ethnicity vs nationalism

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Ethnicity versus NationalismAuthor(s): Thomas Hylland EriksenSource: Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 28, No. 3 (Aug., 1991), pp. 263-278Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/424407.

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@ Journal of Peace Research, vol. 28, no. 3, 1991, pp. 263-278

EthnicityversusNationalism*THOMAS HYLLAND ERIKSENDepartmentof Anthropology,Universityof Oslo

The aim of this article is to identify some conditions for peaceful coexistence between the state andpopulations in multi-cultural societies. Initially, the concepts of ideology, nationalism and ethnicity areexamined briefly. It is argued that a successful ideology, such as a nationalist or an ethnic one, mustsimultaneously legitimize a social order, i.e. a power structure, and provide a meaningful frame for thearticulation of important, perceived needs and wishes of its adherents. A few empirical cases are thenconsidered. These examples, ranging from the multi-cultural island-states of Mauritius and Trinidad &Tobago to the Saami (Lappish) minority situation in northern Norway, involve conflicts between nation-states and ethnic groups, and between different ethnic groups within the nation-state. Some conflicts,and the methods employed to resolve them, are compared. The uniqueness of nationalism as a modern,abstract 'binary' ideology of exclusion and inclusion, and its powerful symbolic as well as practicalaspects, are stressed and contrasted with 'segmentary' ethnic ideologies. Finally, the article proposes alist of necessary conditions for the peaceful coexistence of culturally diverse groups within theframework of a modern nation-state. The conclusion is that the main responsibility lies with the stateinsofar as it possesses a monopoly of political power and the legitimate use of force. State policies shouldgenuinely attempt to decentralize power while at the same time recognizing the right of being culturallydistinctive, even in matters relevant for political discourse. State nationalism should not be symbolicallylinked with the collective identity of only one of the populations. The culturally homogenizingtendencies of nationalism must in other words be counteracted through institutional arrangementswhichsecure some form of ethnic autonomy and encourage cultural pluralism. The alternatives are violentsuppression and the enforced assimilation of culturally distinctive groups.

1. Aims and ConceptsVirtually every modern nation-state is to agreater or lesser extent ethnically divided.This frequently implies a potential for vari-ous forms of conflict - from armed conflictsto autonomist movements and politicalsegregation along ethnic lines.'Two central aspects of the contemporaryglobal situation indicate that ethnic conflictsmay be of increasing relative importance.First, the East-West conflict is presently on

the wane. The recent changes in the globalpolitical system call the attention of bothscholars and policy-makers to conflictswhich cannot be understood within theidiom of the Cold War, and further directlystimulate the growth of a wide range of newideological movements in the former East-ern bloc, many of them drawing explicitlyon nationalist and ethnic rhetoric. Secondly,processes of modernization in the ThirdWorld lead to ever more encompassing con-frontations between dominant nationalismsand other ideologies in many countries.Ethnic ideologies are at odds with domi-nant nationalist ideologies, since the lattertend to promote cultural similarity andwide-ranging integration of all the inhabi-tants of the nation-state, regardless of theirethnic membership. It can therefore beinstructive to contrast ethnic ideologies withnationalism in contemporary nation-states.Through examples from ethnically complexnation-states, the variable content andsocial impact of such different ideologies areexplored. The purpose is to identify someconditions under which culturally justified

* Several persons have read and commented on an ear-lier version of the article. Hillya Demirdirek providedstimulating criticism and comments on both substantialand theoretical issues. Iver B. Neumann contributedmany valuable insights and suggestions from the field ofInternational Relations. Georg Henriksen and JoHelle-Valle raised important issues concerning thetreatment of nationalism and ethnicity. Nils Petter Gle-ditsch suggested several improvements in both formand content. Last, but not least, thanks to Harald Eid-heim's suggestions the exposition has been consider-ably clarified - particularly in the section dealing withthe Saami. The ongoing research project on ideologiesin Trinidad and Mauritius has been funded by a grantand a subsequent fellowship from the NorwegianResearch Council for the Sciences and the Humanities(NAVF).

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264 ThomasHyllandEriksenconflicts may arise within modern nation-states,2 and to suggest conditions for theirresolution or avoidance. The general per-spective is from within; that is, ideologiesand practices are considered largely fromthe point of view of their adherents. It willbe argued, further, that the multi-ethnicnation-state is no contradiction in terms -that it may indeed be a viable and stablepolitical entity.1.1 IdeologyThe central concept of ideology is treatedthroughout as a double concept. On the onehand, ideology serves to legitimize a parti-cular power structure and in this respectconforms to a conventional Marxist view.On the other hand, ideologies necessarilyderive their popular, potentially mobilizingforce from their ability to organize andmake sense of the immediate experiences oftheir adherents; they cannot, therefore, beregarded simply as forms of false conscious-ness.3 The term ideology can profitably beused in the plural insofar as people evaluateavailable ideologies critically and comparethem through choosing their strategies andpractices. The final outcome of a competi-tive situation involving two or several ideo-logies depends on their respective persua-sive power among their frequentlyambivalent audiences. It follows from thisthat an analysis of particular ideologies, inthis case nationalist and ethnic ones,demands an understanding of the lives ofthe followers of the ideologies in question.An analysis of ideology cannot solelyconsider the properties of the politicalsystem and the ideational content of theideologies themselves, since beliefs andother forms of knowledge contribute to thereproduction of society only to the extentthat they are embedded in interaction.1.2 Nationalism and EthnicityIn its most basic sense, ethnicity refers tothe social reproduction of basic classifica-tory differences between categories ofpeople and to aspects of gain and loss insocial interaction. Ethnicity is fundamen-tally dual, encompassing aspects of bothmeaning and politics. Ethnicity is, however,

a concept which refers to a multitude ofsocio-cultural phenomena. It may appear atour door-step any time and vanish in amatter of seconds: for instance, my relation-ship with foreign students at the universityhas ethnic connotations and can thus beviewed as an ethnic relationship. They entermy office and go away; the duration of suchan ethnic relationship can be less than halfan hour. Similarly, my Pakistani-Norwe-gian grocer enters my life to a very limiteddegree, and the ethnic aspect of our rela-tionship is nearly negligible (although neverentirely absent). On the other hand, theterm ethnicity can also refer to large-scale,long-term political processes such as therelationship between blacks in the UnitedStates and the US nation-state; it can referto intricate trade networks throughout theUnited Kingdom or to the religious senti-ments of individuals; sometimes ethnicitybecomes nationalism historically, some-times it vanishes altogether, and so on. In acertain sense, ethnicity is created by theanalyst through the questions she poses inher research. What makes ethnicity a moreinteresting concept in the contexts con-sidered below than say, class, is its empiri-cally pervasive nature: Ethnicity can, if suf-ficiently powerful, provide individuals withmost of their social statuses, and their entirecultural identity can be couched in an ethnicidiom.In social anthropology and urban socio-logy, ethnicity has been analysed exten-sively at the level of interpersonal action, atthe level of the township, at the level offactioning and riots, etc. In this restrictedcontext, I focus on ethnic phenomena whichinvolve nation-states directly or indirectly,and where ethnicity is manifest throughpolitical organization.4I will treat nationalism and ethnicity asideologies which stress the cultural similar-ity of their adherents. By implication,nationalists and ethnicists will, in a situationof conflict, stress cultural differences vis-a-vis their adversaries.5 The distinction be-tween the two may therefore appear to beone of degree, not one of kind - particularlysince many political movements are com-monly perceived as being both nationalist



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Ethnicity versus Nationalism 265and ethnic in character. What is to be made,then, of say autonomist movements inthe Caucasus, proclaiming Azeri orArmenian nations, insofar as their officialstatus is that of ethnic minority groups? Thedifference, in this case, is in the eye of thebeholder. A self-proclaimed nationalistholds that state boundaries should be identi-cal with cultural boundaries (see Gellner,1983, for an excellent discussion of the con-cept). If such claims are not acknowledgedas legitimate by the political authorities ofthe state in which she resides, they willperceive her, and define her, as an ethnicrevivalist. In other words, the major differ-ence between ethnicity and nationalism lies,as they are delineated here for convenience,in their relationship to the state. Unsuccess-ful nationalisms therefore tend to becometransformed into ethnicities whose membersreside more or less uncomfortably under theaegis of a state which they do not identifywith their own nationality or ethnic cate-gory. This has happened to certain indige-nous peoples of autonomist persuasion, tomany of the 'one hundred and four peoples'of the Soviet Union, and to some extent, tothe white minority of Zimbabwe, whose var-iety of nationalism in the end lost the battlefor political and cultural hegemony. Manyof the ethnics7 condemned to such a fateeventually vanish through migration, exter-mination or cultural assimilation. On theother hand, there are ethnicities and ethnicmovements whose ultimate aim is not - andcan never be - full statehood. Urban min-orities in Europe and North America areobvious examples; such groups are in manyrespects integrated in ways radically differ-ent from groups who claim territorial rights.Finally, we need to distinguish provisionallybetween those indigenous 'Fourth World'peoples favouring autonomy but not fullstatehood, and those ethnic minorities (ornations without a nation-state of their own)whose legitimized leaders or spokespersonswork for total political independence.Ethnic minority situations are frequentlyambiguous in this regard. Greenlandersmake up an ethnic category to the extentthat their destiny is intertwined with that ofmetropolitan Denmark, but they constitute

a potential nation-state to the extent thatthey collectively vie for full political auton-omy. Their identity as Greenlanders cantherefore be regarded as both an ethnic anda national one, depending on the analyticalperspective. This contradiction is naturallymanifest also in the experience of manyGreenlanders. The widespread switchingbetween ethnic and national identities inPoland and other central European coun-tries in the 1920s and 1930s further exempli-fies the contextual character - and empiricalinterrelatedness - of ethnicity and national-ism as popular ideologies (Neumann, 1991).Nationalism entails the ideological justifi-cation of a state, actual or potential. Judgedon this criterion, ethnicity can sometimes beinterpreted as a form of stagnant national-ism which may eventually, or periodically,become manifest as nationalism.The social importance, the 'semanticdensity', of such ideologies varies im-mensely historically, geographically, con-textually and situationally - both at the levelof the individual and at the level of thepolitical system. The mere fact that'nationalism exists in country X' or 'ethnicminority groups live in state Y' does notnecessarily imply that such ideologies playan important part in the lives and/or politi-cal processes encompassed by the system.The relative importance of nationalism andethnicity is an empirical question, and thecases discussed below suggest the circum-stances under which they can assumeimportance.

2. Nationalism vs. EthnicityViewed geopolitically, nationalism is an am-biguous type of ideology. It can be aggress-ive and expansionist - within and outsidestate boundaries; and it can serve as a trulypeace-keeping and culturally integratingforce in a nation-state or a region. National-ism is frequently regarded by liberal theor-ists as a universalist kind of ideology empha-sizing equality and human rights within itspolity, but it can just as plausibly be seen asa kind of particularism denying non-citizensor culturally deviant citizens full humanrights and, in extreme cases, even denying



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266 ThomasHyllandEriksenthem membership in the community ofhumans (see Giddens, 1987, pp. 177ff. fora critical discussion of these aspects ofnationalism). Depending on the social con-text, then, nationalism may have socio-cul-turally integrating as well as disintegratingeffects; it sometimes serves to identify alarge number of people as outsiders, but itmay also define an ever increasing numberof people as insiders and thereby encouragesocial integration on a higher level than thatwhich is current. There is nothing natural orhistorically inevitable in this. For the nationis an invention and a recent one at that;to paraphrase Anderson (1983), it is animagined community; it is not a naturalphenomenon, despite the fact that theobject of every nationalism is to present aparticular image of society as natural.Nationalism is ever emergent and must bedefended and justified ideologically,perhaps particularly in new states, wherealternative modes of social integration,usually on a lower systemic level, remainimmediately relevant to a large number ofpeople. The 'multi-ethnic' or 'plural' state isthe rule rather than the exception (Smith,1981); however, cultural plurality can eva-porate historically, it can lead to the for-mation of new nation-states, it can lead toconflict between ethnics or between stateand ethnic, or it can be reconciled withnationhood and nationalism.2.1 The Emergence of NationalismHistorically, an important part played bynationalist ideologies in many contemporarynation-states has been to integrate an everlarger number of people culturally, politi-cally and economically. The French couldnot be meaningfully described as a 'people'before the French revolution, whichbrought the Ile-de-France (Parisian) lan-guage, notions of liberal political rights,uniform primary education and, not least,the self-consciousness of being French, toremote areas - first to the local bourgeoi-sies, later to the bulk of the population.Similar large-scale processes took place inall European countries during the 19th cen-tury, and the modern state, as well asnationalist ideology, is historically and logi-

cally linked with the spread of literacy(Goody, 1986), the quantification of timeand the growth of industrial capitalism. Themodel of the nation-state as the supremepolitical unit has spread throughout the 20thcentury. Not least due to the increasing im-portance of international relations (trade,warfare, etc.), the nation-state has playedan extremely important part in the makingof the contemporary world. Social inte-gration on a large scale through the im-position of a uniform system of education,the introduction of universal contractualwagework, standardization of language,etc., is accordingly the explicit aim ofnationalists in, for example, contemporaryAfrica. It is, of course, possible to achievethis end through contrasting the nation witha different nation or a minority residing inthe state, which is then depicted as inferioror threatening. This strategy for cohesion isextremely widespread and is not a peculiarcharacteristic of the nation-state as such:similar ideologies and practices are found intribal societies and among urban minoritiesalike. Insofar as enemy projections are dealtwith in the present context, they areregarded as means to achieve internal,national cohesion, since international con-flicts are not considered.Nationalism as a mode of social organiz-ation represents a qualitative leap from ear-lier forms of integration. Within a nationalstate, all men and women are citizens, andthey participate in a system of relationshipswhere they depend upon, and contribute to,the existence of a vast number of individualswhom they will never know personally. Themain social distinction appears as that be-tween insiders and outsiders; between citi-zens and non-citizens. The total systemappears abstract and impenetrable to thecitizen, who must nevertheless trust that itserves his needs. The seeming contradictionbetween the individual's immediateconcerns and the large-scale machinationsof the nation-state is bridged throughnationalist ideology proposing to accordeach individual citizen particular value. Theideology simultaneously depicts the nationmetaphorically as an enormous system ofblood relatives or as a religious community,



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Ethnicity versus Nationalism 267and as a benefactor satisfying immediateneeds (education, jobs, health, security,etc.). Through these kinds of ideologicaltechnique, nationalism can serve to openand close former boundaries of socialsystems. Some become brothers metaphor-ically; others, whose citizenship (and con-sequently, loyalty) is dubitable, becomeoutsiders. In Fig. 1 the peculiar communi-cational features of nationalism and thenation-state are depicted crudely and juxta-posed with the Gemeinschaft-like kinship orlocality-based organizations they seek to re-place and imitate in their symbolism. Themajor difference is that nationalism commu-nicates through impersonal media (writtenlaws, newspapers, mass meetings, etc.),whereas kinship ideology is communicatedin face-to-face interaction. The former pre-supposes the latter as a metaphoric model.

Fig. 1. Communicationf ideology n twoideal-typicalsocial systemsKinship Nation-stateM

A B A B C.... nKey: A and B denote agents. Arrows denote authori-tative actions/statements. M denotes a mediating struc-ture (a mass medium).

Nationalism is ideally based on abstractnorms, not on personal loyalty. Viewed as apopular ideology, nationalism is inextricablyintertwined with the destiny of the nation-state. Where the nation-state is ideologicallysuccessful, its inhabitants become national-ists; that is, their identities and ways of lifegradually grow compatible with thedemands of the nation-state and support its

growth. Where nationalism fails to con-vince, the state may use violence or thethreat of violence to prevent fission (that is,in the modern world, the potential forma-tion of new nation-states on its former terri-tory). The monopoly on the use of legiti-mate violence is, together with its monopolyof taxation, one of the most important char-acteristics of the modern state; however,violence is usually seen as a last resort.More common are ideological strategiesaiming to integrate hitherto distinctive cate-gories of people culturally. Since nationalboundaries change historically, and sincenations can be seen as shifting collectivitiesof people conceiving of their culture andhistory as shared, this is an ongoing process.Ethnic groups can vanish through annihila-tion or, more commonly, through assimila-tion. They may also continue to exist, andmay pose a threat to the dominant national-ism in two main ways, either as agents ofsubversion (they do, after all, representalternative cultural idioms and values - thiswas how the Jews of Nazi Germany weredepicted) or as agents of fission (which isevidently the case with Baltic nationalists).Nationalist strategies are truly successfulonly when the state simultaneouslyincreases its sphere of influence and re-sponds credibly to popular demands. It istautologically true that if the nation-stateand its agencies can satisfy perceived needsin ways acknowledged by the citizens, thenits inhabitants become nationalists. Themain threats to national integration aretherefore alternative social relationshipswhich can also satisfy perceived needs.There are potential conflicts between thenation-state and non-state modes of organ-ization which may follow normative prin-ciples incompatible with those representedby the state. This kind of conflict is evidentin every country in the world, and it can bestudied as ideological conflict providedideology is not seen as a system of ideas butas sets of ideological practices. Typicalexamples are African countries, where 'tri-balism' or organization along ethnic lines isperceived as a threat (by the nation-state),or as an alternative (by the citizens), to theuniversalist rhetoric and practices of nation-



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268 ThomasHyllandEriksenalism. From the citizen's point of view,nationalism may or may not be a viablealternative to kinship or ethnic ideology (orthere may be two nationalisms to choosebetween, e.g. a Soviet and a Lithuanianone) - and she will choose the option bestsuited to satisfy her needs, be they of ametaphysical, economic or political nature.The success or failure of attempts atnational integration must therefore be stu-died not only at the level of political strat-egies or systemic imperatives; it mustequally be understood at the level of theeveryday life-world. In a word, the ideologi-cal struggles and the intra-state conflicts, aswell as the context-specific options for 'thegood life', shape and are simultaneouslyrooted in the immediate experiences of itscitizens - and the analysis must begin there.2.2 Binary and Segmentary IdeologiesNationalism, as the ideology of the modernnation-state, ostensibly represents universa-list norms domestically, as opposed to parti-cularist norms. A common type of conflictentailed by this opposition occurs in thelabour markets of many countries. Accord-ing to kinship-based and ethnic ideologies ofthe kind prevalent in many African coun-tries, employment should normally beprovided by members of the extendedlineage (or the ethnic). According tonationalist ideology, employment should beallocated democratically and bureaucrati-cally, according to formal qualifications,regardless of the personal relationship be-tween employer and applicant. These con-tradicting norms pervade labour markets inmany parts of the world. The examplefurther indicates that an individual whoperceives the differences will adhere to theideology whose implications are morebeneficial to himself (Eriksen, 1988; Helle-Valle, 1989). The general point to be madehere is that whenever nationalism is ideolo-gically opposed to ethnic and kinship ideol-ogy it will strive to present itself as just andfair according to abstract principles.Whether or not it succeeds in this respectdepends on its ability to persuade peoplethat it is beneficial to themselves (in somerespect or other) that they subscribe to

impartial justice of the kind represented bythe state.Contradictions between abstract norms ofjustice and concrete norms of loyalty occurin virtually every realm of social life inmodern nation-states. In most states, vari-ations on this theme form a central part ofthe discourse on ideology; the questionconcerns which type of social identity is rele-vant and ultimately, how the social world isconstituted (Larsen, 1987). A relevantquestion while considering different formsof incorporation and integration in somemodern states is therefore this: Under whichcircumstances are social identities, specifi-cally ethnic identities, made relevant in con-flicts in modern states, how do such conflictsarise, and how can they be resolved?The general answer to these questions aswill be evident from the examples and sub-sequent discussion, is that such conflictsevolve when agents act according to particu-laristic systems of segmentary oppositions,which either contribute to inequality or arejustified by perceptions of inequality, andwhere invocations of cultural differencescan serve to account for such strategies. Letme elaborate briefly. Segmentary oppo-sitions in social integration function accord-ing to the general scheme first developed inEvans-Pritchard's analysis of mechanismsfor the articulation and solution of conflictsamong the Nuer of the Sudan (Evans-Prit-chard, 1940, particularlych. 4). The generalformula is: 'It's I against my brother, mybrother and I against our cousins; my cou-sins, my brother and myself against ourmore distant relatives, etc.' In a modernmulti-ethnic society, segmentary oppo-sitions could be expressed thus by a memberof the X's in country N: 'It's I against myfamily, my extended lineage and myselfagainst the rest of the X's; further, it's all ofus X's against the other people and the stateof N; but it's all of us citizens of N againstthe people of the country M.' The pattern ofcompetition and potential conflicts could beenvisaged as one consisting of concentriccircles; the general model is analogue, fordegrees of difference are made relevant.Unlike the digital model advocated bynationalism, dividing people into only two,



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Ethnicity versus Nationalism 269

mutually exclusive categories (insiders andoutsiders), segmentary ideologies entaildegrees of inside- and outsideness.Through its official policies, the state willnormally favour forms of organizationincompatible with corporate action alongethnic or lineage lines; its way of classifyingis different (digital or binary) and the systemof segmentary opposition suggested is there-fore incompatible with the organization ofmost nation-states. On the other hand, thestate may itself represent a form of 'lineageorganization' if it is controlled by a domi-nant ethnic.One of the examples below describes a

society where the nation-state skilfully me-diates between the two conflicting principlesof social organization.2.3 Compromise and Hegemony: Mauritiusand TrinidadNowhere is the notion of the nation as animagined community more evidently truethan in the colonially created states. Com-monly invoked as examples of this are thenew African nation-states (e.g. Hobsbawm& Ranger, 1983; Smith, 1983), whoseboundaries were randomly drawn a centuryago and whose nationalisms are of veryrecent origin. Even more striking are theculturally constructed nationalisms of socie-ties which were never pre-colonial. Mauri-tius and Trinidad & Tobago are examples ofsuch emergent nations. Both of these island-states, one in the Indian Ocean, one in theCaribbean, are ethnically heterogeneousand have always been; the very societieswere created through the mass import ofslaves and indentured labourers during themodern era, and they have been indepen-dent for less than thirty years. Until the1960s, then, the wider identities of the inha-bitants of these islands were colonial; thepeople knew that they were British subjectsand that, to some extent, they were ruledfrom Britain.Mauritius and Trinidad, demographicallysimilar, have followed different courses increating their respective nationalisms. Letus consider Mauritius first.

Mauritians are as a rule very conscious ofproblems related to ethnic differences.

Their society is made up of groups originat-ing from three continents and four majorreligions; there is no clear majority, and yetthe Mauritian nation-state has hithertoavoided systematic inter-ethnic violence(the one notable exception to this is theseries of minor riots around independencein 1967-68). Yet Mauritians are, regardlessof ethnic membership, determined to retaintheir ethnic distinctiveness. Rituals celebrat-ing particular religions are widely attended,there is little intermarriage between groups,and there is currently an upsurge in popularinterest in cultural origins: Hindi courses areheld for Indo-Mauritians who have neverlearnt their ancestral tongue, Arabic isbeing introduced as the language of themosque, an Organization of Afro-Mauri-tians was set up in the mid-1980s, etc. Simul-taneously, there are strong 'centrifugal'forces at work encouraging a Mauritiannationalism which is identified with uni-formity in cultural practices: the emergentindustrial system of production demandsuniformly qualified, mobile labour, which inturn requires a standardization of edu-cation. National radio, TV and newspapersincreasingly influence the form and topic ofdiscourse about society, and the politicalsystem takes little account of ethnic differ-ences. Although parties tend to be ethni-cally based, their rhetoric is nationalistic,and public political discourse is issue-oriented. The Mauritian state, recognizingthe immanent dangers of the potentialdominance of one ethnic, has taken greatpains to develop a set of national symbolswhich can be endorsed by anybody, andwhich are thus not associated with one parti-cular ethnic.9 Caught between different,sometimes conflicting, ideological orien-tations, Mauritians choose situationally be-tween the universalist ethics of nationalismand the particularist ethics of ethnicity. Inmatters relating to employment and mar-riage, ethnicity is still a major variable, butit is constantly counteracted by discourseproclaiming the superiority of abstract jus-tice and non-particularism. The openness ofMauritian discourse, public and private - inparticular, the fact that ethnic conflicts andcultural differences are acknowledged



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270 Thomas Hylland Erikseneverywhereas facts of social life, coupledwith the absence of a hegemonic ethnic -indicate he kindof inter-ethnic ompromiserealized in Mauritius.Although there areimportant contradictionsbetween ideolo-gies of ethnicityand ideologiesof national-ism at the level of individualaction, thecontradictionsare to a great extent recon-ciled on the nationalpolitical level, wherecompromise, ustice, equalrightsandtoler-ance are emphasized. Ethnically basedsystems of segmentary oppositions areencouraged outside of the educational,political and economic systems, where thevirtues of meritocracy are continuouslystressed. Current conomicgrowthcertainlycontributes to accounting for the stablepolitical situation, but it is by no meanscertain that recession would automaticallylead to the breakdown of the currentlysharedrules for inter-ethnicrelations.Pro-cesses of national integrationstressingthenecessity of inter-ethniccompromisewereevident over a decade before the currenteconomic boom, which began in the mid-1980s. The ethnic equilibriummay be fra-gile, but the political systemhas repeatedlyproven capableof copingwithconflict.Strategies of compromise,characteristicof Mauritian ociety, are - as we are pain-fully aware - by no means the inevitableoutcome of ethnic plurality. In Trinidad,ethnicity akes on a differentmeaning.As inMauritius,ethnicity is importantin manysituations n daily life as well as in politics,but it is not alwaysacknowledgedas such.Strategies of playing down ethnicity as arelevant topic are frequentlyemployed inpublicdiscourse; hiskindof strategy s typi-cal of dominantgroups in many societies.The symboliccontent of Trinidadian ation-alismis a good exampleof this.Trinidadiannationalismmay be said tohave emergedin 1956. For the firsttime, apro-independencenationalistpoliticalparty(PNM; People's National Movement)wonthe general elections. What was the contentof its nationalism? The main slogan wasMassa Day Done; a reasonable translationwould be 'our era as colonial servants isover'. Notions of self-reliance and self-determination were in themselves powerful

official national symbols. To the averageurban Trinidadian, these ideas were ex-tremely attractive, and nationalism was astrongand intoxicating orce in Trinidadianpublic life throughout the 1960s. But towhom? Who were the Trinidadianswhosecommunitywas created maginatively ythePNM leaders? Looking more closely, wefindseveral social schisms mplicit n Trini-dadian nationalism,the most importantofwhich runsbetweenblacksandIndians.Theblacksarethe largergroup(butonlyslightlylargerthan the Indo-Trinidadian)nd haveheld the politicalpower since before inde-pendence. Indianswere politicallyandeco-nomicallymarginal, argelyconfinedto thecanefields. The towns were dominatedbyblacks; the radio played black music, andthe nationalheroes, the calypsonians,werenearly invariablyblack or brown Creoles.The core electorate of the PNM were theurbanblack. So what is to be made of thepart playedby Indians n earlyTrinidadiannationalism? It is a fact thattheywere forgenerations alienated from power andinfluence;only since around1960 have themajorityof Indo-Trinidadiansakenpartinthe nationalprojectof Trinidad& Tobagoto the extent that they have receivedcom-pulsory elementaryschoolingandextensivecareeropportunitiesn the nationalpoliticaland economic system. During the last 20years, and particularlyduring the 1980s,there has been a strong wave of Indianethnic revitalizationn Trinidad.Culturallyself-conscious Indians claim that Trinida-dian nationalismis a black ideology withwhich they cannot identify without losingtheir identity as Indians. A question fre-quentlyraisedcriticallyby blacksas a replyto this accusationhas been whether it ispossible to be simultaneouslyIndian andTrinidadian.Here it shouldbe noted that itwouldbe absurd o ask whether t ispossibleto be simultaneouslyblack andTrinidadian,since blackculture s identifiedwithnationalculture. In otherwords,the issue dealswithresponses to state-monitoredattempts atcultural assimilation. Defining Indian cul-ture as anti-national, blacks confirm theirown as that of the Trinidadian nation. Lesspowerful than the blacks politically and in



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public culture, but still a large category ofpeople now well integrated economicallyand politically, Indians react partly throughdeclaring their status as that of an oppressedminority, partly through allowing them-selves to become assimilated, and partlythrough arguing that their customs andnotions, too, form part of national Trinida-dian culture. The latter line of argumentrecalls the official policies of the Mauritianstate, where the desirability of cultural plur-alism is emphasized (provided it does notconflict with bureaucratic and capitalisticvalues). In Trinidad, the legitimacy ofethnic systems of segmentary oppositions isrejected in official discourse, but there isalso a systematic inequality of power be-tween ethnic groups. Stressing an ideologyof equality in an environment of inequalityis characteristic of dominant groups. ' Theunequal distribution of power thus seems toaccount for the significant variations in thetechniques used for handling ethnic differ-ences in Trinidad and Mauritius.Trinidad and Mauritius were chosen asexamples because they are in many wayssimilar, yet display two very different solu-tions to the problem of multi-culturalismversus nationalism. Both maintain ethnicpeace on the national level; neither has cur-rently an ethnic problem involving system-atic physical violence, whether between in-dividuals or between state and individual.However, the Trinidadian model structur-ally resembles that of less successful multi-cultural societies. The United States is anexample of such a society, where all citizens,regardless of race and religion, have thesame basic rights, but where rules of socialmobility favour some but not all, and wherenationalism is identified with culturalsymbols of the hegemonic group. Thus,blacks and Hispanics are disqualified in away structurally similar to that of Indians inTrinidad. Ideologies of equality in this wayserve to justify inequality whenever they failto account for cultural differences. Ad-ditionally, the US nation contains - orencapsulates - ethnic minorities whose cul-tural distinctiveness is in important waysincompatible with the requirements ofnational society. This is clearly the case with

Amerindian groups, who more obviouslythan blacks and Hispanics suffer culturallyfrom the intrusion of nationalistically justi-fied imperatives. Participation in the capita-list economy, the schooling system, etc.,may contradict important features of theirway of life. In the case of such groups, theproblem is not only one of unequal distri-bution of power; it is perhaps chiefly aproblem of cultural and political autonomy.In this kind of state/ethnic relationship, thepowerless, 'muted' group may demand theright to be culturally different in confron-tation with the state in a context of over-whelming power asymmetry.

We now turn to a description of a conflictof this type, which is nevertheless atypical -and therefore interesting analytically -because this state is in principle willing totake part in dialogue with the minority.2.4 Indigenous Peoples and StatePenetration: The Example of NorthernNorwayThe relationship between the Norwegianstate and the Saami (Lappish) minority inNorthern Norway is complex, and a briefoutline of some aspects of the contemporaryrelationship will have to suffice.Since the start of the postwar wave ofethnic revitalization among the Saami(roughly since the 1950s), the Saami organ-izations' demand for cultural and politicalself-determination has grown in intensity.The ethnic processes taking place in territor-ies settled by Saami are similar to nationalistmovements. There is a current resurgence inpopular interest in the recodification andglorification of their stigmatized cultural tra-dition, and there has consequently been anincreasingly articulated dichotomization ininteraction with Norwegians and main-stream Norwegian culture and society (Eid-heim, 1971). These processes are similar tothose of the burgeoning Norwegiannationalism of the mid-19th century(0sterud, 1984). There is one major differ-ence, however, between indigenous rightsgroups such as the Saami and classicalnationalist movements. The Saami do notpresently demand full sovereignty; they donot intend to set up a Saami nation-state.



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272 Thomas Hylland Eriksen

Orienting themselves towards internationallaw, the Saami nevertheless fight for self-determination in matters considered vital totheir survival as a culture-bearing group. Inthis they have aims comparable to those ofindigenous groups in the Americas, in Aus-tralia and elsewhere. This would have toinclude an institutionalization of the re-lationship between the state and themselvesbuilt on an official recognition of their rightto self-determination as an indigenouspeople and a recognition of the state's dutyto grant these special rights.A profound dilemma for the Saami move-ment, then, is rooted in the rather paradoxi-cal situation that the state against whichthey fight for self-determination must also,in the last instance, be accepted as an ulti-mate guarantor for the very same rights thatit threatens. Norwegian policies vis-a-vis theSaami, insofar as they have acknowledgedthe Saami as a culturally distinctive minor-ity, have until recently focused on questionsof juridical rights defined within the nationalNorwegian idiom. The Saami movementwas not successful until it was able topresent itself effectively as the representa-tive of a Fourth World people and presentits case in the idiom of international law,although an institutionalized division ofpower between the nation-state and thenewly elected Saami parliament (1989) isnow emerging. Unlike the situation inMauritius and Trinidad, where negotiationtakes place in a shared idiom of discourse,the State-Saami context is still one wherethere is not always agreement regarding thevery rules of the game (see Eidheim, 1985,for a full discussion).This dilemma goes to the core of a centralproblem of nationalism: the nationalist ten-dency towards cultural homogenization andthe accompanying tendency to frame everypolitical question in the state's legalistic,bureaucratic form of discourse. This dis-qualifies culturally distinctive groups fromfull participation and simultaneously pro-motes their assimilation. The process takingplace in the northernmost part of Europe isan interesting one from this point of view,since the state is here in principle sympathe-tically inclined to a dialogue with a well-

articulated, culturally distinctive group. Therecent founding of an elected Saami parlia-ment (with limited power) may enableSaami to articulate their political demandsin their own terms. Such an attempt may,however, be unsuccessful for two reasons:First, the structure of the Saami parliamentis modelled on Norwegian political insti-tutions - it resembles a county council -which may result in an internationalizationof the form of Saami politics. Secondly, thenecessary discourse with the Norwegianstate must probably be kept within a Norwe-gian idiom focusing on juridical rights andduties.

The ideological situation of contemporarySaami is a difficult one. Simultaneously aNorwegian citizen and member of themodern world on the one hand, and amember of a cultural minority on the other,the average Saami is faced with a number ofdifficult choices. He is culturally and ideolo-gically opposed to, and yet economicallyand structurally dependent on, the Norwe-gian state. It is relatively easy for Saami toassimilate, to become Norwegian, and manydo. This should not be taken as an indi-cation of Norwegian nationalism among theindigenes - there is little in their history andcontemporary situation encouraging such anideology - it should rather be seen as a tang-ible indication of the division of power andopportunities in a modern state society.Unless a truly ingenious model of autonomywithin the national state is developed, thestructural imperatives for Saami to assimi-late will probably work in favour of assimila-tion in the long run, and the Saami ethnicmay eventually vanish. The dominant Nor-wegian nationalism will in that case emergevictorious; not primarily as a belief system,however, but as a power structure and a setof unified, integrating political, economicand domestic practices. Ethnically basedsystems of segmentary oppositions (Saamivalues/principles against Norwegian values/principles) will in this case be invalidated: ifthey eventually cease to be relevant in allkinds of interaction, then the Saami minor-ity will have been fully assimilated.On the other hand, if the principles ofinternational law concerning the rights of



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indigenous peoples are fully acknowledgedin the practices of the Norwegian state, thenthe Saami may survive as a culture-bearinggroup within the territory of the Norwegianstate, which may thereby avoid otherwiseinevitable accusations of cultural genocide.It should be noted, finally, that the Saamimovement draws much of its legitimacyfrom political entities not constituted by thestate or by a system of states (such as theUN or the Common Market), but from in-ternational Fourth World organizations andinformal networks, and through transna-tional public support. Fourth World politicsthus serves as a countervailing influence -however modest - to the state's monopolyof political power in the contemporaryworld.2.5 National Attitudes to Ethnic MinoritiesEthnic minorities pose a problem to thenational state to the extent that they com-municate their distinctiveness in contextswhere this distinctiveness is incompatiblewith requirements of the nation-state,notably those referring to formal equalityand uniform practices. The minorities, as isevident from the example of the Saami, arefaced with threats of more or less enforcedassimilation. The intensity of such pressuresto assimilate is generally linked to thedegree of modernization and the level ofstate integration in national society. Whereethnic minorities could formerly be ignoredand left alone, they are, in the modernworld, defined from the outside as citizensof the national state, and are thus givenequal rights by an administrative apparatusunable to - or at least unwilling to - grant itssubjects unequal rights on grounds of cul-tural distinctiveness. Indigenes or other eth-nically distinctive populations may, too,serve as negative symbols of the nation, inwhich case the relationship is chiefly one ofconflict or oppression, not one of possiblecompromise. This was clearly the case inNazi Germany, where Germanness wasdefined in contrast to the un-Germanness ofJews, Gypsies and Slavs (and this still holdsto some extent in modern Germany; seeForsythe, 1989). On the other hand, ethnicminority populations can also be used sym-

bolically in an apparently opposite way, asmetaphors of the nation. This seems to bethe case in Australia, where aboriginals'have become so close to the centre ofnationalist thought that they have sufferedfrom it' (Kapferer, 1988, p. 142). In empha-sizing the purity and ancientness of aborigi-nal society, official Australia prevents theirassimilation in a manner not dissimilar frompolicies of apartheid; that is, they are givendifferential treatment due to differences inculture (or race). That Aboriginals are nottreated as equals by the Australian state isevident (Kapferer, 1988), and Australianprejudices against people of non-NorthernEuropean descent indicate that Australianegalitarianism applies only to those per-ceived as the same kind of people (Kapferer,1988, pp. 183ff.).2.6 Autonomy or Assimilation?On the one hand, ethnic minorities maydemand specific rights because of their dis-tinctive culture and way of life. On the otherhand, they may suffer systematic discrimi-nation if they are granted such rights by thestate. South African apartheid is an evenmore obvious example of this than the Aus-tralian policies vis-a-vis Aboriginals. Whenthe 'Bantustans' or 'homelands' werecreated, black South Africans were formallyallowed to refuse to contribute to the whiteeconomic system to which they were, inex-tricably, structurally tied. The teaching ofAfrican languages among blacks has alsobeen encouraged in apartheid policy. Thishas enabled blacks to retain parts of theircultural heritage, and it has equally effi-ciently debarred them from political partici-pation in South African society.'2 Theirsystems of segmentary oppositions havebeen isolated from the wider social contextof which they potentially form a part.It may seem, then, that neither solution isviable. If all citizens are to be treatedequally, then cultural minorities are disqua-lified because their particular skills areignored. But if citizens are treatedunequally on the basis of cultural difference,then cultural minorities suffer discrimi-nation because they lack certain rightsgranted to the rest of the population. It may



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274 Thomas Hylland Eriksen

seem, then, that ethnic minorities are boundto lose any conceivable battle with the state.The dilemma is easier to resolve - at leastin theory - than it may seem. If we considerthe Trinidadian situation again, the crucialfactor in the cultural predicament of Indo-Trinidadians clearly consists in the officialdefinition of nationalism. If Trinidadiannationalism is to be defined as coterminouswith black culture, then Indians have tochoose between evils, as it were; either theyassimilate and become 'Creoles', or theyretain their Indianness at the risk of beingostracized and disqualified. If the definitionof Trinidadianness on the contrary isextended to include Hindus, and if India isofficially recognized as an ancestral Trinida-dian land, then it may be possible to beIndian and Trinidadian without more ado.Similarly, multi-cultural nations such asAustralia, the United States and SouthAfrica could conceivably extend the idiomof nationalism to include non-white people,creating compromises and tolerating differ-ences in a 'Mauritian' fashion.The more fundamental problem is, how-ever, not yet resolved, because nationalism,intimately linked with the state and large-scale organization, entails specific principlesof social organization not necessarily com-patible with those of ethnic minorities. Thesuccess of Mauritian nationalism seems todepend on the containment of such differ-ences to contexts where ethnic segmentaryoppositions do not interfere with the prin-ciples of the state. Cultural minorities,apparently, are thus forced to adapt to someof the demands of the modern state in orderto be able to articulate their interests. Thiswill to a greater or lesser extent entail cul-tural change. If they refuse, they run therisk of witnessing the purchase of theirancestral land for a handful of colouredglass beads. For the key variable in theunderstanding of relationships betweennations and ethnics is power. The power in-variably lies with the state, which officiallyrepresents the nation, which possesses themonopoly of legitimate violence, which con-tains the culturally hegemonic group - andwhich thereby defines the terms of nego-tiation and the form of discourse. Powerless

groups must therefore learn to master thelanguage of the powerful, and in this processthey may have to alter their cultural identitysubstantially. This applies equally to abor-iginal populations and to urban minorities,although emphases may differ; for onething, urban minorities, unlike many indi-genes, usually engage in wagework and inthis conform to a central requirement ofnationalist ideology.

3. TheJustification of Nationalism:Symbols, Power, IntegratingPracticesIn order to function successfully, national-ism must legitimize the power of the state,and it must simultaneously make the lives ofcitizens seem inherently meaningful. Thepartial failure of Norwegian nationalism tomake sense to the Saami in this dual fashionhas led to negotiations where the Norwegiannation-state nevertheless sets the terms byignoring and tacitly disapproving of Saamiidentity and selfhood. Indeed, in all theexamples mentioned except that of Mauri-tius, which is in this respect considered asuccess, conflicts between nation-states andethnics can be understood along this dimen-sion. If the state fails to persuade its citizensthat it represents the realization of (someof) their dreams and aspirations, then itspower may appear illegitimate. The resultmay be revolt, and in such cases the statemay well resort to violence. This is wellknown from many countries, past andpresent. My point has been that there arealso powerful non-violent means availablefor the nation-state to secure its monopolyof political power, even if nationalist ideol-ogy fails. The most important is the state'sexclusive right to define the terms of dis-course, including its right to collect taxes. Inwell-integrated states, these terms of dis-course take on the form of doxa (Bourdieu,1980); that is, they are perceived as unques-tionable. In states including groups whichare not integrated in the state through ashared education, participation in the sameeconomic system, etc., this form of statalpower is perceived as a form of coercion; asenforced 'acculturation', as it were.The ideological power of nationalism is



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Ethnicity versusNationalism 275often (but not always) expressed in theofficial identification of enemies, and as hasbeen noted many times by analysts, warfarecan serve as a nationally integrating force.Any segmentary opposition (or other formsof conflict) within the polity may be post-poned and 'forgotten' when an externalenemy encourages the realization of thehighest, unambiguously binary level of thesystem of oppositions. The Falklands/Malvi-nas war between Britain and Argentina(1982) is a recent example of this familiarmechanism, at least if seen from a Britishpoint of view. Similarly, the identificationand prosecution of internalenemies has beena familiar technique of integration for cen-turies. Contemporary witchhunts includethe Kenyan police-state's 'internal war'against the partly mythical opposition groupMwakenya and, emerging from popular(not state-monitored) nationalism, Frenchnationalists' designation of North Africansas the main threat to Frenchness. In orderto understand the persuasive power ofnationalism on the one hand, and itsoppressive aspects on the other, it must beconceded that nationalism is, ultimately, aparticularist form of ideology: it defines cul-tural and social boundaries on behalf of acommunity, and it excludes those who donot fit in. I have argued that these bound-aries are flexible, but have also indicatedthat they are not indefinitely so. Notably,nationalism - as the ideology which holdsthat the boundaries of the state should becoterminous with the boundaries of the cul-tural community' - requires cultural uni-formity in certain respects. Nationalism rep-resents a simple binary opposition (betweencitizens and non-citizens), whereas otherideologies differentiate between people insegmentary terms.The state, which by the late 20th centurynecessarily represents a successful national-ism (i.e. it is a nation-state), possesses amonopoly of violence and has exclusiverights to extract tribute in the form of taxes.It is therefore in the immediate interest of asuccessful nationalism to promote culturalhomogeneity as regards law and order andeconomic activity. Conflicts between pastor-alists and the new states in Africa typically

exemplify this problem. Pastoralists do notacknowledge the laws pertaining to privateproperty (nor, for that matter, nationalborders), and since their economy is notchiefly a monetary one, they do not contrib-ute financially to the state. Therefore, theyare by definition anti-nationalists insofar asthey reside within the state which, as ideol-ogy has it, should be coterminous with thecultural community. In a very fundamentalsense, then, every human being in the late20th century is encouraged - or forced - totake on an identity as a citizen; as indicated,those who do not tend to lose. The battlebetween nationalist and ethnic ideologies ismost frequently won by the dominantnationalism, which is already represented inthe state. However, as I have suggested,there are possible compromises between theideology of the nation-state and ethnicity -even if the inherently aggressive assimilatingdrive of state nationalism is acknowledged.Let us therefore consider some conditionsfor the resolution - or avoidance - of con-flicts between state nationalism andethnicity.

4. Conditions for Multi-culturalPeaceTwo main types of conflict involve national-ist ideology. Many conflicts arise betweenstates or potential states. All internationalconflict involving states - as well as civilwars such as the one in Sri Lanka, whereone party fights for political secession - arevarieties of this kind of conflict. The ideolo-gies activated are all explicitly nationalist incharacter.

This discussion has focused on the secondtype of conflict. This kind of conflict unfoldswithin a state where neither party favourspolitical secession. Such conflicts caninvolve the state and one or several ethnics;ideologically, they are ambiguous as severalof the combatants may claim to representuniversalism and nationalism on behalf ofall the groups involved in the conflict, not-withstanding that some other group may (ormay not) form the majority and/or be incharge of the state administration. Thiscategory of conflicts is the most complex,empirically and ideologically.



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276 ThomasHyllandEriksenBy way of conclusion, we can now indi-cate some necessary (although not suf-ficient) conditions for the resolution of types

of conflicts involving categories of peoplewhere their stressing mutual cultural differ-ences forms an important part of the ideolo-gical justification of the conflict, and wherethe boundaries of the state are not chal-lenged. In other words, this is an attempt todelineate conditions for peaceful culturalplurality within a modern state.4.1 Necessary Conditionsfor PeacefulMulti-culturalism* Equal access to the educational system,

the labour market and/or other sharedfacilities should be deemed as desirable.This must also entail the right to bedifferent, the right not to participate innational society in certain respects, theright to enact systems of segmentaryoppositions not sanctioned by the state.The judiciary system will normally limitthe extent of the articulation of suchdifferences. Laws are changeable.* National identity should be available toall citizens regardless of their culturaldifferences.* State policies pertaining to multi-cultural-ism should take account of possible cul-turally contingent differences in theirdefinitions of situations.* By implication, the state cannot be iden-tified with a set of symbols exclusivelyrepresenting one or a few componentpopulations.* Political power should be decentralized,and different principles for local politicalorganization should be accepted.Differences between nation-states as

regards modes of integration, politicalsystems and economic circumstances areenormous. Since I have throughout thisarticle treated the nation-state as an analyti-cal concept, I am now compelled to mentionsome of the relevant differences betweenactual, historically situated nation-states.First, the differences in degree of incor-poration within the state are crucial. Forinstance, many African and Melanesiansocieties are hardly at all integrated on anational level; their members hardly partici-

pate in national society. The problems dis-cussed in this article do not apply to themyet (although they are faced with differentproblems).Secondly, the degree of cultural uniform-ity within nation-states varies. Even inMauritius, where the absence of culturaluniformity seems to have been turned into ablessing for nationalism, cultural homoge-neity is very high in important respects;there is consensus as regards the politicalsystem, there is uniform participation in theeducational system as well as the capitalisteconomy. Conflicts between state andethnic are more difficult to resolve whenrepresentatives of the ethnic demand par-ticipation on their own terms, which neednot be those of the nation-state.

Thirdly, it is empirically significantwhether a particular nation-state and itsaccompanying ideology has emerged out offeudalism or out of colonialism (or both atonce, as seems to be the case with some ofthe post-1989 East European nationalisms).The former societies tend to be better inte-grated, socially and culturally, than thelatter.

Fourthly, specific political traditions orhistories influence the nature of inter-ethnicrelations. The history of slavery contributesto shaping the contemporary relationshipbetween blacks and the US nation-state andseems to prevent constructive dialogue. Onthe other hand, the moderate success ofindependent Zimbabwe as regards ethnicrelations shows that there is nothing inevi-table in this kind of historical process.Fifthly, and perhaps most fundamentally,the actual division of political and economicpower (and thereby the division of discur-sive power) constitutes, in an importantsense, the social structure of a society. In aword, groups which are oppressed, poor andstigmatized have little opportunity to articu-late their claims convincingly. The remark-able success of North American Jews inretaining their ethnic identity, governingtheir own destiny and yet being recognizedas good Americans, a striking success com-pared with other immigrant groups, hasbeen possible only because their economicpower has been considerable.



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Ethnicity versus Nationalism 277In sum, if violence or other serious con-flicts between nation-state and ethnicity areto be avoided, then the state must reduce its

demands as regards the degree of culturalintegration of its citizens. Since it is virtuallysecond nature of modern, bureaucraticstates (unlike earlier, pre-nationalist states)to promote cultural integration at any cost,this is extremely difficult to achieve. Itremains an indubitable fact, nevertheless,that the responsibility lies largely with thestate so long as it insists on retaining itsmonopolies of political power and the use oflegitimate violence.

NOTES1. See, e.g., Horowitz (1985) for a comprehensiveoverview of ethnic conflicts.2. Relationships of coercion and integration betweenand within states are not, of course, necessarilyconstituted on the principles of the sovereignty ofthe state. When, in 1968, the USSR invaded Cze-choslovakia and when, a decade later, the Red

Army invaded Afghanistan, the limits of the rele-vant polity were drawn outside of national bound-aries. Conversely, to the extent that the USSRfailed to use violence to suppress autonomists inthe Baltic republics in 1989-90, the relevant limitsof the polity were drawn inside the state. In neithercase was the state unambiguously perceived as therelevant political unit.3. A good, topically relevant demonstration of thisdual character of ideology, is Kapferer's (1988)analysis of the nationalisms of Sri Lanka andAustralia.4. This does not mean that ethnicity can be reducedmeaningfully to politics. I have argued earlier(Eriksen, 1988) that ethnic identity and ethnic or-ganization are both irreducible aspects of thephenomenon.5. Whatever their 'objective content', cultural differ-ences are important as long as they make a differ-ence to the people involved. In a given situation,the communicated cultural differences betweensay, Kikuyu and Kamba in Kenya (who are linguis-tically close) may be more important than thoseobtaining between Kikuyu and Luo (who arelinguistically distant).6. The Zimbabwean example brings out some of theambiguities of the matter: To the whites, who lostthe civil war, Zimbabwean nationalism presenteditself as a relevant option to be endorsed orrejected. Many failed to make up their mind unam-biguously, and tend to oscillate situationally be-tween Zimbabwean nationalist and Rhodesiansupremacist ideologies.7. My use of ethnic as noun is inspired by the Frenchword ethnie, which is semantically wider than the

term 'ethnic group', which connotes tight groupintegration.8. Trinidad & Tobago became independent fromBritain in 1962, Mauritius in 1968. Both aremembers of the Commonwealth. Research inMauritius and Trinidad was carried out, respect-ively, in 1986 and 1989.9. This is dealt with more fully in Eriksen (1988), pp.166-213. The issue of language is discussed in Erik-sen (1990).10. See Ardener (1989, pp. 129-130) on dominant and'muted' groups with particular reference to gender.11. The attempted coup d'etat in Trinidad in July,1990, was not ethnically motivated. Althoughknown as 'Black Muslims', apparently an ethniclabel, the rebels were a tiny group of politicallyfrustrated radicals with little initial popular sup-port. It is possible that the looting and burningtaking place in Port of Spain for a few days duringthe drama did have an ethnic aspect in the targetingof wealthy Syrians, but this was no marked featureof the riots.12. The South African situation further exemplifies theconnection between industrialism and nationalism:Business interests in South Africa favour universalnationalism because it will integrate a largernumber of people into the economic system, whileother whites continue to support the non-national-ist apartheid system.13. The related, but different ideology of federalism isnot considered here. It may provide solutions tosome of the problems discussed. This also appliesto the 'consociational' state model discussed andadvocated by Lijphart(1977). Forms of conflict notconsidered here are those emerging from 'irridentanationalism' (the most famous example of which isprobably that of Alto Adige/Suid-Tirol in North-Eastern Italy), and forms of national integrationnot considered include diaspora nationalisms,where the nation is not strictly localized to aterritory.

REFERENCESAnderson, Benedict, 1983. Imagined Communities.London: Verso.Ardener, Edwin, 1989. 'The Problem Revisited', pp.127-133 in E. Ardener, The Voice of Prophecy andOther Essays. Oxford: Blackwell.Bourdieu, Pierre, 1980. Le sens pratique. Paris: Minuit.Eidheim, Harald, 1971. Aspects of the Lappish Minor-ity Situation. Oslo: Norwegian Unversity Press.Eidheim, Harald, 1985. 'Indigenous Peoples and theState: The Saami Case in Norway', pp. 155-172 inJens Brosted et al., eds, Native Power. Oslo: Norwe-gian University Press.Eriksen, Thomas Hylland, 1988. Communicating Cul-tural Difference and Identity. Ethnicity and National-ism in Mauritius. Department of Anthropology,University of Oslo: Occasional Papers in SocialAnthropology.Eriksen, Thomas Hylland, 1990. 'Linguistic Diversityand the Quest for National Identity: The Case of



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278 ThomasHyllandEriksenMauritius',Ethnicand RacialStudies,vol. 13,no. 1,pp. 1-26.Evans-Pritchard,E. E., 1940. The Nuer. Oxford:Clarendon.

Forsythe, Diana, 1989. 'German Identity and theProblemof History',pp. 137-156in ElizabethTon-kin et al., eds, Historyand Ethnicity,ASA mono-graphsno. 27. London:Routledge.Gellner, Ernest, 1983. Nations and Nationalism.Oxford:Blackwell.Giddens,Anthony,1987. Nation-States ndViolence',pp. 166-182 in A. Giddens, Social Theory andModernSociology.Cambridge: olity.Goody, Jack, 1986. TheLogic of Writing nd the Or-ganizationof Society.Cambridge:CambridgeUni-versityPress.Helle-Valle, Jo, 1989. Banyaruandain Uganda.Unpublishedmag.art. thesis,Department f SocialAnthropology,University f Oslo.Hobsbawm,Eric & TerenceRanger,eds, 1983. TheInventionof Tradition.Cambridge:CambridgeUni-versityPress.

Horowitz,DonaldL., 1985.EthnicGroups n Conflict.Berkeley,CA: University f CaliforniaPress.Kapferer,Bruce, 1988. Legendsof People;Myths ofState. Washington, DC: SmithsonianInstitutionPress.Larsen,Tord, 1987. 'Action, Moralityand CulturalTranslation',Journalof AnthropologicalResearch,vol. 43, no. 1. pp. 1-24.Lijphart,Arend, 1977.Democracyn PluralSocieties.A Comparative xploration.New Haven,CT: YaleUniversityPress.Neumann, Iver B., 1991, in press. 'Poland as aRegional Great Power', in I. B. Neumann, ed.,Regional Great Powers in InternationalRelations.London:Macmillan.Smith,AnthonyD., 1981. The EthnicRevival.Cam-bridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Smith,AnthonyD., 1983.StateandNation n theThirdWorld.Brighton:Wheatsheaf.Osterud,0yvind, 1984.Nasjonenes elvbestemmelses-rett.Sokelyspalenpolitiskdoktrine.Oslo:NorwegianUniversityPress.

THOMAS HYLLAND ERIKSEN, b. 1962, Cand. Polit. (University of Oslo, 1987); ResearchFellow, Department of Anthropology, Oslo; fieldwork in Mauritius and Trinidad. Publicationsinclude Communicating Cultural Difference and Identity: Ethnicity and Nationalism in Mauritius(Occasional Papers in Social Anthropology, 1988) and Hvor mange hvite elefanter?(How Many WhiteElephants?), Oslo: Ad Notam 1989.

ethnicity vs nationalism

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