european security & defence magazine, issue nos 3 & 4,2011

7/16/2019 European Security & Defence Magazine, Issue Nos 3 & 4,2011

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Issue 3-4/ 2011

Content

• Lessons Learned from the NATO Mission in Libyaby Henning Bartels

• Periscope • The German Navy of the Future

by Axel Schimpf • Tasks of the Joint Support Service within the Scope of the Bundeswehr Missions Abroad

by Wolfram Kühn •

"Luftwaffe 2020" as an Instrument of German Security Policyby Aarne Kreuzinger-Janik • Current Challenges to the Medical Service in the ISAF Mission

by D irk Stölten • Armament Projects of the Army

by Dietmar Klos • EUROFIGHTER in the Luftwaffe

by Frank Gräfe •

Future Maritime Operations by Frank Thiede • Unmanned Systems in the Mission Spectrum of the Luftwaffe

by Martin Schulz • Modernization of Surface Units

by Christian Peters • Cooperation of Civilian and Military Logistic Service Providers for Missions of the Bundeswehr from

Operational Point of View by Gerald Funke

• Basics of Missions of the Bundeswehr by Dietmar Klos

• Reorientation of the Corps of Engineers in Afghanistan by Oliver Kobza

• Maritime Surveillance (MARSUR) Networking in the European Union

by Joachim Beckh



2 European Security and Defence 3-4/2011

NATO has extended its Libya mission byanother three months until the end of

the year. At the time of going to press thetroops of the National Transitional Council

(Government) were still fighting against twostrongholds of the toppled leader Moam-mar Gadhafi. In its mission which startedin late March, NATO has the task to protectthe civilian population from attacks by Gad-hafi’s military forces on the basis of the UNmandate of 1973. In addition to securing theno-fly zone and the arms embargo by con-trolling ships, NATO is also bombing (straf-ing) the military of the overthrown regime.According to recent details furnished byNATO, the eight alliance countries involvedhave flown a total of 23,350 sorties since

the beginning of the operation “Unified Pro-tector“. NATO’s Secretary General, AndersFogh Rasmussen, corroborated in Brusselsthat NATO will continue its mission as longas Gadhafi supporters are still threateningcivilians. But many and diverse experiencescan be learned from this NATO mission inLibya already before the final terminationof the operations. From the very beginningit has been a mission with limited support.Only nine out of 28 NATO nations are par-ticipating in the mission for the protection ofthe Libyan population from strongman Gad-hafi. Germany remained on the sidelines.

The international community of states hadgreat difficulty in initiating and conductingan operation against Gadhafi and his troops.

A brief summary of the events indicates theproblem areas: When the attacks againstthe civilian population claimed more andmore victims, a no-fly zone was proposedin order to deter the troops of the Gadhafiregime from conducting air raids against theown population. On 17 March 2011, a mili-tary blow was legitimized by the UN Resolu-tion 1973, though in strict accordance withthe general arms embargo and without anemployment of ground forces.

At the summit meeting in Paris on 19

March 2011 with UN Secretary General BanKi-moon, representatives of the EU and ofseveral NATO countries which was convenedby Nicolas Sarkozy, a military interventionbased on the UN Resolution was discussedand the further course of actions against theLibyan regime was deliberated on. A com-muniqué was resolved on in which the par-ticipants of the summit called on “MoammarGadhafi and those who carry out his ordersto withdraw from all areas into which theyinvaded by force and to return to their bas-es“. Invited representatives of the African Un-ion failed to appear. In the late afternoon,

a spokesman of the French Ministry of De-fence announced that French fighter aircrafthad started the attack against the Libyan mil-itary at 16:45 hours. Germany declared thatit has no intention to participate in the mili-tary mission, but permitted the use of its mil-itary bases for that purpose and held out theprospect of relieving the NATO alliance part-ners in Afghanistan. The day after the pas-sage of Resolution 1973 the spokesman ofthe French Foreign Ministry, Bernard Valero,pronounced in Paris against a participation ofNATO in the potential mission. An interven-

tion by NATO “in the affairs of an Arab coun-try“ as “inappropriate in this conjunction“.France was strictly against a ground-basedmission in Libya and deemed the consent ofthe Arab League to be indispensable in eachdecision.

In his meeting on 18 March, the NATOCouncil was not able to come to an under-standing on the type, scope, and participa-tion. Opposition came from Germany andTurkey. Other NATO countries, too, signaledthat they did not want to participate in theair strikes, because the alliance was alreadyheavily committed in the war in Afghanistan.

The operation began in the afternoon of 19March. The military mission de facto servedto support the rebels and consultations were

also held with their military leaders. Attacksagainst ground targets were flown by GreatBritain and France only, however. On 22March, NATO decided to take over the en-forcement of the arms embargo against Lib-ya in the Mediterranean that was resolved bythe UN Security Council. As Germany haddeclared not to participate in the military im-plementation of the UN mandate and that“the arms embargo also provides for an ex-ecutive component which, if necessary, hasto be carried through by force of arms“, all

German forces were withdrawn from the al-liance operations in the Mediterranean Sea.Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff, announced on 31 March thatthe U.S.A. is going to end its combat mis-sion in Libya as of 3 April. It wanted to playnothing but a supporting role and to fly airstrikes in Libya at the request of the NATOcommand only. On 31 March 2011, NATO as-sumed command and control over the totalmilitary mission to enforce the UN Resolution1973. The armed forces of all states involvedin the mission against Libya were placed un-der NATO command as from that date. A

participation in the operation “Unified Pro-tector“ was left to the discretion of the indi-vidual alliance countries of NATO.

Whatever the outcome of the operation„Unified Protector“ will ultimately be, it iscertain that the mission will have significanteffects on NATO as well as on the UN andEU. To justify the mission, the internation-al community referred, for the first time, tothe “Responsibility to Protect“ which was in-itiated by the UN General Assembly in 2005.This might have a bearing on the internation-al law as well as on the sovereignty of nations

and this probably way beyond the Libya mis-sion. With regard to the EU, the Libya missionhas prompted questions about the strategicgoals and priorities of the EU diplomacy. Theevents put a question mark over the capabili-ties of the EU as a crisis manager and the pos-sibilities of the European Foreign Service asan instrument of the Lisbon Treaty for For-eign Affairs and Security. The European alliesare still struggling to overcome internal fric-tions and scissions. The decreasing financialresources of the defence budgets will alsohave an impact on the operability of the Eu-ropean NATO member countries. The ques-

tion is whether a coordinated and coherentCommon Security and Defence Policy of theEU will be aggravated by that in future? í

Lessons Learned from theNATO Mission in Libya

Henning Bartels

Henning Bartels,Editor-in-Chief



European Security and Defence 3-4/2011 3

Aus aller Welt

in C4I systems, e.g. for target assignmentand subsequent engagement.

The microphones feature an extensivedynamic operating range and reliably reg-ister loud artillery fire as well as less noisymuzzle blasts. The microphone antennasand signal analysis procedure enable pre-

cise location of the shooter, with completecoverage of the surrounding terrain, evenwith the vehicle on the move. Furthermore,the display incorporates a history featurethat enables ready access to recent events.

The basic configuration of the ASLS has apower consumption of less than two wattsand can be mounted in less than 15 min-utes even in small vehicles with very littleeffort. The analysis electronics and batterypack are both integrated into the antennabase, enabling the system to operate with-out being connected to the vehicle’s central

power supply. The analysis results can betransmitted to the control and display de-vice either by wireless link or cable.

Product LifecycleManagement for MKS 180

Fürstenfeldbruck. ESG Elektroniksys-tem- und Logistik-GmbH has received an or-der from the Federal German Office of De-fense Technology and Procurement (BWB)for the definition of a product lifecycle man-agement (PLM) concept for the Multi RoleCombat Ship Class 180 (formerly K131). Thiscontract award supports the objective to op-timise the project management throughout

its entire lifecycle, including analysis, projectdefinition, service introduction and opera-tion. By the end of November 2011, ESG is to

Periscope

SEA FOX with EODTool COBRA

Bremen/London. Atlas Elektronik hasteamed with ECS Special Projects Ltd. toexclusively provide the EOD tool COBRAfor the Atlas SEA FOX system. The COBRA(Clip-On BX-90 Re-loadable Assembly) canbe fitted to the re-usable SEA FOX vehi-cle offering Explosive Ordnance Dispos-al (EOD) capability from surface to 300m.Combined with the Rigid-hull InflatableBoat (RHIB) based SEA FOX VSW versionCOBRA provides a hard-kill disposal capa-bility which can be delivered remotely con-

trolled by MCM expeditionary forces. WithCOBRA Atlas is also able to respond to themarket demand for a cost effective ord-nance disposal capability and offer multi-ple target prosecution/multiple target ini-tiation by remote means which makes theSEA FOX System unique.

Acoustic Shooter LocatingSystem (ASLS)

Düsseldorf. In response to asymmetricthreats imposed by ambushes and sniperfire Rheinmetall has developed the Acous-tic Shooter Locating System (ASLS), a firstbasic version of which is now being offered.The ASLS basic version comprises an acous-tic sensor platform (microphone antenna)with integrated analysis electronics as wellas a control and display device inside the ve-hicle. At the firing of a shot ASLS alerts thecrew acoustically and visually, instantly dis-playing the results of the shooter locationprocess on the control and display device,including azimuth, elevation and distance.

In addition, the shooter’s geo-referencedposition is determined with a GPS system.This provides for the information to be used

During Operation “Open Spirit 2011”, a multinational ordnance disposal exercise in the BalticSea, COBRA and SEA FOX successfully disposedof several items of ordnance

Photo: Atlas Elektronik

The position of a detected sniper can be dis-played on a handheld device

Photo: Rheinmetall

present the PLM concept, which should en-able different processes and data, includingmarine use as specific calculation of fluid dy-namics and simulation of shipboard opera-tions, to integrate and exchange.

New Hands at the Helm forThales Deutschland

Stuttgart. Dr. Markus Hellenthal has re-signed from his position as CEO of ThalesDeutschland. He is succeeded by Peter

Obermark who has directed Thales De-fence & Security Systems GmbH since 2007.In future, Obermark’s assignment will coverboth positions.

EURO HAWK UAVarrives in Germany

Manching. The arrival of the EUROHAWK unmanned aerial vehicle after amore than 20 hour long transition flight

from California to Germany represents amilestone for the introduction of an un-manned reconnaissance system in theHALE (High Altitude Long Endurance) cat-egory for the Bundeswehr. EURO HAWKmarks the successful beginning of un-manned air travel in German air space.

The aircraft will serve as a first demonstra-tor, which is to be equipped with the ISIS re-connaissance component (Integrated SIGINTSystem) from Cassidian and is to undertakefurther test flights under the direction of theBundeswehr’s Military Test Centre for AirVehicles at Manching. With the operation

of the EURO HAWK in the signal intelligencesegment the Federal Office of Defense Tech-nology and Procurement (BWB) as the pro-

Peter Obermark is the new CEO of ThalesDeutschland Photo: ESD archives




and training support based on the assump-tion that the CH-148 CYCLONE helicopterwill become subject to a procurement pro-gramme in Germany. Sikorsky AerospaceServices (SAS) represents the aftermarketbusiness area of Sikorsky Aircraft Corp., themanufacturer of the CH-148 CYCLONE na-

val helicopter, which Sikorsky and Rhein-metall are jointly offering to the GermanNavy. In case that the German Navy takesa procurement decision in favour of the CY-CLONE, both companies intend to involveadditional German companies as membersof the support team.

UAS from EMTwith Impressive Records

Penzberg. End of June the two UAV re-connaissance systems LUNA and ALADINof the German company EMT accomplishedtheir 7,000th resp. 10,000th flight missionin the German Bundeswehr’s theatres ofoperation in Northern Afghanistan. Duringa flight lasting four hours and twelve min-utes then LUNA system successfully com-pleted a recce mission using it’s EO/IR sen-sors. Technically, LUNA has been laid outfor airborne operations up to eight hours.Since the year 2000 the system has madevaluable contributions in support of situa-tion awareness in the Bundeswehr’s thea-

tres of operation. Since then, the sensor fit,evaluation capability, range, flight duration,relais operation and landing system havebeen continuously improved. Apart fromthe Bundeswehr there are meanwhile sev-eral export customers for the UAS, whichcan carry a variety of different payloads andcan be integrated with protected vehicles,thus offering a range of flexible deploy-ment patterns.

tems the periscope significantly expands thefield of vision from inside protected vehi-

cles and tanks. The normal field of view is in-creased by more than the factor 20. Threelenses deliver a panoramic view of 180 by 36degrees with their individual images alignedadjacent to each another. Depending on re-quirements, the entire image can be por-trayed on either a round ocular or a rectan-gular optical disc. The images are transmit-ted with the help of fibre optic rods, a ma-ture technology that SCHOTT has been im-plementing for a wide range of medical andindustrial applications for many years. Thenew periscope has exactly the same dimen-sions as conventional systems and can there-

fore be easily retrofitted to existing vehicles.

Cooperation Agreement forCYCLONE Helicopters

Düsseldorf. Rheinmetall and SikorskyAerospace Services have signed a cooper-ation agreement aimed at common logistic

curement agency, the German Air Force asthe operator and the Joint Support service as

the user will make an important contributionto the total situational awareness during themissions of the Bundeswehr.

The Luftwaffe is preparing to operatethe aircraft in the initial operating capabil-ity mode as part of the Immelmann Recon-naissance Wing 51 at Schleswig/Jagel fromspring 2012 onwards. The operation of theintegrated ISIS sensor fit for the fully auto-matic acquisition and evaluation of signalswill be the responsibility of personnel fromthe German Joint Support Service.

180° Periscope forMilitary Vehicles

Mainz. At this year’s DSEi exhibitionSchott introduced a demonstrator of a 180°

periscope capable of transmitting imageswithout power supply thanks to the use offibre optics. Compared to conventional sys-

Periscope

The EURO HAWK UAV arriving at Manching Photo: Northrop Grumman

Demonstrator of the 180° periscope Photo: Schott

The CH-148 CYCLONE is a twin-engine, multi-role shipboard helicopter, which is currently in produc-tion for the Canadian forces Photo: ESD archives




Two Special TransportVessels laid on Keel

Stralsund. In the presence of the Dep-uty Chief of Staff, German Armed Forces,

and Chief of Staff of the Joint Support Ser-vice, Vice-Admiral Wolfram Kühn, two spe-cial transport vessels (roll-on - roll-off, load-on, load-off) were laid on keel at the P+SWerften yard in Stralsund at the beginningof August. The construction of both ves-sels is based on a bilateral agreement be-tween Germany and Denmark. On 16 No-vember 2010 the construction contract wassigned by the Danish shipping companyDFDS A/S (Det Forende Dampskip-Selskap)and the German P+S shipyards. In additionto their direct use for international freight

shipping logistics these special vessels willalso support the strategic sealift capabilitiesof the Danish and German armed forces.The shipping company has the contractu-al obligation to provide both ships and theircrews to the armed forces of both coun-tries on short notice, if so required. Withthis initiative for the so-called secure indus-trial provision of strategic sealift capabilitiesthe Bundeswehr strengthens the missionalignment of the armed forces while utilis-ing its resources in an innovative and eco-nomic way.

German EUROFIGHTERat Tactical LeadershipProgramme in Spain

Albacete. For a period of four weeks,Albacete Air Base in Spain was the hometo three EUROFIGHTER from the Jagdge-schwader 74, based at Neuburg, Germa-ny. The Luftwaffe’s EUROFIGHTERs wereparticipating in the Tactical Leadership Pro-

gramme (TLP) for the first time. This pro-gramme is known to be one of the mostdemanding NATO exercises for flying com-bat units. Next to the EUROFIGHTER jetswere MiG-29s, F-16s, MIRAGE 2000s, F-4s, HAWKs, ALPHA-Jets, various helicop-ter types, transport planes, special units aswell as one frigate from the Spanish Navyparticipating. In the so called CompositeAir Operation (COMAO), the special rolesof each weapon system were harmonisedin order to gain maximum effectiveness ina complex simulated war scenario. The Ba-varian EUROFIGHTERs exploited their air

dominance capabilities during the exerciseto protect other assets from hostile air at-tacks. The exercise demonstrated that EU-

tion and industry from some 20 countriesThe event will provide a platform for the

presentation of innovative approaches andconcepts in support of effective materi-el management ensuring the required per-formance and quality in a timely mannerand within budget. In addition to specialist

presentations and papers there will be am-ple opportunity for the exchange of ideasand information between and among tech-nical experts, programme managers anddecision makers. The conference’s briefingsand presentations will be complemented bya Life Cycle Costing (LCC) workshop on 25January 2012 in the afternoon.

For more information, interested partiesare invited to contact the organiser by e-mail: [email protected].

ALADIN has been in use in support of sit-uational awareness of the Bundeswehr inthe mission areas since 2003.The systemwas first deployed in the scope of the Kos-ovo mission and has been in use in Afghan-istan since 2005. It has an export record,too. The system is transported on vehiclesand can be launched by hand, thus allow-ing for flexible operation in crisis areas. The

immediate integration of both reconnais-sance systems with the Army’s task groupsprovides for timely availability of surveil-lance results to the tactical commanders incharge of the operations. EMT specialisesin the development, production and globallogistic support of unmanned aerial recon-naissance systems.

8th NATO Life CycleManagement Conference

Bonn/Brussels. After seven successfulLCM conferences in Brussels the next meet-ing on 24 and 25 January 2012 will be heldat the Golden Tulip Brussels Airport Hotel(formerly Pullman) and will again be organ-ised by Mittler Verlag (a company of theTamm Media Group) in cooperation withthe NATO Life Cycle Management Group(LCMG) and the NATO Industrial Adviso-ry Group (NIAG). The conference will becombined with a small, dedicated exhibi-tion, where interested parties are invited toshowcase their respective capabilities.

Like in previous years, the organiser ex-pects some 100 conference delegates rep-resenting defence forces, public administra-

Periscope

With more than 500 UAVs delivered - the picture shows the LUNA reconnaissance system at launch -EMT is considered the leading systems house for tactical UAS Photo: EMT

Dr. Jamie Shea, Deputy Assistant Secretary Gen-eral and Head of NATO’s new Emerging SecurityChallenges Division, will give the dinner speechat the 8th NATO LCM Conference Photo: NATO




Furthermore, the report includes 50 de-tailed and reasoned business opportunitiesfor equipment, sub-systems, sensors and ser-vices providers - ideas that are intended tohelp establish, maintain and increase marketcompetitiveness, as well as leverage existingor potential capabilities into new markets.

Eurocopter and HindustanAeronautics Sign

Cooperation Agreements

Bangalore, India. Eurocopter and India’sHindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) have re-iterated their commitment to take their fivedecade long relationship to the next level. Thelong-time partners are in the process of sign-

ing agreements to further strengthen their in-dustrial cooperation and links. This associa-tion will focus on increasing existing collabora-tion and exploring new potential business are-as to serve both Indian and international mar-kets. Since 1962, Eurocopter has partneredwith HAL, through two cooperation agree-ments, enabling HAL to manufacture morethan 600 helicopters based on the ALOUETTE3 and LAMA, more popularly known in Indiaas the CHEETAH and CHETAK. This fleet hasbeen the backbone of the Indian Armed Forc-es over decades. India was the first nation withwhich Eurocopter signed a license agreement

which included technology transfer. In 1984,HAL was supported by Eurocopter in the de-velopment of the Advanced Light Helicopter,a 5-tonne twin-engine transport helicopter.This industrial partnership was strengthenedin 2005 with the manufacturing of compositeassemblies. Today, HAL is manufacturing 100shipsets of these assemblies per year for theAS550/AS350 helicopters, and contributes toEurocopter’s global supply chain.

With the launch of its India subsidiary – Eu-rocopter India Private Limited - Eurocopterdemonstrated its commitment to the Indian

market and industry, in which one of the keypriorities would be the extension of industrialcooperation, further building on the 50-yearrelationship with HAL.

ised Integrated Mine Countermeasures Sys-tem) consists of a portable combat manage-ment system as well as the CLASSIPHI analy-

sis software for post mission analysis of side-scan sonar data, the unmanned surface ves-sel (USV) FAST, the autonomous underwatervehicle (AUV) SEA OTTER Mk II and the minedisposal system (ROV) SEA FOX. For the dem-onstration the system was deployed from theshore; shipborne operations are also possible.The demonstration took place at the compa-ny’s own test site at Bincleaves, Weymouth onthe south coast of England. Representativesfrom Germany, Great Britain, Canada, theUSA, Belgium, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Thai-land took part. The company is also planningto demonstrate the system on board a ship.

Unmanned MaritimeSystems Forecast

Colorado Springs, USA. The unmannedmaritime systems market is evolving rapidlyunder the combined impact of changing mar-itime threats and changing economic, opera-tional and technological advances. To provideinsight into this growing market, Market In-tel Group LLC (MiG) is launching a new, com-

prehensive market and technology forecast ti-tled: “Unmanned Maritime Systems - Defense& Security UUV & USV – Markets, Technolo-gies & Opportunities Outlook - 2012-2020”(lhttp://marketintelgroup.com/unmanned-maritime-systems-umv-usv-uuv-defense-se-curity-markets/). This 530-page research ef-fort examines, analyses and predicts the evo-lution of USVs and UUVs for defence, securi-ty and anti-piracy missions. The twin-scenar-io report provides a reasoned and actionableanalysis covering these subjects: Current/Fu-ture Markets; Current/Future Technologies;Current/Future Uses; Current Vendors & Plat-

forms; Mine Counter-Measures; Anti-Subma-rine Warfare; Port and Harbor Security; Coun-ter-Terrorism; Counter-Piracy; UUV/AUV/USV.

ROFIGHTER is in a class of its own and the jets were nicknamed “Storm” after a shortwhile, delivering remarkable achievements

by showing how agile and dominant theywere in their role when compared to otherair assets involved in the exercise.

Atlas Elektronikdemonstrates MCM System

Bincleaves, UK. With the C-IMCMS, At-las Elektronik has recently presented a mod-ular and platform-independent mine coun-termeasure system that operates exclusive-ly with unmanned vehicles. For the first time,

the complete functional chain of unmannedmine countermeasures - both for minehunt-ing and for influence sweeping - was demon-strated by means of remote-controlled or au-tonomous systems. The missions of all vehicles

used were planned, monitored and evaluatedfrom a container-based command and weap-on control system. The C-IMCMS (Container-

Periscope

The German EUROFIGHTER team added some Bavarian spice to the exercise Photo: Eurofighter

FAST USV with remotely operated SEA FOX mineneutralisation system Photo: Atlas Elektronik

Over 250 CHEETAH type helicopters have beenbuilt by Hindustan Aeronautics

Photo: heliweb.ca




Maritime thinking and maritime aware-ness are not yet very distinct in our

continentally oriented country. This goes

both for wide sections of the populationand a multiplicity of decision makers of tradeand industry and politics. Before I am goingto elaborate on the German Navy of the Fu-ture I would therefore like to firstly take upthe question of the “raison d’etre“ of ourNavy. Why do we have a Navy and why dowe need one anyway? Preceded, it can bestated: Germany is a creative, an innovative,a vigorous, vibrant and a rich country.

Germany is a globally networked econom-ic power which, in addition, is integrated in-to alliances.

Peace, freedom, and democracy are signif-icant values for us. Without them our coun-try would not have been able to develop andprogress in such a thriving way as it did inthe past six decades - in social, political, soci-etal, cultural, and economic respects.Germa-ny’s economic prosperity creates the wealthand affluence for wide sections of the popu-lation. Economic advance and vitality is basedon imports and exports and on our country’sglobal trade which feeds our economic pow-er.

Germany’s MaritimeDependence

Germany is the third biggest export na-tion in the world. As a highly industrializedcountry which, however, is poor in natural re-sources it depends heavily on imports for thefunctioning of its economy. As for metal ma-terials, Germany is import-dependent to afigure of more than 90 percent and as far asenergy and natural resources are concernedthe figure is in excess of 70 percent. It is pre-cisely this global trade as a whole on which

our economic power is based. Everyone inGermany should thus be actually aware ofthe vital and strategic significance of the sea.

For a car to be built in Germany it is neces-sary to import about 45 different raw mate-rials. This is normally effected by ship. Whenwe transport finished products “Made inGermany“ overseas, this happens then inthe strict sense of the word “over seas“.Maritime transport is one of the most eco-friendly, safest, and cheapest carriers of traf-fic. It speaks for itself that every year about140,000 ships call at ports in Germany; thatabout 380,000 people are employed in the

German maritime economy who generatean annual turnover (revenue) of nearly 50 bil-lion euros. Germany’s commercial fleet with

almost 3,500 vessels (of which about 600 areGerman-flagged) ranks third on a worldwidescale; and Germany comes even first in thefield of container shipping. These are just theemployment and industry figures which de-pend directly on the sea. But the maritimeeconomy is also an essential driving force, ifnot even the catalyst of the German econo-my in toto.

The secure access to important raw mate-rials and food resources, the function of theseas as a climate controller, the security of thetrade routes as well as the safety and securi-ty of the numerous oversea cables (95 per-cent of out daily data streams pass throughoversea cables) are also of vital interest to us.

The 21st century, the century of globali-zation, is more then ever before a maritime-oriented century. Globalization without sealines of communication - quasi as its main ar-teries - would be hard to imagine. Hence, itcan be established: “The oceans are Europe’s

lifeblood. Europe’s coasts and marine areasare of central significance for its welfare andprosperity.“

The first two sentences of the blue bookon an integrated maritime policy for the Euro-pean Union (dating from the year 2008) de-scribe briefly and concisely the importance ofthe world’s oceans for Europe and Germany.

Maritime Threats

Safe and secure sea lines of communica-tion as a decisive prerequisite for the func-

tioning of the global economy and the na-tional economies are not a matter of course,however. The security of worldwide mar-

itime traffic is impaired by international ter-rorism, organized crime, piracy and right upto civil wars and regional military conflictsbetween sovereign nations. In addition, thespectrum of potential threats ranges fromecological and natural disasters via hostage-taking/kidnapping, arms smuggling and pro-liferation up to illegal human and drug traf-ficking. Climatic changes can also have con-

siderable effects on our living environment.To be briefly mentioned here as an exampleis the increasing navigability (trafficability) ofthe waters of the Northeast and NorthwestPassages.

These threats become particularly appar-ent in respect of Germany’s dependence onenergy imports. There are numerous bottle-necks, so-called choke points on the mari-time routes from the producing countries toEurope, from the Strait of Gibraltar up to theSuez Canal, the Bab el Mandeb and the Straitof Hormuz and up to the Strait of Malacca.

These can be blocked (obstructed) with com-parably low efforts. A permanent blockadeof individual straits (narrow passages) wouldhave an immediate, adverse and lasting ef-fect on the global economy. In this context Iwould like to briefly call to mind that 40 per-cent of the worldwide oil transports passthrough the Strait of Hormuz every day (Ru-dolf G. Adam: „Geostrategic Dimensions ofEnergy Security“, Presentation 16th Meet-ing of the Atlantik-Bruecke with CDRUSEU-COM/US Component Commanders, Mag-nus-House, 26 March 2008).

Non-governmental actors use the sea as a

means of traffic and communication, threat-ening the international sea transport at thesame time. Just imagine the scenario when

The German Navy of the FutureAxel Schimpf

Federal Minister of Defence, Thomas de Maizière, paying his first official visit to the Navy on boardthe BRANDENBURG Frigate. Thomas de Maizière in talks with the Chief of Staff, Navy, Vice AdmiralAxel Schimpf Photo: Bundeswehr/Bienert




Both the key task of the Bundeswehr (na-tional defence within the scope of the alli-ance) and the most likely tasks of the Bun-deswehr (international conflict preventionand crisis management) are in strict compli-ance with the comprehension of „Protect“and „Project“. In this way the Navy has start-ed early on already to intellectually and con-ceptually focus on the future. This reorienta-

tion of the Navy will, of course, be comple-mented by additional influencing parame-ters. Let me now dwell on these parametersin more detail.

Reorientation of theBundeswehr - Implications

for the Navy

The results of the closed meeting of theFederal Government on the budget for the2012 fiscal year held on 18 March 2011 have

clearly shown that the financial frameworkwill get narrower in future. In 2012, Sched-ule 14 of the defence budget will amount toapprox. 31.7 billion euros and plummet to30.4 billion euros by 2015. Furthermore, im-portant projects will not be possible to be im-plemented. It is for that reason that cost-sav-ing opportunities are being searched for. Ac-cording to today’s state of affairs, there areno cuts planned in respect to the procure-ments of the combat support ship, of theClass U 212 A submarines and of the ClassF125 frigates, however.

The decision of the German Bundestag

(Lower House) on the amending statute ofthe military law of 24 March 2011 led to thefact that nothing but volunteers serve in thearmed forces today. It remains to be seenhow this will affect our future Navy and towhich extent all the volunteers who startedout will actually stay with us.

The numerical strength of the armed forc-es is to amount up to 185,000 (170 + 5 + X)military personnel in future. This manpoweris composed of 170,000 regulars and tempo-rary-career volunteers, 5,000 new personnelserving voluntarily in the armed forces (PS-

VAF) and, depending on the applicant situa-tion, up to X=7,500 PSVAF. The future num-ber of spaces (billets) in the Navy has not yetbeen finally decided on; it will presumablyrange between 13,000 and 13,800 service-men and servicewomen.

The national level of ambition establishesthe quality and the scope of the capabilitiesto be made available. To that end, the armedforces have to sustainably provide a numbertotaling about 10,000 servicewomen andservicemen. With a share of about 8 percentof the total personnel strength we will haveto simultaneously and sustainably provide

about 1,000 sailors for missions and opera-tions (for comparison: in 2010, we had an av-erage of approx. 860 servicewomen and ser-

tion and crisis management is always imper-ative if an area of deployment is located near

the coast or if it is possibly accessible via thehigh seas only. It can thus be assumed thatthe seas will, in future, be increasingly usedfor joint and combined operations in orderto provide the politicians with expanded mil-itary options to act. In future missions of theBundeswehr a demand for efficient and sus-tainable maritime capabilities is to be expect-ed which will at least be not lower in compar-ison with that of today.

The capability spectrum of German navalforces required for that can most succinctlybe characterized with the catchwords “Pro-tect“ and “Project“ which will continue to be

of prevalence for us in conceptual terms.“Protect“ addresses the significance of the

protection of Germany, of our citizens and ofthe German interests in the world, where-as the term “Project“ means the capabilityfor worldwide presence and participation in

joint and combined, multinational missions.Maritime capabilities can act as a multi-

plier during an operation on shore and theycan perhaps make joint and combined oper-ations on shore possible in the first place (asenabling forces). In general, maritime forcescan - beyond their actual numerical strength

- contribute considerably to an expansion ofthe mission spectrum of the armed forcesand thus to the course of action in total.

The postulate derived from the DefencePolicy Guidelines 2011 (DPG) “to guaranteesecurity for our country means [...] to keepthe effects of crises and conflicts at a dis-tance [...]“ paired with the strategic impor-tance of the open access to the high seas asGermany’s security interest amplifies this as-pect even more.

The Navy is well-placed with this concep-tual orientation. Even after the publicationof the DPG in May 2011, it is possible to per-

sist with this course of the Navy as this is inconformity with the reorientation of the Bun-deswehr.

a terrorist group would announce it hadlaid mines in the approaches to the Kiel Ca-

nal. German citizens must thus not only beprotected in (maritime) areas far away fromhome, but the maritime security is a taskwhich is also relevant right here on our door-step.

As a consequence, there arises the ques-tion for Germany as to which requirementshave to be met and which tasks need to beperformed within the scope of the mari-time capabilities of the Bundeswehr againstthe background of all these dependencies,threats as well as interests and political com-mitments.

Maritime Capabilities -Necessary for the Mission

Spectrum of German ArmedForces

On 18 May 201, the Federal Minister ofDefence said: “Security has priority. It is theprime task of the state!“ The main task of theBundeswehr is and continues to be the na-tional defence in the alliance; it is structure-based. Nevertheless, missions for interna-tional conflict prevention and crisis manage-

ment will be much more likely in future, too,and will thus be structure-determining. Bothhas to be brought into accordance with thereorientation of the Bundeswehr.

With regard to the Navy one has to visual-ize the following aspect: The legal status ofthe high seas allows for the naval forces tomove without hindrance all over the worldand to be deployed to an affected area at anearly stage of a conflict or a crisis already. Thisis where they can give expression to Germa-ny’s political intent. This can be accomplishedflexibly and, if required, without a “foot-print“ on shore and it offers nevertheless the

possibility to effectively engage coastal tar-gets from the sea. A powerful maritime com-ponent within the scope of conflict preven-

A cargo ship off the coast of Somalia being controlled by the boarding team of the HAMBURG FrigatePhoto: FMoD




maritime capabilities in future as well. Hereit is essential to keep an eye on the sustaina-bility and operational flexibility when tacklingthe reduction of our fleet and discussing bas-es/garrisons, respectively. It is explicitly ad-dressed in the DPG that the current missionscan only be an orientation for the future ca-pabilities of the armed forces.

For the maritime capabilities of the Bun-

deswehr this means: The unique characteris-tic of the Navy is its capability to militarily actin all three dimensions of the maritime do-main, meaning on, over, and under the wa-ter surface. At the interface of “sea and land“the naval forces are additionally capable ofmaking an effective contribution from off-shore to support air and ground forces. Forthis purpose it is necessary to have respec-tive capability packages available (modulari-ty) which must meet different criteria such assustainability, survivability as well as future vi-ability.

For Germany’s armed forces the allianceorientation continues to be of high relevance- the fulfillment and performance of ourcommitments takes still top priority. NATO,EU, and UN will use the maritime componentof armed forces in future, too. This being thecase, it can be anticipated that our missionand deployment planning will probably be al-most the same in future as it is today.

In order to be able to fulfill this task portfo-lio in future, too, it is necessary to have a fleetwhich continues to maintain a broad andflexible capability spectrum. Even though thecapability for multinational cooperation with

partners in NATO and EU has been custom-

sion (expeditionary) flotillas will be augment-ed by the transfer of the responsibility for the

bases and ports and parts of the (preparato-ry) mission training. The creation of a new,effective and uniform procurement and uti-lization management will also produce syn-ergies through the pooling of competenciesand unlock potentials and resources. In ad-dition, all armament and procurement pro-cedures will be reviewed within the scope ofthe reorientation of the Bundeswehr.

With the publishing of the DPG the Feder-al Minister of Defence has stipulated the prin-ciple “width over depth“ for the future capa-bility spectrum of the armed forces. In this re-spect the goal has been set by the Minister to

hold ready as large as possible a diversity of

vicemen of the Navy integrated in missions).Here, the increase of the commitments for

the provision of personnel in missions is ac-companied by a simultaneous reduction ofthe number of the platforms of the Navy byabout 40 percent.

The new “prioritized capability profile“is still in the process of preparation, but it isto establish the individual capabilities of thearmed forces by type, quality, and scope. Ac-cording to the standards set by the Chief ofStaff, Bundeswehr, it is essential to basicallymaintain all capabilities. In this respect, thegoal has been predetermined by the Minis-ter which is to keep ready a maximum diver-sity of maritime capabilities in future as well.

The work on the eleven projects for the re-orientation of the Bundeswehr has been go-ing on since 10 June 2011 under the aegis ofthe director designated by the Federal Minis-ter. The coarse structure of the Federal Minis-try of Defence (FMoD) has already been de-cided on; the detailed planning is being ef-fected by the “Organization FMoD“ pro-

ject group. The project “Reorganization ofthe Armed Forces“ is the core project withdiverse interfaces to almost all other projectgroups. The Federal Minister has declared hisintention to make the stationing decisions in

coordination with the Laender (states) in fallof this year. Against this background, all sta-tioning-relevant partial aspects of the individ-ual projects should be available by then.

Navy of the Future

Modern, efficient, effective, powerful,and attractive are the attributes according towhich the further development of our Navy ispresently being tailored to. The current stateof planning of the coarse structure of the Na-vy provides for major parts of the Naval Staff

to be merged with elements of Fleet Com-mand and Naval Office into the “Naval Com-mand“ to be newly established. The two mis-

The Frigate MECKLENBURG Vorpommern in operations Photo: FMoD

As from Saturday, 13 August 2011, Germany provides for the fir st time the commander (COMEUNAV-FOR) for the naval force of the EU-led operation ATALANTA. To that end, the German Rear-Admiral

Thomas Jugel (right) assumes command from the incumbent commander, Commodore Alberto Ma-nuel Silvestre Correia from Portugal. The picture shows the handing over of the flag by CommodoreAlberto Correia to Rear-Admiral Thomas Jugel Photo: Bundeswehr/PIZ Marine Djibouti




ourselves and participate actively within themeaning of jointness and combinedness.These deliberations were fed into the “Con-ceptual Basic Ideas of the Sea Base“ datingback to 2007. A capability gap of the Bun-deswehr was also identified herein. Accord-ing to that, the common procurement of aJoint Support Ship (JSS) is still in the plan-ning. With this it is intended to close exact-

ly this joint capability gap - the “ensured mil-itary maritime deployability“. In addition, the

the successor for the RHOEN and SPESSA-RT POL transporters. The procurement of anew naval helicopter type will, among otherthings, effectively upgrade the whole capa-bility profile of the F124 Class and F125 Classfrigates, with the MK41 Sea King weaponsystem going to be replaced in a first stepand the MK 88A Sea Lynx weapon systemat a later date.

We have been contemplating for quitesome time already as to how we can inject

ary in the Navy for decades, it is neverthelessimportant to improve and extend this coop-eration by a consistent expansion and build-up of modular and interoperable capabil-ity packages. Here it will be essential in fu-ture to use synergies and to project capabil-ities (catchword: “pooling“ and “sharing“)within the scope of an enhanced coopera-tion with partners, especially in the Europe-

an framework.The future of the fleet arises from the back-

ground of the task and the mis-sion of the Bundeswehr and fu-ture security challenges as wellas from Germany’s role in theinternational context. At pre-sent, we have 15 frigates in ourvehicle fleet. Still in limbo is theprocurement project of the 130Class corvette. Two units havebeen commissioned to-date;the full operational capability

is expected to be achieved in2012. The availability of all fivecorvettes has been advised for2013.

The prospective 16 frigatesand corvettes planned for themedium term up until 2016consist of eleven frigates (4xF125, 3x F124, 4x F123) and fivecorvettes. For the long-term as-surance of their future quali-fication the Navy is planningthe procurement of the newship class “Multipurpose Com-

bat Ship (MCS) 180“ (= for-mer working term: K131) bythe beginning of the next dec-ade. With the acquisition of thisweapon system it is intended tomodularly project certain capa-bilities in the future. The neces-sary flexibility for future missionscenarios is to be ensured in thisway.

Apart from the F125 frigatesand the combat support shipof the 2nd batch, another pres-

ently determining armamentproject of the Navy is, amongother things, the procurementof two additional Class 212submarines, so that the fleetwill again have six submarinesat its disposal as of 2013.

The current diversity of class-es of MCM vessels is planned tobe adjusted with the number ofunits to be reduced at the sametime. Two boats have alreadybeen withdrawn from the fleetpool in this year.

Further future projects of theNavy include the procurementof a new naval helicopter and

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trum - broad, flexible, scalable. It extendsover all three dimensions of the maritime do-main and combines thus the maritime capa-bilities of the Bundeswehr.

Today, maritime forces must be modular-ly composed correlative to the required capa-bilities in order to guarantee worldwide mo-bility and high flexibility. Last but not least itis also because of this high mobility and thepossibility of using the operating freedom ofthe high seas that the German Navy is able

to articulate, even without a “footprint“ inthe country of deployment, the political in-tent by simple presence off the coast. TheNavy hence provides the policymakers witha width of military options to act.

All units and weapon systems of the fleet(with the exception of K130) have been em-ployed in operations for years already and aregoing to be consistently geared to joint andcombined and multinational mission in fu-ture as well.

The German Navy shall and will continueto be a credible guarantor of security for the

purpose that Germany can look after its mar-itime and political interests in national and in-ternational combine.

To conclusively take up again the startingpoint of the significance of Germany’s mari-time capabilities for the security policy let mequote Friedrich List, the probably most im-portant German economic theorist of the19th century. He said: “The sea is the play-ground of the power and the entrepreneur-ial spirit for all the peoples of the earth andthe cradle of freedom. [...] Those who do nothave a share in the sea are excluded from thegood things and honors of the world“. í

By Axel Schimpf, Vice Admiral, Chief of Staff Navy

ors, the ships and boats and to simultane-ously limit the seafaring-induced absences.From this surplus of attractiveness we expecta surplus of personnel retention and exten-sion enlistments and last but not least an in-

crease in the interest of young school and vo-cational graduates for the service in the Na-vy. For this approach - and this is new in part- we will have to abandon the strict tying-upof steady crews to ships and boats, however.

Summary

In accordance with the principle “widthover depth“ the German Navy provides to-day and tomorrow a wide capability spec-

JSS is the decisive key for the use of the seaas a base for joint and combined operations.This encompasses an advance stationing andthe demonstration of the political intent, theconduct of operations on land, evacuationoperations, special forces missions, humani-tarian aid as well as the support in disastersituations.

The total number of seagoing units is to

amount to approximately 50, those of theflying units to about 40 helicopters and mari-time patrol aircraft. With that, the operation-al minimum for the employment of maritimecapabilities is being maintained. The fleet ofthe future will be capable of ensuring a re-generation of capabilities and a participationin current and future missions. At the sametime, the foreseeable reduction of about 40percent of our fleet implicates that we, whenseen over the time axis, will in future have toprobably take once in a while an operationalbreak in a mission.

Here it becomes apparent what the per-sonnel of the Navy will have to perform in thefuture.

In the discharge of our operational com-mitments we must ensure in future that theabsences of our sailors will remain manage-able and as plannable as possible and thatthe seafaring-related strains and stresses re-

main limited in scope. It is therefore essentialto shape our Navy in a way that the service inthe Navy will become even more attractive toyoung men and women in the years to come.Solution approaches are given in the intro-duction of multi-crew models (eight crewsare, for example, contrived for the four F125units) as well as in the implementation of aconcept of near-base mission-oriented train-

ing, and the concept of intensive use of shipsand boats. With that we want to improve pri-marily the plannability of the duty for our sail-

The U34 Submarine of the 212A Class in the Firth of Flensburg Photo: Bundeswehr/Schönbrodt

Joint and

Combined

Augmentation of Capability

MilEvacOps

Ensured militarymaritime deployability

Employment of specialforces at/from sea

Humanitarian aidfrom sea

Conduct of landoperationsfrom sea

Joint Support Ship

Joint Support Ship (JSS) Graphic: Navy Staff




Since the end of the Cold War, the em-ployment spectrum of conventional

submarines had to change significantly.

During the bipolar threat situation the em-phasis was put on the fields of anti-surfacewarfare (ASuW), combating of surfacevessels as well as on antisubmarine war-fare (ASW). The primary aim was to denythe enemy the use of a defined maritimearea (sea denial). Later on the emphasiswas shifted on intelligence - surveillance- reconnaissance (ISR) and indication andwarning (IW) as well as on the special op-erations forces support (SOPS). Similar to asea mine, the submarine is a tactical meansof naval warfare which contains enemy

forces and can change the operational ge-ography and which, on the strength of itsemployment, can have a direct influencethe operational or even strategic level ofwarfare.

The requirements and necessary capabil-ities which have arisen for the convention-al submarines from the change of the em-ployment and mission spectrum are de-scribed hereinafter in detail.

At first, an outline is given of the devel-opment and use of conventional subma-rines in the past which is followed by a de-scription of the present employment re-

quirements and - as far as possible - also ofthose of the foreseeable future. Eventually,the necessary future capabilities and result-

prove their successful employment. Withthe consequent development of the snor-kel, the decisive step was taken from the

diving boat to a full-fledged submarine.After the end of the Second World War,

the conventional submarines continued tobe a component of the fleets of all biggernavies. In the bipolar threat situation of theCold War, conventional submarines had aclearly defined task which essentially con-sisted in engaging amphibious assault unitsor high-value targets. Submarines usuallysailed as individual operators. An integra-tion into a naval group/task force was oftennot effected, because of limited commu-nications with a permanently submerged

submarine and the low speed under water.Aside from the capability to conduct AS-uW, the conventional submarines were ca-pable of carrying out covert mine laying.Antisubmarine warfare was normally not

possible, but the boats were capable ofconducting antisubmarine defence opera-tions. The cause for that is the low acqui-sition range of the available passive sensorscompared to other submarines as well asthe relative high speed under water which,however, is available for a short time only,but which is indispensable for proactive an-tisubmarine warfare. Active sonar systems/

acoustic radars were mostly employed re-actively in case of a detection by anothersubmarine. The sensor equipment and the

ant employment possibilities of convention-al submarines are derived from that.

Employment of Submarinesin the Past Century

It was only at the beginning of the 20thcentury that submarines were procured bydifferent navies in appreciable numbers forthe first time. According to today’s stand-ards, these units were simple diving boatswhich operated in above-water travel andwere capable of diving for torpedo attacksor for making escapes. The task of theseboats were the sinking of enemy ships by

means of simple, straight-running torpe-does. From today’s point of view these mis-sions can be designated as ASuW. Espe-cially during the Second World War, a con-siderable effort was expended by the allies

to get the submarine threat in the Atlanticand Pacific under control. It was either at-tempted to avoid sea areas with increasedsubmarine hazards or one had to employ aconsiderable number of units for the pro-tection of the own supply routes. The fur-ther development of radar technology andthe employment of maritime patrol aircraftfor submarine search entailed that techni-

cal solutions were worked out in additionto new tactics and procedures for the self-protection of submarines in order to im-

Class 206 Submarines during the Farewell Ceremony on the Occasion of their Decommissioning Photo: Michael Nitz

Future Maritime OperationsCapability Requirements on Conventional Submarines

Frank Thiede




whether a capabilitygain can be achievedby the installation ofother componentsto the disadvantageof a large torpedoloading.

The task spectrumof the naval forc-

es has clearly broad-ened in the last twodecades. The samegoes for the employ-ment of conventionalsubmarines. The em-ployment in e.g. re-gional crises and con-flicts requires the ap-plication of opera-tionally flexible pa-rameters. A shiftingof the area of oper-

ations from the opensea to offshore/litto-ral waters with the

operational conditions prevailing there, i.e.shallow water depths, increased maritimetraffic up to inshore, more complex soundwave propagation - and with that more dif-ficult detection, but also counter-detection,in the head of water - as well as possibly theoperating under increased air threat in therange of land-based units put certain re-quirements on the capability profile of thesubmarines to be employed there. The maxi-mum size of submarines operating there de-

pends always on the minimum water depthsand maneuverability in shallow waters. Thenuclear-powered submarine comes veryquickly up against operational limits here.

Current mission scenarios see conven-tional submarines predominantly employedin the intelligence - surveillance - reconnais-sance (ISR) role, the gathering of informa-tion by means of acoustic, electromagnet-ic, optical, and optronic sensors, in the in-dication and warning (IW) function, in thespecific employment of a unit for the col-lection of essential information for an op-

eration as well as in special operation forc-es support (SOFS) actions, e.g. as covertlyoperating delivery means. It should be not-ed here that, depending on the tactical situ-ation, a submarine can provide valuable in-formation as a covertly operating unit andthus integral component of an informa-tion pool. In addition, the boat is capableto swap from ISR or IW to ASW or ASuW,depending on the respective situation. Theconventional submarine operates here notso much as an „individual operator“, butacts as and integral element of a task groupor task force.

To be able to effectively engage targetsin these missions, a submarine needs tohave certain capabilities which are defined

day. Although the submarine itself is capableof getting in touch with almost all commu-nications stations above water, this is possi-ble to a limited extent only in the reverse di-rection. Only myriametric (low-frequency)waves penetrate from the electromagneticspectrum into a shallow water depth and al-low to establish contact with a submergedsubmarine. The speed of advance (SOA) ofconventional submerged submarines rang-es mostly between 8 to 10 knots; the speed

in an area of operations ranges between 4to 6 knots. Modern conventional subma-rines are nowadays excellent advanced AS-uW units with upgraded capabilities for anti-submarine defence. They are capable of ac-complishing their tasks in a sustainable way.

Future Requirements

What capabilities must conventional sub-marines thus dispose of to be able to besuccessfully employed in present and fore-

seeable future operations? Conventionaland nuclear-powered submarines have suc-cessfully conducted sea denial both in theCold War and in several regional conflicts.In that process they have contained large-scale forces which had to be employed forASW and for the protection of own unitsand which were thus not available for otheroperations. A submarine must continue tohave the capability to conduct ASuW. Thisapplies to the same extent to the possibili-ty to detect and engage other submarinesin order to be able to defend itself in a con-flict. It is questionable, however, whether a

submarine must dispose for that of most-ly 6 or more torpedo tubes and a respec-tive payload of heavy-weight torpedoes or

armament were developed primarily forASuW. ISR was possible to a limited degreeonly, since the reconnaissance means - nor-mally the periscope and radar warning re-ceiver – allowed for only short ranges andonly simple analyses. Besides, the commu-nication capabilities were confined to radioteletype and radio telephony, so that recon-naissance results were available to the sub-marine itself mainly just tactically and thusnot possible to be passed on in their entire-

ty. A limited transmission of data in near re-al time was only made possible with the in-troduction of the satellite communication(SATCOM).

From a technical standpoint, the conven-tional submarine has been clearly advancedsince the 90s of the past century. The in-troduction of the air independent propul-sion (AIP) is mentioned here as an exam-ple. As far as the basic design is concerned,this weapon system has hardly changed inits history, however. Almost all convention-al submarines dispose of heavy-weight tor-

pedoes, either wire-guided or configured asfire-and-forget weapon to engage surfaceand subsurface targets, as well as of the re-quired passive and active sensor systems forthe necessary target data determination andtarget data analysis and of a modern fire con-trol system. The acoustic signature of mod-ern boats has been significantly reduced;the propulsion during submerged travelingis effected by means of sophisticated elec-tric motors which receive their energy fromadvanced, efficient batteries or from energygenerators that are independent of outsideair, such as fuel cells. Moreover, the boats are

equipped with diesel aggregates and snor-kels. The operation of and communicationwith submarines is rather difficult even to-

Submerged U29 Submarine Photo: PIZM




and ASW with a simultaneous, distinct up-grading of its capabilities as naval warfaremeans in a task group/force, in the compi-lation and establishment of the situation,and in the field of specialized operations.

It is foreseeable that the conventionalsubmarine will have its place in the fleetsin future, too. This becomes also obviousby the increasing worldwide prevalence

of modern units. The primary focus ofthe employment of these submarines haschanged from a weapon platform withrather offensive character to a support-ing platform in a naval group/force withthe capability to act offensively. For fu-ture mission requirements the operation-al planner must employ the conventionalsubmarine in a clearly broader tactical-op-

erational spectrum. Operational plannersas well as the shipbuilding representativesmust determine the technical feasibility forthe above outlined mission requirements.Here, the navies in their capacity as usersand the industries in their capacity as ma-teriel developers are called upon to coop-erate in close dialogue. í

By Frank Thiede , Commander, Center of Excellence, Combined and Shallow Waters, Asst. Branch Chief for Underwater Warfare

The article was first published in Marine-Forum September 2011

in time-optimal and target-oriented ways.This requires the capability to conduct arapid submerged transit as well as the pos-sibility for it to be loaded/transported onboard a CONDOCK ship. The capability ofthe submarine to operate in a task group aswell as its range of employment are directlyrelated to a sustained higher speed.

Furthermore, the command capability

needs to be adapted to the future require-ments. This includes primarily the commu-nication down to the submarine and thespectrum of network linkage. Time delayscaused by the indirect way of commandand control exercised from ashore are un-acceptable. The commander at sea must bein the position to command the submarine(direct support).

The third area comprises the armamentand the type of armament, respectively, aswell as the possibility of installing/carryingalong more flexible equipment. The likeli-hood of an employment of heavy-weighttorpedoes has clearly decreased; ergo itshould be possible to significantly reducethe torpedo armament for the mission sce-narios to be expected which, by the reduc-tion of the technology associated with thetorpedo (e.g. significantly smaller tube set),would allow to create more equipment op-

tions for the respective mission.The conventional submarine maintains

thus its capabilities in the fields of ASuW

more closely in the following. Since the ar-ea of operations limits the maximum sizeof the submarine it is essential to use theavailable space in the boat most effective-ly. The heavy-weight torpedo as the “clas-sic“ primary armament will be required infuture as well, namely to exercise self-de-fence and to be able to successfully enforcesea denials. Experience shows that the ad-

vantage of submarines for an operation de-pends on the capability to be able to trans-mit or receive large amounts of data in nearreal time. A submarine commander needscertain information on the situation to ef-fectively employ his boat within the mean-ing of the mission. The information collect-ed by a submarine can be essential for acommander of an operation, enabling himto make far-reaching decisions with regardto the overall operation. This fact and thesafe operating of a submarine as an inte-gral component of a naval group require

the capability for secure, broadband two-way communications as well as the possibil-ity for a participation in surface and subsur-face networks. The decision on the expo-sure of the boat by use of extractable devic-es like periscope or antennas or by acousticand electromagnetic radiation will alwaysbe made by the commander in dependenceon the tactical situation and the mission, ef-fect prior cover or cover prior effect.

As regards the employment of specialforces, the available space on submarinesemployable in offshore waters is also a crit-ical factor. A certain number of personnel

has to be accommodated in addition to thecrew over a limited period of time, and theymust be employed safely and securely, andchanneled out (disembarked) in sufficientnumbers. In special operation forces (SOF)support, the available sensors and effectorsare attached particular significance. Here itis essential to provide the operating forceswith an exact picture of the situation. Asidefrom the information gathered by acoustic,electromagnetic, optical and optronic sen-sors, the employment of mini drones in thecoastal area can expand the capabilities of

a submarine. The capability of submarine-delivered special forces to provide limitedfire support, possibly by means of mini aer-ial vehicles capable of engaging shore tar-gets, would round off the mission profile.

Summary

The future requirements are essentiallyconfined to three areas. In future, a mod-ern conventional submarine must be capa-ble of conducting its advance to the area ofoperations more rapidly than hitherto and

of shifting its mission effort and position bysome hundred nautical miles within a shortperiod of time in order to be employable

Aerial Photo of U31 Submarine of Class 212A Photo: HDW




The employment of unmanned aircraftsystems (AUS) has sustainably changed

the appearance of military operations. Not

only in the public perception have un-manned systems, be them land, naval oraerial vehicles, become increasingly the fo-cus of interest. The capabilities of the un-manned platforms have also a lasting influ-ence on the way of conducting operations.

The nature of military operations hasthoroughly changed in the past two dec-ades. While at the beginning of the 1990s aconflict at the Persian Gulf was, in the clas-sic understanding, still decided betweentwo standing armies, the military conflictsin connection with the disintegration of

power blocs and nations as well as militarystabilization operations have increasinglygained an asymmetric character.

The area in which the armed forces areoperating in today’s and tomorrow’s mis-sions comprises the entire spectrum of ru-ral regions with less developed infrastruc-ture up to densely populated urbane cent-ers and is increasingly more complex andmore difficult to control. Oftentimes sever-al, differently motivated conflicting parties,ranging from governmental power organsvia militant splinter groups/breakaway fac-tions, terrorist organizations up to organ-

ized crime/racketering, represent a broad,inhomogeneous threat spectrum. The lineto noninvolved civilian population cannotalways be clearly drawn. Attackers oftendisappear and hide in a crowd of civiliansand it frequently happens that civilians aregetting involved in the conflict. The com-plexity is further increased by different na-tional and international governmental andnon-governmental organizations acting inthe environment of military operations.

An important prerequisite for the successof military operations in this environment

is a comprehensive picture of the situationwhich includes all groupings involved andnoninvolved in the conflict and which canparticularly serve as a basis for their differ-entiation. Here, a field of tension will buildup very quickly between the necessity ofgaining the required information throughpresence in the area and the concomitantinherent endangerment of the own forc-es employed. In order to be able to reactflexibly and quickly from the assessed sit-uation to the changes in the situation, ahigh degree of presence either by a perma-nent staying on site or by the possibility for

a quick concentration of forces at so-called“hot spots“ is needed here, too. With theirinherent capabilities the airborne platforms

offer the possibility to ensure outside of anyadversarial threat with high flexibility therequired presence in the fields of reconnais-sance and effect in the entire area of oper-

ations. The enhanced capacities in the fieldof information technology, that is data pro-cessing and data transmission, are essentialprerequisites for providing these capabili-ties also with unmanned platforms. The ca-pabilities of these aerial systems with theirlong loiter time (time on task) is their big-gest advantage over manned aircraft insuch missions.

Capability Spectrumof Unmanned System

Unmanned systems expand the charac-teristics and qualities of manned airborneplatforms such as flexibility, speed, range,and potential for quick concentrations in-cluding a long time on station of the sys-tems in the area of operations. However,in the field of unmanned systems there isno concept either which meets the require-ments of all tasks and mission scenarios tothe same high degree. A modular construc-tion of an UAS basically opens up the possi-bility of the multi-role capability and offersthus more flexibility in the operational em-

ployment. This requires platforms with a re-spective payload volume and sufficient re-serve capacities (power reserves). But there

will be additional systems necessary thatmust provide specialized capabilities in highquality.

Depending on the availability of technol-

ogies and based on operational urgencies,the Luftwaffe pursues a gradual approachby which the identified capability gaps are,wherever possible and useful, to be closedby the introduction of unmanned systemsand by which the competence in the em-ployment of these platforms is to be contin-uously expanded. As to this, there are pres-ently two capability fields in the focus ofconsiderations.

In the field of reconnaissance unmannedsystems contribute considerably to nation-ally independent judgement, decision, and

action capabilities up to the political execu-tive level and military commands. They helpin the preparation of a comprehensive, up-to-date picture of the situation and providethe fundamentals for the target and ef-fect analysis. By the continuous coverage ofthe area of operations with reconnaissancemeans, the armed forces are enabled to re-act quickly and situation-adapted to chang-es in the situation. The reconnaissance re-sults can be provided in nearly the entirespectrum by means of active and passivesensor systems. The second capability field“effect from the air“ can be attained by the

capacity for target illumination (designa-tion) combined with the integration of aneffector right into the unmanned system.

Unmanned Systems in the MissionSpectrum of the Luftwaffe

Martin Schulz

The Requirement Profile of UAS Graphic: Author




or command posts in real time. The avail-ability of HERON 1 has increased the pres-

ence in the area, pulled the net of informa-tion gathering tighter and, last but no least,contributed to the protection of the sol-diers in Afghanistan by up-to-date informa-tion on the situation. It is thus not surpris-ing that the daily operational readiness ofthe system has meanwhile become a deci-sive criterion for the conduct of operations.

Initial, Basic and Target Allowancefor a Bundeswehr System for ImagingReconnaissance into the Depth of the Area of Operations (SAATEG)

Whereas the requirements set for an in-terim solution are met by HERON 1, thecomprehensive capability requirements inrespect to an initial SAATEG allowance canonly be projected with a more efficient sys-tem. The armed forces continue to pursuethe procurement of a more powerful sys-tem which is to replace HERON 1 in Afghan-istan. An anticipated clearly improved qual-ity of the reconnaissance results by morepowerful sensor systems and a growth po-tential inherent in the system will not on-ly enhance the effectiveness in the current

mission, but also qualify the system for thefuture with regard to the requirements ofpotential other mission scenarios till the in-troduction of a new or advanced SAATEGbasic and target allowance. A total of 16MALE systems is planned to be procured inthe next ten years.

EURO HAWK

With the introduction of the High Alti-tude Long Endurance (HALE) UAS EUROHAWK the Luftwaffe will take over the sig-nal intelligence (SIGINT) task from the Na-

vy which has decommissioned its BREGUETATLANTIQUE that has been employed inthe SIGINT role since 1972. The UAS EURO

sibility in the Regional Command North inAfghanistan within the scope of an inter-

im solution.The Medium Altitude Long Endurance(MALE) UAS HERON 1 introduced on thebasis of a leasing contract with the Germangeneral contractor Rheinmetall DefenceElectronics (RDE) has been in service use atMazar-e-Sharif since March 2010 and hasperformed more than 4,000 flying hourssince then. The platforms are equippedwith optical cameras and infrared sensorsand can, if required, carry along a Synthet-ic Aperture Radar (SAR) which allows thetracking of moving ground targets at me-

dium ranges in addition to the generationof high resolution radar images. The perfor-mance spectrum ranges here from the clas-sic aerial photo evaluation by personnel of

the Luftwaffe up to the transmission of thesensor’s Full Motion Video (FMV) to the lo-cal tactical commander and to the superi-

Especially the combination of sensor andeffector and the long loiter time (time ontask) in the area of operations guaranteesa so-called “permanent engagement capa-bility“, i.e. the capability for permanent de-tection, identification, and immediate en-gaging of targets.

In addition, UAS can also be employedas relay stations for the transmission of

information. This allows to increase therange of terrestrial transmission systemsand/or to set up airborne communicationnetworks complementary to satellite com-munication networks in areas lacking ofappropriate ground-based infrastructure.With that it is possible to contribute to theimprovement of the command capabili-ty, for example during quick initial opera-tions.

Unmanned Systemsand Future Projects

System for Imaging Reconnaissance inthe Depth of the Area of Operations

The joint (inter-service) capability require-ments for a Bundeswehr system for imag-ing reconnaissance in the depth of the ar-ea of operations were established in mid-dle of the past decade already. Such a sys-tem as well as imaging radar were to closethe capability gap in the field of far-rang-ing, long enduring imaging reconnaissance

in the visible and infrared spectrum. Whenit became apparent that the time require-ment for the procurement of an initial al-lowance did not satisfy the urgent mission

requirement, it was decided in 2009 to pro-vide the reconnaissance capabilities urgent-ly needed in the German area of respon-

HERON 1 on Mission Photos: Luftwaffe

EURO HAWK in Flight




task of the UCAS. A high degree of auton-omy will be necessary for them to be ableto remain combat-ready and robust even

under the conditions of electronic warfare.Here, respective studies like UCAS 2020+show the way. Against the background ofthe costs to be expected and the technol-ogy fields still to be explored, the develop-ment of these capabilities will probably bepossible only within the scope of a multina-tional cooperation.

Operational Value Proven

The principle of unmanned aircraft is al-most as old as the aeronautics itself. Re-

motely controlled aircraft for target and fir-ing exercises were employed during the FirstWorld War already. Later, they were quicklyadapted for other tasks, e.g. for reconnais-sance and, with less success, as „air torpe-does“ for engaging high value targets. Inthe 1960s and ‘70s, the Vietnam War tookplace in the era of emerging microelectron-ics and unmanned aviation got a new impe-tus. And although the Israeli armed forcesattained considerable operational successeswith unmanned reconnaissance platforms,the UAS did not become the focus of pub-

lic and military attention until the mid 1990s.Unmanned aircraft have proved their oper-ational value in various mission scenarios.With the introduction of the UAS, the Luft-waffe emphasizes the relevance of air pow-er in the 21st century. The tasks of mannedaircraft currently in service use will, whenev-er expedient, be taken over by UAS. Howev-er, from the viewpoint of the Luftwaffe onlya complementary employment of both un-manned and manned platforms will be ableto cope with the expanded task spectrum offuture-qualified armed forces in the foresee-able future, too. í

By LTC (GS) Martin Schulz , Assistant Chief of Branch, Air Staff

development and the procurement of theNATO Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS)system. With AGS the alliance will possess

a complementary capability to AWACS forarea-wide, long-range imaging reconnais-sance of the ground situation by means ofSAR as well as the capability to detect andtrack moving ground targets (Ground Mov-ing Target Indicator - GMTI). The air seg-ment consists of six unmanned aircraft ofthe GLOBAL HAWK type which can be con-trolled by up to 15 ground stations.

With the procurement of four GLOB-AL HAWK which are operated by the Luft-waffe, the Bundeswehr intends to improveits own capabilities in the field of area-wideimaging reconnaissance and surveillance by

the end of the decade and to project withmaximum compatibility a national contri-bution in kind to the NATO Alliance GroundSurveillance System.

Unmanned Combat Aircraft Systems

Whereas the main focus of the cur-rent procurement projects is on systemswith long endurance in the field of recon-naissance, the further development of thearmed forces does not allow to remain in

just one capability field. In scenarios with

an unfavorable air situation and a high riskpotential the robustness and survivabil-ity of the systems considered hitherto arerather low, not least because of their lack-ing agility. Only respectively optimized Un-manned Combat Aircraft Systems (UCAS)which combine their sensors, effectors, andthe necessary self-protection equipmentin an agile platform with an intelligent, ex-tremely integrated and maximally automat-ic flight control qualify for an employmentin high-intensive threat scenarios. Especial-ly the suppression and engagement of ene-my ground-based air defence as well as the

penetration of the enemy air defence forthe purpose of reconnaissance and effectagainst targets on the ground will be a core

HAWK which was developed on the basisof the RQ-4B GLOBAL HAWK offers a con-siderable capability gain not only in respect

to range and endurance in the area of op-erations, but also because of the national-ly newly developed, modern sensors. At al-titudes of 50,000 ft to 60,000 ft it is pos-sible to conduct standoff-capable recon-naissance of the electromagnetic spectrumin areas of operation at a distance of morethan 5,000 km.

The first system, initially designed as FullScale Demonstrator (FSD), is presently un-dergoing flight tests in the U.S.A. withinthe scope of its certification. The ferry flightto Manching/Germany is planned for themiddle of the year from where the neces-

sary test flights will be carried out after in-tegration of the sensor system. The begin-ning of initial flight operations by the Luft-waffe is planned for May 2012. Within thescope of these initial flight operations, theoperational trials and assessment of theFSD are - aside from the projection of afirst capability - given top priority in orderto subsequently define the requirementsfor the production aircraft and to initiate onthe basis of them a procurement of four ad-ditional EURO HAWK systems with planneddelivery as of 2015. With the subsequent

adaptation of the FSD to the series stand-ard, there will then be five production air-craft in the inventory of the Luftwaffe. Theemployment of the sensor systems and theevaluation of the reconnaissance resultswill, just as before in ELINT and SIGINT mis-sions, be accomplished by the Strategic In-telligence Command, whereas the Luft-waffe will be responsible for the operationof the platform.

NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance(AGS)

In the field of area-wide imaging recon-naissance and surveillance, Germany partic-ipates together with 13 other nations in the

Parking HERON 1




The backbone of most of the Western na-vies is made up of corvettes, frigates, and

destroyers which are extremely complex sys-tem units with a life cycle of at least a quarterof a century. In the course of this long servicelife there are a lot of opportunities to adaptthe units in the fleet’s inventory to changedoperational tasks, current threats, and newtechnologies by more or less comprehen-sive conversion and modification measures.However, each of these measures is alwaysalso subject to a weighing of the economic

efficiency. It is thus necessary to answer eve-ry time the question whether the remainingresidual service life still justifies the requiredeffort or whether it should better be investedin new constructions. In this article the au-thor dabbles in a systematic contemplationof this complex subject.

The modernization of surface units is not anew issue at all. As long as there are naval ves-sels they are not only reconditioned after longseafaring, but oftentimes also simultaneous-ly furnished with new equipment on such oc-casions.

Comprehensive conversions are possible

when the respective naval-engineering pre-requisites are given. Requirements for thatare a robust platform, a design which haswell proven while in service, a sufficient re-sidual service life, and the necessary reservesin respect to space, weight, energy supply, aircondition/ventilation etc. Practical experienc-es have shown that these preconditions oftenexist mainly with larger designs.

Historic examples for extensive conversionsare the American light and heavy world warcruisers of the CL 55 CLEVELAND and CA 68BALTIMORE classes which were upgraded

in the 1950s and 60s to guided missile cruis-ers with ship-to-air missiles of the first gen-eration. Other examples are the 130 worldwar cruisers of the GEARING and SUMNERclasses which were totally modernized in the1960s within the scope of the FRAM I and IIprograms and which subsequently were pos-sible to be kept in service with some naviesup to the 1980s, in exceptional cases even upto the 1990s. Almost radical was the conver-sion carried out by the Royal Navy in the post-war years of more than 30 emergency war-time destroyers to fast antisubmarine frigatesof the types 15 and 16. These units remained

in service in this heavily modified form up tothe 1960s which allowed the ailing Royal Na-vy to bridge the time until the delivery of the

at the limit of the supplyability and availabili-ty. Due to the great discrepancy between thequick change cycles of commercial comput-er technology (approx. four to five years) andthe long in-service times of the ships (longerthan a quarter of a century), a technical andfinancial gap is very quickly developing duringtheir use. This is aggravated by the fact thatthe commercial computer technology is of-ten introduced without simultaneously mak-ing financial provisions for the higher cost in-volved in the use. As a result, the „sweet poi-son“ of commercial computer technology

leads, due to the obsolescence alone, via thetime factor to a surging bow wave of mod-ernization requirements with modern sys-tem ships. As military computer technology ismeanwhile no longer available, the commer-cial approach and thus also the obsolescenceare now „without any alternative“. The naviesmust face up to the heteronomous driver formodernizations just like we all have to acceptthe weather.

Affected Partial Aspects

A schematic representation of the individ-ual aspects which are affected by the meas-ures for a modernization is furnished in a sec-ond step.

Since the attacks against the USS COLE andagainst the World Trade Center, most of theshort-term immediate measures concentrateon the protection from and the fight againstterroristic and asymmetric threats. In this re-gard, comprehensive communication sys-tems, tactical data links, a large number ofcommand control and information systemsas well as especially electro-optical surveil-

lance, reconnaissance, and fire control sys-tems, high-solution radars, and light auto-matic guns are being retrofitted. The quick-

first “real“ frigates. The German Navy, too,has gathered experiences with the modifica-tion of surface units - even though to a limit-ed extent. The conversion of the HAMBURGdestroyer to 101A Class, the modernization ofthe LUETJENS Class to Level Z-103B or the up-grading of RAM-HAS for the 122 Frigate are

just some of the examples.

Modernizations: Why?

The presentation of the causes that lead to

the necessity of a modernization is made asa first step of a systematic contemplation ofthe subject. In direct context with that are theconsequences that might result if the neces-sary measures cannot be carried out. Here,the picture emerging in today’s view is quitedifferent and more complex than it was 20years back.

The overview on Page 56 shows that thenecessity of a modernization is practically al-ways heteronomous and that the scope ofaction is rather small. At the same time, thecauses are predictable to limited extent on-

ly, except for the obsolescence and the ex-ceeding of the age limit. But since the conse-quences are mostly substantial in cases wherea necessary measure will not (or cannot) becarried out, the navies are often in a kind of(expensive) victim role in their use of complexsystem units.

Modern surface combat ships are high-ly complex system units which are markedby a time discrepancy between the large sta-ble (electro-mechanical) naval constructionand the extremely dynamic mission equip-ment (sensors, command and control means,weapons). The latter are mainly driven by the

obsolescence of the commercial comput-er technology which is usually already obso-lete at the time of delivery of the ships and

Modernization of Surface UnitsInvestment Protection or Waste of Budgetary Funds?

Christian Peters

World War Cruiser of the C 55 CLEVELAND Class




ing guidance. Required in this case are the in-tervention in all aspects of the weapon func-tion chain, the subsequent integration of ra-dar systems as well a comprehensive naval-engineering measures. Because of the result-ant expenditure and the risks associated withthat, such comprehensive modernizations areseldom, however.

In contrast to the comprehensive meas-

ures to be taken with the mission systems, themodernizations in the field of naval technol-ogy (propulsion, equipment) are rather un-spectacular. The necessary overhauls and/orreplacement of systems are mostly effectedwithin the scope of scheduled maintenance.Distinct modernization projects in the fieldof naval technology/engineering are interna-tionally uncommon. Exceptions are: the installation of new systems as a reac-

tion to strict environmental constraints; the amplification of air conditioning and

ventilation systems due to expanded are-

as of operations in warmer/colder regions; the exchange/replacement of unreliable

propulsion or energy generating systems.The most expensive maritime engineeringconversions comprise the integration of newshipborne helicopters. The successor typesare generally more efficient and powerful,but for that reason mostly bigger than theirpredecessors (SH-60 SEA HAWK instead SH-2F SEA SPRITE). The embarkation as organ-ic shipborne helicopters including workshopsand mission packages usually requires com-prehensive naval-engineering interventionsin the ships’ aft sections which can also en-

compass the extension of the hangar andflight deck or even of the hull.

Recently noticeable is an effect which re-sults from the comprehensive subsequent in-stallations. The “price“ to be paid for the ad-aptation of the existing units to the changedmission requirements are the resultant addi-tional weights with partly considerable im-pacts on the balance of weight and mo-ments. More and more systems ships are get-ting stability problems. Since the reserves forkeeping the older units in service are mostlyused up already and the intensity of the use

is often permanently above the projected ser-vice profile, there are also consequences forthe strength of the ship’s structure resultingfrom stability problems caused by the timefactor: e.g. cracking even clearly before reach-ing the projected age limit. Maritime engi-neering maintenance measures can no long-er be avoided from this point in time at thelatest.

Management Aspects

In many cases the elimination of acute ob-

solescences is the actual driver for the initia-tion of a modernization project. Depend-ing on the availability of budgetary means, a

sequent integration of unmanned aircraftas autonomously operating reconnaissancemeans. In connection with the „organic an-ti-mine defence“ the modular integration ofunmanned vehicles for autonomous under-water reconnaissance is also becoming in-creasingly important.

The subsequent additional integration of

long-range ship-to-air missiles for combat-ing air targets is part of the technically and fi-nancially expensive modernization in the fieldof mission systems, especially if these mis-siles are fitted with a semi-active radar hom-

response fire fight in close-in areas has be-come a prerequisite essential for the survivalof all surface units. Against this background,the light automatic guns of 30mm to 40mmcalibers are currently experiencing their sec-ond renaissance after the Falkland War – thistime in the form of remote controlled weap-on stations with peculiar sensor systems and

fire control. From the viewpoint of most ofthe Western navies, the classic tasks of air de-fence, antisubmarine warfare, and the fightagainst enemy surface forces have clearly lostin significance. Currently relevant is the sub-

Initial Cause Flexibility Necessary Cause Effects in Case of Non-Implementation

TimePressure

Design

ImmediateMission

Requirements

Immediate Installation 1.) Non-Performance of Current Tasks

2.) Endangerment of Shipand Crew

3.) Loss of Interoperability

High Low

ObsolescenceCommercial Computer

Technology

Replacement/Exchangeof Commercial

Computer Technology

Degeneration of Materi-al Availability of System

Components

Medium Low

Changed Operational Re-quirements and/or Tasks

Adaptation of MissionEquipment

Reduction of OperationalUse/Value

Medium Medium

Changed Parametersfor the Operation

Adaptation/Replacementof the Equipment

1.) Reduction of the Availability

2.) Reduction of theOperational Use/Value3.) Escalation of Costs

during Use

Medium Medium

Exceeding the

Projected Life Cycle

Extension of the Life Cycle High Loss Rates,

Reduced Availability,High Maintenance Costs

Medium Medium

Loss of theIndustrial Basis

Adaptation/Replacementof the Equipment

Material Supplyability canno Longer be Guaranteed

High Medium

Aspect Dynamic Driver Heteronomous

Communication High Interoperability Yes

Tactical Data Links High Interoperability Yes

Command Control andInformation Systems

High/Medium Interoperability Yes

Naval TacticalData Systems

Medium Obsolescence Yes

Ship Automation Medium Obsolescence Yes

Electro-Optical Sensors Medium Operational Tasks No

Missiles (light) Medium Operational Tasks No

Tube Weapons < 40mm Medium Operational Tasks No

Navigation Medium/Low Legal Requirements Yes

Missile (anti-ship) Low Operational Tasks No

Missile (air targets) (very) Low Operational Tasks No

Tactical Radar Systems Low Operational Tasks No

Tube Weapons > 40mm Low Operational Tasks No

Helicopters sLow Helicopter Procurement No




and systems of the new user, is also often-times absolutely necessary. If (financially)possible, the measures required for that aresimultaneously combined with a respective

modernization. An example for that is thetakeover of the British Type 22 and Type 23frigates by Chile. The ordering of a modern-ization is frequently made in close conjunc-tion with or is even a precondition for thehandoff of the units. In both cases, i.e. forthe sale of the two British Type 22 frigatesto Romania and also in the takeover of usedS-frigates by Greece, the local industry ofthe selling navy has received comprehen-sive modernization orders.

Enormous bargains for customers of usedunits come along when fleets have to make

cuts in the number and, for that reason, needto offer units for sale which were actually in-tended for continued operation. A nation-alization might possibly be necessary in thiscase, too, but as the example of the two ex-Netherlands M-frigates for Belgium shows,there are definitely also perspectives for acommon use: Belgium had to perform thenaval-engineering integration of the new NH90 NFH shipboard helicopter purely national-ly whereas the subsequent expansion of thesensor equipment was accomplished con-

jointly with the Netherlands.An analysis of current modernization pro-

grams for units which are to remain in the in-ventory of the fleet shows that here, too, itis necessary to distinguish between two dif-

the coordination with the ongoing missionsof the fleet and with the scheduled mainte-nance has to be handled in addition to that.As a result, the modernization projects al-

ways involve a high risk with regard to timeand financial expenditure.

Continued Use vs. Sale of Units

In conversion/modification projects it mustbe differentiated between a modernizationfor the continued use in the own fleet and amodernization in connection with the hand-off of used units to other navies.

It happens very often that units are of-fered on the pre-owned ship market which,

in the view of the former user, have reachedthe limit of a reasonable service life and/ or for which the investment for a pendingmaintenance/modernization should (can)no longer be made. On the other hand,the customers for units on the pre-ownedship market have an interest in preferablyinexpensive units, and they have normallynot the financial resources to carry out ex-tensive work. It generally applies, howev-er, that the takeover of used units requiresadditional investments which have to beborne by either the seller (often for politi-cal reasons) or by the customer. For a con-

tinued use it is essential to at least carry outa major overhaul. A nationalization, i.e. theadaptation to the established standards

number of additional individual measures isfrequently added though, and the overall pro-gram is structured in incrementally realizablephases. In this way it is then usually possible to

achieve an adaptation to changed operation-al tasks, an optimization in the operation aswell as the preservation of the supplyability.

Modernization projects are generally lessspectacular than new construction programswith ceremonial keel laying, naming andlaunching. From the view of the project man-agement the utilization projects are, depend-ing on the extent, of absolutely compara-ble complexity, however. In relation to finan-cially equivalent new construction projects,the modernization projects always involve aclearly greater risk, however.

During the modernization period the shipsmust normally remain in the use by the fleet,i.e. they cannot be temporarily decommis-sioned for the length of the measure.

The availability of technical documenta-tion, intellectual rights, and experienced spe-cialist staff is often critical for many old sys-tems.

Individual and divergent system configura-tion of the individual units of a class: each unitis de facto an individual after a few years al-ready.

In a new construction project the projectmanagement has the task to keep the indus-

trial services and capacities in balance withthe budget and the calendar on the basis ofa concluded contract. In a conversion project

SH-60 SEA HAWK instead SH-2F SEA SPRITE



bridge financial straits. This situation fre-quently results in major technical-financialprojects in the amount of several billion eu-ros:

Canada: Frigate Life Extension (FELEX)HALIFAX Class Modernization (HCM).Comprehensive maintenance and modern-ization of the HALIFAX Class. Complete re-placement and modernization of the to-

tal mission equipment. Since the new con-struction program for replacement con-structions is obviously not advancing, thisprograms is to be rated as the preservationof the Canadian fleet.

U.S. Navy: Cruiser conversion plan for themodernization of the 22 remaining CG-47USS TICONDEROGA with new capabilities,an up-to-date AEGIS variant, and modern-ized sensors. After the discontinuation ofthe CG(X) new construction program thereare apparently no replacement construc-tions to substitute this ship class. A limiting

effect is, however, that the hull of the for-mer, already marginally loaded SPRUANCEClass requires comprehensive naval-engi-neering measures to even reach the pro-

jected life cycle of 35 years.U.S. Navy: Conversion of the former FFG-

7 USS O.H.PERRY escort frigates to patrolboats as an interim measure until the de-livery of the Littoral Combat Ships. In thiscontext, the ships have lost their main ar-mament.

Turkey: Installation of a self-developedCombat Direction Center (CDS) on usedPERRY-Class frigates taken over from theU.S. Navy to reduce dependencies andcosts during the period of their use. A par-tial regeneration of the missile armament isalso effected in this connection.

In most cases, however, the modernizationof existing units is to create time for a de-cision on new construction projects or to

ferent cases. In the first case it is intended toeliminate the obsolescence, the maximize thevalue for the fleet, and to optimize the use byinvesting in existing units. Examples for theseprojects of manageable complexity are:Germany: Complete replacement of the

F123 Frigate’s Combat Direction Cent-er (CDS) within the scope of the „capabil-ity adaptation“ project combined with thefunctional integration of new subsystems.

Ship Class Service Life U.S. Navy Service Life-Total

CGN-38 VIRGINIA 15 - 20 years -

CGN-36 CALIFORNIA 25 years -

CGN-35 TRUXTON 28 years -

CG-26 BELKNAP 25 - 30 years -

CGN-25 BAINBRIDGE 34 years -

CG-16 LEAHY 30 - 32 years -DDG-2 CHARLES F. ADAMS 25 - 30 years approx. 40 years

DDG-37 FARRAGUT 30 years -

DDG-993 KIDD 37 years -

DD-963 SPRUANCE 18 - 30 years -

FFG-1 BROOKE 20 - 22 years approx. 27 years

FF-1052 KNOX 18 - 22 years > 40 years

FF-1040 GARCIA 20 - 25 years approx. 40 years

FF-1037 BRONSTEIN 27 years approx. 50 years

DE-1033 CLAUD JONES 14 - 15 years approx. 50 years




profit-oriented industry can afford to holdavailable highly specialized competenciesand capacities just for the vague hope thatthere will be a small contract awarded eve-ry few years or a larger one every decade.Even if the industry would be willing to ac-cept this, the public contracting authoritywould not be able to bear the costs result-ing from that. Thus, the last user of an oldmissile will not be able to afford to financeall alone the total expenditure for keepingthe industrial basis available. As an inev-

itable consequence, the respective busi-ness fields or even the total company willbe closed down. For more and more end-of-life systems still in use there will be nosuitable contractor available anymore who

reached here both from the managementview and due to the technical challenges.

Technical-Industrial Basis

The availability of an efficient techni-cal-industrial basis as a prerequisite for thepreservation of the materiel readiness hasso far been an important, but not a criti-cal aspect. This will change fundamental-ly. The budgets for the procurement of de-

fence materiel which have been continu-ously consolidating for decades lead, be-cause of the absence of new projects onthe side of the industry, to an analogousdepletion of the available resources. No

Australia: Upgrading of the MEKO 200ANZAC, which were delivered as “LowEnd“ patrol ships, to full combat ships.The ships’ equipment is comprehensivelyexpanded, replaced, and modernized bysensors especially to improve the antimis-sile defence.

Australia: Upgrading of now still four PER-RY Class frigates to air defence ships as aninterim measure. It was intended to bridgethe time between the decommissioning ofthe DDG-2 destroyer of the PERTH Class

until the delivery of the new AEGIS destroy-ers of the HOBART Class. The progress ofthe extremely ambitious conversion projectshows that the limit of usefully realizablemodernization projects has obviously been

USS NORMANDY of the TICONDEROGA Class

Frigate Life Extension (FELEX)HALIFAX

DDG 51 ARLEIGH BURKE




comprehensive modernization programs.A service life of 10 years corresponds toabout one third of the procurement costs

for a new unit. Even apart from large mod-ernization projects, financial expendituresare also required for a ship in service use fore.g. immediate mission support and naval-engineering measures. Against this back-ground, the financial edge from which amodernization is no longer justifiable froman economic point of view is estimated tobe about 20 to 25 percent of the procure-ment costs for a new construction. Majormodernization projects are definitely morerisky and more complex than financial-ly comparable new construction projects.In the progression of the project there is a

big risk that the point from which a mod-ernization makes no sense anymore be-cause of escalating costs is reached veryquickly. In this backdrop, projects likethose in Canada (estimated to amountto 25 to 30 percent of new constructioncosts) are marginal; projects like in Austral-ia (estimated to amount to 50 percent ofnew construction costs) are no longer ra-tional from an economic aspect. The jus-tification of modernization projects canonly consist in the cost-effective creation oftechnical, economic, and operational add-

ed values, especially in the form of an addi-tional residual service life. This goal justifiesthe higher risk. But since many navies donot possess the financial resources for newconstructions in this day and age, the initi-ation of apparently cost-effective modern-ization programs will be the sole remain-ing action alternative as a reaction to thebudgetary triathlon – postponing, extend-ing, canceling. The existence of the almost60 years old ALMIRANTE GRAU in the in-ventory of the navy of Peru may give proofof that. í

By Christian Peters , Project Division “Sea“,Federal Office of Defence Technology and Procurement

The frigates of the FFG-7 PERRY Class arecurrently decommissioned after 25 to 30years with the first ones being handed off

to other countries after 20 years.Today, American aircraft carriers are de-

signed for 50 years.

Summary

In general, the necessity for moderni-zation of surface units is heteronomous -the navies are forced to act. The decisionwhether a modernization is actually imple-mented or whether the required resourcesshould better be invested in new construc-tion programs ought to be made primarily

from economic perspectives. Surface unitsor normally designed for service lives of 25to 30 years. If the ship’s hull allows it, an ad-ditional service life in the volume of about10 to 15 years is possible to be bought with

could only just ensure the maintenance ofthe material readiness.

In order to avoid this consequence after all itis essential to leave the way of individual con-tracting of major projects which require maxi-mum industrial resources with a great distanceof time. A plannable process must take itsplace which ensures a continuous capacity uti-lization of the industrial resources on a medi-

um level. A model for this could be the contin-uous and evolutionary process with baselines,flights, and multi-year procurements as estab-lished by the U.S. Navy for the new construc-tion of the DDG 51 ARLEIGH BURKE. The factthat similar approaches can also be successful-ly transferred to the service use is demonstrat-ed by the Royal Navy. Especially in the advance-ment of the Type 23 DUKE frigates it practicesa continuous and ship-specific modernizationapproach within the scope of scheduled main-tenance. As for this, it must be taken into ac-count, however, that this way is supported by

the British procedure of a fleet-wide procure-ment of mission equipment.

Practical Experience

The overview on Page 60 shows for a va-riety of American surface units the averageservice life in the U.S. Navy and the total ser-vice life, taking account of the additional uti-lization after the handoff of the units to oth-er navies.

For comparison:The destroyers of the FLETCHER, SUMNER,

and GEARING classes reached maximumservice lives of about 50 years.

The first five CG-47 TICONDEROGA cruis-ers were decommissioned after just 20years.

KLAKRING Frigate of the Oliver Hazard PERRY Class




Missions and operations outside the na-tional territory of the Federal Repub-

lic of Germany and outside the territory ofthe NATO member countries are nowadaysa matter of course for the Bundeswehr. Inits setup the Joint Support Service (JSS) wasparticularly geared to these missions, and ithas been continuously adapted to the cur-rent developments since then. The accom-

plishments of this military organizationalarea speak for themselves: the merging and

centralizing of joint (inter-service) capabilitiesunder one unified command have provedworthwhile. In this context this assessmentis not in any way contradictory to the naturalrequirement of a constant need for improve-ments and readjustments which results fromthe evaluation of direct experiences gainedin missions as well as from experiences gath-ered in both the preparation of contingentsand in the post-deployment analysis of thecontingents.

The JSS was established in line with the fol-lowing basic principles:concentration on core capabilities;

process orientation; jointnes and combinedness;capability orientation.

alia, the strategic transports and the trans-mission and provision of information. This,too, makes it obvious that missions/opera-

tions are not possible without the participa-tion of JSS.

This article outlines the principal interna-tional missions in which the Bundeswehr ispresently involved, and describes the forcesand capabilities the JSS employs to make itsrespective contribution to these missions.

The Federal Minister of Defence left nodoubt in his benchmark speech of 18 May2011 that Germany will continue to be in-ternationally committed and possibly evenenhance its involvement: “Germany, andI am convinced of that, will in future be ap-

proached by the United Nations more thanto-date for an employment of soldiers evenin cases when there are no direct German in-terests perceptible. For other democratic na-tions this has long been self-evident as part ofthe international responsibility. Prosperity re-quires responsibility. We know already fromdomestic politics that ownership has its re-sponsibilities; we know it also from the third-world policy. If prosperity requires responsi-bility, then this holds also true for the Ger-man security policy“. For the JSS this meansthat it will concentrate on the mission of theBundeswehr in future, too, and that it must

be capable of making a contribution to thesuccess of such missions abroad.

Missions Abroad have Priority

When an armed engagement of Germanarmed forces outside the territory of the NA-TO alliance was absolutely unthinkable up tothe beginning of the 1990s, the Bundeswehrmissions abroad, i.e. outside of these bor-ders, have meanwhile become a daily rou-tine of security policy. When so-called “blue

helmet operations“ within the framework ofmissions of the United Nations (Cambodia,Somalia) still dominated the operational pic-ture of the Bundeswehr at the beginning, thestabilization operations are today the onesthat determine the mission spectrum. Andwith the mission in Afghanistan, these oper-ations have reached a qualitative level for theBundeswehr which was not known in thisscale before.

The mission in Afghanistan with its pa-trol activities and the fighting of the combattroops presently dominate in Germany thepicture of the engagement of German sol-

diers abroad. Associated with that is then al-so the notion of that what German soldiershave to accomplish in the missions. The re-

The JSS has been consistently oriented tothese fundamental principles - both in itsstructure and organization and in its process-

es and procedures. They have proved suc-cessful.

It is therefore logical that these basic prin-ciples will also be applied in the structure, or-ganization, and procedural processes of theJSS of the future. Added to them will be an-other principle which will be consistently ob-served in the new structure of the JSS of thefuture: the consolidation of assets and the re-sponsibility in one hand.

The intended setup of capability com-mands is the structural implementation ofthis additional new principle and thus a sub-

stantial contribution to a strengthening ofthe process responsibility in the armed forc-es. In its new structure, the JSS of the fu-ture will thus come out of the reorientationprocess qualitatively stronger in spite of thequantitative reduction of organic forces.

This strengthening is of decisive impor-tance for the operability of the armed forc-es in toto as the JSS provides all necessary ca-pabilities which are jointly needed in eachmission, irrespective of whether a missionis dominated by ground, air or naval forc-es. This also includes operations/missions forproviding medical assistance and humanitar-

ian aid, respectively, which have to be sup-ported by forces and capabilities of JSS aswell. Examples for that are: water purifica-tion/ treatment, strategic transports as wellas sea and air transshipments, all of them be-longing to the capability spectrum of JSS andpossible to be provided by the JSS only.

Characteristic feature of the operation-al contribution of JSS is the introduction ofprofessionally highly qualified specialists withsimultaneous covering of a broad range ofcapabilities. In the process, the JSS alreadybears the full responsibility prior to the actu-

al beginning of a mission, since it creates theprerequisites for each and every mission inthe first place. With its capabilities in the fieldof military intelligence it provides the Feder-al Minister of Defence and the Chief of StaffBundeswehr with information necessary forthe assessment and evaluation of the situa-tion. Moreover, military intelligence worksout recommendations which are attachedspecial significance in regard to the prepa-ration of decisions to be made by the com-mand and leadership.

But it are exactly the critical core capa-bilities of JSS, and here particularly the lo-

gistics and the command support, that arestringently required in the mission prepara-tion phase already in order to ensure, inter

Tasks of the Joint Support Service within theScope of Bundeswehr Missions Abroad

Wolfram Kühn

Vice Admiral Wolfram Kühn, Deputy of the Chiefof Staff, Bundeswehr, and Chief of Staff, JointSupport Service Photos/Grafics: JSS




erational information, serves as “force multi-plier“, i.e. it involves forces and means whichincrease the effectiveness of other forces andcapabilities many times over.

A major basic principle of the support ofthe missions by JSS is the procedure of the

maximum performance and delivery of sup-port services for the forces in the area of op-erations from the home country (depend-ence on the garrison). Substantial and exten-sive services whose delivery often requires

ed by JSS several times already - for exampleat the beginning of the operations in Afghan-istan in 2002 or in Congo in 2006.

As a “force provider“ the JSS provides- just as the Army, Air Force, and Navy andthe Central Medical Service - trained operat-

ing troops for the joint mission contingents.Here, the pooling of joint, inter-service ca-pabilities has led to a concentration of high-ly qualified specialists in the JSS. A multiplici-ty of these capabilities, e.g. in the field of op-

quirements spectrum of all missions and thatwhat is and has to be provided in the respec-tive contingents are much more comprehen-sive and diverse in the overall picture, how-ever.

A broad spectrum of capabilities is required

to meet these requirements in their entirety.The JSS contributes with its assets considera-bly to these capability packages, with the ca-pabilities having to be available continuous-ly or temporarily depending on the demand.Thus, for example, other forces and capabili-ties are needed in the phases of deploymentor establishment of the operational readi-ness of a contingent than those which maybe required in the course of an operations toaccomplish the task of the contingent. TheJSS acts here with its capabilities in the totalrange as “force enabler“ and “force provid-

er“ as well as “force multiplier“. In the func-tion as “force enabler“ the JSS supports mis-sions/operations of the Bundeswehr in thecapability categories “command capabili-ty“, “support and sustainability“, “survivabil-ity“, and “protection“ as well as “mobility“.In this process, the strategic and operation-al deployment of forces and means of thearmed forces is normally effected by way of a

joint and multinational deployment planningand transport performance, using all modesof transportation including civilian resourc-es. This comprises the military and/or civilianprovision of respective means of transship-

ment which constitutes a special challenge inparticularly early-entry operations. The man-aging of this challenge has been demonstrat-

Bundeswehr Missions Abroad

At his first official visit to the Joint Support Service at Gelsdorf, Federal Minister of Defence, Thomasde Maizière, was given a tour in the presence of the Chief of Staff, JSS, Vice Admiral Kühn (on theright, next to the Minister) of the presentations of different branches of the organizational area



With this principle which has given clearproof of its validity and resilience, especially inthe current ISAF mission, it is possible to im-prove the ratio between the number of thesupport forces and the number of the forcesacting directly in operations within a contin-gent in favor of the „boots on the ground“.This factor is attached particular significance,especially against the background of thepartly tight mandate caps.

holds available data from the Bundeswehrgeographic information data basis for theforces in the area of operations 24 hours aday and 7 days in the week (24/7). This cen-trally provided information constitutes theessential basis for the geoinfo forces of theArmy, Air Force, and Navy which ensure thegeographic information advisory services forthe mission contingents on site in the area ofoperations.

experts and a comprehensive and complexmaterial allowance are thus rendered by forc-es and agencies of the JSS out of Germanyfor the direct support of the mission contin-gent. This principle of banking on the garri-son is applied throughout the total capabilityspectrum of JSS.

In the field of military intelligence the con-tingents are supported by capabilities held

ready by the Strategic Intelligence Commandat Gelsdorf/Germany.

In the field of logistics, the total strategictransport and deployment planning as wellas the disposition of the strategic transportof cargo in and from the areas of operation iscarried out by the Wilhelshaven-based Bun-deswehr Logistics Center.

In the field of command support, the ser-vices needed in the area of operations in re-spect to transmission and processing of in-formation are planned, monitored, and con-trolled by the Bundeswehr IT System Operat-

ing Center at Rheinbach/Germany. With this,the IT platforms provided by the mobile com-mand support forces of the mission contin-gents are integrated into the joint area andstructure-wide IT system of the Bundeswehrin order to ensure the seamless communi-cation and data processing between homecountry and area of operations by an opti-mized disposition of forces and means.

In the field of geographic information ser-vice the Bundeswehr Geographic Office

ISAF Electronic Warfare (EW) Forces




on the one hand, and the group of the insur-gents on the other hand. The aim is here tochange their attitudes and their behavior tothe object of the own task in such a way thatthese are positively minded vis-a-vis the ownforces and act accordingly.

Basis of the effectiveness of the operation-al information is a comprehensive analysis ofthe information environment as well as the

capability to be able to operate safely and se-curely in culturally unfamiliar surroundings. Inorder to guarantee the latter, operational in-formation disposes, among other things, ofintercultural mission advisors. These expertadvisors know the cultural peculiarities of thearea of operations and assist with their ex-pertise. In addition, they also advise the Ger-man military commanders and their staffs incountry-specific matters.

The personnel of OpInfo use differentmethods to bring their messages across tothe target groups and to widely disseminate

the respective information. These methodsencompass the preparation and distributionof both printed material and the transmissionof messages via picture presentation/videodisplay and movies. It is thus, for example,possible to support to great success the jointtraining of local security forces in the area ofoperations by the production and broadcast-ing of motion pictures over state-owned/ public-sector television networks. The pro-duction of such films is effected by OpInfo

personnel together with civilian translatorsand local editors.

Radio broadcasting is another mediumthat can be used. Military commanders havethus the possibility to directly address thepopulation in their area of responsibility byusing their own media to disseminate infor-mation or behavioral hints and advice.

The tactical OpInfo forces are the “bootson the ground“ of the operational informa-

tion for direct and indirect support of thecombat troops. They are an inherent partof the training and protection battalions. In

tary Cooperation) field of activity the capabil-ity to co-act, within the meaning of the

German principle of action of networked se-curity, with other departments/agencies, na-tional and international civilian organizations(IO/GO/NGO) as well as with other civilianactors.

The JSS presently provides more than 20percent of the forces of the German ISAFmission contingent. All capabilities projectedin the JSS are introduced in the area of op-erations; they include: logistics, commandsupport, Bundeswehr military police, opera-

tional information (OpInfo), civil-military co-operation in foreign countries, explosive ord-nance disposal (EOD), electronic warfare(EW), operation of camps, and supplemen-tary capabilities of the special engineers, andgeographic information support.

One of these capabilities is described here-inafter in detail by taking the example of theoperational information (OpInfo). The opera-tional information impacts on predetermined

target groups in the area of operations by useof communicative means and methods. InAfghanistan these are the civilian population,

By taking the example of present missions,some of the essential capabilities of JSS and

of the forces projected by it are described indetail in the following.

International Security AssistanceForce (ISAF)

The Bundeswehr has been participating inthe ISAF operation in Afghanistan since thebeginning of the mission in January 2002.Today, Germany provides with about 5,000servicewomen and servicemen the third larg-est troop contingent right after the U.S.A.and Great Britain and, as “lead nation“, itis responsible for the Regional Command

North. The task of the forces acting underthe ISAF mandate is to assist the governmentbodies in Afghanistan in the maintenance ofthe security and order with the objective tomake it possible for both the Afghan govern-ment and the personnel of the United Na-tions (UN) as well as the institutions and or-ganizations for the promotion of the devel-opment cooperation (DC community) towork in a secure environment.

The German forces in Regional CommandNorth have the following mission:protection of the Afghan population and

confidence building through presence,training support for the Afghan Nation Se-curity Forces - ANSF;

assistance in the Afghan reconstructionwithin the scope of a comprehensive ap-proach;

support in the drug control according tothe statement of the Federal Governmenton drug control in Afghanistan of 22 April2005, with the responsibility for the drugcontrol lying with the Afghan government.

For the accomplishment of this comprehen-sive and complex mission it is necessary tohold most different capabilities available in

the contingent and for the contingent. Forassisting the Afghan reconstruction the JSShas, for instance, with its CIMIC (Civil-Mili-

Radio Broadcast by OpInfo Personnel

JSS Forces in Kosovo




of the military provisions of the Dayton PeaceAccord. Basis for that are the pertinent reso-lutions of the Security Council of the UnitedNations. In addition, EUFOR actively supportsthe Bosnian armed forces in the buildup oftheir capabilities by providing military adviceand training. At present, the Bundeswehrparticipates in this mission with roughly 10soldiers, with JSS providing half of them.

For the whole of the Balkans, i.e. for theKFOR and EUFOR missions, the Bundeswehr,together with the Austrian Armed Forces,supplies one battalion as a joint reserve. Thebattalion comprises about 500 German sol-diers of which approx. 20 belong to the JSS.This battalion was deployed to the Balkansbecause of the development of the situationin Kosovo. Since the beginning of August, itis at the disposal of the COM KFOR as an ad-ditional maneuver element.

European Union Naval Force

Somalia – Operation ATALANTA(EU NAVFOR ATALANTA)United Nations Interim Force inLebanon (UNIFIL)

The task of the forces employed withinthe framework of the EU NAVFOR ATALAN-TA mission is to ensure the protection of theships of the World Food Program and the Af-rican Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).Furthermore, they have to guarantee the pro-tection of other endangered ships in the areaof operation. The mission in its entirety servesto deter and combat piracy in the same area.

The aim of this mission is the ensure the un-impeded and free use of the sea area and thesea lines of communication in the coastal areaoff Somalia and in the Golf of Aden.

The mission of the second large-scale mar-itime operation with German participation -

so integrated into the contingent are ele-

ments of the OpInfo, civil-military coopera-tion (CIMIC), and explosive ordnance dispos-al (EOD) forces.

In addition, the contingent has been aug-mented in stages by temporary forces of JSSsince mid 2009 to ensure the return trans-port of the housekeeping equipment and de-fence materiel, especially from the Toplicaneand Prizen airfields. Comparable to ISAF, theJSS also supports KFOR by providing qual-ified and experienced personnel to the endthat the multinational KFOR Headquarterscan accomplish its mission.

European Forces (EUFOR)

The mission of the multinational EUFORcontingent is to promote a further stabiliza-tion of the peace process in Bosnia-Herzego-vina within the scope of the implementation

combat actions they support the advance of

the own forces by, for instance, loudspeakerannouncements for the purpose of separat-ing non-involved civilian population from thecombat zone. Such a capability is attachedparticular importance in the parametric con-ditions of the asymmetric conflict, because itis about avoiding casualties among the civil-ians. As of recently the equipment of the tac-tical OpInfo forces also includes, aside fromloudspeaker vehicles, portable radio trans-mitters with a transmitting power of up to20 km. With these transmitters it is possibleto inform the population in the direct area ofoperation of own/friendly forces and even in

remote, isolated areas via radio broadcastingin a situation-adapted way.

In addition, the JSS makes with its forces asubstantial contribution to personnel detach-ments for staffs and headquarters in the ar-ea of operations; to be mentioned here areprimarily the headquarters of the RegionalCommand North in Mazar-e-Sharif, the HQISAF in Kabul, and the ISAF Joint Command,also in Kabul.

Kosovo Forces (KFOR)

The mission of the KFOR forces operat-ing in the national territory of Kosovo is toguarantee a secure and stable environmenton the basis of the resolution of the SecurityCouncil of the United Nations. The goal is toensure the public security and order until thenational and/or international civilian pres-ence can take over the responsibility for thistask. With a total contingent strength of theGerman KFOR mission contingent of about900 soldiers, the JSS provides approximate-ly a third of these forces. The capabilities pro-

jected in that process are:logistics including operation of field camps

and supplementary capabilities of the specialengineers, command support, Bundeswehrmilitary police, and electronic warfare. Al-

Military Police of JSS in Support of the ATALANTA Mission

ISAF KFOR EUFOR ATALANTA UNIFILUNMIS/

UNMISSUNAMID

Logistics X X X X X X -

Command Support X X X - X - X

Military Intelligence X X - X X - -

Military Police X X - X - X -

Civil-Military Cooperation / CIMIC X X X - - X -

Operation of Camps X X - X - - -

Operative Information X X - - - - -

Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) X X - - - - -

Electronic Warfare (EW) X X - - - - -

Geographic Information System X - - - - - -

Overview of the Capabilities Introduced into the Missions by JSS




explained in detail here, since there were nosoldiers of JSS involved in the mission at the

time of the preparation of this article.

Summary/Outlook

With its capabilities the JSS contributessubstantially to the fulfillment of the tasksof German mission contingents and of mis-sions with participation of German soldiers,respectively. The table shows in an overviewthe capabilities contributed by JSS. In addi-tion, demand-related and event-oriented re-course is made to the entire capability spec-trum of JSS in all missions.

The effort of JSS is primarily characterizedby the core capabilities to be provided jointlyand combinedly by highly qualified specialists– and here it are especially the critical capabil-ities, the ones of logistics and command sup-port which are to be projected almost con-tinuously. In the process, the support servicesare always rendered in the same high quali-ty, irrespective of whether the respective mis-sion is dominated by the Army, Air Force, Na-vy or the Central Medical Service.

The JSS has been geared to the support ofmissions since its setup. It is nevertheless es-

sential to optimize this mission orientationeven more. Many things of this optimiza-tion potential will be possible to be realizedin the now pending restructuring. The pro-cess concept will continue to be consistent-ly pursued by the intended setup of capabil-ity commands so that it will be quite possibleto achieve the merging and consolidation offorces, means, and responsibility in one hand.Despite all the changes and amendments, theJoint Support Service will stick to its provenmotto “Creative, Efficient, Modern - Success-ful in Missions!“ in future as well. í

By Wolfram Kühn, Vice Admiral, Deputy of the Chief of Staff, Bundeswehr, and Chief of Staff, Joint Support Service

ly and democratically and to assist it in estab-lishing good-neighborly relations. Potential

military tasks are here the protection of UNpersonnel, installations and equipment; theprotection of humanitarian aid and of estab-lished security corridors; deterrence by pres-ence in the areas of conflict; liaison and coor-dination with Sudan People’s Liberation Ar-my (SPLA); and possibly the employment ofmilitary observers.

Aside from the support of UNMIS/UN-MISS, Germany is also involved in the UN-AMID Mission in Darfur. Core task of UNA-MID is to guarantee the immediate and ef-fective implementation of the Darfur PeaceAgreement of 5 May 2006 as well as to sup-

port the peace negotiations presently con-ducted under the direction of the special en-voy of the United Nations and African Union.Moreover, UNAMID is also to guarantee theprotection of the civilian population againstarmed raids. For that purpose, the mission isfurnished with a robust mandate accordingto Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Germanyparticipates in both missions with a total ofabout 20 soldiers who perform staff and ob-servation tasks. Nearly half of them are pro-vided by JSS.

EU Training Mission in Somalia (EUTM SOMALIA)

Germany has been participating in theEU-led EUTM SOMALIA training missionsince April 2010. The tasks of the forc-es employed is to give training to approx.2,000 Somali recruits in Uganda, portionsof which include NCO and officers’ training.Presently employed in the mission are threeGerman soldiers in staff assignments andseven soldiers in trainer/instructor func-tions of which two field grade officers areprovided by JSS.

The EU Advisory and Assistance Missionfor Security Reform in the Democratic Re-public of Congo (EUSEC RD CONGO) is not

the UNIFIL Mission - is to conduct reconnais-sance and surveillance of the sea area with-in the Area of Maritime Operations (AMO)off the coast of Lebanon. This includes al-so the conduct of maritime blocking opera-tions within the AMO, seaward securing ofthe Lebanese coast and coastal waters, thecontrol of maritime traffic in the AMO as wellas the redirection of ships in suspected cas-

es within the scope of the inhibition of ille-gal weapon deliveries by ship to Lebanon.Another part of the mission is the support ofLebanon through military advice and train-ing aid for the Lebanese maritime forces foran autonomous takeover of the above stat-ed tasks.

Both operations are dominated by navalforces. Accordingly, the German Navy pro-vides the quantitatively biggest share of therespective German mission contingent. Butthere are also capabilities required in bothmissions which are projected in the area of

responsibility of JSS, in particular commandsupport, military intelligence, operation ofcamps as well as logistics.

When the German UNIFIL mission contin-gent relies mainly on Limassol, the capabili-ties of JSS in the EU NAVFOR ATALANTA op-eration are basically brought to effect fromout of Djibouti. The contingent’s Joint Logis-tics Base is operated here, too.

The EU NAVFOR ATALANTA operation isalso supported by forces of the military po-lice. Their primary tasks are the provision ofinvestigation support, the preservation of evi-dence as well as the exercise of custody tasks.

For that purpose, military police elements areembarked on the frigates of the Navy to al-low them to discharge their support tasksfrom onboard the ships. The JSS additional-ly participates in both missions by detachingpersonnel for the multinational staffs. In to-tal, it provides quantitatively almost ten per-cent of the German mission contingent withEU NAVFOR ATALANTA alone.

United Nations Mission in Sudan(UNMIS)United Nations Mission in South

Sudan (UNMISS) and United Nations/African Union Missionin Darfur (UNAMID)

Within the scope of available capabilities,the Bundeswehr has been supporting theUNMIS since 2005 as an observation and ver-ification mission of the United Nations to pro-tect the security and freedom of movement/ action of UN personnel and the aid agenciesas well as civilians directly threatened by vio-lence. The UNMIS mandate ended on 9 Ju-ly 2011with the declaration of the independ-ence of South Sudan; it is now continued in

the new UN Mission UNMISS. The objectiveof UNMISS is the provision of aid for the newstate of South Sudan to help rule it efficient-

German Soldiers Supporting the UNMIS Mission




With the commencement of the Bun-deswehr missions abroad the logis-

tic system had to be adjusted and advancedto a considerable extent in order to be ableto ensure the support of our mission con-tingents over great distances as well. Thisarticle describes the logistic challenges andcurrent development from the viewpoint ofthe so-called operational level.

In contrast to the operational conduct ofmissions which is usually effected by a mul-tinational headquarters, the guaranteeing ofthe materiel readiness and sustainability ofGerman troop contingents in missions con-tinues to be a so-called “national task“. Itthus falls under unrestricted national juris-diction for which the Joint Operations Com-mand of the Bundeswehr at Geltow nearPotsdam bears the responsibility.

The logistic forces employed in missionsunder the leadership of the Joint OperationsCommand must be capable of supporting abroad spectrum which can range from hu-

manitarian aid up to high-intensity missions.Here it is essential to ensure, on the onehand, the support of ongoing missions in aresource-optimized way, but with the neces-sary flexibility and sustainability at the sametime. In this respect, the capability for con-stant adaptation, nowadays called transfor-mation, has been an indispensable basic re-quirement all along. This describes simulta-neously the challenge that has to be met inthe planning and ensuring of the logistic ser-vice support. Moreover, the present missionscenarios are characterized by fast pace, di-

versity, and difficult predictability which didnot exist like that in the scenarios of the past.“Logistics follow the Operation“ - this

often cited tenet was true and false at thesame time in the past and is right and wrongat the same time today, too. The operationsplanning will have to define the objectives,but the possibility of acting is decisively in-fluenced by the logistic feasibility. Addition-al challenges to the logistic support of mis-sions/operations result from tight mandatecaps which make it necessary for the benefitof combat units, to keep the so-called “logis-tic footprint“, i.e. the deployment of military

logistic forces, as minimal as possible. The artof the logistic planning and command pro-cess is thus to permanently operate a logistic

system consisting of a mix of logistic capa-

bility components at home and in the coun-try of deployment which allows the militarycommander an option-rich conduct of oper-ations. The efficiency of the logistic system isand continues to be a decisive factor, how-ever, that co-determines which of the objec-tives of an operation can be achieved in theset timeframe.

Current Logistics onOperational Level Today

In the ultimate planning of logistic capa-bilities it is about the maintenance and re-pair of equipment just as about the replen-ishment of gear and equipment, of spare/re-pair parts, food, ammunition, POL, etc., in-cluding their transport to the areas of oper-ation by air, land or sea in accordance withvalid national and international transportand hazardous materials regulations, as wellas storage on site according to German safe-ty regulations and other provisions. The ren-dering of individual services in the differentlogistic disciplines is incumbent on a large

number of military and civilian service pro-viders who are to be coordinated with theaim of providing the troops with the rightproduct at the right place and at the right

time. In view of completely different para-metric conditions, the “just in time“ meth-od as it is applied by the civilian economy

in times of globalization with German mo-

torways being used as a rolling warehouseshould be out of the question, however. Itis rather essential to keep the German mis-sion contingents materially sustainable onan international scale even under adverseparametric conditions and in a hostile, ill-dis-posed environment.

Basis of the considerations are the capabil-ities and forces optimal for an effective con-duct of operations. Here it is essential, how-ever, that the forces necessary for the sup-port (not only logistic troops) just as themandate ceilings, budgetary means as well

as the capabilities and capacities that canbe sustainably provided by the troop pro-viders are taken account of in the concretefine planning. Derived from these param-eters is an absolutely necessary, close andcontinuous coordination between all par-ties involved in the logistic service provisionprocess. A reduction of the interfaces and amore distinct increase in both the possibili-ties for taking rigorous action and in the re-sponsibilities as intended in the pending newconcept can contribute to higher efficiencyand quicker decisions especially in fast-mov-

ing scenarios.On the operational level it is the respon-

sibility of the Joint Operations Commandof the Bundeswehr to “translate“ the mili-

tary-strategic stipulations of FMoD into op-erational performance targets (level of am-bition) - also for logistics. The assets needed

Cooperation of Civilian and Military Logistic ServiceProviders for Missions of the Bundeswehr from anOperational Point of View

Gerald Funke

Maximum Challenges for (Man and) Materiel in Missions Photos: FMoD




means of transport, especially air transportmeans, are suited only to a limited extent forstrategic distances or major equipment, skel-eton contracts were concluded with civilianservice providers to fill this capability gap. Onthe basis of the skeleton contract “Air Car-go Afghanistan“, an average of ten trans-

port aircraft of the IL-76 type take off fromNeubrandenburg to Mazar-e-Sharif week-ly with a total of approx. 300 tons of sup-plies. By the shifting of the freight volumefrom aircraft to other means of transport,it was managed to successively reduce thecosts in the past years. After intensive nego-tiations with the transit countries it was pos-sible to conclude bilateral contracts in 2009which allow to transport non-military ma-terial (e.g. accommodation containers, fur-niture, etc.) by train or trucks from Germa-ny to Afghanistan, using civilian companies.

In total, more than 90 percent of the strate-gic cargo transports are carried out by civil-ian companies today.

Transport services within the areas of op-eration are, to a large extent, carried out bycivilian service providers as well. Thus, for in-stance, supplies are distributed from the mainbase of the Bundeswehr at Mazar-e-Sharif bycivilian trucks, airplanes, and helicopters tothe places of operation in Afghanistan.

The provision of logistic services also in-cludes the civilian Federal Defence Admin-istration. Aside from the basic responsi-bility in the field of armament it is also in

charge of such important tasks as the pro-vision of rations and clothing in the areasof operation as well as for the establish-

tary maintenance capacities are not yet pos-sible to be directly set up at home and forwhich military spare part packages are notavailable yet, are increasingly fielded directlyfrom the industry. This purposeful augmen-tation of the capability will become an add-ed value only if the introduced vehicles can

be kept employable despite the initially exist-ing military logistic deficits. Because of (still)lacking military expertise, this can only be ef-fected by corporate personnel on site. Soledependence on civilian personnel wouldfall short, however. Rather, intelligent logis-tic planning is needed to ensure the contin-uous employability of such vehicles even inoutposts where corporate personnel is basi-cally not possible to be employed.

Here, mobile high-intensity operationsfrom advanced positions, as they are justrepresenting a key feature of the reorienta-

tion in Afghanistan, necessitate an increasedeffort of personnel and materiel and, in con-sequence, lead also to an increased accru-al of maintenance for the equipment em-ployed. As regards this, an early - contrac-tually guaranteed - close interlocking of mil-itary and civilian maintenance personnel inthe secured camps will become top priorityto make at least a limited know-how transferpossible over a transient phase and thus to“win“ military maintenance personnel withat least limited capabilities for the employ-ment in the outposts.

Another example for an integration of

trade and industry is the transportation ofpersonnel and materiel from Germany to therespective are of operations. As the military

to implement these guidelines are ultimate-ly planned and permanently made availableby the so-called troop providers (Army, AirForce, Navy, Central Medical Service, andJoint Support Service (JSS)). This compris-es also the military logistic troops requiredfor the operation of the logistic action pool.Here, decisive significance for a continuous-ly smooth logistic service provision will be at-

tached to the logistic concept which is par-ticularly tailored to the specifics of the re-spective area of operations. This concept isdrawn up by the Joint Support Commandwithin the scope of its logistic process re-sponsibility on the basis of the operationalstandards of the Joint Operations Commandof the Bundeswehr. It regulates especiallythe configuration of the interfaces between

joint logistics and operational logistics, theintegration of multinational capabilities, andthe Host Nation Support (HNS), respectively,as well as the integration of commercial ser-

vices for the respective area of operations.

Actors in the Logistic System

Today, the cooperation with civilian con-tract partners is an integral element of allmissions, with basically positive experienc-es. With regard to a justifiable ratio betweenoperational forces and forces to be support-ed as well as other limiting factors - e.g. lim-ited availability of military logistic troopsand the currently existing necessity to intro-duce new defence materiel in the mission

even before the full logistic supportability isreached - a comprehensive logistic support-ing of the German mission contingents with-out civilian provision of services has mean-while become unthinkable. Depending onthe situation and scenario, logistic supportvaries greatly, however, and requires perma-nent assessment in respect to effectivenessand reliability of service provision.

An example of principally functioningcomprehensive civilian logistic service pro-vision is the operation of the kitchen at theMazar-e-Sharif garrison in Afghanistan by

a civilian provider. In 2007, the kitchen wasplanned for catering about 2,000 personnel;presently, more than 6,000 personnel arebeing provided with meals every day. Theservice provision of the provider on the basisof the military guidelines is permanently su-pervised by applying, aside from economiccriteria, the “customer satisfaction“ and themilitary security as a component of the sup-ply security for assessing the processes andresources.

And in the field of maintenance there isalso no way forward anymore without ci-vilian service provision. The quickest possi-

ble introduction of better suited vehicles re-quired by the operational events entails that“brand new“ vehicles, for which direct mili-

Military Vehicle Maintenance in an Outpost




nificance. Depending on the conditions andthe security situation in the areas of oper-ation, logistic services are also acquired onthe respective local markets. In addition tothe own efforts this serves, at the same time,the consolidation of local economic struc-tures and consequently the development inthe respective area, and the creation of sta-ble structures for supporting and fostering a

peace process. Not to be mistaken for thatare services and assistance immediately ren-dered by the host country (Host Nation Sup-port) which, however, is rather an exceptionin today’s crisis areas due to the lack of suita-ble capabilities and structures.

Still in their infancy are multinational lo-gistic approaches. Here, major conceptualrework has yet to be done both in NATOand EU in relation to especially the differ-entiation of existing command levels, butalso with regard to national logistics. Fur-ther reasons for the hitherto only rudimen-

tary mutual support are primarily the moreor less still lacking common quality and pro-cess standards, divergences in security-le-gal aspects, the unchanged keen nationalinterests in the armament processes as wellas the partly less distinct willingness to pro-vide own - usually cost-intensive - logistic

capacities for other partners. How the ba-sic tendency of reducing even more the mil-itary logistic capabilities in the course ofthe force reforms which are taking place inmany Western nations because of scarcebudgetary situations is going to affect thepossibilities in terms of personnel and ma-

teriel as well as the willingness for a multi-national provision of services remains to beseen.

and uniforms in missions to make it possiblefor them to meet the associated standardsin respect to a proper military conduct. Al-ternatively it would be appropriate to check(also with a view to the compensation law)

the possibilities of a discharge of tasks in aunchanged civilian status even in missions.

In the logistic network of relations, ser-vice providers of public-private partner-ships (PPP) - such as the partly government-owned “Bundeswehr Fuhrpark Service Gm-bH“ or also the “LH Dienstbekleidungs Gm-

bH“ which are acting in the fields of provid-ing mobility services and/or procuring andproviding clothing - gain increasingly in sig-

ment and operation of mission infrastruc-ture. By virtue of its responsibility for theconclusion of contracts with civilian con-tractors as stipulated by the Basic Law it al-so represents the interface for all servicesrendered by civilian contractors in the are-as of operation. The Federal Defence Ad-ministration is thus an integral part of thelogistic action pool in operations, althoughthe requirements in respect to the shap-ing of the cooperation between the civil-ian and military sides as well as the tasks to

be discharged by the Federal Defence Ad-ministration in the missions differ in partsignificantly from those of the routine du-ty at home. Tasks which, for example, resultfrom the complete operation of a missioninfrastructure, are not existent in this format home. The water treatment/purificationor the operation of mission infrastructureare just mentioned here as examples. Un-like in the field of the armed forces wheremission-preparatory training is given in rou-tine duty at home, it is much more difficultfor the members of the civilian Federal De-

fence Administration to follow the “train asyou fight“ principle. Here, the solution canonly lie in pragmatic approaches which donot leave any room for a thinking of differ-entiation (segregation of duties), but ratherallocate in an unbiased way the dischargeof tasks to those who are best equipped forthat. The intended closer interlocking of thecivilian and military sides and a strengthen-ing of the integrative approach is expedienthere, but it requires also the willing adop-tion in the heads of the acting persons onall levels. In addition, it seems to be worthstudying in what way the civilian employ-

ees of the Federal Defence Administrationcan be prepared for the status as a soldierand combined with that for military ranks

Deployment of Major Equipment in Strategic Air Transport

Provision of Mobility in Mission




basis of sound military expertise.It can now already be definitely stated

though: The dependence on civilian con-tractors will increase; military fallback po-

sitions - so far a sign of sound military plan-ning - will, in future, be possible to be projected to a limited extent only due to lack-ing capabilities and capacities which, inturn, can restrict the military options of ac-tion in extreme situations. With concurrent-ly tight public finances, a special challengewill consist in meeting in a customized, de-mand-related way the growing require-ments for budgetary funds for the missionsresulting from the presumably increasing ci-vilian service provision, if one wants (to beable) to sustainably deploy military forces tomissions in future, too. í

By Col. (GS) Gerald Funke, Division Chief J 4, Joint Operations Command

The frequently invoked concentration onthe “core capabilities“ is all too often dispro-portionately related to a reduction in the lo-gistic field, since logistic services can alleg-

edly be rendered by third parties. Here it iseasily overlooked that the capability for anoperation in a hostile environment also re-quires a direct support on the scene of themission. This capability dodges an exclusivecivilian discharge of tasks as it requires mil-itary logistic personnel and materiel specifi-cally trained and designed for such adversesurroundings. An example for this are thefollow-on supply with ammunition or POL offorces employed in mobile operations or al-so the immediate battlefield recovery of de-fect material or material damaged in combataction which must remain reserved for mili-

tary maintenance personnel. Here, the sum-mation must be made in direction of a re-duction with a sense of proportion on the

An option could be the increased use of jointly “purchased“ services through agen-cies like the NAMSA (NATO Maintenanceand Supply Agency).

Lines of Development

The mission in Afghanistan offers logistics,

too, a sustainable learning process whichis now essential to be implemented with-in the scope of the forthcoming reorienta-tion. In this context, the risk should be avoid-ed to regard the situation in Afghanistan as abasis for all coming “requirement specifica-tions“ for the military advancement. Exactlythe contrary is to be realized: an original con-ceptual design and exclusive orientation to-wards certain capabilities will quickly be out-paced by actual events and possibly requiresan increased reversion to other capabilities.A development of defence materiel fixated

on a hundred percent solution leaves only lit-tle flexibility for quick adaptations; the cur-rent armament process is often still too pon-derous and complicated for the quick adap-tation with new materiel capabilities. From alogistical point of view, the provision of nec-essary materiel in missions takes often toomuch time and requires too high a coordi-nation effort. Aside from procedural read-

justments which were to result in a reduc-tion of the interfaces it is required to considera departure from conceptual „hundred per-cent solutions“. It seems to make more senseto give an inherent augmentation potential

and a higher modularity (plug and play) com-bined with a standardization general prefer-ence in the development and procurementof armaments. Here it cannot only be abouta purely functional augmentation potential,but also about not bidding up a priori to thetechnically conditioned limits, for instance.

In the light of tendencies implying a con-tinued decrease of own logistic capacities, itwill be necessary to resort in future missionsrather more than less to civilian logistic ser-vice provision which in turn can lead to a ty-ing up additional budgetary funds.

In the era of globalization and sharehold-er value an all-national industry for the ren-dering of logistic services will be the exceptionrather than the rule. Thus, it will all the morebe essential to seek a close cooperation withtrade and industry and to conclude “lead con-tracts“ whenever possible and to deliberatelypromote the transition of retiring soldiers tothese civilian corporations instead of prohib-iting this by additional hurdles or waiting pe-riods. Cooperation with trade and industry isnot the “second best solution“ in missions ei-ther, but rather the number one priority in or-der to be able to fulfill the political intent for

an increasing international engagement witha simultaneous reduction of military capaci-ties and possibly also of the capabilities.

Multinational Logistics in the Balkans

Recovery of Damaged Materiel from the Area of Operations




The Bundeswehr has been involved indifferent worldwide missions for nearly

two decades. At present, it takes part in six

large to medium-scale operations as well asin additional four smaller missions with atotal of about 7,000 servicewomen/service-men. The Bundeswehr is geared to conductoperations in the entire mission spectrumwith different intensities, ranging from in-tensive battle via stabilization operations,contributions to reconstruction/nation build-ing up to humanitarian relief efforts. In theprocess, the armed forces have to preparethemselves for a broad range of threats,partly new ones, like terror attacks. Themajority of the missions are ground opera-

tions for conflict prevention and crisis man-agement. The management of such difficultmissions, their complexity, the strain/stressput on German soldiers, and the frequentattacks in Northern Afghanistan are wellknown in the general public.

Less aware is the public of the significanceand expenditure of such activities which takeplace in the background - planning, build-up, training, deployment, logistics, and oth-er support tasks. Main emphasis of these ac-tivities is in the lead-up and at the beginningof an operation. But during ongoing missionsthey are an essential basis for the success of

the mission as well. These tasks and activitiesare extremely complex, interlocking and noteasy to accomplish. Each mission is differentand launched with tremendous efforts, eventhough previous experiences can be capital-ized on. It is thus appropriate to take a clos-er look at these tasks. A selection of essen-tial tasks may suffice to make obvious thatthere is more to the employment of Germanarmed forces than operational and combatactions.

Planning, Preparation, Buildup

Prior to the beginning of a mission of theBundeswehr there are mostly critical, cri-sis-prone developments with effects on ourcountry or allied nations and also respectivepolitical activities for their containment. Mostof the missions take place within the frame-work of NATO and EU or within the scope ofa „coalition of the willing“, mostly approvedby a UN mandate. In military regards, thismultinational, “combined“ approach is al-so added the “joint“ aspect, that is the com-mon acting of all operating forces. This de-

scription shows already the complexity of to-day’s missions and the challenge in respectto the start and kickoff of a new operation.

A complicated structure of coordinationand consultation requirements evolves. Com-mon political decisions and procedures and

strategies have to be synchronized on inter-national and national level, in the UN, in thealliances, bilaterally or multilaterally betweenpartner nations for mutual support and possi-bly with the “host nation of the country of de-ployment. Government, political parties, andthe parliament have to come to an agreementin order to ultimately obtain the consent ofthe Bundestag (Lower House) for a mission ofthe Bundeswehr. Almost in parallel to that arethe negotiations and initial planning consider-ations in the military field - here, too, on mul-tinational and national levels. A struggle for

military targets to meet the political stipula-tions, exchange of reconnaissance results andrequests, wishes/requests and requirementsfor the provision of forces, command respon-sibility and command organization or the ap-portionment of the area in the theater of op-

erations are just some of the aspects. In theBundeswehr, the planning is started on thebasis of the stipulations and defined goals bythe Minister of Defence and Chief of Feder-al Armed Forces Staff by the Joint OperationsCommand in coordination with the com-mands of the services/organizational areas.Initial deliberations might also become nec-essary in the domain of civilian actors. Gov-ernmental agencies and relief organizationsfor “nation building“ measures and human-itarian aid are, within the meaning of a “net-worked security“ belong also to them.

It can be imagined how difficult it is tofind a common denominator recognized byall parties involved. In the past, it has always

been achieved, however, even though it mayhave taken some time. But these weeks, ifnot months, until reaching a decision can al-

so be of advantage. The period can very wellbe used for the preparation and training ofthe operating forces, interaction with militarystaffs as well as for measures in respect to theinitial deployment. Unfortunately, this hasnot always functioned successfully in Ger-many in the past. Processes and proceduresof the political decision making as well of themilitary planning did not always proceed syn-chronously, but rather successively. This re-sulted in a waste of time and thus in a de-lay of preparatory measures and quite ofteneven in an aggravation in the use of scarce

strategic resources. For the future it would bedesirable to have military plannings and pre-paratory measures pass off more compre-hensively without having to thwart by thatthe primacy of politics and resolution of theBundestag.

Some examples of necessary measures inthis phase of a new employment are brieflymentioned hereinafter. It is mandatory to de-fine and specify the command organization.As far as existing NATO command authoritiesare not possible to be committed, it is neces-sary to win available staffs from participatingnations. Following that, a “lead nation“ mustbe found which, as in the case of Germany inthe operation EU FOR RD CONGO, will haveto deal with a huge amount of tasks and co-ordination work. Existing staffs must oftenbe augmented in terms of personnel and ma-

teriel. In addition, the national command or-ganization below the Joint Operations Com-mand needs to be designated.

Basics of Missions of

the BundeswehrDietmar Klos

Operations Center of Joint Operations Command Photo: FMoD




ity. Deployments/relocations/transports inthe area of operations, are controlled by theJoint Operations Command and the nation-al commander with its “Bundeswehr Move-ment and Transport Control Team in the Ar-

ea of Operations“. Relocation operations of-ten take place within the scope of multina-tional plannings.

All modes of transport are used for deploy-ing troops, materiel, and supplies to a newmission. As far as possible, priority is givento the “less expensive“ ground transportsby train and road. This was the case with themissions in Bosnia-Herzegovina and partly al-so in Kosovo. For the transportation of heavymajor equipment like tank vehicles, trucks,and containers use was also made of mari-time transports. Personnel and special equip-ment has been and will be deployed by air

transport means. This was quite differentwith the ISAF mission. At first, there was noland connection possible, no port availablein Afghanistan and in the neighboring coun-tries - there was no other choice than the ex-pensive air transport. In 2001/2002 it wastherefore necessary to charter about 150 ex-pensive AN 24-100 ANTONOV in order toensure the German “initial deployment“ toKabul. This has fortunately changed.

But complex plannings and preparationsare required before the first means of trans-port can take off. It is e.g. necessary to co-

ordinate lines of communication on inter-national and national levels and to deter-mine, to secure and possibly expand load-ing and unloading places/ports/airbases aswell as to determine the deployment plan-ning of troops and means in terms of timeand space, to provide military and civilianmeans of transport, and to adapt, where ap-propriate, the existing traffic control organ-ization within the scope of international co-ordination. Unknown territory was enteredin the first missions of the Bundeswehr, eventhough part of the means and procedureswere available - albeit tailored to NATO oper-

ations in Central Europe. The worldwide de-livery of troops is thus indeed quite a novelty.In the meantime it was not only possible to

PTCC) specifically tailored for the new mis-sion. It turned out well that the joint (inter-service) PTCC concept has been applied forsome years which allows to establish a com-mon basis and to save time in the basic, ad-

vance and commander’s training.The above stated comprehensive meas-ures are proportionally also required in cur-rent missions when a new operational ap-proach is chosen. Examples for that are theexpansion of the responsibility of the Inter-national Security Assistance Force (ISAF)from Kabul to all-Afghanistan in 2003 withthe takeover of the Regional Command (RC)North in Mazar-e-Sharif by Germany or themultiple changes of tasks and forces in theoperations ALTHEA as well as KFOR in theBalkans. In such situations it is considerablyeasier, however, to carry out the comprehen-

sive activities as it is possible to build up onexisting assets. Numerous and comparabletasks arise also when the missions is termi-nated; here, however, with a view from thecountry of deployment to Germany and withmore time available for the withdrawal.

Deployment

The deployment of the troops to the mis-sion is the first “operational task“ so thespeak. Means and procedures of the Bun-

deswehr strategic deployability to the ar-ea of operations are applied for this purposewith the operational deployability takingeffect at that very place. The means of thetroops for the tactical mobility are used local-ly in the mission. The Bundeswehr LogisticsCenter with its “Transport and Traffic“ Divi-sion is responsible for the implementation ofmilitary movements/transports in Germanyand up to the areas of operation in accord-ance with the stipulations of the Joint Oper-ations Command and the deployment plan-nings of the Joint Support Command. It co-operates closely with, inter alia, internation-

al agencies as well as with the Federal Of-fice of Defence Administration in respect tothe procurement of civilian transport capac-

Forces must be generated - international-ly and nationally this is often a “fierce quar-rel“ and problematic matter. Who under-takes which tasks, where, how long? Whocan provide rare means such as air trans-port, helicopters, long-range effectors, mod-ern command support or field hospitals. Eve-ryone deems to be able to provide infantryforces - often with the false conclusion that

light, rather unprotected infantry would stillbe suited for everything. In the Bundeswehr,force packages are quickly found most times,but with the problem that the strength num-bers are frequently insufficient. The political-ly determined “contingent strengths“ haveoften been knitted too tight for new mis-sions. The struggle between the military par-ties involved for each space is then prepro-grammed, just as the amendment in the nextmandate agreement.

The determination of the contribution/par-ticipation of forces can also have an impact

on the sustainability in total. Measures inconnection with personnel, materiel and or-ganization need to be initiated for that, be-cause process-organizational measures gen-erally continue to be the rule for the provisionof forces. When selecting available units aswell as staff/special personnel it is necessaryto take account of already ongoing partici-pations and commitments in missions. Manyunits are already continuously committedfor national risk prevention as well as for theNATO Response Force and European BattleGroup. It is possible, however, to generate ini-tial forces for new missions from the last men-

tioned reserves. Also, one is keen to resort toquickly deployable forces, which e.g. includeair assault troops, for a first employment inearly-entry operations. To be considered inthis context is also the duration of the em-ployment; today usually four months with a20-month employment-free phase. An over-expansion of the force provision could have anegative effect on these times, ultimately onthe motivation of the troops and the enlist-ment behavior of the soldiers/volunteers.

The sustainability might also require thatthe procurement of urgently needed equip-

ment is expedited or even initiated. As forthe second mentioned case, the “immediatemission requirements“ procedure has provedvery successful in the course of the years. Ahost of materiel and supplies has to be select-ed, provided and to be procured for the mis-sion, especially with regard to future expen-ditures. While in the further course first re-connaissance is conducted in the area of op-erations and, following this, advance par-ties, e.g. for the buildup of command posts,camps, initial supply, command support, se-curity or establishment of contacts/commu-nications, are launched already, it is neces-

sary to conceive and conduct at home addi-tional training (preparatory training for con-flict prevention and crisis management -

Soldiers of 292nd Light Infantry Battalion Undergoing Training Photo: Army Staff




right dangerous which is the reason why onlyless important material like PX articles are car-ried along. Nevertheless, the expensive AN-TONOV flights are still required about everytwo to three day per week for urgent mate-rial transports.

As for initial deployments and follow-ontransports, the Bundeswehr has made con-siderable progresses in the past years. For fu-

ture missions continued efforts will be madeto make use of all modes of transport and, co-ordinated with allies as well as transit and hostnations, to utilize quick and cost-effectivetransports by inclusion of civilian companies.

Command Support

The command support as the basis ofcommand capability of armed forces andnetwork enabled operations (NEO) plays aprominent role in new missions as well as in

the progress of them. For that reason, thebuildup of a robust and secure commandsupport including its portions of informationmanagement, information supply, and IT se-curity is advanced with the beginning of firstplannings. For that purpose use is made ofthe means of information technology op-erated by the Bundeswehr IT System. Asidefrom the command-technical integration ofGerman troop elements in the command bymultinational headquarters it is also impera-tive to ensure national command and controland command support.

In Germany, the IT services are performed

by the BWI-IT Company (Bundeswehr-In-dustrie Informationstechnik GmbH underthe HERKULES contract) for the routine du-ty at home. Within the meaning of a “home-land basis“ it also comprises activities provid-ed out of Germany for the support of forc-es in the missions. The strategic linking to thearea of operations is effected by the JointSupport Service (JSS). In missions, commandsupport is rendered by mobile forces of JSSand the Services/military organizational are-as. Civilian services or such from the domainof NATO or from allied armed forces may be

added to that. The Bundeswehr Joint Opera-tions Command sets, in its function as “De-mand Manager“, the operational require-ments for the command support in the mis-sions. The Joint Support Command assumesin its function as “Supply Manager“ the pro-cess responsibility for the total BundeswehrIT System. It ensures the command capabil-ity on national level, operates central net-works, access/transition points, and providescertain command and technical informationsystems. Its Bundeswehr IT System operationcenter is collocated with the BWI-IT operativemanagement center to guarantee a contin-

uous information and communication poolquasi “from the FMoD to the effector/weap-on emplacement“.

Almost the same applies to maritime trans-ports. Based on experiences gained, a part-nership was established with Denmark in or-der to get a “basic allowance“ of ships forstrategic-operational maritime transports.The chartering of ships on the so-called spotmarket produces in most cases even longerlead times than with aircraft. Denmark, as acontract party with the DFTS Thorline Ship-

yard, offers the Bundeswehr the possibilityto resort to one Roll on/Roll of and/or Loadon/Load off ship each within 15, 30 a well as60 days. This shipyard is, by the way, in theprocess of building two new, even more so-phisticated ships which are to be available formissions as of 2012.

The use of land and maritime transportshas meanwhile worked out for the follow-on support to Afghanistan as well. This isvery gratifying, especially since it is possible tosave a lot of money with it. The transit agree-ment with Russia is finally in force since April

on the basis of which about 30 large contain-ers „travel“ now weekly in the direction ofthe German ISAF contingent, leaving the portof dispatch at Mukran/Rugia/Germany, thenonwards by train ferry to Lithuania and thenvia Russia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to thefinal destination. Civilian contract companieslike IMEX in Darmstadt/Germany also carryout road transports on about the same routewhich require, just as with train transports, aperiod of about 25-30 days. Maritime trans-ports are carried out under framework freightcontracts via the port of Karachi/Pakistan inapprox. 30 days and subsequently by road

transport to Northern Afghanistan in abouta week’s time. These transports trough Paki-stan over the Kyber Mountain Pass are down-

collect a lot of experience, but there were al-so many measures taken which can be capi-talized on in current and new missions.

This has been producing a positive effectfor some years, especially in the farawayISAF mission. The supranational “Move-ment Coordination Center Europe“ in Ein-dhoven/The Netherlands coordinates trans-ports and means for numerous participat-

ing NATO and EU nations. Air transportsand air-to-air refueling are planned propor-tionally by the attached “Air Movement Co-ordination Center“. Based on the SALIS in-itiative of 16 nations, Germany has a pro-portional access to two civilian AN 124-100stationed at the Leipzig Operation Basewhich are to be made available within 72hours and to two additional ANTONOVeach which have to be available after sixand nine days, respectively. Nearly everythree days an ANTONOV loaded with vehi-cles and materiel is sent to Afghanistan. Ad-

ditional aircraft are provided primarily with-in the scope of the follow-on supply as percontracts with civilian transport companiessuch as DB Schenker Logistics or Kuehne &Nagel. Thus, the 2,000th logistic flight ofan Iljuschin 76 to Afghanistan since 2005took place in May 2011. Added to this aretransport aircraft of the Luftwaffe (Ger-man Air Force). Up until the new A400Mtransport aircraft of the EADS Company willbe delivered in probably 2014 and gradu-ally available for operational flights as of2016/18, personnel transports are restrict-ed to the A310 Airbus of the Special Air

Mission Wing of the Federal Ministry of De-fence and to the C-160 Transall for flight inthe area of operations.

Transall C-160 Transport Aircraft on Mission in Afghanistan Photo: FMoD




connaissance modules with suitable materi-al will be procured “off-the-shelf“ by 2013and kept available in the JSS. The first require-ments for reconnaissance parties and thequick establishment of camps and commandposts are to be met by combinable “150 sol-diers“ modules with stand-alone supplycomponents. A system “Camp Air Trans-portable Modular 150“ of the Kaercher Fu-

turetech Company as general contractor hasbeen available for quite some time.

So-called “quickly deployable camp sys-tems“ for larger-scale operations of addi-tional 7,000 response forces (RF) will be in-cluded in the planning as of 2012 at the ear-liest. The accommodation in missions for RFon the basis of provider contracts with a leadtime of three months could be an alterna-tive. In future, container solutions will con-stitute the basis for camps still more than todate. To that end, standardized 20-foot ISOcontainers furnished with functional built-

in fixtures/fittings are going to be a majormeans. Collapsible containers and so-calledcontainer-space modules for larger interior

and building designs will be added. Two spe-cial engineer battalions of JSS are availablefor setting up and dismantling and operat-ing camps and fuel system supply points asmilitary task.

Another option is to establish new infra-structure on a “greenfield site“. To be men-tioned here as an example is the central mili-tary real property for the majority of the Ger-man forces in Mazar-e-Sharif. The CampMarmal was built in five months in close co-operation between the Federal Defence Ad-ministration and armed forces and with thesupport by NAMSA (NATO Maintenance

and Supply Agency) for the aircraft operat-ing surfaces, as a mixture of mission infra-structure and camp. Used as basic materi-

pabilities basically needed in missions andexercises for a specified area of respon-sibility are cross-sectionally concentratedin these modules/platoons. Among otherthings these include forces/means for SAT-COM, mobile communications, and (trunk-ed) radio and IT-/LAN equipment. Addi-tionally integrated into the units are variousinnovative system/network management

elements which coordinate the mobile em-ployment of their means. The significanceof the assets of the JSS can grow even morein the near future as additional commandsupport forces from the Army, perhaps alsoof other military organizational areas, couldbe transferred there.

Accommodation

The accommodation of initial forces andof operating troops is an essential prerequi-

site for their operational readiness and sus-tainability. It must ultimately offer possibilitiesfor command and control, space to retreat as

well as protection, and be a “soldier’s home“.At the beginning, mobile accommodation invehicles, tents, with allies or possibly in rent-ed infrastructure is used for advance forces.The stationary accommodation in camps tobe set up by use of troop means is aimed foras quickly as possible in order to change overin prolonged missions to so-called “missioninfrastructure“ which lies in the responsibilityof the Federal Defence Administration. Build-ing infrastructure of the host nation may beused in all cases. Mobile camps/bivouacs arewell suited for missions of shorter duration orprovisionally up until the setup of the mission

infrastructure.Ten “modular air transportable camps“ for

about 1,500 soldiers and, in addition, two re-

Of great significance for the missions isthe information transmission and network-ing of all forces and elements which are co-ordinated by the Joint Support Commandin accordance with procedural necessities.The national command capability is ensuredby the linkage of the different areas of op-erations through broadband Stage 2 SAT-COMBw (ND SATCOM/SES ASTRA De-

fence - ground segment; EADS Space Servic-es - space segment), using various frequen-cy ranges of civilian and military satellites. Inaddition, the redundant wide area/long dis-tance network linkage is effected by the HFradio systems. In the areas of operation anIP (Internet Protocol)-based, flexibly adapta-ble core network is established by the JointSupport Service (JSS) and based on the “Bun-deswehr Mobile Communication System“.The network nodes/system teams of the net-work are linked by radio relay, satellite link-age, optical fiber links or also by use of public

networks. The core network is set up to con-nect so-called access networks and with thatthe communication means of the Services/ organizational areas, allowing an intercon-nection with the individual command posts/ camps/forces/means.

The command information systems arethe other important means for leading com-mand support to success in a comprehensiveway. The joint (inter-service) command in-formation system as well as central informa-tion systems for logistic/administrative appli-cations are operated in the missions by forc-es of the Joint Support Service. The introduc-

tion of these systems as well as of the com-mand information systems of the Services/ military organizational areas has been underway for some years already. It will take somemore time, however, until the equipping withthese systems and the final interlinkage willbe fully completed.

National connections must be ensured atthe onset of an operation, that is with thefirst reconnaissance missions and deploy-ments. To that end, available public net-works in the country of deployment, but pri-marily mobile satellite and HF links are made

use of. Banking on the means of the alliescan be helpful and should be addressed be-forehand. The expansion of the communi-cation networks within the aforementionedmeaning should be effected rapidly in orderto be basically prepared prior to the arrivalof major operating troops and command fa-cilities. This, of course, is dependent on thethreat situation. In insecure and unsafe sit-uations, command and control in the areaof operations is first and foremost to be en-sured via radio.

The companies of the command supportbattalions/Joint Support Service dispose of

two so-called DCM (Deployable Communi-cation and Information Module) with a per-sonnel strength of about 40 soldiers. All ca-

Transport Links for Follow-on Supply for German ISAF Mission Contingent Graphic: FMoD




est command, from the manufacturer downto the end user and foxhole. Within this ac-tion pool different supply chains are estab-lished in relation to the logistic requirementswhere the services are delivered and per-formed in accordance with the principles andprocedures of the “Supply Chain Manage-ment. Within the framework of the definedoperational logistic goals and objectives the

Joint Support Command bears the planningresponsibility for the rendering of logistics inmissions including the interfaces to the oper-ations logistics of the Services/military organ-izational areas and the other parties involved.

For the logistics in missions, all assets ofthe Bundeswehr will be brought into ac-tion. The tasks and responsibilities of the lo-gistic forces of the Services/organizationalareas are clearly regulated and subdividedinto the two areas of joint and operationslogistics. The joint logistics and with it pri-marily the follow-on supply as a basis of the

logistic support for German armed forcesis accomplished by JSS with its joint logis-tics base at home and the respective logis-tic bases in the area of operations. Impor-tant logistic capabilities of materiel man-agement and maintenance are performedout of the joint logistics base at home anddelivered to the logistics base in the ar-ea of operations and orders/activities aretaken back from there, respectively. Withthis support and additional logistic servic-es from other sources the logistics base inthe area of operations will then make upthe backbone for the logistics in the respec-

tive area of operations. A logistics opera-tions center of the commander of the logis-

tics base in the area of operations controlsfor the German contingent commander therendering of the services in logistics and as-

procedural process and reliability of the sup-ply and yields time savings, and cost-efficien-cy. Exaggeratedly described: when there isstill a „mild chaos“ at the beginning and sup-plies are delivered “from the palm of hand“,it happens that management processes andeconomic procedures are later on increasing-ly followed with good results.

The spider in the web of the action pool isthe JSS with its forces which is responsible forthe joint logistics of the Bundeswehr at homeand abroad. It bears the process responsibil-

ity for the logistics of the Bundeswehr. Thismeans that it has to combine all forces in the

action pool with the aim of providing effec-tive logistic support in missions and to ensurethe successful flow of logistics from the high-

al were protected container modules of theSABU Company which were delivered fromGermany by rail transport. As a mission in-frastructure, the camp has been in the re-sponsibility of the Federal Defence Adminis-tration since early 2008.

Logistic Support

The logistic support for German operatingtroops is a decisive, often unappreciated pre-

requisite for the success of the mission. Logis-tics with numerous measures and dependen-cies is not only extremely complex, but hasto be planned in good time prior to the be-ginning of a new mission and must possiblybe launched in preparation of such a mission.The materiel readiness of German troops inmissions abroad is - aside from the armedforces staying in Germany - guaranteed by alogistics action pool. This pool is composedof different military, civilian, and partly alsomultinational capabilities, forces, and proce-dures. Own forces must be kept in readiness

in order to ensure the supply at the begin-ning of an operation, but also in the processof it, especially in combat or in vulnerable ar-eas. This means also to keep reserve suppliesavailable in the areas of operations and at thebasis at home in a cost-effective, but sustain-able way. It is tried as early as possible to al-so include other forces and means, primari-ly from the civilian domain or by Host NationSupport (HNS) of host nations. The setup oflogistics follows principles and experienc-es gained from other missions, but in world-wide missions and different parametric con-ditions it is often to be tackled “by a random

shot“. Over the time of the operation the im-plementation is more and more and properlyadjusted to the principles which improves the

Camp, Air Transportable Modular Graphic: ES Archives

Logistic Troops on Mission




place where the bulk of the operating troopsis locally supplied. Outposts and field ware-houses are supported from there. All require-ments are first and foremost satisfied fromown stocks of joint logistics. Direct purchas-es from trade and industry are added to that.In addition to mobile and stationary mainte-nance facilities in the area of operations, the“civilian maintenance teams“ from contract-

ing companies/manufacturers contribute tothe maintenance, especially with regard tonew systems (e.g. HERON, KZO drone andsoon the BOXER or PUMA.

Not only the logistic support of Germanoperating forces is a complex undertaking.To politically and militarily plan missions inmultinational combine, to make respectivedecisions, to provide for the buildup, and tofrequently sustain over many years is timeand again a special and difficult challengeto all commanders and soldiers involved. Tosuccessfully survive in missions/operations, to

neutralize or eliminate enemy forces, to pro-tect the population and to win their hearts iswhat catches the eye and attracts attention.To make this possible and to permanentlysupport that by way of planning, all kinds ofpreparations, training, command and control

and command support, deployment, med-ical service, logistics, and other measures isof the same paramount significance. Thesetasks have been successfully performed inprevious and present missions of the Bun-deswehr, even though one had to learn newlessons again and again and to also acceptsome friction losses. í

By Dietmar Klos , Col. (ret.), Special Corre- spondent of EUROPÄISCHE SICHERHEIT for Army and Armament Topics

Mueritz materiel collecting depot by bankingon reserve supplies (stocks) from fixed logis-tic facilities as well as on procurements from

the industry. The transport of the supplies toAfghanistan and back has already been de-scribed in detail. The employment (oper-ations) reality of logistics is determined bythe actual facts on site. In theaters of opera-tion with heavy Army participation the logis-tics base in the area of operations, i.e. JSS, aswell as the Army’s operations logistics are co-alesced with each other. In Northern Afghan-

istan as well as in Bosnia-Herzegovina and inKosovo the large operation bases were cen-trally united at one location/camp. This is the

sesses holistically the logistic situation. Lo-gistic control elements of operations logis-tics control logistic services within their re-spective area of responsibility.

In the core of the mission accomplishmentof the logistics base in the area of operationsare the mobile logistic troops of the JSS. Theysupport deployments of German operatingforces, keep the initial stockage of suppliesavailable, deliver them on request, and car-ry out cross-sectional logistic tasks as well as

special tasks such as supply with rations orPX articles on a joint (inter-service) level. De-pending on the situation, they support thelogistic forces of operations logistics of theServices. If required, advanced logistic baseswill be set up.

Operations logistics is the third pillar of lo-gistics and geared to the military core capa-bility of the units on mission. It is justified bythe specific logistic requirements of the Ser-vices/military organizational areas due to itsdifferent operational principles and weaponsystems, respectively. In the Army, for exam-

ple, logistic capabilities and troops are availa-ble in the brigades as well as for the divisionaltroops to allow the immediate supply of thetroops of the Army in the entire range of op-erations. With that it is possible to offer theArmy forces a temporary and regional sus-tainability and thus independence from thefollow-on supply in the area of operations.Trains in the units will be added for immedi-ate supply measures.

The example of ISAF/Afghanistan clearlyshows the procedure in today’s missions. Theexecution of the follow-on supply from the

joint logistics base at home is effected by the

Bundeswehr Logistics Center with the “Ma-teriel Management Center for BundeswehrMissions/Operations“ at Hesedorf and the

Logistic Action Pool Graphic: FMoD

Repair Work during Employment with ISAF in Afghanistan Photo: FMoD




The security challenges faced by theWestern community of states today are

characterized by two developments. On the

one hand, they have considerably increasedin complexity and, on the other hand, theyare subject to a constant change in theirconcrete nature and quality.

There is general consensus that the presentcrises and conflicts can lastingly be solved on-ly by way of a holistic, interdepartmental, andmultinational approach. Viewed in this light,the requirements set for the armed forc-es have further increased. In addition, a dis-tinct increase in the number of the missionsof armed forces conducted within the scopeof international conflict prevention and crisismanagement is being noted as well.

Thus, we are presently in a situation wherethe operational challenges to be met by the

armed forces have experienced both an ex-pansion of the mission spectrum and an in-crease in the complexity and frequency ofmissions. At the same time, the defencebudgets are exposed to a high financial pres-sure which, among other things, is fueled bysoaring prices for armament/weapons, thediscontinuation of an existence-threateningmilitary threat as well as by national financialconstraints and austerity programs.

Modern air forces are expensive. And thereis no prospect of a decisive change in theabove described parametric conditions. Thisraises the question of how the air forces need

to be tailored and orientated to enable themto make a substantial contribution within thescope of the national security provisions over

political and criminal misuse potential. Here,one should think of the dangers posed by cy-ber attacks or the proliferation of weapons of

mass destruction and dissemination of carri-er/delivery means technologies.

Apart from these threats which also affectthe German territory including its inhabitantsthere are additional risks emerging which, forinstance, are caused by climate change, mi-gration or social, ethnic, and religious ten-sions.

The increasing complexity and volatilityof the security environment is enhanced byglobal shifts of power. The fight for resourc-es that become increasingly scarcer as well asthe struggle for political influence and access

to markets can lead to serious tensions andcrises which can result in direct consequenc-es for Germany’s security even though thisoccurs, geographically seen, far way fromhome.

Role of the Armed Forces

In this context, an interdepartmental/in-terministerial approach is imperative to safe-guard national interests. This requires a com-prehensive set of instruments which, interalia, includes political, diplomatic, develop-

ment aid policy and economic, police as wellas military measures and means.

Aside from the capability to protect its ter-ritory and its citizens, Germany’s capacity toact in security policy matters is also based on

the long term. Only if the avails generated bythe air forces in this conjunction justify theexpenses necessary for that will they be able

to permanently maintain their relevance as anational security policy instrument.

Security Parameters

In the past 20 years Germany was, as hard-ly any other state, able to profit from the in-creasing stability in the Euro-Atlantic region.From a country divided at the demarcationline between NATO and Warsaw Pact, Ger-many has become a nation surrounded bypartners in the Euro-Atlantic stabilization ar-

ea.A direct territorial threat with conventionalmilitary means does not exist today and notin the foreseeable future either. Therefore,national (territorial) defence means now andin future primarily alliance defence on andbeyond the borders of the alliance area.

The bomber fleets of the former WarsawPact were supplanted by other, more ab-stract threats. Although these appear lesstangible, they are not less dangerous in con-crete individual cases. Terror attacks such asthe one on September 11, 2011 have clear-ly shown this.

In the course of the globalization theworldwide access to technology and infor-mation was made possible with virtually norestrictions. This entails not only great chanc-es, but also considerable risks by the inherent

“Luftwaffe 2020“ as an Instrumentof German Security Policy

Aarne Kreuzinger-Janik

Lieutenant General Aarne Kreuzinger-Janik hasbeen in Office as Chief of Air Force Staff since 29October 2009 Photo: FMoD

Within the scope of the “Air Policing Baltic States“ the Luftwaffe has repeatedly taken on the respon-sibility for the safety/security in the Airspace Over Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The picture showsan F-4F PHANTOM II during takeoff Photo: Luftwaffe




and the Laender (States), the Luftwaffe guar-antees the protection of the German popu-lation and critical infrastructure against non-military threats from the air.

A significant contribution is made for thenational security provisions by a steady up-date/compilation and evaluation of the airsituation as well as by - if required - the re-course to the NATO alert sections which arekept operationally ready around the clock. Inthis context, updating and assessment of thesituation and conduct/control of operationsare effected from the “National Situation

and Operation Center for Airspace Security“within the meaning of the networked securi-ty in concert with the Federal Ministry of theInterior, the Federal Ministry of Defence, and

successfully secured from the North Capedown to East Anatolia for decades already.The Luftwaffe ensures the sovereignty ofthe German airspace within the scope of thisair defence system to which we contributewith our Air Force component headquar-ters/operation centers, sensors, and fight-er aircraft. Moreover, the Luftwaffe has dis-charged these tasks for the Baltic States andIceland several times already. This importantand well-proven contribution as an expres-sion of lived alliance solidarity will not shrinkin significance in the future either and is go-

ing to be continued.Within the scope of the continuous oper-

ational mission “Security in Airspace“ as asupport effort for the Federal Government

its alliance capability. Here, the armed forcescan significantly contribute to that. I am go-ing to elaborate on the contributions of theLuftwaffe in more detail in the following.

From a military point of view, the most im-portant alliances, NATO and EU, are institu-tions based on solidarity and burden shar-ing. Germany - just as all other members -must therefore be willing and able to makean adequate military contribution to securepeace and prosperity within the Euro-Atlan-tic framework according to its internationalstanding and economic power.

In order to be able to meet the require-ments with regard to the protective functionand the alliance capability against the back-ground of the above stated security parame-ters, efficient armed forces continue to be anindispensable instrument of German securitypolicy. On the one hand they must be capa-ble of guaranteeing an effective protectionof Germany and its citizens on the basis of anexpanded, networked security comprehen-sion and, on the other hand, of effectivelycountering a looming security threat alreadyat the place of origin, if possible. This necessi-

tates a broad range of capabilities which canbe brought to effect with quick reaction on aworldwide scale.

Contribution of the Luftwaffe

As regards their concrete configurationthe protection and the alliance capabili-ty of Germany are already closely interwo-ven with the mission structures of the Luft-waffe. The collective protection of NATO ter-ritory and thus also the mission to safeguardthe integrity of the airspace against military

threats has been and will be one of the coretasks of the alliance. In the Integrated NA-TO Air Defence system the airspace has been

By the buildup of a Space Situation Center the Luftwaffe is expanding its contribution within the scope of national protection tasks Photo: ES Archives

In NATO’ current Strategic Concept the antimissile defence constitutes a new core element of collectivedefence. The picture shows a MEADS (Medium Extended Air Defence System) study Photo: ES Archives



the Federal Ministry for Building and UrbanDevelopment.

In a similar interdepartmental/interminis-terial and multinational architecture we areabout to set up a “Space Situation Center“which will make its information available tonon-military (public) agencies/users as well.

In addition, the Luftwaffe keeps perma-nently available the necessary military air

transport capacities needed for worldwiderescue and evacuation of German citizens.

Aside from these national protection ef-forts, the field of “alliance capability“ re-quires also the provision of capabilities foralliance defence as well as for internationalconflict prevention and crisis management.

The capabilities required for making na-tional protection contributions are clearly de-fined as airspace and/or outer space surveil-lance, airspace control, conduct/control ofoperations, air defence, and air transport. Incontrast to that, the derivation of the capabil-

ities necessary for accomplishing the tasks ofalliance defence as well as conflict preventionand crisis management is neither simply norexplicitly possible. The related mission spec-trum ranges from high-intensive battle viastabilization operations, observer missions aswell as advisory and support efforts up to hu-manitarian relief actions. Security and polit-ico-military analyses of potential future mis-sion scenarios produce again and again theresult according to which probabilities of oc-currence for individual scenarios are not as-certainable; as a consequence, it is not pos-

agement to be considered under the aspectof alliance capability are multifarious and ofdifferent relevance. I will therefore confinemyself to the exemplary description of se-lected capabilities which in my view gener-ate an added value on the strategic level bytheir opening up possibilities of action in se-curity policy matters which would not beavailable without respectively enabled air

forces. By their inherent features and quali-ties the air forces allow short-term and flexi-ble worldwide security reactions in the formof doseable military mission options. Theserange from a passive presence in the area ofinterest (e.g. in the form of airborne recon-naissance means) via the direct physical pres-ence in the theater of operations (e.g. in theform of pre-stationed aircraft) up to strate-gic effects (e.g. in the form of engaging ene-my high-value targets). Independent of theirrespective concrete peculiarity, it is necessaryto possess the capabilities for air transport,

for reconnaissance, and for the operation ofan airbase in the area of operations in orderto be able to open up these strategic options.In addition, air forces open up strategic mis-sion option for land and naval forces by cre-ating the necessary preconditions for theiremployment. This applies particularly to thegaining and maintaining of a favorable air sit-uation as a prerequisite for the effective con-duct of operations of the ground-based forc-es including their protection by means of airattack capability. Additional important keyelements in this conjunction are reconnais-

sible to make reliable statements about pri-marily needed capabilities. General consen-sus is the conclusion that it is necessary tohave a broad capability spectrum available.This should also have a high flexibility with-in the meaning of a short-term adaptabilityto current mission requirements. From this itfollows that the Luftwaffe should keep readyfor Germany adequate capabilities in the en-

tire spectrum of air power - ranging from airattack via air defence up to supporting air op-erations.

Relevance of the Luftwaffe

In the introduction of this article I have stat-ed that air forces can lastingly maintain theirsignificance as a security instrument only ifthe avails generated by them justify the nec-essary expenses for that. When looking at thenational protection contributions of the Luft-

waffe described in the previous section it canbe established that in case of an abandon-ment of the related capabilities the protectionagainst attacks from the air as well as the ca-pability for worldwide rescue and evacuationof German citizens would not be available an-ymore and that the alliance capability wouldat least be restricted. I therefore conclude thatair forces capable of performing these protec-tion functions are indispensable for Germany.

The possible contributions of the Luft-waffe to alliance defence as well as to inter-national conflict prevention and crisis man-

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structures and processes featuring a consist-ent mission orientation. The command or-ganization will be streamlined by the poolingof responsibilities and the reduction of hier-archical levels (delayering). And the adminis-trative control and specialist (technical) tasks,including advancement and training, will bepooled to an even greater extent. In a coun-termove, the operational units are going to

be strengthened. The concentration of forc-es and assets will allow an efficient employ-ment of resources. The Luftwaffe will - in fu-ture, too - provide its contributions to themission accomplishment of the Bundeswehralways in the form of capability-based mis-sion modules. In this manner it is possible toattain maximum flexibility and efficiency asoperations contingents can be assembledin a mission-oriented way and largely inde-pendent of the unit structures existing in rou-tine duty at home. Core of the well-provenmodularity principle is the flexible provision

of actually demanded forces for the opera-tion which ultimately allows the projection ofa broad capability spectrum with a clearly re-duced number of forces.

On the basis of these examples in the con-text of the further development of the Luft-waffe it becomes apparent that the preser-vation of the strategic relevance requires acomprehensive approach which encompass-es all decisive factors for the security-politi-cal cost-benefit ratio ranging from geopolit-ical changes up to the structural key (classifi-cation) criteria. Therefore, I regard the prom-inent projection of a respective responsibili-

ty for the advancement within the Luftwaffeas indispensable for the future Bundeswehr.

Future Action Fields ofthe Luftwaffe

I have highlighted the importance of thefurther development for the preservation ofthe strategic relevance of the Luftwaffe inthe previous section. In this context, the fu-ture viability and qualification constitutes anessential design criterion in the fine planning

of the “Luftwaffe 2020“. Future qualificationmeans that foreseeable developments arebeing reacted on so early that, when thereis a concrete demand at a later date, the re-spective capability will be available in the re-quired scope and shape without any time de-lay, if possible. Here, there are three influencevariables whose negative effects interact andintensify each other, thus significantly ham-pering the achievement of objectives. Theseare: the duration and complexity of proce-dures and processes (especially in the field ofarmaments); the great uncertainty in respectto the concrete configuration and organiza-

tion of future missions; as well as the prioriza-tion of current mission requirements in a sit-uation of scarce and limited resources. In or-

dissolution or formation of international de-fence alliances), but also achievements in thetechnological field (e.g. acquirement of thecapability for the employment of multistageballistic delivery means) can affect the stra-tegic action options. Within the scope of itsnational protection contribution the Luft-waffe must thus brace itself up for foresee-able threats to our nationally relevant outerspace infrastructure and those posed by bal-listic delivery means. Within the scope of the

task of conflict prevention and crisis manage-ment the security-political weight of a Ger-man military contribution does not only de-pend on the range of the available capabilityspectrum, but also on the coalition capabil-ity of German armed forces. The qualitativepeculiarity of available capabilities and therespective specific sustainability are decisivecriteria here. Following an analysis of expe-riences so far gained in missions and in viewof foreseeable future security challenges, theLuftwaffe has, as a consequence, made achange of emphasis within its performance

spectrum. In doing so, resources were shift-ed away from the capability to combat ene-my air warfare potentials towards the impor-tant key capabilities of reconnaissance andsurveillance as well as air transports.

The adaptation of the structures and pro-cesses established for the projection of thecapability spectrum can also be referred to aspreservation of/increase in efficiency. The re-peatedly stated cost-benefit ratio which is al-so decisive for the strategic value of the Luft-waffe can not only be improved by an in-crease in the benefit (effectiveness), but al-so by a reduction of the expenses (resourc-

es). This goal will be achieved with the op-timization of the projection of the capabili-ty spectrum. The “Luftwaffe 2020“ will have

sance and surveillance as well as air transportcapabilities.

In summary it can be said that the Luft-waffe is absolutely essential and vital for theaccomplishment of national protection tasks,and by opening up unique options of actionit generates a clear added value in securitypolicy on the strategic level.

Further Development

of the Luftwaffe

If the strategic scope of action preset bypolitics is basically projected by the capabili-ty spectrum, the preservation of this strate-gic value will then be the ultimate goal in theadvancement of the Luftwaffe - both with-in the scope of a continuous, requirement-re-lated adaptation of the capability spectrumand the drastic changes to be expected forthe purpose of the current realignment ofthe Bundeswehr.

To that end it is necessary to pursue two

basic lines. On the one hand it is the contin-uous adaptation of the capability spectrumto the steadily changing military challengesand, on the other hand, the continuous op-timization of the structures and processes es-tablished for the projection of this capabili-ty spectrum. The current fine planning of thefuture Luftwaffe - the „Luftwaffe 2020“ -takes this approach into account.

The adaptation of the capability spectrumcan also be referred to as the preservation ofand/or increase in the effectiveness. In thiscontext it is essential to maintain the prede-termined strategic action options in spite of

the changes in the operational environment.This is a highly complex and challenging taskas not only changes of global dimension (e.g.

The EUROFIGHTER is an essential element of the NATO alert section kept combat ready by the Luft-waffe around the clock Photo: Eurofighter




Luftwaffe has to take the responsibility for abroad task spectrum under a high pressureof resources. Based on the obvious threat de-velopment in NATO’s new Strategic Conceptthe antimissile defence constitutes, as a inte-gral component of air defence, a new coreelement of collective defence. The expertiseand experiences existing in the Luftwaffe forthat purpose justify our competence leader-ship in Europe. They should be capitalized onin future as well and even more expanded inorder to actively support and help shape thebuildup of NATO’s antimissile defence. This

capability, too, would further complementthe contribution within the scope of nationalprotection tasks.

Air Surface Integration (ASI)

There are presently most diverse concep-tual considerations going on both on nation-al and multinational level within the mean-ing of a joint and combined conduct of op-erations to optimize the synergetic co-actingof ground, air, and naval forces in the areaof operations. For the further development

of the Luftwaffe we summarize these effortsunder the term “Air Surface Integration“. ASIrepresents in this context the comprehensive,networked and coordinated planning andsynchronization with, and integration intoground and naval forces of specific Air Forcecapabilities available in an area of operations.

Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)

With the introduction of UAS the Ger-man armed forces will get new functionali-ties for the fields of surveillance, area recon-naissance, target acquisition, and poststrike

reconnaissance; and current and futuremissions can’t be imagined without themany more. By the integration of UAS in-

cance was recently and expressly corrobo-rated by particularly the Strategic Concept ofNATO.

Military Use of Outer Space

The significance of the near-Earth spacefor the viability of modern societies is consid-ered immense. With the buildup of the spacesituation center the Luftwaffe provides thedecisive assessment competence and exper-tise in regard to the processes of that placefor the operations planning of the armed

forces as well as for the risk management ofthe Federal Government. It expands thus itscontribution within the framework of nation-al protection tasks.

Antimissile Defence

With the assumption of all tasks ofground-based and airborne air defence, the

der to minimize the impact of these influencevariables, it is necessary to achieve today al-ready both maximum flexibility and adapta-bility in the configuration of the performancespectrum of the “Luftwaffe 2020“. Promi-nent example for that is the multirole-capa-ble and modular design of manned and un-manned platforms.

Within the scope of the analysis of futurerequirements the Luftwaffe has identifiedseveral development lines whose importancefor the future qualification is rated as partic-ularly significant. In the sequel, the four fields

“military use of outer space“, “antimissile de-fence“, “air surface integration“, and “un-manned aircraft systems“ were eventuallyidentified as points of main effort in the fur-ther development of the Luftwaffe. The fourfuture fields of action are embedded in the

continuous advancement of the Luftwaffeacross the entire capability spectrum, includ-ing their implementation. Their high signifi-

For airborne imaging reconnaissance the Luftwaffe presently uses in Afghanistan the UAS HERON 1 originating in Israel which can operate up to an alti-tude of 13 km Photo: ES Archives

The A310-304 MRTT (Multi Role Transport Tanker) aircraft is employed by the Luftwaffe in the re-spective roles as passenger plane, cargo aircraft, tanker, and for the transport of wounded and sickpersonnel Photo: ES Archives




setup of two training and protection battal-ions as mobile elements of the operationscommand in order to specifically free areas

from insurgents and to create the conditionsfor a transfer into Afghan security responsi-bility and a successful civilian reconstruction.

The number of terror attacks and openfightings with the insurgents have consider-able increased in consequence of the aug-mentation and the more active acting of theISAF troops in all Afghan regions. As a result,the number of victims on the side of the co-alition forces continued to rise and the re-quirements to be met by the Medical Ser-vice in respect to emergency medical treat-ment (EMT), transport/evacuation, and in-

patient treatment of wounded personnel in-creased as expected. With 13,000 ISAF sol-diers and about 26,000 Afghan security forc-es with the Army and Police, there are ap-prox. 39,000 security forces available in theRC North who need to be medically support-ed in a multinational combine and in coac-tion with the Afghan Medical Service.

Aside from that, the stipulations for thetimelines of the casualty evacuation were al-so adapted by the ISAF headquarters in Ka-bul. When hitherto a maximum of 90 min-

utes were the time standard between the re-ceipt of an emergency call/message in themilitary command center and the arrival ofthe wounded personnel in a surgical supportfacility, the ISAF commander, General David

Petraeus, has shortened this time allowanceto 60 minutes. Such an ambition serves thewelfare and care for the entrusted soldiers,

Forces of the Medical Service of the Bun-deswehr have been employed as part of

the German mission contingent within thescope of the ISAF mission in Afghanistansince January 2002. Whereas the basic re-quirements set for the quality of the medicalsupport remained unchanged since then,the strength, structure, and capabilities ofthe Medical Service have been constantlyadapted to the changing operational para-

metric conditions.With the transfer from the direct environ-ment of the capital of Kabul to the assump-tion of the responsibility in the region in2006, a highly dynamic and large-scale op-erations command evolved from a relative-ly static employment of the German forc-es. The area of operations of the ISAF Re-gional Command (RC) North under Germancommand encompasses nine provinces withabout ten million inhabitants, a third of theAfghan population. To protect this popu-

lation from the influence of the Taliban andto train the Afghan security forces for theirtasks are the strategic priorities of the ISAFoperations command within the scope of the“Counterinsurgency Operations“ concept.

An essential step in the adaptation of theBundeswehr contingent to these new stand-ards and objectives in the past year was the

to the “reconnaissance, command, effect,and support pool“ the Luftwaffe makes asignificant contribution within the scope of

joint and combined Network Enabled Op-erations (NEO) to an improvement of effec-tiveness and efficiency. Our focus is on theoperation of UAS with a power spectrumexceeding that of tactical drones. The em-ployment requires appropriately licensed

personnel for the control of the aerial seg-ments and generally necessitates the ex-istence of solid infrastructure. Continuousairborne surveillance and reconnaissanceof large-scale areas of interest far into thedepth of the theater of operations contrib-utes considerably to an improvement of thesituation picture and the decision quality onall command levels.

The Luftwaffe intends to continue to investinto these fields which are considered highlyimportant for the future qualification, as weare convinced that the overall system “Bun-

deswehr“ will be sustainably strengthenedwith it.

Summary and Conclusion

The significance and weight of air forcesare measured by their additional strategic val-ue in the form of security-political options ofaction and the resources to be expended forthat.

In my opinion Germany cannot do withoutefficient air forces due to its national iden-tity (self-conception), its aspiration (ambi-

tion), and its international position. Also, ad-ditional opportunities open up from the ap-proach emerging in the international contextof “pooling and sharing“ in which the Luft-waffe will actively take part in.

Getting its additional strategic value is theprime goal of the further development of theLuftwaffe. Needed to that end is a continu-ous adaptation of the capability spectrum tothe constantly changing military challengesas well as a steady optimization of structuresand processes established for the projectionof this capability spectrum. For adequately

discharging this comprehensive task it is vi-tal that the structural projection of the cor-responding responsibility and competence isgiven within the Luftwaffe, i.e. as it is provid-ed for in the “Luftwaffe 2020“ project.

The Luftwaffe has realized the significanceof the configuration criterion “future qualifi-cation“ and takes it consistently into accountwithin the scope of its further development.

The Luftwaffe will actively help in shapingthe reorientation of the Bundeswehr and reli-ably make its contribution in future as well toensure Germany’s security-political capacityto act. í

By LtGen Aarne Kreuzinger-Janik,Chief of Staff, Air Force

Current Challenges to the MedicalService in the ISAF Mission

Dirk Stölten

Entrance Area to German Field Hospital Photo: FMoD




Both the engineer corps of the Armyand the Joint Support Service (JSS)

have always been an integral part of Ger-

man mission contingents. Irrespective ofa particular area of operations, the engi-neers make an essential contribution toenhancing the survivability. Especially inAfghanistan they constitute an significantcomponent of combat support. They playa major part by their creating of short-term, tactical infrastructure just as bytheir rendering of direct engineer supportfor the operations of the combat troops.The capability spectrum of the engineercorps as an indispensable element of theoperating forces has changed in the past

three years in the same way as the struc-tures of the mission contingents. Moreo-ver, the projection of engineer expertiseon the level of the Regional CommandNorth has sustainably changed as well,aside from the structures of the differentengineer companies. The most significantaspects of the reorientation of the engi-neer troops in Afghanistan are describedhereinafter in detail. In this context it isalso intended to show that there is an ad-ditional demand for adaptations supple-mentary to the steps already taken.

Separation of Capabilities

Up until March 2010, the engineers ofthe German ISAF mission contingent werea component of the logistic support bat-talion. Here, they formed the fifth compa-ny where the capabilities of the special en-gineers from JSS were integrated with acamp construction and operation platoonas well as with an engineer pipeline pla-toon. The Army provided forces in the formof an engineer reconnaissance squad, an

armored engineer platoon, an engineerequipment platoon and an engineer drill-ing squad. Added to them was an NBCdecontamination platoon with the maintasks of water purification/treatment anddisinfection. Within the scope of the setupof an independent armored engineer com-pany in 22nd German ISAF contingent, thesegments originating from the Army andfrom the Joint Support Service were sep-arated from each other. The JSS elementsremained in the logistic support battalionwhereas the Army troops including theNBC defence units were transferred and

integrated into the independent armoredengineer company. The organization tak-en up was of temporary nature, however,

and was changed once again in the 23rdGerman mission contingent with the for-mation of the two training and protection

battalions. This step was a major cut in thequalitative and quantitative shaping of theengineer forces.

More Engineers –More Capabilities

During the period of the employment ofthe 23rd German ISAF mission contingent,a marked change was implemented withregard to the organization and strength ofthe German ISAF engineer forces. The ma-

jority of actions in Afghanistan are coun-terinsurgency operations which can basi-cally be subdivided into four phases called“shape, clear, hold, and build“. During the“shape“ phase, all the prerequisites arecreated for the other phases. In the “clear“phase, the insurgents are actively forcedout of a region which is then in the “hold“phase held by permanent presence of ISAFor Afghan security forces in order to ad-vance in the “build“ phase the reconstruc-tion by changing from military to civilianresources. To be able to pursue this ap-proach it is necessary to have forces which

are sufficiently robust, especially for the„clear“ phase, and sustainable enough inthe „hold“ phase to establish a permanentpresence in an area.

For that purpose, two training andprotection battalions were activated inMazar-e-Sharif and Kunduz, consisting of

two infantry companies each, a mixed re-connaissance company, and one armoredengineer company. In this process, the en-

gineers have, for the first time, been inte-grated into a unit below the brigade lev-el. The training and protection battalionsallowed thus to make up combat units in-to which a major part of their combat sup-port has been directly integrated. In the ar-mored engineer companies they disposeof an engineer reconnaissance squad, anarmored engineer platoon with elementsof armored engineer equipment, an engi-neer equipment platoon as well as an ex-plosive ordnance defence platoon.

The Mazar-e-Sharif training and pro-

tection battalion has in addition an NBCdecontamination platoon whose prima-ry tasks encompass disinfection and wa-ter purification. As this unit possesses thecapability to establish a forward operatingbase (FOB) the number of billets of the or-ganic armored engineer company is thushigher than with the sister unit, the Kun-duz training and protection battalion. Itis about both the forces of the NBC de-contamination platoon and the engineerequipment forces which are to carry outthe necessary construction work for estab-lishing the FOB. The capacities for the con-

struction and operation of camps are nolonger projected in the two armored en-gineer companies. They are ensured bythe special engineer forces which continueto be a component of the logistic supportbattalion. Close interaction of the engi-neer forces of the Army and of JSS is there-

Reorientation of the Corpsof Engineers in Afghanistan

Oliver Kobza

Changes of ISAF Engineer Units up until 2010 Graphics: Oliver Kobza




confirming prior to the start of construc-tion projects that the area or building site

is clear of explosive ordnance. The person-nel are equipped with comprehensive op-tical and technical detection and manip-ulation means, but can be employed in adismounted mode only and are therefore,at present, not comparable with the U.S.“Route Clearance Packages (RCP)“. Thiscapability is presently not yet possible tobe projected by German forces. The detec-tion means can be advanced by the intro-

duction of additional capabilities. A sub-stantial augmentation for this platooncould be achieved by the integration ofhound (detection) dogs with the capabil-ity for area and standoff-capable pinpointsearch.

In total, the capability mix within the ar-

mored engineer companies of the train-ing and protection battalions constitutes ahighly effective approach of engineer sup-

in the camps only. Because of the resultantrestriction in their employment capabili-

ty, the equipping with unprotected engi-neer machines should therefore be newlyassessed. A complete allowance with pro-tected engineer equipment seems to beadvisable. Lacking protection and the highstresses the equipment is subjected to re-sult in the fact that occasionally less than athird of the German engineer equipmentavailable in Afghanistan can be employedoutside of enclosed camps. The fleet of ve-

hicles/machines should therefore be mod-ernized or, alternatively, the volume of theequipment be increased to be able to com-pensate for losses. The explosive ordnancedefence platoon has forces for clearingand removing/destroying explosive ord-nance; the platoon can be employed for

both the exact, pinpoint detection/loca-tion and clearance/disposal of explosivedevices as well as for area search, e.g. for

fore indispensable for the establishment ofan FOB.

The armored engineer companies of thetraining and protection battalions disposeof a broad spectrum of capabilities whichcan be made available for the support ofthe combat troops. With their engineerreconnaissance teams and their FENNEKscout vehicles they are thus able to deter-

mine and assess the trafficability of roadsand bridges and to make in this way an im-portant contribution to the picture of thesituation. This capability is highly benefi-cial for both the targeted preparation ofoperations and the general updating ofthe situation picture.

With their armored engineer platoonsthe companies dispose of forces for imme-diate engineer support which have manu-al and mechanical skills, limited reconnais-sance options, and the capability to giveengineer advice right on the scene. Fur-

thermore, the armored engineer squadwith two DACHS combat engineer vehi-cles 2 are part of this platoon just as thearmored vehicle launched bridge (AVLB)squad with two BIBER armored bridge-layers and a total of five AVLBs. Support-ed by the armored engineer squads, theseforces are essential components of com-bat support. The combat engineer vehi-cles can prepare bridging sites, create by-passes and contribute to anenhancement of the surviv-ability by a hardening of ter-rain sections; whereas the

BIBERs with their bridges areregularly used to quickly re-place destroyed bridges orto create new crossings andthus to decisively assist ownmovements. The combinedemployment of these vehicletypes has proved particularlywell. Due to high employmentstress and demanding climat-ic conditions, the expenditurefor these vehicles, which arevaluable means of employ-

ment, for servicing and main-tenance is assessed to be veryhigh.

The forces of the combatsupport engineer platoon willbe employed whenever a low-er protection in the construc-tion work is sufficient an a higher rangeof construction capabilities is required.This subunit has both protected and un-protected engineer equipment of differ-ent types. It is capable of constructingmakeshift roads and carrying out nearlyall earthworks and constructional main-

tenance tasks. Considering the treat situ-ation in Afghanistan, the unprotected en-gineer equipment can be employed with-

Structure of Armored Engeneer Companies of the Training and Protection Battalions

Employment of DACHS Combat Engineer Vehicle 2 in the Area of Baghlan Photo: Steffen Monier




five German and three U.S. military per-sonnel. These originated from 2nd (U.S.)Engineer Battalion and 176th (U.S.) Engi-neer Brigade which provided route clear-ance capacities in the form of four routeclearance packages on the one hand andconstruction capabilities and planning ca-pacities for the Regional Command Northon the other hand. In the 24th mission

contingent the German soldiers originat-ed from 8th Mountain Engineer Battalion;they were subsequently relieved by fellowsoldiers of 1st Armored Engineer Battal-ion. The division chief - Chief Engineer -position was hitherto manned by either abattalion commander or by a deputy bat-talion commander of the German engi-neer corps which guaranteed a continu-ous high quality of engineer advisory sup-port and which resulted in an adequaterepresentation in the international envi-ronment of the headquarters of Region-

al Command North. Compared with theheadquarters of other regional commandswhich have engineer divisions mannedwith a considerably higher number of per-sonnel, there is still a backlog demandwith Regional Command North, however.On the one hand it is imperative to avoidvacancies, especially with the field gradeofficers; on the other hand it is particular-ly the field of infrastructure tasks which

should have a better manning. Addition-ally expedient would be a second opera-tions officer who, in case of a spin-off ofthe advanced command post of Region-al Command North, could assume the en-gineer advisory task on site without leav-ing a gap in the CJEngr division in this way.

When the engineers in the headquar-ters were formerly subordinate to the Dep-uty Chief of Staff (DCOS) Support and thus

manently changed in the headquarters ofRegional Command North in 2010. Here,the Combined Joint Engineer Division wasformed which is responsible for both theadvising of the commander of the Region-al Command and for coordinating the en-

gineer employment in the German as wellas in the attached multinational engi-neer forces. Projected in its organization-al structure are the fields of operations,planning, and NATO infrastructure tasks,with the manpower being provided in partonly. According to plan, the division has -aside from the Chief Engineer and the di-vision NCO - one field grade officer eachfor ops/plans and infrastructure at its dis-

posal. Also assigned to them are an infra-structure officer, an operations officer,and a planning officer. They are supple-mented by liaison officers of the U.S. en-gineer units in the area of Regional Com-mand North. During the periods of the24th and 25th ISAF mission contingents

neither the ops/plans officer nor the in-frastructure office posts were manned,however. The division consisted thus of

port. With that the unit possesses all en-gineer capabilities required for the sup-port of own operations. Constant adapta-tions of the capabilities and especially ofthe equipment and the allowance volumesto the requirements of the Afghan mission

reality are nevertheless mandatory.Examples to be stated here for this ad-aptation requirement are the route clear-ance capability and the immediate engi-neer support with with engineer equip-ment on the move. As to route clearanceit can be said that the German engineertroops are presently working on the build-up of this capability and that this capabil-ity gap is to be closed by the beginning of2012. The immediate engineer supportwith engineer equipment on the movewas so far not possible to be smoothly pro-vided by the procurement of the equip-

ment. The engineer equipment employedin Afghanistan to-date are either heavy ar-mored tracked vehicles which cannot beemployed in every terrain or it is protectedequipment which cannot reach the nec-essary speed and maintain it over long-er distances, respectively. They need thusto be transported and unloaded at poten-tial employment locations under high ex-penditure of time provided the spatial con-ditions on the site of a march interrup-tion permit this anyway. The procurementof a protected engineer machine/vehicle

which can autonomously (self-powered)be integrated into a march column has ba-sically been decided on, but has yet to berealized. The requirement for that still ex-ists unchanged and ought to be met toachieve a necessary adaptation of the ca-pabilities.

Combined Joint EngineerDivision in Regional

Command North

In addition to the activation of the train-

ing and protection battalions with their ar-mored engineer companies, the qualityof the engineer advisory system was per-

CJEngr-Branch in Regional Command North

Employment of Protected Engineer Equipment Photo: Bernd Lothar Frei




in the broadest sense associated with logis-tics, a changeover was effected in the 23rdmission contingent. Since then the division ispart of the Security Division and subordinateto the Director Operations and the DCOSSecurity. The tasks of the engineers of theCJEngr division are placed both in the fieldof Security and in the field of the SupportDivision, but the organizational assignment

to the field of security is most likely in con-formity with the extent of the principal coor-dination and communication links within theheadquarters of Regional Command North.The close cooperation with the Support Di-vision is essential and imperative in especiallythe field of infrastructure because of the dis-tribution of responsibilities for different sub-areas. The field of infrastructure requires theprocessing and handling of NATO infrastruc-ture, accommodation in missions, and tac-tical infrastructure. The responsibilities forthat lie with the CJEngr division on the one

hand and with the CJ4 division of the Re-gional Command North on the other hand.In other regional commands these responsi-bilities are combined with the engineers inpackages. A respective adaptation wouldpresumably result in a reduction of the coor-dination effort.

An Essential Stepwas Taken

By adopting the new operational organ-ization within the training and protection

battalions an important step forward wastaken in improving the engineer supportboth qualitatively and quantitatively. Theavailability of forces has been decisively en-hanced and the engineer advisory systemwas elevated to a new level by the creationof the CJEngr division. In view of the pro-gresses achieved it is now essential, how-ever, to carry on the work on that and topersist with the new course. The plannedmerging of the tasks “explosive ordnanceclearance“ and “explosive ordnance dispos-al“ to „explosive ordnance defence“ un-

der the aegis of the engineer corps opensup new possibilities both for the operat-ing companies and the distribution of tasksin the headquarters of the Regional Com-mand. The mission reality in Afghanistanrequires a permanent adaptation or expan-sion of the available engineer capabilities.This requirement should implicitly be tak-en account of within the meaning of an up-grading of the engineer support in missionsas it has already been initiated in the case ofroute clearance and with the procurementof protected engineer equipment. í

By LTC Oliver Kobza , Cdr 8th Moun-tain Engineer Battalion, Chief Engineer RC North from 12/2010 to 02/2011

Europe’s geography determines themaritime environment as a “Road of

Economics” for a population of 500 mil-lion people. The merchant vessels in theEU represent the world’s largest fleettransporting almost 90% of the Union’s

external, and over 40% of its domestictrade. The North Sea is the fourth larg-est source of oil and gas in the world.The Mediterranean Sea represents only

1% of all ocean area, but carries 16%of all commercial traffic at sea, and 25%of all oil transports. The armed forces ofthe EU’s 27 member states rank secondlargest behind China and ahead of theUnited States. Despite the EU being a topplayer in world’s economy and military,the member states have lost nearly 40%

of their jobs in the shipbuilding industry,mainly to Asia. In China the Gross Domes-tic Product (GDP) grew by nearly 10% in

the first quarter of 2011, while the Euro-pean GDP had an average growth rate ofbetween 1-2%. The ecologic environmentis affected on a global scale, which has

impact on the fishery and food produc-tion in the EU. The Arctic region has had atemperature increase of 3° Celsius in thepast 50 years, contributing to the shrink-ing of the Arctic ice pack by 15 to 20%;half of Europe’s wetlands are expected todisappear by 2020.

Cooperation in Networks

The European Union has a need for anall-embracing maritime policy aimed at

developing a thriving maritime economy,environmentally sound and with the sup-port of marine scientific research, tech-nology and innovation. To ensure a com-prehensive approach the EU Commissiontherefore proposed an Integrated Mari-time Policy to enhance the cooperation of

all stakeholders. Collaboration under theIntegrated Maritime Policy would enablethe responsible decision makers to com-bine their expertise and resources. Bestand fastest decisions are requiring infor-mation superiority, the knowledge result-ing from information and the relationshipbetween the data. This makes up a strange

but fascinating world of Information Tech-nology (IT), at once exhilarating but diffi-cult to comprehend due to the high level

Maritime Surveillance (MARSUR)Networking in the European Union

Joachim Beckh

On 30 June 2011 the European Defence Agency (EDA) gave a live presentation of “Maritime Surveil-lance (MARSUR) Networking”. 150 senior high level representatives and nearly 300 guests attendedthe presentation. The picture shows the EDA Chief Executive Claude-France Arnould (left) talking tothe Portuguese Ambassador Mira Gomez

The logo of the MARSUR project Photos: EDA




MARSUR utilises existing resources. Na-val Headquarters link their national sys-tems to the dedicated »MEXS« (MARSURExchange System) interface, which ena-bles secure cooperation over the internet.

The entire MARSUR project was imple-mented for only 930,000 Euros ($1.3 mil-lion) and offers the opportunity for oth-er member states to join. Further develop-ment is planned in the framework of anEDA Category-B project. This project is toimprove the functionalities, the level ofconfidentiality, and accommodate poten-

tial new requirements. The MARSUR net-work is a first step by the military, but agiant leap toward an integrated maritimeenvironment.

MARSUR Perspectives

Gaining practical experience in surveil-lance cooperation like MARSUR is vital forthe common understanding and interop-erability. Practical trials will allow the Com-mission and member states to gain further

insight as to the complexities and the chal-lenges on cross-border and cross-sectorlevel cooperation. They will thus providevaluable additional input for future net-working. This should result in more effi-cient operations and reduced costs.

The potential savings in the EU could besignificant given the growing need to de-tect, identify, track, intercept and indict in-dividuals engaging in smuggling, traffick-ing of human beings, illegal fishing, clan-destine immigration, as well as to preventaccidents at sea and to safeguard the en-vironment. The benefits will be in nation-

al security, maritime security and safety,the protection of the marine environment,border control and law enforcement.

network for the maritime systems of Fin-land, France, United Kingdom, Italy, Spainand Sweden. The network is primarilymeant to enhance the exchange of dataand information for the conduct of mari-time operations under the Common Secu-rity and Defence Policy (CSDP), a major el-ement of the Common Foreign and Securi-ty Policy of the European Union (EU). How-ever, in relation to the Integrated Maritime

Policy of the Commission, the technologyhas the potential for interfacing military aswell as civilian communication layers. This

is again envisaged in the Common Infor-mation Sharing Environment (CISE) by theEU Commission.

of abstraction involved. The digital terrainof cooperation in networks is largely invis-ible for the public domain.

“Cooperation in Networks” is a conceptapproach defined as Network Enabled Ca-pability (NEC), NATO Network EnabledCapability (NNEC); the European NetworkEnabled Capability (EURONEC) or also asthe Common Information Sharing Envi-

ronment (CISE). These might be differentwords, but they basically aim at the sameoutcome: “People exchanging informa-tion based on mutual interests and trust”.

“Awareness2 has different wordings invarious concepts, but can essentially bedefined as a “unit of knowledge”. Mari-time Surveillance is part of Maritime Situa-tional Awareness which is the effective un-derstanding of activities, associated withand occurring in the maritime domain thatcould impact the security, safety and envi-ronment.

MARSUR -A System of Systems

Following a tasking by the EU DefenceMinisters the project Maritime Surveillance(MARSUR) started in 2006 with the objec-tive to create a network using existing navaland maritime information systems. Overallgoals were to avoid duplication of efforts

and the use of already available technolo-gies, data and information to enhance co-operation in a simple, efficient and low-

cost solution for civil-military cooperation.The extensive work by fifteen member

states in EDA created a basic MARSUR-

RADM Michael Nelte from the German Military Representation to NATO (right) exchanging viewswith the author, Lieutenant Joachim Beckh

The presentation included a combined display of the British, Finnish, French, Italian, Spanish andSwedish maritime information systems




all odds. We have to make sure others canrecognise when there is a problem, knowthe background, the playing field and ourpartners. Industry as a partner for exam-ple can make things easier. The role of theindustry cannot be overlooked in making

faculty retention and development easierfor any initiative. Industry may have a vest-ed interest in the governmental industrialcomplex, but without the active participa-tion of the industry any programme in aspecialised governmental field that mixeswith economy and trade business partnerswill not be able to meet general needs.

Our exquisite, fragile and delicate exist-ence is nursed by the oceans, but our ac-tivities are a threat to the environment. AnIntegrated Maritime Policy and Surveil-lance among member states hold enor-

mous potential for all parties involved andto preserve and protect Europe’s vast mar-itime spaces and economy with the ca-pabilities provided by technology. Securi-ty was in the past based solely on secre-cy; today it needs transparency and trust.When these conditions are met, we en-counter “Fair Winds” for the Common In-formation Sharing Environment (CISE) incross-border and cross-sector coopera-tion. MARSUR could be the starting plat-form where the different actors can con-tribute their information, proficiency andexperience. “Make the change happen,

make it MARSUR”. í

By Joachim Beckh

extent on its capacity to integrate experi-ences and best practices of stakeholders.The effective organisation for such a policyshould include the development of toolsfor collective learning and linkages be-tween networks and the experience of the

experts. It requires the active participationof the community for any concept to leadto the desired goal and to survive in reality.

Information and knowledge are funda-mental to learning; they are the lifebloodof analysts and of decision makers. Peo-ple ponder and reflect upon the informa-tion and knowledge they gather. They ap-ply it to their inner worlds and often putit into practice in their particular walks oflife. Well trained and educated future de-cision makers and maritime personnel areneeded because change happens in the

mind. We have to part from old structuredthinking and fully understand the capaci-ty of maritime environmental awareness.Expanding the mentality, making peopleunderstand and taking their fear of los-ing their power makes the difference. Thebest concept does not need much negoti-ation, but the best negotiating can’t bringsuccess to an unpopular concept.

Unfortunately we all are very accus-tomed to having law enforcement, mil-itary or armed forces act as protectorsagainst adversaries of internal or externalthreats for their safety and security. Peo-

ple have to understand that there is not anautomatism in creating safety and securi-ty that would result in protection against

Information advantage or superiority re-quires knowledge on how people processinformation, how they think and turn theirthoughts into decisions and actions. Thisdecision cycle depends on the very individ-ual thinking skills and styles, on intellectualcapabilities, culture, personality preferenc-es, and favoured ways of processing, ab-sorbing, storing, and using information and

knowledge and the objectives. The estab-lishment and maintenance of good will andunderstanding is arguably the most impor-tant role in networking. People being thekey to success must be the centre of atten-tion of any policy. This is why Maritime Sur-veillance (MARSUR) Networking consistsof the human relations established and thetechnology developed.

Only if people are convinced and under-stand, they will commit themselves fully totheir task. The complex “thinking aboutthe thinking” consists of different views

and their relations. It is like a cube show-ing the different perspectives of the samesituation from various sites: Rotating theview point - changing the look at a situ-ation - will in turn change the view itselfor picture of the situation. Perception is tobe seen as the truth in the eye of the be-holder.

Then again information superiority can-not be achieved all the time, and the con-dition of information superiority evapo-rates quickly. The means for acquiring andprocessing information and knowledgeare dangerously vulnerable to both crude

and sophisticated means of overt and sur-reptitious entry, manipulation, distortion,and denial. Moreover, the validity of in-formation and knowledge is dependingon what people believe or do not believe,and lies in their cultural backgrounds, so-cial mores, education, religions, traditions,and so forth. Because each human is won-derfully unique, every individual thinks ina unique way and the perceptions of reali-ty vary widely.

For all these reason the maritime coop-eration within the European Union must

be supported in all fields and levels. It isthe perception of the individual partnersthat is most important in this context, notone’s own. Information and data limitedto one sector is no longer sufficient be-cause too many variables can affect theoverall awareness and too many pieces ofinformation are distributed in different po-litical, partial, geographical areas.

Common Objectives

The development of new modes of

thought and innovative mechanisms re-quired by an Integrated Maritime Policy forthe European Union will depend to a large

The Maritime Surveillance Working Group is composed of representatives from 15 EDA member states




setup of two training and protection battal-ions as mobile elements of the operationscommand in order to specifically free areas

from insurgents and to create the conditionsfor a transfer into Afghan security responsi-bility and a successful civilian reconstruction.

The number of terror attacks and openfightings with the insurgents have consider-able increased in consequence of the aug-mentation and the more active acting of theISAF troops in all Afghan regions. As a result,the number of victims on the side of the co-alition forces continued to rise and the re-quirements to be met by the Medical Ser-vice in respect to emergency medical treat-ment (EMT), transport/evacuation, and in-

patient treatment of wounded personnel in-creased as expected. With 13,000 ISAF sol-diers and about 26,000 Afghan security forc-es with the Army and Police, there are ap-prox. 39,000 security forces available in theRC North who need to be medically support-ed in a multinational combine and in coac-tion with the Afghan Medical Service.

Aside from that, the stipulations for thetimelines of the casualty evacuation were al-so adapted by the ISAF headquarters in Ka-bul. When hitherto a maximum of 90 min-

utes were the time standard between the re-ceipt of an emergency call/message in themilitary command center and the arrival ofthe wounded personnel in a surgical supportfacility, the ISAF commander, General David

Petraeus, has shortened this time allowanceto 60 minutes. Such an ambition serves thewelfare and care for the entrusted soldiers,

Forces of the Medical Service of the Bun-deswehr have been employed as part of

the German mission contingent within thescope of the ISAF mission in Afghanistansince January 2002. Whereas the basic re-quirements set for the quality of the medicalsupport remained unchanged since then,the strength, structure, and capabilities ofthe Medical Service have been constantlyadapted to the changing operational para-

metric conditions.With the transfer from the direct environ-ment of the capital of Kabul to the assump-tion of the responsibility in the region in2006, a highly dynamic and large-scale op-erations command evolved from a relative-ly static employment of the German forc-es. The area of operations of the ISAF Re-gional Command (RC) North under Germancommand encompasses nine provinces withabout ten million inhabitants, a third of theAfghan population. To protect this popu-

lation from the influence of the Taliban andto train the Afghan security forces for theirtasks are the strategic priorities of the ISAFoperations command within the scope of the“Counterinsurgency Operations“ concept.

An essential step in the adaptation of theBundeswehr contingent to these new stand-ards and objectives in the past year was the

to the “reconnaissance, command, effect,and support pool“ the Luftwaffe makes asignificant contribution within the scope of

joint and combined Network Enabled Op-erations (NEO) to an improvement of effec-tiveness and efficiency. Our focus is on theoperation of UAS with a power spectrumexceeding that of tactical drones. The em-ployment requires appropriately licensed

personnel for the control of the aerial seg-ments and generally necessitates the ex-istence of solid infrastructure. Continuousairborne surveillance and reconnaissanceof large-scale areas of interest far into thedepth of the theater of operations contrib-utes considerably to an improvement of thesituation picture and the decision quality onall command levels.

The Luftwaffe intends to continue to investinto these fields which are considered highlyimportant for the future qualification, as weare convinced that the overall system “Bun-

deswehr“ will be sustainably strengthenedwith it.

Summary and Conclusion

The significance and weight of air forcesare measured by their additional strategic val-ue in the form of security-political options ofaction and the resources to be expended forthat.

In my opinion Germany cannot do withoutefficient air forces due to its national iden-tity (self-conception), its aspiration (ambi-

tion), and its international position. Also, ad-ditional opportunities open up from the ap-proach emerging in the international contextof “pooling and sharing“ in which the Luft-waffe will actively take part in.

Getting its additional strategic value is theprime goal of the further development of theLuftwaffe. Needed to that end is a continu-ous adaptation of the capability spectrum tothe constantly changing military challengesas well as a steady optimization of structuresand processes established for the projectionof this capability spectrum. For adequately

discharging this comprehensive task it is vi-tal that the structural projection of the cor-responding responsibility and competence isgiven within the Luftwaffe, i.e. as it is provid-ed for in the “Luftwaffe 2020“ project.

The Luftwaffe has realized the significanceof the configuration criterion “future qualifi-cation“ and takes it consistently into accountwithin the scope of its further development.

The Luftwaffe will actively help in shapingthe reorientation of the Bundeswehr and reli-ably make its contribution in future as well toensure Germany’s security-political capacityto act. í

By LtGen Aarne Kreuzinger-Janik,Chief of Staff, Air Force

Current Challenges to the MedicalService in the ISAF Mission

Dirk Stölten

Entrance Area to German Field Hospital Photo: FMoD




but it presents the Medical Service in a wide,extensive and mountainous country withoutmajor traffic infrastructure with considerablechallenges.

Integration of U.S. Forces

In order to be able to effectively sup-

port the fight against the insurgents whoregained strength in the past years, near-ly 5,000 U.S. soldiers have been employedin the area of RC North since early summer2010. These troops - basically a maneuverbrigade and a helicopter brigade with morethan 70 helicopters - have, of course, alsobrought in medical elements. Whereas themedical primary care is provided by medicalofficers (battalion surgeons) in national re-sponsibility, the U.S. forces rely on the Ger-man hospital facilities, primarily on the rescuecenter in Kunduz and the larger field hospital

in Mazar-e-Sharif. These facilities have beenaugmented by American surgery groups -so-called “Forward Surgical Teams“ - to takeaccount of the increased number of soldiersneeding medical treatment. The integrationof these elements into the framework struc-ture of German hospitals/medical centers ad-vanced rather smoothly and problem-free onthe basis of the already internationally ori-ented medical support standards - the civil-ian “Clinical Practice Guidelines“ negotiatedby multinational associations. Practical issuesand questions arising on site were thus possi-

ble to be solved much quicker and more un-bureaucratically than negotiating necessary“Technical Agreements“ on binational level

of results as well. Aside from GPS-controlledinformation on the situation, the quick dataexchange via chatroom-type forums in mil-itary data networks can facilitate the man-agement of the transport/evacuation of cas-ualties to the appropriate medical care/treat-ment facilities. This is not always the nearestclinic/surgical hospital, but a facility which isequipped with the necessary special capabil-

ities for diagnostics and therapy (e.g. com-putet tomography (CT) or neurosurgery.

Further Development ofMedical Service Capabilities

The new reconnaissance and protectionbattalions are employed in closed formationsor within company scope far away from thelarge garrisons Mazar-e-Sharif and Kunduz.They man small outposts/bivouacs and ob-servation points for weeks or months. For

providing medical support it was thereforenecessary that the mobile elements be fur-ther consolidated and in one “Medical Com-pany Mobile Operation“ each.

As the focus has shifted to air rescue, theground-based transport plays more andmore an only secondary role in the Germanarea of responsibility. The available elements– “rescue teams“ (correspond to the Ger-man ambulance) and „mobile medical of-ficer’s team (the emergency ambulance) areemployed for mobile escorting of the troopson patrol and during protracted missions as

well as for providing medical support at for-ward operation bases. Even though they arehardy employed as primary means for casu-

where the lacking accustoming of the U.S.A.to the role of a “junior partner“ became con-spicuous after all.

The augmentation by U.S. helicopters ofthe UH/HH-60 “Black Hawk“ type has pro-duced a decisive improvement in the evac-uation of casualties. The CH-53 helicop-ter which can be employed as the only Ger-man airborne model in the conditions pre-

vailing in Afghanistan (climate, mountains,threat posed by enemy fire) can, due to itssize, weight, and reaction time, be designat-ed with restrictions only as a „primary res-cue means“ within the meaning of rescuehelicopters known from Germany. In con-trast, the smaller, quicker, and more efficientBlack Hawks with reaction times below 10minutes have definitely reduced the dura-tion of air transport missions. The mentioned60-minute standard is thus possible to be, onaverage, clearly undercut by the consistentuse of helicopters as transport means - from

presently four garrisons in the RC North. Thesurvival chances of heavily wounded person-nel in the medical treatment system havethus been distinctly improved.

The integration of the U.S. forces has con-tributed to increase even more the interna-tional orientation of the Medical Serviceoperating under German command in RCNorth. The medical headquarters element atthe headquarters and the Patient EvacuationCoordination Cell for wounded personnelwere augmented; in future, Sweden and TheNetherlands will also be represented with

specialists in addition to those from Belgiumand Norway. The introduction of digital in-formation systems has improved the quality

U.S. Rescue Helicopter of the HH-60 Type Refueling with Running Rotor




Kabul - not possible to ensure a time-optimalpatient care without constant neurosurgicalmanning at Mazar-e-Sharif.

Training Support for theAfghan Security Forces

As it is foreseeable that the stabilization

of the situation in Afghanistan will rest up-on a presence of multinational security forc-es in the long run as well, the support of thebuildup of the Afghan Army and Police is ofdecisive importance for the success of theISAF mission and the withdrawal perspec-tive of the international troops. In view of thecontinued high losses with the Afghan Na-tional Security Forces (ANSF), the trainingof the medical service of mainly the AfghanNational Army (ANA) is attributed great sig-nificance. Therefore, the medical service inRC North, too, has incorporated this training

support as a key portion of the task.According to a concept basically adaptedin 2010, German medical forces are activeon different levels in supporting the forcesof the ANA. The units of 209th ANA Corpsin RC North are attached mentors on battal-ion, brigade, and Corps levels who assist theAfghan medical officers in mainly their com-mand functions and who support the organ-ization of the ANA medical service. The med-ical advisor of the commander of RC Northand chief medical officer of the German mis-sion contingent, a German senior physician,plays in important role in providing the Af-

ghan Corps doctor with professional advice.Level-related mentoring on an equal footingis decisive here if the 209th Corps is to takeover the mission tasks from the internationaltroops of RC North in the foreseeable future.

The medical service of the ANA will - anal-ogously to the armed forces in total - bebuild up along the lines of U.S. structuresand procedures. The management for thatlies with the NATO Training Mission Afghan-istan (NTM.-A) which is set up below theISAF headquarters in parallel to the opera-tion-leading command, the „ISAF Joint Com-

mand“, also under the command of a U.S.Lieutenant General. This construction provesonce more the enormous importance oftraining support. In order to follow the over-all concept and to ensure a country-wide uni-form training of the ANA medical service, aspecific preparation of the German instruc-tors is required for the application of thetraining material already available in Englishand Dari. Without clearly defined goals andstandards, an instructor will intuitively conveyGerman procedures and ideas which seemto be unsuited in view of the unfavorable ed-ucational qualifications of the Afghan per-

sonnel (hardly any adequate schooling, poorwriting and reading abilities, limited learningreceptivity). U.S. procedures with their clear

ments. Aidmen employed with combat unitsin missions must be able to think and act inthe same way as the troops to be supported.They need not only know how to use theirweapons, but must also be able to blend inwith the essential types of combat, the ad-vancing in terrain or the dismounted secur-ing of convoys. For that reason, an addition-al “cohesion training“ is conducted togeth-

er with the combat troops at the infantry ex-ercise center and at the Army Combat Ma-neuver Training Center where the medi-cal elements are integrated into the com-panies and platoons and where the forma-tion of teams for the mission takes place. Thistraining phase has proven successful over thelast contingents. Above all, it is not a one-way street - it fosters mutual understand-ing for the respective procedures, becausethe combat force, too, must take account ofthe employment of medical elements. Unlikethe mobile forces, the clinical capabilities re-

mained almost unchanged. Surgical and in-tensive care capabilities continue to be avail-able in the three garrisons of Faizabad, Kun-duz, and Mazar-e-Sharif. Aside from the co-operation with the U.S. forces, the well-prov-en cooperation with the Hungarian medicalpersonnel in the Mazar-e-Sharif field hospitalis being continued. Last year’s injury patterns

of the wounded have confirmed that there isa considerable and urgent need for neurosur-gical interventions or medical specialist con-tributions. This is why the permanent station-ing of a neurosurgeon in the field hospitalwas endorsed and the intention to multina-tionally pool neurosurgical expertise in Kabul

abandoned. Considering the urgency of in-terventions it is - due to the frequently uncer-tain flight connections over the Hindukush to

alty transports anymore, they neverthelessremain indispensable in cases of insufficientsupport with helicopters (weather, enemysituation, etc.).

In addition, the new medical compa-nies will get a mobile element of the medi-cal support on battalion level - a “rescue sta-tion“ based on tents or protected contain-ers - as well a light and highly mobile facil-

ity for surgical emergency treatment. Thiscompact version of a “rescue center“ is ca-pable of performing with a crew of 20 wom-en and men an emergency medical stabiliza-tion of wounded personnel and can establishtheir transportability. The material for thesefacilities is kept available at Mazar-e-Shariffor transfers/evacuations by road or air trans-ports. They are primarily employed whenthe operation planning includes the setup oflarger forward operating bases (FOB) locatedoutside of the core ranges of rescue helicop-ters which, in consequence, necessitates a re-

duction of the times for medical support ofwounded. In the light of the good coverageby helicopters of large sections of RC North,such locations a rather rarely to be found.Moreover, the establishment of an FOB ne-cessitates longer-term preplanning which isdue to the considerable logistic expenditurerequired. In case of need this lead time in

the planning allows to bring up personnel ofthe light rescue centers from Germany, thusavoiding to have them permanently – qua-si in standby state – available in Afghanistan.

The medical troops operating with thetraining and protection battalions - primarily,of course, the rescue teams and mobile med-

ical officer’s teams - will receive an extend-ed preparation for the mission by the con-veyance of clearly more general military ele-

Dentist in Afghan Military Hospital at Mazar-a-Sharif




so, the always necessary indirect way via theAfghan translator does not contribute to thedevelopment of mutual trust and impedes aprecise information transfer necessary in themedical field. But yet, there is no alternativeto the continued support of the ANA medi-cal service. A withdrawal perspective for theinternational forces – and thus also for the

German medical service - can, in a chroni-cally troubled country like Afghanistan, lieonly in the handover of the responsibility tothe ANSF. Their capability development hastherefore absolute priority.

Successful Support

In summary it can be stated that the med-ical forces are comprehensively and success-fully supporting the new overall approach inRC North. The rescue chain experienced a

distinct improvement - primarily also thanksto the U.S. helicopters whose potentials andcapacities are not yet possible to be replacedby German airborne models. The mobileforces support the intensive operations of thecombat troops in a comprehensive way; ap-preciable progresses were also made in thegeneral military preparation. The trainingsupport for the ANA in the medical servicefield is firmly established as an important partof the task and will continue to gain signifi-cance as a core element for the “exit strate-gy“ of the ISAF forces. í

By Dr. Dirk Stölten, Physician of the Fleet and Division Chief, Joint Operations Com-mand

sonnel actually starts their service in the Af-ghan province which is because of the bet-ter earning power in the capital. Apart fromthat, the aidmen who belong to the few sol-diers knowledgeable of reading and writingare preferably employed by superiors in non-specialist fields. With the few medical per-sonnel available in the area of RC North, the

level of knowledge is generally poor and ru-dimentary. For a refreshment of the knowl-edge (e.g. of the cardiac rescue technicians)the 209th Corps at Mazar-e-Sharif is there-fore required to conduct additional cours-es which will also be supported by the Bun-deswehr with instructors.

The clinical field looks somewhat better.An adequately equipped ANA hospital canbe operated only with constant help by anISAF training team to ensure a certain basicquality in treatment and care. The Germanfield hospital at Mazar-e-Sharif supports the

training of the Afghan physicians by offeringthem to sit in on classes and lectures for sev-eral months. The indigenous colleagues learnin the German clinic the basics in handlingmodern equipment for giving the patient an-easthetic and intensive care treatment or forsurgical examination and treatment proce-dures.

However, due to the only rudimentaryknowledge in the field of physiology for ex-ample and also in the attitude to work whichcannot be compared with Central Europe-an standards, progress can only be reachedwith a lot of patience and tenacity. The cul-

tural differences are the cause that an in-structor can only begin to effectively impartknowledge after weeks of familiarization. Al-

algorithms and emphasis on drill-type learn-ing are more appropriate under these con-ditions than German mission-type tacticswhich bet on more self-responsibility.

The medical service advisors in the Opera-tional Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLT)mentor the Afghan personnel continuouslyfrom the transfer of the “Kandaks“ from the

central training camp in Kabul to their garri-sons in the northern region. During the closecontact in the garrisons they mainly impartskills in primary care, e.g. holding a surgery/ consulting hour, documentation of medicalservices or management of medical material.The mentoring activity is complemented by anew component of the training support, theconcept of partnering. Here, German and Af-ghan units down to company and platoonlevel co-act directly in the jointly planned op-erations against insurgents. This lends themissions not only an “Afghan face“, but al-

lows also to give practical instructions in allessential activities, a leaning by examples.For the medical service this field is support-ed by the “medical companies mobile em-ployment“ which are to impart to their Af-ghan fellow-soldiers primarily the applicationof basic life support measures, the stabiliza-tion of wounded for the transport as well asthe organization of the rescue chain includ-ing the associated reporting.

The rendering of assistance in the applica-tion of medical knowledge has thus been tak-en care of. But how will the technical basis belaid? The respective training phases for physi-

cians and assistant staff take place centrally inKabul with the support of NTM-A. Unfortu-nately only a small number of the trained per-

Afghan Military Ambulance - Off-the-Shelf and Unarmored




The armament projects of the Army aredetermined to a considerable extent by

the tasks of the Army, its enhanced mission

orientation, and by the changed paramet-ric conditions. The most important goal ofthe Bundeswehr in the past years, the im-

provement the operability of German armedforces, is the decisive level of ambition forthe armament planning in the Army. As coreelement of the ground forces, the Armycontributes substantially to the successes ofthe mostly ground-based missions and hasbeen the main troop provider for Germanmission contingents for years. It fulfills its in-creasingly diverse tasks in joint (inter-service)and multinational combine. In the focus ofthe orientation are the most likely missionsto be conducted within the scope of conflictprevention and crisis management. Here,

but also in conventional missions of nationaland alliance defence, whose possibility can-not be ruled out, the Army prepares itself foroperations in the entire mission spectrumwith different intensities and a broad rangeof partly novel threats.

This is where the armaments planning ofthe Army was geared to in the past yearsand which, in view of the tight financial sit-uation existing in the investment field of theBundeswehr for quite some time already,was concentrated on that what is absolute-ly necessary in missions. With its armamentprojects the Army tried to achieve a broadly

designed augmentation in all capability are-as and the capacity for network enabled op-erations (NEO) as a basis for the success in

missions. The sluggish implementation of theprocurement of new equipment resulted inan “auxiliary construction“. The delivery of

new systems was to take place subdividedin the three phases “initial, basic and targetallowance“ in order to provide with priority

the forces in the current missions with mod-ern equipment and to maintain, even thoughstep-by-step only, the system coherence inthe Army.

As everyone knows, the situation haschanged drastically. The consolidation of thefederal budget, heavy cuts in the defencebudget as well as the upcoming reform of

the Bundeswehr and its structure have alsochanged the fundamentals of the procure-ment situation of the Bundeswehr and the

armament projects of the Army. The Armyis forced to proceed even more intensely inaccordance with its maxim “Thinking fromMission Aspects“. The orientation towardsthe entire mission and intensity spectrum willcontinue as before and thus also the furtherdevelopment in all capability categories. Thefull equipping of entire system combines/ major formations with new systems will bean absolute exception, however.

Therefore, a new approach is being con-sidered. The total sum of the systems for theArmy will now first of all be oriented towards

the mission requirements, in second placetowards the training necessities in Germa-ny. Oriented towards an „estimated“ num-ber of systems for „cross-sectional missions“,the troops considered necessary for that willbe provided the equipment a hundred per-cent plus an attrition/failure reserve. Just asthat will the two “follow-on contingents“ befurnished a hundred percent with equipmentfor the „mission-preparing training. The re-maining troops in the garrison will only begranted equipment up to about 30 percent,i.e., equipped will be a company width in thebattalion or a platoon per company; and the

common training will have to be conductedwith that. There will, of course, be some sys-tems added for the training in courses at thebranch schools. In the aggregate it is intend-ed to reach an equipment volume of the Ar-my of approx. 70 to 80 percent, thus savingabout 20 percent. Also, the furnishing withnew equipment is to be effected in “semi-

Armament Projects of the ArmyDietmar Klos

An Armored Self-Propelled Howitzer 2000 being Loaded into the Russian Antonov AH-124-100 CargoAircraft at Mazar-e-Sharif Airport Photo: Bundeswehr/Schmidt

neu!

Command Control and Information System (CCIS) , Army - Main Functionalities Graphic: Army Staff




troops, are already available. Others will beinstalled as of this year, beginning with the in-troduction of new vehicles.

As concerns communications, the Army al-ready relies heavily on the means of the JointSupport Service (JSS). By the concentrationof additional capabilities and command sup-port troops in the Joint Support Service (JSS)these can be expanded even further. The Ar-

my will receive portions of the SATCOMBwPhase 2 project for a wide area (long-dis-tance) linkage with mobile ground stations.The project “Joint and Combined Network-Capable Radio Communication Set Allow-ance“ is to make the secure broadband, IP-based voice and data communications pos-sible in the mobile tactical field by means ofradio network. Hardware and functionali-ties are separate. The project development isplanned to be completed by the general con-tractor, the “Rohde und Schwarz“ Compa-ny, by 2013. The series delivery is expected to

start as of 2014.

Intelligence

In the past years, the reconnaissance capa-bilities of the Army were possible to be con-siderably improved by structural measures,training, and procurement of new means.The new reconnaissance units were com-bined with the different reconnaissance ca-pabilities under one unitary command. This isprobably going to be like that in the next Ar-my structure as well; the strength of the forc-

es and perhaps even the demand for newsystems might become subject to changes.

New equipment has been delivered forsome years. The 1st and maybe the on-ly batch of approx. 180 FENNEK scout vehi-cles (KMW Company) is part of it. They areemployed in Afghanistan. The modern ob-servation and reconnaissance equipment al-lows to detect targets up to a distance of ap-prox. 10 km and to identify them up to 2 km.For remote point target surveillance the re-connaissance patrols are now equipped withALADIN drones and BOSA ground sensor

equipment of the Swedish Exensor Compa-ny. Based on that it is intended to performarea surveillance and/or securing support byuse of additional sensors and cameras in theso-called BOSANet. The mobile sensor sys-tem (MoSeS) as unmanned, mobile groundreconnaissance system detect and acquirestargets in close-in areas and in impenetrableand dangerous terrain. The start of the pro-curement of this “robotic system“ is plannedfor 2014; the project planing will begin in thenear future. The ground surveillance systemof the Cassidian/EADS Companies will re-place the present radar systems by sector and

point target surveillance, and individual tar-get tracking at ranges of up to 40 km. Thedata collected in real time will be evaluated

curement projects of the Army will continueto be pursued in the coming years. Some im-portant ones are presented hereinafter in abrief description.

Operability

A successful mission accomplishment is

not possible without a modern, jointly (on in-ter-service level) coordinated operability andoperational support. Required for this pur-pose are good communication networks us-ing modern means of information process-ing and transmission. The Command Con-trol and Information System (CCIS) in the Ar-my improves the operability of the divisions

and below in mobile operations and providesa level-related picture of the situation. Digi-tally possible are graphic displays of the sit-uation, transmission of reports and ordersas well as “Blue-Force Tracking“. Aside fromthe software system of the Cassidian/EADSmanufacturers and the IT hardware of differ-ent contractors, the total systems comprisesnew command post vehicles and equipmentof the Krauss-Maffei Wegmann -KMW/

Rheinmetall Consortium. The first batch ofthe CCIS has been in use since 2007 and ispartially employed in missions since 2010. Aproduct improvement of the software is saidto be developed as of 2011. The DP supportwithin the formations/units and thus a com-prehensive networking in the Army is possi-ble to be ensured by the linking of the CCISwith the Command and Weapon ControlSystem for Land-based Operations (CWCSLBO) of the branches. Build up on the soft-ware of the Army’s CCIS, the CWCS are com-plemented by particularly needed functional-ities. Some systems, such as the ADLER com-

mand and fire control system of the artilleryor the Integrated Command Control and In-formation System (ICCIS) of the combat

generations“. Roughly outlined this means:the delivery of a new system will be made toan extent of 40 to 50 percent in a first pe-riod of approx. five years. The remaining 50to 60 percent will subsequently be realized ina second “five-year step“. It cannot be ruledout that this will then be followed by anoth-er system.

This means that the branches of the Army

will regularly be equipped in non-uniform, in-consistent ways. Because of the long deliv-ery periods this is nothing new in the Army,but here it is wanted as a principle. But whatabout the numerous (major) items of equip-ment now available in the Army through TOEallowance, special procurements for currentmissions, and new procurements? Pursuant

to the new equipment systematic, all newsystems are lined with “reference systems“as long as the total delivery has not yet beencarried out in the Army. An example: thenew BOXER armored transport vehicle (ATV)is available in certain quantities only; the up-graded FUCHS 1A8 armored wheeled trans-port vehicle and the DINGO all-round pro-tected transport vehicle could, for instance,be used as “variables“ till the delivery of the

additional ATVs.The new equipment approach will notimprove the armament situation in the Ar-my in toto. For putting together and arrang-ing troops for operations/missions, process-organizational measures will again be fre-quently the normal case, even as regardsthe equipment. End-of-life equipment willbe kept longer in use with the troops, thusincurring high costs. The logistics, especial-ly maintenance and stockage of spare/re-pair parts, will have to cope with big require-ments and accruing costs. The training in thebranches will also not get easier either. But

the austerity and financial constraints appar-ently do not leave any other choice. Despitethis new situation, a lot of prominent pro-

Reconnaissance Patrols with FENNEK Scout Vehicles in Afghanistan Photo: FMoD




and disseminated to the information poolsof the intelligence units. The first series-pro-duced equipment is to come out in 2013.

As to unmanned reconnaissance, the Ar-my has been well positioned in the pastyears. With its four different unmanned aeri-al vehicles with penetration depths of 500 mup to 70 km it is possible to achieve excellentreconnaissance results by economizing forc-

es at the same time. All drones are highly mo-bile, equipped with modern sensors, can bere-used and prove useful in missions and op-erations of the Bundeswehr. The MIKADOreconnaissance system is employed in urban-ized terrain up to approx. 500 m and ALADINin close-in areas up to

5,000 m in front of the troops. For thetime being, about 170 MIKADO are intend-ed to be procured by 2012, and about 100systems of the AirRobot Company and EMT/ Penzing are already fielded. Of the planned224 ALADIN (EMT Company) a number of

132 unmanned aircraft will have been pro-cured in 2011. As concerns the LUNA system(also from EMT) which is employed as a bri-gade means for close areas up to 40 km, theprocurement of nine LUNAs was completedin 2010. As with all unmanned aircraft, sub-sequent improvements were or are beingmade on the basis of mission experiences.Here, these are e.g. protected vehicles, therelay capability, linkage to satellite communi-cation, and an upgraded infrared reconnais-

twelve platoon systems. Some of them arebeing successfully used with ISAF. Experi-ences will also be injected into a product im-provement (PI), primarily with regard to thesensor systems and linkage to the CWCS.

The knowledge gained in the missionsshowed that two different shorter-range un-manned aircraft are probably not neededwith the operating forces. It might be worth-while to design improved MIKADO as “suc-

sance camera of the AIM Company. The dig-itized linkage with the ADLER system of theartillery is in the planning. The still new KZOtarget locating remote controlled unmannedaerial vehicle of the Rheinmetall Company isthe airborne, imaging reconnaissance systemof the major formations for a penetrationdepth of up to approx. 70 km. The reconnais-sance units and the artillery corps, respec-tively, received the delivery of the planned

Launch of a KZO in Afghanistan Photo: RMD

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sion spectrum (inter alia: new programmable(pre-conditioned) 120mm HE ammunition,5,000 m range, integration into the CWCSLBO). At first a company width is planned tobe optimized for operations. The operation-al capacity of LEOPARD 2 battle tanks for anemployment in urbanized terrain is anotherambition of the Army with the LEOPARD 2PSO (Peace Support Operation) of KMW to

be taken as a model. It is planned to adapt 50battle tanks for urban operations (UrbOp) asfrom the middle of the decade. The realiza-tion is still open, though.

The PUMA armored infantry fighting vehi-cle (AIFV) will become the innovative, modu-lar weapon system of the mechanized infan-try. The mechanized forces will not suffer adrain provided that the 405 contracted PU-MA AIFV will indeed be procured. Generalcontractor is the “Projekt System & Manage-ment“ Company, a joint venture of the KMWand Rheinmetall companies. The high capa-

bility profile comprises among other things:superior effectiveness, high tactical mobility,air transportability in A400M transport air-craft, threat-related protection, and capac-ity for network enabled operations (NEO).The stabilized 30mm MK 30-2/ABM auto-matic gun in the first unmanned turret al-lows to engage hard, soft as well as air tar-gets up to a distance of 3,000 m. The EURO-SPIKE LR of the EuroSpike consortium (Rhein-metall, Diehl BGT Defence, and Rafael/Isra-el) is the “multirole-capable light guided mis-sile system“ of the PUMA AIFV which cancombat tank, helicopters, and infrastructure/

fortifications up a distance of 4,000 m. Thefirst two series-production PUMA were de-livered to the Bundeswehr in early December2010. The integrated compliance demon-stration/operational test is said to be carriedout by 2012. Prior to the planned operation-

corps is absolutely possible to be partially al-

so used in stabilization operations, but itserves primarily as a “variable“ for highly mo-bile combat within the scope of alliance de-fence. The worldwide recognized Germanarms industry for land effectors will natural-ly be supported in important export projects,if high-quality German battle tanks contin-ue to be employed in the own Army. The stillavailable 350 LEOPARD 2 A5/6 battle tanksof the KMW Company were upgraded sev-eral times, inter alia in the tactical engage-ment capability. The operational improve-ments included an additional armor plating,the 120mm L 44 smooth-bore tank gun of

the Rheinmetall Company with an extend-ed tube and upgraded ammunition as wellas an additional shielding/protection againstmines with 70 battle tanks. With addition-al retrofit actions it is intended to adapt allbattle tanks to the entire range of the mis-

cessors“ for urbanized andclose-in areas with an in-creased accumulator capaci-ty, ranges of ten kilometers,and quintuple flight endur-ance. New systems for re-connaissance at distancesof 70 and more kilometersare also planned to be ac-

quired in the medium term.To this end, the use of succes-sor drones of the KZO/LUNA typesor of unmanned aircraft with rotor,fixed or flat surface wings is under study.

The reconnaissance gap over andabove 70 km is to be closed by the

joint and combined SAATEG system (a sys-tem for imaging reconnaissance in the depthof the area of operations). As an interim so-lution the employment of the HERON 1 un-manned aircraft as an operator model of theLuftwaffe is being successfully carried out in

Afghanistan in tandem with the RheinmetallCompany (on the basis of the drone of the Is-rael Aerospace Industries Ltd). Some of theSAATEG systems are largely autonomouslyflying helicopters used as “Vertical Take Offand Landing (VTOL)“ vehicles for the pointtarget and poststrike reconnaissance. TheS-100 CAMCOPTER (cooperation of DiehlBGT Defence, Schiebel and M4Com compa-nies) can be equipped with different sensorsand detect and acquire targets up to a dis-tance of 150 km. Following an adaptationdevelopment the introduction of ten systemsinto the Army is now planned as from 2014.

Effect

Effectiveness in operations and missions isultimately ensured within the scope of Net-work Enabled Operations (NEO). Each indi-vidual effector of the Army has its own sig-nificance here, even though its employmentwill only just become really decisive in thenetwork pool of all forces. The means of theArmy produce their effect directly or indirect-ly against targets on the ground and in near-

ground airspace. As for the effectors, an ad-ditional capability spectrum is required whichmust be applicable in highly mobile combatup to stabilization operations. Among otherthings this encompasses a balanced ratio ofeffect and protection of the systems, directand indirect fires with different engagementranges by day and night and with it destruc-tion up to and including individual targets,use of lethal and non-lethal means, effect inurban terrain, standoff capability, high de-gree of precision to avoid collateral damag-es, possibilities for deliberate mission abort,and co-action in joint and combined as well

as multinational action pools.In the future Army, the combat troops are

going to be newly portioned. The armored

AIM µCAM-640: IR Camera with Double VisionField Optics and High-Resolution Detector

Photo: AIM

Combat Vehicles of the Army Graphic: ES Archives




lants, and fuzes. First systems of the upgrad-ed MARS II (Medium Range Artillery Rock-et System) with the UNITARY Guided Mul-tiple Launch Rocket System for precision ef-fects up to 85 km has just been deliveredto the troops. Both artillery weapons canachieve point target capabilities with an ac-curacy of 10 m, with the 155mm shell withthe advanced EXCALIBUR, possibly as of ap-

prox. 2012.The KZO drone as a sophisticated, high-

performance target locating equipment andthe HAROP missile (Israel Aerospace Indus-

tries) will be combined as a first airborne ef-fector for long-range, precise target engage-ment up to a distance of 120 km by avoid-ing collateral damages. This “effector forstandoff-capable engagement of individ-ual and point targets“ is the most innova-tive and “most precious“ project of the Ar-my. The system is capable of loitering up tonine hours over the target area and can be di-rected to the target under observation. If re-quired, it is possible to abort the mission. Theprocurement is planned as of 2012 with onesystem as a start.

In the Army, the capabilities for airmobileoperations will in future probably be main-tained in a special division. A particularly de-cisive turning-point is the fact that the MTHCH-53 do no longer belong to the Army asthey are transferred to the Luftwaffe (Ger-man Air Force). It must be assumed that thestrength of combat and light transport heli-copter troops in the New Army will be low-er than heretofore. The two light regimentsmight possibly continue to be available. Bythe takeover of the task and means from theLuftwaffe, i.e. concentration of all light trans-port helicopter forces in the Army, the total

number of the NH90 light transport helicop-ters in the Bundeswehr might rather reach anumber below 100. It was hitherto planned

The new mortar combat systems of theRheinmetall Company as part of JTF areabout to be introduced for the infantryunits, perhaps also for the mechanized in-fantry battalions. Nine mortar combat sys-tems with a total of 74 weapon platformsof the 120mm WIESEL 2 light armored self-propelled mortar are to be procured asidefrom command/fire control and periphery

vehicles. The mortar ammunition includesHE, IR smoke as well as IR flares with a newmulti-function fuze. The air transporta-ble, protected system can engage targetswith precise firefrom distances of500 m up to 8,000m; it possesses ahigh-value fire con-trol system and es-tablishes readinessfor firing in 90 sec-onds already. The

new CWCS ADLERDVA JTF ensuresthe connection ofall components aswell as the linkageto the ADLER DVA IIof the artillery. Theprocurement start-ed in 2009 with the1st batch for the in-tegrated compli-ance demonstra-tion. The deliveryof the series will be

completed by March 2012 in a first step ofeight mortars, two command/fire controlvehicles as well as four ammunition teams.Following that, an operational test will becarried out in 2012 before they are goingto be employed in Afghanistan to replacethe mortar systems presently used there.Because of the reduced initial allowanceand a possibly higher demand in the newArmy structure, the present 120mm mor-tar systems (Rheinmetall) must be adapt-ed to M113 and as standoff mortars onbase plate to the state-of-the-art technol-

ogy. Efforts are made to enable these mor-tars to autonomously adjust in indirect lay-ing, to fire 120mm ammunition of the newgeneration at ranges up to seven kilome-ters, and to link them with the new CWCS.This modernization is planned for the years2013/2014.

Within the scope of JTF, the 150 armoredself-propelled howitzers 2000 of the KMWCompany with the 155mm L/52 weaponsystem of Rheinmetall can also engage tar-gets at ranges up to 40 km. Five of theseworldwide most sophisticated tube weap-on systems will be employed to support Ger-

man troops in northern Afghanistan. Long-er ranges and more precise effects are tobe obtained by new types of shells, propel-

al capability in 2014, it is intended to deliv-er a company width for the purpose of train-ing in 2013.

The BOXER ATV (consortium of ARTECGmbH, Stork N.V., Netherlands, KMW, andRheinmetall) is under contract. It is going tobe the first armored “command, transport,and combat vehicle“ of the infantry whichwill be enabled with this vehicle to fight in all

types of missions/operations. For the infan-try with its present 2-ton truck it is a “revo-lution“. Worldwide best, modularly designedprotection for wheeled vehicles, high sus-tainability, excellent mobility, air transport-ability in A400M transport aircraft, protect-ed weapon station, and large dismountingstrengths with a crew of ten soldiers charac-terize this vehicle. Of the 272 BOXER plannedfor the Bundeswehr, the Army will get 190BOXER ATV in the 1st batch of which 125 aregroup vehicles and 65 command vehicles,all of which are to be delivered by mid 2013.

In the meantime, some BOXER have alreadybeen delivered to the Infantry School and thetroops for training purposes. The objective isto have a platoon equivalent in the ISAF mis-sion in summer of this year already. It remainsto be seen whether the Army will, despite thestrengthening of the infantry component,get more than the 1st batch in future.

A significant portion of the effectivenessof infantry and mechanized infantry will beachieved with the equipment “Infantrymanof the Future - Expanded System (IoF -ES)“.General contractor for the project planningis the Rheinmetall Company with many com-

ponent companies. Unlike the basic system(IoF - BS) it is, among other things, intend-ed to enhance the command capability andeffectiveness, to reduce the weight of sys-tem components, and to cut down the ener-gy demand by use of novel technologies. Thesystem is designed for group strengths of upto ten soldiers and comprises a large num-ber of improved equipment. The group ve-hicles will integrate the IoF-ES as an interfaceinto the CCIS of the Army. Of nearly 1,100planned systems, the 1st batch of about 240“IoF-ES“ is now to be procured as of 2012.

For a transition period, the available 241 IoF-BS of Cassidian Electronics/EADS will be sup-plemented by additional 50 systems.

With the “Joint Tactical Fire Support (JTF)“it is planned to advance the capability forquick fire support on tactical level by all suit-able, long-range effectors of the armed forc-es as a whole, including those of allies. Struc-turally, various coordination and decision el-ements, respectively, are going to be stab-lished on different tactical levels. For the timebeing, the Army will procure 20 FENNEK forten Joint Fire Support Teams by the end of2011. Additional vehicles, command/com-

munication means as well as special equip-ment such as interface teams tactical data-link, are planned in the coming years.

Light 120mm Armored Mortar Ready to be Air Loaded into a CH-53 HelicopterPhoto: InfS




proving well in the missions. Additional PCMV2 with even better protection and bigger pay-loads are to be procured as of 2013; a “com-paring assessment“ with respective demon-strators has been initiated. In Class 3, the DIN-

GO 2 of KMW has been employed in the Ar-my as patrol/covering vehicle for a long timealready. In Class 1, the ENOK (ACS/Achleitneron Daimler chassis) was selected as commandand liaison vehicle with a load capacity of 1.2tons. About 150 ENOK are in the planning, al-most 50 were procured in advance in 2010. Inthe air transportable variant (MTH CH 53) theMUNGO of the KMW Company (base vehicleof the Multicar Company) in the „large capac-ity“ version as conversion kit carrier will notbe acquired until 2015. As a specialized forc-es combat vehicle (SFCV) the MUNGO is al-ready in service use as command and group

vehicle. Approx. 340 vehicles have been pro-cured since 2005.

As for the PTV in five classes with 2-ton,5-ton, 9-ton, 15-ton load capacities andthe 25-ton tractor-trailer there has been nochange in the planned procurement as of2011. The 9-ton class was canceled; acquiredin the 2-ton class will be the UNIMOG U 5000of the Daimler Company. Subject to approv-al, the vehicle in the 5-ton class will presuma-bly be the “Zetros“ of the Daimler Companyas a so-called “Haubenwagen (hood car)“.Here, the cross-country mobility of an UNI-

MOG was combined with the load capacityof a heavy truck. The 15-ton PTV will proba-bly be the IVECO 8x8 on Tracker chassis; andas regards the 25-ton tractor-trailer an IVECOmodel will be procured as well. As for theseprotected vehicles, the protection against at-tacks in the missions will be improved evenmore, although this is going to happen in on-ly small steps and margins over the time axis.

Other and numerous projects are beingpursued without any changes; here just afew examples in brief: The convoy protectionwill also be improved by the aforementionedvehicles. Projects such as the equipping with

electronic jammer systems against attackswith improvised explosive devices (CounterIED) which is going on since 2007 contrib-

The TIGER has a mix of four weapon systems,among them the primary means, the “Anti-tank Guided Missile System 3 Long Range“,which is fired individually or in salvoes of upto four missiles. With that the TIGER is capa-

ble of combating the enemy in fixed (hard-ened) infrastructure up to modern battletanks at ranges of up to 6,000 m.

Means of Other Fieldsof Capability

A large number of armament projects inthe fields of protection, mobility, and sup-port will augment the operability of the Army.They are often implemented in joint (inter-ser-vice) projects. Of particular significance is theprotection in missions, primarily the protected

tactical mobility. Many armored or protectedvehicles, ranging from MARDER AIFV via DIN-GO 1 ATV, MUNGO special forces combat ve-

hicle (SFCV) up tothe FUCHS armoredwheeled transportvehicle in the new1A8 version, havealready proved suc-cessful in missionsand operations. Theprojects „ProtectedCommand and Mul-

tifunction Vehicles(PCMV)“ and “Pro-tected Transport Ve-hicles (PTV)“ whichare in progress forquite some time areto additionally re-place non-protect-ed vehicles. The fourPCMV classes dif-fer from each otherby tactical mobility,

air transportability, protection, payload, anduseful volume. The selection decisions were

all made, except for Class 4 large-capacitytrucks. In Class 2, the EAGLE IV of General Dy-namics European Land Systems/MOWAG is

to acquire 122 NH90 for the Bundeswehr, 80for the Army. 16 NH90 are available in theArmy for tests and training, two additionalones and a few for the Luftwaffe are to bedelivered in this year. The NH90 in the IOC+version delivered last are said to be intro-duced in the “Forward Air Medevac“ variantinto the ISAF mission by 2012. The NH90 ofNHIndustries (with main share by Eurocopter

Company) can be employed with differentmission equipment packages for commandand control, reconnaissance, suppression ofenemy air defence, search and rescue ser-vice or with the classic air transport compo-nent with a payload of 2.5 tons. The employ-ment endurance amounts up to 4.5 hours,and the range is 800 km without addition-al tanks and 1,260 km, respectively, with twoadditional tanks. Practically all onboard sys-tems are digitally controlled for the first time.

The situation is similar with the TIGER sup-port helicopters. It is doubtful whether there

will still be two combat helicopter regimentsand the presently planned number of 80 TI-GERs in future. Delivered so far were 16 sup-port helicopters for the joint training site atLe Luc/France, and also for the troops sinceMarch of this year. Four additional ones areto follow in 2011 and another eight com-bat helicopters by 2012. These are to be fur-nished with the equipment set for the mis-sion in Afghanistan and are earmarked for adeployment to that country in also 2012. Themultirole-capable TIGER of the EurocopterCompany will enhance the standoff-capa-ble and quickly available precision effect for

many mission options of the Army. The heli-copter is all-weather as well as night combatcapable. High protection is achieved by par-

tial armoring of the mast sight and defensive(counterfire) systems. The range is about 700

km and the endurance is about five hours.Sophisticated navigation and weapon em-ployment systems, respectively, are available.

TIGER, NH90, CH-53 Helicopters Photo: ES Archives

MARS II System in Guided Missile Launch Rocket System (GLMRS)Version Photo: KMW




sible in government and parliament. Germa-ny needs an operational, presentable Armywhich does not have to hide in internationalcomparison and which safeguards Germansecurity interests.

For the German arms industry the timeswill get even harder and the scope of deliveryeven smaller. What can help to preserve thewell-proven, excellent “land system industry“

and to make German products economical-ly available for German ground forces? Hereare some catchwords with no claim to com-pleteness: closer coordination between us-er, procurement activity/materiel develop-er and industry to provide modern equip-ment quickly and without frictional/cost loss-es; proportional consolidation of German ar-mament projects, but also of German com-panies, to maintain oneself competitive to theoutside; internationalization of projects to in-crease quantities, to minimize costs, and tostrengthen the interoperability in missions. Fi-

nally, against the background of an aggrava-tion of the situation in the German arms in-dustry, it is necessary to put more emphasison and attach more importance to a national“defence industry“ policy, linked with a Euro-pean course of action. í

By Dietmar Klos (Col., ret.), Special Corre- spondent for “Europäische Sicherheit“ for Army and Armament Topics

ning towards the operational capability ofits forces and the preservation of the systemArmy. A whole lot has been achieved in theprocurement of new systems, but frequentlyonly as a first start. New times are dawning;the budgetary and armament situations willnot get better. This means: furnishing withnew equipment will mostly occur over longperiods of time and in small steps - hopeful-

ly not more starkly as it is presently the case.The force will have to prepare itself for thefact that its units in Germany are going to beequipped differently than the ones employedin operations. This means flexibility, rethink-ing and relearning. In times when new re-cruits are struggled for this can have also anadverse impact on the motivation of the sol-diers. A new “construction site“ that has tobe worked on.

For the Army it will be essential to contin-ue to pursue its system combine and to main-tain itself as efficiently as possible. At least

the troops in operations and in training mustbe modernly equipped for that. However, fo-cusing on current missions involves the risk tolose track of future requirements. To makehere the right decisions for structures, per-sonnel strengths, and materiel allowancesin times of limited resources is a great chal-lenge. “Good soldiers’ luck“ - for the politicaland military leadership of the Bundeswehrand Army, but also for other persons respon-

ute considerably to that. Added to this is the“Route Clearing Package“ of the engineercorps. Seven remotely controllable systemsof the Rheinmetall Company for the detec-tion and clearing of mines/IEDs - amongother things with the protected portions onWIESEL 1, “MiniMinewolf“, and FUCHS ATV- are to improve the protection of the troopsalong march routes in a first stage by the end

of 2011. By 2014, the project “FUCHS Explo-sive Ordnance Reconnaissance/ Identifica-tion“ will be added which allows by meansof a manipulator arm to identify explosiveson both sides of streets/roads, in underpass-es, and buildings. Moreover, there are addi-tional stationary and, for the first time, mo-bile sniper detection equipment sets in theprocess of delivery.

Outlook

New technologies are being consideredand will become necessary to maintain amodern Army in the future. Future transporthelicopters, robotics, miniaturization, tele-maintenance, and laser/microwave weaponsystems are just some keywords here. Eventhough the studies on this are in progress,the focus of the efforts is to now implementall things feasible. In the past years, the Armyhas consistently oriented its armament plan-

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Within the framework of the quad-ripartite procurement (Germany,

Great Britain, Spain, Italy) of a total of 620

aircraft of the EUROFIGHTER weapon sys-tem, the acquisition of 180 EUROFIGHTERsfor Germany was approved by the parlia-ment. The delivery of these 180 aircraft forGermany is effected in three batches to becalled off individually, i.e. 44 EUROFIGHTERsin Batch 1 as well as 68 EUROFIGHTERs eachin Batches 2 and 3. The ordering of the indi-vidual batches is each time subject to a newapproval by the parliament.

Due to the support of the export to Aus-tria, the 1st batch for Germany comprisedthus a total of 33 aircraft which were deliv-ered during the period from 2003 to March2008. They are planned for the employment

in the air-to-air role and equipped for thatpurpose with the 27mm internal gun, the ra-dar-controlled AMRAAM (Advanced Medi-um Range Air To Air Missile) AIM-120 B aswell as with the modern IRIS-T (Infra-red Im-aging System-Tail/Thrust Vector Controlled)heat-seeking air-to-air short-range guidedmissile as successor for the AIM-9L. A capa-bility extension of Batch 1 is not planned atpresent.

In contrast to the other three partner na-tions, the Royal Air Force (RAF) has alreadybuild up a first basic capability for an air-to-ground employment of its 1st Batch EU-

ROFIGHTERs. This so-called AUSTERE solu-tion allows the employment of the EnhancedPaveway II precision gliding bomb in combi-

nation with the Litening III laser designatorpod (LDP). In July 2008, the RAF had officiallydeclared the multirole capability and the ca-

pability for an employment in the function ofclose air support for its Batch 1 EUROFIGHT-ERs.

Whereas the Batch 1 EUROFIGHTERs ofthe Luftwaffe are planned for an employ-ment in the air-to-air role, the aircraft ofBatches 2 ad 3 are earmarked for the mul-tirole-capable employment. The request forthe delivery of Batch 2 was approved by theparliament in 2004. After the compensation

of the aircraft handed over to Austria, theBatch 2 encompasses now 79 aircraft whichare in the process of delivery since 2008; fulldelivery is scheduled to be completed by2013. For those aircraft of Batch 1 delivered

to Austria, the Luftwaffe received eleven ad-vanced, multirole-capable EUROFIGHTERs ofBatch 2 with extended functionalities.

Within the scope of the quadripartiteagreement, the 3rd batch will be ordered intwo steps with the first Sub-batch 3a com-prising 45 percent of the total amount; it wascontracted by the EUROFIGHTER nations inJuly 2009. For Germany this Sub-batch 3acomprises 31 of 68 planned aircraft whichare to be delivered by 2015.

In the contract on the Sub-batch 3a it wassimultaneously agreed that a decision on thesucceeding contract to Batch 3b be made by

31 May 2011 at the latest. This date was notpossible to be complied with by the four na-tions. In order to avoid a cost-intensive inter-

ruption of the production in 2015, negotia-tions are currently conducted with the indus-try to extend the delivery time for Batches 2

and 3a. By this extension the pending May2011 date for a decision by the partner na-tions on the procurement of Sub-batch 3bwas postponed to the end of 2013. The pres-ently negotiated extension of the productionis to begin in 2011 already and provides for adelayed delivery up to three years so that theEUROFIGHTERs originally planned for 2015would not be delivered until 2018.

Export customers up to now were the Re-public of Austria, as the first EUROFIGHTERexport nation, which has acquired 15 partlyused EUROFIGHTERs in the Batch 1 produc-

tion state, and Saudi Arabia as the second ex-port customer which has ordered a total of72 aircraft of Batch 2.

Operation of 140 Multirole-capable EUROFIGHTERs

The 1997 decision of the German Bunde-stag (Lower House of Parliament) on the pro-curement of 180 EUROFIGHTERs reflects theoperationally justified demand of the Luft-waffe for multirole-capable EUROFIGHT-ERs of Batches 2 and 3 and EUROFIGHT-

ERs of Batch 1 planned for the employmentin the air-to-air role. Within the scope of thenecessary measures for a budget consolida-tion it was recommended in 2010 that on-ly 140 EUROFIGHTERs be operated. This re-duced approach of 140 EUROFIGHTERs will- with a concurrently premature reduction ofthe TORNADO fleet to 85 aircraft - representthe backbone in the next decades and, afterthe end of the TORNADO flight operations,possibly the only manned combat aircraft ofthe Luftwaffe for longer period of time. To bederived from that is the operational require-

ment according to which this smaller fleet of140 EUROFIGHTERs must be furnished withhigh-quality equipment, be flexibly employa-ble and multirole-capable for efficiency rea-sons. From a technical and operational view-point of the Luftwaffe this is best realizableby a largely uniform fleet consisting of Batch-es 2 and 3 aircraft and so the procurementof Sub-Batch 3b should clearly be given prec-edence. The then no longer needed Batch1 aircraft with their rather limited possibili-ty for being upgraded to multirole capabili-ty, would then be available unrestrictedly forfurther use - e.g. for exports. Only as an op-

tion to fall back on in case of a non-contract-ing of Sub-batch 3b could Batch 1 be partial-ly upgraded to multirole capability.

EUROFIGHTER in the LuftwaffeFrank Gräfe

Austrian EUROFIGHTER at Zeltweg during a QRA exercise. The aircraft is equipped with IRIS-T guidedmissiles Photo: Eurofighter




A concluding financial comparison be-tween the approach of the procurement ofSub-batch 3b as favored by the Luftwaffeand the waiving of this procurement withsimultaneous upgrading of Batch 1 is diffi-cult at present. In the comparison it wouldbe necessary to contrast the costs for thepost calculation claim of the industry result-ing from a non-contracting of Sub-batch3b or an indemnification of the partner na-

ern Europe. It would also be imaginable thatan export customer interested in advancedBatch 3 EUROFIGHTERs will initially acquireused Batch 1 EUROFIGHTERs as a start or in-terim solution.

Introduction intothe Luftwaffe

The EUROFIGHTER weapon system hasmeanwhile been in service with the Luft-waffe for more than seven years. Train-ing flight operations with the EUROFIGHERweapon system were initiated in the Luft-waffe in 73rd Fighter Wing “Steinhoff“, thecentral EUROFIGHTER training unit, in April2004. Since the start of the EUROFIGHTERtraining in the Luftwaffe in January 2005,more than 70 pilots have so far been trainedon the EUROFIGHTER weapon system ofwhich more than 30 received continued

training to become pilot instructors. Until theyear 2013, a total of 24 Austrian pilots, too,are going to be retrained to EUROFIGHTERsin 73rd Fighter Wing “Steinhoff“ of which 16have already completed their training. Opera-tional EUROFIGHTER flight operations beganin 74th Fighter Wing - the first EUROFIGHTERcombat wing of the Luftwaffe - in July 2006.The start of the flight operations in 31stFighter Bomber Wing „Boelke“ in December2009 marked an additional milestone since

tions in case of their own commissioning aswell as the upgrading costs of Batch 1 whoseamount cannot be estimated yet with theprice for the possible procurement of Sub-batch 3b. An export of used aircraft of Batch1 - which is also aimed for by some partnernations - could contribute to further financ-ing Sub-batch 3b. The industry sees a marketfor used Batch 1 aircraft with especially theyoung NATO partners in East and Southeast-

Colonel Markus Krammel, Commander 73rd Fighter Wing “Steinhoff“, and Lieutenant Colonel DirkPingel, pilot, accept the congratulations of the Eurofighter Company for the whole German Eurofight-er fleet after the symbolic 100,000th flying hour Photo: Eurofighter

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ER with air-to-air refueling by an A 310 Mul-ti Role Transport Tanker of the Luftwaffe in2009 for the purpose of taking part in Asia’sbiggest air show, the AERO INDIA in Banga-lore/India. That deployment represented amilestone in the extension of the capabili-ty profile of the Bundeswehr since it was thefirst time that combat aircraft of the Luft-waffe were possible to be deployed over a

strategic distance of 9,000 km with own in-flight refueling assets without allied support.

The next employment of the EUROFIGHT-ER in the Luftwaffe will be the participation inthe one-year NATO Response Force in 2012.To that end, Germany will provide a modulewith six EUROFIGHTERs of 74th Fighter Wingin the air-to-air mission role to NATO.

The initial operational capability (IOC) ofthe EUROFIGHTER became obvious in theenforcement of the no-fly zone over Libyawithin the scope of the enforcement of theUN resolutions when the RAF had, for the

first time, deployed up to ten EUROFIGHTERsin addition to twelve TORNADOs to partici-pate in a NATO operation. The EUROFIGHT-ERs of the RAF’s Batch 1 were stationed in It-aly and at the beginning of the operation in-itially employed in the air-to-air role. For thatpurpose they were equipped with AMRAAMmedium-range air-to-air guided missiles andwith ASRAAM (advanced short range air-to-air missiles).

With the decreasing threat situation in con-sequence of weakening enemy air defencesand the concentration on air-to-ground mis-sions, the EUROFIGHTERs of the RAF have

also taken on this task. Based on the afore-mentioned AUSTERE air-to-ground capabili-ty a EUROFIGHTER of the RAF has thus con-ducted for the first time an air-to-ground at-tack in early April, engaging two tanks withtwo Enhanced Paveway II. With that, the EU-ROFIGHTER has proved over Libya its multi-role capability for the first time.

Advancement of theMultirole Capability

The main effort in the development of theEUROFIGHTER weapon system is focusedon the consistent extension of the multirolecapability. Highly prioritized is here the ena-blement to perform the function of close airsupport.

Originally, the EUROFIGHTER, former-ly designated JAEGER 90, was designed asan all-fighter aircraft in reaction to the threatposed by the Warsaw Pact at that time. Withthe role adaptation and further develop-ment to a multirole-capable combat aircraft,the EUROFIGHTER partner nations have ad-

justed themselves to the changing security

situation and changed operational challeng-es of modern conflict scenarios and decidedin favor of an efficiently employable weap-

der. NATO scrambles and NATO operation-al tests (OT) conducted since then prove theoperational suitability of the EUROFIGHTERfor this mission role.

The Luftwaffe regularly supports alliancepartners in the accomplishment of this taskin addition to the NATO alert section in Ger-many. The collective protection of NATO ter-ritory - and thus also the joint task to ensurethe integrity of NATO airspace - is one of thecore tasks of the NATO treaty nations. Someof the newer NATO members like Slowenia,

Macedonia, the Baltic States, but also Icelanddo not possess own air defence forces to en-sure the sovereignty of their airspace. For thatreason, other NATO nations guarantee thesecurity in the respective airspace; in the Bal-tic States, for instance, in a rotational proce-dure since April 2004. So far, Germany hasparticipated in this “NATO Air Policing BalticStates“ for three to four months each in theyears 2005, 2008, 2009, and 2011, thus giv-ing a clear sign in the German alliance solidar-ity. In 2009, EUROFIGHTERs were employedwithin the scope of “NATO Air Policing Bal-

tic States“ for the first time. The EUROFIGHT-ER has proved successful during that mission.Despite pre-winter conditions, the missioncontingent with its four EUROFIGHTERs hada very high aircraft availability (ready status)rate in the daily flight operations and NATOalert procedures were always possible to beimplemented in the preset timeframe. Thisfirst international employment of the EU-ROFIGHTER represents a milestone in theuse of this weapon system as an interceptor.Shortly after that, the RAF has replaced theTornado F3 fighter aircraft of its alert sectionwith EUROFIGHTERs for airspace surveillance

over the Falkland Islands.Another highlight in the use of that aircraft

was the deployment of the EUROFIGHT-

the EUROFIGHTER is, for the first time in theLuftwaffe, to be employed in this unit in theair-to-ground role in the medium term. In thetarget structure all EUROFIGHTER wings aregoing to be multirole-capable units.

At present it is not possible, however, toconclusively assess what effects the plannedoperation of only 140 EUROFIGHTERs willhave on the original planning which providedfor a stationing of five EUROFIGHTER wings(four combat units and one training unit).

In the meantime, more than 70 EU-

ROFIGHTERs have been delivered to Germa-ny which have flown more than 20,000 fly-ing hours since the start of the flight opera-tion in the Luftwaffe more than seven yearsago. In total, the 100,000th flying hour wascompleted by the six EUROFIGHER user na-tions in January of this year.

Employment of theEUROFIGHTERs

71st Fighter Wing “Richthofen“ in East-

ern Friesland (region in Northern Germany)- where the F-4F PHANATOM weapon sys-tem will still be operated up to the year 2013- and 74th Fighter Wing in Bavaria provide analert section around the clock, each consist-ing of two rearmed and refueled fighter air-craft (NATO Quick Reaction Alert Intercep-tors (QRA(I)). Both sections are permanent-ly assigned to NATO and accomplish both thealliance task to preserve the integrity of NA-TO airspace and simultaneously the contin-uous national mission task “Security in Air-space“. To guarantee this continuous missiontask of the Luftwaffe, 74th Fighter Wing has,

in June 2008, transferred the provision of theNATO alert section from the F-4F PHANTOMto the EUROFIGHTER as first mission-type or-

Air-to-air refueling of a EUROFIGHTER of 73rd Fighter Wing “Steinhoff“ with an Airbus A-310 MRTTPhoto: Luftwaffe




on system which is possible to be used flexibly and resource-effi-ciently in several mission roles at the same time. The multirole ca-pability is agreed on by the four nations and will be introduced intwo phases as of 2012. (The international contractual designation

for the first phase of the role adaptation is called Phase 1 Enhance-ments (P1E), the German portion of that is the 1st stage role adap-tation. The 2nd stage has not yet been negotiated on internationallevel.) In 2004, the German Bundestag (Lower House) has resolved,contemporaneously with the request for the delivery of Batch 2, onthe multirole-capable advancement within the scope of the role ad-aptation of the EUROFIGHTERs of Batches 2 and 3. The 1st stage ofthe role adaptation was approved by the parliament in 2007. This1st stage serves the establishment of the precision capability in theair-to-ground role and includes for Germany the integration of anelectro-optical target designator pod (LDP) to illuminate/designateground targets as well as an allweather-capable short-range preci-sion armament, the Guided Bomb Unit (GU)-48, which will be de-livered as of 2015. (Spain and Italy will also integrate the GBU-48 in-

to their EUROFIGHTERs). The GBU-48 is a heavy bomb weighing1,000 pounds with laser-guided homing and GPS navigation. Withthe orientation to most likely missions, the employment within thescope of close air support gains increasingly in importance. To thatend, the Luftwaffe plans - aside from the engagement with the in-ternal gun - to introduce with a modification of the GBU-48 the Tro-

jan Improved Penetrator (TIP) which combines an increased pene-tration potential with simultaneously clearly reduced explosive pow-er. By this adapted effect in the target and the resultant possibilityto minimize collateral damages, the TIP is optimized for the employ-ment in close air support in direct proximity of own or allied groundforces and in urban terrain. The operational availability of a missionmodule with GBU-48 and TIP for a scalable effector employment is

planned for 2016.The capabilities of the EUROFIGHTER in the air-to-air role will beexpanded with the integration of the Meteor medium-range guid-ed missile planned for 2014. Due to the inherent characteristics ofthe ramjet engine, Meteor possesses high speed, range and maneu-verability even in the final phase of the engagement. In addition,Meteor opens up new possibilities for air combat such as change oftarget allocation while in flight and/or target allocation by anoth-er aircraft within the scope of network enabled operations (NEO).Hence, the EUROFIGHTER possesses with the already integratedIRIS-T guided missile and the planned Meteor an effective air-to-airarmament for short and medium ranges. The procurement of Me-teor must be planned and arranged in a way to avoid the develop-ing of a gap when the end of the AMRAAM service life is reached

in a few years.As regards reconnaissance, a complementary approach will be

pursued by the Luftwaffe in future as well, namely on the basis

EUROFIGHTER of the RAF on mission over Libya with Enhanced Paveway IIand AMRAAM and ASRAAM armament Photo: Eurofighter

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to the intelligence, command and effect pooland to create the prerequisites for the partic-ipation in joint and combined and multina-tional network enabled operations.

The further development of the multirolecapability of the EUROFIGHTERs of the Luft-waffe must take particular account of the re-quirements and approaches of the other EU-ROFIGHTER nations as the high costs for in-

tegration and development can be consid-erably reduced for the individual countrythrough concerted and coordinated actions.The Brimstone which was optimized for closeair support and which has been employed inAfghanistan and Libya or the Small DiameterBomb II with a small effector which was op-timized for medium ranges are just a few ex-amples that need to be studied and tested byother EUROFIGHTER nations.

Weapon System of Choice

The tailoring of the EUROFIGHTER for amultirole-capable employment and the fur-ther development for mission-relevant tasksof the current and most likely scenarios ofthe future have priority. For that reason, thearming of the EUROFIGHTERs for an em-ployment in close air support (CAS) missionsof own and allied ground forces has prece-dence. With the introduction of the GBU-48and TIP the EUROFIGHTERs of the Luftwaffewill be enabled for the first time to conductair-to-ground missions and, as a result, be ca-pable of supporting effectively, precisely, ef-

fect-orientated, and quickly ground forceson mission over great distances within thescope of close air support.

In the medium term, the EUROFIGHTERwill thus become the mainstay of air attacks.Here, the possible reduction to the opera-tion of 140 multirole-capable EUROFIGHT-ERs constitutes a distinct cut in the planningof the Luftwaffe which, from an operationpoint of view, can only be compensated bythe procurement of Sub-batch 3b and simul-taneous further use of Batch 1.

Distinct synergy effects are expected in the

support and deployment as well as in the op-erational employment as it will in future bepossible to use a single weapon system in alltypes of mission. The multirole capability ofthe EUROFIGHTER is a core element in theadvancement of the capability profile of theLuftwaffe. Therefore, the EUROFIGHTER hasb l d f lti l bl

ously. AESA radar systems are increasinglyrequested by potential export customers ofthe EUROFIGHTER, such as e.g. India.

Short-range air-to-ground armament likethe GBU-48 can no longer be employed ifthe enemy threat obstructs the approach in-to the target area. To that end it is necessaryto have a medium-range armament whichcan also be employed outside the threat

posed by the enemy. The integration andprocurement of an allweather-capable me-

dium-range air-to-ground armament for theEUROFIGHTER is planned for the end of thedecade. The integration of the already pro-cured TAURUS modular standoff weaponwhich is presently employed with the TOR-NADO aircraft is going to be stretched interms of time.

Summarized, the chronological upgradingof the EUROFIGHTER proceeds from Batch2 onward via the procurement of the GBU-48 and TIP, the integration and procurementof Meteor, the integration of RecceLite, the

development, integration and procurementof an AESA radar system, the integrationand procurement of a medium-range air-to-ground armament up to the integration ofthe TAURUS standoff weapon. These capa-bilities will have to be transferred to the EU-ROFIGHTER by the end of the presumable

i lif f th TORNADO

of the respective advantages of unmannedsystems – e.g. loiter time in the air - andmanned combat aircraft - e.g. responsecapability and robustness. Manned air re-connaissance will continue to be a primarytype of employment in future, too. There-fore, the multirole capability will - in thenext possible expansion stage after the in-tegration of Meteor - be enhanced by an

upgrading of the reconnaissance capabili-ty through the integration of the Recce-Lite

reconnaissance pod into the EUROFIGHT-ERs of Batches 2 and 3. A single platformwill thus be capable of robustly conductingtarget reconnaissance, weapon employ-ment and post-strike analyses at the sametime.

The radar system as the most impor-tant sensor of the EUROFIGHTER must al-so be adapted to the challenges of modernscenarios. Most of the sophisticated com-bat aircraft on the world market are or willbe equipped with an Active Electronical-

ly Scanned Array (AESAS) radar system. AnAESA radar system offers numerous ad-vantages, such as higher acquisition/detec-tion ranges, the capability for multiple tar-get engagement, a higher stability and reli-ability, and an improved protection functionagainst enemy jamming measures. Planned

f th M S d i th d

First EUROFIGHTER of RAF takes off for enforcing the no-fly zone over Libya Photo: Eurofighter

european security & defence magazine, issue nos 3 & 4,2011

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