ethics for thurs
TRANSCRIPT
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ST. LOUIS UNIVERSITY LABORATORY HIGH
SCHOOL (SLU-LHS) FACULTY and STAFF,
Complainant,
- versus-
ATTY. ROLANDO C. DELA CRUZ,
Respondent.
A.C. No. 6010
Present:
PANGANIBAN, C.J.,
PUNO,
QUISUMBING,YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,*
CARPIO MORALES,
CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA, andVELASCO, JR.,JJ.
Promulgated:
August 28, 2006
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D E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO,J.:
This is a disbarment case filed by the Faculty members and Staff of the Saint Louis University-Laboratory High
School (SLU-LHS) against Atty. Rolando C. Dela Cruz, principal of SLU-LHS, predicated on the following grounds:
1) Gross Misconduct:
From the records of the case, it appears that there is a pending criminal case for child abuse allegedly
committed by him against a high school student filed before the Prosecutors Office ofBaguio City; a pending
administrative case filed by the Teachers, Staff, Students and Parents before an Investigating Board created by SLU
for his alleged unprofessional and unethical acts of misappropriating money supposedly for the teachers; and the
pending labor case filed by SLU-LHS Faculty before the NLRC, Cordillera Administrative Region, on alleged illegal
deduction of salary by respondent.
2) Grossly Immoral Conduct:In contracting a second marriage despite the existence of his first marriage; and
3) Malpractice:
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In notarizing documents despite the expiration of his commission.
According to complainant, respondent was legally married to Teresita Rivera on 31 May 1982 at Tuba, Benguet,
before the then Honorable Judge Tomas W. Macaranas. He thereafter contracted a subsequent marriage with one
Mary Jane Pascua, before the Honorable Judge Guillermo Purganan. On 4 October 1994, said second marriage was
subsequently annulled for being bigamous.
On the charge of malpractice, complainant alleged that respondent deliberately subscribed and notarizedcertain legal documents on different dates from 1988 to 1997, despite expiration of
respondents notarial commission on 31 December 1987. A Certification[1]
dated 25 May 1999 was issued by the
Clerk of Court of Regional Trial Court (RTC), Baguio City, to the effect that respondent had not applied for
commission as Notary Public for and in the City of Baguio for the period 1988 to 1997. Respondent performed acts
of notarization, as evidenced by the following documents:
1. Affidavit of Ownership[2]
dated 8 March 1991, executed by Fernando T. Acosta,
subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;
2. Affidavit
[3]
dated 26 September 1992, executed by Maria Cortez Atos, subscribedand sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;
3. Affidavit[4]
dated 14 January 1992, executed by Fanolex James A. Menos,
subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;
4. Affidavit[5]
dated 23 December 1993, executed by Ponciano V. Abalos, subscribed
and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;
5. Absolute Date of Sale[6]
dated 23 June 1993, executed by Danilo Gonzales in
favor of Senecio C.Marzan, notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz;
6. Joint Affidavit By Two Disinherited Parties[7]
dated 5 March 1994, executed by
Evelyn C. Canullas andPastora C. Tacadena, subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;
7. Sworn Statement[8]
dated 31 May 1994, executed by Felimon B. Rimorin,
subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;
8. Deed of Sale[9]
dated 17 August 1994, executed by Woodrow Apurado in favor of
Jacinto Batara, notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz;
9. Joint Affidavit by Two Disinterested Parties[10]
dated 1 June 1994, executed
by Ponciano V. Abalos andArsenio C. Sibayan, subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;
10. Absolute Deed of Sale[11]
dated 23 March 1995, executed by Eleanor D.Meridor in
favor of Leonardo N. Benter, notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz;
11. Deed of Absolute Sale[12]
dated 20 December 1996, executed by Mandapat in
favor of Mario R.Mabalot, notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz;
12. Joint Affidavit By Two Disinterested Parties[13]
dated 17 April 1996, executed
by Villiam C. Ambongand Romeo L. Quiming, subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;
13. Conditional Deed of Sale[14]
dated 27 February 1997, executed by
Aurelia Demot Cados in favor of Jose Ma. A. Pangilinan, notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz;
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14. Memorandum of Agreement[15]
dated 19 July 1996, executed by JARCO
represented by Mr. JohnnyTeope and AZTEC Construction represented by Mr. George Cham,
notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz.
Quite remarkably, respondent, in his comment, denied the charges of child abuse, illegal deduction of salary
and others which are still pending before the St. Louis University (SLU), National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
and the Prosecutors Office. He did not discuss anything about the allegations of immorality in contracting a second
marriage and malpractice in notarizing documents despite the expiration of his commission.
After the filing of comment, We referred[16]
the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), for
investigation, report and recommendation.
The IBP conducted the mandatory preliminary conference.
The complainants, thereafter, submitted their position paper which is just a reiteration of their allegations in
their complaint.
Respondent, on his part, expressly admitted his second marriage despite the existence of his first marriage, and
the subsequent nullification of the former. He also admitted having notarized certain documents during the period
when his notarial commission had already expired. However, he offered some extenuating defenses such as good
faith, lack of malice and noble intentions in doing the complained acts.
After the submission of their position papers, the case was deemed submitted for resolution.
On 30 March 2005, Commissioner Acerey C. Pacheco submitted his report and recommended that:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that respondent beadministratively penalized for the following acts:
a. For contracting a second marriage without taking the appropriate legal
steps to have the first marriage annulled first, he be suspended from the practice of
law for one (1) year, and
b. For notarizing certain legal documents despite full knowledge of the
expiration of his notarialcommission, he be suspended from the practice of law for
another one (1) year or for a total of two (2) years.[17]
On 17 December 2005, the IBP Board of Governors, approved and adopted the recommendation of
Commissioner Pacheco, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution as Annex A and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that Respondent contracted a second
marriage without taking appropriate legal steps to have the first marriage annulled, Atty. Rolando
C. dela Cruz is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year and for notarizing legal
documents despite full knowledge of the expiration of his notarial commission Atty. Rolando
C. dela Cruz is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for another one (1) year, for a total of two (2)years Suspension from the practice of law.
[18]
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This Court finds the recommendation of the IBP to fault respondent well taken, except as to the penalty
contained therein.
At the threshold, it is worth stressing that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the
State on those who show that they possess the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such
privilege. Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege and right to
practice law only during good behavior, and he can be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by
judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has been afforded him. Without invading any constitutionalprivilege or right, an attorneys right to practice law may be resolved by a proceeding to suspend, based on conduct
rendering him unfit to hold a license or to exercise the duties and responsibilities of an attorney. It must be
understood that the purpose of suspending or disbarring him as an attorney is to remove from the profession a
person whose misconduct has proved him unfit to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to an
office of attorney and, thus, to protect the public and those charged with the administration of justice, rather than to
punish an attorney. Elaborating on this, we said on Maligsa v. Atty. Cabanting,[19]
that the Bar should maintain a
high standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing. A lawyer brings honor to the legal
profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. A member of the
legal fraternity should refrain from doing any act which might lessen in any degree the confidence and trust reposed
by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal profession. Towards this end, an attorney may be
disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath or of his duties as an attorney and counselor, which include
statutory grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, all of these being broad enough to cover
practically any misconduct of a lawyer in his professional or private capacity.
Equally worthy of remark is that the law profession does not prescribe a dichotomy of standards among its
members. There is no distinction as to whether the transgression is committed in the lawyers professional capacity
or in his private life. This is because a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a
mere citizen at another.[20]
Thus, not only his professional activities but even his private life, insofar as the latter may
reflect unfavorably upon the good name and prestige of the profession and the courts, may at any time be the
subject of inquiry on the part of the proper authorities.[21]
One of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant must possess good moral
character. Possession of such moral character as requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice must
be continuous. Otherwise, membership in the bar may be terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good moral
conduct.[22]
In the case at bench, there is no dispute that respondent and Teresita Rivera contracted marriage on 31 May
1982before Judge Tomas W. Macaranas. In less than a year, they parted ways owing to their irreconcilable
differences without seeking judicial recourse. The union bore no offspring. After their separation in-fact,
respondent never knew the whereabouts of Teresita Rivera since he had lost all forms of communication with
her. Seven years thereafter, respondent became attracted to one Mary Jane Pascua, who was also a faculty member
of SLU-LHS. There is also no dispute over the fact that in 1989, respondent married Mary Jane Pascua in the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of BaguioCity, Branch 68. Respondent even admitted this fact. When the second
marriage was entered into, respondents prior marriage with Teresita Rivera was still subsisting, no action having
been initiated before the court to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity or annulment of respondents prior marriage
to Teresita Rivera or a judicial declaration of presumptive death of Teresita Rivera.
Respondent was already a member of the Bar when he contracted the bigamous second marriage in 1989,
having been admitted to the Bar in 1985. As such, he cannot feign ignorance of the mandate of the law that before a
second marriage may be validly contracted, the first and subsisting marriage must first be annulled by the
appropriate court. The second marriage was annulled only on 4 October 1994 before the RTC of Benguet, Branch 9,
or about five years after respondent contracted his second marriage. The annulment of respondents second
marriage has no bearing to the instant disbarment proceeding. Firstly, as earlier emphasized, the annulment came
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after the respondents second bigamous marriage. Secondly, as we held in In re: Almacen, a disbarment case
is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal but is rather an investigation by the court into the
conduct of its officers. Thus, if the acquittal of a lawyer in a criminal action is not determinative of an administrative
case against him, or if an affidavit of withdrawal of a disbarment case does not affect its course, then neither will the
judgment of annulment of respondents second marriage also exonerate him from a wrongdoing actually
committed. So long as the quantum of proof - clear preponderance of evidence - in disciplinary proceedings against
members of the Bar is met, then liability attaches.[23]
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court cites grossly immoral conduct as a ground for disbarment.
The Court has laid down with a common definition of what constitutes immoral conduct, vis--vis,grossly
immoral conduct. Immoral conduct is that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the communityandwhat is grossly
immoral,that is,it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree.[24]
Undoubtedly, respondents act constitutes immoral conduct. But is it so gross as to warrant his
disbarment? Indeed, he exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the
Bar. In particular, he made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. His
act of contracting a second marriage while the first marriage was still in place, is contrary to honesty, justice,
decency and morality.[25]
However, measured against the definition, we are not prepared to consider respondents act as grossly
immoral. This finds support in the following recommendation and observation of the IBP Investigator and IBP Board
of Governors, thus:
The uncontested assertions of the respondent belies any intention to flaunt the law and the
high moral standard of the legal profession, to wit:
a. After his first failed marriage and prior to his second marriage or for a period of almost
seven (7) years, he has not been romantically involved with any woman;
b. His second marriage was a show of his noble intentions and total love for his wife,
whom he described to be very intelligent person;
c. He never absconded from his obligations to support his wife and child;
d. He never disclaimed paternity over the child and husbandry (sic) with relation to his
wife;
e. After the annulment of his second marriage, they have parted ways when the mother
and child went toAustralia;
f. Since then up to now, respondent remained celibate.[26]
In the case of Terre v. Terre,[27]
respondent was disbarred because his moral character was deeply flawed as
shown by the following circumstances, viz: he convinced the complainant that her prior marriage to Bercenilla was
null and void ab initioand that she was legally single and free to marry him. When complainant and respondent had
contracted their marriage, respondent went through law school while being supported by complainant, with some
assistance from respondents parents. After respondent had finished his law course and gotten complainant
pregnant, respondent abandoned the complainant without support and without the wherewithal for delivering his
own child safely to a hospital.
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In the case of Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma,[28]
respondent was also disbarred for his grossly immoral acts such
as:first, he abandoned his lawful wife and three children; second, he lured an innocent young woman into marrying
him;third, he mispresented himself as a bachelor so he could contract marriage in a foreign land; and fourth, he
availed himself of complainants resources by securing a plane ticket from complainants office in order to marry the
latters daughter. He did this without complainants knowledge. Afterwards, he even had the temerity to assure
complainant that everything is legal.
Such acts are wanting in the case at bar. In fact, no less than the respondent himself acknowledged and
declared his abject apology for his misstep. He was humble enough to offer no defense save for his love and
declaration of his commitment to his wife and child.
Based on the reasons stated above, we find the imposition of disbarment upon him to be unduly harsh. The
power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and may be imposed only in a clear case of misconduct that
seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court. Disbarment should never be
decreed where any lesser penalty could accomplish the end desired.[29]
In line with this philosophy, we find that a
penalty of two years suspension is more appropriate. The penalty of one (1) year suspension recommended by the
IBP is too light and not commensurate to the act committed by respondent.
As to the charge of misconduct for having notarized several documents during the years 1988-1997 after his
commission as notary public had expired, respondent humbly admitted having notarized certain documents despite
his knowledge that he no longer had authority to do so. He, however, alleged that he received no payment in
notarizing said documents.
It has been emphatically stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. On the
contrary, it is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act
as notaries public. Notarization of a private document converts the document into a public one making it admissible
in court without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon
its face and, for this reason, notaries public must observe with the utmost care the basic requirements in the
performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance
would be undermined.[30]
The requirements for the issuance of a commission as notary public must not be treated as a mere casual
formality. The Court has characterized a lawyers act of notarizing documents without the requisite commission to
do so as reprehensible, constituting as it does not only malpractice but also x x x the crime of falsification of public
documents.[31]
The Court had occasion to state that where the notarization of a document is done by a member of the
Philippine Bar at a time when he has no authorization or commission to do so, the offender may be subjected to
disciplinary action or one, performing a notarial act without such commission is a violation of the lawy ers oath to
obey the laws, more specifically, the Notarial Law. Then, too, by making it appear that he is duly commissioned
when he is not, he is, for all legal intents and purposes, indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyers oath
similarly proscribes. These violations fall squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct. By acting as a notary public without the proper commission to do so, the lawyer likewise violates Canon 7
of the same Code, which directs every lawyer to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.
In the case of Buensuceso v. Barera,[32] a lawyer was suspended for one year when he notarized five
documents after his commission as Notary Public had expired, to wit: a complaint for ejectment, affidavit,
supplemental affidavit, a deed of sale, and a contract to sell. Guided by the pronouncement in said case, we find
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/A.C.%20No.%206010.htm#_ftn28http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/A.C.%20No.%206010.htm#_ftn28http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/A.C.%20No.%206010.htm#_ftn28http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/A.C.%20No.%206010.htm#_ftn29http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/A.C.%20No.%206010.htm#_ftn29http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/A.C.%20No.%206010.htm#_ftn29http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/A.C.%20No.%206010.htm#_ftn30http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/A.C.%20No.%206010.htm#_ftn30http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/A.C.%20No.%206010.htm#_ftn30http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/A.C.%20No.%206010.htm#_ftn31http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/A.C.%20No.%206010.htm#_ftn31http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/A.C.%20No.%206010.htm#_ftn31http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/A.C.%20No.%206010.htm#_ftn32http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/A.C.%20No.%206010.htm#_ftn32http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/A.C.%20No.%206010.htm#_ftn32http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/A.C.%20No.%206010.htm#_ftn32http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/A.C.%20No.%206010.htm#_ftn31http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/A.C.%20No.%206010.htm#_ftn30http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/A.C.%20No.%206010.htm#_ftn29http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/A.C.%20No.%206010.htm#_ftn28 -
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that a suspension of two (2) years is justified under the circumstances. Herein respondent notarized a total of
fourteen (14) documents[33]
without the requisite notarial commission.
Other charges constituting respondents misconduct such as the pending criminal case for child abuse
allegedly committed by him against a high school student filed before the Prosecutors Office ofBaguio City; the
pending administrative case filed by the Teachers, Staff, Students and Parents before an Investigating Board created
by SLU; and the pending labor case filed by SLU-LHS Faculty before the NLRC, Cordillera Administrative Region, on
alleged illegal deduction of salary by respondent, need not be discussed, as they are still pending before the properforums. At such stages, the presumption of innocence still prevails in favor of the respondent.
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Rolando Dela Cruz guilty of immoral conduct, in disregard of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, and
another two (2) years for notarizing documents despite the expiration of his commission or a total of four (4) years
of suspension.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all the courts of the land through the Court Administrator, as well as
the IBP, the Office of the Bar Confidant, and recorded in the personal records of the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Claridades
PUP College of Law
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Home About Atty. Alvin T. ClaridadesLee v. Tambago, A.C. No. 5281, February 12, 2008; 544 SCRA 393 (2008)
Posted onJune 20, 2012byalbinoski2005
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FIRST DIVISION
[A.C. No. 5281, February 12, 2008]
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MANUEL L. LEE, Complainant, vs. ATTY. REGINO B. TAMBAGO, Respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
CORONA, J.:
In a letter-complaint dated April 10, 2000, complainant Manuel L. Lee charged respondent Atty. Regino B. Tambago
with violation of the Notarial Law and the ethics of the legal profession for notarizing a spurious last will and
testament.
In his complaint, complainant averred that his father, the decedent Vicente Lee, Sr., never executed the contested
will. Furthermore, the spurious will contained the forged signatures of Cayetano Noynay and Loreto Grajo, the
purported witnesses to its execution.
In the said will, the decedent supposedly bequeathed his entire estate to his wife Lim Hock Lee, save for a parcel of
land which he devised to Vicente Lee, Jr. and Elena Lee, half-siblings of complainant.
The will was purportedly executed and acknowledged before respondent on June 30, 1965.[1]
Complainant, however,
pointed out that the residence certificate[2]
of the testator noted in the acknowledgment of the will was dated
January 5, 1962.[3]
Furthermore, the signature of the testator was not the same as his signature as donor in a deed of
donation[4]
(containing his purported genuine signature). Complainant averred that the signatures of his deceased
father in the will and in the deed of donation were in any way (sic) entirely and diametrically opposed from (sic) one
another in all angle*s+.[5]
Complainant also questioned the absence of notation of the residence certificates of the purported witnesses
Noynay and Grajo. He alleged that their signatures had likewise been forged and merely copied from their respective
voters affidavits.
Complainant further asserted that no copy of such purported will was on file in the archives division of the Records
Management and Archives Office of the National Commission for Culture and the Arts (NCCA). In this connection, the
certification of the chief of the archives division dated September 19, 1999 stated:
Doc. 14, Page No. 4, Book No. 1, Series of 1965 refers to an AFFIDAVIT executed by BARTOLOME RAMIREZ on June
30, 1965 and is available in this Office*s+ files.[6]
Respondent in his comment dated July 6, 2001 claimed that the complaint against him contained false allegations:
(1) that complainant was a son of the decedent Vicente Lee, Sr. and (2) that the will in question was fake and
spurious. He alleged that complainant was not a legitimate son of Vicente Lee, Sr. and the last will and testament
was validly executed and actually notarized by respondent per affidavit[7]
of Gloria Nebato, common-law wife of
Vicente Lee, Sr. and corroborated by the joint affidavit[8]of the children of Vicente Lee, Sr., namely Elena N. Lee and
Vicente N. Lee, Jr. xxx.[9]
Respondent further stated that the complaint was filed simply to harass him because the criminal case filed by
complainant against him in the Office of the Ombudsman did not prosper.
Respondent did not dispute complainants contention that no copy of the will was on file in the archives division of
the NCCA. He claimed that no copy of the contested will could be found there because none was filed.
Lastly, respondent pointed out that complainant had no valid cause of action against him as he (complainant) did not
first file an action for the declaration of nullity of the will and demand his share in the inheritance.
In a resolution dated October 17, 2001, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.[10]
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In his report, the investigating commissioner found respondent guilty of violation of pertinent provisions of the old
Notarial Law as found in the Revised Administrative Code. The violation constituted an infringement of legal ethics,
particularly Canon 1[11]
and Rule 1.01[12]
of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).[13]
Thus, the investigating
commissioner of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline recommended the suspension of respondent for a period of
three months.
The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution No. XVII-2006-285 dated May 26, 2006, resolved:
[T]o ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution
as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws
and rules, and considering Respondents failure to comply with the laws in the discharge of his function as a notary
public, Atty. Regino B. Tambago is hereby suspended from the practice of law for one year and Respondents notarial
commission is Revoked and Disqualifiedfrom reappointment as Notary Public for two (2) years.[14]
We affirm with modification.
A will is an act whereby a person is permitted, with the formalities prescribed by law, to control to a certain degree
the disposition of his estate, to take effect after his death.[15]
A will may either be notarial or holographic.
The law provides for certain formalities that must be followed in the execution of wills. The object of solemnities
surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door on bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and
testaments and to guarantee their truth and authenticity.[16]
A notarial will, as the contested will in this case, is required by law to be subscribed at the end thereof by the
testator himself. In addition, it should be attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the
presence of the testator and of one another.[17]
The will in question was attested by only two witnesses, Noynay and Grajo. On this circumstance alone, the will must
be considered void.[18]
This is in consonance with the rule that acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or
prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their validity.
The Civil Code likewise requires that a will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the
witnesses.[19]
The importance of this requirement is highlighted by the fact that it was segregated from the other
requirements under Article 805 and embodied in a distinct and separate provision.[20]
An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some competent officer or court and
declaring it to be his act or deed. It involves an extra step undertaken whereby the signatory actually declares to the
notary public that the same is his or her own free act and deed.[21]
The acknowledgment in a notarial will has a two-
fold purpose: (1) to safeguard the testators wishes long after his demise and (2) to assure that his estate is
administered in the manner that he intends it to be done.
A cursory examination of the acknowledgment of the will in question shows that this particular requirement was
neither strictly nor substantially complied with. For one, there was the conspicuous absence of a notation of the
residence certificates of the notarial witnesses Noynay and Grajo in the acknowledgment. Similarly, the notation of
the testators old residence certificate in the same acknowledgment was a clear breach of the law. These omissions
by respondent invalidated the will.
As the acknowledging officer of the contested will, respondent was required to faithfully observe the formalities of a
will and those of notarization. As we held in Santiago v. Rafanan:[22]
The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of notaries public. They are required to certify that the
party to every document acknowledged before him had presented the proper residence certificate (or exemption
from the residence tax); and to enter its number, place of issue and date as part of such certification.
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These formalities are mandatory and cannot be disregarded, considering the degree of importance and evidentiary
weight attached to notarized documents.[23]
A notary public, especially a lawyer,[24]
is bound to strictly observe these
elementary requirements.
The Notarial Law then in force required the exhibition of the residence certificate upon notarization of a document
or instrument:
Section 251. Requirement as to notation of payment of [cedula] residence tax.Every contract, deed, or otherdocument acknowledged before a notary public shall have certified thereon that the parties thereto have presented
their proper [cedula] residence certificate or are exempt from the [cedula] residence tax, and there shall be entered
by the notary public as a part of such certificate the number, place of issue, and date of each [cedula] residence
certificate as aforesaid.[25]
The importance of such act was further reiterated by Section 6 of the Residence Tax Act[26]
which stated:
When a person liable to the taxes prescribed in this Act acknowledges any document before a notary public xxx it
shall be the duty of such person xxx with whom such transaction is had or business done, to require the exhibition of
the residence certificate showing payment of the residence taxes by such person xxx.
In the issuance of a residence certificate, the law seeks to establish the true and correct identity of the person to
whom it is issued, as well as the payment of residence taxes for the current year. By having allowed decedent to
exhibit an expired residence certificate, respondent failed to comply with the requirements of both the old Notarial
Law and the Residence Tax Act. As much could be said of his failure to demand the exhibition of the residence
certificates of Noynay and Grajo.
On the issue of whether respondent was under the legal obligation to furnish a copy of the notarized will to the
archives division, Article 806 provides:
Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witness. The notary public
shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the office of the Clerk of Court. (emphasis
supplied)
Respondents failure, inadvertent or not, to file in the archives division a copy of the notarized will was therefore not
a cause for disciplinary action.
Nevertheless, respondent should be faulted for having failed to make the necessary entries pertaining to the will in
his notarial register. The old Notarial Law required the entry of the following matters in the notarial register, in
chronological order:
1. nature of each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him;2. person executing, swearing to, or acknowledging the instrument;3. witnesses, if any, to the signature;4. date of execution, oath, or acknowledgment of the instrument;5. fees collected by him for his services as notary;6. give each entry a consecutive number; and7. if the instrument is a contract, a brief description of the substance of the instrument.[27]In an effort to prove that he had complied with the abovementioned rule, respondent contended that he had
crossed out a prior entry and entered instead the will of the decedent. As proof, he presented a photocopy of his
notarial register. To reinforce his claim, he presented a photocopy of a certification[28]
stating that the archives
division had no copy of the affidavit of Bartolome Ramirez.
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A photocopy is a mere secondary evidence. It is not admissible unless it is shown that the original is unavailable. The
proponent must first prove the existence and cause of the unavailability of the original,[29]
otherwise, the evidence
presented will not be admitted. Thus, the photocopy of respondents notarial register was not admissible as
evidence of the entry of the execution of the will because it failed to comply with the requirements for the
admissibility of secondary evidence.
In the same vein, respondents attempt to controvert the certification dated September 21, 1999[30]
must fail. Not
only did he present a mere photocopy of the certification dated March 15, 2000;
[31]
its contents did not squarelyprove the fact of entry of the contested will in his notarial register.
Notaries public must observe with utmost care[32]
and utmost fidelity the basic requirements in the performance of
their duties, otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of notarized deeds will be undermined.[33]
Defects in the observance of the solemnities prescribed by law render the entire will invalid. This carelessness
cannot be taken lightly in view of the importance and delicate nature of a will, considering that the testator and the
witnesses, as in this case, are no longer alive to identify the instrument and to confirm its contents.[34]
Accordingly, respondent must be held accountable for his acts. The validity of the will was seriously compromised as
a consequence of his breach of duty.[35]
In this connection, Section 249 of the old Notarial Law provided:
Grounds for revocation of commission. The following derelictions of duty on the part of a notary public shall, in
the discretion of the proper judge of first instance, be sufficient ground for the revocation of his commission:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) The failure of the notary to make the proper entry or entries in his notarial register touching his notarial acts in
the manner required by law.
xxx xxx xxx
(f) The failure of the notary to make the proper notation regarding cedula certificates.[36]
These gross violations of the law also made respondent liable for violation of his oath as a lawyer and constituted
transgressions of Section 20 (a), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court[37]
and Canon 1[38]
and Rule 1.01[39]
of the CPR.
The first and foremost duty of a lawyer is to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, uphold the
Constitution and obey the laws of the land.[40]
For a lawyer is the servant of the law and belongs to a profession to
which society has entrusted the administration of law and the dispensation of justice.[41]
While the duty to uphold the Constitution and obey the law is an obligation imposed on every citizen, a lawyer
assumes responsibilities well beyond the basic requirements of good citizenship. As a servant of the law, a lawyer
should moreover make himself an example for others to emulate.[42]
Being a lawyer, he is supposed to be a model in
the community in so far as respect for the law is concerned.[43]
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.[44]
A breach of these conditions justifies disciplinary
action against the erring lawyer. A disciplinary sanction is imposed on a lawyer upon a finding or acknowledgment
that he has engaged in professional misconduct.[45]
These sanctions meted out to errant lawyers include disbarment,
suspension and reprimand.
Disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction.[46]
We have held in a number of cases that the power to
disbar must be exercised with great caution[47]
and should not be decreed if any punishment less severesuch as
reprimand, suspension, or finewill accomplish the end desired.[48]The rule then is that disbarment is meted out
only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the
court.[49]
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Respondent, as notary public, evidently failed in the performance of the elementary duties of his office. Contrary to
his claims that he exercised his duties as Notary Public with due care and with due regard to the provision of
existing law and had complied with the elementary formalities in the performance of his duties xxx, wefind that he
acted very irresponsibly in notarizing the will in question. Such recklessness warrants the less severe punishment of
suspension from the practice of law. It is, as well, a sufficient basis for the revocation of his commission[50]
and his
perpetual disqualification to be commissioned as a notary public.[51]
WHEREFORE,respondent Atty. Regino B. Tambago is hereby found guilty of professional misconduct. He violated (1)the Lawyers Oath; (2) Rule 138 of the Rules of Court; (3) Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; (4) Art. 806 of the Civil Code and (5) the provisions of the old Notarial Law.
Atty. Regino B. Tambago is hereby SUSPENDEDfrom the practice of law for one year and his notarial
commission REVOKED. Because he has not lived up to the trustworthiness expected of him as a notary public and as
an officer of the court, he is PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIEDfrom reappointment as a notary public.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to all the courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
Office of the Bar Confidant, as well as ma
ROSALIE DALLONG-GALICINAO, A.C. No. 6396
Complainant,
Present:
PUNO,J.,
Chairman,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO,
TINGA, and
CHICO-NAZARIO,JJ.
ATTY. VIRGIL R. CASTRO,
Respondent, Promulgated:
October 25, 2005
x-------------------------------------------------------------------x
R E S O L U T I O N
TINGA,J.:
This administrative case concerns a lawyer who hurled invectives at a Clerk of Court. Members of the bar
decorum must at all times comfort themselves in a manner befitting their noble profession.
Complainant Atty. Rosalie Dallong-Galicinao is the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya. On 8 May 2003, she filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a Complaint-Affidavit[1]with supporting documents[2]against respondent Atty. Virgil R.
Castro for Unprofessional Conduct, specifically violation of Canon 7, Rule 7.03, Canon 8 and Rule 8.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.[3]
The charge in the complaint is summed up as follows:
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/oct2005/ac_6396.htm#_ftn1http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/oct2005/ac_6396.htm#_ftn1http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/oct2005/ac_6396.htm#_ftn1http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/oct2005/ac_6396.htm#_ftn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/oct2005/ac_6396.htm#_ftn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/oct2005/ac_6396.htm#_ftn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/oct2005/ac_6396.htm#_ftn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/oct2005/ac_6396.htm#_ftn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/oct2005/ac_6396.htm#_ftn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/oct2005/ac_6396.htm#_ftn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/oct2005/ac_6396.htm#_ftn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/oct2005/ac_6396.htm#_ftn1 -
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Respondent Atty. Castro was a private practitioner and Vice-President of IBP-Nueva Vizcaya Chapter. On 5 May
2003, respondent went to complainants office to inquire whether the complete records of Civil Case No. 784,
entitledSps. Crispino Castillano v. Sps. Federico S. Castillano and Felicidad Aberin,had already been remanded to the
court of origin, MCTC Dupax del Norte, Alfonso Castaned, Nueva Vizcaya. It must be noted that respondent was not
the counsel of record of either party in Civil Case No. 784.
Complainant informed respondent that the record had not yet been transmitted since a certified true copyof the decision of the Court of Appeals should first be presented to serve as basis for the transmittal of the records
to the court of origin. To this respondent retorted scornfully, Who will certify the Court of Appeals Decision, the
Court of Appeals? You mean to say, I would still have to go to Manila to get a certified true copy? Surprised at this
outburst, complainant replied, Sir, its in the Rules but you could showus the copy sent to the party you claim to be
representing. Respondent then replied, Then you should have notified me of the said requirement. That was two
weeks ago and I have been frequenting your office since then, but you never bothered to notify me. Complainant
replied, It is not our duty, Sir, to notify you of the said requirement.
Respondent then answered, You mean to say it is not your duty to remand the record of the case?
Complainant responded, No, Sir, I mean, its not our duty tonotify you that you have to submit a copy of the Court
of Appeals decision. Respondent angrily declared in Ilocano,Kayat mo nga saw-en, awan pakialam yon?
Kasdiay?(You mean to say you dont care anymore? Is that the way it is?) He then turned and left the office,
banging the door on his way out to show his anger. The banging of the door was so loud it was heard by the people
at the adjacent RTC, Branch 30 where a hearing was taking place.[4]
After a few minutes, respondent returned to the office, still enraged, and pointed his finger at complainant and
shouted, Ukinnan, no adda ti unget mo iti kilientek haan mo nga ibales kaniak ah! (Vulva of your mother! If you
are harboring ill feelings against my client, dont turn your ire on me!) Complainant was shocked at respondents
words but still managed to reply, I dont even know your client, Sir. Respondent left the office and as he passed by
complainants window, he again shouted,Ukinnam nga babai! (Vulva of your mother, you woman!)[5]
Complainant suffered acute embarrassment at the incident, as it happened in her office of which she was, and
still is, the head and in front of her staff. She felt that her credibility had been tarnished and diminished, eliciting
doubt on her ability to command full respect from her staff.[6]
The Complaint-Affidavit, filed three days after the incident,was supported by anAffidavit[7]signed by employees
of RTC-Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya who witnessed the incident. TheAffidavitnarrated the same incident as witnessed
by the said employees. A Motion to File Additional Affidavit/Documentary Evidencewas filed by complainant on 25
September 2003.[8]
On 26 May 2003, the CBD-IBP issued an Order[9]requiring respondent to submit his answer to the complaint.
Respondent submitted his Compliance[10]
dated 18 June 2003. Respondent explained that he was counsel for the
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 847, entitled Sps. Federico Castillano, et al. v. Sps. Crispin Castillano, et al., filed with the
RTC of Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 30.He learned of the finality of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
64962 with respect to Civil Case No. 847 before the lower court. Prior to the incident, he went to the office of the
complainant to request for the transmittal of the records of the case to the MCTC and the complainant reassured
him of the same.
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Respondent admits having inquired about the status of the transmittal of the records on 5 May 2003.
However, he has no explanation as to what transpired on that day. Instead, he narrates that on 25 May 2003, twelve
days after the incident, the records had not yet been transmitted, and he subsequently learned that these records
were returned to the court of origin.
The hearing for the administrative complaint before the CBD was set on 25 September 2003 by the
Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan. However, on said date, only complainant appeared. The latter alsomoved that the case be submitted for resolution.
[11]Respondent later on filed a Manifestationstating that the reason
for his non-appearance was because he was still recuperating from physical injuries and that he was not mentally fit
to prepare the required pleadings as his vehicle was rained with bullets on 19 August 2003. He also expressed his
public apology to the complainant in the same Manifestation.[12]
Complainant filed a Manifestation expressing her desire not to appear on the next hearing date in view of
respondents public apology, adding that respondent personally and humbly asked for forgiveness which she
accepted.[13]
The Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent be reprimanded and warned that any other
complaint for breach of his professional duties shall be dealt with more severely.[14]
The IBP submitted to this Court a
Notice of Resolution adopting and approving the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.[15]
At the onset, it should be noted that respondent was not the counsel of record of Civil Case No. 784. Had he
been counsel of record, it would have been easy for him to present the required certified true copy of the decision of
the Court of Appeals. He need not have gone to Manila to procure a certified true copy of the decision since the
Court of Appeals furnishes the parties and their counsel of record a duplicate original or certified true copy of its
decision.
His explanation that he will enter his appearance in the case when its records were already transmitted to
the MCTC is unacceptable. Not being the counsel of record and there being no authorization from either the parties
to represent them, respondent had no right to impose his will on the clerk of court.
Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:
Rule 8.02A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professionalemployment of another lawyer; however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give
proper advice and assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.
Through his acts of constantly checking the transmittal of the records of Civil Case No. 784, respondent
deliberately encroached upon the legal functions of the counsel of record of that case. It does not matter whether
he did so in good faith.
Moreover, in the course of his questionable activities relating to Civil Case No. 784, respondent acted rudelytowards an officer of the court. He raised his voice at the clerk of court and uttered at her the most vulgar of
invectives. Not only was it ill-mannered but also unbecoming considering that he did all these to a woman and in
front of her subordinates.
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As held inAlcantara v. Atty. Pefianco,[16]
respondent ought to have realized that this sort of public behavior
can only bring down the legal profession in the public estimation and erode public respect for it.[17]
These acts violate
Rule 7.03, Canon 8 and Rule 8.01, to wit:
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflect on his fitness to
practice law, now shall he, whether in public or private life behave in scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession.
Canon 8 A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his
professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper.
Moreover, Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility demands that lawyers conduct themselves
with courtesy, fairness and candor toward their fellow lawyers. Lawyers are duty bound to uphold the dignity of thelegal profession. They must act honorably, fairly and candidly towards each other and otherwise conduct themselves
without reproach at all times.[18]
As correctly evaluated by the Investigating Commissioner, respondent did not categorically deny the charges
in the complaint. Instead, he gave a lengthy narration of the prefatory facts of the case as well as of the incident on 5
May 2003.
Complainant also alleged in her Complaint-Affidavitthat respondents uncharacteristic behavior was not an
isolated incident. He has supposedly done the same to Attys. Abraham Johnny G. Asuncion and Temmy Lambino, the
latter having filed a case against respondent pending before this Court.
[19]
We, however, cannot acknowledge suchallegation absent any evidence showing the veracity of such claim. No affidavits to that effect were submitted by
either Atty. Asuncion or Atty. Lambino.
Nonetheless, the penalty to be imposed should be tempered owing to the fact that respondent had
apologized to the complainant and the latter had accepted it. This is not to say, however, that respondent
should be absolved from his actuations. People are accountable for the consequences of the things they say and do
even if they repent afterwards. The fact remains that things done cannot be undone and words uttered cannot be
taken back. Hence, he should bear the consequences of his actions.
The highest reward that can be bestowed on lawyers is the esteem of their brethren. This esteem cannot be
purchased, perfunctorily created, or gained by artifice or contrivance. It is born of sharp contexts and thrives despite
conflicting interest. It emanates solely from integrity, character, brains and skills in the honorable performance of
professional duty.[20]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent is hereby FINED in the amount of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00)
PESOS with a warning that any similar infraction with be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this Decisionbe
furnished the Bar Confidant for appropriate annotation in the record of the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
CO-NAZARIO,J.:
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This is an administrative complaint filed by Atty. Marcos V. Prieto, against respondent Judge Ferdinand A. Fe,
both as a member of the bar and bench, and respondent Atty. Oscar B. Corpuz as a member of the bar, for
dishonesty, serious misconduct prejudicial to the integrity and dignity of the Judiciary under Section 27, Rule 138 and
Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court relative to the latters actuations in the handling of Civil Case No.
1081-BG entitled, Yolanda M. Roque v. Atty. Marcos V. Prieto, et al. and Civil Case No. 1518-BG entitled, Yolanda
MarquezRoque v. Atty. Marcos V. Prieto, et al.
Complainant implies that not only did the respondent lawyer had free access to the records of Civil Case No.
1081-BG through the help of respondent Judge, he was also given the liberty to copy what perhaps would help him
in his quest to win the case.
Invoking the principle ofres ipsa loquitor, complainant objects to the fact that Civil Case No. 1518-BG was
raffled to the respondent Judge, who was the former counsel of the plaintiff therein in Civil Case No. 1081-
BG. Another reason for his objection is that, allegedly, some paragraphs in the complaint in Civil Case No. 1518-BG
were obviously copied from Civil Case No. 1081-BG wherein the complaint was prepared by respondent Judge in his
capacity as then lawyer of herein complainant (plaintiff therein). Complainant claims that the foregoing constitute
misconduct which imply malice or wrongful intent, not just mere errors of judgment. He insists that the fact that
respondent Judge will try the case upon a complaint in which the plaintiff was his former client and which complaint
was copied from the complaint he himself prepared does not speak well of his intention as to the disposition of the
case.
Complainant maintains that the act of respondent Judge in allowing the respondent lawyer to copy thecomplaint in Civil Case No. 1081-BG and to present it to court as the latters work does violence to Rule 1.01, Canon
1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a judge should be the embodiment of competence,
integrity and independence. Complainant also asserts that in placing his signature in the complaint not written by
him, respondent lawyer committed deceit, which serves as a ground for his disbarment.
In a Resolution dated 28 September 2005, the Second Division of this Court referred the instant
administrative case to Court of Appeals Justice Josefina G. Salonga for investigation, report and recommendation
within ninety (90) days from receipt thereof.
Pursuant thereto, Justice Salonga set the case for hearing on 13 December 2005, and directed the
complainant and the respondents, and their witnesses, if any, to appear before her and to submit documents
relevant to the complaint.
During the scheduled hearing, the complainant and the respondent Judge, after the marking and offering of
their respective documentary evidence, manifested that they would not be adducing any further evidence. Upon
their motion, they were given a period of thirty (30) days within which to simultaneously file their Memoranda, after
which the case will be deemed submitted for resolution.
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On 13 December 2005, complainant filed his Memorandum. The respondent judge, on the other hand, filed
his Memorandum on 18 January 2006 while the respondent lawyer filed his Memorandum on 20 January 2006.
In her report, Justice Salonga summarized the facts as follows:
In October 1992, Salud Andrada Marquez (Marquez)mortgaged six (6) parcels of land to
the Rural Bank of Luna, La Union, Inc., one of which is a parcel of land with an area of Twenty Two
Thousand Five Hundred Ninety Nine Square Meters (22,599 sq. meters) located at Calumbaya,
Bauang, La Union covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. FP-15344 under a Free Patent
granted on 5 July 1989.
Failing to pay her debt, the bank foreclosed the mortgage. On 2 August 1993, the
mortgaged properties were sold at public auction the highest bidder of which was the
petitioner. Consequently, OCT No. FP-15344 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. T-40223 was issued in the name of the petitioner.
In the meantime, petitioner, through his attorneys-in-fact Antonio O. Prieto and Monette O.
Prieto, mortgaged the aforesaid properties to Far East Bank and Trust Company.
Seeking the nullification of the mortgaged and the consequent transfer of the mortgaged
properties in the name of the petitioner, Roque, Marquez daughter, filed a complaint docketed as
Civil Case No. 1081-BG with the RTC Branch 67, for Declaration of Nullity of Contracts with Damages
against said petitioner, the Rural Bank of Luna, La Union, Inc. and Far East Bank and Trust
Company. Respondent judge, then a practicing lawyer, was retained by Roque as her counsel of
record in said case and was the one who drafted said complaint.
On 18 August 2000, the RTC Branch 67, through then Presiding Judge Jose G. Pineda, issued
an order dismissing the case on the ground that Roque was not a real party in interest since her right
of action has still to ripen upon the death of her mother.
On 8 November 2001, respondent judge was appointed as the presiding judge of RTC Branch
67. By reason of his appointment, he completely severed all his professional relationships with his
clients, including Roque, and turned over or relinquished all case records of his office to said clients.
Upon the demise of Marquez on 9 August 2002, Roque, who had now acquired by way of
succession her mothers right of action to pursue the annulment of contracts executed over theproperty formerly covered by OCT No. 15344, engaged the legal services of respondent lawyer.
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Thus, on 5 January 2004, respondent lawyer, as Roques counsel, filed a complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Contracts, Reconveyance of Property, and Damages against petitioner, his
attorneys-in-fact Antonio O. Prieto and Monette O. Prieto, the Rural Bank of Luna, La Union, Inc. and
Far East Bank and Trust Company, Inc., now merged with the Bank of the Philippine Islands, before
the Regional Trial Court of Bauang, La Union.
On 7 January 2004, the case, docketed as Civil Case No. 1518-BG, was raffled to the
respondent judge. On 8 January 2004, RTC Branch 67, through Atty. Jeovannie C. Ordoo, its Branch
Clerk of Court, issued summons to the defendants. The summons and copy of the complaint was
duly served upon the petitioner on 20 January 2004.
Going over the individual case folders of the newly raffled cases to his court, respondent
judge came across Civil Case No. 1518-BG and discovered that the plaintiff therein was Roque, his
former client. Immediately, without going over the allegations of the complaint, the respondent
judge issued an Order dated 23 January 2004 inhibiting himself from the case and ordered that the
record of said case be transferred to the Regional Trial Court of Bauang, La Union, Branch 33 (RTC
Branch 33).
On 27 January 2004, the Branch Clerk of Court of RTC Branch 67 transmitted the entire
record of Civil Case No. 1518-BG to RTC Branch 33 through its Clerk of Court, Atty. Richard T.
Domingo, which was duly received by the latter.
On 30 January 2004, petitioner separately filed with the RTC Branch 67, an Objection to
Competency and his Answer to the Complaint. Since the records thereof were already transmitted
to RTC Branch 33, RTC Branch 67s Branch Clerk of Court had said pleadings forwarded
thereto. Since then, the proceedings in Civil Case No. 1518-BG have been conducted by RTC Branch
33.
In an Order dated 22 April 2004, after the parties therein filed their Answers and the issues
having been joined, Presiding Judge Rose Mary R. Molina-Alim of RTC Branch 33 set the case for pre-trial conference and ordered the submission of the parties respective pre-trial briefs.
On 24 May 2004, petitioner filed with the RTC Branch 33 an Amended Answer together with
the Authority given by his co-defendants Antonio O. Prieto and Monette O. Prieto, in his favor to
appear for and in their behalf, and their Pre-Trial Brief.
In a Resolution dated 28 September 2005, the Second Division of the Supreme Courtreferred the instant administrative case to the undersigned for investigation, report and
recommendation within ninety (90) days from receipt thereof. A copy of the said Resolution was
received by the undersigned on 18 November 2005.
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Pursuant thereto, in an Order promulgated on 21 November 2005, the undersigned set the
case for hearing on 13 December 2005 directing the petitioner and the respondents, and their
witnesses, if any, to appear before her and to submit documents relevant to the complaint.
During the scheduled hearing, the petitioner and the respondent judge, after the marking
and offering of their respective documentary evidence, manifested that they will not be adducing
any further evidence. Upon their motion, they were given a period thirty (30) days within which to
simultaneously file their Memoranda, after which the case will be deemed submitted for resolution.
On 13 December 2005, petitioner filed his Memorandum. The respondent judge, on the
other hand, filed his Memorandum on 18 January 2006 while the respondent lawyer filed his
Memorandum on 20 January 2006.
In her report, Justice Salonga recommended the dismissal of the complaint against respondents, and that
complainant be admonished for filing the frivolous complaint.
A reading of the records of this case clearly shows that the present administrative case is
unfounded, as it is devoid of factual and legal basis. Stripped of all its verbosity, petitioners
allegations in support of his complaint against the respondents should be treated for what they
really are, mere allegations founded on speculation and conjecture. In this connection, it must be
stressed that in administrative proceedings, the burden of proof that the respondents committed
the act complained of rests on the complainant. Failing in this, the complaint must be dismissed.
First off, the allegation of the petitioner to the effect that the respondent lawyer, through
the intervention and assistance of the respondent judge, had free access to the court records Civil
Case No. 1081-BG fails to find evidentiary support. Without more, petitioner deduced that the court
records of Civil Case No. 1081-BG were made available to the respondent lawyer at the instance ofthe respondent judge simply because relevant and substantial portions of the complaint filed by the
latter were re-written and adopted in Civil Case No. 1518-BG. Bare and conclusory as it is, the said
allegation deserves scant consideration.
Emphatically, the mere fact that respondent lawyer had adopted relevant and substantial
portions of the complaint filed by the respondent judge does not in any way bespeak of any illegal or
unethical practice on his part.
For one, the respondent lawyer could have easily read and gained access to the case record
of Civil Case No. 1081-BG. As can be gleaned from the records, respondent judge had already turned
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over and relinquished his case records of Civil Case No. 1081-BG to Roque after his appointment to
the bench on 8 November 2001. Since she intended to re-file the case against petitioner, it is
expected, if not necessary, for Roque to give the records of the previously dismissed complaint to
her newly retained counsel. What is more apparent is the right of Roque and the respondent
lawyer, as her retained counsel, to request access to the court records for their reproduction or
certification.
For another, a perusal of the complaints separately and successively filed by the respondent
judge and the respondent lawyer belies petitioners claim that the latter merely copied, verbatim or
otherwise, the original complaint. True, some allegations contained therein were substantially
retained by respondent lawyer. However, these allegations are essential and crucial to the cause of
action of Roque against the petitioner. Aside from the fact that there is hardly a number of ways to
construct a sentence, petitioner cannot plausibly claim that respondent lawyer is legally restrained
from retaining or rewriting sentences earlier constructed by the respondent judge.
More importantly, petitioners assertion that respondent judge allowed the respondent
lawyer to copy the complaint in Civil Case No. 1081-BG is unfounded. Aside from the petitioners
mere say so, there is not even an iota of evidence to support this assertion. It is all too obvious that
there is a dearth of evidence that would in any way prove petitioners accusation against the
respondents.
In the same vein, petitioners inference that respondent judge intended to try Civil Case No.
1518-BG is a blatant fabrication. The records of the case refute this. Reading his petition, it isevident that petitioner cunningly attempted to mislead this court to believe that respondent judge is
still conducting the proceedings in Civil Case No. 1518-BG and had refused to inhibit himself
therefrom. His intent to deceive this court to achieve his end to vex and harass the respondents is
undeniable.
As asserted by the respondent judge, petitioner cannot feign ignorance in this regard. He is
well aware that the respondent judge already issued an Order dated 23 January 2004 inhibiting
himself from the case and ordering the transmission of the record of said case to the RTC Branch
33. In fact, petitioner has been actively participating in the proceedings of said case before the RTC
Branch 33 prior to the institution of the instant administrative case as he had already filed several
pleadings therewith.
If truth be told, the allegations in the instant petition was ingeniously written to deliberately
and maliciously withhold and suppress the fact that the respondent judge had already inhibited
himself from taking cognizance of Civil Case No. 1518-BG and that the records thereof had in fact
been transmitted to RTC Branch 33.
All told, it cannot be gainsaid that the instant administrative case in itself is frivolous,
calculated merely to harass, annoy, and cast groundless suspicions on the integrity and reputation of
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both the respondents. The only piece of evidence that the petitioner has offered in support of his
claim is his bare assertions, which certainly deserves scant consideration. It must be emphasized
that a mere charge or allegation of wrongdoing does not suffice. Accusation is not synonymous with
guilt. There must always be sufficient evidence to support the charge. This brings to the fore the
application of the age-old but familiar rule that he who alleges must prove his allegations.
Counter-Petition Against the Petitioner
Adopting the above-findings made in the petition against the respondents, there is merit in
the separate counter-petitions filed by the latter to hold the petitioner administratively liable for
filing an unfounded and frivolous suit.
As already stated, petitioners allegations in support of his complaint against the
respondents are baseless, as they are mere allegations founded on pure speculation and
conjecture. Sans evidence, his petition was purposely written to mislead the Court and cast a doubt
on the integrity and dignity of the respondents. Petitioner made the said administrative case as a
vehicle to unduly harass or otherwise prejudice the respondents. Worse, in selfishly satisfying his
own desire to vex the respondents, he had tarnished the integrity of the entire judiciary and the bar.
For this reason, the petitioner should be cited in contempt, as what the Supreme Court had
pronounced in the recent case of Galman Cruz vs. Alio-Hormachuelos. Said the Court:
Verily, this Court is once again called upon to reiterate that, although the
Court will never tolerate or condone any act, conduct or omission that would violate
the norm of public accountability or diminish the peoples faith in the judiciary,
neither will it hesitate to shield those under its employ from unfounded suits that
only serve to disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration of justice.
The eloquent words of the late Justice Conrado V. Sanchez in Rheem ofthe Philippines vs. Ferrer are enlightening:
By now, a lawyers duties to the Court have become commonplace. Really,
there could hardly be any valid excuse for lapses in the observance thereof. Section
20(b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, in categorical terms, spells out one such duty:
To observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial
officers. As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that it is the
duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the Court a respectful attitude, not for thesake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its
supreme importance. That same canon, as corollary, makes it peculiarly incumbent
upon lawyers to support the courts against unjust criticism and clamor. And more,
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the attorneys oath solemnly binds him to a conduct that should be with all good
fidelityto the courts. Worth remembering is that the duty of an attorney to the
courts can only be maintained by rendering no service involving any