europeanization of turkish politics. the protection of minority rights
TRANSCRIPT
National and Kapodistrian University of Athens
School of Economics and Political Sciences
Faculty of Political Science and Public Administration
Department of International and European Studies
The Europeanization of
Turkish Politics
The protection of minority rights
By Evangelos Marios Kemos
1342201000095
Thesis advisor: Assistant Professor Susannah Verney
Athens, February 2015
2
to my family that made me the person I am,
my friends that honoured me with their kindness and
embraced me with their positive thinking
and to everyone that believed in me…
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KEYWORDS
Turkey, European Union, Europeanization, conditionality, domestic reform, democracy, minori-
ties, minority rights.
ABSTRACT
Turkey’s EU candidacy initiated Turkey’s subjection to Europeanization’s rational- and con-
structivist-based mechanisms. Ever since, successive Turkish governments engaged in unprece-
dented reforms, aiming to conform Turkey to the Copenhagen political criteria including the re-
spect for and protection of minorities, located in great numbers, relics of the multi-ethnic and
multi-religious Ottoman Empire. However, the virtuous cycle slumped and gradually deviated to
a vicious cycle of EU-Turkey relations deterioration and reforms discontinuity after the official
negotiations initiation, reflecting among others, the decreasing credibility of the EU membership,
the public opinion’s fading support and the decomposition of the AKP-EU strategic alliance.
Nevertheless, as argued, factors other than Europeanization pressures contributed to the devel-
opments and are therefore analyzed in this thesis.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction .............................................................................................................. 8
1. Theorizing Europeanization ...........................................................................11
1.1. Theoretical evolution of EU integration......................................................................... 11
1.1.1. Neofunctionalism and Intergovernmentalism ......................................................... 11
1.1.2. Rational choice and Constructivism approaches .................................................... 12
1.2. The emergence of the Europeanization concept ............................................................ 13
1.2.1. Europeanization and the EU member states ........................................................... 14
1.2.2. Europeanization and the EU accession candidate states ......................................... 15
1.2.2.1. Constructivist approach and the EU-led policy learning and socialization
mechanism ........................................................................................................................ 17
1.2.2.2. Rationalist mechanism, the case of conditionality .......................................... 18
2. Minorities in Turkey .......................................................................................20
2.1. Ethnic minorities ............................................................................................................ 21
2.1.1. Kurds ....................................................................................................................... 22
2.1.2. Roma ....................................................................................................................... 24
2.1.3. Caucasians............................................................................................................... 25
2.2. Religious minorities ....................................................................................................... 27
2.2.1. Alevis ...................................................................................................................... 28
2.2.2. Caferis ..................................................................................................................... 29
2.2.3. Armenians ............................................................................................................... 29
2.2.4. Jews ......................................................................................................................... 29
2.2.5. Assyrians ................................................................................................................. 29
2.2.6. Rum Greek Orthodox Christians ............................................................................ 30
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3. Turkey’s path to EU accession .......................................................................30
3.1. Post-Helsinki convergence ............................................................................................. 33
3.1.1. Ecevit coalition government’s reforms, 1999-2002................................................ 34
3.1.2. AKP’s first term reform period, 2002-2005 ........................................................... 35
3.2. The 2005 backlash and the post-2005 reforms discontinuity ......................................... 36
3.2.1. AKP’s second term reform shortcomings, 2007-2011 ........................................... 37
3.2.1.1. The ephemeral AKP ‘openings’ to minorities ................................................. 38
3.2.1.2. The ‘privileged partnership’ and the freeze of negotiations ............................ 39
3.2.2. AKP’s third term politics, 2011 until today ............................................................ 41
3.2.2.1. New agenda, relabeled approach and the loss of the EU momentum ............. 42
3.2.2.2. The state of the Turkish democracy and the EU membership perspective ..... 44
4. Europeanization and minority rights protection in Turkey .......................45
4.1. Europeanization factors in Turkey’s accession process ................................................. 46
4.1.1. The Copenhagen criteria ......................................................................................... 47
4.1.2. The conditionality mechanism and the external incentives model ......................... 48
4.1.2.1. Legal coercion and the acquis communautaire ............................................... 50
4.2. Domestic political expediencies ..................................................................................... 54
4.3. Civil society pressure ..................................................................................................... 55
4.4. International agents other than the European Union ...................................................... 57
Conclusion ...............................................................................................................58
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LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1 Map of Turkey ................................................................................................................ 26
Figure 2 Austrian, French and German public opinion towards Turkey’s EU membership ........ 32
Figure 3 Turkish public opinion towards EU membership, 2004-2014 ....................................... 37
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1 Turkish reforms regarding minority rights, 2000-2008 ................................................... 51
Table 2 Chapter 23 assessment process and current status ........................................................... 53
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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
AKP Justice and Development Party (Turkey) - Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi
ANAP Motherland Party (Turkey) - Anavatan Partisi
AP Accession Partnership
BDP Peace and Democracy Party (Turkey) – Baris ve Demokrasi Partisi
CDU Christian Democratic Union (Germany) - Christlich Demokratische Union
CEECs Central and Eastern European Countries
CHP Republican People’s Party (Turkey) - Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi
CoE Council of Europe
DSP Democratic Left Party (Turkey) - Demokratik Sol Parti
DTP Democratic Society Party (Turkey) - Partiya Civaka Demokratîk
ECHR European Convention of Human Rights
ECtHR European Court of Human Rights
EC European Commission
EEC European Economic Community
EP European Parliament
EU European Union
FDP Free Democratic Party (Germany) – Freie Demokratische Partei
FP Virtue Party (Turkey) - Fazilet Partisi
MHP Nationalist Movement Party (Turkey) - Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi
PKK Kurdistan Workers' Party - Partiya Karkerane Kurdistani
RP Welfare Party (Turkey) - Refah Partisi
SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SPD Social Democratic Party (Germany) - Sozialdemokratische Partei
TNP Turkish National Programme
UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UMP Union for a Popular Movement (France) - Union pour un mouvement populaire
US United States of America
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Introduction
Since the establishment of the Turkish Republic, minorities1 have been perceived as a threat to
the “indivisible integrity of the state with its territory and nation” enshrined in article 14 of the
Turkish Constitution, perception that has had a grave impact on generations of minorities in ac-
cessing their fundamental rights in Turkey. Even though it has been argued that the Kemalist
establishment has been superficially western in form, it remained rigidly authoritarian and dog-
matic in substance continuing to stress republicanism over democracy, homogeneity over differ-
ence, the military over the civilian and the state over society as Hakan Havuz concludes (cited in
Kubicek, 2004, p. 112).
However, Turkey since its foundation and up to our days, nevertheless its adopted policies,
remains a land of vast ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity. It is home not only to Turks,
Kurds and Armenians, but also to Alevis and Assyrians followed in size by Laz, Caferis, Roma,
Rum Orthodox Christians, Caucasian and Jewish populations. This diversity assembles a centu-
ries-old mix of languages, cultures and traditions being practiced within its borders during the
multi-ethnic and multi-religious Ottoman Empire.
Starting from the Helsinki European Council in 1999 Turkey has been exposed to the cele-
bration of its ethno-cultural and religious identity, mainly due to the process of the Europeaniza-
tion of its politics. This process has been ongoing with certain difficulties testing the consolida-
tion of its democracy and the practical application of the Europeanization concept itself. Still, it
is of great interest that while Turkey’s capacities to implement domestic reforms is less limited
than in most of other European Union [EU] candidates case, its perspective as well as its own
enthusiasm for membership has been gradually fading.
This thesis, analysing the application of the concept of Europeanization in Turkish politics,
aims to explore the degree of its application to the case of the EU acceding, candidate states. It is
important in that sense to observe whether the transformation of domestic politics, inter alia and
of great importance, the protection of minority rights has been the result of Europeanization
pressures and of its factors or an aspect of a broader process based on deeper interests and politi-
1 Since there is no universally accepted definition of minorities, minorities in this thesis will refer to groups that are
ethnically, religiously, linguistically and culturally different from the majority of the population, difference that can
be recognized either by outsiders or by members of the minority group itself.
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cal expediencies. Although, it has already been concluded in the relevant literature that Europe-
anization is in fact observed in the case of EU candidate states, as argued, its importance and
exclusivity in domestic reforms, as well as the adjustment pressures that applies, greatly vary.
Therefore, it is critical to assess not only how external pressure contributes to domestic reform
but also in what extent. Moreover, in the case of Turkey and especially in the AKP governance
period, political expediencies, as argued in this thesis, are crucial in order for the political devel-
opments to be understood.
Additionally, this thesis attempts to disprove and possibly amend the hypothesis that in the
Turkish case, the minority rights protection amelioration has been exclusively driven by the
pressure applied in the framework of Turkey’s EU candidacy, based on the concept of Eu-
ropeanization and its conditionality mechanism. In order for this hypothesis to be examined,
useful information concerning the ethnic and religious minorities in Turkey, as well as the histor-
ical events that led to the current negotiations phase, are analyzed. This analysis aims to provide
an accurate understanding of recent political developments, especially during the AKP govern-
ance period. Moreover, the theoretical framework of the Europeanization concept is being related
with key events and procedures that occurred during the given period of time, consequently
elaborating on the adjustment load that the process involves.
For the topic’s as well as the working hypothesis’ elaboration, various sources were used.
They included but were not limited to primary sources, notably international treaties, together
with international organizations documents - EU Council and European Commission [EC] doc-
uments, presidency conclusions and progress reports as well as Council of Europe [CoE] docu-
ments. Other primary sources included newspaper articles written at time of the events that con-
tributed to the political developments’ evaluation. Moreover, the author’s traineeship at
RUMVADER, The Association for the Support of Greek Community Foundations provided use-
ful insight, concerning the recognized minorities’ status in Istanbul, Turkey’s largest city, that
contributed to the deeper interest and understanding of the topic. The primary sources have also
been supplemented by secondary sources and relevant literature, mainly in the form of books and
academic articles gathered from reputable journals. Furthermore, the use of studies analyzing
criticizing but also interpreting primary sources have been crucial in providing useful and accu-
rate understanding of the actual events and developments.
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Accordingly, the thesis is structured as follows. The first chapter develops the analytical
framework, the concept of Europeanization, its theoretical predecessors that contributed to its
emergence and its effect on current EU member states as well as the perspective member states.
An attempted synthesis of the constructivist approach with the rationalist mechanisms is being in
that sense selected as suitable to explain the pressures of Europeanization applied to the specific
case study of the Turkish EU candidacy. The second chapter presents the ethnic and religious
minorities residing in Turkey and provides useful insight to the issue of their traditional mis-
treatment and suppression by the dominant Turkish-Sunni-Muslim majority.
The third chapter focuses on Turkey’s path to EU accession, chronologically analyzing the
successive governments in power since the late 1990s up to our days and their contribution to the
promotion of the minority rights protection. Concurrently, the relevant developments taking
place in the EU- and EU member states level are being highlighted; hence they provide useful
information for the shifting general view of the EU toward the Turkish EU membership. The
fourth and last chapter elaborates on the factors that constitute adjustment pressure and have con-
tributed to the improvement of minority rights protection in Turkey in the past. Those are not
limited to Europeanization factors such as the conditionality mechanism and the acquis commu-
nautaire [acquis] adoption but extend to domestic political expediencies, the civic pressures de-
riving from the society as well as pressure applied by other external international agents in do-
mestic politics
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1. Theorizing Europeanization2
1.1. Theoretical evolution of EU integration
The beginning of the European unification project over time led to the emergence of a number of
theoretical explanations trying to amplify the European evolving integration process. As Pollack
(2005, p. 13) summarizes, the:
neofunctionalist models of integration through spill-over [were soon pitted] against inter-
governmentalist models emphasizing the continuing dominance of national governments;
later, this debate was largely supplanted by a second debate pitting rational-choice theo-
rists against constructivist analyses.
In this context, the emergence of the concept of Europeanization should be explained by the shift
of the European theory studies from the narrow explanation of the European integration with a
focus centred on the question of how to account for the emerging European polity adopting a
'bottom-up' perspective (Börzel & Risse, 2003, p. 57).
1.1.1. Neofunctionalism and Intergovernmentalism
Using the words of Hix (Hix, 2005, p. 15) “the first and most enduring grand theory of European
integration is neofunctionalism”, first introduced by Ernst Haas and based on the argument that
European integration is a deterministic process, in which, as elaborated by Lindberg (as cited in
Hix, 2005, p. 15)
a given action, related to a specific goal, creates a situation in which the original goal can
be assured only by taking further actions, which in turn create a further condition and a
need for more, and so forth.
Vital to the theory is the mechanism of spill-over, the domestic pressure from social interest
groups for further policy integration in order for them to promote their narrow economic and
2 Alternative terms have been introduced by scholars of which of great relevance to the current thesis is Wallace’s
(2000) ‘EU-ization’. As summarized by Flockhart (2010, pp. 790-791) there is a conceptual distinction between
‘EU-ization’ and Europeanization: “The ‘EU-ization’ is in this case different from ‘Europeanization’ because of its
focus on the EU and because it is predominantly concerned with ‘political encounters’” that encapsulate transfer of
institutional and organizational practices and policies. Hence, EU-ization is understood as the specific effects of the
EU accession process in candidate countries, whereas Europeanization encapsulates the broader effects of European
ideas and governance in the European periphery both before and after the establishment of the EU. This thesis will
however, use Europeanization interchangeably with the term EU-ization.
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ideological interests, parallel to the delegation of more powers to supranational institutions,
namely the EC, in order to increase their influence over policy outcomes.
Neofunctionalism’s mainly opposing theory, intergovernmentalism, has been rather a result
of the theory’s failure to explain the slowdown of European integration in the 1960s, and the
subsequent strengthening of the intergovernmental elements of the EC. As Rosamond (2000, p.
73) concludes, the alleged implausibility of empirical data pointing out the increasing relevance
of the nation-states as well as their continuing centrality in promoting and safeguarding certain
sorts of key values and freedoms has been contrary to neofunctionalist assumptions, thus putting
the theory under stress.
Intergovernmentalism, presents a European integration driven by the European nation-states
interests and actions. Thus, it elaborates on the basic aim of national governments, the protection
of their geopolitical interests, such as national security and sovereignty. In the words of Hoff-
mann (as cited in Hix, 2005, p. 15; Rosamond, 2000, p. 77), “intergovernmentalist ‘logic of di-
versity’ in areas of key importance to the national interest, certainty or self-controlled uncertainty
is preferred and promoted”. Furthermore, as per Rosamond (2000, p. 78) the new theory’s cri-
tique added up to the ambivalence of the idea of spillover and the implications of automaticity it
conveyed. However, the critical developments of the 1960’s and 1970’s saw the undertaking of a
series of theoretical refinements by neofunctionalists that led to the obsolescence of the ‘grand
theories’ as discussed (p. 97) that were subsequently replaced by middle-range3 explanations.
1.1.2. Rational choice and Constructivism approaches
Rational choice and constructivist approaches to politics, in contrast to neofunctionalist and in-
tergovernmentalist theory, did not originate in the field of EU study and should therefore be un-
derstood broadly and in a more general manner. As Pollack (2007) summarizes, over the past
two decades, rational choice theories have made rapid inroads into the study of EU politics, most
notably through the combination of rational choice and institutionalism4 to the study of EU deci-
sion-making. Rational choice institutionalism is based in that sense on the perception of “actors
as utility-maximizers operating according to a ‘logic of consequentiality’” (Pollack, 2005, p. 24)
3 Opposing to a grand theory seeking to explain phenomena at a societal level, a middle-range theory has a limited
scope, generally trying to explain a specific set of phenomena. 4 Applied as Rational Choice Institutionalism in the framework of new institutionalism.
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striving to maximize the expected benefits in the framework of a fixed set of preferences. In ad-
dition to the above, more recently, an increasing number of studies started focusing apart from
the effects of the EU on domestic politics within the EU’s old and new member states, on its
effects within EU candidate states (See Chapter 1.2.2).
Constructivism on the other hand understands institutions broadly, including not only formal
rules but also formal norms, constituting actors who inter alia shape identities and preferences.
Using the wording of Pollack (2005, p. 24), in constructivism, “actor preferences are not exoge-
nously given and fixed as in rationalist models but endogenous to institutions and individuals’
identities are shaped and re-shaped by their social environment.” Indeed, in constructivism one
observes a shift towards the logic of ‘appropriateness’5 of an action in the basis of a socially con-
structed role or institutional rule.
In short, recent developments in EU study and in Europeanization and enlargement studies in
specific, have witnessed the adoption of a pragmatic ‘tool-kit’ use of mechanisms, that as con-
firmed by Pollack (2007, p. 42), derive from rational choice and constructivist approaches. These
approaches aim rather to shed light on issues currently in the spotlight than compete with the
grand theories mentioned in the previous Chapter. Moreover, Pollack complements that “external
incentives in the form of political conditionality have emerged as the best predictor of policy”,
therefore its analysis has become more crucial than ever.
1.2. The emergence of the Europeanization concept
Nevertheless, none of the grand theories has proven powerful enough to provide satisfactory ex-
planations for the EU enlargement mainly in the framework of the shift towards the analysis of
EU governance. As a result, a tendency to use middle-range theoretical notions to promote par-
tial explanations emerged. Europeanization being one of those middle-range concepts moves
steadily towards becoming a theory. Europeanization is generally understood as the domestic
impact of, and adaptation to, European governance in the EU’s member states.
However, the precise meaning and scope of the term remains unclear, while some scholars
disregard and rather contest its usefulness as an analytical tool. Even providing a broadly ac-
5 The concept of a ‘logic of appropriateness’ is introduced in the work of March and Olsen (as cited in Pollack,
2005, p.24).
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ceptable definition has become a serious problem to overcome, with most scholars de facto fa-
vouring a definition of Europeanization as the domestic impact of the EU, increasingly differen-
tiated by either ‘uploading’ or ‘downloading’ stances to and from the EU as observed by Börzel
(2002), with great “emphasis on the process and extent to which member states and prospective
member states adopt EU rules and implement EU policy-making.” (Flockhart, 2010, p. 790)
Nevertheless, Claudio Radaelli has provided one of the most comprehensive but mostly EU cen-
tric definitions. In Claudio Radaelli’s words (2000, p. 4), Europeanization is the incorporation of:
formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’,
and shared beliefs and norms, which are first defined and consolidated in the making of
EU public policy and politics … in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political
structures, and public policies.
During the 1990s6, the study of Europeanization became a popular subject “with a growing
number of studies seeking to explain both the process of Europeanization and the significant var-
iation in outcomes observed across both member states and issue areas” (Pollack, 2005, p. 40),
namely political processes as indicated by Flockhart (2010, pp. 790-791). Thus, scholars have
used Europeanization as a “newly fashionable term to denote a variety of changes within Euro-
pean politics and international relations.” (Featherstone & Radaelli, 2003, p. 3) Even today Eu-
ropeanization is rather seen as an “‘orchestration’ of existing concepts and theories, with major
theoretical import from comparative politics and theoretical policy analysis” as Featherstone and
Radaelli put it, than a theory by itself as already argued.
1.2.1. Europeanization and the EU member states
At this stage, Europeanization was best described as a process whereby EU institutions and poli-
cies influence national institutions and policies within the member states. In their 2001 work
Transforming Europe; Europeanization and Domestic Change, Cowles, Caporaso and Risse (as
cited in Pollack, 2005, p. 40) elaborating on the conditions of Europeanization, suggested that the
extent of Europeanization is:
6 As cited in Pollack (2005, p. 40), the study of Europeanization dates back to the 1970s, when a small number of
scholars examined how EU membership had influenced national political institutions and public policies.
15
a dual product of the adaptational pressures resulting from the varying ‘goodness to fit’
between the EU and national institutions and policies; and the domestic intervening vari-
ables, including the number of veto points and the organizations and political cultures
embedded in existing national institutions.
Additionally, the impact of Europeanization has been typically described as incremental, irregu-
lar, and uneven over time and between national and subnational levels. (Featherstone & Radaelli,
2003, p. 4)
Furthermore, important to stress, the concept of Europeanization has been a broadly extended
concept. It is being supposed to explain processes varying from cultural change, new identities
formation to policy change, administrative innovation, even modernization as Radaelli (2000, p.
4) confirms, covering the formation of European public policy and the effects of EU decisions on
national systems, and affecting member states but also the wider world. In this framework, there
is undoubtedly Europeanization of policy in countries applying for EU membership, as this thesis
elaborates. Nevertheless, it is also true that the response to the processes involved, as signified in
the Differential Responses to European Policies: a Comparison, 2001 work of Héritier and Knill
(as cited in Radelli, 2003), may not necessarily be of convergence. Convergence as a result of
EU participation is therefore far from being inevitable.
1.2.2. Europeanization and the EU accession candidate states
Grabbe (2003, p. 304) rejuvenated the concept of Europeanization by analysing its application in
Central and Eastern European countries [CEECs] at their EU accession process at the time7, with
the reasoning that these countries are already subjected to substantially the same pressures of
adaptation to EU policies as current member states. It is true that the Europeanization mecha-
nisms as identified in the relevant literature are likely to operate for the applicant countries, given
that the same policy structures and implementation procedures are used. In the light of the above,
contractual agreements signed between the EU and third countries have become one of the main
instruments of the EU for promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms in those countries
(Arikan, 2010, p. 20). Concurrently, as identified by Kubicek (2004, p. 4) further methods are
7 Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania that joined the EU in
2004.
16
being used by international actors to shape processes of democratization and facilitate the path to
democratization in general and the Europeanization of the EU ascending states in specific, based
on a certain degree of control over state policy.
However, even in the above-mentioned framework, the case of the CEEC candidates slightly
differs from their Southeastern European counterparts, thus hindering further generalizations. As
Börzel and Soyaltin (2012, pp. 10-11) assert, the traditional mediating factors identified by the
early Europeanization literature are becoming less and less relevant8 or more ambivalent in their
impact9 in Southeast Europe. Newer conditions for EU-induced domestic institutional change
have emerged. Those conditions are according to many scholars cited in the work of Börzel,
Risse and Soyaltin (Börzel & Risse, 2012, pp. 10-14; Börzel & Soyaltin, 2012), mainly focusing
on power asymmetries, regime type10, domestic incentives for change, and degrees of state-
hood11.
Into detail, the early Europeanization literature did not deal with regime type at all, since the
member states before the 2004 enlargement were all consolidated democracies. Soon however
the level and quality of democracy came into the epicentre of the Europeanization debate and
culminated with the assessment of mostly democratizing countries, including Turkey, for EU
membership (Börzel & Soyaltin, 2012, p. 11). This is indeed the basis of the research question of
this thesis. Therefore, the Turkish case, especially in the period of the AKP government is a good
example of whether Europeanization was bound to meet and actually met greater resistance in
areas such as minority rights where democratic institutions were less consolidated and fragile.
Preliminary, one can only observe that the support of the EU played a vital role in the establish-
ment of the AKP in Turkish politics since as this thesis argues it was the alignment of interest
that made possible their strategic partnership. As a consequence, the Europeanization of Turkey
rather disproves the above argument.
8 Notably factors such as the existence of norm entrepreneurs and formal supporting institutions. 9 Namely, veto players and the existence of informal institutions. 10 Namely, democracy versus autocracy. 11 Notably the level of state consolidation. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2004, p. 663) also conclude that there is
a variation in the impact of the conditions according to the political context of the country observed. While in the
context of democratic conditionality, domestic adoption costs severely limit the effectiveness of EU conditionality,
even when it was credible and rewards were sizeable, while at the same time, authoritarian governments turn down
the offer of membership rather than accept the political power costs of adopting liberal democratic rules. By con-
trast, in the context of acquis conditionality, variation in the size of domestic adoption costs only accounted for the
speed of rule transfer but did not matter systematically for its effectiveness.
17
Coming back to EU’s impact on the political governance of accession candidates sizeable
and credible incentives were offered by the EU in the form of a membership prospect. As sug-
gested by the Europeanisation literature and confirmed by Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier
(2004, p. 662), the EU incentives formed the basis of a strong conditionality policy. Indeed as
they continue:
the dominant logic underpinning EU conditionality is a bargaining strategy of reinforce-
ment by reward, under which the EU provides external incentives for a target government
to comply with its conditions.
Those conditions included but were not limited to democratic reforms and the compliance with
core political values of the EU. However, the recent fatigue and the discontinuity of reforms in
Turkey, mostly observed after 2005 highlighted the fact that a big enough and tangible reward
able to compensate the incumbents for perceived losses of power or popularity after introducing
unpopular reforms was rather at the core of the conditionality mechanism (see Chapter 4.1.1;
Noutcheva & Aydin-Düzgit, 2012, p. 59).
Developments in alternative rationalist and constructivist hypotheses about the effect of EU
membership on the newer member states brought new conceptual evidence to light. As Börzel
and Risse (2000) pointed out, scholars made increasing notions of an EU-led policy learning and
socialization attributed to constructivism, nevertheless the timing of policy reforms in the newer
member states suggested that the greatest impact of the EU has resulted from explicit EU condi-
tionality attributed to rationalist mechanisms (Pollack, 2005). Soon those notions materialized
into a newer branch of the Europeanization literature (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004) that
concentrates on the modes of social learning, adaptation and lesson-drawing as the mechanisms
involved in the process of Europeanization. Therefore it is useful that Europeanization itself is
theorized in terms of those two distinct mechanisms.
1.2.2.1. Constructivist approach and the EU-led policy learning and
socialization mechanism
The social learning model follows core tenets of social constructivism, with its main assumptions
being the logic of appropriateness. According to this logic, actors rather than maximising their
egoistic self-interest, seek to meet social expectations in a given situation. Processes of socialisa-
tion often result in complex learning by which actors redefine their interests and identities
18
(Börzel & Risse, 2012, p. 7). In addition, as Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2004, p. 675)
elaborate, among:
alternative courses of action, they choose the (most) appropriate or legitimate one. Corre-
spondingly, arguing about the legitimacy of rules and the appropriateness of behaviour
(rather than bargaining about conditions and rewards), persuasion (rather than coercion),
and ‘complex’ learning (rather than behavioural adaptation) characterizes the process of
rule transfer and rule adoption.
Furthermore, as pointed out at the same work, the lesson-drawing should be analysed as a re-
sponse to domestic dissatisfaction with the status quo. It is policy-making actors that evaluate the
transferability and adjustment prospects of rules and policies applied in other countries or issues,
namely the adoption of EU rules and the acquis, expecting the rules to solve effectively domestic
policy problems.
1.2.2.2. Rationalist mechanism, the case of conditionality
Conditionality and external incentives provide a stronger explanation of the states behaviour than
socialization. According to the empirical observation of Zürn and Checkel (as cited in Pollack,
2005, p. 25), socialization effects are rather weak and secondary to dynamics at the national lev-
el. Concurrently, as per Avcı (2011, p. 410) the rationalist institutionalist branch of the literature
suggests that, “candidate country governments adopt EU rules if the benefits of the EU rewards
exceed the domestic adoption costs.” In this framework and under the limitations imposed, the
EU’s conditionality mechanism offers rational incentives for domestic actors to undertake re-
forms in expectation of the credible perspective of EU membership.
Even though different studies point out that the effectiveness of EU conditionality differs
across countries and issues, there are certain factors that are generally crucial for the success of
conditionality. Most notably and according to Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2004), two fac-
tors that are singled out are the credibility of the membership perspective itself, offered as the
key reward by the EU, followed by domestic adjustment costs that are not excessively high for
governments and do not endanger their power base.
In general, studies have confirmed that EU conditionality has successfully spread by opening
windows of opportunity for policy reform to domestic actors by decreasing the political costs of
controversial reforms. (Avcı, 2011, p. 410). Featherstone and Radaelli (2003, p. 58) explain this
19
process of changes in the political opportunity structure as a domestic redistribution of power.
This depends in any case on the capacity of actors to exploit these opportunities and avoid the
constraints. They also observe two mediating factors with opposite effects influence these capac-
ities, the multiple veto points in a country's institutional structure and the formal institutions. The
first can effectively empower actors with diverse interests to resist adaptational pressures ema-
nating from Europeanization while the latter, might exist providing actors with material and idea-
tional resources to exploit new opportunities, leading to an increased likelihood of change.
However, as Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2004) suggest, these dominant features of
conditionality might be superseded by other mechanisms that can also lead to rule transfer. The
existence of conditionality should not therefore undermine the possibility of independent adop-
tion of rules as part of application of best practices or as effective solutions to domestic policy
challenges in the EU accession framework. Moreover, it should also be taken into account that:
while the EU might provide incentives for the adoption of its rules, the mechanism
through which the CEECs adopt these rules might relate to processes of persuasion and
learning in which EU actors socialize CEEC actors rather than coerce them. (p. 662)
This latter idea combines the rational choice mechanism of conditionality, and the EU incentives
in specific, with the constructivist mechanism of social learning. Accordingly, the rule transfer
from the EU to the CEECs and the variation in its effectiveness are best explained in the basis of
the external incentives model but in particular with the credibility of EU conditionality and the
domestic costs of rule adoption, factors already mentioned in this Chapter.
In the Turkish case study, one can distinguish the rule adoption as a result both of the use of
conditionality as well as in the framework of the independent adoption of rules; application of
best practices as effective solutions to domestic policy challenges. The latter, elaborated in Chap-
ter 4 is also based on the exerted pressure in the direction of minority rights protection applied by
the EU but also by other international agents such as the CoE. Taking the above into account it
can be concluded that besides conditionality also external, EU incentives have played and con-
tinue to play a vital role as tools promoting reform at the domestic level. Therefore, the mainte-
nance of a stable and highly credible commitment by the EU towards the perspective member-
ship remains crucial.
20
2. Minorities in Turkey
The Turkish official position on minorities began to formulate soon after the promulgation of the
Republic on the 29th of October 1923. During the previous period, following the Ottoman defeat
in 1918, saw the rise of Turkish nationalism, linked to the “Sèvres Syndrome, the fear of territo-
rial and national disintegration inherited from World War I and the War of Independence during
which Christian (Rum Orthodox Christians, French and Armenian) minorities had collaborated
with foreign occupiers” and have been therefore associated with attempts to implement their
plans to dismember Anatolia (Türkmen & Öktem, 2013, pp. 463-464). During the same period,
nationalist Turks successfully appealed to Kurds to assist them in the name of the Muslim father-
land, a cause that had great appeal in view of the Armenian Christian threat in eastern Anatolia.
The agreed in the Lausanne Peace Treaty of 1923 population exchange meant that almost all
Orthodox Christians in Turkey had to be transferred to Greece in exchange for Greece’s [non-
Albanian] Muslim populations. Only a small number escaped this transfer, notably the popula-
tions of Istanbul and the islands of Imvros and Tenedos12, nevertheless, the Ecumenical Patriar-
chate of Constantinople remained in the city. As Türkmen and Öktem note (2013, p. 466) “in
accordance with the Turkish government’s wish…, [the Lausanne Peace Treaty] excluded other
sectarian Muslim minorities, like Alevis, as well as various ethnic and linguistic groups such as
Kurds and Arab…. [However,] the Western powers accepted these limitations in order to protect
the remaining non-Muslim portion of the population considerably reduced after two wars, the
1915 events involving the Armenians”, and the population exchange stated above. The Lausanne
Peace Treaty, with its very specific and limited definition of minorities on the basis of religion,
was the Treaty that also outlined the country’s policy on minority rights for the years to come.
Generally, the Turkish domestic policy asserts that national minorities are those that are rec-
ognized by international treaties, implying the Lausanne Treaty which indeed provides safe-
guards for the non-Muslim inhabitants of Turkey and their rights13, consequently only Rum
12 Imvros and Tenedos are the names of Gökçeada and Bozcaada respectively, two neighbouring islands on the Ae-
gean Sea that belong to Turkey. 13 The articles 37-43, section III, Part I of the Treaty grant, the freedoms of living, religious beliefs and migration,
the rights of legal and political equality, the right of use of the mother tongue in the courts and a series of rights that
end from the holding of religious ceremonies to the right to open minority schools or similar institutions (Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 1924).
21
Greek Orthodox Christians, Armenian Christians and Jews were being formally acknowledged as
minorities (Karimova & Deverell, 2001, p. 7) and are still recognized as those today. However,
since only a small fraction of the Turkey’s population is non-Muslim, “sizeable Muslim minori-
ties of sectarian as well as ethnic nature continue to exist…. such as the Kurds [ethnic] or …
such as the Alevis [religious] (Çarkoğlu & Çağın Bilgili, 2011, p. 351), which are “integrated
socio-economically but are treated politically as second-class citizens because they do not belong
to the dominant Turkish-Sunni-Muslim majority.” (Kaya & Harmanyeri, 2012, p. 13) Those
populations have been “banned from using their languages in schools and in media, and from
fully exercising their religious rights…. have been subjected to policies aimed at homogenizing
the population of Turkey and destroying minority language, culture and religion.” (Kurban,
2007, p.p. 3, 15-31)
Once more, as a result of Lausanne’s “restrictive definition of minorities on the basis of ‘reli-
gion’ instead of ‘religion, sect and denomination’, minorities within Islam are also excluded
from its protection.” (Kurban, 2007, p. 21) The size of all mentioned minority groups is un-
known and undetermined, since the state does not ask citizens to declare their ethnic, religious or
other origin in censuses14 (p. 11), thus the present thesis drawing its information from the work
of Kurban retains the original disclaimer clarifying that: “The quantitative estimates … should be
read with caution; they are mostly provided by the minorities themselves and are not supported
by academic research.”
2.1. Ethnic minorities
The Turkish state as formulated by the Turkish nationalist movement comprised itself by a part
of the Ottoman Empire, a multi-ethnic and multi-religious Empire. Turks were just one of the
ethnic groups of the Empire at the time, but through the Young Turks revolution and under Mus-
tafa Kemal’s leadership were to form the “Turkish Motherland and Nation” as later enshrined in
the preamble of the Constitution. Apart from Turks, the borders of the Turkish State enclosed a
series of ethnic minorities, notably Kurds, Roma and other populations of Caucasian origin as
well as the Laz. According minority rights to those minorities according to many Turks would,
14 The lack of minority censuses further hinders the analysis of other ethnic minorities that live in small and unde-
termined numbers around Turkey such as are Alevi, Sunni and Christian Arabs, Bulgarians, Bosnians, Pomacs and
Albanians, analysis which is not however in the interest of this thesis.
22
as per Kubicek (2004, p. 115), tempt dissolution, “while allowing religious intrusion into the
public sphere is seen as backsliding from modernity.”
2.1.1. Kurds
Kurds were first included and tolerated in the definition of the nation provided by the Ankara
Government, considered an integral part of the Turkish nation and they were never legally rec-
ognized as a minority group; since in their case civic nationalism15 has been firstly employed.
Nevertheless, Kurds were also the first ethnic minority to be affected by the consolidation of
nation-state authority under Mustafa Kemal trying to eliminate “imperial legacies such as the
binding role of religion in defining the nation and the autonomy of Kurdish tribal leaders after
1925” (Köksal, 2006, p. 506) 16 by promoting secularism, ethno-territorial nationalism and a cen-
tralized system. The above process ranging from tolerance and inclusion to pluralist policies17
and eventually to assimilation confirms the necessity for a “reformulation of the relations be-
tween states and minority groups… [especially taking into account that] government policy to-
wards minorities is defined under the influence of several factors18, and it may fluctuate until
state consolidation is completed” (p. 503) as it did in the Turkish case but also in the case of the
Turks in Bulgaria19.
However, Mustafa Kemal’s ambition led to, as noted by Gurses (2010, p. 341) “an aggressive
assimilationist policy toward the large Kurdish minority” located in the eastern part of the coun-
try. Indeed, as per Yildiz (2012, p. 152) “since the 1920s, the political and social attitudes of
Turkey’s successive governments towards Kurdish demands and interests have been marked by
15 Civic nationalism, as opposed to ethnic nationalism, is the form of nationalism where the state derives political
legitimacy from the active participation of its citizenry. States in which civic forms of nationalism predominate are
usually products of diverse ethnic group i.e. ex-settler colonies, in which ethnic nationalism is difficult to construct.
The civic nationalism notion adopting states are often characterized by adoption of the jus soli for granting citizen-
ship, deeming all persons born within the integral territory of the state citizens and members of the nation, regardless
of their parents' origin. 16 As per Yonca Köksal (2006, pp. 501, 506), “state policy became more assimilationist after the Sheikh Said rebel-
lion of 1925” itself a reaction to earlier efforts of state centralization. 17 Pluralist policies were applied in the early years of the Republic of Turkey for a short period of time and out of
necessity (Köksal, 2006, p. 518). 18 Such as the imperial legacy, ruling elite competition, responses of minority groups, legal definitions and interna-
tional pressure to name a few. 19 As analysed in the work of Köksal (2006, p. 516), the organizational capacity of Turks in Bulgaria and Kurds in
Turkey was indeed different. Before the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, Turks in Bulgaria were the administra-
tion’s privileged community, since they represented a Muslim presence within a non-Muslim majority.
23
denial, intolerance and marginalization”, which according to Kirişci (2011, p. 336) failed to re-
consider the definition of national identity in a manner that would allow Kurds to express their
ethnic and cultural identity in public. This liberal idea has been generally opposed to the later
popular belief associating the Kurdish issue with terrorism, “aggravated by the economic and
social problems of underdevelopment in south-eastern Turkey and the support given to the PKK
by the international community”.
By the 1980s, Turkey had gone through significant changes notably “the transition to a mul-
tiparty democracy…, the rapid modernization [which] engendered a relatively freer political en-
vironment and gave rise to increases in income, literacy, and urbanization” followed by a series
of other factors, formed such a political environment that brought up the PKK (Gurses, 2010, p.
341), who launched its first attack and initiated an insurgency that lasted for 16 years and put
enormous human, economic, social, and political burdens on Turkey.
The capture of Abdullah Öcalan in 1999 and the implicit Turkish army’s victory, the de-
clared unilateral ceasefire by PKK, also signified the abandon of the goal for the creation of an
independent Kurdish state and coincided with the Ecevit government’s aim “to develop a more
liberal democracy and improve Turkey’s human rights record” and determination to meet the
Copenhagen criteria (Kirişci, 2011, p. 337). However, the violence perpetrated by the PKK re-
sumed in 2004 and continued since 2012 when the current resolution process between Turkey
and the PKK was initiated. The demands have eventually “evolved from the goal of a completely
separate state into more viable goals such as institutionally protected autonomy”, promoting
smaller steps towards that goal such as the acknowledgement of the Kurdish identity thus bring-
ing it into the scope of legal and democratic protection of their “basic human rights fundamental
to the maintenance of ethnic identity, such as the freedom to educate Kurdish children in the Kurdish
language” (Gurses, 2010, pp. 341-342).
Up to our days, Kurds indisputably remain the largest ethnic and linguistic minority in Tur-
key, the estimate size of which claimed by various sources ranges from 10 to 23 per cent of the
total population of the country (as cited by Kurban, 2007, p. 11). Moreover according to Kurb-
ban (2007, p. 11), the Kurdish language is divided into Kurmanci, Zaza and other dialects and
the majority of Kurds are Sunni Muslims, with a significant number being Alevis. Historically
Kurdish populations concentrated in the eastern and south-eastern region of Turkey, where they
24
constitute the overwhelming majority, however large numbers have migrated to urban areas in
western Turkey (Kurban, 2007, p. 11).
2.1.2. Roma
After the Kurds, the second largest ethnic minority is considered the Roma, whose settlement
within today’s Turkey’s boarders has a long past. Although the Roma populations fell under the
category of the Muslim Millet during Ottoman times20, they were, similarly to other ethnic mi-
norities, not granted full rights and privileges, and discrimination against them occurred fre-
quently (Kolukirik & Toktaş, 2007, p. 762). It is true however that the previous experiences in
the Ottoman era continued in the Republican era when Turkish Roma as pointed out by Kolu-
kirik and Toktaş (2007, p. 762) “continue to face economic and social hardship…. [maintaining
a] low socio-economic status with low levels of income and education, and they furthermore face
disrespect from other people… [being] subject to pejorative and discriminatory practices in every
aspect of their lives.” Analogous to other ‘openings’ towards minorities21, the Justice and Devel-
opment Party [AKP] government officially acknowledged the discrimination against Turkish
Roma and declared that the necessary political, social and economic measures would be taken to
ward off this situation (Gençoğlu-Onbaşi, 2012, p. 599).
Roma according to information gathered by Kurban (2007, p. 12) live all across the country
and are not concentrated in any particular region. The Roma population as suggested by a re-
search conducted by the Bilgi University is estimated to be around 2 million (as cited in EU
Commission, 2006, p. 23), with its vast majority being Muslim, nearly half Sunni and half Alevi,
while there is a small number of Rum Greek Orthodox Christians (see Chapter 2.2).
20 Following the same logic, seeing the Roma as belonging to the dominant group as noted by Kolukirik and Toktaş
(2007, p. 762) Roma were included in the 1923 population exchange agreement between Greece and Turkey allow-
ing the Muslims of Greece, among them the Roma, to immigrate to Turkey. 21 The “Romani Opening” in Turkey followed the “Kurdish Opening”, “Alevi Opening” and an allegedly “Armenian
Opening”, all of which are projects initiated the AKP government with the allegedly aim of fighting against ethno-
religious discrimination (Gençoğlu-Onbaşi, 2012, p. 599).
25
2.1.3. Caucasians
Caucasians comprise a smaller ethnic minority which consists of various groups of peoples of
Caucasian origin22, each of which has its own language but Muslim religion and do unlike other
groups aspire to return to their historical homelands, where they had left behind a small minority.
As stated in the work of Kurban (2007, p. 11) “90 per cent of Caucasians in Turkey are Circassi-
an, while the majority of the remaining 10 per cent are Abkhaz”.
There is divergence on the estimates given by different sources regarding the significant Cir-
cassian population in Turkey, that may vary from 2 to 5 million people (Kurban, 2007, p. 11;
Zhemukhov, 2012, p. 505), whereas, according to Kurban (2007, p. 11) they live scattered in
numerous provinces in north-west, central and southern Turkey. Interestingly enough, during the
relatively more democratic political and legal structure of the 1990s, the Turkish state encour-
aged Circassians to establish associations mainly mobilized around the idea of an eventual return
to the homeland emphasizing that Circassian “ancestors had been expelled from their homeland
and had been tools in the political machinations of the Russian and Ottoman empires;… [con-
cluding] that a return to the homeland was inevitable” (as cited in Zhemukhov, 2012, pp. 232-
233).
According to Karimova and Deverell (2001, p. 16) Laz is a South Caucasian language related
to Georgian. The Laz population based on information gathered by Kurban (2007, pp. 11-12)
comprises of people of Caucasian origin which form two main groups inside Turkey, unified by
the Lazuri language that they do speak, the first of which having homeland the eastern half of the
Black Sea region, Rize and Artvin provinces (see Figure 1) and the second descending of immi-
grants who escaped the war between the Ottoman and Russian Empires in the late nineteenth
century and settled in Adapazarı, Sapanca, Yalova and Bursa, in western and eastern parts of the
Black Sea and Marmara regions (see Figure 1). Their number today according to the same source
is estimated to be between 750,000 and 1.5 million (Kurban, 2007, pp. 11-12).
22 Namely Abkhazians, Chechens, Circassians, Daghistanis, Ossetians and other various Turkic groups (Kurban,
2007, p. 11).
26
F
igu
re 1
Map
of T
urk
ey
27
2.2. Religious minorities
Mustafa Kemal’s conception of the Turkish nation avoids the distinction of any social segment
along with religion, ethnicity, and sectarianism (Kaya & Harmanyeri, 2012, p. 399) while in an
attempt to distance itself from the Ottoman legacy, “Kemalist discourse focused on ‘Turkish-
ness’ rather than Islam as the core of Republican identity…. [although] Islam is considered to be
an essential element of Turkish identity.” (Kose, 2013, p. 599) The essentiality and use of Islam
has been proven many times during the Republican era, when the content of the religion was
restructured and manipulated according to the needs of the Government, in recent years as well,
in the context of facilitating, monitoring and constraining certain religious activities sometimes
in contrast to the secular Kemalist principles. Taking the preceding into account and recognizing
that a genuinely secular state has no preferential links with any religion and neither promotes,
nor obstructs religious belief among its citizens, Turkey can be described as an ‘assertive secu-
larist’ state (Grigoriadis, 2009, p. 1196).
Moreover, as per Kaya and Harmanyeri (2012, p. 399) and on the discourse of the omission
of sectarian distinctions, “the republican Kemalist elite were difference-blind, and did not recog-
nize the ethno-cultural diversity of the Turkish nation”, making highly probable that the underes-
timation of ethno-cultural and religious diversity among the Muslim population of the Republic
was due to the preceding Ottoman Millet system23, which paradoxically influenced the success of
the Young Turks revolution as they note. Just as Bayar (2014, p. 115) also suggests, by situating
the definition of minorities along a Muslim versus non-Muslim divide, “the political elite was
bypassing the ethnic and linguistic heterogeneity of the nation … highlighting the presence of a
predominantly Muslim population” to whom the regime had to appeal to in order to legitimize its
rule. A similar appeal reappeared recently with the ongoing ‘Alevi Opening’ which started dur-
ing AKP second term in office following its victory in the 2007 general elections (see Chapter
4.2; Soner & Toktaş, 2011, p. 420).
Moreover, the recognition of religious other than the non-Muslim minorities during the for-
mation of the Republic would forego and undermine national unity by misleadingly simplifying
23 “The Millet system did not consider ethnic differences among Muslims. All Muslims, regardless of their other
differences, belonged to the one and the same ‘Muslim nation’.” (Kaya & Harmanyeri, 2012, p. 399)
28
a deeply divided Muslim community as a homogeneous entity24 (Bayar, 2014, pp. 114-115; Çar-
koğlu & Çağın Bilgili, 2011, p. 351). It is also true, that even though in line with the Lausanne
Treaty minorities are referred to as the ‘non-Muslim nationals’ living in Turkey, the Turkish
state interprets this definition to refer to the Rum Greek Orthodox Christian, Armenian and Jew-
ish citizens consequently, omitting other non-Muslims such as the Assyrians.
2.2.1. Alevis
Alevis are known to be the largest religious minority in Turkey and consequently the second
largest religious community in Turkey after Sunnis (Paul & Seyrek, 2014). Alevi is the term used
for a large number of heterodox Muslim Shi’a communities with different characteristics, which
do not form a homogeneous religious group, with many groups within Alevism itself, some more
influential than others. Their population is estimated to be between 10 and 40 per cent of the total
population (for estimate sources see Kurban, 2007, p.12), while Alevis are scattered throughout
Turkey. Linguistically, they consist of four groups: Azerbaijani Turkish, Arabic, Turkish and
Kurdish with the last two categories composing the largest Alevi groups (Kurban, 2007, p. 12).
According to Karimova and Deverell (2001, p. 9) 3 million of the Alevis are also Kurdish, thus
politically they face a dilemma whether should their primary loyalty be to their ethnic or to their
religious community25.
Alevis have not enjoyed any specific social, economic or political privileges in the past while
they have been subjects to ethnic homogenization and assimilation policies using religion as a tie
to connect ethnically diverse groups as part of the ethno-territorial Turkish identity during the
Turkish nation-building process. Alevi as pointed out by Karimova and Deverell (2001, p. 9)
experience both prejudice and discrimination in every aspect of their public lives, while not be-
ing able to manifest their belief openly in the Sunni-dominated society, consider their belief to be
misrepresented and misunderstood. In addition, contrary to Sunni religious leaders, there are no
government-salaried Alevi religious leaders and they are under-represented in the political
24 Hence an expansive definition of minorities was opposed by the Ankara Government during the Lausanne Con-
ference on that argumentative ground (Bayar, 2014, p. 115). 25 However, they also define themselves “primarily as a religious group belonging to the Shi’a denomination of
Islam.” (Kurban, 2007, p. 13) This preference, according to Erman and Göker (2000, p. 100) should also be exam-
ined under the effect of the Kurdish issue, the military confrontation between the PKK and the Turkish forces (see
Chapter 2.1.1) that turned Kurdish Alevis towards the religious elements of their ethnicity, stressing their Aleviness
in public discourse.
29
sphere. Alevi communities often lack the protection from harassment and other forms of abuse
by Sunni extremists, understandably since as Kose (2013, p. 603) concludes “the content and the
form of the religion was re-shaped according to an individualist and centrally organized [Sunni]
notion of official Islam.”
2.2.2. Caferis
Caferis are by majority ethnically Azerbaijani Turks who according to their own understanding
are presence in Turkey as “a result of the fact that their historical homeland in the province of
Iğdır (see Figure 1) was transferred from Russia to Turkey when the borders of the latter were
drawn” however, “they define themselves primarily as a religious group belonging to Shi’a Is-
lam.” (Kurban, 2007, p. 13) According to the information provided by a former official endorsed
by CAFERIDER, their national organization (as cited in Kurban, 2007, p. 13), the number of
Caferis is around 3 million, with the highest number of Caferis residing in Istanbul.
2.2.3. Armenians
Armenians are among the ancient people of Anatolia, with the majority of Armenians in Turkey
today belonging to the Orthodox Church, while there are also a few Catholic and Protestant Ar-
menians (Kurban, 2007, p. 12). While, according to Kurban (2007, p. 12), their number was
around 2 million during the Ottoman Empire era, today, slightly more than 60,000 remain,
50,000 of who live in Istanbul. Armenians run private schools providing primary and secondary
education in their mother tongue (Kurban, 2007, p. 12) and do generally actively participate in
the socio-economic life of Istanbul.
2.2.4. Jews
Another recognized minority is the Jewish community of Turkey. The majority of Jews in
Turkey are “descendants of Sephardic Jews expelled from Spain in 1492” while “their language
is Ladino, a variant of fifteenth century Spanish.” (Kurban, 2007, p. 12) Nowadays, around
23,000 Jews live in Turkey with the vast majority residing in Istanbul and Izmir.
2.2.5. Assyrians
Assyrians are a religious minority whose language and practices originated in early Christianity
and historically residing in their homeland, Turkey in the provinces of Mardin and Hakkari in the
30
south-east (see Figure 1). Although Assyrians are Christian, they cannot benefit from the rights
laid out in the Lausanne Treaty as the rest of the Christian minorities, thereafter it is forbidden to
found their own establishments, schools, or social institutions, while they remain banned from
public service (Karimova & Deverell, 2001, p. 12). As pointed out by Samur (2009, p. 328) due
to both external factors and differences in religious interpretation, the Assyrians split among
themselves and historically failed to establish their own state, while at times they were massa-
cred and exiled. The Assyrians residing in Turkey began to emigrate in the 1960s for economic
reasons, throughout the 1970s and especially the 1980s due to security concerns26. The majority
of the remaining Assyrians nowadays live in Istanbul (Kurban, 2007, p. 13).
2.2.6. Rum Greek Orthodox Christians
The Rum Greek Orthodox Christian community comprises of ethnic Rums27 as well as Arabic-
and Turkish- speaking Antakya Rum Orthodox Christians (Antiochians) who are not ethnically
Rum. According to Kurban (2007, p. 13) the comprised number of those two populations is esti-
mated to be around 16,000, while according to the Istanbul based RUMVADER, the central as-
sociation of the Rum community, the ethnically Rum residing in Istanbul are estimated to be
around 3500-4000 in number28.
3. Turkey’s path to EU accession
In July 1959, shortly after the creation of the EEC in 1958, Turkey made its first application to
join the community. The EEC's response to Turkey's application in 1959 was to suggest the es-
tablishment of an association until Turkey's circumstances permitted its accession. The negotia-
tions that followed resulted in the signature of the ‘Agreement Creating an Association between
26 One major reason for emigration of Assyrian was the intensified security problem in the region where they resid-
ed. In fact in many areas in south-eastern Anatolia, Kurds and Assyrians lived side by side therefore during the in-
creased acts of terrorism of PKK, villages populated only by the Assyrian community carried the same risk alike,
since they were situated near the areas of armed conflict. It is estimated that some 45,000 Assyrians migrated from
Turkey, mostly to western European countries, notably Germany and Sweden during this final wave of migration
(Karimova & Deverell, 2001, p. 12; Samur, 2009, p. 329). 27 According to Alexandris (1992, p. 17) “faithful to the belief that they descended directly from the citizens of Ro-
mano-Byzantine Constantinople, the Istanbul Greeks considered themselves as Romioi”. This fact has been
acknowledged by the Turks, who were addressing the Greek Orthodox community as Rum Milleti, thus “distin-
guishing a Greek of the Ottoman empire from one of the independent Greek state, whose citizens are known to the
Turks as Yunanlı.” 28 Data collected during the author’s traineeship term.
31
the Republic of Turkey and the EEC’29 on 12 September 1963. This first agreement, which en-
tered into force on 1 December 1964, aimed at securing Turkey's full membership in the EEC
through the establishment in three phases of a customs union, which would serve as an instru-
ment to bring about integration between the EEC and Turkey. At this point of the EU’s history,
no provisions towards the fulfilment of any political criteria in the framework of the accession
were in place. The declaration of the so-called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in 1983 and
the subsequent recognition of the illegal entity by Turkey led to a vigorous response by the Eu-
ropean Community that had a negative impact on the EU-Turkish relations.
However, from 1987 when Ankara applied for full membership to December 1999 when its
candidacy was formally approved by the Helsinki European Council30, certain reforms with a
view to democratize the entire political system have been undertaken by various governments,
nevertheless, characterized as “superficial and ad hoc…. [not representing] a fully-fledged and
committed programme of democratic transformation” (Tocci, 2005, p. 74). As suggested they
fell short in terms of human and minority rights protection, thus not meeting the political criteria,
set out by the Copenhagen European Council of June 199331. As affirmed by the CoE’s Parlia-
mentary Assembly (1999), the Turkish Government’s leverage at the time, the imminent threat
of terrorism perpetrated by the PKK, has been a hindering factor towards the full respect of the
rights of minorities, particularly of the Kurds. Nevertheless in the same document it is yet
stressed that only such temporary and imperative factors as terrorism can justify divergence with
respect to human and minority rights. In addition, as the CoE concluded, the long-standing Turk-
ish arguments advocating the non-implementation of cultural rights for ethnic groups should be
abandoned since those do not harm the territorial integrity of the Turkish state.
Additionally, it is true that the EU’s policies towards Turkey’s membership have been quite
ambiguous; limiting the EU’s influence on Turkey and therefore confirming the hypotheses that
the situation faced is a result of a vicious circle. As pointed out by Vardan (2009, p. 52) the tur-
29 The document is known as the ‘Ankara Agreement’. 30 Turkey and the EU formed a customs union in 1995, earlier than the grant of the official candidacy status. 31 In short, the Copenhagen criteria, set the following requirements for membership: a. the stability of institutions
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; b. the existence
of a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the
Union; c. the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, econom-
ic and monetary union and the administrative capacity to effectively apply and implement the acquis (see Chapter
4.1.1; EU European Council, 1993).
32
co-scepticism in Europe peaked during the first years of the century with a number of influential
European leaders32 openly opposing Turkey’s EU membership reflecting the public opinion
views towards Turkey’s EU membership in their respective countries (see Figure 2), while Tur-
key in the post 2005 period has been more and more reluctant to proceed to further reforms and
adjustments.
Figure 2 Austrian, French and German public opinion towards Turkey’s EU membership
Spring 2005
Note: Author’s compilation based on Eurobarometer spring 2005 wave data.
Concurrently, two interdependent developments were of great importance to the stance of
concern that EU formed towards Turkish politics in general and political parties in specific. First,
the Constitutional Court ruling of 1998 for the closure of the Welfare Party [ RP], an Islamist
party, on the grounds that it was violating the principle of secularism and the latter 2001 decision
of the Court that ruled to close the Virtue Party [FP], the successor to the Welfare Party. These
two party closures produced a series of political developments that were crucial in the formation
of the AKP and its first term politics as well as its strategic allegiance with the EU. Second, the
32 Including but not limited to the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, the Prime Minister [PM] of Austria, Wolf-
gang Schüssel, the leader of the Christian Social Union [CSU] in Germany, Edmund Stoiber, and the President of
France, Nicholas Sarkozy.
10,00%
21,00% 21,00%
80,00%
70,00%74,00%
10,00% 9,00% 5,00%0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
Austria France Germany
In favour
Not in favour
Don't know
33
known as post-modern Turkish coup, initiated by the 1997 military memorandum that precipitat-
ed the resignation of Islamist PM Necmettin Erbakan and the end of his coalition government
has also produced serious concerns for the state of democracy in the country.
3.1. Post-Helsinki convergence
Coming back to Turkey’s path to EU accession and having the previous framework in mind,
the great leap forward came after 1999, under the incitement of the EU and in the context of the
official candidacy, which placed the country within “the stream of ‘conditionality compliance’
principles.” (Ulusoy, 2007, p. 472) Having Turkey on an equal footing with other candidate
countries marked the beginning of a series of reforms in the scheme of a pre-accession strategy,
which included enhanced political dialogue, with emphasis on progressing towards fulfilling the
political criteria for accession and particularly the issues of human rights (EU European Council,
1999), consequently the minority rights. As Font (2006, pp. 199-200), summarizes:
The Helsinki agreement opened a divergent institutional course of action and generated
new institutional dynamics with a series of self-reinforcing effects. First, it generated new
expectations and incentives on the applicant’s side to make progress in fulfilling the Co-
penhagen conditions. … Second, it replaced the EU traditional containment strategy with
a more proactive and cooperative one. … Third, it contributed to creating a climate of
opinion that viewed Turkey’s accession as being a plausible option in the long run.
Fourth, it reduced the range of possible EU options to those having a treaty-based legiti-
macy and framed them within the post-Helsinki institutional dynamic.
Indeed, Turkey in the framework of its EU accession prospect engaged in far-reaching constitu-
tional, legislative and policy reforms in order to meet the political criteria, while at the same time
the EU adjusted to the new realities. In particular, the EU offered Turkey an Accession Partner-
ship [AP] based on enhanced political dialogue and financial assistance tools. Especially, the AP
has been extensively used as a tool, promoting the enlargement processes, clarifying a road map
for the candidate countries with short- and medium-term measures, emphasising the immediate
priorities drawn by the political and economic aspects of the Copenhagen criteria and the im-
portance of concerned candidate country’s capacity to adopt the acquis (Ulusoy, 2007, p. 474).
The AP set out in a single framework the priority areas for further work identified in the EC’s
regular reports on the progress made by Turkey towards its EU accession, the financial means
34
available to help Turkey implement these priorities and the conditions, which will apply to that
assistance.
During the same period, the negotiated draft of an EU Constitution was affecting the charac-
ter of the EU itself. The controversy surrounding the question of whether the EU Constitution,
rejected by French and Dutch voters in May and June 2005, ought to have included some
acknowledgement of Europe’s Christian heritage in its Preamble was indicative of the complexi-
ty of the intensely debated issue. Nevertheless, the developments showed that the EU had aban-
doned the idea “of elevating a Christian culture to the status of membership condition” (Font,
2006, p. 200), and promoted secularism in general instead. As Michael O’Neill (2008, p. 244)
argues:
if the idea … was to use this cultural referent as an excuse to exclude Turkey from the
EU, that cause was already undermined by the fact that 15 million Muslims are already
residing there, some of them EU citizens.
The final text of the constitutional treaty, avoided making any explicit reference to cultural or
ethnic exclusivity, settling for the common European values in an otherwise culturally heteroge-
neous continent (2008, p. 245).
3.1.1. Ecevit coalition government’s reforms, 1999-2002
The Ecevit coalition government33 in response to the developments34, issued in March 2001 the
TNP35, “regarded for the most part as an unconvincing document.” (Ulusoy, 2007, p. 474), fol-
lowed however by the October 2001 first reform package of 34 constitutional amendments36,
33 A coalition government composed of the Democratic Left Party [DSP], the Motherland Party [ANAP], and the
Nationalist Movement Party [MHP]. 34 As Müftüler Baç (2005, p. 23) argues “the coalition government of DSP, ANAP and MHP could not act more
decisively earlier, partly because they were a coalition government and had different preferences, and partly because
the economic crisis became a more pressing problem.” Furthermore, the Turkish National Programme [TNP] itself
has been published in the framework of the EU demands set in the document concerning ‘the principles, priorities,
intermediate objectives and conditions contained in the Accession Partnership with the Republic of Turkey’. Ac-
cording to the document (2001, p. 13), Turkey should prepare a national programme for the adoption of the acquis,
setting out a timetable for achieving the priorities and intermediate objectives established in the AP. 35 The TNP has been revised in July 2003 and December 2008 by the successive AKP government. 36 Τhe Constitution of 1982, most of which is still in force, has been ratified by popular referendum during the mili-
tary junta of 1980-1983. The 1982 Constitution re-asserted the powers of the State against inter alia democratic
values and human rights. Nevertheless, it has been modified many times since its ratification, with its last amend-
ment being the one in 2010.
35
succeeded by a second package of legislative reforms in February 2002 that affirmed the gov-
ernment’s reform commitment.
The elections of November 2002 that followed, completely changed the political landscape
wiping out the ANAP, DSP and MHP parties of the coalition government, giving rise to the new-
ly established AKP party and the CHP [Republican People’s Party] which became the major par-
ties of the Turkish Parliament. This dramatic political change should not be seen disconnected
from the reforms that the government put forward concerning the minority rights and the tradi-
tional cleavage in Turkish society between “the Turkish nationalists who perceive any kind of
diversity as a threat to the Turkish nation and the state, and the supporters of the recognition of
diversity in the Turkish society.” (Müftüler Baç, 2005, p. 23) As Müftüler Bac highlights (2005,
pp. 23-24), the granting of cultural rights to minorities, notably to the Kurdish groups has been
regarded as concessions to terrorism, while the abolition of the death penalty as serving conven-
iently PKK’s Abdullah Öcalan, comparing the reform packages’ clauses on increased freedom of
expression and cultural rights to giving in to the terrorists.
3.1.2. AKP’s first term reform period, 2002-2005
Between 2002 and 2005 the consolidated AKP government with a more reformist stance ap-
peared to be more forthcoming to the EU’s demands for domestic change, having as a conse-
quence a virtuous circle period as Kaya and Harmanyeri (2012, p. 410) note. At the same time
and until 2004 as per Saatçioğlu and Yılmaz: “the EU accession created pressure for the adapta-
tion for deep-seated reforms…when the credibility of EU conditionality37 towards Turkey was
still high” (as cited in Börzel & Soyaltin, 2012, p. 13). Political reforms have introduced changes
ranging from improved civil liberties and human rights to enhanced civilian control of the mili-
tary while the civil society has grown stronger (EU Commission, 2004, p. 15).
Concurrently, the AKP government gained additional support by backing the UN-proposed
Cypriot conflict-resolution Annan plan. The separate simultaneous referenda held in Cyprus on
24 April 2004 resulted in the majority Greek Cypriot population voting down the Annan plan,
whereas the minority Turkish Cypriot population voted for the Plan. The developments con-
37 The effects of EU conditionality on the Turkish EU accession are of great significance and therefore discussed
separately in Chapter 4.1.2.
36
firmed Erdoğan’s will to make progress on the issue of EU membership, by supporting a viable
Cyprus solution at the time.
3.2. The 2005 backlash and the post-2005 reforms discontinuity
The actual start of the accession negotiations in October 2005 has been however “a turning
point towards Eurosceptisism” (Kaya & Harmanyeri, 2012, p. 411). As Börzel and Soyaltin
(2012, p. 14) point out, since the AKP gained electoral support, consolidated its power and the
membership perspective became less credible in the post-2005 period, “the EU lost relevance for
domestic institutional change”, while the fading support for EU membership in the Turkish pub-
lic has “further undermined the potential for using EU accession as a legitimization device.” The
developments led to a vicious circle of deterioration of Turkish EU membership prospects.
The pursuit of EU membership, which served in the pre-2005 period as a way of shying away
from conflict, staying in power and carrying out the party’s declared political programme lost its
significance once the AKP consolidated its domestic power, topic thoroughly analysed in Chap-
ter 4.2. At the same time, the rising Eurosceptisism in Turkish public opinion38 (see Figure 3),
understandably because of the higher perceived costs of the EU accession against the uncertain
membership prospects, applied additional pressure adding to the opposing to the AKP politics
motives of the CHP, the main opposition party in the Turkish Parliament. The CHP’s uncoopera-
tive stance can therefore partly explain the discontinuity of the reforms, motivated in the previ-
ous period by Turkey’s EU accession prospect. Over time, the favourable conditions already
discussed (see Chapter 3.1.2) weakened further and eventually, after the AKP’s second election
victory in 2007, the CHP was joined in the Turkish Parliament by the ultranationalist MHP in
opposing further constitutional changes.
The negotiations led to an impasse also due to issues related to Cyprus’ EU accession as a
divided island, and the continuous scepticism of EU Member States, notably Austria, France,
Germany and the Netherlands with regard to Turkey’s EU accession39. In December 2006, nego-
38 According to Aydın and Keyman (as cited in Saatçioğlu, 2014, p. 97), the support for EU membership rose sys-
tematically since the receipt of EU candidacy and stabilized around 70 per cent between 2002 and 2004 to subse-
quently reach levels below 50 per cent in fall 2007 and eventually 41 per cent in 2011. 39 Hale (2011, pp. 326-327) elaborates on the factors and events that led to this scepticism starting in the winter of
2004, when early signs of the more negative tone from Europe emerged. At the Brussels European Council of De-
cember 2004 the EU heads of state and government stated that, “although the ‘shared objective of the negotiations is
37
tiations on eight Chapters was blocked40, as a consequence of the Turkish government’s refusal
to extend its customs union with the EU to the ten states that had joined the EU in May 2004,
most notably the Republic of Cyprus.
Figure 3 Turkish public opinion towards EU membership, 2004-2014
Note: Author’s compilation based on available Eurobarometer data.
3.2.1. AKP’s second term reform shortcomings, 2007-2011
The AKP won its second term in the July 2007 elections, expanding its electoral support
base41 and emerging as a stronger and genuine mass party in the Turkish political scene. Given
its enlarged power base and secured position in the secular political context, as noted by
Saatçioğlu (2014, p. 90) “due mostly to liberalizing EU reforms … the AKP started to rule ‘with
an exaggerated sense of its own power’.” becoming less dependent on the EU and its democrati-
zation agenda and more reluctant on implementing any reforms in the field of human and minori-
ty rights. It is true that AKP’s strategic alliance with the EU during its power consolidation peri-
accession’, the negotiations ‘are an open-ended process, the outcome of which cannot be guaranteed beforehand’,
and that the process, taking into account ‘the absorption capacity of the Union’.” 40 Following a unilateral blockage of negotiations on five chapters of the acquis communautaire imposed by Sar-
kozy’s newly elected Union for a Popular Movement [UMP] government in France. 41 Analysis of the 2002 and 2007 election results in the work of Yılmaz (2009, p. 61).
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
A good thing A bad thing Neither good or bad Don't know
38
od was rather crucial42 given the AKP’s Islamist roots (see Chapter 4.2). Those particular Islam-
ist roots provoked scrutiny by the members of the secular state establishment in the Turkish mili-
tary and high judiciary. These two particular institutions were in the core of previous either Is-
lamist party closure cases or coups d'état. They firmly accused the party of harbouring a hidden
‘Islamist agenda’ (Saatçioğlu, 2014, p. 91), while the party faced the threat of being banned by
the Constitutional Court two times, one before the November 2002 elections and one in 200843.
In spite of the recent developments elaborated in the chapter’s introduction, the government’s
political expediencies and its growing control over the secular state establishment, the extent of
the reform discontinuity should not be exaggerated. Reforms have not been entirely abandoned
by Turkey after 2005.
While the decreasing public support for EU accession affected the overall post-2005 reform
and AKP government’s Europeanization slowdown, according to some scholars (Saatçioğlu,
2014, p. 97), it cannot fully but only partly explain the reform reversing developments. Indeed
as elaborated by Eurobarometer (see Figure 3), the percentage of citizens who find the EU mem-
bership to ‘be a good thing’ had already fallen to around 50% before 2007, even reaching 44% in
spring 2006, without those low levels having as a result a reversal of reforms, that were reinitiat-
ed after 2007 (Saatçioğlu, 2014, p. 97).
3.2.1.1. The ephemeral AKP ‘openings’ to minorities
New conditions started emerging during the autumn of 2009. This period saw the reappear-
ance of a traditional extra-European influence actor in Turkish politics that in recent years and
during the post-Helsinki convergence period has been marginalized. The United States [US],
wishing to insure that the US withdrawal from Iraq will not produce a dangerous collision be-
tween Turkey and Iraqi Kurds encouraged and promoted a successful cooperation between them,
supporting Turkey in making effective moves to solve its own internal Kurdish problem. The US
geostrategic demands, coinciding with the AKP government’s narrow political interests and ex-
pediencies endorsed the AKP policy options, dictating the need to reduce the risk of terrorist
42 As Saatçioğlu (2014, p. 91) points out, “the liberalizing democratic reforms needed for membership promised to
make the rigid Kemalist model of secularism ‘less repressive and more inclusive’ and neutralize the secular state
bureaucracy.” 43 The closure was most recently prevented by a split decision by the Constitutional Court in March 2009.
39
attacks by the PKK and strengthen the AKP’s electoral position in the southeast by overcoming
primarily, the alienation of the Kurdish minority from the Turkish state (Hale, 2011, p. 328).
These processes launched in September 2009 what is referred to as the ‘Kurdish opening’, which
ended unsuccessfully after the propaganda victory promotion made by Democratic Society Party
[DTP] and its sudden ban by the Constitutional Court on December 11, 2009 on the basis of its
close association with the PKK. As Hale (2011, p. 329) noted, the events seemed to have put the
‘Opening’ in the freezer.
The AKP government during the following years made analogous ‘opening’ to either reli-
gious or ethnic minorities. Before the Kurdish, there have been initiatives towards the Alevi mi-
nority, starting from the summer of 2007 (Kose, 2010, p. 143) around the same time with the
2007 national elections. The AKP leaderships realizing the gains of such initiatives engaged it-
self in a series of similar ‘openings’ with both ethnic and religious minorities of the country. In
the late 2009 PM Tayyip Erdoğan inaugurated the latter known as ‘Romani opening’, while more
recently some commentators (Shlykov, 2015) made notions for an ‘Armenian opening’ based on
a series of recent actions taken by Davutoğlu’s government.
3.2.1.2. The ‘privileged partnership’ and the freeze of negotiations
Developments also took place at the EU level. The changing political landscape in the EU
member states raised doubts concerning the prospective admission of Turkey. Relevant discus-
sions in Germany and France were a key issue during the election campaign before the German
national elections in September 2005 and the French presidential elections of May 2007.
In Germany, as described by Hale (2011, p. 326), the proposed by Christian Democratic Par-
ty (CDU) ‘privileged partnership’ instead of a full Turkish membership gained ground, once the
CDU became the dominant partner in a coalition with the Social Democratic Party of Germany
[SPD] in the elections. The initial idea came from Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg, representative of
the CDU in the Bundestag at the time. According to Guttenberg (zu) (2004) in the Turkish case
“a privileged partnership instead of an underprivileged membership is the better — and more
honest — option for both sides [EU and Turkey]” highlighting the EU objectives and proposing
a consistent strategy. Angela Merkel adhered to the ‘privileged partnership’ line, even after
forming her second coalition, this time with the Free Democratic Party [FDP] in October 2009,
mainly seeking to find ways “to fit German public concerns to Turkish expectations” (Pope,
40
2009). As further analysed by Pope (2009), the vague content of the ‘privileged partnership’,
ostensibly offers no new privileges to Turkey, which is in many ways closer to the EU than any
other non-member, confirmed by the fact that Turkey has already signed a Customs Union
agreement with the EU in 1995, the only major non-EU member state having signed such. Nei-
ther does the partnership offer a real and substantially new partnership, “since the main goal ap-
pears to be either to control Turkey or to exclude it from the decision-making that would make it
a true partner.” (Pope, 2009)
In France, the UMP also supported the stance, although Jacque Chirac himself joined other
European leaders in endorsing full Turkish membership as the eventual aim”, as Hale (2011, p.
326) notes. However, the presidential elections that brought Nikolas Sarkozy to the French pres-
idency have been an even more serious setback; during his presidency, the ‘privileged partner-
ship’ for Turkey became an official part of French government’s policy. Soon the French gov-
ernment unilaterally blocked negotiations on five chapters of the acquis that following the freeze
of negotiations on another eight chapters44.
Even before the French actions, the political processes in the member states had already
fueled the debate in the EU level. Indeed the EU elaborated on the Franco-German motions by
changing its stance towards Turkey to a more negative tone emerging from the wording of the
EC’s Negotiating Framework for Turkey subsequently accepted by the EU heads of state and
government, according to which (2005, p. 1):
The shared objective of the negotiations is accession. These negotiations are an open-
ended process, the outcome of which cannot be guaranteed beforehand. While having full
regard to all Copenhagen criteria, including the absorption capacity of the Union, if Tur-
key is not in a position to assume in full all the obligations of membership it must be en-
sured that Turkey is fully anchored in the European structures through the strongest pos-
sible bond.
44 Since Turkey has not complied with the requirements of the additional protocol of June 2005 extending the 1963
Ankara Agreement to the new EU members including Republic of Cyprus, the eight Chapters related to the Customs
Union did not open. These Chapters are: free movement of goods (Chapter 3), right of establishment and freedom to
provide service (Chapter 9), financial services (Chapter 11), agriculture and rural development (Chapter 13), fisher-
ies (Chapter 14), transport policy (Chapter 29), customs union and external relations (Chapter 30).
41
The Negotiating Framework document even though it implicitly state that the objective of the
negotiations is accession, clearly alternates the character of the negotiating basis as conceived by
the Turkish side. By describing the negotiations as an ‘open-ended’ process, it endorses the
‘privileged partnership’ as proposed by the Franco-Germans, while by including the vague
phrasing concerning the ‘absorption capacity of the Union’ weakens the negotiating safeguards
for Turkey furthermore and according to some scholars risks the credibility of the EU (Hale,
2011).
3.2.2. AKP’s third term politics, 2011 until today
In the 2011 Turkish national elections, AKP established its predominance in Turkey by increas-
ing its share of the vote for three elections in a row45, therefore giving rise to the academic dis-
cussion of whether we are confronted with the emergence of a predominant-party system in Tur-
key46 (Gumuscu, 2013; Müftüler-Baç & Keyman, 2012; Çarkoğlu, 2011). Clearly, as suggested
by Gumuscu, (2013, p. 224) the AKP “conforms to the trend of predominant parties in more
advanced democracies and follows a complex strategy that sustains the party’s political
dominance.” Precisely, this political domincance has as a consequence the dominance of AKP in
the agenda and policy setting process raising serious questions regarding the nature and quality
of Turkish democracy. Besides, the AKP’s ability to claim the record share of the 50 percent of
the total vote in the elections created huge confidence on the part of the Erdoğan’s leadership47.
The steady consolidation of the AKP’s power, initiated before the 2002 elections, led to a
progressive move of Erdoğan’s leadership from the periphery to the centre of the Turkish
political system (Öniş, 2014, p. 5). This was bolstered by the marginalization or at some point
even the elimination of forces of oposing and contesting its power and hegemony. The most
recent local and presidential elections of March 2014 and August 2014 respectedly, confirmed
45 As Giovanni Sartori in his 1976 work under the title ‘Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis’ (as
cited in Çarkoğlu, 2011, p. 44) argues: “three consecutive election wins are the criteria for a system to qualify as a
dominant party system”. 46 Dominant parties in competitive parliamentary systems are distinguished by three characteristics, (1) the vote or
seat shares in representative assemblies obtained by the parties in the system. (2) the nature of the opposition against
such parties and (3) the time-span over which these parties acquire a certain majority of the votes and seats
(Çarkoğlu, 2011, p. 44). 47 Given the fact that the rest of the remaining parties maintain very different identity being naturally unable to pre-
sent a unified front.
42
the AKP’s political domination; hence they ended both succesful for the AKP. The presidential
election brought to power the incumbent PM Erdoğan, who was elected President of the Turkish
Republic outright by a simple majority of the vote in the first round.
3.2.2.1. New agenda, relabeled approach and the loss of the EU
momentum
In this environment, Turkey’s democratic, let alone the minority rights record over the last
years has been mixed but mostly declining. As pointed out by Özbudun (2014, pp. 160-161) on
the positive side, the most important development was the ceasefire with the PKK, since March
2013, that allegedly was the event that led to the introduction of certain modest reforms relating
to the Kurdish issue through direct talks with the imprisoned Öcalan. In spite however, of the
ceasefire and the termination of the armed conflict in southern Turkey in the short-term, as noted
by Öniş (2014, p. 8), it remains to be seen “whether this process will be firmly institutionalized,
leading to a durable peace in the long-term.” It is too early to tell, whether the democratic
demands of the Kurds, especially on the issue of selfautonomy within a federal structure, will be
accommodated through the new Constitution, since commentators suggest that the kurdish
involvement has been simply a tactical move on the part of Erdoğan and the AKP, in terms of
changing the Constitution towards a presidential system and counting support of the Kurds in the
process (Öniş, 2014, p. 8).
Other reforms involved the return of certain properties to non-Muslim, namely Greek and
Armenian minorities charitable foundations, unlawfully taken away from them in earlier dec-
ades, while at the same time, the developments led to the announcement of the ‘democratization
package’ by Erdoğan on 30th September 201348. Even so, the Europeanization impetus of the
third AKP government further diminished and even fully halted during the second semester of
the 2012. From the July 1st 2012 to December 31st 2012, Turkey froze relations with the EU for
the duration of the Republic of Cyprus’ rotating presidency of the Council of the EU, despite the
48 The modest Democratization Package among others and relevant to the minority rights protection, promised to
allow the conduct of political activity and education in private schools in languages and dialects other than Turkish,
to apply a three year imprisonment punishment for hate crimes committed on a racial, ethnical, sexual, religious, or
other basis and for the prevention of religious worship by using threat or coercion (Albayrak, 2013; Özbudun, 2014,
p. 161)
43
actions taken by the EC, which in May 2012 launched what was termed as the ‘positive agenda’
with Turkey and described as intended to bring fresh dynamics into EU-Turkey relations its ac-
complishments are rather unclear. What some have categorized as dynamic changes that have
taken place in Turkey, driven in part by its EU aspirations, Turkey’s EU accession process con-
tinues at a relatively slow pace (Morelli, 2013, p. 15).
Even though Turkey remains part of the Western security structures, with its NATO mem-
bership and strategic bilateral ties with the US continuing being of critical importance and its
economic ties to the EU still remaining vital, as argued by scholars “it is no longer the country
that was firmly Western oriented and committed to the EU” (Öniş, 2014, p. 3). Indeed in many
occasions in the past PM Erdoğan opened the debate on Turkey’s membership to other interna-
tional organizations other than the EU. Most recently, in 2013 PM Erdoğan opted-out for mem-
bership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization [SCO]49; hence making an ‘opening’ towards
Russia and China (Blank, 2014; Keck, 2013). However, it is unclear whether the then PM’s and
current President’s increasing rhetoric about such possible memberships is not purely symbolic
or it represents a real change of mind-set. It is true that in order for Turkey’s EU membership
candidacy to move forward a virtuous dynamic between the country and the EU should be ignit-
ed; hence overcoming the notable vicious circle of relations deterioration. The limited progress
observed by Tocci (2013) in:
François Hollande’s lifting of the veto over one accession negotiation chapter50, Germa-
ny’s appreciation of the need to re-dynamise EU–Turkey ties, the prospects for a re-
launched Cyprus peace process after Nicos Anastasiadis’ election in Cyprus, the Cyprus
bail-out, and the potential dynamics brought about by Eastern Mediterranean gas could
all converge to unblock the paralysis in Turkey’s accession talks.
Positive developments should therefore be capitalized, since they provide the basis of renewed
interest from both sides.
49 The SCO’s members include Russia, China, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. 50 Chapter 22 includes maters of Regional Policy and Coordination of Structural Instruments and is one of the five
Chapters frozen back in 2007 by the UMP Sarkozy government.
44
3.2.2.2. The state of the Turkish democracy and the EU member-
ship perspective
At the same time, one must notice that negative developments have somewhat weakened the
image of Turkey in the EU. The developments were mainly, the recent Gezi park protests, the
AKP executives’ corruption cases, as well as the ban of twitter and YouTube. In early June 2013,
public protests in Turkey over the future of Gezi park and the government’s tough reaction pre-
cipitated, as summarized in the work of Morelli (2013), a harsh response from the EC and the
European Parliament [EP] expressing concerns for the disproportionate and excessive use of
force by the Turkish police and the government’s handling in general. In general, the events un-
derline a manifestation of a growing confrontation that is refuelled by the government’s politics
and the Erdoğan’s lifestyle. Notable examples include the recently inaugurated Presidential Pal-
ace as well as another hefty acquisition of a Presidential jet plane. In his third term of office,
Erdoğan, as argued by Kirişci (2014a), became “increasingly linked to a majoritarian understand-
ing of democracy and scant respect for criticisms and dissent.”
Although apparently unlinked to one another, the Gezi protests were followed in December
2013 by the opening of a series of corruption investigations by the police and the legal estab-
lishments, both of which have long been suspected of being influenced by the Gülen movement51
(Çarkoğlu, 2014, p. 4). The scandal involved close relatives of high-ranking government- and
state- officials that were in the possession of currency allegedly used in bribery, fraud, money
laundering and smuggling of gold. The result has been a cabinet reshuffle ousting the accused of
corruption AKP ministers.
One of the indirect developments of the Gezi park protest and the corruption cases52 has been
the ban of popular social media platform twitter, following a Turkish court’s decision. The deci-
sion came on March 20 2014 as the country prepared to go to the ballot box for the local elec-
51 Fethullah Gülen is the influential founder a preacher and former imam, that started a moderately Islamist group
known as the hizmet or ‘the service’. According to many claims, the group has considerable influence over several
state institutions, particularly the judiciary, the police, and the national intelligence agency. The Gülen was a critical
ally in the AKP’s efforts during its early years in power, the collaboration between PM Erdoğan’s government and
the movement has increasingly turned sour (Çarkoğlu, 2014, p. 1). 52 As reported by Kirişci (2014a), during the Gezi Park protests, Erdoğan not only accused social media of becoming
a channel for ‘spreading lies’ but his dislike of the media was exacerbated after twitter “was widely used to spread
corruption allegations against him, his son and members of his government.”
45
tions, essentially an indirect confirmation of the government’s legitimation, triggering both do-
mestic and international reaction. On April 3, the site was unblocked; 24 hours after the Consti-
tutional Court ruled that the ban was a violation of free speech. During this process, YouTube
was also banned in Turkey on March 27, this time, after a leak of an alleged top-secret Turkish
government meeting on Syria. The Constitutional Court unblocked YouTube on May 29, 2014,
citing freedom of expression.
Moreover, Erdoğan has been rather silent with respect to EU-Turkey relations, while the EU
and its member state officials have publicly expressed their discomfort with the AKP govern-
ment’s authoritarian ways (Kirişci, 2014b). Nevertheless as Tocci (2014, pp. 3-4) concludes, the
EU itself is in a profound state of transformation since the eruption of the Eurozone crisis, which
has side-effectively brought the integration project to a brink. Instead, what is clear, as elaborat-
ed, is that:
if the EU successfully concludes its banking union, proceeds towards a fiscal union,
bolsters its democratic legitimacy, and tackles crucial policy challenges spanning
across defence, energy, migration, and infrastructure matters, it will be a profoundly
different union from the one we know today.
Taking into account that further integration makes enlargement more complicated and requires
deeper adjustments from the candidate states, the new conditions will make less probable a suc-
cessful Turkish EU accession.
4. Europeanization and minority rights protection in Turkey
The Europeanization of Turkish politics provided a new question to the enlargement process
academic discussion, presented and analysed in Chapter 1; hence, whether the example of the
Turkish membership is stretching the concept of Europeanization itself to its Limits (Börzel &
Soyaltin, 2012). Moreover, concerning the specific case study of minority rights, it indisputably
involved a series of different factors and agents other than the EU that nevertheless contributed
to Europeanization in a more general sense.
The bid to join the EU has brought Turkey under closer scrutiny from the EU. The EU from
the beginning identified areas in which Turkey needed to undertake policy reform in order to
make its standards converge with those of the EU. This would materialize mainly by the adop-
tion of a legal framework on anti-discrimination and the harmonization of Turkey’s national le-
46
gal framework with the EU acquis, inter alia concerning minority rights, to “avoid breaches of
human rights” and with special attention towards a viable resolution of the Kurdish issue (Ari-
kan, 2010, pp. 22-23; Kurban, 2007, p. 9).
Moreover, the direct involvement of the EU became critical with respect to the resolution of
the Kurdish issue, for at least three reasons best synopsized in the work of Kirişci (2011, p. 337).
Firstly, by granting “a powerful incentive based on conditionality as well as a relatively clear
blueprint for reform expressed in the AP”. Secondly, by providing, according to Tocci (2005; as
also cited in Kirişci, 2011, p. 337), “a ‘push’ or ‘trigger’ for growing domestic demands and ef-
forts to reform”, based on a promise to start accession negotiations if the Copenhagen political
criteria were met. Finally, by tipping the balance in Turkey in the favour of the liberal approach
against coalitions resisting reform efforts.
Subsequently, the EU’s promise of membership talks contingent on further democratization
emerged as a triggering factor for the reform measures that were adopted until 2005. However,
the pace of reforms slowed down after 2005 when negotiations opened. Critical developments on
the EU’s and its member state’s side contributed to this outcome and were therefore already ana-
lysed (see Chapter 3). In general, the EU stance reflected the member state governments’ strive
to focus more on the absorption capacity of the EU as a factor shaping the terms of Turkey’s
membership negotiations by including ‘special arrangements’ (Saatçioğlu, 2014, p. 96) while
considering the eventual Turkish accession (see Chapter 3.2.1.2).
4.1. Europeanization factors in Turkey’s accession process
The concept of Europeanization as already analysed in Chapter 1, involves a series of different
processes, agents and factors that contribute to domestic adjustment and reforms. In short, as
summarized by Böhler, Pelkmans and Selcuki (2012, p. 1) “adopting the full acquis in earnest,
fulfilling the political and economic Copenhagen criteria, demonstrating the required administra-
tive capacity”, generally displaying a readiness to address other outstanding issues in a spirit of
cooperation and eagerness to join the EU are vital parts of a successful pre-accession process.
Accordingly, because of the central role of the acquis adoption and the Copenhagen criteria sat-
isfaction, as well as the demonstration of the required administrative capacity in order for re-
forms to be successfully introduced those individual aspects should be analysed into more detail.
47
4.1.1. The Copenhagen criteria
The European Council of Copenhagen in June 1993 laid down the criteria and rules that define
whether a country is eligible to join the EU that have already applied to the consecutive 1995,
2004 and 2007 enlargement waves. Moreover, the criteria find application to EU accession can-
didate countries, among others to Turkey. It is important to stress that the criteria can be divided
into three categories of both explicit and implicit nature, namely into political and economic,
explicitly deriving from the document’s wording as well as legislative, deriving from the acquis’
adoption practice. The criteria generally request that a state has the institutions to preserve dem-
ocratic governance and human rights, a functioning market economy, and accepts the obligations
and intent of the EU. In fact, according to the Copenhagen European Council Presidency Con-
clusions (1993, p. 13):
Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of
minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope
with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. Membership presupposes
the candidate's ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to
the aims of political, economic and monetary union.
Again, the Copenhagen criteria make specific reference to the respect for and protection of
minorities, confirming that ethnic, linguistic and religious rights are enshrined in European
standards. Since 1993, the content of the criteria is being reflected in the successive EU legisla-
tion and the framework for negotiations with particular candidate states. In other words, the ful-
filment and complete satisfaction of the political criterion is crucial for the European Council
decision to open negotiations. However, the post-Copenhagen EC practice as argued in the work
of Emerson (2004, p. 2) showed a shift from an ‘absolutist position’ to the acknowledgement of
‘sufficient progress’ towards meeting the Copenhagen criteria as sufficient condition for the
opening of negotiations53. If the EU strictly followed its prior doctrine, the conclusion would
53 Emerson (2004, p. 2) drawing his examples from the CEEC candidates observes the adoption of four categories
(1) Yes (2) Yes, but (3) On the way (4) No, revealing the spectrum of possible assessments that may or not lead to
the opening of EU negotiations for the candidate states. As he further notes, for Turkey the present (2004) assess-
ment of the EU seemed to be neither ‘Yes’ nor ‘No’.
48
have been that Turkey did not yet fulfil the Copenhagen criteria back in 2004, in spite of the no-
table legislative reform progress (see Chapter 4.1.2.1). In this framework, the Brussels European
Council of December 2004 in conclusion:
welcomed the adoption of the six pieces of legislation identified … [and] decided that …
Turkey sufficiently fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria to open accession negotia-
tions provided that it brings into force … specific pieces of legislation.
4.1.2. The conditionality mechanism and the external incentives model
The EU’s main tool for inducing national domestic political change is its conditionality mecha-
nism. In principle, conditionality is invoked to explain the role of the EU in inducing not only
member states but also candidate countries to adopt reforms and harmonize their laws and poli-
cies with those of the EU (Kirişci, 2011). In the post-Helsinki era, Turkish politics have been
highly exposed to conditionality, in the framework of Turkey’s need to comply with the Copen-
hagen Criteria that triggered an unprecedented reform programme, which considerably improved
minority rights (Grigoriadis, 2008, p. 35).
Furthermore, the external incentives model has also been assumed able to enlighten Turkey’s
adjustment and reform process. As elaborated by Cengiz and Hoffmann (2013, p. 417), crucially,
supporters of the external incentives model have argued that credible EU commitment to future
membership constitutes a necessary but not sufficient condition for democratic reforms in candi-
date countries, whereas low adoption costs and weak veto players constitute necessary and suffi-
cient conditions. However, Cengiz and Hoffmann’s analysis based on empirical data, most re-
cently confirmed the connection and interaction of the presence of a strong and credible com-
mitment by the EU to Turkish accession and the Turkish government’s adoption of initial re-
forms.
This credible commitment showed weakening signs during the critical juncture of the year
2005 that materialized in the wording of the latter EC’s Negotiating Framework for Turkey. The
initial reforms proceeded in spite of high domestic adoption costs and strong veto players that the
government faced at the time. As already analysed, even the public opinion towards the EU
memberships has been steadily decreasing (see Figure 3). Yet, as stressed by the researchers
(Cengiz & Hoffmann, 2013, p. 417) and argued in this thesis:
49
once the EU’s credible commitment declined with the stagnation in accession talks, the
reform process also slowed considerably despite a continuous decrease in adoption costs
as well as a weakening of veto players. Thus, in this specific case we have found that
credible EU commitment constituted a necessary and sufficient condition, whereas weak
veto players and low adoption costs constituted neither necessary nor sufficient condi-
tions.
Additionally, in the same work, a dynamic relationship between adoption costs and EU con-
ditionality can only marginally be observed. As Cengiz and Hoffmann (2013, p. 417) argue, Tur-
key’s AP has required removal of the political powers of non-majoritarian institutions, most no-
tably the military. Since those institutions constituted strong veto players, adoption costs have
decreased considerably and continuously as the EU-induced democratic reforms were adopted.
The above assumption is confirmed by the AKP reforms continuation up to a certain point after
which, it is not clear whether the shift has essentially been provoked by the weakening of the
credibility of the EU commitment, or because of pressure applied by strategic veto players, in
combination with the high reform adoption costs.
As suggested by this thesis, the shift in the EU’s stance toward the Turkish membership per-
spective, reflecting the shift in power in its member states confirmed the EU commitment dis-
continuity. At the same time and especially after 2005, as noted by Börzel and Soyaltin (2012, p.
13), “the EU certainly has provided not only new opportunities, but also legitimacy for the AKP
government to overcome the resistance of veto players in the state structure”. Those include not
only the military but also large parts of the judiciary and bureaucracy. More recently, the gov-
ernment achieved a further weakening of the judiciary and bureaucracy as well as of media not
related to the government, allegedly adjacent to the Gülen movement54. Nevertheless, the devel-
opments mirror rather narrower political expediencies, namely the Erdoğan-Gülen collaboration
backlash, than pressures of Europeanization.
54 In the framework of the Turkish government’s accusation of the Gülen movement allegedly having infiltrated the
police and judiciary, on 14 December 2014, the Turkish police arrested senior journalists and media executives on
charges of forming, leading and being a member of an armed terrorist organization.
50
4.1.2.1. Legal coercion and the acquis communautaire
A fundamental part of EU candidacy has always been apart from the conditions, the timing of the
candidate's adoption, implementation and enforcement of all current EU rules, known as the ac-
quis. The acquis is divided into 35 different policy fields, chapters inter alia such as transport,
energy, environment each of which is negotiated separately. However, for the purpose of this
thesis, it is Chapter 23: Judiciary and Fundamental Rights, which is of importance 55.
EU policies in the area of judiciary and fundamental rights aim to maintain and further de-
velop the EU as an area of freedom, security and justice. This is achieved by promoting the es-
tablishment of an independent and efficient judiciary, by fighting corruption representing a threat
to the stability of democratic institutions and the rule of law and by ensuring the respect for fun-
damental rights and EU citizens’ rights.
With this in mind one must notice that initially, during the Ecevit coalition government, se-
verely criticised articles of the Turkish Penal Code and of the Law for the Struggle against Ter-
rorism [Anti-Terror Law]56 used by the courts to restrict human cultural and political rights, inter
alia, the freedom of expression and association, were amended (see Table 2; Tocci, 2005, p. 73;
Ulusoy, 2007, p. 474). As Ulusoy (2007, p. 474) further points out the “reforms of August 2002
… [brought about the] extension of rights over religious property of the non-Muslim minorities
[recognized by the Treaty of Lausanne], and rights of broadcasting [and receiving education] in
languages other than Turkish – particularly referring to regional dialects and the Kurdish lan-
guage.”
The succeeding AKP government maintained the reforms pace; hence in the framework of
the constitutional amendments passed in July 2003 the freedom of speech and of association
were extended and a series of cultural, religious and linguistic rights were safeguarded. The new
Law on Associations introduced in July 2004 brought a new and more transparent framework in
the organization and operation of the associations. Moreover, during the first AKP government
various covenants of the UN were adopted, covenants that Turkey had traditionally held reserva-
55 Chapter 23 covers the independence, impartiality, integrity and efficiency of the judiciary, the fight against cor-
ruption, and respect for fundamental rights and EU citizens’ rights, as guaranteed by the acquis and by the EU Char-
ter of Fundamental Rights. 56 Articles 159 and 312 of the Turkish Penal Code and Article 8 of the Anti-Terror Law (No. 3713)
51
tions about. The Turkish Parliament proceeded to the ratification of the ‘International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights’57 and the ‘International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultur-
al Rights’.
Table 1 Turkish reforms regarding minority rights, 2000-2008
Date Type Changes
October 2001 Constitutional Package 34 amendments to the 1982 Constitution
February/March
2002
Constitutional Package Constitutional amendments inter alia concerning the freedom
of expression and association
August 2002 Constitutional Package and
Anti-Terror Law Revision
Abolish of the death penalty; allowance of broadcasting in
languages other than Turkish
December 2002 Constitutional Package Operationalization of previous reforms; expansion of the
freedom of the press and of association
May/July 2003 Constitutional Package and
Anti-Terror Law Revision
Repeal Article 8 of Anti-Terror Law58; extent of freedom of
speech and association, cultural, religious and linguistic rights
May 2004 8Harmonization Package 10 amendments to the Constitution, inter alia on the freedom
of press and the supremacy of supranational treaties over
domestic law.
July 2004 New Law on Associations
September 2004 New Penal Code
February 2008 New Law on Associations
April 2008 Amendment of Penal Code Amendment of Article 30159 strengthening the safeguards for
freedom of expression.
Note: Author’s compilation, based on the work of Müftüler Bac (2005, p. 22), Tocci (2005, pp. 73-74), Hale (2011,
p. 327)
Furthermore, the AKP government showed signs of appreciating the need to ensure the effective
implementation of the new laws (Tocci, 2005, p. 74), thus the EU quickly recognized the gov-
ernment’s “great determination in accelerating the pace of reforms, which have brought far-
reaching changes to the political and legal system.” (EU Commission, 2004, p. 11) In its 2004
57 Its article 27 states that “in those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging
to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their
own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language.” 58 This article had been used in the previous decade for the imprisonment of a number of journalists and publishers
for crimes against the ‘indivisible unity of the Turkish Republic’. 59 According to which, insulting the ‘Turkish identity’ and state institutions a punishable offence.
52
progress report on Turkey, the EC (EU Commission, 2004) recognized the accomplishment of
the Turkish Parliament which according to the report “between October 2003 and July 2004,
adopted a total of 261 new laws”.
Several articles of the Constitution and laws were amended to meet the new requirements. As
Grigoriadis (2007, pp. 424-425) summarizes, the amendments involve constitutional reforms
which undeniably reached unprecedented levels by lifting limitations, expanding fundamental
rights and freedoms and allowing the use of minority languages aiming at bringing about con-
vergence of the Constitution with the Copenhagen criteria but also in the content of other various
legislation. Soon, a new more liberal Law on Associations was introduced in February 2008 (see
Table 2), significantly improving “the property rights of religious foundations established by the
small non-Muslim minorities in Turkey60” (Hale, 2011, p. 327). In April 2008, an amendment of
Penal Code’s Article 301 has been ratified by the Turkish Parliament (see Table 2), further
strengthening the safeguards for freedom of expression. Regardless of those reforms, a large
unachievable agenda pointed out by the successive EC progress reports (2008, pp. 23-27; 2009,
pp. 18-29) remained61.
The negotiations stalled further following the EU Council meeting of December 2009,
where the Greek Cypriot Administration unilaterally stated that it would block the opening of
further six chapters, among others of Chapter 23. Chapter 23 (Judiciary and Fundamental Rights)
and Chapter 24 (Justice, Freedom and Security) remain politically blocked by the Republic of
Cyprus, despite the EC’s and EP’s call for them to be opened. The EC, eventually, in May 2012,
after some years of not opening negotiating chapters, tried to reinvigorate the process with a so-
called ‘Positive Agenda’. In the last two months of 2013 the ‘Positive Agenda’ resulted in “the
opening of negotiations on Chapter 22 on regional policy, the signing of a readmission agree-
ment and the adoption of a visa liberalisation roadmap.” however, this “did little to address the
root causes of the lethargy in relations.” (Blockmans, 2014, p. 4)
60 Notably the Armenian, Jewish and Rum Orthodox Christian minorities. 61 Summarized by Hale (2011, p. 327), the Turkish government failed to further extend the cultural and other rights
of the Kurdish minority. Indeed the EC’s concerns included the continued restrictions of freedom of speech and
communication, the continuation of compulsory classes in religious culture and ethics in primary and secondary
schools that ignored the interests of the Alevi minority, and restrictions on the Greek Orthodox Ecumenical Patriar-
chate, in particular, the closure of its seminary, the Halki Theological School on the Marmara island of Heybeli.
53
In general, the distance covered with successive legislation confirms both the usefulness
of conditionality as a reform enhancing mechanism as well as the constructivism-based lesson-
drawing mechanism. The latter could successfully explain the continuation of reforms after the
AKP consolidated its power and by the time, the EU perspective provided fewer benefits and
became less popular in the Turkish public opinion (see Figure 3). As assumed in Chapter 1, the
policy-making actors adopt rules, successfully applied in other countries or issues expecting an
effective domestic policy problem solution.
4.1.2.1.1. Normative shortcomings
Nevertheless, the government-adopted measures, laws and constitutional amendments; they have
been rather harshly criticized by subsequent EC’s Turkey progress reports as being half-
measures and legal framework improvements short of EU standards. For example, the status of
the assessment process of Chapter 23, which, for example, has been open for negotiations until
December 2009 and for a limited time, confirms the efforts further needed (see Table 2). Unde-
niably, the EU remains an important anchor for Turkey’s economic and political reforms, while
as elaborated in the EC’s 2014 progress report (p. 1) “it is in the interest of both Turkey and the
EU that the opening benchmarks for Chapter 23 … [lead] to opening of negotiations”. This is
important in the light of the Turkish government’s response following allegations of corruption
in December 2013 that gave rise to serious concerns regarding the independence of the judiciary
and separation of powers in Turkey.
Table 2 Chapter 23 assessment process and current status
Chapter
EC’s
assessment
at
start
Screening
completed
2007 EC
report
2008 EC
report
2009 EC
report
Chapter
froze
Current
status
23. Judiciary
& Fundamen-
tal Rights
Considerable
efforts
needed
13
October
2006
Limited
progress
Some
legislative
progress
Some
progress
08
December
2009
Further
efforts
needed
Note: Author’s compilation.
Concerning the protection of minority rights, it should be stressed that Turkey has not yet
signed the CoE Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and does not
54
recognise minorities other than those defined by the Lausanne Treaty. (EU Commission, 2000, p.
19). Moreover, even in areas that have been tackled with recent legislation in the framework of
the Europeanization pressures, more actions should be taken. It is true that none of the
Europeanization reforms suggested in the relevant literature have been successfully introduced.
The provision of safeguards to the legislated freedom of expression and association as well as to
the property rights and the lift of limitations to the education of the clergy of the non-Muslim
minorities should be further promoted and be recognized to the highest level. Furthermore, as
Emerson argued back in 2004 (pp. 3-4), the Kurds should especially receive important benefits
regarding the freedom of expression which has been mostly tackled by the successive reforming
legislation ever since.
In the framework of the ‘democratization package’, some minority-protection-oriented re-
forms have been included. On hate crimes according to an article of Turkey Agenda (2014), the
package stipulates that hate speech or acts related inter alia, to language, race, nationality, col-
our, religion or sectarian differences will be punished by up to three years in prison. Moreover,
according to the same source, Assyrian confiscated property in Mardin (see Figure 1) has to be
returned by law. Additionally, the package also announced the establishment of a Roma lan-
guage and cultural institute. Other reforms were the abolishment of restrictions on collecting
charitable donations and measures of deterrence by legal punishment from any action preventing
the practice of religious beliefs. The announcements also included reforms related to the Kurdish
issue; it does not however cover key steps essential for a viable resolution to the long-lasting
Kurdish issue62 (Cengiz O. , 2013).
4.2. Domestic political expediencies
Overall, as Börzel and Soyaltin (2012, p. 16) argue, domestic change in Turkey has been less
and less “driven by the EU and its fading conditionality, but by the political agenda of the Turk-
ish ruling elites and their preference for consolidating their political power”. At the same time,
the decision of the same elites to focus on failed restrictive policies in minority rights of previous
62 As per Cengiz (2013) “the wide-ranging definitions of ‘terror’ and ‘organization membership’ that are the cause
of the detentions of many Kurdish politicians and activists would remain” in place. At the same time, legal provi-
sions that enable mass detentions would stay unchanged. Concluding, the package limits mother tongue education
only to private schools not including public schools.
55
governments was perceived and called forth in order to please their constituencies and increase
their voting shares. As further elaborated by Grigoriadis (2009, p. 1199), the AKP leadership
realized that the EU could be of critical help in its effort to gain political legitimacy and promote
the sensitive, religion-related aspects of its political agenda. In this framework, the AKP’s first
and partly second term in office, until 2008 (see Table 1), demonstrates the use of Europeaniza-
tion reforms as an instrument of domestic political empowerment (Saatçioğlu, 2014, p. 90).
Interestingly enough, as summarized by Börzel and Soyaltin (2012, p. 14), the sum of Tur-
key’s Europeanization itself appears to be often ‘bottom-up’ or ‘indirect’. In the epicentre of this
hypothesis is the assumption that domestic actors are “not merely downloading EU policies nor
do they simply ignore them”. It must therefore be stressed that the politics of AKP simply
demonstrate the “(ab)use [of] the EU as a ‘legitimization device’” in order for narrower political
interests to be promoted and introduced.
It provides no surprise that reforms in aspects of cultural rights, the improvement of the rule
of law and of fundamental freedoms63, altogether, reforms in the legal system, analysed in previ-
ous chapters, liberalized the Turkish political environment, thus enhancing AKP’s power and
survival prospects with respect to long-standing secular ‘rivals’ in the military and high judiciary
(Saatçioğlu, 2014, pp. 92-93). Those institutions had monitored and scrutinized religion-based
parties for years, a fact that has been in the core of AKP’s reform stance and EU dedication since
the AKP-advocated new version of secularism sought to transform Turkish politics (Grigoriadis,
2009, p. 1196). The degree of transformation is somewhat controversial with many scholars sug-
gesting that AKP essentially saw “the EU as the path to ‘de-Kemalization’ and hence greater
religious freedom” (Kubicek, 2004, pp. 124-125) in order to fulfil the goal of a political Islam,
established in Turkey.
4.3. Civil society pressure
The increasing split over the EU and the Turkish membership perspective (see Figure 3) are also
reflected in civil society, where there are both pro-EU and Eurosceptic NGOs with diverging
views, although according to Smith (2004, p. 124) “all the leading Turkish labour unions and
63 The nature of the pressure that led to the promotion of human rights in the Turkish case in the frist place, namely
the political expediencies, as per Plagemann (as cited in Hale, 2011, p. 324) understandably show a tendency to
promote human rights on a particularist rather than universalist basis.
56
business organizations favour membership.” It is also observed that the pro-EU organizations in
particular have close allies in Europe. Given the importance of such transnational alliances, as
hypothesized in Chapter 1, Turkey would appear to be a good target for democracy promotion by
the EU.
Moreover, the role of the growing and active civil society in Turkey has been of critical im-
portance during the recent Gezi park protest in Istanbul and related protests across Turkey. Its
activities during the incidents reflected the actual emergence of vibrant, active citizenry as also
observed by the EC (2013, p. 11). Earlier, an equally important element of the 1999 to 2004
Turkish reforms, aiming to meet the political aspects of the Copenhagen criteria, was the pres-
sure coming from various civil society groups in Turkey that wanted the accession negotiations
with the EU to begin. As observed by Müftüler Baç (2005, p. 20) the general prospect of mem-
bership increased the visibility of pro-democracy and pro-European groups in the country. Fur-
thermore, the decrease of military’s political involvement and the power-consolidation-based
AKP governments’ strategic alliance with the EU affected the action of governmental bodies that
in the post 1997 democratic coup era started to regularly consult such groups. This regular con-
sultation, regardless the motives of the government, supports the argument that Turkish politics
during the analyzed period acquired a more democratic profile, mainly due to the socialization
with the EU and following the example of EU member states. The pursuit of alternative courses
of action, based on their appropriateness and legitimacy level confirms therefore the Turkish
politics adjustment in the process of rule transfer and rule adoption.
Even though the civil society has been empowered in Turkey, not least through legal, finan-
cial, and technical support by the EU (Börzel & Soyaltin, 2012, p. 15), there is no coherent legal
framework organising this cooperation (EU Commission, 2008, p. 18). As observed by the EC,
consultations are held:
on an ad hoc basis, with unclear selection criteria, and do not result in tangible policy
outputs. Political pluralism would be enhanced if participation of civil society and other
stakeholders in policy-making were increased. Furthermore, the breadth and scope of civ-
il society organisations needs to be strengthened.
At the same time, the Turkish legislation on the right to association still needs to be improved in
order to be brought in line with EU standards, while legislative and administrative obstacles that
hinder the financial sustainability of civil society organisations should be lifted (European Com-
57
mission, 2014, p. 15). In conclusion, other factors hindering the organizations’ power and limited
their policy-forming role in the past and present are:
their weak organizational capacities … the absence of a strong culture of civic engage-
ment, civil society … [and] the decreasing public support for EU membership [that]
makes it more difficult to mobilize in favor of implementing EU demands for reform.
4.4. International agents other than the European Union
Equally important, as suggested by Grigoriadis (2008, p. 34), it was not only the EU but also a
different international body, “the CoE… [that] exerted pressure in the direction of minority rights
protection and provided an alternative agent of socialisation to European norms”. Undeniably,
just as Kurban (2007, p. 8) states, the adoption of the European Convention of Human Rights
[ECHR] by the CoE gave the long sought effect to ascertain rights stated in the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights [UDHR] making them binding for the signatory states. As a conse-
quence the UDHR was made binding for Turkey, with the article 14 of the ECHR prohibiting
discrimination based on inter alia membership to a national minority. At the same time, the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights [ECtHR] has also clearly stated that “the protection of minorities
is a basic European principle” (as cited in Kurban, 2007, p. 8) further safeguarding the rights of
the minorities.
Moreover, the recognition of the right to individual petition and the binding judicial compe-
tence of the ECtHR in 1990 were of decisive importance after all. As further observed by Grigo-
riadis (2008, p. 34), resulting from their recognition, Turkey “has been confronted by an increas-
ing number of convictions, many of which referred to violations of minority rights.” Basic pieces
of Turkish legislation were found to be contrary to the ECHR, and Turkey came under pressure
to reform. Furthermore, the Turkish interest in fulfilling the Copenhagen political criteria for its
EU membership increased the importance of the Turkish compliance to the recommendations
made by the CoE.
58
Conclusion
Turkey’s EU accession has been a highly fluctuating process. The euphoric Helsinki European
Council decision, although reflecting the EU’s temporary positive view on Turkey, soon to be
amended following domestic political developments in key EU member states, placed Turkey
within the stream of conditionality and EU-induced adjustment pressure, inaugurating a virtuous
cycle of domestic reforms, among others of human and minority rights. Europeanization, under-
stood as the domestic impact of, and adaptation to, European governance found in that sense
application to the Turkish case. Soon reforms were to be further promoted based on AKP’s stra-
tegic allegiance to the EU. Indisputably, this allegiance, although founded on domestic political
expediencies, contributed to the far-reaching reforms introduced in the following years with em-
phasis on progressing towards the fulfilment of the Copenhagen political criteria and the eventu-
al opening of membership negotiations, initiated in 2005. In general, reforms introduced during
the virtuous cycle of the Ecevit coalition and the AKP governments are best explained by the
application of constructivist policy learning and socialization as well as the rational-based condi-
tionality mechanisms that led to adjustment and lesson-drawing results.
In the post-2005 period, AKP has been progressively reluctant to proceed to further reforms,
namely as a result of its electoral support consolidation that undermined the use of the EU as a
legitimation device, the increasingly ambiguous credibility of the EU membership and the fading
EU membership support by the public opinion. However, reforms did not entirely halt. Ephemer-
al political approaches to minorities took place in the meanwhile, resting on domestic and exter-
nal agents other than the EU. The virtuous cycle steadily lost ground and eventually deviated to a
vicious cycle of EU-Turkey relations deterioration, since domestic political developments within
the EU member states promoted a special status for Turkey, namely a ‘privileged partnership’.
Following this tendency, the expected reward of the EU membership and its credibility plunged.
Taking into account the above in conjunction with the results of the consecutive 2011 nation-
al and the 2014 local, and presidential elections, there is no doubt that the crisis in AKP-EU rela-
tions on top of its dominance in Turkish politics led to the loss of the Europeanization momen-
tum. The recent negative developments, among others, the Gezi park protests, corruption charges
against government ministers and the conflict with the Gülen movement, increased the fears of
an AKP drift towards an excessively majoritarian conception of democracy, or even an electoral
authoritarianism of a more markedly Islamic character as argued by Özbudun (2014). Further-
59
more, the EU accession perspective and the political action appropriateness it involves have only
marginally affected the developments’ political management. Nevertheless, it should be stressed
that in spite of the EU-Turkey relations deterioration, as Volkan Bozkir, the Turkish Minister for
EU Affairs and Chief Negotiator stated64, “the fact that Turkey has been engaged with the EU for
40 years shows that we are determined, stubborn, patient, and tolerant”.
Throughout this period, even though it can be safely concluded that in the Turkish case, the
minority rights protection amelioration has been among others caused by the pressure applied in
the framework of Turkey’s EU candidacy as a result of external pressure interpreted by the con-
cept of Europeanization and its conditionality mechanism, it cannot be as well concluded that
this factor has been exclusively responsible for the developments. As observed, Europeanization
although, the most prominent, is only one of the factors that construct a complex puzzle of do-
mestic and international interactions promoting the safeguard and protection of minority rights.
The thesis findings, as a consequence, partly disprove and rather amend the working hypothesis.
As suggested, there is a series of other interdependent factors, such as domestic political expedi-
encies and pressures coming from civil society as well as international agents other than the EU
that contribute to minority rights reforms and to Turkey-EU convergence relevant adjustments.
With the domestic politics resting in the epicenter of the Europeanization of Turkish politics it is
useful to draw the attention to the AKP’s need for domestic political empowerment and promote
an analysis of the incentives provided based on the rational conditionality mechanism.
Being true that in a period when an enlargement fatigue has been exacerbated by Europe’s
recent negative economic projections, Europeanization of Turkish politics may seem to be of
secondary importance. Nevertheless, an analysis of the newer conditions, elaborated on the rele-
vant literature, concerning the focus on power asymmetries, regime type, domestic incentives,
and degrees of statehood has the potential to shed light to the application of the conditionality
mechanism in specific and the Europeanization concept in general and is still valid. Such an at-
tempt of an analysis should take note that, as this thesis disproved for the Turkish case, Europe-
anization and conditionality are not to be used as panacea considering that domestic reform is not
an exclusive effect of a single process or mechanism.
64 Statement made in a Centre for European Policy Studies’ event titled “Turkey & Europe: New Challenges – New
Opportunities” held on Thursday, February 12th 2015.
60
Works cited
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