Ethics VIII:Morality & Advantage

Ethics VIII:Morality & Advantage

David Gauthier: “Morality and Advantage”• What is the relation between morality and advantage?• Can duty be reduced to interest?

Many argue that morality may require the agent to put aside considerations of his or her own advantage.

• Kurt Baier: “[B]eing moral is following rules designed to overrule self-interest whenever it is in the interest of everyone alike that everyone should set aside his interest.” (736) Morality is designed to overrule prudence when it is to

everyone’s advantage that it do so.

• Gauthier contends, if morality is to contribute anything to our advantage over and above prudence, it must offer something to advantage that prudence cannot.

The ThesisThesis Under Consideration: “Morality is a system of principles such that it is advantageous for everyone if everyone accepts and acts on it, yet acting on the system of principles requires that some persons perform disadvantageous acts.” (736)

• That is, each person would do better under this system than if:

i. No system is accepted and acted on; orii. A similar system is accepted and acted on, but which never

requires an agent to perform disadvantageous acts.

• “Disadvantageous acts” refers to acts which would be truly less advantageous than any alternative (in both the long- and short-term).

• Each person must gain more from the disadvantageous acts performed by others than he loses from the disadvantageous acts he performs himself.

The Thesis (cont’d)• Gauthier hopes to show that the thesis could be true, but not

necessarily that it is true (that a system of morality could work this way, but not necessarily that our current system does).

• Example: Suppose a simple system with only one rule: Everyone is always to tell the truth. If the Thesis is correct, then on such a system, each

person will gain more from others’ truth-telling than she will lose from those occasions where it would be to her advantage to lie, but where she refrains from doing so.

On the principle of the Thesis, whether or not one tells the truth will have no effect on whether others tell the truth.

B

ANuclear Arms Example

• Each possesses the latest in weaponry andrecognizes that a full-scale war would bemutually disastrous.

• As such, A and B agree to a pact of mutualdisarmament rather that continue mutualarmament.

• A is considering whether or not to adhere to the pact. A assumes disarmament will have disadvantageous

consequences. A expects to benefit not from its own disarmament, but

from B’s acts. If A were reasoning simply in terms of its immediate

interests, A might decide to violate the pact.

Nations A and B are engaged in an arms race.

B

A

B

ANuclear Arms Example (cont’d)

• Suppose B is able to determine whether or not A adheres to the pact. If A violates, then B will take this into account when

considering its own actions. It would not be to B’s advantage to disarm alone, as B is in

the same position as A. So, if A violates the pact, B is likely to do the same,

dissolving the pact. Assuming A knows all this, its prudent course of action is to

adhere to the pact. • Suppose B is unable to determine whether or not A adheres to

the pact.

B

ANuclear Arms Example (cont’d)

If A judges adherence in some particular situation to be disadvantageous, it will decide on the basis of prudence and immediate interest to violate the pact.

Since B is unaware, A’s decision to violate will not affect B’s actions.

• Therefore, if A and B are prudent, they will adhere to the pact when their actions would be detectable, and violate the pact whenever their actions would be known. “[T]hey will adhere openly and violate secretly.” (738)

• The disarmament pact suits two aspects of the Thesis:

1) Accepting the pact and acting on it is more advantageous for each, than having no pact at all.

2) It requires each to perform disadvantageous acts—acts that run counter to considerations of prudence.

B

ANuclear Arms Example (cont’d)

• For the pact to fit the constraints of the Thesis, it must also be the case that the requirement of performing disadvantageous acts be essential to the advantage conferred by the pact. A and B must do better to adhere to the pact than to some

other pact under which each must disarm only when their disarming is detectable.

• We can reasonably assume this to be the case: While A will gain by secretly retaining arms, it will lose by B

also doing so, and the losses may outweigh the gains. While prudence would require violating secretly, each may

well do better if both adhere under conditions of secrecy than if both violate.

• Supposing this to be the case, the disarmament case is formally analogous to a moral system, according to the Thesis.

B

A

2, 2 4, 1

1, 4 3, 3

adheres violates

adheres

violates

A

B

Nuclear Arms Example (cont’d)• Assuming each A and B have two choices—to adhere to, or to

violate the pact, there are four possible outcomes. We can rank these outcomes in order of preference for

each nation. (We can assume mutual violation is equivalent to no pact.)

• Mutual adherence is not the most advantageous for either.• As each ranks mutual adherence above

mutual violation, each gains less from itsown violation than it loses from the other’s.

B

A

2, 2 4, 1

adheres violates

adheres

violates

A

B

Nuclear Arms Example (cont’d)

• Suppose each initially adheres to the pact.• A notices that switching to violation moves its outcome from a 2

to a 1.• But A realizes if it switches, B can also be expected to switch,

moving from 4 to 3.• With both now violating, A’s outcome will

have moved from a 2 to a 3.• So prudence dictates no change.

Case (1): Adherence or violation is publicly known.

1, 4 3, 3

B

A

2, 2 4, 1

adheres violates

adheres

violates

A

B

Nuclear Arms Example (cont’d)

• Although A does not know B’s strategy, it knows that if B adheres, it is preferable that A violate.

Case (2): Adherence or violation is secret.

1, 4 3, 3

Likewise, if B violates, it is preferable that A violate.

• So regardless of what B does, prudence dictates A violate.• B, of course, reasons the same way.• This outcome, however, is mutually

disadvantageous, since mutual adherencewould be preferable to each over mutualviolation.

• So prudence alone will notreap the maximum possibleadvantage.

B

ANuclear Arms Example (cont’d)

• It is to the advantage of each to make it possible for the other to detect his own violations.

• Each must find it prudentially advantageous to ensure their strategies are interdependent, but this will not always be possible.

Return to Morality• According to the Thesis, morality requires some to perform

genuinely disadvantageous acts as a means to greater mutual advantage.

• Those who are merely prudent will not perform the required disadvantageous acts. So violating the principles of morality, they disadvantage

themselves. Each loses more by the violations of others than he gains

by his own violations.

Return to Morality (cont’d)• Since one gains from the sacrifices of others, one cannot secure

the advantages of the moral system by himself.• “If all men are moral, all will do better than if all are prudent. But

any one man will always do better if he is prudent than if he is moral.” (739)

• If all are moral, all will do better than if all are prudent.• But any individual always does better to be prudent rather than

moral, provided his choice does not determine others’ choices.• “The individual who needs a reason for being moral which is not

itself a moral reason cannot have it.” (740)

So, why should I be moral?

Return to Morality (cont’d)• The rationally prudent man is incapable of moral behavior.• The “moral” man (the man who is moral according to the Thesis)

is prudent-but-trustworthy. One who is trustworthy adheres to a commitment he has

made, regardless of advantage. However, the prudent-but-trustworthy (or “moral”) man is

trustworthy only insofar as he sees the commitment as advantageous.

B

AReturn to Morality (cont’d)There are two characteristics commonlyassociated with morality:

1) A willingness to make sacrifices; and 2) A concern with fairness.

• The “moral” man—being trustworthy—isrequired to make certain sacrifices, but theseare limited in scope.

• Assume the government of A has developed a defense rendering A invulnerable to attack by B, which can be installed secretly. A now has to decide whether to take advantage by

installing its defense, violating its pact with B, and establishing its dominance.

3, 2 4, 1

1, 4 2, 3

adheres violates

adheres

violates

A

B

B

A

B

A• A reasons that:

It will do better to violate no matter what B does; and It will in fact do better if both violate than if both continue to

adhere to the pact.

Return to Morality (cont’d)

• A is now in a position to gain from abandoning the pact.• Had this been the case from the beginning, A would never have

had reason to enter the disarmament pact.• A is prudent-but-trustworthy—but is A

going to stick by the pact, now that itno longer considers itadvantageous to do so?

B

A• If A adheres to the pact in this situation, it makes a sacrifice

greater than any advantage it receives from similar sacrifices of others. It must possess a capacity for trustworthiness greater than

that ascribed to the merely prudent-but-trustworthy.

Return to Morality (cont’d)

• The (fully) trustworthy man (or nation) is the one willing to adhere—and judges he ought to adhere—to his prudentially undertaken agreements even if they prove disadvantageous to him. “It is likely that there are advantages available to

trustworthy men which are not available to merely prudent-but-trustworthy men.” (741)

Only (fully) trustworthy men who know each other to be such will be able to rationally enter into such agreements.

B

A• “Our commonplace moral views do, I think support the view that

the moral man must be trustworthy. Hence, we have established one modification required in the thesis, if it is to provide a more adequate set of conditions for a moral system.” (742)

Return to Morality (cont’d)