Cities 31 (2013) 29–36

Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect

Cities

journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate /c i t ies

Evaluating the impact of national government involvement in localredevelopment projects in the Netherlands

Marjolein Spaans a,⇑, Jan Jacob Trip a, Ries van der Wouden b

a Delft University of Technology, OTB Research Institute for the Built Environment, Jaffalaan 9, 2628 BX Delft, The Netherlandsb Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, Oranjebuitensingel 6, 2511 VE The Hague, The Netherlands

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history:Received 28 February 2012Received in revised form 21 August 2012Accepted 27 October 2012Available online 29 November 2012

Keywords:National government involvementSubsidiarityUrban redevelopmentKey projectsThe Netherlands

0264-2751/$ - see front matter � 2012 Elsevier Ltd. Ahttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2012.10.014

⇑ Corresponding author. Address: Delft UniversityInstitute for the Built Environment, P.O. Box 5030, 260Tel.: +31 15 2782987; fax: +31 15 2784422.

E-mail addresses: M.Spaans@tudelft.nl, J.J.Trip@tuderwouden@pbl.nl (R. van der Wouden).

Urban redevelopment projects are usually the responsibility of local government, but there can be localprojects which generate large national wealth effects and for that reason have a direct national govern-ment involvement. While such involvement can be justified theoretically, evidence from the Netherlandssuggests that in practice the issue is far from unambiguous. This paper therefore considers (1) thegrounds on which higher tiers of government, particularly national government, become activelyinvolved in local urban projects and (2) to what extent the results of local projects indeed justify theinvolvement of national government. To this end, we evaluate the involvement of the Dutch governmentin local projects based on an analysis of a series of large-scale projects (known as key projects).

� 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Introduction

In the continuing debate on the allocation of tasks and compe-tences to different levels of government with regard to urban rede-velopment policy and projects, the principle of subsidiarity is oftentaken as a guideline. Subsidiarity states that competences should beallocated at the lowest possible level, at which citizens supposedlybenefit the most. This implies that urban redevelopments are usu-ally the responsibility of local, rather than higher tiers of govern-ment. There are exceptions, however, notably for projects whichare expected to generate significant national wealth effects in termsof additional income and employment, for example, where nationalgovernment actively participates in urban projects. Examples arethe French grands projets as grands projets is a French word or theEnglish Urban Development Corporations (Booth, Brueillard, Fraser,& Paris, 2007), but also Copenhagen’s Ørestad (Majoor, 2008: 131).

In general, the involvement of national governments in urbanpolicy and urban development projects has grown since the1970s. However, there remains much variety between countries.Within the European Union, some countries have a specific na-tional urban policy, such as France, UK and the Netherlands, whileothers have no national urban policy at all, such as Austria (Van

ll rights reserved.

of Technology, OTB Research0 GA Delft, The Netherlands.

delft.nl (M. Spaans), ries.van-

den Berg, Braun, & Van der Meer, 2004). In certain other countries,national involvement in urban policy and projects is increasing.Apart from general national urban policies on housing, infrastruc-ture, business sites, etc. (not aimed at specific cities or projects),national governments are also becoming actively involved inspecific development and redevelopment projects. In Denmark,for example, the Copenhagen Ørestad project was the first urbanproject in 30 years to have the active involvement of the Danishnational government (Salet, 2008: 2356). National governmentscan contribute financially to local development in two ways: eitherthrough a generic contribution (e.g. standardised contributions tohousing programmes, urban renewal, etc.) or a specific contribu-tion (to a project at a specific location). This paper elaborates onprojects in which a national government combined generic andspecific contributions.

A closer look at urban redevelopment projects across Europeindicates that the involvement of national government is not al-ways self-evident. Not only do the extent and focus of nationalgovernment involvement vary between countries and projects,but also the question of whether or not national governmentshould be involved in local urban redevelopment is addressed indifferent ways. Can a common rationale be found to justify na-tional involvement in local urban projects? In view of the above,this paper addresses the following questions: (1) On what groundsdo higher tiers of government, particularly national government,become actively involved in local urban projects? and (2) To whatextent do the results of local projects indeed justify the involve-ment of national government? We address these questions from

30 M. Spaans et al. / Cities 31 (2013) 29–36

both a theoretical perspective and on the basis of an empiricalanalysis.

The first question will be addressed by means of a brief reviewof the possible theoretical grounds for the involvement of nationalgovernment in local urban projects. In the following sections wewill then address the second question by means of an evaluationof key projects in the Netherlands. These involve a number oflarge-scale urban redevelopment projects in Dutch cities that wereinitiated in the 1980s (first-generation projects) and 1990s (sec-ond-generation projects). The key projects were an instrument ofnew spatial policy in which the Dutch government adopted an ac-tive and direct role in urban development. We will, then, discussthe policy context of the key projects, followed by a discussion ofthe background and process used to select the first and second gen-eration of key projects. In the section that follows, we will evaluatethe effects of national government involvement by comparing thekey projects with a number of reference projects in which theDutch government was not significantly involved. We focus onthe results in terms of economic benefits and urban quality, sincethese were cited as the main reasons for national involvement. Adiscussion of the main results of the analysis concludes the paper.

National government involvement in urban redevelopment

When is it appropriate for national government to participate inlocal projects, and which cases should be left to local government?In all cases, the cost of national government intervention has to bebalanced against the benefit to society (cf. Besley & Coate, 2003:2613). A simple rule, based on the subsidiarity principle, mightbe that public action should be taken at the level of governmentclosest to the citizens who benefit the most from the action. Invest-ment in urban public space would thus be considered a task for lo-cal government, while investment in highways would be a regionalor national task. However, it is not a matter of scale only; a nationalairport may occupy a relatively small area, but if it provides a sig-nificant contribution to national wealth – for instance by offeringinternational connections that are crucial to broad sectors of theeconomy – it should be the object of national policy.

Discussing the urban revitalisation of Lille, Birmingham andMalmö, Thornley and Newman (1996: 590–591) state that:

(. . .) in all countries [i.e. France, the UK and Sweden] centralgovernment was linked into local development issues throughits financial management role and control of major infrastruc-ture. However, the structures were distinctive in each nationalsetting and created particular organizational processes. (. . .)Thus, in Europe it is evident that inter-city competition is med-iated by national context. There are clearly differences betweenthe US and Europe but it is also important to appreciate thevariety within Europe itself.

Thus, there is enough scope for differences between nations, ascan be seen among countries of the European Union. Most of theScandinavian countries have a decentralised system of govern-ment, whereas France traditionally has a much more centralisedsystem. The Netherlands lies somewhere between these poles(SCP, 2000: 137–44). Since the 1980s, European countries havetended to converge on this issue, with most decentralised coun-tries undergoing some centralisation, and more importantly, thehistorically most centralised countries such as Spain and Francetending towards decentralisation and the devolution of power tolocal governments and regions.

Decentralisation does not mean that no national responsibilitieswill remain, as it may also entail a redefinition of the nature of na-tional power, such as national government coordinating and sup-porting specific local roles. This is the more so because, as Le

Galès (2002: 75) remarks, national governments in highly urban-ised countries also need well-functioning cities, where wealth isgenerated and the main public services are located. Cities and cityregions increasingly function as semi-independent economic enti-ties in international economic networks (cf. Le Galès, 2002: 150–51; Scott, 1996), and as drivers of national economies. Accordingly,urban planning, economic policy and city marketing have becomemore closely intertwined, a process that is reinforced by theincreasing competition between European cities for national andinternational investment, EU grants and prestigious internationalevents (Thornley & Newman, 1996: 579). In many urban areas na-tional investment in public goods such as infrastructure and publicspace aims at enhancing the international business environment,thus attracting additional employment and leading to greater na-tional wealth. As Savitch and Kantor (2002: 338–339) point out,‘only national government can provide stable, long-term andencompassing protections for cities’. National policies guaranteea uniform social security and legislation system, thus creating a le-vel playing field nationwide. Furthermore, the scope and complex-ity of urban investment have grown. Local or even regional budgetsalone are unlikely to be able to pay for a massive investment ininfrastructure such as a high-speed railway or mega-events suchas a World Expo that lead to many of these development projects.If this is true, it would justify national policy and active nationalinvolvement.

Finally, the ‘rescaling of the economy’, in which cities becomecrucial drivers of national economies, is accompanied by a ‘rescal-ing of the state’ (Van der Heiden & Terhorst, 2007: 342). This en-tails a change ‘from centralised bureaucratic decision making to aplurality of networks and partnerships between government, busi-nesses, and other nongovernmental agents’, as well as a process of‘downscaling and upscaling of various forms of governance’ (Vander Heiden & Terhorst, 2007: 343). As a result, urban redevelop-ment is increasingly a matter of governance involving public,semi-public and private actors at various levels, and explicitlyincluding national government.

Based on the literature, our preliminary conclusion would bethat in Europe the international competition between cities is oftenmediated through the national government. Firstly, through theformulation of national urban policy and, secondly, through the ac-tive involvement of national government in a selection of urbanprojects which are assumed to generate additional income andemployment and thereby contribute to national wealth, measuredin terms of GDP, for example. In the following sections we addressour research questions with regard to the Dutch case of keyprojects: on what grounds did the national government becomeactively involved in these projects and did the results of these pro-jects justify its involvement? In other words, was a surplus value orcontribution to national wealth generated as a result of nationalgovernment involvement?

Dutch policy context

The economic transformation from industrial to service econo-mies that has occurred in Western Europe since the 1960s also af-fected the Netherlands, confronting Dutch cities with severalproblems that became acute in the early 1980s. Cities becamedependent on the service sector for growth and employment, rely-ing on this sector to compensate for the employment effects ofindustrial decline. In addition, the decline of the manufacturingindustry left considerable derelict ‘brownfield locations’, not onlyin seaport areas but also in or close to inner cities (cf. Couch, Sykes,& Börstinghaus, 2011: 3).

The simultaneous suburbanisation of inhabitants and change ineconomic activities meant that many major cities lagged behind

M. Spaans et al. / Cities 31 (2013) 29–36 31

smaller towns and locations on the urban fringe. Due to the strongdegree of fiscal centralisation in the Netherlands and the tendencytowards income redistribution, the faltering economic develop-ment of Dutch cities also affected the national economy. Revitalisa-tion of the major cities therefore became a concern of the nationalgovernment (Terhorst & Van de Ven, 1995: 358).

Nonetheless, by 1995 the nadir had already passed. New urbanredevelopment initiatives were introduced, aiming to attract pri-vate investment, primarily in the service sector, and to improvethe shabby urban quality of inner cities. However, these initiativesdepended on additional funding, as the financial situation of citiesstill tended to be weak. Some of the cities which traditionally weremanufacturing cities such as Rotterdam lagged behind cities with amore diverse economic structure (cf. Kloosterman, 1996) and hadan even worse financial situation. Nevertheless, rather than the dif-ferent needs of individual cities, national wealth concerns justifiedthe active role of national government.

National involvement in urban redevelopment

The active involvement of the national government in urbanredevelopment is nothing new to the Netherlands. The nationalgovernment has had a direct role in housing and spatial planningsince the Second World War, with spatial planning closely relatedto housing production. A good example of the integration betweenthe two was the new towns policy (groeikernenbeleid) introducedin the 1970s, which meant new housing development would beconcentrated in a number of greenfield locations in the proximityof existing cities in the Randstad. National government investedheavily in these developments, showing a readiness to take signif-icant financial risks (Priemus, 1998: 31). Involvement was mainlyfocused on subsidies for social housing and concerned numbersand categories of housing at administrative level. Apart from this,urban policy in the 1970s concentrated on the urban renewal ofdilapidated 19th-century housing areas. National spatial policy,in turn, was mostly limited to regional policy and focused particu-larly on the transfer of economic activity to the north and south ofthe country.

In the mid-1980s, the Fourth Memorandum on Spatial Planning(Vierde Nota Ruimtelijke Ordening: VINO) marked a radical breakwith this policy. The national government was to retreat fromthe scene both financially and administratively. However, the VINOleft some exceptions to this rule, with the direct involvement of na-tional government in urban redevelopment still considered justi-fied in certain instances. This policy document argued thatnational government involvement was needed in these instancesto increase the international competitive power of urban areas.In this regard, the VINO emphasised the strengths of the Randstadin particular, its main seaport and airports, and paved the way for aresurgence of interest in ‘the city’, as economic competition andwelfare-creation in Europe would increasingly take place in urbanareas. The cities themselves shared this approach, and had ‘becomekeener to promote their competitive position in relation to otherEuropean cities’ (Terhorst & Van de Ven, 1995: 344). This had tobe facilitated by creating attractive inner-city locations for interna-tional companies. As we will see below, these ‘key projects’ wouldbecome a new form of national spatial policy.

The publication of the Fourth Memorandum on Spatial PlanningExtra (Vierde Nota Ruimtelijke Ordening Extra: VINEX) added a fur-ther reason for the intervention of the national government: theconcentration of urban development would avoid urban sprawland prevent additional mobility growth. Although this urban con-centration could have been realised through the market or by localauthorities alone, it was decided that it also required coordinationby national government (Spaans, 2002). One of the instruments

designed to improve the competitiveness of cities was to under-take certain ‘key projects’. These were introduced in the nationalgovernment policy document Fourth Memorandum on SpatialPlanning (Ministerie van VROM, 1993: 10) stating that projectswhich contribute largely to the central aims of this policy docu-ment will be selected as ‘‘key spatial planning projects’’. In this pol-icy document national government shifted its policy from equalitybetween regions in the Netherlands (distribution policy) to a policyin which regions have to compete internationally and have to de-velop their own strengths. The policy document focused on theconditions and consequences of this shift in policy for spatialdevelopment. Key projects as introduced by the Ministry concerninvestment projects in the fields of urban redevelopment andinfrastructure. For the first time, national government was to be di-rectly involved in urban mixed-use development at the project le-vel. Previously, national involvement was rather focused on socialhousing development, although never at the project level. Nationalspatial instruments at the project level all had a generic character,with legislation and financial instruments providing the conditionsfor local development. We will elaborate on this concept in the fol-lowing section.

Dutch key projects

The Dutch key projects are an example of a national govern-ment becoming actively involved in local urban redevelopment.In the 1980s and 1990s, the national government intended to de-vote special attention to these projects by means of proceduraland financial coordination. Previously, active involvement in localurban development had been limited to local authorities and pri-vate parties, with national government only playing a generic,facilitating role. Why then were key projects made into a nationalresponsibility?

The motives for this were twofold but both came down to ur-ban-economic reasons. Firstly, the economic conditions in Dutchcities had deteriorated, as deindustrialisation had led to massivejob losses in Dutch urban areas during the 1970s and 1980s. Sec-ondly, the government considered that the Dutch cities would beunable to cope with increasing international competition thatwas expected with the advent of the Single European Market in1992. The main arguments behind the key projects – includingtwo generations of projects – were thus economic: the first gener-ation of key projects aimed to strengthen the economies of Dutchcities by developing internationally competitive locations; the sec-ond generation involved developing high-speed train stations, cre-ating attractive business locations and stimulating the localeconomy. These were considered urgent national policy issueswhich justified the active intervention of the national governmentin the development and redevelopment policies of Dutch cities.

Moreover, the national government had developed a vision ofthe kind of locations required to attract international and high-pro-file investment, but observed that they were not being developedby the private sector, and that cities were inclined to compete witheach other for public investment. If efforts were concentrated on asmall number of urban redevelopment projects, this would im-prove the chance of success on the international level. A concentra-tion of public money was thought to trigger private investment aswell. National government thus invested heavily in such projectsas government offices, a museum and a court of justice in the firstgeneration of projects, and infrastructure and railway stations inthe second. Subsequently, the cities themselves ‘had to do the‘‘follow up’’ in attracting private investors or partners in joint pub-lic-private projects: in short, central-state money was used as a‘‘leverage’’ for capitalist economic growth’ (Terhorst & Van deVen, 1995: 354).

32 M. Spaans et al. / Cities 31 (2013) 29–36

The national government considered it important to focus onurban quality to strengthen the business climate at the locationsof the key projects, since it was increasingly assumed to be animportant location factor for businesses. This is confirmed in liter-ature (Bell, 2005; Florida, 2002; Gospodini, 2002; Rowley, 1998).Research – for instance by UCL (2001) and Burinskienè, Rudzkienè,and Venckauskaitè (2011) – also shows that urban quality is re-flected in higher real estate values and rents. This is particularlytrue for the high-end services industries that were the primary fo-cus of the key projects. Since locations offering sufficient quality toattract international business were hardly available in the Nether-lands at the time, national governments considered that the keyprojects could attract businesses that would otherwise not locatein the Netherlands. As the main focus was on attracting businesses,the aim to develop housing on these locations was secondary, andpart of the pursuit for urban quality and avoidance of monofunc-tional ‘islands’ within the city. The largest share of housing hadto be developed in the high-quality and more expensive segmentas this was lacking in inner-city areas. But in some of the projectsalso social and student housing was envisaged as liveliness was ex-pected to increase by a mix of residents.

The first generation of key projects was conceived in the late1980s. The focus of these projects varied as the criteria for selec-tion changed over time and some projects were included afterpolitical lobbying by cities. The selection criteria thus becamesomewhat less stringent. Due to these changes and the fact thatnational investment came from regular sectoral funds rather thana large budget earmarked for the first-generation projects, it subse-quently proved virtually impossible to gain a clear overview of thenational investment figures due to lack of data from the ministryresponsible. The eight key projects of the first generation includewell-known examples such as the Kop van Zuid in Rotterdamand the Sphinx-Céramique in Maastricht, and less well-known

Fig. 1. Kop van Zuid in Rotterdam.

projects such as the central urban area in Amersfoort and the areanorthwest of the railway station in the city of Groningen. They var-ied considerably in size and focus, and were strongly – and in somecases exclusively – focused on office development. Most of theseprojects have been completed, although construction in the Kopvan Zuid, for example, continues to this day (Fig. 1).

In the late 1990s, the national government selected a secondgeneration of key projects. These six key projects involved high-speed railway stations, with Amsterdam Zuidas being the best-known example (Fig. 2). An additional instrument in these projectswas the use of financial contributions in addition to supportthrough the existing sectoral means. In contrast to the firstgeneration, both the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning andthe Environment and the Ministry of Transport, Public Worksand Water Management reserved a budget in advance (over € 1.4billion, see Table 1). The focus on urban quality was stronger andmore explicit than in the first generation of projects. This partly re-flected the increased focus on urban quality in the debate on inter-national office locations at the time, partly also the additionalchallenge of railway station areas with their large-scale infrastruc-ture and in most cases inner city locations. These projects are nowall underway, and none of them have yet been completed. They allinclude a mix of offices, housing and various amenities, as well asthe large-scale development of infrastructure.

Comparing the two generations

Both generations of the key projects are comparable in terms ofthe motivation for national government involvement, with

Fig. 2. Zuidas in Amsterdam.

Table 1National government investment in the second-generation key projects (EUR million, price level 2005). Source: Ministerie van VROM (2006).

Amsterdam Zuidas Rotterdam Centraal Utrecht Centraal Arnhem Centraal Breda Stations-kwartier Den Haag Centraal Total

VROMa 139 54 54 25 25 49 346V&Wb 514 161 253 59 37 81 1105Total 653 215 307 84 62 130 1451

a VROM = Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment.b V&W = Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management.

M. Spaans et al. / Cities 31 (2013) 29–36 33

arguments in favour of this involvement focusing on the genera-tion of additional national wealth through the creation of appropri-ate locations for international companies and the notion of publicspace as a public good. However, in spite of these similarities in thejustification of national government involvement, there are signif-icant differences in the policy instruments used by the nationalgovernment. Governance in the first-generation projects restedparticularly on procedural instruments such as coordination mea-sures and policy agreements, while, as suggested above, in the sec-ond generation an additional national budget was specificallydeployed for the key projects. Furthermore, a review of urban qual-ity was reinforced by calling in the Chief Government Architect(Atelier Rijksbouwmeester), who holds an independent position inthe Netherlands, intended to promote the quality of architectureby advising the government on architectural policy and govern-ment housing. Consequently, the Chief Government Architectmonitored the results of national investment in the second-gener-ation projects more intensely and more systematically than thefirst-generation projects.

5

6

First-generation key projectsBrabantse Poort (Nijmegen)Centraal Stadsgebied AmersfoortCéramique MaastrichtEindhoven-Welschap Corridor Kop van Zuid (Rotterdam)Nieuw Centrum Den HaagOostelijk Havengebied (Amsterdam)Stationsgebied NW (Groningen)

First-generation reference projectsKanaaloevers (Apeldoorn)Laakhavens (Den Haag)Paleiskwartier (Den Bosch)IJ-oevers (Amsterdam)

Second-generation key projectsArnhem CentraalDen Haag CentraalRotterdam CentraalBreda StationskwartierUtrecht CentraalAmsterdam Zuidas

Second-generation reference projectsArenA-Poort (Amsterdam)Leiden CentraalSpoorzone Tilburg

12345678

13

12

910

192021

14151617

11

18

Fig. 3. Location of key project

Evaluation of national government involvement in key projects

Did the key projects add value due to the involvement of thenational government, and if so, which specific aspects of the pro-jects created this surplus value? In order to effectively reconstructthe effects of national government involvement in the key projects,we compared them with a number of reference projects (Fig. 3). Anumber of reference projects were selected based on an overviewof large-scale urban redevelopment projects in the Netherlands.For each generation of key projects, these reference projects wereequivalent in terms of (1) surface area of the project, (2) plannedvolume of offices, housing and other functions, (3) functional mixand (4) the complexity and number of actors involved. In contrastto the key projects, the national government had no significantinvolvement in these reference projects. The regional distributionof the reference projects was also comparable to that of the keyprojects. These criteria resulted in four reference projects forthe first-generation and three for the second-generation keyprojects.

1

2

3

4

7

8

13

12

9

10

19

20

21

14

15

17

18

1116

s and reference projects.

Table 2Development of the rental prices of offices, 1991–2006. Source: Own calculations based on data from the ABF Vastgoedmonitor database (1990–2007).

Project (%) Corrected for regional developmenta

1991–2006 1991–1996 1996–2001 2001–2006 1991–2006

First-generation key projects 41 2 �7 1 �2First-generation reference projects 56 �1 14 �5 4Second-generation key projects 47 �3 1 1 �1Second-generation reference projects 64 7 3 �6 4

a The development within the projects was corrected for regional development in the regions in which the projects are situated: (growth factor project/growth factorregion) minus 1. Strictly speaking, the resulting factors are not percentages, but they may be interpreted as such: e.g. office rent development in the first-generation keyprojects was 7% below the regional average between 1996 and 2001.

1 Prices of social rental housing and student housing are regulated by the nationalgovernment and are thus not affected by urban quality.

34 M. Spaans et al. / Cities 31 (2013) 29–36

Criteria

To select criteria to assess the effects of national governmentinvolvement, we looked at the objectives behind this involvement.Urban-economic development was the main motive behind bothgenerations of key projects and the main reason for the nationalgovernment to become involved in the projects. The benefits of thisdevelopment would accrue to public as well as private parties bysuch means as private investment, employment growth (particu-larly in the service sectors) and an increase in the demand for officespace and housing, and lead to higher real estate prices (cf. Broun-en & Jennen, 2008: 400; De Wit & Van Dijk, 2003: 39).

Explicitly with regard to the second-generation projects, andmore implicitly also in the first generation, urban quality was an-other reason for national government involvement. The motivationbehind this was twofold. First, in the second-generation key pro-jects urban quality was explicitly a motivation on its own. Thisconcerned the integration of large-scale redevelopment areas –including the extensive transport infrastructure around high-speedtrain stations – in the surrounding city. This was partly motivatedby the thought that an attractive office location, when sufficientlyintegrated into the urban context, contributes to the attractivenessof the city as a whole, partly also by reasons of quality of life andliveability in inner-city areas (Ministerie van VROM, 2003a).

Second, national policy-makers acknowledged that urban qual-ity – for instance the level of amenities and public space, but alsointangibles such as authenticity – was increasingly considered animportant factor in the attractiveness of locations for businessesand thereby, urban competitiveness (Bell, 2005; Florida, 2002;Gospodini, 2002; Rowley, 1998). Urban quality in the key projectswas therefore assumed to contribute to the development of inter-nationally competitive business locations. As such, urban qualitywould be reflected in higher real estate prices of both offices andhousing (Burinskienè et al., 2011; Kuethe, 2012; UCL, 2001). Like-wise, accessibility has also been found to contribute to the attrac-tiveness of an area for businesses (Willigers & Van Wee, 2011) andto real estate prices (Debrezion, Pels, & Rietveld, 2007).

This surplus value of urban quality is relatively resistant to mar-ket fluctuations, as an historical pattern in the Dutch real estatemarket indicates that high-quality locations virtually always per-form better in terms of demand and rental level than lower-qualitylocations. Inner-city locations are in higher demand than moreperipheral locations (Zuidema, Van Elp, & Van der Schaaf, 2012).This may be illustrated by the relatively strong position of the Zui-das and similar high-end locations during the current downturn.The same can be observed for instance in Lille, where the rent levelof Euralille – which was in many aspects an example for the second-generation key projects – is considerably higher than that of otherlocations within the city (Trip, 2007). This makes it reasonable toassume that also in different market conditions high-end locationsmaintain a higher and more stable rent level than other locations.

Accordingly, our evaluation of the role of the national govern-ment in these projects focused largely on the economic benefitsand the urban quality in the project areas. We looked specifically

at (1) employment effects, (2) established businesses, accordingto sector and place of origin, (3) planned and realised real estateprogrammes, (4) the development of real estate values in housingand offices, (5) mobility effects and (6) urban quality(Van der Wou-den, Spaans, Foeken, Hollander, Trip, Milder, & De Wit, 2009).

Employment effects proved hard to measure but could be esti-mated based on the real estate programme. Assessment of estab-lished businesses was only possible for the second-generationprojects. This showed that mainly international and national firmsin business services (such as financial and legal services) settled inthe project areas. On the whole, the key projects did not attract anymore private investment than the reference projects. With regardto these two criteria, employment and established businesses, noclear effect of the involvement of national government was found(Van der Wouden et al., 2009). However, an important surplus va-lue was found for public investment as the national governmentchose to locate public real estate – such as ministry buildings,law courts, museums and government archives – on the sites offirst-generation key projects.

For reasons of conciseness and in view of the above discussion,we will concentrate on real estate prices and urban quality indica-tors within the context of this paper. The urban quality indicators in-clude the functional mixture in the planned and realised real estateprogramme, and mobility effects. Real estate values and mobility ef-fects were assessed largely using quantitative measures, while ur-ban quality was assessed mostly by way of qualitative criteriasuch as the integration of the project into the city, functional diver-sity and the quality of the public space (Van der Wouden et al., 2009).

Real estate values

Although not all of the projects have been completed (especiallyin the case of the second-generation key projects), it was possibleto draw tentative conclusions on the basis of the data available.Our assessment of the development of office rental rates was basedon data on all new rental contracts for new and existing offices.These showed considerable fluctuation over the years, as they werebased on relatively few large transactions. This was partly miti-gated by using a 3-year moving average. A correction factor wasalso applied to account for differences in regional development.It was not possible to use a weighted average, as the office surfaceareas involved in each transaction were not known.

On the whole, the reference projects scored as highly as the keyprojects regarding the development of office rents (Table 2). Inother words, we did not encounter a surplus value due to nationalgovernment involvement in the key projects. This is remarkable,considering the extensive economic ambitions of the key projects.

Another indicator of the development of real estate prices ishousing prices. In the previous discussion, we brought forward thaturban quality would also be reflected in higher real estate prices ofhousing.1 To analyse this indicator, we looked at the transaction

Table 3Development of the selling prices of owner-occupied housing, 1996–2006. Source: own calculations based on data obtained by e-mail from Kadaster (Dutch Land Registry Office)(1995–2008) and via www.nvm.nl from NVM (1990–2007).

Project (%) Corrected for regional developmenta

1996–2006 1996–2001 2001–2006 1996–2006

First-generation key projects 139 12 4 17First-generation reference projects 129 7 1 8Second-generation key projects 124 4 7 12Second-generation reference projects 122 6 �1 5

a The development within the projects was corrected for regional development of the regions in which the projects are situated: (growth factor project/growth factorregion) minus 1. Strictly speaking the resulting factors are not percentages, but they may be interpreted as such: e.g. housing prices in the first-generation key projectsincreased by 12% more than the average in their regions between 1996 and 2001.

M. Spaans et al. / Cities 31 (2013) 29–36 35

costs in owner-occupied housing. These reflect market develop-ments earlier than the value of the existing housing stock. We usedthe average selling price of all the housing sold in a certain year andarea, including both newly-built and pre-existing housing. This aver-age was weighted on the basis of the number of transactions in eachpostal code area, as the selling price for each individual dwelling wasnot available. Since our housing price data were based on a largenumber of transactions, they showed less fluctuation than officerents; it was therefore not necessary to apply a moving average.

Average housing prices increased by over 125% between 1996and 2006. The key projects showed a remarkable surplus valuecompared to the reference projects in terms of the real estate valueof housing (Table 3): if we correct for differences in regional devel-opment, transaction costs for owner-occupied housing in the keyprojects rose more than those in reference projects over the entireperiod. The picture is only mixed for the 1996–2001 period, partic-ularly for the second-generation projects.

Urban quality

Urban quality was evaluated on the basis of the urban qualityindicators mentioned in the project plans, as most of the projectshave not yet been completed. We distinguished three groups of cri-teria: (1) logistics, accessibility and the unbundling of mobilityflows, (2) the layout of the area and (3) the liveliness and mix offunctions. For each group, these were translated into a number ofindicators, selected largely on the basis of literature. For instance,criteria in the second group (layout of the area) were the presenceof water and green areas in the project, and the attention paid inproject plans to pedestrian-friendliness and the quality of appliedmaterials. In the third group (liveliness) criteria included the pres-ence and type of amenities, and their location within the area.Quantitative indicators such as density and mix of functions werealso used. Two indicators stood relatively alone: image and socialsecurity.

The national government had a varying degree of influence overurban quality in the key projects. Two examples may demonstratethis. One of the objectives of the project known as The Hague NewCentre (Den Haag Nieuw Centrum) was to give the area a city centrefunction. Redevelopment of the public space was thus prioritised. Aseparate project group – De Kern Gezond (‘The Healthy Core’) – wasgiven responsibility for this. The Austrian urban planner Rob Krierand Dutch architect Sjoerd Soeters became urban planning super-visors for the area called ‘The Resident’. Urban quality was para-mount in the plan for this area and was based on creating publicspace, to which the surrounding buildings were designed to add.In the second example, the Amsterdam Zuidas project, urban plan-ners used many classic means, such as a mix of functions, high den-sity and a dense street pattern inspired by the inner city ofAmsterdam. The national government’s involvement is currentlyfocused on the decision to cover the ring road and railway with astructure that can be built on. This will largely address the

nuisance of train and car traffic and bring the Zuidas closer tothe inner city, functionally and instinctively. The question ofwhether the national government will ultimately partly financethis project has yet to be answered.

It is apparent that the monitoring of key projects by the nationalgovernment has evolved. The first-generation key projects did notuse a predetermined evaluation framework for urban quality,while the Chief Government Architect drew up a number of gen-eral indicators of urban quality for the second-generation projects(Atelier Rijksbouwmeester, 2002). This was not a framework ofquantifiable indicators, because urban quality largely depends onqualitative and partly subjective factors such as the quality of thepublic space and architectonic quality. Moreover, the activeinvolvement of the Chief Government Architect was limited tothe plan development phase. Major decisions on urban qualitywere taken later, and by then the monitoring of the projects bythe national government had become less frequent and was lim-ited to progress and finance. The Chief Government Architect’s of-fice has not yet conducted its evaluation of the urban quality of theprojects.

Our analysis reveals that there is slightly more focus on urbanquality in the key projects than in the reference projects. How-ever, in the second-generation key projects in particular, the dif-ference is marginal. The analysis of project plans shows that thesecond-generation key projects focus slightly more on the mix offunctions and liveliness than the reference projects, issues whichhave gained in importance in the past decade. In terms of func-tional mix per se, the reference projects include a larger share ofhousing and other functions (mostly a mix of amenities), but thekey projects do better on more qualitative indicators (Table 4).In particular, second-generation key projects show a higher den-sity, and pay more attention to the location of amenities (for in-stance in the plinths of buildings) and the presence of amenitiesthat stimulate ‘24/7’ liveliness, such as restaurants and enter-tainment. The effect of the national government’s commissionof the Chief Government Architect and the greater financial re-sources for the second-generation key projects are not clearlyrevealed.

Conclusions

The main question addressed in this paper is whether nationalgovernment involvement in local urban redevelopment projectsmight be justified by a resulting surplus value in the outcome ofthese projects. Our analysis of the Dutch key projects producedambiguous results. National government involvement in these pro-jects was clearly motivated by their presumed contribution to na-tional wealth. The aims were to provide incentives for urbaneconomic development and to guarantee the provision of urbanquality, a public good. Nevertheless, our evaluation of the eco-nomic effects and urban quality found no conclusive evidence ofany surplus value as a result of the involvement of the national

Table 4Real estate programme, density and functional mix (average per category). Source: Ministerie van VROM (2003b); various project websites.

Real estate programme (m2) Density (m2 floor surface/ha) Functional mix (%)

Offices Housing Other

First-generation key projects 572,311 9,053 34 51 14First-gen. reference projects 707,400 11,281 33 52 15Second-gen. key projects 731,998 10,674 53 31 16Second-gen. reference projects 334,480 8,127 37 29 35

36 M. Spaans et al. / Cities 31 (2013) 29–36

government. Likewise, an evaluation based on a larger number ofother indicators, which have not been used here, also producedmixed results (Van der Wouden et al., 2009). Broadly speaking,the conclusion must be that while national involvement in thekey projects may have been justified beforehand in conceptualterms, it cannot be justified convincingly on the basis of the empir-ical findings discussed in this paper.

This conclusion can only be tentative, however, due to the diffi-culties related to the evaluation of these projects. For one thing, theapplicability of the criteria concerning the contribution to nationalwealth – as a justification for active national involvement – de-pends upon the ability of the national government to uphold itsinitial criteria in the selection of projects in which it wants to be-come actively involved. In the Netherlands, the government hasnot always succeeded in this. Indeed, the Dutch case shows thatstrict criteria for national government involvement evolved duringthe selection of projects, for example, due to political lobbying bylocal actors to include an urban project in the national urban pro-gramme. This can undermine the clear-cut criteria for the involve-ment of the national government in local urban redevelopmentprojects, leading it to intervene in projects that actually do notmeet the criteria that were initially set, and where the expectedsurplus value perhaps cannot therefore be realised. Moreover, ifthe national programme encompasses too many projects, citiesmay end up competing with each other with the assistance of na-tional public funds.

The evaluation of national government involvement is itselfcomplicated by the long-term development process accompanyingthese large-scale projects – which often include significant changesin the project plans – as well as by the complexity concerning thecriteria involved. On the one hand, this complexity is due to thenecessity to convert theoretical criteria concerning the contribu-tion of projects to national wealth into more practical criteria thatcan be monitored and evaluated, such as urban quality or employ-ment growth. On the other hand, this complexity results from theneed to use qualitative indicators. This again highlights howimportant it is for the national government to put more effort intospecifying the objectives of their involvement in local projects. Italso demonstrates how important it is to have a clear evaluationframework for these projects, in which criteria are related to thespecific aims of the national government in unambiguous terms.

References

Atelier Rijksbouwmeester [Office of the Chief Government Architect] (2002). Internenotitie over toetsing van de ruimtelijke kwaliteit in de NSP door deRijksbouwmeester. Den Haag: Ministerie van VROM.

Bell, D. (2005). The emergence of contemporary masterplans: Property markets andthe value of urban design. Journal of Urban Design, 10(1), 81–110.

Besley, T., & Coate, S. (2003). Centralized versus decentralized provision of localpublic goods: A political economy approach. Journal of Public Economics, 87(12),2611–2637.

Booth, Ph., Brueillard, M., Fraser, Ch., & Paris, D. (Eds.). (2007). Spatial planningsystems of Britain and France: A comparative analysis. London/New York:Routledge.

Brounen, D., & Jennen, M. (2008). Local office rent dynamics: A tale of ten cities.Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 39(4), 385–402.

Burinskienè, M., Rudzkienè, V., & Venckauskaitè, J. (2011). Effects of quality of lifeon the price of real estate in Vilnius city. International Journal of StrategicProperty Management, 15(3), 295–311.

Couch, C., Sykes, O., & Börstinghaus, W. (2011). Thirty years of urban regeneration inBritain, Germany and France: The importance of context and path dependency.Progress in Planning, 75, 1–52.

De Wit, I., & Van Dijk, R. (2003). The global determinants of direct office real estatereturns. Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 26(1), 27–45.

Debrezion, G., Pels, E., & Rietveld, P. (2007). The impact of railway stations onresidential and commercial property value: A meta-analysis. Journal of RealEstate Finance and Economics, 35(2), 161–180.

Florida, R. (2002). The rise of the creative class; and how it’s transforming work, leisure,community and everyday life. New York: Basic Books.

Gospodini, A. (2002). European cities in competition and the new ‘uses’ of urbandesign. Journal of Urban Design, 7(1), 59–73.

Kloosterman, R. C. (1996). Double Dutch: Polarization trends in Amsterdam andRotterdam after 1980. Regional Studies, 30(5), 467–476.

Kuethe, T. H. (2012). Spatial fragmentation and the value of residential housing.Land Economics, 88(1), 16–27.

Le Galès, P. (2002). European cities: Social conflicts and governance. Oxford): OxfordUniversity Press.

Majoor, S. J. H. (2008). Disconnected innovations: New urbanity in large-scaledevelopment projects. Delft: Eburon.

Ministerie van VROM (Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer)[Ministry of VROM (Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment)] (1993).Vierde nota over de ruimtelijke ordening Deel 4: Planologische KernbeslissingNationaal Ruimtelijk Beleid. Den Haag: SDU Uitgeverij.

Ministerie van VROM (Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer)[Ministry of VROM (Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment)] (2003a).Verbinding; zes nieuwe stations geven hart aan de stad. Over de vormgeving van deNederlandse haltes aan het Europese hogesnelheidsnet. Den Haag: SDU Uitgeverij.

Ministerie van VROM (Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer)[Ministry of VROM (Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment)] (2003b).Nieuwe Sleutelprojecten in aantocht; voortgangsrapportage december 2003. DenHaag: SDU Uitgeverij.

Ministerie van VROM (Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer)[Ministry of VROM (Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment)] (2006).Nieuwe sleutelprojecten op stoom; voortgangsrapportage maart 2006. Den Haag:SDU Uitgeverij.

Priemus, H. (1998). Contradictions between Dutch housing policy and spatialplanning. Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie, 89(1), 31–43.

Rowley, A. (1998). Private-property decision makers and the quality of urbandesign. Journal of Urban Design, 3(2), 151–173.

Salet, W. (2008). Rethinking urban projects: Experiences in Europe. Urban Studies,45(11), 2343–2363.

Savitch, H. V., & Kantor, P. (2002). Cities in the international marketplace: The politicaleconomy of urban development in North America and Western Europe. Princeton:Princeton University Press.

Scott, A. J. (1996). Regional motors of the global economy. Futures (28), 391–411.SCP [Netherlands Institute for Social Research] (2000). The Netherlands in a European

perspective – Social and cultural report 2000. The Hague: SCP.Spaans, M. (2002). The implementation of urban revitalization projects: An

international comparison. Delft: DUP Science.Terhorst, P., & Van de Ven, J. (1995). The national urban growth coalition in The

Netherlands. Political Geography (14), 343–361.Thornley, A., & Newman, P. (1996). International competition, urban governance

and planning projects: Malmö, Birmingham and Lille. European Planning Studies,4(5), 579–593.

Trip, J. J. (2007). What makes a city? Planning for ‘quality of place’. The case of high-speed train station area redevelopment. Delft: Delft University Press.

UCL [University College London] (2001). The value of urban design. London: CABE/DTLR/Thomas Telford.

Van den Berg, L., Braun, E., & Van der Meer, L. (2004). National urban policies in theEuropean union. Rotterdam: Erasmus University.

Van der Heiden, N., & Terhorst, P. (2007). Varieties of glocalisation: Theinternational economic strategies of Amsterdam, Manchester and Zurichcompared. Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 25(3), 341–356.

Van der Wouden, R., Spaans, M., Foeken, G., Hollander, K., Trip, J. J., Milder, J., & DeWit, P. (2009). Evaluatie sleutelprojecten. Gouda/Delft: Bureau StedelijkePlanning/Technische Universiteit Delft.

Willigers, J., & Van Wee, B. (2011). High-speed rail and office location choices. Astated choice experiment for the Netherlands. Journal of Transport Geography,19(4), 745–754.

Zuidema, M. V, Van Elp, M., & Van der Schaaf, M. J. (2012). Landelijke samenvattingkantorenmonitor; Verkenning van regionale vraag- en aanbodontwikkelingen[National summary offices monitor; Exploration of regional demand and supplydevelopment]. Amsterdam: Economisch Instituut voor de Bouw (EIB).