excess injuries anddeaths due to intake of KI tablets for the entire population to 40 km from FukushimaDaichi and those caused by the I131 release

Due to KI Tablets Due to I131

Excess injuries to 40 km 410E+01 190E+01

Excess deaths to 40 km 400E+00 300E+00

49 Sensitivity Study 5 Castle Bravo and Fukushima

Castle Bravo was a test that involved detonation of a hydrogen bomb in the Bikini

atoll (Marshall Islands) in March 1954 The test somehow went awry because theyield was 15 MT-equivalent instead of the expected 5 MT-equivalent and the test wasconducted under extremely unfavorable weather conditions ([58] [59]) The falloutreached all atolls of the (now) Marshall Islands Republic exposing about 14000

people to high levels of radiation In addition one Japanese fishing vessel (the DaigoFukuiu Maru) was hit about 65 km from the point of detonation The first case ofdeath due to ARS has been officially recorded among the crew of the vesselImmediately ldquoOperation 41rdquo was initiated to monitor the radiation effects Operation

41 even though defunct for a long time culminated in the BNL report listed asreference [31] (note that both operation 41 and the BNL follow-up were conductedunder the leadership of the same individual Dr Eugene P Cronkite) Some of thedata from operation 41 made its way into the ACRP and ICRP recommendationsused for the ICRP60 Reference [41] gives an estimate of fallout source terms perMT-equivalent in weapons tests These estimates are used to extrapolate the totalsource terms for the Castle Bravo test shown in Table 34 The most significantreleases are highlighted As shown the releases of I131 Ba140 and Ce in general arevery large The releases of these radionuclides in such quantities are unthinkable froma severe accident in an NPP This is not the case for Cs137

Table 34 Fallout source terms for test ldquoCastle Bravordquo

Isotope Bq per MegaTonCastle Bravo

Total Bq

Sr90 37E+15 56E+16

Cs137 52E+15 78E+16

I131 27E+18 41E+19

Ce144 14E+17 21E+18

Ru103 70E+17 11E+19

Ru106 11E+16 17E+17

Zr95 78E+17 12E+19

Ba140 37E+18 56E+19

Y91 74E+17 11E+19Ce143 31E+19 47E+20



34

Nd147 20E+18 30E+19

H3 44E+17 66E+18

An input file for the Bikini site has been developed using the data given in [31] and aMACCS2 calculation was performed to compare results with the known data [59] and

the estimated data [31] for fatalities and injuries The same weather used for theFukushima studies was used and results have been interpolated for a single weatherwith wind direction towards the other atolls of the Marshall Islands Table 35 showsthe comparison between ldquorealrdquo data and the MACCS2 calculations

Table 35 Fatalities and injuries from the fallout of the ldquoCastle Bravordquo detonation

Castle Bravo Predicted (MACCS2) Observed (BNL others) Acute deaths due to radiationsyndrome 300E+00 100E+00


Long term fatalities total 514E+02 532E+02

Thyroid cancers 400E+00 262E+02Lungs cancers 660E+01 000E+00

Long term hospitalizations total 528E+02

The total number of acute deaths and injuries is the same between known data andMACCS2 estimates showing that the new hazard curves adopted for the present

study are valid Overall predictions of long term deaths are also in very goodagreement except that BNL [31] seems to largely overestimate thyroid cancers whileignoring lung cancers In any case both MACCS2 and BNL assessments appear to

confirm that the estimate of total chronic fatalities could be performed just by

dividing the total population TEDE by 8 Sv as was done before the attempt to

separate individual causes of death

The Castle Bravo fallout source term was then input to MACCS2 with the Fukushimasite data file Two analyses have been performed the first with the source termsshown in Table 34 the second suppressing the I131 component Tables 36 through 39show the results compared with those of the BE Fukushima source term

Table 36 Castle Bravo in Fukushima health effectsFukushima Source

Terms Case 3 (BE)Castle Bravo Fallout

Source TermsCastle Bravo NoI131 (41e19 Bq)

Acute fatalities 000E+00 857E+03 692E+03

Acute injuries (no minor) 400E+00 420E+04 330E+04Excess lifetime deaths total 281E+05 102E+06 955E+05

Thyroid cancer deaths 235E+03 128E+04 554E+03

Lungs cancer deaths 338E+04 229E+05 229E+05

Excess lifetime deaths to 20 km 230E+03 942E+03 863E+03

Excess lifetime deaths 20-30 km 100E+03 352E+03 319E+03


Excess lifetime deaths Tokyo 120E+05 342E+05 316E+05

Excess lifetime hospitalizations total 544E+05 125E+06 124E+06

Collective Ingestion Dose (Sv) 190E+05 140E+05 140E+05



35

Table 37 Castle Bravo in Fukushima individual risks

Risk of lifetimedeath

Fukushima SourceTerms Case 3 (BE)

Castle BravoFallout Source

TermsCastle Bravo No I131

(41e19 Bq)

risk to 20 km 450E-03 196E-02 175E-02

risk 20-30 600E-03 211E-02 183E-02

risk 30-40 670E-03 229E-02 199E-02

Risk Tokio 230E-03 471E-03 427E-03

Table 38 Castle Bravo in Fukushima costsFukushima

Source TermsCase 3 (BE)

Castle Bravo FalloutSource Terms

Castle Bravo NoI131 (41e19 Bq)

Costs Total 2005 US$ 222E+11 718E+11 695E+11

Actuarial deaths 843E+11 309E+12 289E+12

Actuarial Injuries 816E+10 194E+11 191E+11

Plants 400E+10 000E+00 000E+00

Total 119E+12 400E+12 377E+12

Table 39 Castle Bravo in Fukushima other societal consequences



TermsCastle Bravo NoI131 (41e19 Bq)

Interdicted area to 80 kmkm2 439E+02 165E+02 145E+02

Condemned to 80 km km2 452E+02 462E+02 462E+02Relocated population to 80km 140E+05 114E+05 114E+05

Condemned population to 80 km 981E+03 121E+04 121E+04

Crop disposal area km2 489E+03 129E+04 516E+03Milk disposal area km2 570E+03 140E+04 452E+03

It can be said that the Fukushima accident resulted in essentially the sameconsequences as expected from the fallout following the detonation of a 4 MT-

equivalent hydrogen bomb Note that the impact for most of the other societal

consequences is higher for the Fukushima releases largely due to the higher

Cs137 content with respect to hydrogen bomb tests In addition the impact of theextremely large I131 fallout is still for the most part marginal except for thyroidcancer deaths Note that the I131 content of the Castle Bravo test fallout is

essentially equal to the entire I131 inventory in Fukushima Daichi (6 cores all

spent fuel and all other fuel on site)

5 Impact from contamination of ocean waters

The radiation released to the ocean via fallout and liquid releases has been dismissedwith the argument that the radiation would be diluted in the enormous volume of thePacific Ocean This argument cannot be easily accepted Considering the fallout the

present estimates (confirmed by the MACCS2 results) would indicate that between 80and 90 of the total atmospheric release was carried over the ocean Which meansthat more than 1e17 Bq of Cs137 (best estimate releases) could have been and are

being deposited on the water Given the spectrum of radionuclides released from the plant the radiological impact scaled as suggested in [47] is much greater The



36

following discussion gives an estimate for the additional liquid pathways of thereleases All appropriate references can be found in [37]

On 21 April TEPCO estimated that 520 tons of radioactive water leaked into the sea before leaks were plugged releasing 4700 TBq of total liquid release (calculated by

simple sum which is inconsistent with the IAEA methodology for mixed nuclidereleases but still 20000 times facilitys annual limit) TEPCOs detailed estimateswere 2800 TBq of I131 940 TBq of Cs-134 940 TBq of Cs137 An approximate1E14 Bqs of Cs137 were released into the ocean by dumping lower levelcontaminated water from units 5 and 6 (11500 tons of water) In addition 67000 tonsof highly radioactive water was present in all the pools and puddles within the 6 unitsand auxiliary buildings in open areas These eventually either leaked or were released(WITH THE CONSENT OF THE JAPANESE AUTHORITY because thecapacity of the storage facilities was exhausted If the concentrations reported byTEPCO on 25th March 2011 [38] are used then the total content of Cs137 in the67000 tons is 12e16 Bq The total liquid release would amount to about 14e16 Bq of

Cs137 Adding this release to the estimated atmospheric fallout more than 11e17 Bqof Cs137 are estimated to have been or will be released to the ocean waterTEPCO confirmed the estimates at the end of April through some computersimulation [39] According to [40] the velocity of the oceanic currents in the WesternPacific is about 10 kmhour and the pattern of circulation would keep the aerosolcontent for the most part around the Japanese East coast The velocity of deposition inair is about 001 ms [11] Assuming that velocity of deposition in sea water is equalto the velocity of deposition in air multiplied by the ratio of densities the aerosolwould reach 60 m or about the depth where marine life becomes sparse in about 70days and the current would have traveled about 16000 km This is sufficient time formost of the radioactivity to be ingested or ldquobreathedrdquo in by fish and other marine

organisms This would trigger a never ending cycle for perpetuation of theradioactivity which may not only kill marine life forms like it kills humans butwould ultimately end up on the tables of the Japanese population The fish seafoodwhale meat and seaweed consumed may have concentrations below legal limits butthe radioactive content will be increased from normal levels As noted in Section363 the ingestion dose could be substantial even if the legal limits for the foodstuffare preserved This cycle will last for many generations because of the food chain offish and other marine fauna and the radioactivity will be recycled and in fact the meatcontent will increase rather than decreasing by decay Even if only one one-hundredthof the radioactivity (more than 1e15 Bq of CS137) were to enter this recirculation

pattern the collective whole body ingestion dose over many generations wouldexceed 1e7 Sv sufficient to kill more than 1000000 people

The estimate given above underscores the effects on marine life itself Measured

concentrations of I131 Cs134 and Cs137 in the ocean water show values up to

3500 Bql in zones further than 15 km from shore as of April 15 2011 and

probably rising [46] According to [41] for Cs the bio-accumulation factor for fishin salt water is 40 Bio-accumulation factor is defined as the ratio of concentration ofradionuclides in flora or fauna in Bqkg to concentration of radionuclide in water inBql Thus the accumulation of Cs137 in fish meat per kg is going to beapproximately 40 times larger than the measured activity in water per liter (from the

figure given above up to 140000 Bqkg) For other organisms weighting factorshave been defined by the ICRP relative to the effect on humans [42] as shown in



37

Table 40 The effects reflect for the most part the weight in kg of the organismsrelative to the weight of manTable 40 Relative weight of effects of radiation with respect to humans

Organism relative weight

Viruses bacteria protozoans

003 ndash 00003

Insects 01 ndash 0002

Mollusks 006 ndash 0006

Plants 2 ndash 002

Fish 075 ndash 003

Amphibians 04 ndash 014

Reptiles 1 ndash 0075

Birds 06 ndash 015

Therefore for fish taking an average 04 relative weights for effects the net biological effect is 16 times larger than for humans with respect to the measurementin Bq in the water Using the ingestion DCF for humans (see Section 363) the

potential of 1e15 Bq of Cs137 means death of 22e8 kg of fish And the concentrationof radioactivity in the flesh of the fish that is harvested is 40 times higher per kg thanthe concentration in the water per liter which means that the estimated potential forhuman ingestion over several generations could be much larger

6 Conclusions

This work explored the potential of the Fukushima atmospheric and marine release of

radioactivity in view also of the mitigative countermeasures used after the accidentThe real inventory of Iodine and Cs in the spent fuel pools could not be assessed

because the age of the fuel is not known therefore it was assumed that inventorieswere the same as during operation The large releases of Cs are a result of the GEBWR inventories at power In reality inventories of Cs may be approximatelycorrect but releases of Iodine are conservative The following provides a summary ofthe findings of the study

1 Assessments performed for this work show that the release estimate forFukushima is higher than for Chernobyl as far as Cs137 is concerned becauseof the significant fraction of releases coming from spent fuel pools where

much lower inventories of Iodine131 are present in comparison to Cs1372 Evacuation models are constructed to reflect the multi stage evacuation

scheme adopted during the accident with large delays and not strictlyenforced almost 27 of the population was still in place in the entire area to20 km as of July 2011 This population and the population from the mostcontaminated areas beyond 20 km received cumulative TEDE doses tens oftimes higher (30-60 times) than the 1 mSv annual yearly dose limit in a fourmonth period

3 IAEA suggested a criterion of 10MBqm2 to expand evacuation areas this is~20-times the contamination limit for relocation after Chernobyl The exactlevel of intervention (if any) has never been made public

4 For acute health effects the MACCS2 code allows for assessment only ofdeaths due to doses to lungs bone marrow and Gastro-Intestinal (GI) tract



38

(ie through induced cancers but not of thyroid) whereas the Merckmedical investigations show acute health effects not due to cancers but tohematopoietic effects (ARS) with the hazard threshold at 1Sv or less and notat 4 Sv as assumed in MACCS2 inputs It should be noted here also that itcannot be expected in general cancers to develop within 1 month Therefore

the consideration of cancers as acute health effects is incorrect and notcorresponding with the real development of consequences of radiationexposure From this also it follows that assuming only acute health effects

as the measure of severity of nuclear accidents is incorrect (See also [45])

This has implications on basing all measurements on I131 Calculations

performed for the ldquoCastle Bravordquo hydrogen bomb test fallout show that

these conclusions are supported by evidence

5 In particular comparisons of consequences with and without releases of

I131 and with those from fallout of hydrogen bombs show that the

relevance of releases of I131 from NPP severe accidents is largely over-

played The current philosophy of basing all consequences and dosimetric

measurements on I131 should be abandoned in favor of some othermeasure of risk Prophylactic use of KI tablets should be reviewed with

much more attention

6 In case of chronic health effects and MACCS2 calculations only excess

cancer deaths are considered despite the fact that infectious diseases

cardiovascular diseases and other diseases due to genetic effects would be

bigger contributors to excess deaths due to radiation than cancers [45 47

and 48] In addition the hazard curves consider the potential effects only

for the population living at the time of the accident and give no

assessment for future generations (see conclusion 7)

From what is said in items 4 and 5 it is obvious that the results both for acutehealth effects and for chronic long-term health effects can be considered

largely under-estimated by the MACCS2 code

7 Other problems with models in the MACCS2 code were recognized modelsfor health effects are inconsistent with health physics references or principlesconcerning lethal doses the linearity principle of doses vs health effects etctherefore changes in some parameters were introduced to be consistent withevidence and to follow widely accepted principles and to be as objective as thecode allows It would be advisable to return to the original assessment for

chronic excess deaths which was performed on the basis of total populationTEDE (1 death per 8 person-Sv) Calculations performed for the ldquoCastle

Bravordquo hydrogen bomb fallout show that these conclusions are supported

by the results of the most recent assessment of chronic deaths due to the

fallout8 The results with respect to health effects show that within 80 years the number

of victims of the Fukushima disaster can be expected to be AT LEAST in the

range of 10000 to 300000 people in terms of deaths due to infectious

diseases cardiovascular diseases genetic diseases and cancers and about

the same number of sicknessessyndromes needing prolonged

hospitalization and health care are expected to occur This estimates

accounts only for the population already living at the time of the accidentA comparable number of excess deaths and sicknesses may be expected in



39

the population that will be born in the period In addition to these more

than 100000 excess still-births and a comparable or larger number of

excess children born with genetic deformations (eg Down syndrome) are

expected projecting the results of [48] The consequences from the

accident at Fukushima are equivalent to those resulting from the fallout

following detonation of a 4 MT hydrogen bomb 9 Some estimates of contamination of ocean waters were performed also within

the study where fallout of atmospheric releases into the ocean as well asleakages and intentional discharge of highly contaminated waters into theocean were taken into considerations More than 11e17 Bq of Cs137 in totalis estimated to have been released into the ocean With respect to bio-accumulation and weighting factors for fish and other sea fauna a long-term

cycle can be expected and high potential for marine life sea-birds and

human health effects through ingestion over generations10 At the time of the Fukushima nuclear disaster the Chernobyl nuclear accident

was considered to be the worst accident that ever occurred Comparison of

results for the Fukushima best estimate and Chernobyl source terms used forthe Fukushima site shows that the Fukushima accident as a whole is verylikely the largest nuclear accident which mankind experienced becauseestimates of long term fatalities risks of death and other societal impact basedon Chernobyl source terms in Fukushima show lower potential ofconsequences than Fukushima source terms

With respect to consequences it must be noted that potential health effectsestimates are highly influenced by the fact that about 50 of surrounding areaaround the site is sea and that the prevailing wind direction at Fukushima istowards sea waters (gt70 of the time) and thus the MACCS2 results are muchless than half of what they would be if Fukushima were surrounded by industrialland But this does not mean that estimates of potential health effects cover all

possible consequences The true potential includes also environmental long

term effects as well as indirect health effects originating from environmental

contamination and through the marine life food chain none of which are

directly addressed in MACCS2 calculations

11 Some estimates with respect to other societal risks were performed within thestudy showing potential for very large economic short- and long-term impactstaking into account costs for relocation livestock disposal and assessment forcondemned and interdicted areas Criterion for relocation used was of 350mSv

lifetime Total areas estimated to be closed for 30 years or more are between400 to about 900 km2 which is in very good agreement with the areas (about870 km2) assessed from the measurements of NNSAUSDOE on Aerial Mapof Surface Contamination from March 16th 2011

12 Within the study it was shown that if the PSA had been performed properlyand conservatively enough considering cliff edge effects involving all units atthe site and focusing on RISKS AND NOT ON FREQUENCIES ONLYthe SAGs would have included also procedures for the case of loss of power

and cooling in all units at the site (and the need for sufficient resources) andoperators following instructions in better risk-informed SAGs may havesucceeded to terminate the accident in Fukushima with much smaller

consequences (at least two orders of magnitude)



40

Taking into account all other circumstances of the nuclear disaster together

with the effects of the tsunami and earthquake and including not only

immediate and tangible consequences but also psychological and very long

term impacts it can be concluded that Fukushima probably is the biggest

natural AND industrial nuclear (man-made) event which mankind ever

experienced in its history



41

ACRONYMS

ALARP As Low As Reasonably PracticalARS Acute Radiation SyndromeBE Best Estimate

BEIR National Academy of Sciences Advisory Committee on theBiological Effects of Ionizing Radiation (USA)

Bq Bequerel - radioactivity unit (number of decays per second)BWR Boiling Water ReactorCs Cesium chemical elementDCF Dose Conversion FactorDDREF Dose and Dose Rate EffectivenessECRR European Committee on Radiation RiskEU European UnionGE General ElectricGI Gastro-Intestinal

Gy Gray - radiation absorbed dose unitI Iodine chemical elementIAEA International Atomic Energy AgencyICRP International Commission for Radiation ProtectionIRSN Institut de Radioprotection et de Sucircreteacute Nucleacuteaire (France)JNES Japan Nuclear Energy Safety organizationLD50 Lethal Dose with 50 probability of deathLHS Latin Hypercube SamplingMACCS2 MELCOR Accident Consequence Code SystemsMELCOR Methods for Estimation of Leakages and Consequences of

Releases - code developed by Sandia National Laboratories forthe US Nuclear Regulatory Commission for analyzing severeaccidents in nuclear industry

MEXT Ministry of Education of JapanMOX Mixed Oxide Fuel contains Plutonium blended with natural

uranium reprocessed uranium or depleted uraniumMT MegaTon of TNT equivalent

N North NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration (USDOE) NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration NW North-West

Pu Plutonium chemical elementrem radiation protection unit (radiation equivalent measure)Sv Sievert - radiation protection unitSPEEDI System for Prediction of Environmental Emergency Dose

InformationTEDE Total Effective Dose EquivalentTEPCO Tokyo Electric Power CompanyUSDOE US Department of EnergyUSNRC US Nuclear Regulatory Commission protecting people and

environmentUNSCEAR United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic

RadiationWHO World Health Organization



42

REFERENCES

1 TEPCO status release No 35 March 29th 20112 globalresearchcaindexphpcontext=vaampaid=24376 WHO No Need for

new Public Health Measures April 14th 2011 also in NHK (Japanese public media) archives

3 akiotumblrcompost3869218042 fukushima-daiichi-nuclear-plant-detected-radiation March 14th 2011 from NHK

4 La Repubblica June 5th 20115 NISA missing information until March 24th quoted in JiJi press and

verifiable in MEXT (Ministry of education Culture Sport science andTechnology-Japan) database of radiation monitoring posts outside of the

plant httpwwwmextgojpenglish ldquoReading of environmental

radioactivity levelsrdquo This database was available also in English untilmid-April 2011 Translations of the documents were patchy occasional

and incomplete after that time6 Martin Alex Lowdown on nuclear crisis and potential scenarios Japan

Times 20 March 2011 p 37 Qiao Wu ldquoIntroduction to Boiling Water Reactor (BWR)rdquo Department of

Nuclear Engineering Oregon State University NE 113 413988 B Aktas ldquoBWR Fuel and ABWR experiencerdquo GE-Hitachi Nuclear

Energy lectures at ldquo1 week WNU Course Turkeyrdquo September 2008 9 NISAMETI News Releases especially April 12 2011 ldquoINES Rating on

the event in Fukushima-Daichi Power Stationrdquo Revised and updated June6th 2011

10 www-pubiaeaorgMTDCpublicationsINES-2009_webpdf INES - TheInternational Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale pg 16

11 D Chanin ML Young ldquoCode Manual for MACCS2rdquo Volumes 1 and 2

NUREGCR-6613 SAND97-0594 published May 199812 International Committee on Radiological Protection ldquo1990

Recommendations of the International Commission on RadiologicalProtectionrdquo Annals of the ICRP ICRP Publication 60 Vol 21 Nos 1-3Pergamon Press New York 1991

13 Electronic Systems San Diego Ca Radiation Monitoring EMSEnvironmental Monitoring Station data sheet ESI Doc EMSDS-01-01-03Technical Specifications

14 General Atomics LCU-05 Area Gamma Monitor Data Sheet ESI DocDSLCU05-01-03 Electronic Systems San Diego Ca15 enwikipediaorgwikiFileFukushima_trajectory_animation_for_days_10

_to_21_after_the_accidentgif from NOAA Hysplit Model16 Energy Research Inc ldquoA Regulatory Evaluation of the Muumlhleberg

Probabilistic Safety Assessment Part II Level 2rdquo Final Report October

1993 ERIHSK 93-304 HSK 11356 prepared for the Swiss Federal Nuclear Authority HSK

17 httpcommonswikimediaorgwikiFileNNSA_DOE_Dose_Map_Fukushimapng

18 Sylvia Westall and Fredrik Dahl Vienna Mar 30 2011 533pm EDT

Reuters - ldquoRadiation measured at a village 40 km from Japans cripplednuclear plant exceeded a criterion for evacuation the UN nuclear



43

watchdog said on Wednesday the latest sign of widening consequencesfrom the crisisrdquo

19 OECD Papers Volume 3 Issue 1 OECD 200320 Chernobylskaia Katastrofa Bariachtara Kiev Naukova Dumka 199521 INES Rating on the Events in Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station

by the Tohoku District - off the Pacific Ocean Earthquake JNSC 12April 2011 httpwwwnisametigojpenglishfilesen20110412-4pdf Retrieved 15 April 2011

22 Central Institute for Meteorology and Geodynamics (ZAMG) ViennaMarch 24th 2011

23 TEPCO Release wwwtepcocojpenpresscorp-comreleasebetu11_eimages110421e2pdf

24 R Gauntt et al ldquoMELCOR Computer Code Manualsrdquo Vols 1 and 2

NUREGCR-6119 SAND2000-2417 October 200025 EGCazzoli J Vitaacutezkovaacute ldquoRisk Assessment on Future Nuclear Industry

Developments (or Alternative Nuclear Options) Summary Reportrdquo

CC002005 prepared for GaBePSI Paul Scherrer Institut SwitzerlandApril 1 2006

26 enwikipediaorgwikiEvacuations_and_Japanese_reaction_to_the_Fukushima_I_nuclear_accidents

27 Upton AC National Council on Radiation Protection and MeasurementsScientific Committee 1-6 ldquoThe state of the art in the 1990s NCRP Report

No 136 on the scientific bases for linearity in the dose-responserelationship for ionizing radiationrdquo Health Physics 2003 July 85(1) pages

152228 Radiation Exposure and Contamination Merck Manuals

httpwwwmerckcommmpesec21ch317ch317ahtml Retrieved 8 April2011

29 Dongmei Qiu Kota Katanoda Tomomi Marugame Tomotaka Sobue AJoinpoint regression analysis of long-term trends in cancer mortality inJapan (1958 ndash 2004) DOI 101002ijc23911 2008 Wiley-Liss Inc

30 ldquoSources and Effects of Ionizing Radiationrdquo United Nations Scientific

Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation UNSCEAR 2008 Volume

II Annex D Health effects due to radiation from the Chernobyl accident

United Nations New York 201131 ldquoEstimation of the Baseline of Cancers Among Marshallese and the

Number of Cancers Attributable to Exposure to Fallout from Nuclear

Weapons Testing Conducted in the Marshall Islandsrdquo Division of CancersEpidemiology and Genetics National Cancer Institute National Institutesof Health Department of Health and Human Services Prepared for SenateCommittee on Energy and Natural Resources September 2004

32 ldquoEstimating Radiogenic Cancer Risksrdquo US Environmental ProtectionAgency 401 M Street SW Washington DC 20460 EPA 402-R-93-076June 1994

33 K Matsuyama synthesis of regulatory limits reported by Bloombergnet inwwwbloombergcom news2011-03-21japan-sets-safe-limits-for-consuming-radiation-contaminated-food-table-html

34 Director-General Department of Food Safety Pharmaceutical and FoodSafety Bureau Ministry of Health Labour and Welfare Notice No 0317Article 3 of the Department of Food Safety March 17 2011



44

35 University of Maryland Environmental Health and Safety BoardRadiation Safety Committee ldquoA Summary of Radiation Dose Guidelines

and Limits Applicable to Human Subjectsrdquo UMB 2010 36 Code of Federal Regulations Title 10CFR Part 2037 All the appropriate references can be found in enwikipediaorg

wikiFukushima_I_nuclear_accidents 38 TEPCO Press Release Result of the investigation on exposure to radiation

of workers from cooperative companies at Unit 3 in Fukushima Daichi Nuclear Power Station 25th March 2011

39 NHK Article Sunday May 22 2011 0115 +0900 (JST)40 Ocean Currents - sea depth oceans effects temperature important

largest salt system source effect salinity oxygen Pacific httpwwwwaterencyclopediacomMi-OcOcean-Currentshtmlixzz1PNFSXekK

41 Koprda V Ecological influence of energetic sources In 53 Zjazdchemickyacutech spoločnostiacute Zborniacutek priacutespevkov Diel 3 410 p ISBN 80-89029-24-8

42 A D Wrixon New ICRP recommendations Journal on RadiologicalProtection iopscienceioporg0952-4746282R02pdf0952-4746_28_2_R02pdf Retrieved 2011-04-15

43 httpsearchjapantimescojpcgi-binnn20110501a2html Sunday May 12011

44 DOSE-GARD Microelectronic Dosimeter data sheet General AtomicElectronic Systems San Diego Ca 92123

45 J Vitaacutezkovaacute EG Cazzoli ldquoRisk Targets in view of Fukushima Facts andMythsrdquo paper submitted to Nordic PSA Conference Stockholm SwedenSeptember 5-6 2011

46 Ing G Schmidt ldquoRadiological Consequences of the Fukushima Event via

Water Pathwaysrdquo Oeko-Institut e V Darmstadt 1804201147 IngRHincaPhD Radiačnaacute bezpečnosť a ochrana pred ožiareniacutem Slovak

University of Technology Bratislava Faculty of Electrical Engineering andInformation Technology Department of Nuclear Physics and Technology2009

48 Hagen Scherb GSFIBB ldquoFehlbindungen SaumluglingssterblickheitSchilddruumlsekrebs und die Tschernobyl-Katastropheldquo GSF-Forschungzentrum fuumlr Umwelt und Gesundheit Institut fuumlr Biomathematikund Biometrie (IBB) Neuherberg bei Muumlnchen Deutschland September2006

49 S Guumlntay D Powers and L Devell ldquoThe Chernobyl Reactor AccidentSource Term Development of a Consensus Viewrdquo 1996 50 ldquoChernobyl Assessment of Radiological and Health Impacts 2002 Update

of ldquoChernobyl 10 Years onrdquordquo NEAOECD 2002 51 Institut de Radioprotection et de Sucircreteacute Nucleacuteaire Health Consequences of

chronic internal contaminations by radionuclides Direction de laRadioprotection de lrsquohomme Report BP 17 Comments on the ECRR

report rdquoThe health effects of ionizing radiation exposure at low doses forradiation protection purposesrdquo R eport DRPHNo 2005-20

52 Ch Busby The Health Outcome of the Fukushima Catastrophe Initialanalysis from Risk Model of the European Committee on Radiation Risk

ECRR Green Audit Occasional Paper 20117 Aberystwyth UK 30th

March 2011





2

1 Introduction

In the immediate aftermath of the Fukushima disaster the plants operator theJapanese authority UNSCEAR WHO and the IAEA insisted for more than a monththat the accident would cause no (immediate) health consequences ([1] [2] and [3]

among others) The qualifier ldquoimmediaterdquo was often omitted Following the accidentevacuation was asked for but not enforced in a patchy and multi-stage fashion in aradius of 20 km The population probably trusted the official reports that ldquono health

threat is expectedrdquo and much more than 20 of the residents within the 20 km radiusremained in their homes and many returned after the end of April 2011 [26]Evacuation (better called relocation) from 20 to 30 km has been called for but there isno evidence that it has been enforced as of July 2011 The Japanese authority has

been praised by the IAEA (May 20th 2011) for their management of the aftermath ofthe accident despite all the disinformation and misinformation that came from theofficial channels ([4] and [5]) Since precise information on the events is notavailable this work explores critically the consequences that can be expected using

the USNRC code MACCS2 in order to elaborate to some extent how accurate theofficial statements were concerning the severity of the accidentThe emotion caused by the disaster should induce the nuclear community to lookmore carefully at the risks and not to ignore reality in order to preserve our corporateinterests All the data and information used are from available authoritative sources

published during the accident by the Japanese authorities and their technicalconsultants and from reputed international organizations

2 Estimate of releases of I131 and Cs137

A range of atmospheric releases is estimated using three methods dosimetricmeasurements at the plant simplified accident progression and assessment of groundcontamination from aerial maps Estimates from other sources are also included toarrive at the range Estimates of radioactive inventories for all the fuel present at thesite are also needed for the assessment from accident progression Note that manyassumptions are made to arrive at source terms in all three methods Theseassumptions are not critical because ranges of releases (ie considering uncertainties)are defined including the results of other independent assessments Moreover only asmall fraction of the overall releases has been dispersed over inhabited ground andthe results of the MACCS2 calculations for best estimates agree with the reported ormeasurable data (relocated population total areas with severe ground contamination

local dosimetric measurements)

21 Estimate of radioactive inventories

At the time of the accident the units and central storage facility contained the numberof fuel assemblies shown in Table 1 ([6]) The core in Unit 1 will be taken asldquoreference corerdquo in terms of number of assemblies for the estimate of releases from

accident progression for all units



3


Location Unit

1

Unit

2

Unit

3

Unit

4

Unit

5

Unit

6

Central

Storage

Reactor Fuel

Assemblies

400 548 548 0 548 764 0


292 587 514 1331 946 876 6375

New Fuel

Assemblies

100 28 52 204 48 64 na






I131 57e18 69e18 13e19

Cs137 19e18 71e18 90e18

Pu 16e18 60e18 76e18






4







03 Sv 8872e-9 SvBq = 338E7 Bq





5




36 ms x 70 m x 120 m = 30240 m3 s


122e11 Bq-sm3 x 3024E4 m3s x (107) = 527e15 Bq














6
















7











235 Summary





I131 Bq 14E16 3E16 14E16-2E17 9E16

Cs137 Bq 5E15 9E15 5E15-6E16 3E16



8


Minimum Maximum

I131 13E+17 20E+17

Cs137 38E+16 61E+16




per year









9





Total 814E+03 535E+15



10




11













12






Chernobyl ([19][20]) 18E18 85E16


ZAMG [22] 4E17 33E16








survey

86E17 29E17





3 Inputs to MACCS2





13










(Min)10E+00 19E-02 29E-02 15E-02 97E-03 29E-03 15E-04 29E-05

Case 2

(Max)10E+00 27E-01 12E+00 60E-01 40E-01 12E-01 60E-03 12E-03

Case 3

(B E)10E+00 12E-01 54E-01 27E-01 18E-01 54E-02 27E-03 54E-04

Case 4

(BEMOX)10E+00 12E-01 54E-01 27E-01 18E-01 54E-02 27E-03 54E-03









14

32 Population data













15













16

34 Meteorology




Ocean 071

Rest of Japan 014



35 Economic data















17




















18














19



0

20

40

60

80

100

0 2 4 6 8 10

Dose (Sv)


Probability of

death


Mortality distance

10E+17

60E+17

11E+18

16E+18

21E+18

0 2 4 6 8

Distance (km)

I - 1 3 1 E q


Mortality distance








20









younger groups



CancerDeath Rate


LEUKEMIA 112E-02 112E-02 1

BONE 104E-03 104E-03 1

BREAST 621E-03 183E-02 1

LUNG 178E-02 199E-02 1

THYROID 146E-03 828E-03 1

GI 158E-02 661E-02 1






21





4 Results














22





the tsunami











263E+04 427E+05 281E+05 349E+05



753E+02 320E+03 230E+03 261E+03


242E+02 138E+03 100E+03 110E+02


188E+02 109E+03 795E+02 838E+02



400E+01 200E+02 200E+02 200E+02





23


risk to 20 km 200E-03 510E-03 450E-03 540E-03

risk 20-30 km 200E-03 650E-03 600E-03 710E-03

risk 30-40 km 210E-03 720E-03 670E-03 720E-03

risk Tokyo 170E-04 320E-03 230E-03 290E-03













24





43 Economic impact









Plants 400E+10 400E+10 400E+10 400E+10

Total 132E+11 189E+12 119E+12 150E+12





25





















26
















27


effects


Case 3(BE)
















FukushimaCase 3


Risk to 20 km 450E-03 430E-03

Risk 20-30 600E-03 420E-03

Risk 30-40 670E-03 440E-03




Case 3Chernobyl

Source Term




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 119E+12 769E+11



Case 3Chernobyl

Source Term












28








Case 3(BE)














29



Case 3(BE)


Risk to 20 km 450E-03 170E-03

Risk 20-30 600E-03 220E-03

Risk 30-40 670E-03 240E-03



CostsFukushima

Case 3




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 119E+12 592E+11




MERCK data [28]









30


MACCS2Results














Risk person


risk 20-30 950E-04

risk 30-40 410E-04

Risk Tokyo 790E-06


MACCS2

Results

Adjusted for future




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 495E+10 619E+10











31












Case 3 (BE) No I
















No IRisk person

risk to 20 km 450E-03 440E-03

risk 20-30 600E-03 597E-03

risk 30-40 670E-03 660E-03




32


Case 3 (BE) No I

Costs Total 2005 US$ 222E+11 220E+11



Total 119E+12 118E+12


Case 3 (BE) No I





















33















Total Bq

Sr90 37E+15 56E+16

Cs137 52E+15 78E+16

I131 27E+18 41E+19

Ce144 14E+17 21E+18

Ru103 70E+17 11E+19

Ru106 11E+16 17E+17

Zr95 78E+17 12E+19

Ba140 37E+18 56E+19

Y91 74E+17 11E+19Ce143 31E+19 47E+20



34

Nd147 20E+18 30E+19

H3 44E+17 66E+18






























35






(41e19 Bq)

risk to 20 km 450E-03 196E-02 175E-02

risk 20-30 600E-03 211E-02 183E-02

risk 30-40 670E-03 229E-02 199E-02

Risk Tokio 230E-03 471E-03 427E-03








Plants 400E+10 000E+00 000E+00

Total 119E+12 400E+12 377E+12





















36














37




003 ndash 00003



Plants 2 ndash 002

Fish 075 ndash 003



Birds 06 ndash 015



6 Conclusions











38












much more attention























39
























40









41

ACRONYMS















42

REFERENCES



























43



























44






















March 2011





3


Location Unit

1

Unit

2

Unit

3

Unit

4

Unit

5

Unit

6

Central

Storage

Reactor Fuel

Assemblies

400 548 548 0 548 764 0


292 587 514 1331 946 876 6375

New Fuel

Assemblies

100 28 52 204 48 64 na






I131 57e18 69e18 13e19

Cs137 19e18 71e18 90e18

Pu 16e18 60e18 76e18






4







03 Sv 8872e-9 SvBq = 338E7 Bq





5




36 ms x 70 m x 120 m = 30240 m3 s


122e11 Bq-sm3 x 3024E4 m3s x (107) = 527e15 Bq














6
















7











235 Summary





I131 Bq 14E16 3E16 14E16-2E17 9E16

Cs137 Bq 5E15 9E15 5E15-6E16 3E16



8


Minimum Maximum

I131 13E+17 20E+17

Cs137 38E+16 61E+16




per year









9





Total 814E+03 535E+15



10




11













12






Chernobyl ([19][20]) 18E18 85E16


ZAMG [22] 4E17 33E16








survey

86E17 29E17





3 Inputs to MACCS2





13










(Min)10E+00 19E-02 29E-02 15E-02 97E-03 29E-03 15E-04 29E-05

Case 2

(Max)10E+00 27E-01 12E+00 60E-01 40E-01 12E-01 60E-03 12E-03

Case 3

(B E)10E+00 12E-01 54E-01 27E-01 18E-01 54E-02 27E-03 54E-04

Case 4

(BEMOX)10E+00 12E-01 54E-01 27E-01 18E-01 54E-02 27E-03 54E-03









14

32 Population data













15













16

34 Meteorology




Ocean 071

Rest of Japan 014



35 Economic data















17




















18














19



0

20

40

60

80

100

0 2 4 6 8 10

Dose (Sv)


Probability of

death


Mortality distance

10E+17

60E+17

11E+18

16E+18

21E+18

0 2 4 6 8

Distance (km)

I - 1 3 1 E q


Mortality distance








20









younger groups



CancerDeath Rate


LEUKEMIA 112E-02 112E-02 1

BONE 104E-03 104E-03 1

BREAST 621E-03 183E-02 1

LUNG 178E-02 199E-02 1

THYROID 146E-03 828E-03 1

GI 158E-02 661E-02 1






21





4 Results














22





the tsunami











263E+04 427E+05 281E+05 349E+05



753E+02 320E+03 230E+03 261E+03


242E+02 138E+03 100E+03 110E+02


188E+02 109E+03 795E+02 838E+02



400E+01 200E+02 200E+02 200E+02





23


risk to 20 km 200E-03 510E-03 450E-03 540E-03

risk 20-30 km 200E-03 650E-03 600E-03 710E-03

risk 30-40 km 210E-03 720E-03 670E-03 720E-03

risk Tokyo 170E-04 320E-03 230E-03 290E-03













24





43 Economic impact









Plants 400E+10 400E+10 400E+10 400E+10

Total 132E+11 189E+12 119E+12 150E+12





25





















26
















27


effects


Case 3(BE)
















FukushimaCase 3


Risk to 20 km 450E-03 430E-03

Risk 20-30 600E-03 420E-03

Risk 30-40 670E-03 440E-03




Case 3Chernobyl

Source Term




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 119E+12 769E+11



Case 3Chernobyl

Source Term












28








Case 3(BE)














29



Case 3(BE)


Risk to 20 km 450E-03 170E-03

Risk 20-30 600E-03 220E-03

Risk 30-40 670E-03 240E-03



CostsFukushima

Case 3




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 119E+12 592E+11




MERCK data [28]









30


MACCS2Results














Risk person


risk 20-30 950E-04

risk 30-40 410E-04

Risk Tokyo 790E-06


MACCS2

Results

Adjusted for future




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 495E+10 619E+10











31












Case 3 (BE) No I
















No IRisk person

risk to 20 km 450E-03 440E-03

risk 20-30 600E-03 597E-03

risk 30-40 670E-03 660E-03




32


Case 3 (BE) No I

Costs Total 2005 US$ 222E+11 220E+11



Total 119E+12 118E+12


Case 3 (BE) No I





















33















Total Bq

Sr90 37E+15 56E+16

Cs137 52E+15 78E+16

I131 27E+18 41E+19

Ce144 14E+17 21E+18

Ru103 70E+17 11E+19

Ru106 11E+16 17E+17

Zr95 78E+17 12E+19

Ba140 37E+18 56E+19

Y91 74E+17 11E+19Ce143 31E+19 47E+20



34

Nd147 20E+18 30E+19

H3 44E+17 66E+18






























35






(41e19 Bq)

risk to 20 km 450E-03 196E-02 175E-02

risk 20-30 600E-03 211E-02 183E-02

risk 30-40 670E-03 229E-02 199E-02

Risk Tokio 230E-03 471E-03 427E-03








Plants 400E+10 000E+00 000E+00

Total 119E+12 400E+12 377E+12





















36














37




003 ndash 00003



Plants 2 ndash 002

Fish 075 ndash 003



Birds 06 ndash 015



6 Conclusions











38












much more attention























39
























40









41

ACRONYMS















42

REFERENCES



























43



























44






















March 2011





4







03 Sv 8872e-9 SvBq = 338E7 Bq





5




36 ms x 70 m x 120 m = 30240 m3 s


122e11 Bq-sm3 x 3024E4 m3s x (107) = 527e15 Bq














6
















7











235 Summary





I131 Bq 14E16 3E16 14E16-2E17 9E16

Cs137 Bq 5E15 9E15 5E15-6E16 3E16



8


Minimum Maximum

I131 13E+17 20E+17

Cs137 38E+16 61E+16




per year









9





Total 814E+03 535E+15



10




11













12






Chernobyl ([19][20]) 18E18 85E16


ZAMG [22] 4E17 33E16








survey

86E17 29E17





3 Inputs to MACCS2





13










(Min)10E+00 19E-02 29E-02 15E-02 97E-03 29E-03 15E-04 29E-05

Case 2

(Max)10E+00 27E-01 12E+00 60E-01 40E-01 12E-01 60E-03 12E-03

Case 3

(B E)10E+00 12E-01 54E-01 27E-01 18E-01 54E-02 27E-03 54E-04

Case 4

(BEMOX)10E+00 12E-01 54E-01 27E-01 18E-01 54E-02 27E-03 54E-03









14

32 Population data













15













16

34 Meteorology




Ocean 071

Rest of Japan 014



35 Economic data















17




















18














19



0

20

40

60

80

100

0 2 4 6 8 10

Dose (Sv)


Probability of

death


Mortality distance

10E+17

60E+17

11E+18

16E+18

21E+18

0 2 4 6 8

Distance (km)

I - 1 3 1 E q


Mortality distance








20









younger groups



CancerDeath Rate


LEUKEMIA 112E-02 112E-02 1

BONE 104E-03 104E-03 1

BREAST 621E-03 183E-02 1

LUNG 178E-02 199E-02 1

THYROID 146E-03 828E-03 1

GI 158E-02 661E-02 1






21





4 Results














22





the tsunami











263E+04 427E+05 281E+05 349E+05



753E+02 320E+03 230E+03 261E+03


242E+02 138E+03 100E+03 110E+02


188E+02 109E+03 795E+02 838E+02



400E+01 200E+02 200E+02 200E+02





23


risk to 20 km 200E-03 510E-03 450E-03 540E-03

risk 20-30 km 200E-03 650E-03 600E-03 710E-03

risk 30-40 km 210E-03 720E-03 670E-03 720E-03

risk Tokyo 170E-04 320E-03 230E-03 290E-03













24





43 Economic impact









Plants 400E+10 400E+10 400E+10 400E+10

Total 132E+11 189E+12 119E+12 150E+12





25





















26
















27


effects


Case 3(BE)
















FukushimaCase 3


Risk to 20 km 450E-03 430E-03

Risk 20-30 600E-03 420E-03

Risk 30-40 670E-03 440E-03




Case 3Chernobyl

Source Term




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 119E+12 769E+11



Case 3Chernobyl

Source Term












28








Case 3(BE)














29



Case 3(BE)


Risk to 20 km 450E-03 170E-03

Risk 20-30 600E-03 220E-03

Risk 30-40 670E-03 240E-03



CostsFukushima

Case 3




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 119E+12 592E+11




MERCK data [28]









30


MACCS2Results














Risk person


risk 20-30 950E-04

risk 30-40 410E-04

Risk Tokyo 790E-06


MACCS2

Results

Adjusted for future




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 495E+10 619E+10











31












Case 3 (BE) No I
















No IRisk person

risk to 20 km 450E-03 440E-03

risk 20-30 600E-03 597E-03

risk 30-40 670E-03 660E-03




32


Case 3 (BE) No I

Costs Total 2005 US$ 222E+11 220E+11



Total 119E+12 118E+12


Case 3 (BE) No I





















33















Total Bq

Sr90 37E+15 56E+16

Cs137 52E+15 78E+16

I131 27E+18 41E+19

Ce144 14E+17 21E+18

Ru103 70E+17 11E+19

Ru106 11E+16 17E+17

Zr95 78E+17 12E+19

Ba140 37E+18 56E+19

Y91 74E+17 11E+19Ce143 31E+19 47E+20



34

Nd147 20E+18 30E+19

H3 44E+17 66E+18






























35






(41e19 Bq)

risk to 20 km 450E-03 196E-02 175E-02

risk 20-30 600E-03 211E-02 183E-02

risk 30-40 670E-03 229E-02 199E-02

Risk Tokio 230E-03 471E-03 427E-03








Plants 400E+10 000E+00 000E+00

Total 119E+12 400E+12 377E+12





















36














37




003 ndash 00003



Plants 2 ndash 002

Fish 075 ndash 003



Birds 06 ndash 015



6 Conclusions











38












much more attention























39
























40









41

ACRONYMS















42

REFERENCES



























43



























44






















March 2011





5




36 ms x 70 m x 120 m = 30240 m3 s


122e11 Bq-sm3 x 3024E4 m3s x (107) = 527e15 Bq














6
















7











235 Summary





I131 Bq 14E16 3E16 14E16-2E17 9E16

Cs137 Bq 5E15 9E15 5E15-6E16 3E16



8


Minimum Maximum

I131 13E+17 20E+17

Cs137 38E+16 61E+16




per year









9





Total 814E+03 535E+15



10




11













12






Chernobyl ([19][20]) 18E18 85E16


ZAMG [22] 4E17 33E16








survey

86E17 29E17





3 Inputs to MACCS2





13










(Min)10E+00 19E-02 29E-02 15E-02 97E-03 29E-03 15E-04 29E-05

Case 2

(Max)10E+00 27E-01 12E+00 60E-01 40E-01 12E-01 60E-03 12E-03

Case 3

(B E)10E+00 12E-01 54E-01 27E-01 18E-01 54E-02 27E-03 54E-04

Case 4

(BEMOX)10E+00 12E-01 54E-01 27E-01 18E-01 54E-02 27E-03 54E-03









14

32 Population data













15













16

34 Meteorology




Ocean 071

Rest of Japan 014



35 Economic data















17




















18














19



0

20

40

60

80

100

0 2 4 6 8 10

Dose (Sv)


Probability of

death


Mortality distance

10E+17

60E+17

11E+18

16E+18

21E+18

0 2 4 6 8

Distance (km)

I - 1 3 1 E q


Mortality distance








20









younger groups



CancerDeath Rate


LEUKEMIA 112E-02 112E-02 1

BONE 104E-03 104E-03 1

BREAST 621E-03 183E-02 1

LUNG 178E-02 199E-02 1

THYROID 146E-03 828E-03 1

GI 158E-02 661E-02 1






21





4 Results














22





the tsunami











263E+04 427E+05 281E+05 349E+05



753E+02 320E+03 230E+03 261E+03


242E+02 138E+03 100E+03 110E+02


188E+02 109E+03 795E+02 838E+02



400E+01 200E+02 200E+02 200E+02





23


risk to 20 km 200E-03 510E-03 450E-03 540E-03

risk 20-30 km 200E-03 650E-03 600E-03 710E-03

risk 30-40 km 210E-03 720E-03 670E-03 720E-03

risk Tokyo 170E-04 320E-03 230E-03 290E-03













24





43 Economic impact









Plants 400E+10 400E+10 400E+10 400E+10

Total 132E+11 189E+12 119E+12 150E+12





25





















26
















27


effects


Case 3(BE)
















FukushimaCase 3


Risk to 20 km 450E-03 430E-03

Risk 20-30 600E-03 420E-03

Risk 30-40 670E-03 440E-03




Case 3Chernobyl

Source Term




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 119E+12 769E+11



Case 3Chernobyl

Source Term












28








Case 3(BE)














29



Case 3(BE)


Risk to 20 km 450E-03 170E-03

Risk 20-30 600E-03 220E-03

Risk 30-40 670E-03 240E-03



CostsFukushima

Case 3




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 119E+12 592E+11




MERCK data [28]









30


MACCS2Results














Risk person


risk 20-30 950E-04

risk 30-40 410E-04

Risk Tokyo 790E-06


MACCS2

Results

Adjusted for future




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 495E+10 619E+10











31












Case 3 (BE) No I
















No IRisk person

risk to 20 km 450E-03 440E-03

risk 20-30 600E-03 597E-03

risk 30-40 670E-03 660E-03




32


Case 3 (BE) No I

Costs Total 2005 US$ 222E+11 220E+11



Total 119E+12 118E+12


Case 3 (BE) No I





















33















Total Bq

Sr90 37E+15 56E+16

Cs137 52E+15 78E+16

I131 27E+18 41E+19

Ce144 14E+17 21E+18

Ru103 70E+17 11E+19

Ru106 11E+16 17E+17

Zr95 78E+17 12E+19

Ba140 37E+18 56E+19

Y91 74E+17 11E+19Ce143 31E+19 47E+20



34

Nd147 20E+18 30E+19

H3 44E+17 66E+18






























35






(41e19 Bq)

risk to 20 km 450E-03 196E-02 175E-02

risk 20-30 600E-03 211E-02 183E-02

risk 30-40 670E-03 229E-02 199E-02

Risk Tokio 230E-03 471E-03 427E-03








Plants 400E+10 000E+00 000E+00

Total 119E+12 400E+12 377E+12





















36














37




003 ndash 00003



Plants 2 ndash 002

Fish 075 ndash 003



Birds 06 ndash 015



6 Conclusions











38












much more attention























39
























40









41

ACRONYMS















42

REFERENCES



























43



























44






















March 2011





6
















7











235 Summary





I131 Bq 14E16 3E16 14E16-2E17 9E16

Cs137 Bq 5E15 9E15 5E15-6E16 3E16



8


Minimum Maximum

I131 13E+17 20E+17

Cs137 38E+16 61E+16




per year









9





Total 814E+03 535E+15



10




11













12






Chernobyl ([19][20]) 18E18 85E16


ZAMG [22] 4E17 33E16








survey

86E17 29E17





3 Inputs to MACCS2





13










(Min)10E+00 19E-02 29E-02 15E-02 97E-03 29E-03 15E-04 29E-05

Case 2

(Max)10E+00 27E-01 12E+00 60E-01 40E-01 12E-01 60E-03 12E-03

Case 3

(B E)10E+00 12E-01 54E-01 27E-01 18E-01 54E-02 27E-03 54E-04

Case 4

(BEMOX)10E+00 12E-01 54E-01 27E-01 18E-01 54E-02 27E-03 54E-03









14

32 Population data













15













16

34 Meteorology




Ocean 071

Rest of Japan 014



35 Economic data















17




















18














19



0

20

40

60

80

100

0 2 4 6 8 10

Dose (Sv)


Probability of

death


Mortality distance

10E+17

60E+17

11E+18

16E+18

21E+18

0 2 4 6 8

Distance (km)

I - 1 3 1 E q


Mortality distance








20









younger groups



CancerDeath Rate


LEUKEMIA 112E-02 112E-02 1

BONE 104E-03 104E-03 1

BREAST 621E-03 183E-02 1

LUNG 178E-02 199E-02 1

THYROID 146E-03 828E-03 1

GI 158E-02 661E-02 1






21





4 Results














22





the tsunami











263E+04 427E+05 281E+05 349E+05



753E+02 320E+03 230E+03 261E+03


242E+02 138E+03 100E+03 110E+02


188E+02 109E+03 795E+02 838E+02



400E+01 200E+02 200E+02 200E+02





23


risk to 20 km 200E-03 510E-03 450E-03 540E-03

risk 20-30 km 200E-03 650E-03 600E-03 710E-03

risk 30-40 km 210E-03 720E-03 670E-03 720E-03

risk Tokyo 170E-04 320E-03 230E-03 290E-03













24





43 Economic impact









Plants 400E+10 400E+10 400E+10 400E+10

Total 132E+11 189E+12 119E+12 150E+12





25





















26
















27


effects


Case 3(BE)
















FukushimaCase 3


Risk to 20 km 450E-03 430E-03

Risk 20-30 600E-03 420E-03

Risk 30-40 670E-03 440E-03




Case 3Chernobyl

Source Term




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 119E+12 769E+11



Case 3Chernobyl

Source Term












28








Case 3(BE)














29



Case 3(BE)


Risk to 20 km 450E-03 170E-03

Risk 20-30 600E-03 220E-03

Risk 30-40 670E-03 240E-03



CostsFukushima

Case 3




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 119E+12 592E+11




MERCK data [28]









30


MACCS2Results














Risk person


risk 20-30 950E-04

risk 30-40 410E-04

Risk Tokyo 790E-06


MACCS2

Results

Adjusted for future




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 495E+10 619E+10











31












Case 3 (BE) No I
















No IRisk person

risk to 20 km 450E-03 440E-03

risk 20-30 600E-03 597E-03

risk 30-40 670E-03 660E-03




32


Case 3 (BE) No I

Costs Total 2005 US$ 222E+11 220E+11



Total 119E+12 118E+12


Case 3 (BE) No I





















33















Total Bq

Sr90 37E+15 56E+16

Cs137 52E+15 78E+16

I131 27E+18 41E+19

Ce144 14E+17 21E+18

Ru103 70E+17 11E+19

Ru106 11E+16 17E+17

Zr95 78E+17 12E+19

Ba140 37E+18 56E+19

Y91 74E+17 11E+19Ce143 31E+19 47E+20



34

Nd147 20E+18 30E+19

H3 44E+17 66E+18






























35






(41e19 Bq)

risk to 20 km 450E-03 196E-02 175E-02

risk 20-30 600E-03 211E-02 183E-02

risk 30-40 670E-03 229E-02 199E-02

Risk Tokio 230E-03 471E-03 427E-03








Plants 400E+10 000E+00 000E+00

Total 119E+12 400E+12 377E+12





















36














37




003 ndash 00003



Plants 2 ndash 002

Fish 075 ndash 003



Birds 06 ndash 015



6 Conclusions











38












much more attention























39
























40









41

ACRONYMS















42

REFERENCES



























43



























44






















March 2011





7











235 Summary





I131 Bq 14E16 3E16 14E16-2E17 9E16

Cs137 Bq 5E15 9E15 5E15-6E16 3E16



8


Minimum Maximum

I131 13E+17 20E+17

Cs137 38E+16 61E+16




per year









9





Total 814E+03 535E+15



10




11













12






Chernobyl ([19][20]) 18E18 85E16


ZAMG [22] 4E17 33E16








survey

86E17 29E17





3 Inputs to MACCS2





13










(Min)10E+00 19E-02 29E-02 15E-02 97E-03 29E-03 15E-04 29E-05

Case 2

(Max)10E+00 27E-01 12E+00 60E-01 40E-01 12E-01 60E-03 12E-03

Case 3

(B E)10E+00 12E-01 54E-01 27E-01 18E-01 54E-02 27E-03 54E-04

Case 4

(BEMOX)10E+00 12E-01 54E-01 27E-01 18E-01 54E-02 27E-03 54E-03









14

32 Population data













15













16

34 Meteorology




Ocean 071

Rest of Japan 014



35 Economic data















17




















18














19



0

20

40

60

80

100

0 2 4 6 8 10

Dose (Sv)


Probability of

death


Mortality distance

10E+17

60E+17

11E+18

16E+18

21E+18

0 2 4 6 8

Distance (km)

I - 1 3 1 E q


Mortality distance








20









younger groups



CancerDeath Rate


LEUKEMIA 112E-02 112E-02 1

BONE 104E-03 104E-03 1

BREAST 621E-03 183E-02 1

LUNG 178E-02 199E-02 1

THYROID 146E-03 828E-03 1

GI 158E-02 661E-02 1






21





4 Results














22





the tsunami











263E+04 427E+05 281E+05 349E+05



753E+02 320E+03 230E+03 261E+03


242E+02 138E+03 100E+03 110E+02


188E+02 109E+03 795E+02 838E+02



400E+01 200E+02 200E+02 200E+02





23


risk to 20 km 200E-03 510E-03 450E-03 540E-03

risk 20-30 km 200E-03 650E-03 600E-03 710E-03

risk 30-40 km 210E-03 720E-03 670E-03 720E-03

risk Tokyo 170E-04 320E-03 230E-03 290E-03













24





43 Economic impact









Plants 400E+10 400E+10 400E+10 400E+10

Total 132E+11 189E+12 119E+12 150E+12





25





















26
















27


effects


Case 3(BE)
















FukushimaCase 3


Risk to 20 km 450E-03 430E-03

Risk 20-30 600E-03 420E-03

Risk 30-40 670E-03 440E-03




Case 3Chernobyl

Source Term




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 119E+12 769E+11



Case 3Chernobyl

Source Term












28








Case 3(BE)














29



Case 3(BE)


Risk to 20 km 450E-03 170E-03

Risk 20-30 600E-03 220E-03

Risk 30-40 670E-03 240E-03



CostsFukushima

Case 3




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 119E+12 592E+11




MERCK data [28]









30


MACCS2Results














Risk person


risk 20-30 950E-04

risk 30-40 410E-04

Risk Tokyo 790E-06


MACCS2

Results

Adjusted for future




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 495E+10 619E+10











31












Case 3 (BE) No I
















No IRisk person

risk to 20 km 450E-03 440E-03

risk 20-30 600E-03 597E-03

risk 30-40 670E-03 660E-03




32


Case 3 (BE) No I

Costs Total 2005 US$ 222E+11 220E+11



Total 119E+12 118E+12


Case 3 (BE) No I





















33















Total Bq

Sr90 37E+15 56E+16

Cs137 52E+15 78E+16

I131 27E+18 41E+19

Ce144 14E+17 21E+18

Ru103 70E+17 11E+19

Ru106 11E+16 17E+17

Zr95 78E+17 12E+19

Ba140 37E+18 56E+19

Y91 74E+17 11E+19Ce143 31E+19 47E+20



34

Nd147 20E+18 30E+19

H3 44E+17 66E+18






























35






(41e19 Bq)

risk to 20 km 450E-03 196E-02 175E-02

risk 20-30 600E-03 211E-02 183E-02

risk 30-40 670E-03 229E-02 199E-02

Risk Tokio 230E-03 471E-03 427E-03








Plants 400E+10 000E+00 000E+00

Total 119E+12 400E+12 377E+12





















36














37




003 ndash 00003



Plants 2 ndash 002

Fish 075 ndash 003



Birds 06 ndash 015



6 Conclusions











38












much more attention























39
























40









41

ACRONYMS















42

REFERENCES



























43



























44






















March 2011





8


Minimum Maximum

I131 13E+17 20E+17

Cs137 38E+16 61E+16




per year









9





Total 814E+03 535E+15



10




11













12






Chernobyl ([19][20]) 18E18 85E16


ZAMG [22] 4E17 33E16








survey

86E17 29E17





3 Inputs to MACCS2





13










(Min)10E+00 19E-02 29E-02 15E-02 97E-03 29E-03 15E-04 29E-05

Case 2

(Max)10E+00 27E-01 12E+00 60E-01 40E-01 12E-01 60E-03 12E-03

Case 3

(B E)10E+00 12E-01 54E-01 27E-01 18E-01 54E-02 27E-03 54E-04

Case 4

(BEMOX)10E+00 12E-01 54E-01 27E-01 18E-01 54E-02 27E-03 54E-03









14

32 Population data













15













16

34 Meteorology




Ocean 071

Rest of Japan 014



35 Economic data















17




















18














19



0

20

40

60

80

100

0 2 4 6 8 10

Dose (Sv)


Probability of

death


Mortality distance

10E+17

60E+17

11E+18

16E+18

21E+18

0 2 4 6 8

Distance (km)

I - 1 3 1 E q


Mortality distance








20









younger groups



CancerDeath Rate


LEUKEMIA 112E-02 112E-02 1

BONE 104E-03 104E-03 1

BREAST 621E-03 183E-02 1

LUNG 178E-02 199E-02 1

THYROID 146E-03 828E-03 1

GI 158E-02 661E-02 1






21





4 Results














22





the tsunami











263E+04 427E+05 281E+05 349E+05



753E+02 320E+03 230E+03 261E+03


242E+02 138E+03 100E+03 110E+02


188E+02 109E+03 795E+02 838E+02



400E+01 200E+02 200E+02 200E+02





23


risk to 20 km 200E-03 510E-03 450E-03 540E-03

risk 20-30 km 200E-03 650E-03 600E-03 710E-03

risk 30-40 km 210E-03 720E-03 670E-03 720E-03

risk Tokyo 170E-04 320E-03 230E-03 290E-03













24





43 Economic impact









Plants 400E+10 400E+10 400E+10 400E+10

Total 132E+11 189E+12 119E+12 150E+12





25





















26
















27


effects


Case 3(BE)
















FukushimaCase 3


Risk to 20 km 450E-03 430E-03

Risk 20-30 600E-03 420E-03

Risk 30-40 670E-03 440E-03




Case 3Chernobyl

Source Term




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 119E+12 769E+11



Case 3Chernobyl

Source Term












28








Case 3(BE)














29



Case 3(BE)


Risk to 20 km 450E-03 170E-03

Risk 20-30 600E-03 220E-03

Risk 30-40 670E-03 240E-03



CostsFukushima

Case 3




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 119E+12 592E+11




MERCK data [28]









30


MACCS2Results














Risk person


risk 20-30 950E-04

risk 30-40 410E-04

Risk Tokyo 790E-06


MACCS2

Results

Adjusted for future




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 495E+10 619E+10











31












Case 3 (BE) No I
















No IRisk person

risk to 20 km 450E-03 440E-03

risk 20-30 600E-03 597E-03

risk 30-40 670E-03 660E-03




32


Case 3 (BE) No I

Costs Total 2005 US$ 222E+11 220E+11



Total 119E+12 118E+12


Case 3 (BE) No I





















33















Total Bq

Sr90 37E+15 56E+16

Cs137 52E+15 78E+16

I131 27E+18 41E+19

Ce144 14E+17 21E+18

Ru103 70E+17 11E+19

Ru106 11E+16 17E+17

Zr95 78E+17 12E+19

Ba140 37E+18 56E+19

Y91 74E+17 11E+19Ce143 31E+19 47E+20



34

Nd147 20E+18 30E+19

H3 44E+17 66E+18






























35






(41e19 Bq)

risk to 20 km 450E-03 196E-02 175E-02

risk 20-30 600E-03 211E-02 183E-02

risk 30-40 670E-03 229E-02 199E-02

Risk Tokio 230E-03 471E-03 427E-03








Plants 400E+10 000E+00 000E+00

Total 119E+12 400E+12 377E+12





















36














37




003 ndash 00003



Plants 2 ndash 002

Fish 075 ndash 003



Birds 06 ndash 015



6 Conclusions











38












much more attention























39
























40









41

ACRONYMS















42

REFERENCES



























43



























44






















March 2011





9





Total 814E+03 535E+15



10




11













12






Chernobyl ([19][20]) 18E18 85E16


ZAMG [22] 4E17 33E16








survey

86E17 29E17





3 Inputs to MACCS2





13










(Min)10E+00 19E-02 29E-02 15E-02 97E-03 29E-03 15E-04 29E-05

Case 2

(Max)10E+00 27E-01 12E+00 60E-01 40E-01 12E-01 60E-03 12E-03

Case 3

(B E)10E+00 12E-01 54E-01 27E-01 18E-01 54E-02 27E-03 54E-04

Case 4

(BEMOX)10E+00 12E-01 54E-01 27E-01 18E-01 54E-02 27E-03 54E-03









14

32 Population data













15













16

34 Meteorology




Ocean 071

Rest of Japan 014



35 Economic data















17




















18














19



0

20

40

60

80

100

0 2 4 6 8 10

Dose (Sv)


Probability of

death


Mortality distance

10E+17

60E+17

11E+18

16E+18

21E+18

0 2 4 6 8

Distance (km)

I - 1 3 1 E q


Mortality distance








20









younger groups



CancerDeath Rate


LEUKEMIA 112E-02 112E-02 1

BONE 104E-03 104E-03 1

BREAST 621E-03 183E-02 1

LUNG 178E-02 199E-02 1

THYROID 146E-03 828E-03 1

GI 158E-02 661E-02 1






21





4 Results














22





the tsunami











263E+04 427E+05 281E+05 349E+05



753E+02 320E+03 230E+03 261E+03


242E+02 138E+03 100E+03 110E+02


188E+02 109E+03 795E+02 838E+02



400E+01 200E+02 200E+02 200E+02





23


risk to 20 km 200E-03 510E-03 450E-03 540E-03

risk 20-30 km 200E-03 650E-03 600E-03 710E-03

risk 30-40 km 210E-03 720E-03 670E-03 720E-03

risk Tokyo 170E-04 320E-03 230E-03 290E-03













24





43 Economic impact









Plants 400E+10 400E+10 400E+10 400E+10

Total 132E+11 189E+12 119E+12 150E+12





25





















26
















27


effects


Case 3(BE)
















FukushimaCase 3


Risk to 20 km 450E-03 430E-03

Risk 20-30 600E-03 420E-03

Risk 30-40 670E-03 440E-03




Case 3Chernobyl

Source Term




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 119E+12 769E+11



Case 3Chernobyl

Source Term












28








Case 3(BE)














29



Case 3(BE)


Risk to 20 km 450E-03 170E-03

Risk 20-30 600E-03 220E-03

Risk 30-40 670E-03 240E-03



CostsFukushima

Case 3




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 119E+12 592E+11




MERCK data [28]









30


MACCS2Results














Risk person


risk 20-30 950E-04

risk 30-40 410E-04

Risk Tokyo 790E-06


MACCS2

Results

Adjusted for future




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 495E+10 619E+10











31












Case 3 (BE) No I
















No IRisk person

risk to 20 km 450E-03 440E-03

risk 20-30 600E-03 597E-03

risk 30-40 670E-03 660E-03




32


Case 3 (BE) No I

Costs Total 2005 US$ 222E+11 220E+11



Total 119E+12 118E+12


Case 3 (BE) No I





















33















Total Bq

Sr90 37E+15 56E+16

Cs137 52E+15 78E+16

I131 27E+18 41E+19

Ce144 14E+17 21E+18

Ru103 70E+17 11E+19

Ru106 11E+16 17E+17

Zr95 78E+17 12E+19

Ba140 37E+18 56E+19

Y91 74E+17 11E+19Ce143 31E+19 47E+20



34

Nd147 20E+18 30E+19

H3 44E+17 66E+18






























35






(41e19 Bq)

risk to 20 km 450E-03 196E-02 175E-02

risk 20-30 600E-03 211E-02 183E-02

risk 30-40 670E-03 229E-02 199E-02

Risk Tokio 230E-03 471E-03 427E-03








Plants 400E+10 000E+00 000E+00

Total 119E+12 400E+12 377E+12





















36














37




003 ndash 00003



Plants 2 ndash 002

Fish 075 ndash 003



Birds 06 ndash 015



6 Conclusions











38












much more attention























39
























40









41

ACRONYMS















42

REFERENCES



























43



























44






















March 2011





10




11













12






Chernobyl ([19][20]) 18E18 85E16


ZAMG [22] 4E17 33E16








survey

86E17 29E17





3 Inputs to MACCS2





13










(Min)10E+00 19E-02 29E-02 15E-02 97E-03 29E-03 15E-04 29E-05

Case 2

(Max)10E+00 27E-01 12E+00 60E-01 40E-01 12E-01 60E-03 12E-03

Case 3

(B E)10E+00 12E-01 54E-01 27E-01 18E-01 54E-02 27E-03 54E-04

Case 4

(BEMOX)10E+00 12E-01 54E-01 27E-01 18E-01 54E-02 27E-03 54E-03









14

32 Population data













15













16

34 Meteorology




Ocean 071

Rest of Japan 014



35 Economic data















17




















18














19



0

20

40

60

80

100

0 2 4 6 8 10

Dose (Sv)


Probability of

death


Mortality distance

10E+17

60E+17

11E+18

16E+18

21E+18

0 2 4 6 8

Distance (km)

I - 1 3 1 E q


Mortality distance








20









younger groups



CancerDeath Rate


LEUKEMIA 112E-02 112E-02 1

BONE 104E-03 104E-03 1

BREAST 621E-03 183E-02 1

LUNG 178E-02 199E-02 1

THYROID 146E-03 828E-03 1

GI 158E-02 661E-02 1






21





4 Results














22





the tsunami











263E+04 427E+05 281E+05 349E+05



753E+02 320E+03 230E+03 261E+03


242E+02 138E+03 100E+03 110E+02


188E+02 109E+03 795E+02 838E+02



400E+01 200E+02 200E+02 200E+02





23


risk to 20 km 200E-03 510E-03 450E-03 540E-03

risk 20-30 km 200E-03 650E-03 600E-03 710E-03

risk 30-40 km 210E-03 720E-03 670E-03 720E-03

risk Tokyo 170E-04 320E-03 230E-03 290E-03













24





43 Economic impact









Plants 400E+10 400E+10 400E+10 400E+10

Total 132E+11 189E+12 119E+12 150E+12





25





















26
















27


effects


Case 3(BE)
















FukushimaCase 3


Risk to 20 km 450E-03 430E-03

Risk 20-30 600E-03 420E-03

Risk 30-40 670E-03 440E-03




Case 3Chernobyl

Source Term




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 119E+12 769E+11



Case 3Chernobyl

Source Term












28








Case 3(BE)














29



Case 3(BE)


Risk to 20 km 450E-03 170E-03

Risk 20-30 600E-03 220E-03

Risk 30-40 670E-03 240E-03



CostsFukushima

Case 3




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 119E+12 592E+11




MERCK data [28]









30


MACCS2Results














Risk person


risk 20-30 950E-04

risk 30-40 410E-04

Risk Tokyo 790E-06


MACCS2

Results

Adjusted for future




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 495E+10 619E+10











31












Case 3 (BE) No I
















No IRisk person

risk to 20 km 450E-03 440E-03

risk 20-30 600E-03 597E-03

risk 30-40 670E-03 660E-03




32


Case 3 (BE) No I

Costs Total 2005 US$ 222E+11 220E+11



Total 119E+12 118E+12


Case 3 (BE) No I





















33















Total Bq

Sr90 37E+15 56E+16

Cs137 52E+15 78E+16

I131 27E+18 41E+19

Ce144 14E+17 21E+18

Ru103 70E+17 11E+19

Ru106 11E+16 17E+17

Zr95 78E+17 12E+19

Ba140 37E+18 56E+19

Y91 74E+17 11E+19Ce143 31E+19 47E+20



34

Nd147 20E+18 30E+19

H3 44E+17 66E+18






























35






(41e19 Bq)

risk to 20 km 450E-03 196E-02 175E-02

risk 20-30 600E-03 211E-02 183E-02

risk 30-40 670E-03 229E-02 199E-02

Risk Tokio 230E-03 471E-03 427E-03








Plants 400E+10 000E+00 000E+00

Total 119E+12 400E+12 377E+12





















36














37




003 ndash 00003



Plants 2 ndash 002

Fish 075 ndash 003



Birds 06 ndash 015



6 Conclusions











38












much more attention























39
























40









41

ACRONYMS















42

REFERENCES



























43



























44






















March 2011





11













12






Chernobyl ([19][20]) 18E18 85E16


ZAMG [22] 4E17 33E16








survey

86E17 29E17





3 Inputs to MACCS2





13










(Min)10E+00 19E-02 29E-02 15E-02 97E-03 29E-03 15E-04 29E-05

Case 2

(Max)10E+00 27E-01 12E+00 60E-01 40E-01 12E-01 60E-03 12E-03

Case 3

(B E)10E+00 12E-01 54E-01 27E-01 18E-01 54E-02 27E-03 54E-04

Case 4

(BEMOX)10E+00 12E-01 54E-01 27E-01 18E-01 54E-02 27E-03 54E-03









14

32 Population data













15













16

34 Meteorology




Ocean 071

Rest of Japan 014



35 Economic data















17




















18














19



0

20

40

60

80

100

0 2 4 6 8 10

Dose (Sv)


Probability of

death


Mortality distance

10E+17

60E+17

11E+18

16E+18

21E+18

0 2 4 6 8

Distance (km)

I - 1 3 1 E q


Mortality distance








20









younger groups



CancerDeath Rate


LEUKEMIA 112E-02 112E-02 1

BONE 104E-03 104E-03 1

BREAST 621E-03 183E-02 1

LUNG 178E-02 199E-02 1

THYROID 146E-03 828E-03 1

GI 158E-02 661E-02 1






21





4 Results














22





the tsunami











263E+04 427E+05 281E+05 349E+05



753E+02 320E+03 230E+03 261E+03


242E+02 138E+03 100E+03 110E+02


188E+02 109E+03 795E+02 838E+02



400E+01 200E+02 200E+02 200E+02





23


risk to 20 km 200E-03 510E-03 450E-03 540E-03

risk 20-30 km 200E-03 650E-03 600E-03 710E-03

risk 30-40 km 210E-03 720E-03 670E-03 720E-03

risk Tokyo 170E-04 320E-03 230E-03 290E-03













24





43 Economic impact









Plants 400E+10 400E+10 400E+10 400E+10

Total 132E+11 189E+12 119E+12 150E+12





25





















26
















27


effects


Case 3(BE)
















FukushimaCase 3


Risk to 20 km 450E-03 430E-03

Risk 20-30 600E-03 420E-03

Risk 30-40 670E-03 440E-03




Case 3Chernobyl

Source Term




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 119E+12 769E+11



Case 3Chernobyl

Source Term












28








Case 3(BE)














29



Case 3(BE)


Risk to 20 km 450E-03 170E-03

Risk 20-30 600E-03 220E-03

Risk 30-40 670E-03 240E-03



CostsFukushima

Case 3




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 119E+12 592E+11




MERCK data [28]









30


MACCS2Results














Risk person


risk 20-30 950E-04

risk 30-40 410E-04

Risk Tokyo 790E-06


MACCS2

Results

Adjusted for future




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 495E+10 619E+10











31












Case 3 (BE) No I
















No IRisk person

risk to 20 km 450E-03 440E-03

risk 20-30 600E-03 597E-03

risk 30-40 670E-03 660E-03




32


Case 3 (BE) No I

Costs Total 2005 US$ 222E+11 220E+11



Total 119E+12 118E+12


Case 3 (BE) No I





















33















Total Bq

Sr90 37E+15 56E+16

Cs137 52E+15 78E+16

I131 27E+18 41E+19

Ce144 14E+17 21E+18

Ru103 70E+17 11E+19

Ru106 11E+16 17E+17

Zr95 78E+17 12E+19

Ba140 37E+18 56E+19

Y91 74E+17 11E+19Ce143 31E+19 47E+20



34

Nd147 20E+18 30E+19

H3 44E+17 66E+18






























35






(41e19 Bq)

risk to 20 km 450E-03 196E-02 175E-02

risk 20-30 600E-03 211E-02 183E-02

risk 30-40 670E-03 229E-02 199E-02

Risk Tokio 230E-03 471E-03 427E-03








Plants 400E+10 000E+00 000E+00

Total 119E+12 400E+12 377E+12





















36














37




003 ndash 00003



Plants 2 ndash 002

Fish 075 ndash 003



Birds 06 ndash 015



6 Conclusions











38












much more attention























39
























40









41

ACRONYMS















42

REFERENCES



























43



























44






















March 2011





12






Chernobyl ([19][20]) 18E18 85E16


ZAMG [22] 4E17 33E16








survey

86E17 29E17





3 Inputs to MACCS2





13










(Min)10E+00 19E-02 29E-02 15E-02 97E-03 29E-03 15E-04 29E-05

Case 2

(Max)10E+00 27E-01 12E+00 60E-01 40E-01 12E-01 60E-03 12E-03

Case 3

(B E)10E+00 12E-01 54E-01 27E-01 18E-01 54E-02 27E-03 54E-04

Case 4

(BEMOX)10E+00 12E-01 54E-01 27E-01 18E-01 54E-02 27E-03 54E-03









14

32 Population data













15













16

34 Meteorology




Ocean 071

Rest of Japan 014



35 Economic data















17




















18














19



0

20

40

60

80

100

0 2 4 6 8 10

Dose (Sv)


Probability of

death


Mortality distance

10E+17

60E+17

11E+18

16E+18

21E+18

0 2 4 6 8

Distance (km)

I - 1 3 1 E q


Mortality distance








20









younger groups



CancerDeath Rate


LEUKEMIA 112E-02 112E-02 1

BONE 104E-03 104E-03 1

BREAST 621E-03 183E-02 1

LUNG 178E-02 199E-02 1

THYROID 146E-03 828E-03 1

GI 158E-02 661E-02 1






21





4 Results














22





the tsunami











263E+04 427E+05 281E+05 349E+05



753E+02 320E+03 230E+03 261E+03


242E+02 138E+03 100E+03 110E+02


188E+02 109E+03 795E+02 838E+02



400E+01 200E+02 200E+02 200E+02





23


risk to 20 km 200E-03 510E-03 450E-03 540E-03

risk 20-30 km 200E-03 650E-03 600E-03 710E-03

risk 30-40 km 210E-03 720E-03 670E-03 720E-03

risk Tokyo 170E-04 320E-03 230E-03 290E-03













24





43 Economic impact









Plants 400E+10 400E+10 400E+10 400E+10

Total 132E+11 189E+12 119E+12 150E+12





25





















26
















27


effects


Case 3(BE)
















FukushimaCase 3


Risk to 20 km 450E-03 430E-03

Risk 20-30 600E-03 420E-03

Risk 30-40 670E-03 440E-03




Case 3Chernobyl

Source Term




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 119E+12 769E+11



Case 3Chernobyl

Source Term












28








Case 3(BE)














29



Case 3(BE)


Risk to 20 km 450E-03 170E-03

Risk 20-30 600E-03 220E-03

Risk 30-40 670E-03 240E-03



CostsFukushima

Case 3




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 119E+12 592E+11




MERCK data [28]









30


MACCS2Results














Risk person


risk 20-30 950E-04

risk 30-40 410E-04

Risk Tokyo 790E-06


MACCS2

Results

Adjusted for future




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 495E+10 619E+10











31












Case 3 (BE) No I
















No IRisk person

risk to 20 km 450E-03 440E-03

risk 20-30 600E-03 597E-03

risk 30-40 670E-03 660E-03




32


Case 3 (BE) No I

Costs Total 2005 US$ 222E+11 220E+11



Total 119E+12 118E+12


Case 3 (BE) No I





















33















Total Bq

Sr90 37E+15 56E+16

Cs137 52E+15 78E+16

I131 27E+18 41E+19

Ce144 14E+17 21E+18

Ru103 70E+17 11E+19

Ru106 11E+16 17E+17

Zr95 78E+17 12E+19

Ba140 37E+18 56E+19

Y91 74E+17 11E+19Ce143 31E+19 47E+20



34

Nd147 20E+18 30E+19

H3 44E+17 66E+18






























35






(41e19 Bq)

risk to 20 km 450E-03 196E-02 175E-02

risk 20-30 600E-03 211E-02 183E-02

risk 30-40 670E-03 229E-02 199E-02

Risk Tokio 230E-03 471E-03 427E-03








Plants 400E+10 000E+00 000E+00

Total 119E+12 400E+12 377E+12





















36














37




003 ndash 00003



Plants 2 ndash 002

Fish 075 ndash 003



Birds 06 ndash 015



6 Conclusions











38












much more attention























39
























40









41

ACRONYMS















42

REFERENCES



























43



























44






















March 2011





13










(Min)10E+00 19E-02 29E-02 15E-02 97E-03 29E-03 15E-04 29E-05

Case 2

(Max)10E+00 27E-01 12E+00 60E-01 40E-01 12E-01 60E-03 12E-03

Case 3

(B E)10E+00 12E-01 54E-01 27E-01 18E-01 54E-02 27E-03 54E-04

Case 4

(BEMOX)10E+00 12E-01 54E-01 27E-01 18E-01 54E-02 27E-03 54E-03









14

32 Population data













15













16

34 Meteorology




Ocean 071

Rest of Japan 014



35 Economic data















17




















18














19



0

20

40

60

80

100

0 2 4 6 8 10

Dose (Sv)


Probability of

death


Mortality distance

10E+17

60E+17

11E+18

16E+18

21E+18

0 2 4 6 8

Distance (km)

I - 1 3 1 E q


Mortality distance








20









younger groups



CancerDeath Rate


LEUKEMIA 112E-02 112E-02 1

BONE 104E-03 104E-03 1

BREAST 621E-03 183E-02 1

LUNG 178E-02 199E-02 1

THYROID 146E-03 828E-03 1

GI 158E-02 661E-02 1






21





4 Results














22





the tsunami











263E+04 427E+05 281E+05 349E+05



753E+02 320E+03 230E+03 261E+03


242E+02 138E+03 100E+03 110E+02


188E+02 109E+03 795E+02 838E+02



400E+01 200E+02 200E+02 200E+02





23


risk to 20 km 200E-03 510E-03 450E-03 540E-03

risk 20-30 km 200E-03 650E-03 600E-03 710E-03

risk 30-40 km 210E-03 720E-03 670E-03 720E-03

risk Tokyo 170E-04 320E-03 230E-03 290E-03













24





43 Economic impact









Plants 400E+10 400E+10 400E+10 400E+10

Total 132E+11 189E+12 119E+12 150E+12





25





















26
















27


effects


Case 3(BE)
















FukushimaCase 3


Risk to 20 km 450E-03 430E-03

Risk 20-30 600E-03 420E-03

Risk 30-40 670E-03 440E-03




Case 3Chernobyl

Source Term




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 119E+12 769E+11



Case 3Chernobyl

Source Term












28








Case 3(BE)














29



Case 3(BE)


Risk to 20 km 450E-03 170E-03

Risk 20-30 600E-03 220E-03

Risk 30-40 670E-03 240E-03



CostsFukushima

Case 3




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 119E+12 592E+11




MERCK data [28]









30


MACCS2Results














Risk person


risk 20-30 950E-04

risk 30-40 410E-04

Risk Tokyo 790E-06


MACCS2

Results

Adjusted for future




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 495E+10 619E+10











31












Case 3 (BE) No I
















No IRisk person

risk to 20 km 450E-03 440E-03

risk 20-30 600E-03 597E-03

risk 30-40 670E-03 660E-03




32


Case 3 (BE) No I

Costs Total 2005 US$ 222E+11 220E+11



Total 119E+12 118E+12


Case 3 (BE) No I





















33















Total Bq

Sr90 37E+15 56E+16

Cs137 52E+15 78E+16

I131 27E+18 41E+19

Ce144 14E+17 21E+18

Ru103 70E+17 11E+19

Ru106 11E+16 17E+17

Zr95 78E+17 12E+19

Ba140 37E+18 56E+19

Y91 74E+17 11E+19Ce143 31E+19 47E+20



34

Nd147 20E+18 30E+19

H3 44E+17 66E+18






























35






(41e19 Bq)

risk to 20 km 450E-03 196E-02 175E-02

risk 20-30 600E-03 211E-02 183E-02

risk 30-40 670E-03 229E-02 199E-02

Risk Tokio 230E-03 471E-03 427E-03








Plants 400E+10 000E+00 000E+00

Total 119E+12 400E+12 377E+12





















36














37




003 ndash 00003



Plants 2 ndash 002

Fish 075 ndash 003



Birds 06 ndash 015



6 Conclusions











38












much more attention























39
























40









41

ACRONYMS















42

REFERENCES



























43



























44






















March 2011





14

32 Population data













15













16

34 Meteorology




Ocean 071

Rest of Japan 014



35 Economic data















17




















18














19



0

20

40

60

80

100

0 2 4 6 8 10

Dose (Sv)


Probability of

death


Mortality distance

10E+17

60E+17

11E+18

16E+18

21E+18

0 2 4 6 8

Distance (km)

I - 1 3 1 E q


Mortality distance








20









younger groups



CancerDeath Rate


LEUKEMIA 112E-02 112E-02 1

BONE 104E-03 104E-03 1

BREAST 621E-03 183E-02 1

LUNG 178E-02 199E-02 1

THYROID 146E-03 828E-03 1

GI 158E-02 661E-02 1






21





4 Results














22





the tsunami











263E+04 427E+05 281E+05 349E+05



753E+02 320E+03 230E+03 261E+03


242E+02 138E+03 100E+03 110E+02


188E+02 109E+03 795E+02 838E+02



400E+01 200E+02 200E+02 200E+02





23


risk to 20 km 200E-03 510E-03 450E-03 540E-03

risk 20-30 km 200E-03 650E-03 600E-03 710E-03

risk 30-40 km 210E-03 720E-03 670E-03 720E-03

risk Tokyo 170E-04 320E-03 230E-03 290E-03













24





43 Economic impact









Plants 400E+10 400E+10 400E+10 400E+10

Total 132E+11 189E+12 119E+12 150E+12





25





















26
















27


effects


Case 3(BE)
















FukushimaCase 3


Risk to 20 km 450E-03 430E-03

Risk 20-30 600E-03 420E-03

Risk 30-40 670E-03 440E-03




Case 3Chernobyl

Source Term




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 119E+12 769E+11



Case 3Chernobyl

Source Term












28








Case 3(BE)














29



Case 3(BE)


Risk to 20 km 450E-03 170E-03

Risk 20-30 600E-03 220E-03

Risk 30-40 670E-03 240E-03



CostsFukushima

Case 3




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 119E+12 592E+11




MERCK data [28]









30


MACCS2Results














Risk person


risk 20-30 950E-04

risk 30-40 410E-04

Risk Tokyo 790E-06


MACCS2

Results

Adjusted for future




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 495E+10 619E+10











31












Case 3 (BE) No I
















No IRisk person

risk to 20 km 450E-03 440E-03

risk 20-30 600E-03 597E-03

risk 30-40 670E-03 660E-03




32


Case 3 (BE) No I

Costs Total 2005 US$ 222E+11 220E+11



Total 119E+12 118E+12


Case 3 (BE) No I





















33















Total Bq

Sr90 37E+15 56E+16

Cs137 52E+15 78E+16

I131 27E+18 41E+19

Ce144 14E+17 21E+18

Ru103 70E+17 11E+19

Ru106 11E+16 17E+17

Zr95 78E+17 12E+19

Ba140 37E+18 56E+19

Y91 74E+17 11E+19Ce143 31E+19 47E+20



34

Nd147 20E+18 30E+19

H3 44E+17 66E+18






























35






(41e19 Bq)

risk to 20 km 450E-03 196E-02 175E-02

risk 20-30 600E-03 211E-02 183E-02

risk 30-40 670E-03 229E-02 199E-02

Risk Tokio 230E-03 471E-03 427E-03








Plants 400E+10 000E+00 000E+00

Total 119E+12 400E+12 377E+12





















36














37




003 ndash 00003



Plants 2 ndash 002

Fish 075 ndash 003



Birds 06 ndash 015



6 Conclusions











38












much more attention























39
























40









41

ACRONYMS















42

REFERENCES



























43



























44






















March 2011





15













16

34 Meteorology




Ocean 071

Rest of Japan 014



35 Economic data















17




















18














19



0

20

40

60

80

100

0 2 4 6 8 10

Dose (Sv)


Probability of

death


Mortality distance

10E+17

60E+17

11E+18

16E+18

21E+18

0 2 4 6 8

Distance (km)

I - 1 3 1 E q


Mortality distance








20









younger groups



CancerDeath Rate


LEUKEMIA 112E-02 112E-02 1

BONE 104E-03 104E-03 1

BREAST 621E-03 183E-02 1

LUNG 178E-02 199E-02 1

THYROID 146E-03 828E-03 1

GI 158E-02 661E-02 1






21





4 Results














22





the tsunami











263E+04 427E+05 281E+05 349E+05



753E+02 320E+03 230E+03 261E+03


242E+02 138E+03 100E+03 110E+02


188E+02 109E+03 795E+02 838E+02



400E+01 200E+02 200E+02 200E+02





23


risk to 20 km 200E-03 510E-03 450E-03 540E-03

risk 20-30 km 200E-03 650E-03 600E-03 710E-03

risk 30-40 km 210E-03 720E-03 670E-03 720E-03

risk Tokyo 170E-04 320E-03 230E-03 290E-03













24





43 Economic impact









Plants 400E+10 400E+10 400E+10 400E+10

Total 132E+11 189E+12 119E+12 150E+12





25





















26
















27


effects


Case 3(BE)
















FukushimaCase 3


Risk to 20 km 450E-03 430E-03

Risk 20-30 600E-03 420E-03

Risk 30-40 670E-03 440E-03




Case 3Chernobyl

Source Term




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 119E+12 769E+11



Case 3Chernobyl

Source Term












28








Case 3(BE)














29



Case 3(BE)


Risk to 20 km 450E-03 170E-03

Risk 20-30 600E-03 220E-03

Risk 30-40 670E-03 240E-03



CostsFukushima

Case 3




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 119E+12 592E+11




MERCK data [28]









30


MACCS2Results














Risk person


risk 20-30 950E-04

risk 30-40 410E-04

Risk Tokyo 790E-06


MACCS2

Results

Adjusted for future




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 495E+10 619E+10











31












Case 3 (BE) No I
















No IRisk person

risk to 20 km 450E-03 440E-03

risk 20-30 600E-03 597E-03

risk 30-40 670E-03 660E-03




32


Case 3 (BE) No I

Costs Total 2005 US$ 222E+11 220E+11



Total 119E+12 118E+12


Case 3 (BE) No I





















33















Total Bq

Sr90 37E+15 56E+16

Cs137 52E+15 78E+16

I131 27E+18 41E+19

Ce144 14E+17 21E+18

Ru103 70E+17 11E+19

Ru106 11E+16 17E+17

Zr95 78E+17 12E+19

Ba140 37E+18 56E+19

Y91 74E+17 11E+19Ce143 31E+19 47E+20



34

Nd147 20E+18 30E+19

H3 44E+17 66E+18






























35






(41e19 Bq)

risk to 20 km 450E-03 196E-02 175E-02

risk 20-30 600E-03 211E-02 183E-02

risk 30-40 670E-03 229E-02 199E-02

Risk Tokio 230E-03 471E-03 427E-03








Plants 400E+10 000E+00 000E+00

Total 119E+12 400E+12 377E+12





















36














37




003 ndash 00003



Plants 2 ndash 002

Fish 075 ndash 003



Birds 06 ndash 015



6 Conclusions











38












much more attention























39
























40









41

ACRONYMS















42

REFERENCES



























43



























44






















March 2011





16

34 Meteorology




Ocean 071

Rest of Japan 014



35 Economic data















17




















18














19



0

20

40

60

80

100

0 2 4 6 8 10

Dose (Sv)


Probability of

death


Mortality distance

10E+17

60E+17

11E+18

16E+18

21E+18

0 2 4 6 8

Distance (km)

I - 1 3 1 E q


Mortality distance








20









younger groups



CancerDeath Rate


LEUKEMIA 112E-02 112E-02 1

BONE 104E-03 104E-03 1

BREAST 621E-03 183E-02 1

LUNG 178E-02 199E-02 1

THYROID 146E-03 828E-03 1

GI 158E-02 661E-02 1






21





4 Results














22





the tsunami











263E+04 427E+05 281E+05 349E+05



753E+02 320E+03 230E+03 261E+03


242E+02 138E+03 100E+03 110E+02


188E+02 109E+03 795E+02 838E+02



400E+01 200E+02 200E+02 200E+02





23


risk to 20 km 200E-03 510E-03 450E-03 540E-03

risk 20-30 km 200E-03 650E-03 600E-03 710E-03

risk 30-40 km 210E-03 720E-03 670E-03 720E-03

risk Tokyo 170E-04 320E-03 230E-03 290E-03













24





43 Economic impact









Plants 400E+10 400E+10 400E+10 400E+10

Total 132E+11 189E+12 119E+12 150E+12





25





















26
















27


effects


Case 3(BE)
















FukushimaCase 3


Risk to 20 km 450E-03 430E-03

Risk 20-30 600E-03 420E-03

Risk 30-40 670E-03 440E-03




Case 3Chernobyl

Source Term




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 119E+12 769E+11



Case 3Chernobyl

Source Term












28








Case 3(BE)














29



Case 3(BE)


Risk to 20 km 450E-03 170E-03

Risk 20-30 600E-03 220E-03

Risk 30-40 670E-03 240E-03



CostsFukushima

Case 3




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 119E+12 592E+11




MERCK data [28]









30


MACCS2Results














Risk person


risk 20-30 950E-04

risk 30-40 410E-04

Risk Tokyo 790E-06


MACCS2

Results

Adjusted for future




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 495E+10 619E+10











31












Case 3 (BE) No I
















No IRisk person

risk to 20 km 450E-03 440E-03

risk 20-30 600E-03 597E-03

risk 30-40 670E-03 660E-03




32


Case 3 (BE) No I

Costs Total 2005 US$ 222E+11 220E+11



Total 119E+12 118E+12


Case 3 (BE) No I





















33















Total Bq

Sr90 37E+15 56E+16

Cs137 52E+15 78E+16

I131 27E+18 41E+19

Ce144 14E+17 21E+18

Ru103 70E+17 11E+19

Ru106 11E+16 17E+17

Zr95 78E+17 12E+19

Ba140 37E+18 56E+19

Y91 74E+17 11E+19Ce143 31E+19 47E+20



34

Nd147 20E+18 30E+19

H3 44E+17 66E+18






























35






(41e19 Bq)

risk to 20 km 450E-03 196E-02 175E-02

risk 20-30 600E-03 211E-02 183E-02

risk 30-40 670E-03 229E-02 199E-02

Risk Tokio 230E-03 471E-03 427E-03








Plants 400E+10 000E+00 000E+00

Total 119E+12 400E+12 377E+12





















36














37




003 ndash 00003



Plants 2 ndash 002

Fish 075 ndash 003



Birds 06 ndash 015



6 Conclusions











38












much more attention























39
























40









41

ACRONYMS















42

REFERENCES



























43



























44






















March 2011





17




















18














19



0

20

40

60

80

100

0 2 4 6 8 10

Dose (Sv)


Probability of

death


Mortality distance

10E+17

60E+17

11E+18

16E+18

21E+18

0 2 4 6 8

Distance (km)

I - 1 3 1 E q


Mortality distance








20









younger groups



CancerDeath Rate


LEUKEMIA 112E-02 112E-02 1

BONE 104E-03 104E-03 1

BREAST 621E-03 183E-02 1

LUNG 178E-02 199E-02 1

THYROID 146E-03 828E-03 1

GI 158E-02 661E-02 1






21





4 Results














22





the tsunami











263E+04 427E+05 281E+05 349E+05



753E+02 320E+03 230E+03 261E+03


242E+02 138E+03 100E+03 110E+02


188E+02 109E+03 795E+02 838E+02



400E+01 200E+02 200E+02 200E+02





23


risk to 20 km 200E-03 510E-03 450E-03 540E-03

risk 20-30 km 200E-03 650E-03 600E-03 710E-03

risk 30-40 km 210E-03 720E-03 670E-03 720E-03

risk Tokyo 170E-04 320E-03 230E-03 290E-03













24





43 Economic impact









Plants 400E+10 400E+10 400E+10 400E+10

Total 132E+11 189E+12 119E+12 150E+12





25





















26
















27


effects


Case 3(BE)
















FukushimaCase 3


Risk to 20 km 450E-03 430E-03

Risk 20-30 600E-03 420E-03

Risk 30-40 670E-03 440E-03




Case 3Chernobyl

Source Term




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 119E+12 769E+11



Case 3Chernobyl

Source Term












28








Case 3(BE)














29



Case 3(BE)


Risk to 20 km 450E-03 170E-03

Risk 20-30 600E-03 220E-03

Risk 30-40 670E-03 240E-03



CostsFukushima

Case 3




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 119E+12 592E+11




MERCK data [28]









30


MACCS2Results














Risk person


risk 20-30 950E-04

risk 30-40 410E-04

Risk Tokyo 790E-06


MACCS2

Results

Adjusted for future




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 495E+10 619E+10











31












Case 3 (BE) No I
















No IRisk person

risk to 20 km 450E-03 440E-03

risk 20-30 600E-03 597E-03

risk 30-40 670E-03 660E-03




32


Case 3 (BE) No I

Costs Total 2005 US$ 222E+11 220E+11



Total 119E+12 118E+12


Case 3 (BE) No I





















33















Total Bq

Sr90 37E+15 56E+16

Cs137 52E+15 78E+16

I131 27E+18 41E+19

Ce144 14E+17 21E+18

Ru103 70E+17 11E+19

Ru106 11E+16 17E+17

Zr95 78E+17 12E+19

Ba140 37E+18 56E+19

Y91 74E+17 11E+19Ce143 31E+19 47E+20



34

Nd147 20E+18 30E+19

H3 44E+17 66E+18






























35






(41e19 Bq)

risk to 20 km 450E-03 196E-02 175E-02

risk 20-30 600E-03 211E-02 183E-02

risk 30-40 670E-03 229E-02 199E-02

Risk Tokio 230E-03 471E-03 427E-03








Plants 400E+10 000E+00 000E+00

Total 119E+12 400E+12 377E+12





















36














37




003 ndash 00003



Plants 2 ndash 002

Fish 075 ndash 003



Birds 06 ndash 015



6 Conclusions











38












much more attention























39
























40









41

ACRONYMS















42

REFERENCES



























43



























44






















March 2011





18














19



0

20

40

60

80

100

0 2 4 6 8 10

Dose (Sv)


Probability of

death


Mortality distance

10E+17

60E+17

11E+18

16E+18

21E+18

0 2 4 6 8

Distance (km)

I - 1 3 1 E q


Mortality distance








20









younger groups



CancerDeath Rate


LEUKEMIA 112E-02 112E-02 1

BONE 104E-03 104E-03 1

BREAST 621E-03 183E-02 1

LUNG 178E-02 199E-02 1

THYROID 146E-03 828E-03 1

GI 158E-02 661E-02 1






21





4 Results














22





the tsunami











263E+04 427E+05 281E+05 349E+05



753E+02 320E+03 230E+03 261E+03


242E+02 138E+03 100E+03 110E+02


188E+02 109E+03 795E+02 838E+02



400E+01 200E+02 200E+02 200E+02





23


risk to 20 km 200E-03 510E-03 450E-03 540E-03

risk 20-30 km 200E-03 650E-03 600E-03 710E-03

risk 30-40 km 210E-03 720E-03 670E-03 720E-03

risk Tokyo 170E-04 320E-03 230E-03 290E-03













24





43 Economic impact









Plants 400E+10 400E+10 400E+10 400E+10

Total 132E+11 189E+12 119E+12 150E+12





25





















26
















27


effects


Case 3(BE)
















FukushimaCase 3


Risk to 20 km 450E-03 430E-03

Risk 20-30 600E-03 420E-03

Risk 30-40 670E-03 440E-03




Case 3Chernobyl

Source Term




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 119E+12 769E+11



Case 3Chernobyl

Source Term












28








Case 3(BE)














29



Case 3(BE)


Risk to 20 km 450E-03 170E-03

Risk 20-30 600E-03 220E-03

Risk 30-40 670E-03 240E-03



CostsFukushima

Case 3




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 119E+12 592E+11




MERCK data [28]









30


MACCS2Results














Risk person


risk 20-30 950E-04

risk 30-40 410E-04

Risk Tokyo 790E-06


MACCS2

Results

Adjusted for future




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 495E+10 619E+10











31












Case 3 (BE) No I
















No IRisk person

risk to 20 km 450E-03 440E-03

risk 20-30 600E-03 597E-03

risk 30-40 670E-03 660E-03




32


Case 3 (BE) No I

Costs Total 2005 US$ 222E+11 220E+11



Total 119E+12 118E+12


Case 3 (BE) No I





















33















Total Bq

Sr90 37E+15 56E+16

Cs137 52E+15 78E+16

I131 27E+18 41E+19

Ce144 14E+17 21E+18

Ru103 70E+17 11E+19

Ru106 11E+16 17E+17

Zr95 78E+17 12E+19

Ba140 37E+18 56E+19

Y91 74E+17 11E+19Ce143 31E+19 47E+20



34

Nd147 20E+18 30E+19

H3 44E+17 66E+18






























35






(41e19 Bq)

risk to 20 km 450E-03 196E-02 175E-02

risk 20-30 600E-03 211E-02 183E-02

risk 30-40 670E-03 229E-02 199E-02

Risk Tokio 230E-03 471E-03 427E-03








Plants 400E+10 000E+00 000E+00

Total 119E+12 400E+12 377E+12





















36














37




003 ndash 00003



Plants 2 ndash 002

Fish 075 ndash 003



Birds 06 ndash 015



6 Conclusions











38












much more attention























39
























40









41

ACRONYMS















42

REFERENCES



























43



























44






















March 2011





19



0

20

40

60

80

100

0 2 4 6 8 10

Dose (Sv)


Probability of

death


Mortality distance

10E+17

60E+17

11E+18

16E+18

21E+18

0 2 4 6 8

Distance (km)

I - 1 3 1 E q


Mortality distance








20









younger groups



CancerDeath Rate


LEUKEMIA 112E-02 112E-02 1

BONE 104E-03 104E-03 1

BREAST 621E-03 183E-02 1

LUNG 178E-02 199E-02 1

THYROID 146E-03 828E-03 1

GI 158E-02 661E-02 1






21





4 Results














22





the tsunami











263E+04 427E+05 281E+05 349E+05



753E+02 320E+03 230E+03 261E+03


242E+02 138E+03 100E+03 110E+02


188E+02 109E+03 795E+02 838E+02



400E+01 200E+02 200E+02 200E+02





23


risk to 20 km 200E-03 510E-03 450E-03 540E-03

risk 20-30 km 200E-03 650E-03 600E-03 710E-03

risk 30-40 km 210E-03 720E-03 670E-03 720E-03

risk Tokyo 170E-04 320E-03 230E-03 290E-03













24





43 Economic impact









Plants 400E+10 400E+10 400E+10 400E+10

Total 132E+11 189E+12 119E+12 150E+12





25





















26
















27


effects


Case 3(BE)
















FukushimaCase 3


Risk to 20 km 450E-03 430E-03

Risk 20-30 600E-03 420E-03

Risk 30-40 670E-03 440E-03




Case 3Chernobyl

Source Term




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 119E+12 769E+11



Case 3Chernobyl

Source Term












28








Case 3(BE)














29



Case 3(BE)


Risk to 20 km 450E-03 170E-03

Risk 20-30 600E-03 220E-03

Risk 30-40 670E-03 240E-03



CostsFukushima

Case 3




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 119E+12 592E+11




MERCK data [28]









30


MACCS2Results














Risk person


risk 20-30 950E-04

risk 30-40 410E-04

Risk Tokyo 790E-06


MACCS2

Results

Adjusted for future




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 495E+10 619E+10











31












Case 3 (BE) No I
















No IRisk person

risk to 20 km 450E-03 440E-03

risk 20-30 600E-03 597E-03

risk 30-40 670E-03 660E-03




32


Case 3 (BE) No I

Costs Total 2005 US$ 222E+11 220E+11



Total 119E+12 118E+12


Case 3 (BE) No I





















33















Total Bq

Sr90 37E+15 56E+16

Cs137 52E+15 78E+16

I131 27E+18 41E+19

Ce144 14E+17 21E+18

Ru103 70E+17 11E+19

Ru106 11E+16 17E+17

Zr95 78E+17 12E+19

Ba140 37E+18 56E+19

Y91 74E+17 11E+19Ce143 31E+19 47E+20



34

Nd147 20E+18 30E+19

H3 44E+17 66E+18






























35






(41e19 Bq)

risk to 20 km 450E-03 196E-02 175E-02

risk 20-30 600E-03 211E-02 183E-02

risk 30-40 670E-03 229E-02 199E-02

Risk Tokio 230E-03 471E-03 427E-03








Plants 400E+10 000E+00 000E+00

Total 119E+12 400E+12 377E+12





















36














37




003 ndash 00003



Plants 2 ndash 002

Fish 075 ndash 003



Birds 06 ndash 015



6 Conclusions











38












much more attention























39
























40









41

ACRONYMS















42

REFERENCES



























43



























44






















March 2011





20









younger groups



CancerDeath Rate


LEUKEMIA 112E-02 112E-02 1

BONE 104E-03 104E-03 1

BREAST 621E-03 183E-02 1

LUNG 178E-02 199E-02 1

THYROID 146E-03 828E-03 1

GI 158E-02 661E-02 1






21





4 Results














22





the tsunami











263E+04 427E+05 281E+05 349E+05



753E+02 320E+03 230E+03 261E+03


242E+02 138E+03 100E+03 110E+02


188E+02 109E+03 795E+02 838E+02



400E+01 200E+02 200E+02 200E+02





23


risk to 20 km 200E-03 510E-03 450E-03 540E-03

risk 20-30 km 200E-03 650E-03 600E-03 710E-03

risk 30-40 km 210E-03 720E-03 670E-03 720E-03

risk Tokyo 170E-04 320E-03 230E-03 290E-03













24





43 Economic impact









Plants 400E+10 400E+10 400E+10 400E+10

Total 132E+11 189E+12 119E+12 150E+12





25





















26
















27


effects


Case 3(BE)
















FukushimaCase 3


Risk to 20 km 450E-03 430E-03

Risk 20-30 600E-03 420E-03

Risk 30-40 670E-03 440E-03




Case 3Chernobyl

Source Term




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 119E+12 769E+11



Case 3Chernobyl

Source Term












28








Case 3(BE)














29



Case 3(BE)


Risk to 20 km 450E-03 170E-03

Risk 20-30 600E-03 220E-03

Risk 30-40 670E-03 240E-03



CostsFukushima

Case 3




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 119E+12 592E+11




MERCK data [28]









30


MACCS2Results














Risk person


risk 20-30 950E-04

risk 30-40 410E-04

Risk Tokyo 790E-06


MACCS2

Results

Adjusted for future




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 495E+10 619E+10











31












Case 3 (BE) No I
















No IRisk person

risk to 20 km 450E-03 440E-03

risk 20-30 600E-03 597E-03

risk 30-40 670E-03 660E-03




32


Case 3 (BE) No I

Costs Total 2005 US$ 222E+11 220E+11



Total 119E+12 118E+12


Case 3 (BE) No I





















33















Total Bq

Sr90 37E+15 56E+16

Cs137 52E+15 78E+16

I131 27E+18 41E+19

Ce144 14E+17 21E+18

Ru103 70E+17 11E+19

Ru106 11E+16 17E+17

Zr95 78E+17 12E+19

Ba140 37E+18 56E+19

Y91 74E+17 11E+19Ce143 31E+19 47E+20



34

Nd147 20E+18 30E+19

H3 44E+17 66E+18






























35






(41e19 Bq)

risk to 20 km 450E-03 196E-02 175E-02

risk 20-30 600E-03 211E-02 183E-02

risk 30-40 670E-03 229E-02 199E-02

Risk Tokio 230E-03 471E-03 427E-03








Plants 400E+10 000E+00 000E+00

Total 119E+12 400E+12 377E+12





















36














37




003 ndash 00003



Plants 2 ndash 002

Fish 075 ndash 003



Birds 06 ndash 015



6 Conclusions











38












much more attention























39
























40









41

ACRONYMS















42

REFERENCES



























43



























44






















March 2011





21





4 Results














22





the tsunami











263E+04 427E+05 281E+05 349E+05



753E+02 320E+03 230E+03 261E+03


242E+02 138E+03 100E+03 110E+02


188E+02 109E+03 795E+02 838E+02



400E+01 200E+02 200E+02 200E+02





23


risk to 20 km 200E-03 510E-03 450E-03 540E-03

risk 20-30 km 200E-03 650E-03 600E-03 710E-03

risk 30-40 km 210E-03 720E-03 670E-03 720E-03

risk Tokyo 170E-04 320E-03 230E-03 290E-03













24





43 Economic impact









Plants 400E+10 400E+10 400E+10 400E+10

Total 132E+11 189E+12 119E+12 150E+12





25





















26
















27


effects


Case 3(BE)
















FukushimaCase 3


Risk to 20 km 450E-03 430E-03

Risk 20-30 600E-03 420E-03

Risk 30-40 670E-03 440E-03




Case 3Chernobyl

Source Term




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 119E+12 769E+11



Case 3Chernobyl

Source Term












28








Case 3(BE)














29



Case 3(BE)


Risk to 20 km 450E-03 170E-03

Risk 20-30 600E-03 220E-03

Risk 30-40 670E-03 240E-03



CostsFukushima

Case 3




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 119E+12 592E+11




MERCK data [28]









30


MACCS2Results














Risk person


risk 20-30 950E-04

risk 30-40 410E-04

Risk Tokyo 790E-06


MACCS2

Results

Adjusted for future




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 495E+10 619E+10











31












Case 3 (BE) No I
















No IRisk person

risk to 20 km 450E-03 440E-03

risk 20-30 600E-03 597E-03

risk 30-40 670E-03 660E-03




32


Case 3 (BE) No I

Costs Total 2005 US$ 222E+11 220E+11



Total 119E+12 118E+12


Case 3 (BE) No I





















33















Total Bq

Sr90 37E+15 56E+16

Cs137 52E+15 78E+16

I131 27E+18 41E+19

Ce144 14E+17 21E+18

Ru103 70E+17 11E+19

Ru106 11E+16 17E+17

Zr95 78E+17 12E+19

Ba140 37E+18 56E+19

Y91 74E+17 11E+19Ce143 31E+19 47E+20



34

Nd147 20E+18 30E+19

H3 44E+17 66E+18






























35






(41e19 Bq)

risk to 20 km 450E-03 196E-02 175E-02

risk 20-30 600E-03 211E-02 183E-02

risk 30-40 670E-03 229E-02 199E-02

Risk Tokio 230E-03 471E-03 427E-03








Plants 400E+10 000E+00 000E+00

Total 119E+12 400E+12 377E+12





















36














37




003 ndash 00003



Plants 2 ndash 002

Fish 075 ndash 003



Birds 06 ndash 015



6 Conclusions











38












much more attention























39
























40









41

ACRONYMS















42

REFERENCES



























43



























44






















March 2011





22





the tsunami











263E+04 427E+05 281E+05 349E+05



753E+02 320E+03 230E+03 261E+03


242E+02 138E+03 100E+03 110E+02


188E+02 109E+03 795E+02 838E+02



400E+01 200E+02 200E+02 200E+02





23


risk to 20 km 200E-03 510E-03 450E-03 540E-03

risk 20-30 km 200E-03 650E-03 600E-03 710E-03

risk 30-40 km 210E-03 720E-03 670E-03 720E-03

risk Tokyo 170E-04 320E-03 230E-03 290E-03













24





43 Economic impact









Plants 400E+10 400E+10 400E+10 400E+10

Total 132E+11 189E+12 119E+12 150E+12





25





















26
















27


effects


Case 3(BE)
















FukushimaCase 3


Risk to 20 km 450E-03 430E-03

Risk 20-30 600E-03 420E-03

Risk 30-40 670E-03 440E-03




Case 3Chernobyl

Source Term




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 119E+12 769E+11



Case 3Chernobyl

Source Term












28








Case 3(BE)














29



Case 3(BE)


Risk to 20 km 450E-03 170E-03

Risk 20-30 600E-03 220E-03

Risk 30-40 670E-03 240E-03



CostsFukushima

Case 3




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 119E+12 592E+11




MERCK data [28]









30


MACCS2Results














Risk person


risk 20-30 950E-04

risk 30-40 410E-04

Risk Tokyo 790E-06


MACCS2

Results

Adjusted for future




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 495E+10 619E+10











31












Case 3 (BE) No I
















No IRisk person

risk to 20 km 450E-03 440E-03

risk 20-30 600E-03 597E-03

risk 30-40 670E-03 660E-03




32


Case 3 (BE) No I

Costs Total 2005 US$ 222E+11 220E+11



Total 119E+12 118E+12


Case 3 (BE) No I





















33















Total Bq

Sr90 37E+15 56E+16

Cs137 52E+15 78E+16

I131 27E+18 41E+19

Ce144 14E+17 21E+18

Ru103 70E+17 11E+19

Ru106 11E+16 17E+17

Zr95 78E+17 12E+19

Ba140 37E+18 56E+19

Y91 74E+17 11E+19Ce143 31E+19 47E+20



34

Nd147 20E+18 30E+19

H3 44E+17 66E+18






























35






(41e19 Bq)

risk to 20 km 450E-03 196E-02 175E-02

risk 20-30 600E-03 211E-02 183E-02

risk 30-40 670E-03 229E-02 199E-02

Risk Tokio 230E-03 471E-03 427E-03








Plants 400E+10 000E+00 000E+00

Total 119E+12 400E+12 377E+12





















36














37




003 ndash 00003



Plants 2 ndash 002

Fish 075 ndash 003



Birds 06 ndash 015



6 Conclusions











38












much more attention























39
























40









41

ACRONYMS















42

REFERENCES



























43



























44






















March 2011





23


risk to 20 km 200E-03 510E-03 450E-03 540E-03

risk 20-30 km 200E-03 650E-03 600E-03 710E-03

risk 30-40 km 210E-03 720E-03 670E-03 720E-03

risk Tokyo 170E-04 320E-03 230E-03 290E-03













24





43 Economic impact









Plants 400E+10 400E+10 400E+10 400E+10

Total 132E+11 189E+12 119E+12 150E+12





25





















26
















27


effects


Case 3(BE)
















FukushimaCase 3


Risk to 20 km 450E-03 430E-03

Risk 20-30 600E-03 420E-03

Risk 30-40 670E-03 440E-03




Case 3Chernobyl

Source Term




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 119E+12 769E+11



Case 3Chernobyl

Source Term












28








Case 3(BE)














29



Case 3(BE)


Risk to 20 km 450E-03 170E-03

Risk 20-30 600E-03 220E-03

Risk 30-40 670E-03 240E-03



CostsFukushima

Case 3




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 119E+12 592E+11




MERCK data [28]









30


MACCS2Results














Risk person


risk 20-30 950E-04

risk 30-40 410E-04

Risk Tokyo 790E-06


MACCS2

Results

Adjusted for future




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 495E+10 619E+10











31












Case 3 (BE) No I
















No IRisk person

risk to 20 km 450E-03 440E-03

risk 20-30 600E-03 597E-03

risk 30-40 670E-03 660E-03




32


Case 3 (BE) No I

Costs Total 2005 US$ 222E+11 220E+11



Total 119E+12 118E+12


Case 3 (BE) No I





















33















Total Bq

Sr90 37E+15 56E+16

Cs137 52E+15 78E+16

I131 27E+18 41E+19

Ce144 14E+17 21E+18

Ru103 70E+17 11E+19

Ru106 11E+16 17E+17

Zr95 78E+17 12E+19

Ba140 37E+18 56E+19

Y91 74E+17 11E+19Ce143 31E+19 47E+20



34

Nd147 20E+18 30E+19

H3 44E+17 66E+18






























35






(41e19 Bq)

risk to 20 km 450E-03 196E-02 175E-02

risk 20-30 600E-03 211E-02 183E-02

risk 30-40 670E-03 229E-02 199E-02

Risk Tokio 230E-03 471E-03 427E-03








Plants 400E+10 000E+00 000E+00

Total 119E+12 400E+12 377E+12





















36














37




003 ndash 00003



Plants 2 ndash 002

Fish 075 ndash 003



Birds 06 ndash 015



6 Conclusions











38












much more attention























39
























40









41

ACRONYMS















42

REFERENCES



























43



























44






















March 2011





24





43 Economic impact









Plants 400E+10 400E+10 400E+10 400E+10

Total 132E+11 189E+12 119E+12 150E+12





25





















26
















27


effects


Case 3(BE)
















FukushimaCase 3


Risk to 20 km 450E-03 430E-03

Risk 20-30 600E-03 420E-03

Risk 30-40 670E-03 440E-03




Case 3Chernobyl

Source Term




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 119E+12 769E+11



Case 3Chernobyl

Source Term












28








Case 3(BE)














29



Case 3(BE)


Risk to 20 km 450E-03 170E-03

Risk 20-30 600E-03 220E-03

Risk 30-40 670E-03 240E-03



CostsFukushima

Case 3




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 119E+12 592E+11




MERCK data [28]









30


MACCS2Results














Risk person


risk 20-30 950E-04

risk 30-40 410E-04

Risk Tokyo 790E-06


MACCS2

Results

Adjusted for future




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 495E+10 619E+10











31












Case 3 (BE) No I
















No IRisk person

risk to 20 km 450E-03 440E-03

risk 20-30 600E-03 597E-03

risk 30-40 670E-03 660E-03




32


Case 3 (BE) No I

Costs Total 2005 US$ 222E+11 220E+11



Total 119E+12 118E+12


Case 3 (BE) No I





















33















Total Bq

Sr90 37E+15 56E+16

Cs137 52E+15 78E+16

I131 27E+18 41E+19

Ce144 14E+17 21E+18

Ru103 70E+17 11E+19

Ru106 11E+16 17E+17

Zr95 78E+17 12E+19

Ba140 37E+18 56E+19

Y91 74E+17 11E+19Ce143 31E+19 47E+20



34

Nd147 20E+18 30E+19

H3 44E+17 66E+18






























35






(41e19 Bq)

risk to 20 km 450E-03 196E-02 175E-02

risk 20-30 600E-03 211E-02 183E-02

risk 30-40 670E-03 229E-02 199E-02

Risk Tokio 230E-03 471E-03 427E-03








Plants 400E+10 000E+00 000E+00

Total 119E+12 400E+12 377E+12





















36














37




003 ndash 00003



Plants 2 ndash 002

Fish 075 ndash 003



Birds 06 ndash 015



6 Conclusions











38












much more attention























39
























40









41

ACRONYMS















42

REFERENCES



























43



























44






















March 2011





25





















26
















27


effects


Case 3(BE)
















FukushimaCase 3


Risk to 20 km 450E-03 430E-03

Risk 20-30 600E-03 420E-03

Risk 30-40 670E-03 440E-03




Case 3Chernobyl

Source Term




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 119E+12 769E+11



Case 3Chernobyl

Source Term












28








Case 3(BE)














29



Case 3(BE)


Risk to 20 km 450E-03 170E-03

Risk 20-30 600E-03 220E-03

Risk 30-40 670E-03 240E-03



CostsFukushima

Case 3




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 119E+12 592E+11




MERCK data [28]









30


MACCS2Results














Risk person


risk 20-30 950E-04

risk 30-40 410E-04

Risk Tokyo 790E-06


MACCS2

Results

Adjusted for future




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 495E+10 619E+10











31












Case 3 (BE) No I
















No IRisk person

risk to 20 km 450E-03 440E-03

risk 20-30 600E-03 597E-03

risk 30-40 670E-03 660E-03




32


Case 3 (BE) No I

Costs Total 2005 US$ 222E+11 220E+11



Total 119E+12 118E+12


Case 3 (BE) No I





















33















Total Bq

Sr90 37E+15 56E+16

Cs137 52E+15 78E+16

I131 27E+18 41E+19

Ce144 14E+17 21E+18

Ru103 70E+17 11E+19

Ru106 11E+16 17E+17

Zr95 78E+17 12E+19

Ba140 37E+18 56E+19

Y91 74E+17 11E+19Ce143 31E+19 47E+20



34

Nd147 20E+18 30E+19

H3 44E+17 66E+18






























35






(41e19 Bq)

risk to 20 km 450E-03 196E-02 175E-02

risk 20-30 600E-03 211E-02 183E-02

risk 30-40 670E-03 229E-02 199E-02

Risk Tokio 230E-03 471E-03 427E-03








Plants 400E+10 000E+00 000E+00

Total 119E+12 400E+12 377E+12





















36














37




003 ndash 00003



Plants 2 ndash 002

Fish 075 ndash 003



Birds 06 ndash 015



6 Conclusions











38












much more attention























39
























40









41

ACRONYMS















42

REFERENCES



























43



























44






















March 2011





26
















27


effects


Case 3(BE)
















FukushimaCase 3


Risk to 20 km 450E-03 430E-03

Risk 20-30 600E-03 420E-03

Risk 30-40 670E-03 440E-03




Case 3Chernobyl

Source Term




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 119E+12 769E+11



Case 3Chernobyl

Source Term












28








Case 3(BE)














29



Case 3(BE)


Risk to 20 km 450E-03 170E-03

Risk 20-30 600E-03 220E-03

Risk 30-40 670E-03 240E-03



CostsFukushima

Case 3




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 119E+12 592E+11




MERCK data [28]









30


MACCS2Results














Risk person


risk 20-30 950E-04

risk 30-40 410E-04

Risk Tokyo 790E-06


MACCS2

Results

Adjusted for future




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 495E+10 619E+10











31












Case 3 (BE) No I
















No IRisk person

risk to 20 km 450E-03 440E-03

risk 20-30 600E-03 597E-03

risk 30-40 670E-03 660E-03




32


Case 3 (BE) No I

Costs Total 2005 US$ 222E+11 220E+11



Total 119E+12 118E+12


Case 3 (BE) No I





















33















Total Bq

Sr90 37E+15 56E+16

Cs137 52E+15 78E+16

I131 27E+18 41E+19

Ce144 14E+17 21E+18

Ru103 70E+17 11E+19

Ru106 11E+16 17E+17

Zr95 78E+17 12E+19

Ba140 37E+18 56E+19

Y91 74E+17 11E+19Ce143 31E+19 47E+20



34

Nd147 20E+18 30E+19

H3 44E+17 66E+18






























35






(41e19 Bq)

risk to 20 km 450E-03 196E-02 175E-02

risk 20-30 600E-03 211E-02 183E-02

risk 30-40 670E-03 229E-02 199E-02

Risk Tokio 230E-03 471E-03 427E-03








Plants 400E+10 000E+00 000E+00

Total 119E+12 400E+12 377E+12





















36














37




003 ndash 00003



Plants 2 ndash 002

Fish 075 ndash 003



Birds 06 ndash 015



6 Conclusions











38












much more attention























39
























40









41

ACRONYMS















42

REFERENCES



























43



























44






















March 2011





27


effects


Case 3(BE)
















FukushimaCase 3


Risk to 20 km 450E-03 430E-03

Risk 20-30 600E-03 420E-03

Risk 30-40 670E-03 440E-03




Case 3Chernobyl

Source Term




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 119E+12 769E+11



Case 3Chernobyl

Source Term












28








Case 3(BE)














29



Case 3(BE)


Risk to 20 km 450E-03 170E-03

Risk 20-30 600E-03 220E-03

Risk 30-40 670E-03 240E-03



CostsFukushima

Case 3




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 119E+12 592E+11




MERCK data [28]









30


MACCS2Results














Risk person


risk 20-30 950E-04

risk 30-40 410E-04

Risk Tokyo 790E-06


MACCS2

Results

Adjusted for future




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 495E+10 619E+10











31












Case 3 (BE) No I
















No IRisk person

risk to 20 km 450E-03 440E-03

risk 20-30 600E-03 597E-03

risk 30-40 670E-03 660E-03




32


Case 3 (BE) No I

Costs Total 2005 US$ 222E+11 220E+11



Total 119E+12 118E+12


Case 3 (BE) No I





















33















Total Bq

Sr90 37E+15 56E+16

Cs137 52E+15 78E+16

I131 27E+18 41E+19

Ce144 14E+17 21E+18

Ru103 70E+17 11E+19

Ru106 11E+16 17E+17

Zr95 78E+17 12E+19

Ba140 37E+18 56E+19

Y91 74E+17 11E+19Ce143 31E+19 47E+20



34

Nd147 20E+18 30E+19

H3 44E+17 66E+18






























35






(41e19 Bq)

risk to 20 km 450E-03 196E-02 175E-02

risk 20-30 600E-03 211E-02 183E-02

risk 30-40 670E-03 229E-02 199E-02

Risk Tokio 230E-03 471E-03 427E-03








Plants 400E+10 000E+00 000E+00

Total 119E+12 400E+12 377E+12





















36














37




003 ndash 00003



Plants 2 ndash 002

Fish 075 ndash 003



Birds 06 ndash 015



6 Conclusions











38












much more attention























39
























40









41

ACRONYMS















42

REFERENCES



























43



























44






















March 2011





28








Case 3(BE)














29



Case 3(BE)


Risk to 20 km 450E-03 170E-03

Risk 20-30 600E-03 220E-03

Risk 30-40 670E-03 240E-03



CostsFukushima

Case 3




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 119E+12 592E+11




MERCK data [28]









30


MACCS2Results














Risk person


risk 20-30 950E-04

risk 30-40 410E-04

Risk Tokyo 790E-06


MACCS2

Results

Adjusted for future




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 495E+10 619E+10











31












Case 3 (BE) No I
















No IRisk person

risk to 20 km 450E-03 440E-03

risk 20-30 600E-03 597E-03

risk 30-40 670E-03 660E-03




32


Case 3 (BE) No I

Costs Total 2005 US$ 222E+11 220E+11



Total 119E+12 118E+12


Case 3 (BE) No I





















33















Total Bq

Sr90 37E+15 56E+16

Cs137 52E+15 78E+16

I131 27E+18 41E+19

Ce144 14E+17 21E+18

Ru103 70E+17 11E+19

Ru106 11E+16 17E+17

Zr95 78E+17 12E+19

Ba140 37E+18 56E+19

Y91 74E+17 11E+19Ce143 31E+19 47E+20



34

Nd147 20E+18 30E+19

H3 44E+17 66E+18






























35






(41e19 Bq)

risk to 20 km 450E-03 196E-02 175E-02

risk 20-30 600E-03 211E-02 183E-02

risk 30-40 670E-03 229E-02 199E-02

Risk Tokio 230E-03 471E-03 427E-03








Plants 400E+10 000E+00 000E+00

Total 119E+12 400E+12 377E+12





















36














37




003 ndash 00003



Plants 2 ndash 002

Fish 075 ndash 003



Birds 06 ndash 015



6 Conclusions











38












much more attention























39
























40









41

ACRONYMS















42

REFERENCES



























43



























44






















March 2011





29



Case 3(BE)


Risk to 20 km 450E-03 170E-03

Risk 20-30 600E-03 220E-03

Risk 30-40 670E-03 240E-03



CostsFukushima

Case 3




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 119E+12 592E+11




MERCK data [28]









30


MACCS2Results














Risk person


risk 20-30 950E-04

risk 30-40 410E-04

Risk Tokyo 790E-06


MACCS2

Results

Adjusted for future




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 495E+10 619E+10











31












Case 3 (BE) No I
















No IRisk person

risk to 20 km 450E-03 440E-03

risk 20-30 600E-03 597E-03

risk 30-40 670E-03 660E-03




32


Case 3 (BE) No I

Costs Total 2005 US$ 222E+11 220E+11



Total 119E+12 118E+12


Case 3 (BE) No I





















33















Total Bq

Sr90 37E+15 56E+16

Cs137 52E+15 78E+16

I131 27E+18 41E+19

Ce144 14E+17 21E+18

Ru103 70E+17 11E+19

Ru106 11E+16 17E+17

Zr95 78E+17 12E+19

Ba140 37E+18 56E+19

Y91 74E+17 11E+19Ce143 31E+19 47E+20



34

Nd147 20E+18 30E+19

H3 44E+17 66E+18






























35






(41e19 Bq)

risk to 20 km 450E-03 196E-02 175E-02

risk 20-30 600E-03 211E-02 183E-02

risk 30-40 670E-03 229E-02 199E-02

Risk Tokio 230E-03 471E-03 427E-03








Plants 400E+10 000E+00 000E+00

Total 119E+12 400E+12 377E+12





















36














37




003 ndash 00003



Plants 2 ndash 002

Fish 075 ndash 003



Birds 06 ndash 015



6 Conclusions











38












much more attention























39
























40









41

ACRONYMS















42

REFERENCES



























43



























44






















March 2011





30


MACCS2Results














Risk person


risk 20-30 950E-04

risk 30-40 410E-04

Risk Tokyo 790E-06


MACCS2

Results

Adjusted for future




Plants 400E+10 400E+10

Total 495E+10 619E+10











31












Case 3 (BE) No I
















No IRisk person

risk to 20 km 450E-03 440E-03

risk 20-30 600E-03 597E-03

risk 30-40 670E-03 660E-03




32


Case 3 (BE) No I

Costs Total 2005 US$ 222E+11 220E+11



Total 119E+12 118E+12


Case 3 (BE) No I





















33















Total Bq

Sr90 37E+15 56E+16

Cs137 52E+15 78E+16

I131 27E+18 41E+19

Ce144 14E+17 21E+18

Ru103 70E+17 11E+19

Ru106 11E+16 17E+17

Zr95 78E+17 12E+19

Ba140 37E+18 56E+19

Y91 74E+17 11E+19Ce143 31E+19 47E+20



34

Nd147 20E+18 30E+19

H3 44E+17 66E+18






























35






(41e19 Bq)

risk to 20 km 450E-03 196E-02 175E-02

risk 20-30 600E-03 211E-02 183E-02

risk 30-40 670E-03 229E-02 199E-02

Risk Tokio 230E-03 471E-03 427E-03








Plants 400E+10 000E+00 000E+00

Total 119E+12 400E+12 377E+12





















36














37




003 ndash 00003



Plants 2 ndash 002

Fish 075 ndash 003



Birds 06 ndash 015



6 Conclusions











38












much more attention























39
























40









41

ACRONYMS















42

REFERENCES



























43



























44






















March 2011





31












Case 3 (BE) No I
















No IRisk person

risk to 20 km 450E-03 440E-03

risk 20-30 600E-03 597E-03

risk 30-40 670E-03 660E-03




32


Case 3 (BE) No I

Costs Total 2005 US$ 222E+11 220E+11



Total 119E+12 118E+12


Case 3 (BE) No I





















33















Total Bq

Sr90 37E+15 56E+16

Cs137 52E+15 78E+16

I131 27E+18 41E+19

Ce144 14E+17 21E+18

Ru103 70E+17 11E+19

Ru106 11E+16 17E+17

Zr95 78E+17 12E+19

Ba140 37E+18 56E+19

Y91 74E+17 11E+19Ce143 31E+19 47E+20



34

Nd147 20E+18 30E+19

H3 44E+17 66E+18






























35






(41e19 Bq)

risk to 20 km 450E-03 196E-02 175E-02

risk 20-30 600E-03 211E-02 183E-02

risk 30-40 670E-03 229E-02 199E-02

Risk Tokio 230E-03 471E-03 427E-03








Plants 400E+10 000E+00 000E+00

Total 119E+12 400E+12 377E+12





















36














37




003 ndash 00003



Plants 2 ndash 002

Fish 075 ndash 003



Birds 06 ndash 015



6 Conclusions











38












much more attention























39
























40









41

ACRONYMS















42

REFERENCES



























43



























44






















March 2011





32


Case 3 (BE) No I

Costs Total 2005 US$ 222E+11 220E+11



Total 119E+12 118E+12


Case 3 (BE) No I





















33















Total Bq

Sr90 37E+15 56E+16

Cs137 52E+15 78E+16

I131 27E+18 41E+19

Ce144 14E+17 21E+18

Ru103 70E+17 11E+19

Ru106 11E+16 17E+17

Zr95 78E+17 12E+19

Ba140 37E+18 56E+19

Y91 74E+17 11E+19Ce143 31E+19 47E+20



34

Nd147 20E+18 30E+19

H3 44E+17 66E+18






























35






(41e19 Bq)

risk to 20 km 450E-03 196E-02 175E-02

risk 20-30 600E-03 211E-02 183E-02

risk 30-40 670E-03 229E-02 199E-02

Risk Tokio 230E-03 471E-03 427E-03








Plants 400E+10 000E+00 000E+00

Total 119E+12 400E+12 377E+12





















36














37




003 ndash 00003



Plants 2 ndash 002

Fish 075 ndash 003



Birds 06 ndash 015



6 Conclusions











38












much more attention























39
























40









41

ACRONYMS















42

REFERENCES



























43



























44






















March 2011





33















Total Bq

Sr90 37E+15 56E+16

Cs137 52E+15 78E+16

I131 27E+18 41E+19

Ce144 14E+17 21E+18

Ru103 70E+17 11E+19

Ru106 11E+16 17E+17

Zr95 78E+17 12E+19

Ba140 37E+18 56E+19

Y91 74E+17 11E+19Ce143 31E+19 47E+20



34

Nd147 20E+18 30E+19

H3 44E+17 66E+18






























35






(41e19 Bq)

risk to 20 km 450E-03 196E-02 175E-02

risk 20-30 600E-03 211E-02 183E-02

risk 30-40 670E-03 229E-02 199E-02

Risk Tokio 230E-03 471E-03 427E-03








Plants 400E+10 000E+00 000E+00

Total 119E+12 400E+12 377E+12





















36














37




003 ndash 00003



Plants 2 ndash 002

Fish 075 ndash 003



Birds 06 ndash 015



6 Conclusions











38












much more attention























39
























40









41

ACRONYMS















42

REFERENCES



























43



























44






















March 2011





34

Nd147 20E+18 30E+19

H3 44E+17 66E+18






























35






(41e19 Bq)

risk to 20 km 450E-03 196E-02 175E-02

risk 20-30 600E-03 211E-02 183E-02

risk 30-40 670E-03 229E-02 199E-02

Risk Tokio 230E-03 471E-03 427E-03








Plants 400E+10 000E+00 000E+00

Total 119E+12 400E+12 377E+12





















36














37




003 ndash 00003



Plants 2 ndash 002

Fish 075 ndash 003



Birds 06 ndash 015



6 Conclusions











38












much more attention























39
























40









41

ACRONYMS















42

REFERENCES



























43



























44






















March 2011





35






(41e19 Bq)

risk to 20 km 450E-03 196E-02 175E-02

risk 20-30 600E-03 211E-02 183E-02

risk 30-40 670E-03 229E-02 199E-02

Risk Tokio 230E-03 471E-03 427E-03








Plants 400E+10 000E+00 000E+00

Total 119E+12 400E+12 377E+12





















36














37




003 ndash 00003



Plants 2 ndash 002

Fish 075 ndash 003



Birds 06 ndash 015



6 Conclusions











38












much more attention























39
























40









41

ACRONYMS















42

REFERENCES



























43



























44






















March 2011





36














37




003 ndash 00003



Plants 2 ndash 002

Fish 075 ndash 003



Birds 06 ndash 015



6 Conclusions











38












much more attention























39
























40









41

ACRONYMS















42

REFERENCES



























43



























44






















March 2011





37




003 ndash 00003



Plants 2 ndash 002

Fish 075 ndash 003



Birds 06 ndash 015



6 Conclusions











38












much more attention























39
























40









41

ACRONYMS















42

REFERENCES



























43



























44






















March 2011





38












much more attention























39
























40









41

ACRONYMS















42

REFERENCES



























43



























44






















March 2011





39
























40









41

ACRONYMS















42

REFERENCES



























43



























44






















March 2011





40









41

ACRONYMS















42

REFERENCES



























43



























44






















March 2011





41

ACRONYMS















42

REFERENCES



























43



























44






















March 2011





42

REFERENCES



























43



























44






















March 2011





43



























44






















March 2011





44






















March 2011



estimated consequences fukushima nuclear disaster, castle meeting 2011 09

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