evolution and pragmatism

7/31/2019 Evolution and Pragmatism

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Abstract

William James’s letter of 12 January 1883 to William Erasmus Darwin is here publishedfor the first time. The letter brings out theimportance for the development of James’s

philosophy of the Darwinian emphasis onconcreteness and the activities of organisms.

Keywords: Charles Darwin; WilliamErasmus Darwin; F. E. Abbot; Evolution;Pragmatism; Ethics and Evolution; Essence;Religion; Free Religion; Unitarianism;Christianity; Morality; Suicide.

The letter of William James here publishedfor the first time was noted too late forinclusion in The Correspondence of William James. Of James’s early letters, it is amongthe more important from the point of view of philosophy, because it documents theimportance of Darwinian evolution in thedevelopment of some of James’s most dis-tinctive views, both theoretical and moral.

At work here are not specific hypothesesof evolutionary theory, but the general out-look, placing at the center concrete organ-isms, with each engrossed in its ownbusiness. For Darwinian theory, humanbeings are organisms and only that, a radi-cal claim in its time and crucial in the for-mation of James’s point of view. Humans

differ from other organisms not by virtue of a soul, but by their peculiarity of makingknowing and valuing important compo-nents of their business. From this, Jamesconcludes that both knowing and valuingcan be understood only as activities of cer-tain organisms striving for their own ends.

The letter is written to William ErasmusDarwin (1839–1914), eldest son of Charles

Darwin. James’s link with the Darwins was William Erasmus Darwin’s American wife,

Evolution and Pragmatism: AnUnpublished Letter of William James ignas k. skrupskelis



Sara Sedgwick Darwin, who with several of her relatives belonged to James’s social circle in Cambridge. Sara Darwin was the sister of James’slifelong friend Theodora Sedgwick, Susan Sedgwick Norton—wife of Charles Eliot Norton, an art historian teaching at Harvard—, and Arthur George Sedgwick, lawyer and journalist. Sara Darwin was the

niece of the sisters Anne and Grace Ashburner, at whose home in Cam-bridge James was a frequent guest in his earlier years.In 1882–83, James was in Europe, supposedly writing The Principles

of Psychology. From early December 1882 into February 1883 he waslodging in the apartment of his brother, Henry James, at 3 Bolton St.,London. Henry in the meantime was rushing off to the United Statesto be with their dying father—he arrived too late—while Williamremained in London to await definitive word about their father’s con-dition. William’s social activities in London included meeting the Dar-

wins. Thus, on 6 January 1883 he wrote to his wife: “I am going in twohours down to Basset to see the Darwins. . . . I am almost glad to getout of the heart-beating of the postman’s knock.”1

Charles Darwin died on 19 April 1882, and shortly thereafter, hischildren set to work upon his manuscript remains. In 1887, FrancisDarwin (1848–1925)—another of Charles Darwin’s sons, no directcontacts between him and James are known—published The Life and Letters of Charles Darwin in three volumes. At some point James wasconsulted about the Darwin-Abbot correspondence, as is clear from aletter to Francis Darwin from William Erasmus Darwin, dated “3 June”: “I enclose Abbot’s letters. Professor James of Harvard (Prof of Psychology) thinks 2 or 3 of the letters should certainly be pub-lished. . . . I also enclose an interesting letter of James, which I shouldlike again.”2 Likely, the letter mentioned by William Erasmus Darwinis the letter here published.

In The Life and Letters , extensive excerpts from two of Darwin’s let-ters to Abbot were published, namely from the letters of 6 September

1871 and 16 November 1871.3

In both, Darwin explains that he can-not comment about religion in part because of weak health, but prima-rily, because he has not thought systematically about the subject. Toanother correspondent, Darwin explained that his thoughts on religionoften fluctuate. But even in the extreme, he has never been an atheist.The term agnosticism fits his views better.4

Francis Ellingwood Abbot (1855–1903) was one of the more tragicfigures in American philosophy. Depressed by the death of his wife andhaving failed to obtain a university position or gain recognition among

philosophers, after placing a bouquet on his wife’s grave, he drank poi-son and died. Highly valued by Peirce, among others, he is now rarely

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decided not to accept Abbot’s dissertation and postpone the examination.Explaining his position to Abbot, James wrote that the dissertation was a“programme rather than a performance.” The “establishment of objec-tivism by a simple appeal to the ‘verifications’ of Science seemed to leaveundefended and unreasoned out, what to my mind constituted the most

vulnerable and difficult points in your position.” Abbot’s claim that thereare objective truths and objective moral standards differs from James’sposition, which—here James agrees with Abbot—”leads to skepticism.” James’s view is “based on a deliberate skepticism of any objective standardof certitude which all men alike can use.”5

While justifying the committee’s action, James assured Abbot thatthe rejection was not on theological grounds, an allusion to sharp pub-lic criticisms of Abbot’s unorthodox view of Christianity and his advo-cacy of what he called free religion. The committee, in James’s view, was

“not in the least animated by odium theologicum.” Abbot’s radical religious views are sometimes seen as another reason

for his failure to gain recognition and an academic post. He was anordained Unitarian minister, but resigned to become an advocate of “free religion,” that is, of religion free of churches, ecclesiastical author-ities, historical traditions, supposed revelations. A rough sense of Abbot’s position, a position he claims is the necessary “outcome of allphilosophy which deserves to be called scientific,” can be obtainedfrom the following:

The universe is known as at once infinite machine, infinite organism,and infinite person—as mechanical in its apparent form and action,organic in its essential constitution, and personal in its innermostbeing; it is eternally self-evolving and self-involving unity of the Absolute Real and the Absolute Ideal in GOD.6

But at the core of Abbot’s religious unorthodoxy was his refusal torecognize a special status for Christianity. At a Unitarian conference in

1866, in opposition to Abbot’s proposal, it was decided to retain theclaim that Unitarians are “disciples of the Lord Jesus Christ.” As aresult, Abbot and a group of dissidents left the Unitarian Conferenceand in 1867 founded the Free Religious Association. In 1870, thegroup began to publish The Index , a weekly journal with Abbot as edi-tor.7

Abbot admired Darwin and was a supporter of evolutionary theory.In 1871, he contacted Darwin asking for Darwin’s views on religion to

which, as has been noted, Darwin replied that he not thought deeply enough about the subject. The 1871 exchange initiated an occasionalcorrespondence 8

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his essay “Darwin’s Theory of Conscience and Its Relation to ScientificEthics,”9 asking for comments. Darwin replied on 30 March expressingapproval of Abbot’s presentation of Darwin’s views, but adding that hecannot comment on the essay because he is not practiced in “followingabstract and abstruse reasoning.” However, Darwin does not see how

morality can be “objective and universal.”

10

That it is Abbot’s paper on Darwin and conscience that is under dis-cussion is shown by an undated fragment of a letter in the hand of William Erasmus Darwin, possibly to James:

It would probably be necessary to read Dr Abbot’s long & strikingessay clearly to appreciate the difficulty my Father felt in acceptingfully his conclusions. The following sentences may be sufficient toshow the general bearing of the portion of the essay in question to which my father refers in his letter.

I have shown that ethics treat of rights and duties among all moralbeings, as objective and universal facts. This is only to state in other words that moral obligation is itself an objective and universal fact.

The relation of mutual moral obligation among all moral beings is just as objective, just as universal, just as necessary as the relationbetween the double triangles of the square.11

James’s letter has obvious links to the position he voices in 1891, in“The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life.” James there holds thatthere is no good or bad, no rightness or wrongness, except when thereare sentient beings making demands. Moral relations and moral lawscan exist only in a “mind which feels them; and no world composed of merely physical facts can possibly be a world to which ethical proposi-tions apply.” In language similar to that of his letter to Darwin, James writes:

Since the outcome of the discussion so far has been to show us thatnothing can be good or right except so far as some consciousness feelsit to be good or thinks it to be right, we perceive. . . that the real supe-riority and authority which are postulated by the philosopher toreside in some of the opinions, and the really inferior character whichhe supposes must belong to others, cannot be explained by any abstract moral “nature of things” existing antecedently to the concretethinkers themselves with their ideals.12

The same Darwinian influence can be detected in his treatment of essences in Principles of Psychology . As in the nature of things there is no

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light of some interest. He writes: “There is no property ABSOLUTELY essential to any one thing. The same property which figures as the essenceof a thing on one occasion becomes a very inessential feature uponanother.” Thus, common sense—and much of philosophy—is wrongin thinking that every thing has an essence which makes it just the

thing it is. As a matter of fact, the “essence of a thing is that one of itsproperties which is so important for my interests that in comparison withit I may neglect the rest. . . . The properties which are important vary from man to man and from hour to hour.”13

The rejection of the traditional notion of essence leads to the very center of James’s philosophy, but is a subject much too broad for treat-ment in the present context. Nor is this necessary for an understandingand appreciation of the letter being published. The importance for James of the Darwinian outlook with its rejection of abstractions and

its emphasis on the activities of concrete organisms is evident withoutdetailed analysis.

While in Europe, James had with him a caligraph, a bulky machine which gave him much trouble: “After three days of tinkering & screw-ing & unscrewing & and taking apart & putting together, the Caligraphworks !”14 But even when in working order, the machine could only pro-duce capital letters. His letter to Darwin—like many other letters fromthis period—was typed on this machine. In transcribing, lower case let-ters were used except in cases where James would normally have usedcapitals. The machine did not always produce clear letters and some-times James found it necessary to overwrite his typing by hand. Suchoverwriting is treated silently. Several obvious misspellings were leftuncorrected, also without comment. But there were also substantivechanges, some of unknown origin, and these are commented upon innotes to the text.

William James to William Erasmus Darwin15

3 Bolton St. Piccadilly Jan, 12, 1882[3]16

My dear Darwin,

As to the double use of the word “moral”, & other points touched onin your letter, I could have no opinion without consulting again thetexts,—perhaps not even then. But the main difference between yourfather & Mr. Abbot seems to be this, or something like it: Abbot thinksthere is a real, objective, universal rightness or wrongness, grounded in

the nature of things, absolute therefore, whether any discover & obey itor not, & fit therefore to be called “the moral environment”. Little by


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creature will perform either from instinct or will18 deliberately, & in thelatter case with a perfectly good conscience, acts which according to theobjective & immutable standard are absolutely wrong. In other words,moral imperfection is one among many consequences of his imper-fectly evolved state. Such acts done by him should not be called evenright for him, unless by the phrase you mean19 a rightness relative

merely to his own taken judgment. Objectively & absolutely the actsare wrong, no matter how well they may be approved by his judgment,because that judgment20 itself is still in the Stage of Wrongness21 how-ever it may seem repectively to each of them, there is not one rightnessfor this creature & another for that.

Now I take it that your father meant to protest against this ideal of aperfection equally binding on all types of creature, no matter whattheir physiological differences. It was something far too abstract for

his mind, accustomed as it was to consider concrete things in theplenitude of their peculiarities & with all the consequences thereof.For him the virtue of the rabbit could not with any kind of sense bemeasured by the same “objective” standard as that of the lion. Thephrase is meaningless; virtue can’t swing in vacuo,—it is relative tothe facts of life, & these facts are wholly different in the case of thetwo objects, why not then call each right “in his way” & why notdeny the existence of any rightness at all out of relation to the partic-ular “way” of its subject.

Into the question of the comparative22 rightness of the “ways” or thatof the comparative23 perfection of the several types as measured by anabsolute standard, a question which any professional moralist wouldthen immediately take up, your father does not enter. Of course he would have said here too that the notion of an absolutely perfect type,considered out of connexion with “conditions of existence” was ameaningless idea to him.

This is all I can suggest upon the matter. I may add that I think your

father’s way on the whole more sound than Abbot’s, that is more fruit-ful. But after all is said 24 & done about the virtue of each creature con-sidered in the midst of its conditions, the question still remains, doesthe enveloping end by which each of the creatures25 virtues is meas-ured, namely the26 persistence of life admit of a relative treatment? If it were merely relative to the matter of fact-existence of a certain passionfor life in living things, then, in case all living things were to grow indif-ferent or suicidal & allow themselves to become extinct, it would beimpossible to say truly that in any real sense this was a pity, or that the

universe had failed. On the other hand, if it be really, objectively, &absolutely better (as Abbot would have it) for life to exist so that itwould be really a pity for the world to stop 27 then our passion for life

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Your kinsman has demonstrated anew his fondness for taking troubleby doing all sorts of things for my benefit. I am truly grateful.

Always yours

[Postscript in WJ’s hand ]: In short the concrete test-question to bring

the difference between Abbot’s type of mind and your father’s to anissue would be this: supposing a universal suicide be possible, wouldit be right. Abbot wd say no. Your father, if consistent, would have tosay, it would be neither right nor wrong; for it would, at the sametime, carry away out of existence the only standard of rightness thereis, namely our passion for survival.

University of South [email protected]

NOTES

1. The Correspondence of William James , 12 vols. (Charlotteville: University Press of Virginia, 1992–2004), 5: 378. The Darwin home was in Southampton.For a description see Henry James’s letter to William of 28 January 1878. Accord-ing to Henry, William Erasmus Darwin was “a very gentle, kindly, reasonable, lib-eral, bald-headed, dull-eyed, British-featured, sandy-haired little insulaire , . . . fondof conversation & laughter, of books & etchings” (Correspondence , 1:295).

2. DAR 198:109, Charles Darwin Papers, Cambridge University Library.3. The Life and Letters of Charles Darwin, ed. Francis Darwin, 3 vols. (London:

John Murray), 1:305–306. James’s set of the Life and Letters remained in the Jameshome at 95 Irving St., Cambridge, until 1978, when it was sold to a book dealer.Its present whereabouts are unknown.

4. Life and Letters , 1:304.5. Correspondence , 5:96–97.6. Francis Ellingwood Abbot, The Way Out of Agnosticism or the Philosophy of

Free Religion (Boston: Little, Brown, 1890), pp. 5–6.

7. W. Creighton Peden, The Philosopher of Free Religion (New York: PeterLang, 1992), pp. 39–44.

8. Darwin at times expressed support for Abbot’s program of free religion. Abbot published Darwin’s remarks under the title, “The Coming Empire of Sci-ence”; for the text see The Collected Essays of Francis Ellingwood Abbot (4 vols.), ed. W. Creighton Peden and Everett J. Tarbox, Jr. (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press,1996), 1:229–32. For Darwin’s relations with The Index see Janet Browne, Charles Darwin: The Power of Place (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), pp.391–92.

9. Francis Ellingwood Abbot, “Darwin’s Theory of Conscience: Its Relation toScientific Ethics,” The Index , 12 March 1874, pp. 122–25. Reprinted in Collected Essays 1: 333 56


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