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Ethical Decision-Making Theory: An Integrated Approach
Mark S. Schwartz1
Received: 15 December 2014 / Accepted: 23 September 2015 / Published online: 26 October 2015
� Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015
Abstract Ethical decision-making (EDM) descriptive
theoretical models often conflict with each other and typ-
ically lack comprehensiveness. To address this deficiency,
a revised EDM model is proposed that consolidates and
attempts to bridge together the varying and sometimes
directly conflicting propositions and perspectives that have
been advanced. To do so, the paper is organized as follows.
First, a review of the various theoretical models of EDM is
provided. These models can generally be divided into
(a) rationalist-based (i.e., reason); and (b) non-rationalist-
based (i.e., intuition and emotion). Second, the proposed
model, called ‘Integrated Ethical Decision Making,’ is
introduced in order to fill the gaps and bridge the current
divide in EDM theory. The individual and situational fac-
tors as well as the process of the proposed model are then
described. Third, the academic and managerial implica-
tions of the proposed model are discussed. Finally, the
limitations of the proposed model are presented.
Keywords Emotion � Ethical decision making �Intuition � Moral rationalization � Moral reasoning
Introduction
While much has been discovered regarding the ethical
decision-making (EDM) process within business organi-
zations, a great deal remains unknown. The importance of
EDM is no longer in doubt, given the extent of illegal and
unethical activity that continues to take place every year
and the resultant costs to societal stakeholders including
shareholders, employees, consumers, and the natural
environment (U.S. Sentencing Commission 2014; Asso-
ciation of Certified Fraud Examiners 2014). Unethical
activity by individuals continues despite the best efforts of
business organizations to implement comprehensive ethics
programs, including codes of ethics, ethics training, and
whistleblowing hotlines (Ethics Resource Center 2014;
Webley 2011) and despite the extent to which business
schools around the world teach the subject of business
ethics (Rossouw and Stuckelberger 2012). The significant
negative yet potentially preventable costs to society
resulting from the unethical actions of individual firm
agents suggest that ethical decision making might be
considered one of the most important processes to better
understand, not only for the academic management field,
but also for the corporate community and society at large
(Trevino 1986).
There have however been important developments
through academic research over recent years leading to an
improved understanding of EDM (see Trevino et al. 2006;
Tenbrunsel and Smith-Crowe 2008) including how to
measure each of its constructs and dimensions (Agle et al.
2014). Building on and borrowing from a series of aca-
demic disciplines and theories including moral philoso-
phy, moral psychology, social psychology, social
economics, organizational behavior, criminology, behav-
ioral science, behavioral ethics, cognitive neuroscience,
and business ethics, a number of descriptive EDM theo-
retical models have been proposed to help explain the
decision-making process of individuals leading to ethical
or unethical behavior or actions (see Torres 2001).
Commonly referred to as EDM theory, these descriptive
& Mark S. Schwartz
1 School of Administrative Studies, Faculty of Liberal Arts and
Professional Studies, York University, 4700 Keele Street,
Toronto, ON M3J 1P3, Canada
123
J Bus Ethics (2016) 139:755–776
DOI 10.1007/s10551-015-2886-8
theoretical EDM frameworks (as opposed to normative
EDM frameworks) help to explain how cognitive pro-
cesses (i.e., reason or intuition) or affective processes
(i.e., emotion) operate within the brain (Reynolds 2006a;
Salvador and Folger 2009; Greene et al. 2001) leading to
moral judgment and behavior on the part of individuals.
To further enhance our understanding, these theoretical
models typically present the EDM process as a series of
temporal and sequential process stages, typically begin-
ning with initial awareness or recognition of an ethical
issue leading to a moral judgment, intention to act, and
finally to behavior (Rest 1984, 1986).1
In addition to explaining the EDM process, most theo-
retical EDM models also include a set of individual, orga-
nizational, or situational-related variables and indicate at
which stage of EDM (i.e., awareness, judgment, intention,
or behavior) they can exert a causal effect or a moderating
influence. Based on these theoretical EDM models, hun-
dreds of empirical studies, both qualitative and quantitative
in nature, along with several meta-studies, have now been
conducted to try to verify and explain exactly which inde-
pendent factors or variables actually influence the decision
making of individuals, including whether one stage of EDM
necessarily leads to the next stage (see Ford and Richardson
1994; Loe et al. 2000; O’Fallon and Butterfield 2005; Craft
2013; Lehnert et al. 2015).
While such theoretical and empirical research has
proven helpful to better understand what has been referred
to as the ‘black box’ of EDM (Liedka 1989, p. 805;
Tenbrunsel and Smith-Crowe 2008, p. 584), the relevance
or explanatory power of the theoretical and empirical
research can at least initially be questioned given the lack
of consistent findings (O’Fallon and Butterfield 2005;
Craft 2013; Pan and Sparks 2012). This may be partially
attributable due to the research methods being used (e.g.,
the use of scenarios/vignettes, surveys, student samples,
or self-reporting, see Randall and Gibson 1990; O’Fallon
and Butterfield 2005) or the diversity or quality of the
research measurement instruments being utilized (see
Mudrack and Mason 2013; Casali 2011). Another possi-
bility may be that EDM is simply too complex a neuro-
cognitive-affective process involving too many inter-re-
lated or undiscoverable variables being processed by our
brains preventing any possible generalizable conclusions.
It may also be that the predictive ability of any theoretical
EDM model will be limited to activity that more clearly
constitutes ethical or unethical behavior, rather than pre-
dicting behavior involving more complex ethical dilem-
mas where achieving normative consensus over what even
constitutes ‘ethical’ behavior can often prove to be
elusive.2 The challenges and complexity of EDM have
even led some researchers to suggest a ‘punch bowl’ or
‘garbage can’ approach to EDM, which assumes that
researchers will never know exactly what takes place
leading to ethical judgments in that only what goes into or
out of the process is capable of being analyzed (e.g.,
Schminke 1998, p. 207).
One other possible explanation for the lack of consistent
empirical findings however is that further refinements to
EDM descriptive theory models if undertaken might
improve the models’ explanatory and predictive capability
leading to more relevant and consistent empirical findings.
It is this latter possibility that this paper seeks to address.
For example, a review of the descriptive EDM theoretical
models proposed to date (Tenbrunsel and Smith-Crowe
2008) along with consideration of the more recent chal-
lenges and criticisms raised with respect to EDM research
(Haidt 2001; Sonenshein 2007; Whittier et al. 2006; Bar-
tlett 2003) suggests that there is significant room for
improvement in theoretical EDM models. Following their
review of the empirical EDM research, O’Fallon and
Butterfield state (2005, p. 399): ‘‘If the field of descriptive
ethics is to move forward to strengthen our understanding
of the EDM process, it is imperative that future studies
focus more attention on theory development.’’ According
to Tenbrunsel and Smith-Crowe (2008, p. 547): ‘‘…many
[studies] are still atheoretical or uni-theoretical, relying on
a single theory.’’ They then reflect on the deficiency in
EDM theory: ‘‘Unlike in the past, researchers no longer
need to justify their rationale for studying ethics; instead,
their attention needs to focus on developing a more com-
prehensive theoretical platform upon which empirical work
in behavioral ethics can continue’’ (Tenbrunsel and Smith-
Crowe 2008, p. 593). In other words, the current dis-
agreement among scholars over which theoretical EDM
model (if any) is the most appropriate, especially when
engaging in empirical research, needs to be addressed.
This paper will attempt to contribute to EDM literature
by focusing on the primary gaps in the theoretical EDM
models that have been identified. By doing so, the research
objective is to develop a theoretical EDM model that not
only captures and builds upon the current state of EDM, but
also consolidates and attempts to bridge together the vary-
ing and sometimes directly conflicting propositions and
perspectives that have been advanced. In other words, the
paper will attempt to incorporate and depict what has not
always been clearly portrayed in any proposed EDM model
in a more integrated manner. The most important or key
integration being advanced is the combined and inter-
1 For ease of reference, ‘ethics’ or ‘ethical’ are considered throughout
the paper to be synonymous with ‘morality’ or ‘moral.’
2 For example, Ferrell and Gresham state (1985, p. 87): ‘‘Absence of
a clear consensus about ethical conduct…has resulted in much
confusion among academicians…’’
756 M. S. Schwartz
123
related impact of intuition–emotion along with reason–ra-
tionalization on the moral judgment stage of EDM. In
addition, to address the proliferation of individual, organi-
zational, and situational/issue-related factors being applied
in EDM research, several core constructs are proposed in
order to better capture their corresponding sub-variables,
such as an individual’s ‘moral capacity’ and an organiza-
tion’s ‘ethical infrastructure.’ Other important features of
the revised model include (i) the presence of ‘lack of moral
awareness’ leading to behavior; (ii) the expansion of the
issue-based EDM variable; (iii) the inclusion of moral
rationalization; and (iv) the addition of an explicit ‘moral
consultation’ stage into the EDM process.
The proposed integrated model essentially reflects a
synthesis of the ‘intuitionist/sentimentalist’ (Haidt 2001),
‘rationalist’ (Kohlberg 1973; Rest 1986), ‘person-situation
interactionist’ (Trevino 1986), and ‘issue-contingent’ (Jones
1991) approaches to EDM. The revised model attempts to
depict the current theoretical field of EDM in a relatively
comprehensive yet hopefully more coherent and simplified
manner. The intended contribution of the proposed model is
not necessarily to offer any particularly new major insights
into EDM, but to depict a theoretical platform and schematic
representation upon which a broader range of EDM
researchers, including both rationalists and non-rationalists,
can hopefully feel comfortable utilizing in a more cohesive
and consistent manner. In addition, while ‘is’ does not
necessarily imply ‘ought,’ the development of a more robust
descriptive EDM model may lead to more effective and
relevant normative EDM models which might then have an
effect on future management or educational practices.
In order to propose and depict a reformulated theoretical
EDM model, the paper will be organized as follows. First, a
review of the various theoretical models of EDM will be
provided. These models can generally be divided into
(a) rationalist-based (i.e., reason); and (b) non-rationalist-
based (i.e., intuition and emotion). Second, the proposed
model, called ‘Integrated EDM’ (I-EDM), is introduced in
order to fill the gaps and bridge the current divide in EDM
theory. The individual and situational factors as well as the
process of the proposed model are then described. Third,
the academic and managerial implications of the proposed
model will be discussed. Finally, the limitations of the
proposed model are presented.
Several notes of caution are required however. This
study is not intended to provide a comprehensive literature
review of the EDM field. Only what might be considered to
be the most salient or utilized EDM models or research is
included in the discussion.3 In addition, each of the EDM
constructs or processes is not discussed to the same extent,
rather those that require modification from previous EDM
models are given greater emphasis throughout the paper. In
addition, the unit of analysis is individuals acting within or
on behalf of business organizations, rather than organiza-
tional-level ethical decision making.
Finally, for the purposes of the paper, a few key defi-
nitions are required. An ethical dilemma is defined as a
situation in which an individual must reflect upon com-
peting moral standards and/or stakeholder claims in
determining what is the morally appropriate decision or
action.4 Moral judgment is defined as the determination of
the ethically appropriate course of action among potential
alternatives. Ethical behavior is defined not merely as
conforming to the legal or moral norms of the larger
community5 (Jones 1991), but consists of behavior sup-
ported by one or more additional moral standards.6
Review of the Theoretical Descriptive EDMApproaches
A review of EDM research reveals that there are two
general categories of EDM theoretical models, those that
are (a) rationalist-based; and (b) non-rationalist-based.7
The rationalist-based models specifically assume that the
3 This is similar to the approach used by Trevino et al. (2006) in their
literature review of EDM.
4 One might try to distinguish situations involving ‘ethical dilemmas’
from those whereby an individual is facing a ‘moral temptation.’
‘Ethical dilemmas’ can be seen as those more challenging situations
involving ‘right versus right’ or ‘wrong versus wrong’ alternatives,
such as deciding which employee to lay off. ‘Moral temptations’
however involve ‘right versus wrong’ alternatives more directly
linked to one’s self-interest, such as deciding whether to steal supplies
from the office supply cabinet (see Kidder 1995). For the purposes of
the I-EDM model, both ethical dilemmas and moral temptations can
be faced by individual decision makers as ethical issues.5 Jones states (1991, p. 367): ‘‘…an ethical decision is defined as a
decision that is both legal and morally acceptable to the larger
community. Conversely, an unethical decision is either illegal or
morally unacceptable to the larger community.’’ This is too limited a
definition of ‘ethical’ to be utilized for the purposes of properly
studying the EDM process. Jones (1991, p. 367) himself admits that
his definition of an ethical decision is ‘‘imprecise and relativistic’’ and
refers to the difficulties of establishing substantive definitions for
ethical behavior. Others have also suggested that this definition of
what is ethical is ‘‘too relativistic’’ and avoids a precise normative
position on right versus wrong (Reynolds 2008; Tenbrunsel and
Smith-Crowe 2008). In addition, community norms can violate
‘hypernorms’ (see Donaldson and Dunfee 1999).6 While there is an extensive literature on moral theory, the moral
standards can be grouped under three general categories: (i) conven-
tionalist (e.g., industry or corporate codes of ethics); (ii) consequen-
tialist (e.g., utilitarianism); or (iii) deontological, including
trustworthiness, respect, moral rights, and justice/fairness (see
Schwartz and Carroll 2003; Schwartz 2005).7 Another possible way of dividing up EDM models is to categorize
those that focus primarily on the disposition of the decision maker,
versus those that are more interactional (person-situation) in nature.
See Tsang (2002, p. 25).
Ethical Decision-Making Theory: An Integrated Approach 757
123
moral reasoning process dominates the core of the model,
leading to moral judgment. The non-rationalist-based
models assume that both intuition and emotion dominate the
moral judgment process, with moral reasoning playing a
secondary ‘after the fact’ explanatory (i.e., reason) or jus-
tificatory (i.e., rationalization) role for one’s moral judg-
ment (Haidt 2001; Sonenshein 2007). More recent models
however suggest that rather than reason–rationalization and
intuition–emotion being mutually exclusive, there is either
a ‘dual-process’ involving two stages or a ‘two-systems’
process whereby there is concurrent interaction between
intuition (impulsive) and reason (reflective) leading to
moral judgment (see Reynolds 2006a; Strack and Deutsch
2004) or between emotion and reason leading to moral
judgment (Greene et al. 2001). These interactions form the
basis of the revised model discussed below. Each group of
EDM theoretical models will now be briefly outlined.
Rationalist approaches
The first group of theoretical models explicitly or implicitly
assumes that a predominantly reason-based process takes
place leading to moral judgment. The rationalist approach
suggests that upon experiencing an ethical dilemma, the
decision maker attempts to resolve conflicts through a
logical, rational and deliberative cognitive process by
considering and weighing various moral standards that
might be in conflict with one another. The vast majority of
empirical EDM researchers appear to rely on this particular
theoretical framework when conducting their research.
For example, Ferrell and Gresham (1985) developed a
‘multistage contingency’ model of EDM, in which an eth-
ical dilemma arises from the social or cultural environment.
The behavior of the decision maker is then affected by two
sets of ‘contingency factors’ including (1) individual factors
(i.e., knowledge, values, attitudes, and intentions); and (2)
organizational factors (i.e., significant others including top
management and peers, and opportunity including codes,
enforcement, and rewards and punishment).8
Trevino (1986) introduces a ‘person-situation interaction-
ist’ model of ethical decision making. Her model begins by
suggesting that the manner by which an ethical dilemma is
analyzed by the decisionmaker depends upon the individual’s
stage of cognitive moral development (Kohlberg 1973).9 The
decision maker’s initial cognition of right and wrong is then
moderated by individual factors including ego strength
(strength of conviction or self-regulating skills), field depen-
dence (dependence on external social referents), and locus of
control (perception of how much control one exerts over the
events in life). Situational factors alsomoderate behavior such
as immediate job context (reinforcement contingencies such
as rewards and punishment for ethical/unethical behavior) and
other external pressures (including personal costs, scarce
resources, or competition). Organizational culture (normative
structure, referent others, obedience to authority, and
responsibility for consequences) and characteristics of the
work also moderate behavior.
Possibly the most significant or prominent rationalist-
based theoretical model of EDM is by Rest (1986), who
posited that there are four distinct process components (or
stages) of EDM: (1) becoming aware that there is a moral
issue or ethical problem or that the situation has ethical
implications (also referred to as ‘interpreting the situation,’
‘sensitivity,’ or ‘recognition’)10; (2) leading to a moral
judgment (also referred to as ‘moral evaluation,’ ‘moral
reasoning,’ or as ‘ethical decision making’)11; (3) estab-
lishing a moral intent (also referred to as moral ‘motiva-
tion,’ ‘decision,’ or ‘determination’)12; and (4) then acting
on these intentions through one’s behavior (also referred to
as ‘implementation’ or ‘action’).13 The moral judgment
stage of Rest’s model which is the key moral reasoning
component of the EDM process is based on Kohlberg’s
(1973) rationalist theory of moral development.
Jones (1991) provided an important contribution to
EDM theory by not only building on and consolidating
previous theoretical EDM models such as Rest (1986), but
by including an important new factor, the nature of the
8 Ferrell et al. (1989) later suggest a revised ‘synthesis model’ which
incorporates into their original model (1985) Kohlberg’s stages of
moral development as well as the deontological and teleological
moral evaluation process taken from Hunt and Vitells’ EDM model
(1986).9 Kohlberg (1973) proposed three general levels of moral develop-
ment including the pre-conventional (stage one: punishment; stage
two: self-interest), conventional (stage three: referent others; stage
four: law), and post-conventional (stage five: social contract; stage
Footnote 9 continued
six: universal ethical principles). Kohlberg in later years indicated
that his model focused on moral reasoning, and later clarified that it
really only focused on justice/fairness issues. See Rest et al. (1999).10 For ‘heightened ethical concern,’ see De Cremer et al. (2010, p. 3).
Moral awareness is defined by Rest (1986, p. 3) as the ‘‘…interpre-
tation of the particular situation in terms of what actions (are)
possible, who (including oneself) would be affected by each course of
action, and how the interested parties would regard such effects on
their welfare.’’11 Moral judgment is defined by Rest as: ‘‘[F]iguring out what one
ought to do. Applying moral ideals to the situation to determine the
moral course of action’’ (Rest 1984, p. 26).12 For ‘determination’ see Ferrell et al. (1989, p. 60). Moral intention
might be considered synonymous with moral motivation which Rest
defines as giving ‘‘…priority to moral values above other personal
values such that a decision is made to intend to do what is morally
right’’ (1986, p. 3).13 Moral action is defined as having ‘‘…sufficient perseverance, ego
strength, and implementation skills to be able to follow through on
his/her intention to behave morally, to withstand fatigue and flagging
will, and to overcome obstacles’’ (Rest 1986, pp. 4–5).
758 M. S. Schwartz
123
ethical issue itself. Jones (1991, p. 367) states that an ethical
issue exists when a person’s actions, when freely performed
(i.e., involve a choice) ‘‘…may harm or benefit others.’’
Jones defines the ‘moral intensity’ of the ethical issue as a
construct that ‘‘…captures the extent of [the] issue-related
moral imperative in a situation’’ (1991, p. 372). Jones’
components or characteristics of ‘moral intensity’ include:
consequences (i.e., magnitude of consequences, probability
of effect, temporal immediacy, and concentration of effect);
social consensus that a proposed act is evil or good; and the
proximity or ‘the feeling of nearness’ (social, cultural, psy-
chological, or physical) the agent has to those affected. The
moral intensity of the issue is proposed by Jones to influence
each of the four stages of EDM and can act as both an
independent and moderating variable.
Most other rationalist models proposed since 1991
appear to be a variation or a combination of Rest (1986)
and Jones (1991).14 Sonenshein (2007) groups the
rationalist approaches into what he considers to be three
‘prominent streams of research’: (i) manager as philoso-
pher (e.g., Hunt and Vitell 1986); (b) person-situation
(Trevino 1986); and (iii) issue-contingent (Jones 1991).
What unites all of these theoretical models however is the
emphasis on the rational cognitive process used by decision
makers to resolve ethical dilemmas. While rationalist
approaches tend to recognize that intuition or emotion
might play a role in EDM,15 they would never be deter-
minative of one’s moral judgments. Rationalist approaches
are now beginning to recognize their limitations however,
including constraints such as ‘bounded rationality’ (or
more specifically ‘bounded ethicality,’16 see Chugh et al.
2005), or due to other cognitive biases that affect how
information is processed (Messick and Bazerman 1996;
Trevino et al. 2006).17
Non-rationalist (Intuitionist/Sentimentalist)
Approaches
Another stream of EDM research has developed that argues
that a non-rationalist approach involving intuition (a cog-
nitive process) and/or emotion or sentiments (an affective
process) should be considered more central or ‘sovereign’
to the moral judgment process of EDM (Saltzstein and
Kasachkoff 2004, p. 274). For example, ‘‘…recent work in
moral psychology shows that ethical decisions are fre-
quently informed by one’s feelings and intuitions’’ (Ruedy
et al. 2013, p. 532).
In terms of intuition, this non-rationalist research stream
posits that intuitive (i.e., gut sense) and emotive processes
(i.e., gut feelings) tend to at least initially generate moral
judgments. For example, according to Haidt (2001): ‘‘The
central claim of the social intuitionist model is that moral
judgment is caused by quick moral intuitions and is fol-
lowed (when needed) by slow, ex post facto moral rea-
soning’’ (Haidt 2001, p. 818). Haidt states (2001, p. 814):
Intuitionism in philosophy refers to the view that there
are moral truths and that when people grasp these
truths they do so not by a process or ratiocination and
reflection but rather by a process more akin to per-
ception, in which one ‘just sees without argument that
they are and must be true’…Intuitionist approaches in
moral psychology, by extension, say that moral intu-
itions (including moral emotions) come first and
directly cause moral judgments…Moral intuition is a
kind of cognition, but it is not a kind of reasoning.18
14 For example, other rationalist models include the ‘general theory
model’ proposed by Hunt and Vitell (1986), a ‘behavior model’
proposed by Bommer et al. (1987), and a ‘reasoned action’ model
proposed by Dubinsky and Loken (1989) based on the theory of
reasoned action (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975). In conducting a summary
of various early models, Brady and Hatch (1992) propose that at least
four of the models (Ferrell and Gresham 1985; Hunt and Vitell 1986;
Trevino 1986; Bommer et al. 1987) contain the same four elements
(1) a decision process, modified by (2) internal and (3) external
factors, leading to (4) ethical or unethical behavior.15 For example, Rest himself refers to the cognitive–affective
interactions that take place during each of the four stages of EDM
(Rest 1984, p. 27). According to Rest (1986, p. 6), the moral
awareness stage involves trying to understand our own ‘gut feelings’
and in terms of the moral judgment stage ‘‘…most people seem to
have at least intuitions about what’s morally right or wrong’’ (1986,
p. 8). Rest states: ‘‘…there are different affect and cognition
interactions in every component’’ (1984, p. 28). He also states:
‘‘…I take the view that there are no moral cognitions completely
devoid of affect, no moral affects completely devoid of cognitions,
and no moral behavior separable from the cognitions and affects that
prompt the behavior’’ (Rest 1986, p. 4). Hunt and Vitell (1986, p. 10)
also refer to the ‘feeling of guilt’ one might experience if behavior
and intentions are inconsistent with one’s ethical judgments.
16 ‘Bounded ethicality’ can be defined as one making decisions that
run counter to values or principles without being aware of it (Chugh
et al. 2005; Palazzo et al. 2012).17 In terms of cognitive biases, Messick and Bazerman (1996)
propose a series of theories about the world, other people, and
ourselves which are suggested to help explain the often unethical
decisions that executives make. In terms of theories about the world,
people often ignore possible outcomes or consequences due to five
biases: ‘‘…ignoring low-probability events, limiting the search for
stakeholders, ignoring the possibility that the public will ‘find out,’
discounting the future, and undervaluing collective outcomes’’ (1996,
p. 10).18 Moral reasoning might also be argued to potentially take place
without a conscious, effortful deliberation, suggesting it can be
classified as a form of intuition. Intuition might also be classified as a
very basic form of moral reasoning, meaning there is no real dispute
between the two forms of processing, but rather they merely represent
a difference in degree (i.e., time or effort) of processing. However,
because moral reasoning involves non-automatic inferential process-
ing, moral reasoning can be distinguished from intuition not only in
terms of degree but also in terms of the kind of processing taking
place (see Wright 2005, pp. 28–29 and 44–45).
Ethical Decision-Making Theory: An Integrated Approach 759
123
In other words, ‘‘…moral reasoning is retroactive: It
seeks to rationalize previous judgments and not to arrive at
those judgments’’ (Saltzstein and Kasachkoff 2004,
p. 276). One way to express the intuitive process is by
saying: ‘‘I don’t know, I can’t explain it, I just know it’s
wrong’’ (Haidt 2001, p. 814).
Emotion or sentiment, defined as one’s ‘feeling state’
(Gaudine and Thorne 2001, p. 176), has also become more
explicitly incorporated into EDM research: ‘‘…[C]umula-
tive evidence from empirical research supports the asser-
tion that ethical decision making is based not only on
intuitive but also on emotion-based mechanisms, and that
emotions constitute a key component of moral decision
making’’ (Salvador and Folger 2009, pp. 11–12). Tangney
et al. (2007, p. 346) also note the importance of emotion in
relation to EDM: ‘‘Moral emotions may be critically
important in understanding people’s behavioral adherence
(or lack of adherence) to their moral standards.’’ Emotions
that have been suggested as being more directly related to
EDM can be categorized into: (i) ‘pro-social’ emotions
which promote morally good behavior such as empathy,
sympathy, concern, or compassion19; (ii) ‘self-blame’
emotions such as guilt and shame; or (iii) or ‘other-blame’
emotions, such as contempt, anger, and disgust (see Prinz
and Nichols 2010).20
Several researchers have attempted to explain how
emotion impacts EDM. Haidt (2001) as a non-rationalist
appears to directly link emotion to intuition with little
emphasis placed on reason. According to Elfenbein (2007,
p. 348): ‘‘The three main perspectives on the relationship
between emotion and cognition are that emotion interferes
with cognition, that emotion serves cognition, and that the
two are intertwined…’’ Greene et al. (2001) link emotions
directly to the cognitive process and state (p. 2107):
‘‘…emotional responses generated by the moral-personal
dilemmas have an influence on and are not merely inci-
dental to moral judgment.’’21 According to Damasio
(1994), emotion is not in conflict with reason but provides
crucial support to the reasoning process by acting as a
regulator of conduct. Another similar means to explain the
relationship between emotion and reason is by describing
emotions as the ‘hot system’ (‘go’), which can undermine
efforts to self-control one’s behavior. In contrast, the ‘cool
system’ (‘know’) which is cognitive, contemplative, and
emotionally neutral can potentially control the ‘hot system’
through what is referred to as ‘moral willpower’ (Metcalfe
and Mischel 1999).22
The non-rationalist approaches have been persuasively
argued by researchers such as Haidt (2001) and Sonenshein
(2007). Building on the works of philosophers like
Shaftesbury and Hume, Haidt (2001, p. 816) suggests that:
‘‘…people have a built-in moral sense that creates plea-
surable feelings of approval toward benevolent acts and
corresponding feelings of disapproval toward evil and
vice.’’ The relationship between emotions and intuition is
not so clear however. Monin et al. (2007, p. 101) state that:
‘‘The difference between intuitions and emotions…seems
to be that intuitions are behavioral guides or evaluations
that directly follow from an emotional experience.’’ Dane
and Pratt (2007, pp. 38–39) refer to intuitive judgments as
‘‘…affectively charged, given that such judgments often
involve emotions’’ and are ‘‘…detached from rationality.’’
Kahneman (2003) states: ‘‘The operations of [intuition] are
typically fast, automatic, effortless, associative, implicit
(not available to introspection), and often emotionally
charged.’’ This seems to suggest that emotions either affect
or cause intuitions and are thus importantly related, or in
other cases, emotions may directly affect any of the four
EDM stages (Gaudine and Thorne 2001). It is important to
note however that not all intuitive judgments are neces-
sarily emotionally charged, and that intuitions should be
considered to be a cognitive (albeit non-deliberate) process
evoked by the situation: ‘‘It must be stressed…that intu-
ition, reasoning, and the appraisals contained in emo-
tions…are all forms of cognition’’ (Haidt 2001, p. 818).
Proposed Reformulation: Integrated EthicalDecision-Making (I-EDM) Model
Building on previous EDM models and in order to address
the key divergence outlined above between the rationalist
and non-rationalist approaches to EDM, a reformulated and
more integrative EDM model, referred to as ‘Integrated
Ethical Decision Making’ (or I-EDM), will now be
described (see Fig. 1 below).
At its most basic level, there are two major components
to the I-EDM model: (1) the EDM process (including
19 While positive emotions such as empathy are generally associated
with ethical behavior, it may also be the case that positive affect arises
following unethical behavior (e.g., cheating) which can then reinforce
additional future unethical behavior. See: Ruedy et al. (2013).20 The sorts of emotions that have been suggested as impacting EDM
include anger; anxiety; compassion; distress; dominance; embarrass-
ment; empathy; fear; grief; guilt; hope; humiliation; love; meaning-
lessness; mercy; pride; regret; remorse; responsibility; sadness;
shame; and sympathy (see: Haidt 2001; Agnihotri et al. 2012).
Eisenberg (2000) provides a review of the research on guilt, shame,
empathy, and moods in relation to morality.21 ‘Moral-personal’ dilemmas (as opposed to ‘impersonal’ dilemmas)
that trigger an emotional response relate to situations such as deciding
whether to physically push someone onto a trolley track to save the
lives of many others. See Greene et al. (2001).
22 Moral willpower (or self-sanction) can act like a ‘moral muscle’
that can be depleted following heavy use, or strengthened over time
(see Muraven et al. 1999).
760 M. S. Schwartz
123
antecedents and subsequents along with lack of moral
awareness); and (2) the factors (or variables) that influence
the EDM process. The EDM process is composed of four
basic stages: (i) awareness; (ii) judgment; (iii) intention;
and (iv) action/behavior, and in this respect continues to
reflect the basic process framework proposed by Rest
(1984, 1986). The antecedents to the EDM process include
basic environmental norms, while the subsequent stages of
the process include potential learning feedback loops. The
EDM factors that influence the process fall into two basic
categories: (i) individual; and (ii) situational (Trevino
1986). The I-EDM model assumes that ethical behavior is
contingent on which particular individual is facing the
ethical dilemma (e.g., different individuals may act dif-
ferently when faced with the same dilemma), and (ii) the
situational context within which an individual faces a
dilemma (e.g., the same individual can behave differently
depending on the particular situation one is facing or
environment one is situated within). The following will
first describe the individual and situational factors that can
influence each of the stages of EDM, followed by a
description of each stage in the Integrated-EDM process.
Individual Factors
Most EDM models refer to individual factors or variables
including, for example, ego strength, field dependence, and
locus of control (Trevino 1986), values (Ferrell and Gre-
sham 1985), or personal experiences (Hunt and Vitell
1986). It may however be more useful to utilize a broader
construct that captures all of the individual factors. Toward
this end, the I-EDM model attempts to collate together all
the individual factors into one general overarching main
construct: one’s ‘moral capacity’ (see Hannah et al. 2011).
There are two inter-related but distinct components that
comprise an individual’s moral capacity: (i) moral char-
acter disposition; and (ii) integrity capacity. Moral
capacity is defined as the ability of an individual to avoid
moral temptations, engage in the proper resolution of eth-
ical dilemmas, and ultimately engage in ethical behavior.
In other words, one’s moral capacity is based not only on
one’s level of moral maturity and the core ethical values
they possess, but the extent to which they will cling to
those values even when faced with pressures to act other-
wise. Each component of moral capacity will now be
described in more detail.
The first component of an individual’s moral capacity is
one’s moral character disposition. A number of researchers
have raised the concern that this factor is lacking in EDM
models. According to Pimental et al. (2010, p. 360): ‘‘The
presently available models are insufficient [because] they
fail to find that individuals’ characteristics are integral to
the identification of ethical dilemmas.’’ Others suggest that
‘‘…‘bad’ or ‘good’ apples, or bad features of otherwise
good apples play a role in decision making as well’’
(Watson et al. 2009, p .12). Damon and Hart (1992, p. 455)
propose that: ‘‘…there are both theoretical and empirical
reasons to believe that the centrality of morality to self may
Awareness(Recognize)
Consulta�on(Confirm)
Issue
Norms
Learning(Retrospect)
Emo�on(Feel)
Ra�onaliza�on(Jus�fy)
Reason(Reflect)
Intui�on(Sense)
Judgment(Evaluate)
Inten�on(Commit)
Behavior(Act)
Lack ofAwareness(Overlook)
Situa�on(Issue; Organiza�on;
Personal)
Individual(Moral Capacity)
Modera�ngFactors
Fig. 1 Integrated ethical decision-making model. Primary sources of
the model: Rest (1984, 1986) (four-component model); Jones (1991)
(issue-contingency model); Trevino (1986) (person–situation interac-
tionist model); Tenbrunsel and Smith-Crowe (2008) (lack of moral
awareness); Hannah et al. (2011) (moral capacity); Haidt (2001)
(social intuitionist model). Legend solid box—mental state; dotted
box—mental process; solid circle—active conduct; dotted circle—
factor/variable
Ethical Decision-Making Theory: An Integrated Approach 761
123
be the single most powerful determiner of concordance
between moral judgment and conduct.’’ It is therefore clear
that moral character disposition should be incorporated into
any EDM model.
While there might be several different approaches to
defining moral character disposition,23 for the purposes of
the Integrated-EDM model, it is intended to be a broad
construct that would potentially capture other moral char-
acter concepts that have been identified in the EDM liter-
ature. These concepts include ‘cognitive stage of moral
development’ (CMD) (Kohlberg 1973; Trevino 1986),
‘current ethical value system’24 (CEVS) (Jackson et al.
2013), ‘personal value orientations’ (Weber 1993; Bartlett
2003), ‘philosophy/value orientation’ (O’Fallon and But-
terfield 2005), ‘ethical ideology’25 (Schlenker 2008),
‘ethical predisposition’ (Brady and Wheeler 1996; Rey-
nolds 2006b26), and ‘moral sensitivity’ (Reynolds 2008).
Moral character disposition is closely related to the con-
struct of ‘moral maturation’ described by Hannah et al.
(2011, pp. 669–670) which includes moral ‘complexity’
(i.e., ‘‘knowledge of concepts of morality’’), ‘meta-cogni-
tive ability’ (i.e., the ‘engine’ used to ‘‘deeply process
complex moral knowledge’’), and ‘moral identity’27 (i.e.,
‘‘….individuals’ knowledge about themselves as moral
actors’’). For the purposes of the I-EDM model, an indi-
vidual’s moral character disposition is defined as one’s
level of moral maturity based on their ethical value system,
stage of moral development, and sense of moral identity.
Moral capacity however also includes another construct
related not just to one’s moral character disposition but to
the commitment or motivation one has to act consistently
according to their moral character disposition through their
ability to self-regulate (see Jackson et al. 2013). The con-
struct that comes closest to capturing this consistency and
therefore what will be used in the I-EDM model is one’s
integrity capacity suggested by Petrick and Quinn (2000).
They define ‘integrity capacity’ as the individual’s
‘‘…capability for repeated process alignment of moral
awareness, deliberation, character and conduct…’’ (2000,
p. 4).
The construct of integrity capacity overlaps closely with
Rest’s (1986) conceptualization of ‘moral character’ or
Hannah et al.’s (2011) ‘moral conation’ construct (i.e., the
impetus or moral willpower to act in accordance with one’s
ethical values or principles). Integrity capacity would
include concepts such as ‘moral ownership’ (i.e., the extent
to which one feels responsible over the ethical nature of their
own actions or the actions of others), ‘moral efficacy’ (i.e.,
believing one has the capability to act ethically), and ‘moral
courage’ (i.e., the strength and commitment to resist pres-
sures to act unethically) (see Hannah et al. 2011). An indi-
vidual’s moral capacity is continuously tested depending on
the circumstances one is facing. Whether one’s moral
character disposition will be maintained when put to the test
depends directly on one’s integrity capacity, meaning there
is a direct relationship between the two constructs.
According to the I-EDM model, rather than directly
affecting awareness, judgment, intention, or behavior as
suggested in much EDM research, the key EDM individual
variables found in EDM literature potentially affect one’s
‘moral capacity’ which then potentially affects the various
EDM stages. These include demographic variables (e.g.,
age, gender, education, nationality, work experience, etc.),
personality or psychological variables (e.g., cognitive
moral development/CMD, locus of control, ego strength,
etc.), and variables more directly related to one’s ethical
experience (e.g., religion/religiosity, ethics training, pro-
fessional education, etc.).28 Figure 2 below depicts the
individual moral capacity construct.
Situational Context
As indicated above, all dominant EDM models refer to
situational or organizational factors that can impact the
decision-making process (Bommer et al. 1987; Ferrell and
Gresham 1985; Hunt and Vitell 1986; Trevino 1986).
Building on these models along with Jones (1991), the
23 For example, one might include intuition and emotions (or the
ability to control one’s emotions) as part and parcel of one’s moral
character based on a virtue-based ethics approach. For the purposes of
the I-EDM model, intuition and emotion are described as part of the
moral judgment stage; however, the extent and manner in which this
takes place would potentially depend on one’s moral character
disposition.24 ‘Current ethical value system’ (CEVS) is the framework that
guides an individual’s ethical choices and behavior (see Jackson et al.
2013, p. 236).25 Ethical ideology is ‘‘…an integrated system of beliefs, values,
standards, and self-assessments that define an individual’s orientation
toward matters of right and wrong’’ (McFerran et al. 2010, p. 35).
One’s ‘ethical ideology’ is made up of one’s ‘moral personality’ and
‘moral identity’ (McFerran et al. 2010). Schlenker (2008, p. 1079)
suggests that there is a continuum between a ‘principled ideology’
(one believes moral principles exist and should guide conduct
‘‘…regardless of personal consequences or self-serving rationaliza-
tions’’) and ‘expedient ideology’ (one believes moral principles have
flexibility and that deviations for personal gain are justifiable).26 Ethical predisposition is defined as ‘‘…the cognitive frameworks
individuals prefer to use in moral decision making’’ (Reynolds 2006b,
p. 234).27 ‘Moral identity’ has been suggested by several theorists as playing
an important self-regulatory role in linking moral attitudes to one’s
behavior. See Schlenker (2008, p. 1081). See also Lapsley and
Narvaez (2004) for a review of the concept of moral identity.
28 See O’Fallon and Butterfield (2005) and Craft (2013) for a
complete list of EDM individual-related variables that would
potentially fall into these categories.
762 M. S. Schwartz
123
situational context of the I-EDM model comprises three
components: (1) the issue; (2) the organizational infras-
tructure; and (3) personal factors.
Issue
With respect to the first component, rather than focusing on
the good or bad ‘apples’ (i.e., individual characteristics) or
the good or bad ‘barrels’ (i.e., organizational environment),
some have argued that the issue itself should be the focus of
EDM (Jones 1991; Weber 1996; Bartlett 2003; Kish-
Gephart et al. 2010). While Jones’ (1991) issue-contingent
model clearly moved EDM in this direction, it is not clear if
it was moved far enough in certain respects. For the pur-
poses of the I-EDM model, the issue variable would consist
of three dimensions: (i) issue moral intensity; (ii) issue
importance; and (iii) issue complexity. Each dimension of
the issue-related variable will now be described.
As indicated above, Jones (1991) suggests that the moral
intensity of an issue can impact each of the four stages of the
EDM process. One initial concern with Jones’ moral inten-
sity construct is that the dimensions of moral intensity can
simply be incorporated into the moral judgment stage
(Herndon 1996).29 Setting this concern aside, Jones’ char-
acteristics of moral intensity can also be considered some-
what limited in a normative sense. Jones only considers
consequences (either positive or negative), social norms, and
the proximity or ‘closeness’ the agent has to those affected,
as tied to moral intensity. For the purposes of the I-EDM
model, the moral intensity of an issue would include not only
Jones’ (1991) criteria, but would be extended to include
additional deontological (i.e., duty-based) and fairness
dimensions (see May and Pauli 2002; McMahon and Harvey
2007; Singer 1996). In other words, the moral intensity of an
issue would be expected to increase if an individual is facing
a situation which might require breaking rules (e.g., codes),
laws, or promises, acting in a disloyal or dishonest manner,
infringing the moral rights of others, or relate to notions of
retributive, compensatory, procedural, or distributive justice.
As indicated by some researchers, ‘‘…other ethical per-
spectives should also be considered…such as fairness or law
breaking where harm was not involved’’ as part of the moral
intensity construct (Butterfield et al. 2000, p. 1010). A higher
level of moral intensity would then presumably increase the
likelihood of moral awareness (see May and Pauli 2002).
Issue importance is another component that would be
taken into account by the I-EDMmodel. Issue importance is
defined as the ‘‘…perceived personal relevance or impor-
tance of an ethical issue to an individual’’ (Robin et al. 1996,
p. 17, emphasis added). Anumber of researchers have shifted
Jones’ (1991) focus on the moral intensity of an issue to the
subjective importance placed on a particular issue by a par-
ticular individual. The reason for this approach is that any
objective determination of issue intensity would be irrele-
vant unless the decision maker himself or herself subjec-
tively perceived the issue as being of importance (Haines
et al. 2008; Valentine and Hollingworth 2012; Yu 2015;
Dedeke 2015). If issue importance to the decision maker is
not considered, the ethical implications of the issue might be
ignored altogether leading to a lack of moral awareness.
Another dimension of an issue that appears to have been
ignored in EDM theoretical models is the extent to which an
issue is perceived to be very complex. Issue complexity is
defined as issues that are perceived by the decision maker to
be hard to understand or difficult to resolve. Warren and
Smith-Crowe (2008, p. 90) refer to issue complexity in
relation to the type of moral judgment (reason versus intu-
ition) that might take place: ‘‘…the intuitionists are not
seeking judgments from individuals on issues that are new,
complex, or have many options.’’ Issue complexity can
involve the perceived degree of conflict among competing
moral standards or multiple stakeholder claims. Issues can
also be perceived as more complex when the decision maker
has never faced a similar situation before, or faces a wide
range of different alternatives. Issue complexity might also
include other components such as the degree to which there
are complicated facts involved or multiple factual assump-
tions that need to be made due to a lack of relevant infor-
mation being available. Such information may be necessary
in order to properly understand the ramifications of a par-
ticular issue (e.g., potential future harm to oneself or others).
In a similar vein, relevant knowledge on the issue has been
suggested as being linked with ‘‘…one’s ability to engage in
effortful cognitive activity’’ (see Street et al. 2001, p. 263).
As a result, regardless of its intensity or importance, themere
perceived complexity of the issue or dilemma could possibly
cause one to ignore facing and addressing the issue alto-
gether, leading to a type of ‘moral paralysis.’ For example,
decidingwhether to blow the whistle on firmmisconduct can
be a highly complex and difficult decision with ramifications
to multiple parties (De George 2010) which might prevent
Moral Character Disposition
Integrity Capacity
Individual Moral Capacity
Demographics EthicalExperience
Personality/Psychological
Fig. 2 Individual moral capacity
29 For example, Herndon states (1996, p. 504): ‘‘While Jones (1991)
adds the concept of moral intensity which is the degree of ‘badness’
of an act; it can be placed in the consequences and behavioral
evaluation portions of the synthesis integrated model.’’
Ethical Decision-Making Theory: An Integrated Approach 763
123
coming to any judgment on the ethically appropriate action
to take. Due to its potential impact on at least the moral
awareness and moral judgment stages, perceived ‘issue
complexity’ is also included in the I-EDM model as part of
the issue-related situational construct in addition to issue
intensity and issue importance.
Organizational Environment
The second component of the situational context is the
organizational environment. One potentially useful way to
denote organizational factors is to collectively refer to them
as representing the ‘ethical infrastructure’ of the organi-
zation (Tenbrunsel et al. 2003; Trevino et al. 2006). Ethical
infrastructure, as the overarching construct for all organi-
zational environmental variables, is defined as ‘‘…the
organizational elements that contribute to an organization’s
ethical effectiveness’’ (Tenbrunsel et al. 2003, p. 286). The
ethical infrastructure would include formal and informal
systems such as communication systems (i.e., codes of
conduct or ethics, missions, performance standards, and
compliance or ethics training programs), surveillance sys-
tems (i.e., performance appraisal and reporting hotlines),
and sanctioning systems (i.e., rewards and punishments
including evaluations, promotions, salary, and bonuses).30
Both the formal and informal systems form part of ‘‘…the
organizational climates that support the infrastructure’’
(Tenbrunsel et al. 2003, p. 286). A substantial body of
empirical research has examined the potential impact the
various components of ethical infrastructure can have on
ethical decision making by individuals within organiza-
tions (see O’Fallon and Butterfield 2005; Craft 2013). The
underlying assumption is that firms with a strong ethical
culture and climate generally lead to more employees
becoming aware of ethical issues and the importance of
behaving in what would be considered by the company to
be in an ethical manner (Ethics Resource Center 2014).
The impact of significant or ‘referent’ others/peers
which can lead to one imitating or learning from the
behavior of others along with authority pressures (e.g.,
managers or executives) would also be included in the
I-EDM model as part of the ethical infrastructure (e.g.,
Hunt and Vitell 1986; Bommer et al. 1987; Trevino 1986).
Opportunity, or ‘‘…the occurrence of circumstances to
permit ethical/unethical behavior’’ would also be included
as a component of an organization’s ethical infrastructure
in terms of organizational culture (Ferrell et al. 1989,
p. 61).
Personal Situation
One’s personal situation, as distinct from one’s moral
capacity, is the final component of the situational context.
The key variable of one’s personal situation is one’s per-
ceived ‘need for personal gain,’ which can result from
living beyond one’s means, high debt, financial losses, or
unexpected financial needs (see Albrecht 2003). Another
means of expressing one’s ‘need for personal gain’ at any
given point in time is what might be referred to as one’s
current state of ‘ethical vulnerability.’31 This means that if
one is in a weak financial position, facing significant per-
ceived financial pressures or obligations, with few or non-
existent career or job alternatives available, one would
presumably be in a much weaker position to resist uneth-
ical requests and put one’s job, promotion, or bonus at risk
or be willing to accept the ‘personal costs’ of taking moral
action (Trevino 1986). Other constraints such as time
pressure or limited financial resources to do what one
knows to be right can also be considered part of the per-
sonal situational context (Trevino 1986).
One or more of the situational factors can come into
direct conflict with one’s moral character disposition, and
whether one is able to withstand the pressures one faces
would be dependent on the extent of one’s integrity
capacity. Figure 3 below depicts each of the components of
the situational context construct.
Process Stages of EDM
Now that the individual and situational context factors have
been described, the process stages of the I-EDM model
which can be affected by the moderating variables can be
outlined. In terms of the process of the I-EDM model, the
initial starting point are the norms (i.e., environment) that
are prevalent which tend to determine whether an ethical
issue or dilemma potentially exists. Norms are defined as
those prevailing standards or expectations of behavior held
by members of a particular group or community. Norms
can simultaneously exist at several different levels,
including at the societal/cultural/national level (e.g., brib-
ery is seen as being generally acceptable), at the organi-
zational level32 (e.g., dating a work colleague is considered
unacceptable according to corporate policy), or at the work
group level (e.g., padding expense accounts is viewed as
acceptable by one’s work colleagues).
30 As an alternative to ‘ethical infrastructure,’ others (e.g., Valentine
et al. 2013) have used the term ‘ethical context’ to refer to both the
‘ethical culture’ (Trevino et al. 1998) and the ‘ethical climate’ of the
organization (Victor and Cullen 1988).
31 The notion of ‘vulnerability’ has apparently received little
attention in the business ethics literature. See: Brown (2013).32 The firm’s ethical infrastructure should be considered distinct from
organizational-level norms, although there would clearly be a
relationship between them. This discussion is however beyond the
scope of the paper.
764 M. S. Schwartz
123
Several EDM models propose that there is an ‘environ-
mental’ context within which the existence of an ethical
issue or dilemma can arise (Ferrell and Gresham 1985; Hunt
and Vitell 1986; Jones 1991; Brass et al. 1998; Randall
1989; Trevino 1986). While the sources of these norms
might also be discussed, such as deeply embedded socio-
logical, political, legal, or religious considerations or views,
this discussion is beyond the scope for the purposes of this
paper. For the I-EDM model, a potential ethical issue or
dilemma arises when there is a situation whereby different
norms apply, each of which cannot be followed at the same
time. This basic starting point of the EDM process has also
been referred to as the ‘eliciting situation’ (Haidt 2001).
Moral Awareness
Assuming that a situation with a potential ethical issue or
dilemma exists due to conflicting norms, the next question
is whether the individual becomes aware of the existence of
the issue or dilemma. Moral awareness is defined as the
point in time when an individual realizes that they are
faced with a situation requiring a decision or action that
could the affect the interests, welfare, or expectations of
oneself or others in a manner that may conflict with one or
more moral standards (Butterfield et al. 2000). Moral
awareness that a particular situation raises ethical issues
can take place simply due to an individual’s moral capacity
and inherent ability to recognize ethical issues (Hannah
et al. 2011) and/or as a result of a firm’s ethical infras-
tructure (i.e., including codes, training, meetings, or other
disseminated ethical policy communications) (Tenbrunsel
et al. 2003). If one becomes aware that an ethical issue or
dilemma exists, then one has by definition identified at
least two different possible courses of action, and can then
potentially engage in an EDM process consisting of the
moral judgment and intention stages.33 The following will
now explain how the ‘lack of moral awareness’ process
takes place, considered to be an equally important com-
ponent of the I-EDM model.
Lack of Moral Awareness
The vast majority of EDM theoretical models, by relying
on Rest (1986), presume that only through moral awareness
of the potential ethical nature of a dilemma can one ulti-
mately engage in ethical behavior. For example, Sonen-
shein states (2007, p. 1026): ‘‘…moral awareness is often
viewed as binary—you either recognize the ethical issue or
you fail to do so…Consequently, research has tended to
focus on whether moral awareness is present or absent as a
precondition for activating the other stages of rationalist
models (Jones 1991, p. 383)…’’ What appears to be lack-
ing in current EDM models however is the depiction of
one’s lack of moral awareness, meaning one does not
realize (i.e., they overlook) that the situation one is expe-
riencing raises ethical considerations.
There are now several overlapping theories that have
been proposed in EDM literature to help explain the pro-
cesses or reasons by which one might lack moral aware-
ness, also referred to as unintentional ‘amoral awareness’
(Tenbrunsel and Smith-Crowe 2008) or unintentional
‘amoral management’ (Carroll 1987).34 For example,
Bandura’s theoretical work on moral disengagement is an
important theoretical source underlying one’s lack of moral
awareness. According to Bandura (1999), moral disen-
gagement involves a process by which one convinces
oneself in a particular context that ethical standards do not
apply. Moral standards regulate behavior only when self-
regulatory mechanisms or ‘moral self-sanctions’ (i.e., one’s
conscience) are activated. Psychological processes that can
prevent this activation include ‘‘…restructuring of inhu-
mane conduct into a benign or worthy one by moral jus-
tification, sanitizing language, and advantageous
comparison; disavowal of a sense of personal agency by
diffusion or displacement of responsibility; disregarding or
minimizing the injurious effects of one’s actions; and
Issue Organization (Ethical Infrastructure)
Situational Context
Personal
Intensity;Importance;Complexity
Perceived Need for Gain;
Constraints(time, financial
ability)
Communication; Training;
Sanctioning Systems(including
peers, authority,opportunity,
rewards, sanctions)
Fig. 3 Situational context for EDM
33 There is however a risk of moral awareness being confounded with
moral judgment, especially when the definition of moral awareness
Footnote 33 continued
includes consideration of one or more ethical standards (see Reynolds
2006b, p. 233).34 Carroll (1987) refers to ‘amoral managers,’ who can either act
intentionally or unintentionally. Unintentional amoral managers
‘‘…do not think about business activity in ethical terms. These
managers are simply casual about, careless about, or inattentive to the
fact that their decisions and actions may have negative or deleterious
effects on others. These managers lack ethical perception and moral
awareness; that is, they blithely go through their organizational lives
not thinking that what they are doing has an ethical dimension to it.
They may be well intentioned but are either too insensitive or
egocentric to consider the impacts on others of their behavior’’
(Carroll 1987, p. 11).
Ethical Decision-Making Theory: An Integrated Approach 765
123
attribution of blame to, and dehumanization of, those who
are victimized’’ (Bandura 1999, p. 193).
Similar to moral disengagement, one can also lack moral
awareness due to ethical fading. Ethical fading is ‘‘…the
process by which the moral colors of an ethical decision
fade into bleached hues that are void of moral implica-
tions’’ (Tenbrunsel and Messick 2004, p. 224). In order for
‘ethical fading’ to take place, people engage in self-de-
ception through the use of euphemistic language (e.g.,
‘aggressive’ accounting practices; ‘right sizing’) and other
techniques to ‘shield themselves’ from their own unethical
behavior. Another similar concept used to explain one’s
lack of moral awareness is ethical blindness, or ‘‘…the
decision maker’s temporary inability to see the ethical
dimension of a decision at stake’’ (Palazzo et al. 2012,
p. 324). Ethical blindness includes three aspects: (i) people
deviate from their own values and principles; (ii) this
deviation is temporary in nature; and (iii) the process is
unconscious in nature (Palazzo et al. 2012, p. 325).35
Another theory related to a lack of moral awareness is
the use of non-moral decision frames, which occurs when
one focuses on the business or legal implications of issues
rather than on the ethical considerations (Tenbrunsel and
Smith-Crowe 2008; Dedeke 2015). The process of framing
in a non-moral manner leading to a lack of awareness can
result due to insufficient or biased information gathering, or
socially constructing the facts in a particular manner (So-
nenshein 2007). Moral myopia can also take place which is
similarly defined as ‘‘….a distortion of moral vision that
prevents moral issues from coming into focus’’ (Drum-
wright and Murphy 2004, p. 7). These initial theories or
processes (moral disengagement, ethical fading, ethical
blindness, non-moral decision frames, and moral myopia)
appear to relate more directly to one’s work environment
leading to a lack of moral awareness. In other words, if one
is situated in a work environment which tends to ignore
ethical considerations in its decision making or consistently
prioritizes the bottom line over ethical concerns, as well as
uses non-moral language in its operations,36 then one
would likely be less inclined to be morally aware when
facing a dilemma.
Moral awareness however could be attributable to the
particular individual’s inherent nature, and thus directly
related to one’s moral character disposition described
above. For example, moral awareness can result from
moral attentiveness, which has been defined as: ‘‘…the
extent to which an individual chronically perceives and
considers morality and moral elements in his or her expe-
riences’’ (Reynolds 2008, p. 1027). Similar to the notion of
moral attentiveness, others have linked moral awareness to
the concept of mindfulness, which is described as ‘‘…an
individual’s awareness both internally (awareness of their
own thoughts) and externally (awareness of what is hap-
pening in their environment)’’ (Ruedy and Schweitzer
2010, p. 73). It may be that a lack of mindfulness exac-
erbates one’s self-serving cognition, self-deception, and
unconscious biases leading to unethical behavior: ‘‘Mindful
individuals may feel less compelled to ignore, explain
away, or rationalize ideas that might be potentially
threatening to the self, such as a conflict of interest or a
potential bias’’ (Ruedy and Schweitzer 2010, p. 76).
Engaging in moral imagination (Werhane 1998) might
also potentially lead to moral awareness, while failing to
engage in moral imagination might lead to a lack of moral
awareness. Moral imagination involves whether one has
‘‘…a sense of the variety of possibilities and moral con-
sequences of their decisions, the ability to imagine a set of
possible issues, consequences, and solutions’’ (Werhane
1998, p. 76). When one is only able to see one option rather
than create imaginative solutions, one may be unaware that
one is even facing an ethical dilemma with a potentially
more ethical alternative being available. Figure 4 below
summarizes the theories or processes discussed above that
help explain and contribute to moral awareness or a lack of
moral awareness.
By not including the phenomenon of ‘lack of moral
awareness’ in EDM models, an important stream of EDM
research is being ignored. Even if one is not aware that an
ethical dilemma exists, one can still engage in what might
be considered ‘unintentional’ ethical or unethical behavior
(Tenbrunsel and Smith-Crowe 2008; Jackson et al. 2013).
Due to the importance of understanding why there might be
a lack of moral awareness and the processes leading to it,
which would presumably increase the potential for
Ethical Issue
• Moral Disengagement• Ethical Fading• Ethical Blindness• Non-Moral Framing• Moral Myopia
• Moral Attentiveness• Moral Mindfulness• Moral Imagination• Moral Framing
MoralAwareness
Lack of Moral Awareness
Fig. 4 Processes affecting moral awareness
35 The classic example of ‘ethical blindness’ comes from the recall
coordinator of the defective Ford Pinto vehicle who asked himself:
‘‘Why didn’t I see the gravity of the problem and its ethical
overtones?’’ (Gioia 1992, p. 383).36 This can also take place due to moral muting, which involves
managers who ‘‘…avoid moral expressions in their communica-
tions…’’ (Bird and Waters 1989, p. 75).
766 M. S. Schwartz
123
unethical behavior, the lack of moral awareness path is
depicted in the I-EDM model.
Moral Judgment and Intention Stages of I-EDM
The moral judgment and intention stages represent the crux
of the I-EDM model, and might be referred to as the actual
EDM process that takes place. Moral judgment is defined
for the purposes of the model as the determination of the
most ethically appropriate course of action among the
alternatives. Moral intention is defined as the commitment
or motivation to act according to one’s moral values.37 This
is the point in the I-EDM model where several different
processes either affect moral judgment directly, or poten-
tially interact with each other leading to judgment and
intention. These mental processes include (i) emotion; (ii)
intuition; (iii) reason; (iv) rationalization; as well as (v) the
active process of consultation.
As can be seen in Fig. 1 above, the Integrated-EDM
model does not suggest that only reason or intuition is
involved in the moral judgment process, but that both are
potentially involved, along with emotion and rationaliza-
tion. As indicated above, a growing number of researchers
are indicating the importance of including what has been
referred to as the ‘dual process’ of both reason and emo-
tion/intuition in any EDM model (e.g., see Elm and Radin
2012; Marquardt and Hoeger 2009). For example, Woice-
shyn (2011, p. 313) states [emphasis added]: ‘‘Following
the developments in cognitive neuroscience and neu-
roethics (Salvador and Folger 2009) and paralleling the
general decision-making literature (Dane and Pratt 2007),
most researchers have since come to hold a so-called dual
processing model of ethical decision making.’’
Despite this fact, very few studies provide a clear visual
depiction of the influence of reason, intuition, and emotion
on EDM. Haidt (2001) includes reason (or reasoning) as
well as intuition in his schematic social intuitionist model,
although as indicated above reason serves primarily a post
hoc rationalization function and emotion (or affect) appears
to be comingled with intuition. Reynolds (2006a) proposes
a two-system model which also includes both intuition (the
reflexive X-system) and reason (the higher order conscious
reasoning C-system) but appears to have left out the impact
of emotion. Woiceshyn (2011) also attempts to integrate
reason and intuition through a process she calls ‘integration
by essentials’ and ‘spiraling’ but does not explicitly include
emotion. Gaudine and Thorne (2001) visually depict the
influence of emotion on the four EDM stages but do not
refer to intuition. Other fields, such as social psychology,
have attempted to merge intuition and reason together
schematically (Strack and Deutsch 2004).
One EDM study was identified however that shows the
links between reason, intuition, and emotion. Dedeke
(2015) does so by proposing a ‘cognitive-intuitionist’
model of moral decision making. In the model, intuitions
are referred to as reflexive ‘automatic cognitions,’ which
may or may not interact with ‘automatic emotions.’ This
interaction is considered part of the ‘pre-processing’ pro-
cess which often takes place and is then ‘‘…subject to
review and update by the moral reflection/reasoning pro-
cess’’ (Dedeke 2015, p. 446). Emotion can also ‘sabotage’
the moral reflection stage for some people and thus an
‘emotional control variable’ is proposed ‘‘…that enables an
individual to…modify…their feelings stages’’ (Dedeke
2015, p. 448). Dedeke’s ‘cognitive-intuitionist’ model
recognizes and captures the importance of moving future
EDM theory in a more integrative manner, in other words,
one that incorporates reason, intuition, and emotion into the
EDM process.
While the actual degree of influence of reason versus
intuition/emotion and the sequencing or nature of the
interaction remain open for debate and further research
(Dane and Pratt 2007), virtually everyone now agrees that
both approaches play a role in EDM.38 The relationships
between emotion and intuition upon each other, as well as
on moral judgment and intention, should therefore be
indicated in any revised EDM model. As indicated by
Haidt (2001, p. 828):
The debate between rationalism and intuitionism is an
old one, but the divide between the two approaches
may not be unbridgeable. Both sides agree that people
have emotions and intuitions, engage in reasoning,
and are influenced by each other. The challenge, then,
is to specify how these processes fit together.
Rationalist models do this by focusing on reasoning
and then discussing the other processes in terms of
their effects on reasoning. Emotions matter because
they can be inputs to reasoning…The social intu-
itionist model proposes a very different arrangement,37 Ethical intention is sometimes linked with ethical behavior as
being part of the ‘same phenomenon’ (Reynolds 2006a, p. 741) or
they can be combined together as representing one’s ‘ethical choice’
(Kish-Gephart et al. 2010, p. 2). It may be therefore that ‘intention’
should be eliminated from Rest’s (1986) four-stage model, but might
continue to act as a proxy for measuring judgment or behavior in
EDM empirical research (see Mencl and May 2009, p. 205). For the
purposes of the I-EDM model, intention remains theoretically distinct
from behavior.
38 Some have argued that the debate over reason versus intuition/
emotion is actually based on whether one is experiencing a moral
dilemma requiring a reasoning process, versus an affective or
emotion-laden process based on reacting to a shocking situation such
as considering the prospect of eating one’s own dog (Monin et al.,
2007, p. 99).
Ethical Decision-Making Theory: An Integrated Approach 767
123
one that fully integrates reasoning, emotion, intuition,
and social influence.
Yet despite the claim of ‘fully’ integrating reason,
emotion, and intuition, Haidt (2001) clearly makes reason
play a secondary role to intuition in a potential two-stage
process, highlighting its lack of importance to EDM (see:
Saltzstein and Kasachkoff 2004). As opposed to the EDM
process models discussed above, the following will briefly
explain how the I-EDM model incorporates emotion,
intuition, reason, and rationalization along with their
potential inter-relationships as part of a neuro-cognitive-
affective process as depicted in Fig. 1 above.
Emotion
Emotion is considered an important part of the moral
judgment and intention stages in the I-EDM model. In
many cases, emotion might be the first response when
faced with an ethical situation or dilemma (Haidt et al.
1993). Emotions such as empathy can lead to intuitive
judgments (e.g., ‘affect-laden intuitions’), often referred to
as ‘gut feelings’ about the rightness or wrongness of certain
actions (Toffler 1986). For example, the discovery that a
work colleague is downloading child pornography, or that
one’s firm is selling defective and dangerous goods to
unknowing consumers, may trigger an emotional response
such as a feeling of anger or disgust. This may then lead to
an intuitive moral judgment that such behavior is unac-
ceptable and needs to be addressed. In addition to affecting
intuitions, emotion may impact or affect the moral rea-
soning process (Damasio 1994; Metcalfe and Mischel
1999; Dedeke 2015). Emotions can also lead to moral
rationalization, for example, envy of one’s work colleagues
who are paid more than oneself for the same performance
may lead one to morally rationalize padding expense
accounts. Emotions may impact other stages of the EDM
process in addition to judgment such as intention by cre-
ating a motivation to act (see Eisenberg 2000; Huebner
et al. 2009).
Intuition
The I-EDM model presumes that for most dilemmas,
including those that are non-complex or involve moral
temptations (right versus wrong), an intuitive cognitive
process takes place at least initially after being evoked by
the situation (Haidt 2001; Reynolds 2006a; Dedeke 2015),
and in this respect, intuition plays a significant role in the
EDM process. Intuition is the more automatic and less
deliberative process often leading to an initial intuitive
judgment that may or may not be acted upon. For example,
several situations may provide an automatic gut ‘sense’ of
rightness and wrongness, such as paying a bribe or over-
charging a customer. The moral reasoning or the moral
rationalization process is then expected typically to follow
one’s initial intuitive judgment.
Reason
The I-EDM model considers the moral reasoning process
to be just as important as intuition (Saltzstein and
Kasachkoff 2004), and not limited to merely post hoc
rationalization (e.g., Haidt 2001). For example, in deciding
whether to dismiss an underperforming colleague who is
also considered a close friend, a more deliberative moral
reasoning process may take place, leading to a particular
moral judgment. Moral reasoning provides the means by
which the decision maker can reflect upon and resolve if
necessary any conflict among the moral standards (e.g.,
consequences versus duties versus fairness) or competing
stakeholder claims. More complex ethical dilemmas would
presumably lead to a more challenging moral reasoning
process, the proper resolution of which may require a
stronger individual moral capacity. Moral intention is then
expected to follow one’s moral judgment depending on
one’s integrity capacity and situational context.
Moral Rationalization
This is the point during the I-EDM process when moral
rationalization, which has not been made explicit in any of
the dominant EDM models, becomes important. Moral
rationalization has over time become recognized as a more
important psychological process with respect to EDM.
Moral rationalization has been defined as ‘‘…the cognitive
process that individuals use to convince themselves that
their behavior does not violate their moral standards’’
(Tsang 2002, p. 26) and can be used to justify both small
unethical acts as well as serious atrocities (Tsang 2002,
p. 25). Another way of thinking about rationalization is
through the process of belief harmonization which involves
‘‘…a process of arranging and revising one’s needs, beliefs,
and personal preferences into a cohesive cognitive network
that mitigates against cognitive dissonance’’ (Jackson et al.
2013, p. 238). Rest seems to suggest that the rationalization
process is a type of faulty or ‘flawed’ moral reasoning
(1986, p. 18):
…a person may distort the feelings of obligation by
denying the need to act, denying personal responsi-
bility, or reappraising the situation so as to make
alternative actions more appropriate. In other words,
as subjects recognize the implications of [their moral
judgment and intention] and the personal costs of
moral action become clear, they may defensively
768 M. S. Schwartz
123
reappraise and alter their interpretation of the situa-
tion [i.e., the awareness stage] so that they can feel
honorable, but at less cost to themselves.
There are several potential theories underlying moral
rationalization. Moral rationalization may be based on the
notion of moral appropriation or ‘‘…the desire for moral
approval from oneself or others’’ (Jones and Ryan 1997,
p. 664). The moral rationalization process has also been
tied to what Ariely (2012, p. 53) refers to as fudge factor
theory, which helps explain how many are prepared to
cheat a little bit through ‘flexible’ moral reasoning while
still maintaining their sense of moral identity. Similarly,
moral balance theory permits one to engage in moral
deviations as long as one’s moral identity remains ‘satis-
factory’ (Nisan 1995).
Anand et al. (2005) extend Bandura (1999) and Sykes
and Matza (1957) by outlining the means by which one can
rationalize corrupt or unethical acts.39 These methods
include (Anand et al. 2005, p. 11): (i) denial of responsi-
bility (‘My arm was being twisted’); (ii) denial of injury
(‘No one was really harmed’); (iii) denial of victim (‘They
deserved it’); (iv) social weighting (‘Others are worse than
we are’); (v) appeal to higher authorities (‘We answered to
a higher cause’); and (vi) balancing the ledger (‘I deserve
it’). In terms of the timing of rationalization in the EDM
process, according to Anand et al. (2005, p. 11): ‘‘Ra-
tionalizations can be invoked prospectively (before the act)
to forestall guilt and resistance or retrospectively (after the
act) to ease misgivings about one’s behavior. Once
invoked, the rationalizations not only facilitate future
wrongdoing but dull awareness that the act is in fact
wrong.’’
If one’s moral judgment based on moral reasoning is
contrary to one’s self-perceived moral identity, typically
due to a preference or desire to act toward fulfilling one’s
self-interest, then one may engage in a biased or distorted
process of moral rationalization. By doing so, one is able to
avoid experiencing the emotions of guilt, shame, or
embarrassment. Some refer to this state as being one of
‘moral hypocrisy’ or the appearance of being moral to
themselves or others while ‘‘…avoiding the cost of actually
being moral’’ (Batson et al. 1999, p. 525). While moral
rationalization is a cognitive (albeit possibly subconscious)
process, it may also affect, be affected by, or work in
conjunction with (i.e., overlap) the moral reasoning process
(Tsang 2002), intuition (Haidt 2001), or emotion (Bandura
1999). With few exceptions, moral rationalization is often
unfortunately ignored or simply assumed to exist by most
EDM models,40 but due to its importance is included in the
I-EDM model.
Moral Consultation
One additional potential process that can impact one’s
judgment, intention, or behavior is that of moral consul-
tation. Moral consultation is defined as the active process
of reviewing ethics-related documentation (e.g., codes of
ethics) or discussing to any extent one’s ethical situation
or dilemma with others in order to receive guidance or
feedback. While it is clear that not all individuals will
engage with others in helping to determine the appropri-
ate course of action, any degree of discussion with col-
leagues, managers, family members, friends, or ethics
officers, or the review of ethics documentation when
facing an ethical dilemma, would constitute moral
consultation.
Moral consultation as a procedural step of EDM, while
not incorporated into the dominant EDMmodels, is referred
to by some EDM theorists (see Sonenshein 2007; Hamilton
and Knouse 2011). For example, Haidt (2001, 2007) refers
to individuals being influenced or persuaded through their
social interactions with others in his ‘social intuitionist’
model and suggests that ‘‘…most moral change happens as
a result of social interaction’’ (Haidt 2007, p. 999). Moral
consultation should be considered particularly important in
an organizational setting given that firms often encourage
and provide opportunities to their employees to discuss and
seek ethical guidance from others or from ethics docu-
mentation (Weaver et al. 1999; Stevens 2008). While moral
consultation is generally expected to improve ethical deci-
sion making, the opposite might also occur. One may dis-
cover through discussion that ‘unethical’ behavior is
considered acceptable to others or even expected by one’s
superiors potentially increasing the likelihood of acting in
an unethical manner.
Ethical Behavior
One’s moral judgment (evaluation), whether based on
emotion (feel), intuition (sense), moral reasoning (reflect),
moral rationalization (justify), and/or moral consultation
(confirm), may then lead to moral intention (commitment),
which may then lead to ethical or unethical behavior (ac-
tion) (see Fig. 1 above). Each of the above processes (i.e.,
emotion, intuition, reason, rationalization, and
39 Heath (2008) provides a similar list of moral rationalizations
which he refers to as ‘neutralization techniques.’
40 Three notable exceptions include Reynolds (2006a), who makes
rationalization explicit in his model as a retrospective (e.g., post hoc
analysis) process operating as part of the higher order conscious
reasoning system, while the decision-making model proposed by
Tsang (2002) positions moral rationalization (along with situational
factors) as being central to the ethical decision-making process.
Dedeke (2015) also indicates that rationalization of one’s reflexive
(intuitive or emotion-based) judgment can be part of the ‘moral
reflection’ stage of EDM where moral reasoning also takes place.
Ethical Decision-Making Theory: An Integrated Approach 769
123
consultation) can impact moral judgment either directly or
following interaction with each other. The behavior can
either relate to ‘proscriptive’ (e.g., avoid harm) or ‘pre-
scriptive’ (e.g., do good) actions (see Janoff-Bulman et al.
2009) and can be of different degrees of ethicality in terms
of the ‘rightness’ or ‘wrongness’ of the behavior (see
Henderson 1984; Green 1994; and Kaler 2000).
Feedback Loops
Potential feedback loops represent the final procedural
step in the I-EDM model. Behavior may be followed by
perceived positive or negative consequences to others or
to oneself through rewards or punishments/sanctions for
the decision made or actions taken. When the conse-
quences are observed by the decision maker, learning
involving internal retrospection over one’s actions can
take place, which may then affect one’s individual moral
capacity and thereby the decision-making process the next
time an ethical dilemma arises. According to Reynolds
(2006a, p. 742): ‘‘…anyone who has lain awake at night
contemplating the experiences of the previous day knows
that retrospection is a key component of the ethical
experience…’’ The learning might be either positive or
negative, for example, one might determine that acting in
an unethical manner was worth the risks taken, or that
acting ethically was not worth the personal costs suffered.
In either case, such realizations might impact future
decision making. Similar feedback loops including con-
sequences and learning are included in several (but not
all) EDM models. For example, Ferrell and Gresham
(1985) refer to ‘evaluation of behavior,’ while Hunt and
Vitell (1986, p. 10) refer to ‘actual consequences’ which
is the ‘‘major learning construct in the model’’ which
feeds back to one’s ‘personal experiences.’ Stead et al.
(1990) refer to their feedback loop as one’s ‘ethical
decision history.’
One additional feedback loop of the I-EDM model (see
Fig. 1) flows from behavior to awareness, in that only after
one acts (e.g., telling a white lie, fudging an account) one
may realize that there were ethical implications that ought
to have been considered (i.e., if there was originally a lack
of awareness) meaning that the matter ought to have been
considered differently. The original issue or dilemma may
then potentially be judged again based on any of the pro-
cesses (i.e., emotion, intuition, reason, rationalization, and/
or consultation) leading to a different judgment and addi-
tional behavior (e.g., admission, apology, steps to fix the
mistake, etc.). To provide greater clarity, Table 1 below
summarizes the various moderating factors, while Table 2
below summarizes the process stages of the I-EDM model
including the potential interaction between emotion, intu-
ition, reason, rationalization, and consultation.
Basic Propositions
In general, according to the I-EDM model, ethical behavior
is assumed to be more likely to take place when there is
strong individual moral capacity (strong moral character
disposition and integrity capacity), strong issue character-
istics (high level of moral intensity and perceived impor-
tance with a lack of complexity), strong ethical
infrastructure (including weak perceived opportunity with
strong sanctions for unethical behavior), along with weak
personal constraints (weak perceived need for personal
gain, sufficient time and financial resources). Unethical
behavior tends to take place when there is weak individual
moral capacity (weak moral character disposition and
integrity capacity), weak issue characteristics (weak issue
intensity and importance along with a high level of issue
complexity), weak ethical infrastructure (including strong
perceived opportunities, weak sanctions, along with strong
authority pressures and peer influence to engage in uneth-
ical behavior), and a lack of personal constraints (strong
perceived need for personal gain and time pressures).
Teaching, Research, and Managerial Implications
The I-EDM model has a number of important potential
implications for both the academic and business commu-
nities. In terms of teaching implications, despite the history
of major corporate scandals, a debate continues over the
utility of business ethics education (Bosco et al. 2010). For
those who teach business ethics, many still argue over what
the proper teaching objectives should consist of (Sims and
Felton 2006). The I-EDM model suggests that the focus of
business ethics education should be on two particular
stages of EDM, the moral awareness stage, and the moral
judgment stage. In terms of moral awareness, by presenting
an array of relevant ethical dilemmas, and then sensitizing
students to the potential ethical implications arising from
the dilemmas, might increase students’ general level of
moral awareness following the course.
By explaining the tools of moral reasoning, including
consequentialism and deontology, students may be better
prepared and able to engage in moral reasoning. The
dangers of pure egoism in the form of greed along with the
deficiencies of relativism as a moral standard need to be
pointed out. Students should also be exposed to the moral
rationalization process, so that they will be more aware
when it is taking place and can better guard against its
occurrence. New approaches such as ‘giving voice to val-
ues’ (Gentile 2010) can also help provide a better means
for students and others to transition their values from
intentions to actual behavior rather than merely focus on
the moral reasoning process. Ultimately, business students
770 M. S. Schwartz
123
need to possess the tools to be able to determine and
actualize what might be considered ethical versus unethical
behavior.
Research that focuses on the relationship and interaction
between emotion, intuition, reasoning, rationalization, and
moral consultation should be further pursued. It is not clear,
for example, the extent to which intuition and emotions
improve ethical decision making or hinder it. More research
on the particular aspects and types of ethical issues, beyond
issue intensity such as issue importance and complexity,
should be examined to see which process (i.e., emotion,
intuition, reason, consultation) is utilized to a greater
degree, and to what extent this leads to more ethical
behavior with fewer instances of rationalization. New sci-
entific methods and studies of brain activity should assist in
this endeavor. Given that the current EDM models have
only partially explained the causes and processes of ethical
behavior, clearly more work needs to be done to revise
EDM theory leading to more fruitful empirical examination.
Future EDM research should also continue to consider
whether certain individual and/or situational variables play
a more significant causal or moderating role depending on
which stage of EDM is taking place. For example, it may
be that during the awareness and judgment stages, one’s
moral character disposition, issue intensity, issue impor-
tance, and issue complexity are more important, while
during the intention to behavior stage, integrity capacity
and perceived ‘need for gain’ might play more important
roles. The role of biases and heuristics should also continue
to be examined in relation to EDM during each of the
stages.
In terms of managerial implications, the I-EDM model
suggests that ethical infrastructure and moral consultation
each play an important role in EDM, with formal elements
such as codes and training potentially being more impor-
tant for awareness and judgment. The model also suggests
that hiring practices based on seeking individuals with
strong moral capacities should continue to be pursued,
especially for managers or senior executives. For managers
and employees, the I-EDM model may have possible
normative implications as well, such as avoiding the sole
use of intuition and emotion whenever possible, taking
steps to improve one’s ethical awareness potential, and to
always be cognizant of rationalizations and biases affecting
the moral reasoning process.
Limitations
The proposed I-EDM model contains a number of impor-
tant limitations. In terms of scope, the I-EDM model is
focused on individual decision making and behavior, rather
than organizational, and is designed to apply mainly to the
business context. One could argue that the model is overly
rationalist in nature by continuing to rely on Rest (1986) as
the dominant framework to explain the EDM process, and
Table 1 I-EDM moderating factors
Concept/construct Definition and relationships Key sources
Individual moral
capacity
The ability to avoid moral temptations, engage in the proper resolution of ethical
dilemmas, and engage in ethical behavior. Consists of one’s moral character
disposition and integrity capacity. Can impact each EDM stage
Hannah et al. (2011)
Moral character
disposition
An individual’s level of moral maturity based on their ethical value system, stage of
moral development, and sense of moral identity. Primarily impacts the moral
awareness and moral judgment stages
Kohlberg (1973);
Jackson et al. (2013)
Integrity capacity The capability to consistently act in a manner consistent with one’s moral character
disposition. Impacts primarily the intention and behavior stages
Petrick and Quinn (2000)
Ethical issue A situation requiring a freely made choice to be made among alternatives that can
positively or negatively impact others. Can impact each EDM stage
Jones (1991)
Issue intensity The degree to which consequences, social norms, proximity, or deontological/fairness
considerations affect the moral imperative in a situation. Can impact each EDM stage
Butterfield et al. (2000)
Issue importance The perceived personal relevance of an ethical issue by an individual. Direct
relationship with issue intensity. Primarily impacts the moral awareness stage
Robin et al. (1996)
Issue complexity The perceived degree of difficulty in understanding an issue. Based on perceived
conflict among moral standards or stakeholder claims or required factual information
or assumptions needed to be made. Primarily impacts the moral awareness and moral
judgment stages
Street et al. (2001); Warren
and Smith-Crowe (2008)
Organization’s ethical
infrastructure
The organizational elements that contribute to an organization’s ethical effectiveness.
Can impact each EDM stage
Tenbrunsel et al. (2003)
Personal context The individual’s current situation which can lead to ‘ethical vulnerability’ including
‘personal need for gain’ or time/financial constraints. Can impact each EDM stage
Albrecht (2003)
Ethical Decision-Making Theory: An Integrated Approach 771
123
thus does not represent a purely synthesized model. The
manner and extent to which the variables and processes
were depicted by the I-EDM model as portrayed in Fig. 1
can be criticized as being too all encompassing and thus
lacking sufficient focus. It might on the other hand be
criticized as failing to take into account other key variables
or processes involved in EDM that have been suggested in
the literature. For example, the role of inter-personal pro-
cesses (rather than intra-personal processes) may not be
sufficiently accounted for in the I-EDM model (Moore and
Gino 2013) despite recognizing the influence of peers/ref-
erent others, authority pressures, the rationalization process
(‘everyone is doing it’), and the consultation process.
Finally, each element of the I-EDM model, including the
individual and situational context variables as well as the
relationship between and overlap among the variables and
each of the process stages of EDM, requires further
detailed exploration and explication which hopefully fur-
ther research will address.
Conclusion
This paper attempts to address several deficiencies that
appear to exist in current EDM theoretical models. It does
so by merging together the key processes, factors, and
theories together, including emotion, intuition, moral rea-
soning, moral rationalization, and moral consultation along
with the key individual and situational variables. The
proposed integrated model might be considered to take a
‘person-situation’ interactionist approach along with an
‘intuition/sentimentalist-rationalist’ approach to moral
judgment. It attempts to clarify the key factors influencing
EDM, and introduces or makes more explicit other factors
such as ‘moral capacity’ including ‘moral character dis-
position’ and ‘integrity capacity,’ and additional situational
characteristics of the issue beyond merely intensity
including ‘issue importance’ and ‘issue complexity.’ As
research suggests: ‘‘…most all of us may commit unethical
behaviors, given the right circumstances’’ (De Cremer et al.
Table 2 I-EDM process stages and constructs
Process stages Definition and relationship with other I-EDM constructs and stages
Moral awareness The point in time when an individual realizes that they are faced with a situation requiring a decision or action that could
affect the interests, welfare, or expectations of oneself or others in a manner that may conflict with one or more moral
standards (Butterfield et al. 2000)
Lack of moral
awareness
The state of not realizing that a dilemma has moral implications. Leads to unintentional ethical or unethical behavior
(Tenbrunsel and Smith-Crowe 2008)
Moral judgment Determination of the ethically appropriate course of action among alternatives. Activates the moral intention stage (Rest
1986)
Emotion One’s feeling state. Can impact judgment directly (Greene et al. 2001). Can also impact the moral reasoning process
(Damasio 1994; Greene et al. 2001; Huebner et al. 2009); trigger intuitions (Haidt 2001), or can lead to rationalization
(e.g., through feelings of guilt or sympathy for others) (Tsang 2002)
Intuition A cognitive process involving an automatic and reflexive reaction leading to an initial moral judgment. Can lead to moral
judgment directly (Haidt 2001). Can also impact emotion (Dedeke 2015), moral reasoning when there are unclear or
conflicting intuitions (Haidt 2001), or lead to a rationalization process if judgment is contrary to one’s moral identity
(Reynolds 2006a; Sonenshein 2007)
Reason The conscious and deliberate application of moral standards to a situation. Can impact moral judgment directly
(Kohlberg 1973). Reason (‘cool system’) can also control emotions (‘hot system’) (Metcalfe and Mischel 1999).
Reason through ‘private reflection’ can lead to a new intuition (Haidt 2001), or can be ‘recruited’ to provide post hoc
rationalizations (Dedeke 2015)
Moral rationalization The conscious or unconscious process of explaining or justifying one’s intended or actual behavior in an ethically
acceptable manner to oneself or others. Can lead to moral judgment directly (Tsang 2002). Can also impact emotion by
forestalling or reducing guilt (Anand et al. 2005; Bandura 1999; Ariely 2012), lead to new intuitions (Haidt 2001), or
over-ride moral reasoning through a biased or distorted cognitive process (Tsang 2002)
Moral consultation Discussing to any extent one’s ethical dilemma with others or the review of ethical documentation (e.g., codes). Can be
overridden by rationalization. Takes place after initial awareness, but could also take place after behavior.
Moral intention The commitment or motivation to act according to one’s moral values. Affects moral behavior and can lead to moral
consultation (Rest 1986)
Ethical behavior Ethical behavior supported by one or more moral standards. Can be intentional (moral awareness) or unintentional (lack
of moral awareness). Typically follows moral judgment and/or moral intention (Rest 1986)
Learning The process of understanding and internalizing the impacts of one’s decisions. Can impact one’s moral capacity for
future decisions (Reynolds 2006a)
772 M. S. Schwartz
123
2010, p. 2). The possibility of a lack of moral awareness is
also depicted in the model, as well as ‘moral consultation’
and the key feedback loops (i.e., learning and reassessment
of behavior). Obviously, the proposed I-EDM model
remains subject to further criticism, leading to the need to
be further modified as new EDM research is generated.
There are several other potential important deficiencies
in the current state of EDM theory which are beyond the
scope of this study that should be addressed as well. But if
a new proposed theoretical EDM model can at least
properly take into account the primary concerns raised
above, a potentially more robust model will have been
developed for use by a broader range of empirical
researchers. Given the extent of theoretical and empirical
research that has now taken place, EDM in organizations
might be considered to be moving toward developing into a
‘stand-alone’ academic field (Tenbrunsel and Smith-Crowe
2008, p. 545). Whether this eventually takes place is pri-
marily dependent on the strength of the theoretical EDM
models being developed and tested by empirical EDM
researchers.
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