Chapter Six

Evolution of Russia's New Federal Structure and Centre-Periphery Relations

247

When Russia became independent in 1991, many Russian and

Western observers predicted that the fragmentation that had doomed the

USSR would not stop at the borders of the Russian Federation. By the end

of 1991, most of Russia's autonomous republics had declared themselves

sovereign and since each of these entities was designated homeland of a

different non-Russian ethnic group, the threat of ethnic conflict was real. In

Tatarstan, for instance, radical nationalists called for independence. In

Chechnya, a secessionist movement succeeded in disarming and expelling

Russian troops sent to quash the revolt. seven years later, many observers

see the Russian Federation advancing towards a restoration of Soviet style

unitary centrism. Despite the military debacles that have trapped federal

troops in Chechnya, separatism has not spread to the other ethnic republics.

On the contrary, Presidents of many of these republics have consolidated

power at home with understanding with the party of power in Moscow.

Indeed, one of the most difficult aspects of post-Soviet institution

building has been the establishment of Russia as a truly federal state. Is the

Russian federal experiment doomed to revert to centralized rule or to

dissolve into anarchy? Are the national and sub-national governments

beginning to reach a consensus on a stable and lasting division of power

and responsibilities? Is the Russian Federation a true federation or a

federation by name only? Since 1990 and the popular election of the

regional Soviets (legislatures), the question of what kind of federation

248

Russia is to be or whether it is to be a federal system at all has been a

pressing concern. The launching of the economic reforms in 1992 made the

division of authority between central government in Moscow and Russia's

provinces, complicated as both the levels of governments constantly strived

towards gaining more economic power.

This chapter explores the development of centre-periphery relations

from 1990 through 1998 and the possibility of emergence of stable federal

institutions in the post-Soviet Russia. It tries to analyze the changed

configuration in federal structure as the new constitution was adopted in

1993, the gamut of regional issues which cropped up and the new set of

institutions which came up thereby. It would begin with a brief description

of the problematic legacy left to the Russian Federation by the Soviet

system. Then it would explore the effects of marketization and

democratization on the devolution of authority from centre to periphery.

The second section of the chapter would analyze the federal-institutional

development in three phases: 1990-93, a phase of relative regional

activism; October 1993-95 when regional activism relatively subsided and

the end of 1995 till the present day when regional activism and regional

challenge is again on the rise. The chapter would then end with a note on

the emerging issues and main challenges facing the future development of

federal institutions.

249

I SOVIET LEGACY

Federalism had a long tradition in Russia. It could be argued that the

treaties signed between the Tsar and the governments of people entering

the Empire like Caucasian Khans and Central Asian Emirs, contained

provisions for a division of powers between centre and the locality.

Various national areas of the old empire had certain rights and privileges

with local self-government and limits to the rights of the Tsar to meddle in

local affairs. These early elements of federalism were undermined during

the centralizing and unitarist period of the second half of the 19th Century

as the Tsarist imperial statehood began to give way to a nation-building

statism, yet did not disappear entirely. The Bolsheviks had at first

condemned the concept of 'federalism' but were soon forced to incorporate

it in their state building programme, but the working of their system

showed that federal forms were always undermined by unitary practice.

If a federal system is considered to be two levels of government,

each ruling at least one area of action with granted autonomy, the Soviet

Union could not be considered a federation in the strict sense of the term.

Although Article 70 of the 1977 constitution declared the USSR to be a

unified, federal, multinational state formed on the principle of socialist

federalism, a strict communist system with vertical organization of

Communist Party lower down and extreme centralization of the command

250

economy rendered the USSR a 'unitary' structure and not a 'federation' in

real sense.

Following Lenin's original nationalities policy, the entire state

structure was organized on territorial principles. Each of the fifteen Union

Republics was named after a particular ethnic group (e.g., Kazakh Soviet

Socialist Republic, Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic etc.) In addition,

smaller units within the fifteen Union Republics were also named after

particular people. Thus the fifteen Union Republics of the Soviet Union

were further subdivided into twenty Autonomous Soviet Socialist

Republics, eight Autonomous Oblasts, ten Autonomous Okrugs, 120

Oblasts and six Krais. 1 From 1929 until the mid-1930s, Stalin redrew and

renamed the old provincial (Gubemiya) borders of the Russian state and

formed the majority of the boundaries that exist today in the post-Soviet

era.

Within the USSR, the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic

itself was home to eighty-eight units in total including sixteen Autonomous

Soviet Socialist Republics (ASSR); forty-nine Oblasts and six Krais plus

two special status cities of Moscow and Leningrad, five Autonomous

The words Oblast and Krai meaning region and land respectively entered the Russian political lexicon shortly after the Revolution of 1917. See Figure 1.4 in page 251.

All­Union

Union­Republic

Province

City/ Country

251

Figure 1.4 The Political Administrative Structure of the Soviet Union

USSR

Union Republics (SSR): 15

I I Autonomous Autonomous region (AR):8

Cities of republics Autonomous area (AA): 10

Republican (ASSR):20 Regions (Ob1asts): 123

Territories (Krays):6) Subordination: 90

Towns 902 Countries 3,225

1 I Towns:

Urban Urban settlements Villages Urban

wards I, 184 392 42,411 wards

Source: The Cambridge Encyclopaedia of Russia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)

252

Dblasts and ten Autonomous Okrugs (which were located within the

borders of the Autonomous Republics, Oblasts and Krais). It is this

complicated legacy of the territorial principle and the uneven treatment

these three levels of the federation received on paper that has proven to be

particularly problematic for the development of post-Soviet Russian federal

system.2 While autonomous Oblasts and Okrugs were supposed to be

organized around one or several of the hundred or so ethnic groups living

in the RSFSR, Oblasts and Krais were essentially administrative units

supposedly populated mostly by ethnic Russians. Autonomous Republics

were organized around a particular non-Russian ethnic group and the

Oblast, the Krai level had mostly the same powers. The Oblast and Krai

level remained at the basic sub-national unit of the RSFSR.

By 1992, due to promotion of four Autonomous Oblasts to ASSR

status and the splitting of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR into two republics, the

Russian Federation was comprised of eighty nine units. This included

twenty one republics (Formerly ASSRs), forty nine Oblasts, six Krais and

two special status cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg (formerly

See Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, "f-ederation and Regionalism" in Stephen White, Zvi Gitelman and Alex Pravda, eds., Developments in Russian politics 4 (London: Macmillan Press Limited, 1997), p.23!.

253

Leningrad) and eleven 'Autonomies', one Autonomous Oblast and ten

Autonomous Okrugs.3

Soviet strategy for managing a multi-national state involved built-in

tensions whose explosive potential became manifest as a result of the

Gorbachev reforms. In particular, the design of the Soviet state as a

federation of ethno-territorial "Union Republics" that were symbolically, if

not in fact, national states, nationality as a central aspect of individual

identity created a setting in which liberalization would catalyze ethno-

national mobilization.

Two features of Gorbachev's reforms played a critical role in the

emergence of nationalism as a powerful political force in the Perestroika

period: the de-legitimization of . the Communist Party elite as a

consequence of glasnost and democratization and the deliberate as well as

unintended process of resource redistribution brought about by

Gorbachev's economic reforms.4 Glasnost unleashed a far-reaching

competition for power and a simultaneous effort at relegitimation in which

nationalist ideology played a major role. Democratization, in tum, impelled

republic elite to seek increased economic autonomy, thereby placing

property rights collective as well as individual at

Table 1.3 & 1.4 shows Russia's Republics and Regions according to the 1993 constitution.

See Gail W. Lapidus and Edward W. Walker, "Nationalism, Regionalism and Federalism: Center-Periphery Relations in Post-Communist Russia" in Gail W. Lapidus, The New Russia: Troubled Transformation (London: Westview Press, 1995), p.80.

Table 1.3 Russia's Republics and Regions (According to the 1993 Constitution)

Republics (2 I) Republic of Adygeya Altai Republic Republic of Bashkortostan Republic of Buryatia Chechen Republic Republic of Degestan Chuvash Republic Ingush Republic Kabardino-Balkar Republic Republic of Kalmykia-Khalmg-Tangch Karachai-Cherkess Republic Republic of Karelia Khakass Republic Republic of Komi Republic ofMarii EI Republic of Mordovia Republic of North Ossetia Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) Republic of Tatarstan Republic ofTuva Udmurt Republic

Krais (6)

Altai Krai Khabarovsk Krai Krasnodar Krai Krasnoyarsk Krai Primorkii Krai

Oblasts (49)

Amur Oblast Arkhangcl Oblast Astrakhan Oblast Bclgorod Oblast Bryansk Oblast Chclyabinsk Oblast Chita Oblast Irkutsk Oblast I vanovo Oblast Kaliningrad Oblast Kaluga Oblast Kamchatka Oblast Kemerovo Oblast Kirov Oblast

Leningrad Oblast Lipetsk Oblast Magadan Oblast Moscow Oblast Murmansk Oblast Nizhnii Novgorod Oblast Omsk Oblast Ore! Oblast Orenburg Oblast Penza Oblast Perm Oblast Pskov Oblast Rostov Oblast Ryazan Oblast Sakhalin Oblast Samara Oblast Saratov Oblast Smolensk Oblast Sverdlovsk Oblast Tambov Oblast Tomsk Oblast Tula Oblast Tver Oblast Tyumen Oblast Ulyanovsk Oblast Vladimir Oblast Yolgograd Oblast Yologda Oblast Yaroslavl Oblast

Federal Cities enjoying status equivalent to an oblast (2)

Moscow St. Petersburg

Autonomous Oblast (/) Jewish Autonomous Oblast

Autonomous Okrugs (10) Agin Buryat Chukchi Evenk Khanty-Mansi Komi-Permyak Koryak

Kostroma Oblast Nenets Kurgan Oblast Taimyr Kursk Oblast Ust-Orda Buryat

Yamai-Nenets

254

Source: Kathryn Stoner - Weiss "Federalism and Regionalism" m Stephen White ed., Russian Politics (London: Macmillan Press, 1997).

255

Table 1.4

Constituent Parts of the Russian Federation

The Russian Federation today consists of 21 republics, 6 krais, 49 oblasts, 1 autonomous oblast, I 0 autonomous okrugs , and two federal cities (Moscow and St. Petersburg). According to the constitution adopted in December 1993, all components are equal, in relation to the center. They are roughly equivalent to states in the United States.

Republics

When the Soviet Union was formed in the 1920s, republics were delineated to recognize strong ethnic groups. Republics typically have their own legislature, and most have their own president. The constitution grants republics the right to formulate economic laws that differ from federal regulations.

Oblasts (Regions)

Oblasts do not have titular ethnic minorities. Oblasts are locally governed by legislative and executive bodies.

Krais (Territories)

Originall Krais were a hybrid between republics and oblasts, delineated by containing one or more ethnically defined subgroups. This subunit could be an autonomous oblast, autonomous okrug, or both.

Autonomous Oblasts and Okrugs

These administrative units were designed in the Soviet period to give small ethnic groups a political identity. Autonomous oblasts and okrugs are found in sparsely populated regions such as Siberia and the Russian Fast East.

Raions (Districts)

Republics, oblasts, krais, and okrugs are subdivided into raions, similar to the way U.S. states are split into countries. Most cities are administered as raions, although cities with populations exceeding 50,000 or significant economic influence may be reassigned to a higher level.

Source: Problems of Post-Communism, July-August 1995.

256

the centre of contention. Glasnost also led to a cognitive liberation where

Soviet policy was subjected to growing critical scrutiny as well as

development of alternative cultural, economic and political agendas. As the

boundaries of permitted socio-political activism gradually broadened, new

political movements emerged with the peoples front of Baltic Republics in

the lead - that gave expression to the demand for national revival as a

central component of reform. At the same time, democratization and

partially competitive elections at both national and local levels created new

legislatures that no longer served as mere rubber stamps for the Communist

Party. Insisting that Soviet federalism be reformulated, political elites in

the fifteen Union Republics grew increasingly assertive in their demands

for greater autonomy from Moscow and centralized Soviet power.

Gorbachev's failure to respond promptly and effectively to the

rapidly evolving situation further weakened the central government's

authority. The task of building a new system of state power both vertically

and horizontally was made even more difficult by two additional features

of the Soviet system: the extreme degree of centralized political power at

the federal centre and the control of all aspects of economic as well as

political life (including control over the military and the security

establishments) by the Communist Party. The void created by the

disintegration of the party as a nation wide institution led to a rapid and

257

uncontrolled fragmentation of power and the de-facto autonomy of local

economic, political and military actors.

(i) Soviet Collapse: Impact on Emergence of Russia as an Independent State

The role of the RSFSR in accelerating the dissolution of the Soviet

Union had far-reaching consequences for state-building in post-communist

Russia. In early 1990, Boris Y eltsin tried to build an independent political

base in the RSFSR to challenge Gorbachev and the old centre. In most of

his speeches during this period, he declared his support not only for

Russian sovereignty but for the renegotiation of relations between the

RSFSR's central government and the governments of the ethnically defined

autonomous areas within Russia as well. Drawing on the views of leading

figures in democratic circles at the time - including Andrei Sakharov,

Galina Starvoitova and Victor Palme - he responded to demands for

greater rights from local governments by championing a doctrine of

sovereignty "from ground up", in which the lowest governmental unit,

closest to the people in villages or towns, delegates power to the next

highest level, then to the republic parliament, then the national parliament. 5

Yeltsin's radical challenge to the Gorbachev regime won him a seat

m the new USSR Congress of People's Deputies in March 1988, the

New York Times, 31 May 1990. Certain democratic critics of Soviet Federation were calling at the time for sovereignty for the Union Republics as well as for the equalization of all ethnic unity in the Soviet federal administrative hierarchy. This would have meant linking the restructuring of the Soviet federal system with a restructuring of federal relations within Russia as well.

258

RSFSR parliament a year later and the chairmanship of the RSFSR

Supreme Soviet in June 1990. On 12 June 1990, the new RSFSR

parliament, following the lead of the Baltic Republics issued its own

declaration of state sovereignty asserting that the RSFSR had "complete

authority" in resolving all questions relating to state and public life with the

exception of those that it voluntarily handed over to USSR jurisdiction.6 It

also asserted the primacy of RSFSR constitution and RSFSR laws

throughout the territory of the RSFSR and stipulated that the Congress of

People's Deputies confirms the need to broaden substantially the rights of

Autonomous Republics, Autonomous Oblasts and Autonomous Okrugs

alongwith RSFSR Krais and Oblasts.7

The declaration had a far-reaching significance for the fate of the

Soviet Union as well as for the future development of Russian state from

the Soviet Union. By identifying Russia with the other 14 members of the

Union as equals, it not only attempted to define a new non-imperial

Russian identity but also helped legitimate the sovereignty aspirations of

the other republics.

In leading the struggle for Russian sovereignty, Y eltsin adopted a

complex political strategy. To compensate for the weakness of the

6 Lapidus & Walker, n.4, p. 82.

See Charles W. Lapidus and Andrea Chandler, eds., Perestroika in the Soviet Republics: Documents on National Question (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), pp.325-326.

259

democratic refonners in the central institutions of Soviet power, he resorted

to a "horizontal" strategy that promoted ties among the republics that

would curtail the centre's powers. Y eltsin's personal struggle for power

against Gorbachev was entwined with a broader institutional conflict

between republics and central institutions. As RSFSR deputy Galina

Starvoitova put it:

The conflict between Yeltsin and Gorbachev is not simply a dispute between two men who do not like each other. There is an objective historical basis for the conflict: a clash of two opposing tendencies namely, the strive of Russia to find its sovereignty and the striving of an empire to preserve its former might. The President of the USSR, who does not have his own territorial domain inside the huge country is with the loss of power in Russia, in effect losing his power. For this reason, he naturally seeks to obstruct the growing sovereignization of the republics.8

Fumio Uda also argued that the origin of localism does not lie only

m the geographical and multi-ethnic features of the country but that a

centrifugal momentum was built into Y eltsin's basic strategy. Yeltsin and

his allies legitimized their challenge to Soviet leadership on the basis of a

constitutional fiction- the sovereignty of the Russian Federation Republic.9

From summer of 1990 through the end of 1991, Y eltsin sought the backing

of the autonomies for his intensifYing struggle with Gorbachev and the

Soviet centre repeatedly promising support for their sovereignty and

autonomy. Most notably, during a three week trip in August and September

Komsomol'skoe Znamia, 7 June 1991, cited in ibid.

See Pete Glatter, "Regional and Local Power in Russia", .Slovo, vol.8, no. v (April 1995), p.58.

260

1990 that took him to Tatarstan, Bashkiria and the Komi Autonomous

Republic he told local elites that they could take as much sovereignty as

they were able to swallow. 10 Yeltsin supported the demands for greater

rights from local governments by championing a doctrine of sovereignty

'from the ground up'. 11 This doctrine of 'sovereignty from ground up'

threatened to undermine Russia's territorial integrity as much as USSR's.

The greater the conflict at the centre, the more the centrifugal forces

appeared to be gaining ground as in the summer of 1993, when

assertiveness among the reg1ons seemed to be matching that of the

republics.

Thus it is clear that well before the Soviet Union disintegrated, there

'were signs that the centrifugal forces pulling it apart were also at work in

the giant Russian Republic. The parallel was note.d by Gavril Popov, then

Mayor of Moscow, as early as 1990. It soon became clear that centrifugal

tendencies were widespread in the Russian administrative structure:

10

II

12

During 1992 and early 1993, it was possible to observe some of the same problems between Russian regions and Moscow that were dominating the relations between Moscow and the Union Republics in 1991. Several regions were holding back tax revenues, there were disputes over property rights .... Resource rich regions have been claiming they are exploited by Moscow. Several regions have printed their own local surrogate money. Some have asserted that they have a distinct national identity. 12

See I. Busygina, Memo (May 1994 ), p.6 cited in ibid.

See S.K. Jha, "National Identities, State and Democracy in Russia", Critique (A Journal of Critical Theory), vol.2, no. I (September 1998), p.ll.

Roman Sochanyk, "TI1e Draft Union Treaty and the Big Five", Report on the USSR, vo1.3, no. 18 (3 May 1991), quoted in Glatter, n.9, p.S7.

261

Similarly Alexander Tsipko warned in early 1991:

If Russia is only one of the Union Republics, then, it in no way differs from Tatarstan, Bashkiria and Dagestan. As a result, the strong the striving of the RSFSR to free itself from the centre, the stronger will be the desire ofthe autonomous formations to free themselves from Yeltsin. And in their own way they are right. The relationship of "Russia to the autonomies" is co~structed on the same principle as that of "the Union to the RSFSR". The election of a President of the RSFSR will produce a domino effect. 13

It was clear that within months of the Russian Republic's declaration

of sovereignty, each of the Autonomous Republics within the Russian

Federation would follow the suit.

However, Y eltsin's position began to change after he entered into

serious negotiations with Gorbachev over a new USSR Union Treaty late

in the spring of 1991. By then, a growing number of RSFSR autonomies

were demanding the enhancement of their status (i.e, from Autonomous

Republics to full Union Republics and from Autonomous Okrugs to

Autonomous Republics). Tatarstan's leaders were particularly outspoken

demanding that Tatarstan be a signatory to the Union Treaty with equal

status to the RSFSR. Tatarstan, Checheno-Ingushetia, North Ossetia and

Tuva refused to attach a question on the creation of a Russian presidency to

the March 1991 referendum on the preservation of the Union.

13 John Dunlop, The Rise of Russia and the Fall of the Soviet Empire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), p.64.

262

Eventually a compromise was worked out at a 12 May 1991 meeting

between Y eltsin, Gorbachev and the heads of fourteen of the fifteen

RSFSR Autonomous Republics. The sovereignty of the Autonomous

Republics were reaffirmed and it was agreed that they would sign the

Union Treaty as members of the USSR and the RSFSR. 14

Relations between the RSFSR government and the autonomies

deteriorated further after the failed August coup. As the failure of

Gorbachev's effort to preserve the Union became clear, officials in the

autonomies became increasingly convinced that the principal challenge to

local autonomy came from Yeltsin and democrats in the Russian

government, not from Gorbachev and the dying Soviet centre. These

concerns intensified in the fall after Dudayev came to power as leader of

Checheno-Ingushetia. Yeltsin reacted by declaring a state of emergency

and ordering the dispatch of troops to the rebellious Autonomous Republic

to enforce the constitution.

As Russia approached independence at the end of 1991, it was

already confronting serious challenges to central authority from numerous

regions around the country. As Andranik Migranian argued, Y eltsin's

14 Nevertheless, Tatarstan's leadership refused to support voting in the RSFSR presidential elections in June and as a result, turnout in Tatarstan was only 36.6%, less than half the 75% figure for the RSFSR as a whole.

263

doctrine of sovereignty from the 'ground up' threatened to undermine

Russia's territorial integrity as much as the USSR's:

Our attempts to create all state institutions from scratch on a contractual basis are attempts to put into effect yet another grandiose Utopia... The bomb planted under the USSR by the declaration of Russian sovereignty is, it seems to me, facilitating not only the destruction of the USSR but also to an even greater extent. .. the destruction of Russia itself... Where are the geographical boundaries of the Republic that is supposed to

hn. R . ?Is represent et 1c uss1ans.

The widespread anxiety about Russia's future at this time was

expressed by the title of an article by a leading Russian specialist on

nationality issues- "Will Russia Repeat the Path of the Union?"

(ii) Russia's Federal Structure at Independence

Russia's growmg centre-periphery problems at the time of

independence were in significant degree a legacy of the federal structure

inherited from the Soviet era. The 1918 constitution of the Russian Soviet

Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) had characterized the new state as a

free union of free nations, a federation of Soviet national republics.

However, Russia's federalism was essentially administrative and formal

with its constituent parts lacking constitutionally protected autonomous

powers.

I 5 "An Indissoluble Union", Izvestia (20 September 1990) translated in CDSP, vol. XLII, no.39, p.2, Also see Alexander Tsipko, "Crisis of Russia's Statehood," Russia (6-12 July 1991).

264

The formal structure of hierarchical relations within the RSFSR

distinguished between five types of administrative-territorial units, each

with somewhat different rights. These units included forty-nine non­

ethnically defined Oblasts, six Krais, thirty nine ethnically defined

Autonomous Areas, sixteen of the latter were Autonomous Republics, five

were Autonomous Oblasts and ten were Autonomous Okrugs. These thirty

one Autonomies were located in four broad regions - the North Caucasus,

the Central Volga Ural region, alongwith the border with Mongolia and

one major interruption, along the Northern rim of the country running from

Karelia in the West to the Chukchi Autonomous Okrug in the East.

In addition to Russia's complex federal structure, the Russian

Federation spans eleven time zones and contains about 140 million people

with more than 100 distinct nationalities. As a result, the sheer size of the

country and the complicated delineation of sub-national units inherited

from the Soviet system helped make centre-periphery relations one of the

most important and contentious issues in present day Russian politics. The

combined processes of democratization and marketization initiated in the

early 1990s made a further contribution to the challenge of development of

sound political institutions at the federal and sub-national level.

265

II DEMOCRATIZATION, MARKETIZATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS IN THE POST-SOVIET RUSSIA: 1990-98

In March 1990 elections to the popularly elected regional Soviets

were held across the Russian Federation. For the first time competitive

elections created regional legislatures that were more accountable to their

constituents than Moscow. Thus, the elections of 1990 alongwith market

reforms introduced not only certain degree of responsibility and democracy

into the local political process, but they also initiated a period of relative

regional activism which lasted till October 1993.

(i) Regional Activism

The increase in regional pressure for greater influence over local

affairs emerged from the fact that 1990 elections injected the notion of

political accountability into subnational politics. The regional activism in

this early period was also an immediate reaction to the extreme

centralization of the past.

By October 1990, eleven of the then 16 Autonomous Republics had

declared themselves sovereign authorities over their own territories, but not

actually independent from Russia. In making these sovereignty

declarations, they were following the RSFSR's example of declaring itself

sovereign from the USSR. In March 1992, the Republic of Tatarstan even

went so far as to hold a referendum on its status within the Russian

266

Federation. Remarkably 61 per cent of the participating voters voted in

favour of the Republic becoming an independent territory within the

Russian Federation, although the words of the Declaration were unclear.

This type of assertiveness at the level of ethnic Republics was

accompanied by war of laws between Russian Federation in Moscow and

several republics. There were widespread withholding of tax revenues from

Moscow by both Oblast and Krai as well as Republic level governments.

The tug of war between the national government and the regions

was further complicated by a conflicting view of what kind of federation

Russia was to become. An interesting debate over Russia's federal structure

was a major obstacle to the drafting of a new constitution for the country.

Not only the division of powers between the centre and territories but also

the administrative borders themselves were in dispute. An even more

fundamental problem of principle was whether to commit to a national or

to a treaty constitution. In issue was whether the new constitution should

be preceded by a treaty of Federation voluntarily entered into by the

constituent parts of the federation; whether those parts would be given the

right to ratify or reject such a treaty, whether 'sovereignty' would rest with

the centre or the localities and finally whether secession could be a matter

267

for the voters in the constituent units or would it require approval by the

federal parliament or a nation-wide referendum. 16

While Moscow sought to impose a national federal system, that is, a

system imposed from above, with the central government being the clear

leading power - the provinces advocated a more "contractual" federal

system, where each subnational unit would agree to enter the federation on

a negotiated basis and where the central government's power would be de-

emphasized relative to that of federation's constituent parts.

Even when Moscow was thinking hard about introducing the Zemli

proposal, 17 in the wake of the coup of August 1991, Russian President

Y eltsin introduced two institutional reforms which had senous

repercussions for the federal relations in post-Soviet Russia. He created

two new offices m a further attempt to gam a strong gnp over the

increasingly assertive provinces. The new positions - that of the office of

the Presidential Representative, as well as Head of Oblast and Krai

Administrations commonly referred to as Governor were to be filled at

least initially by Yeltsin appointees.

16

17

See Lapidus and Walker, n.4, p.93.

TI1e failed Zemli proposal modeled after the German system of Lander is the excellent example of the type of federal system Moscow preferred. Under this proposal, part of the early draft constitutions for the Russian Federation, the boundaries of the federations' constituent units would have been redrawn such that some oblasts and republics would have been combined into single units and overall number of constituent units of federation would have come down to fifty.

268

The position of Presidential Representative was an overt attempt by

Moscow to introduce central executive control over provinces. This was to

ensure that presidential decisions would be reliably implemented and to

provide reliable information about political situation in the region. The

Decree that he signed in August 1991 officially creating the position stated

simply -leaders and officials of ministries, departments and other

organizations of the RSFSR and organs of executive power are instructed

to assist the RSFSR Presidential Representative in the fulfillment of the

functions vested in them. These functions were described merely on

fulfilling the President's instructions. Though Y eltsin claimed that the job

of the Presidential Representative would not be to interfere in the business

of local governance, the office was soon criticized as the emperor's eyes

and ears in the provinces. The paradox of the situation was such that many

of these appointees were not knowing what functions they were supposed

to perform. 18 In reality, however, the Office of Presidential Representative

did not carry with it much influence in local govemance. 19

While Presidential Representatives proved to be largely weak and

ineffectual, another office, i.e., Head of Local Administration or the

Governor emerged as relatively more powerful institution. While Y eltsin

attempted to ensure that the first appointed heads of administration would

18

19

See Stoner- Weiss, Local Heroes: The Political Economy of Russian Regional Government Performance (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), Chapter 3.

In Yaroslavl Oblast, for example, the Presidential Representative apparently had no real influence in local governance. In the first 18 months after his appointment, he revealed that there had been just two instances where local authorities failed to implement President's decrees.

269

have their loyalties firmly based in Moscow rather than the regions over

which they governed, in practice, this often turned out to be something

different. The combined effect of the election of all Governors, the

enhanced role of the Federation Council, and the concessions to the

Republics and Regions in various treaties made Governors the central

players in shaping the future of the Russian state. While Governors carried

with them wide powers which included the right to appoint an entire local

cabinet, they were still accountable to local Soviets and, according to the

March 1992 'Law on Oblast and Krai Soviets and Oblast and Krai

Administration', they could even be removed from office by local Soviets.

Although Governor's position got politicized because of the power struggle

in Moscow and some debated the liberation of Governors from political

dependence on the President, Russia's Governors were praised to play a

much more influential role in shaping the future of the state.20

The post-October 1993 period marked a new stage in the

development of federal institutions. The October clash ushered in a less

confrontational period in federal relations. The Governors gained a new

respect for Yeltsin and he increased his appreciation of the importance of

having the Governors as the new allies.

20 For more details on the subject, see Mark Zlotnik, "Russia's Governors: All the President's Men?" Problems of Post-Communism, vol.43, no.6 (Nov-Dec 1996), pp.26-34.

270

Following the appointment of Presidential Representatives and

Governors in the spring of 1992, as market reforms got underway, the

central government began pushing more and more policy responsibility to

the provincial level. The difficulty was that the provincial governments had

little funds with which to pay for these responsibilities. Further, as the

struggle for ownership of property slated for privatization intensified, and

the propensity of subnational governments to withhold tax revenue from

Moscow increased, the lack of clarity in the division of powers between

Moscow and the constituent units of the federation became an even more

pressing issue. This led to signing of the March ·1992 Federation

Agreements. This set of three agreements (one for each level of the

federation - Republics, Oblasts, Krais and the Autonomies) was supposed

to formally establish what areas were to be under central jurisdiction, what

areas were to be the shared responsibilities and what areas were to be

assigned to each of the three categories of the constituent units. 21 While

these agreements went a long way in establishing Russia as a truly federal

system, realization of the agreements remained a dream as the enabling

legislation was never passed by the central government in Moscow. In

practice, the federative arrangements, far from alleviating the growing

tensions between the Oblast and Republic level, reinforced the inequalities

between Russian and non-Russian territories. Further, despite special

privileges that had accrued to Republics in their federative agreement with

Moscow, two Republics - Tatarstan and Chechnya - refused to sign this

21 See Stoner- Weiss, n.2, p.238.

271

agreement and two others Bashkhortostan and Sakha insisted on special

clauses granting them additional control over resources. Tatarstan's

stubbornness in particular led to the establishment of a dangerous

precedent in centre-periphery relations. In February 1994, after long

negotiations, Tatarstan successfully obtained a separate bilateral treaty with

Moscow which granted the Republic wide authority over economic

resources. This deal, at a later phase led to Moscow's unequal treatment of

various units of federation.

These mounting centre-periphery and ethnic problems were

aggravated over the course of 1992 by the intensifying legislative-

executive conflict in Moscow. In need of their political support, both

Y eltsin and his opponents began to outbid each other in raising the favour

of local authorities. At this time, Y eltsin aggressively courted local leaders

as allies in his struggle with parliament, not only making significant

economic concessions to win their support but also granting the republics

and regions considerable economic autonomy in the belief that economic

decentralization would prevent conservatism from reversing marketization

and privatization should they come to power in Moscow.22

In sum, provincial power was on the rise as the Russian Federation

entered the summer of 1993 when President Y eltsin convened a

22 For example, late in Summer of 1992, Yeltsin dispatched Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar to Sakha where he signed an agreement setting up a joint stock company to exploit Sakha's diamonds and confirmed a major Sakha-De Beers deal that Moscow conservatives attacked as disadvantageous to Federation.

272

constitutional convention in yet another failed attempt to provide Russia

with a comprehensive basic law. As steele wrote:

By 1993, the centrifugal tendencies were still gaining strength and not only the twenty-one republics which make up the Federation, in particular, Tatarstan, Baskhortostan, and Sakha, several regions including parts of Siberia, the Urals and the Far East- were also demanding greater economic rights. They felt Moscow had always imposed excessive control and time had come to loosen the links. During the long debates in 1993 over a new Russian constitution, Russian Regions insisted on equal status with Republics in

I · M 23 re at10ns to oscow ...... .

While the sharp divisions between President and parliament during

this time was usually considered the main reason for the failure of

constitution project, the growing insistence of regional leaders on regional

autonomy in fiscal matters also greatly contributed to a crisis in

constitutional field.

(ii) October 1993- Summer 1995: Russian Regionalism Subsided

The storming of the Russian parliament in October 1993 by the

federal troops, acting on President Y eltsin's Decree 1400, marked the

beginning of a dark age in regional activism. During the October crisis

many regional Governors adopted wait and watch policy and were slow in

declaring their support to President's actions. This increased Yeltsin's

susptcton on regional institutions. While Y eltsin did not exercise his

discretionary power of dismissing the regional Governors, he did

23 See Glatter, n.9, p.59.

273

immediately pass a decree giving himself the authority to independently

remove all Governors including those who had been elected.24

In December 1993, in conjunction with new parliamentary elections

at the national level, President Y eltsin asked the Russian electorate to

approve a new constitution for the federation. Although this constitution

declared all subjects of the federation equal, many of the provisions of the

constitution relating to mutual jurisdiction (Art. 71, 72) and the Federation

Council or upper house of parliament continued to remain a bone of

contention between the federal government and the sub-units. Further,

during this period beginning with agreements signed between Moscow and

Tatarstan (in February 1994) Moscow and Kabardino - Balkaria in July

1994 and Moscow and Baskhortostan in August 1994 some regions and

republics attempted to claim special treatment through alternative means.

As pointed out earlier, the upper house of the parliament called

Federation Council received two representatives from each of the 89

federation subjects. Although the constitution remained vague about how

these seats were to be filled in future, the 1993 elections to the Federation

Council were held in conjunction with the State Duma elections. For the

Fed_eration Council only those candidates contested elections, who were

members of either executive or legislative branches of government. As a

24 Indeed Yeltsin used this authority to remove elected Governors in Amer and Bryansk Oblasts shortly after the decree was declared.

274

result, in most cases the Regional Governor and the head of regional

legislature each won a seat in these elections. This was Moscow's design

on the levers of power by guaranteeing Regional Governor a voice in

legislative side of national politics.25 During this period while the centre

followed a divide and rule strategy, the regional leaders tried to gain as

much power as possible from the centre. •

The growing dissatisfaction on the part of the regions increased to

disproportionate limits when Chechnya openly waged a battle against

Moscow. The Chechen crisis and Y eltsin's decree ordering federal armed

forces into that republic in December 1994 put a temporary hold on

regional activism. The ongoing war between Chechnya and federal troops

served to underscore the potential danger of heightened separatist activism

to Russian statehood. It also raised the moral question regarding the limits

of legitimate action in projecting Russian territorial boundaries. 26

25

26

See Stoner- Weiss, n.2, p.242.

Printsip "Razdelyai i Vlastbui' lspolzuyut obe Storony: Tsentr V Otnosheniyakh s Regionami, Regionalnyie Lidery V Otnosheniyakh so Structurami Vlasti V Tsentre, see Nikolai Petrov, Rossiya Regionov s Tsentram iii Bez? (ESRC Seminar Paper presented in LSE, 21 October 1998), p.26.

The Chechen Republic had been created in 1991 when the Chechen - lngush Autonomous Republic was divided into two. This division stemmed from growing Chechen nationalism in the late 1980s. By August 1991, new leaders of Chechen Republic had came out in support of the August coup plotters in Moscow and had embarked upon a path of independence from not only the RSFSR, but also the Soviet Union. In part, the Chechen claim to independence stemmed from the region's status as a largely Muslim Republic, as well as a long history of revolts against Russian rule prior even to the Revolution of 1917. For recent developments, see Ajay Pattnaik, Russia and Chechnya- the Cycle of Stagnation and Escalation (Paper Presented in a Seminar, SIS, JNU, 25 February 2000), pp.1-8.

275

In general, however, while condemning Russian military 'action' in

the Chechen Republic, most of the other constituent units of the federation

have remained relatively quiet about the war, although some regional and

republican leaders did oppose sending troops from local garrisons to

Chechnya. None, however, has gone so far as they did in 1990-93 period in

declaring themselves sovereign entities. Maintenance of territorial integrity

is of vital importance for Russia as a state. In this sense Russia cannot

afford the secession of even a tiny Republic like Chechnya, for, it might

create a chain repercussion for the other Republics aspiring for secessiOn

and independent statehood.

(iii) Summer 1995- Present: Regional Resurgence

Because the 1993 constitution did not resolve the issue of the division of

powers between the centre and the provinces, pressure for the autonomy

did not abate after the constitution entered into force. On the contrary,

horse trading between the centre and the periphery has continued. The

Republics, Krais and Oblasts have gone on demanding financial

concessions and have grabbed increased powers whenever they could get

away with it. The centre has also responded by negotiating a series of

bilateral treaties between the Russian Federation and its autonomy minded

276

provinces. Relation between centre and regions had based on a strategic

plan which is now more institutionalised than the period before 1998.4

The first such bilateral treaty between the Russian Federation and

the Republic of Tatarstan was signed in February 1994. So determined

were Tatarstan's leaders to assert autonomy that they refused outrightly to

sign the Federal Treaty in March 1992. In February 1994, after nearly three

years of negotiations, Russia and Tatarstan signed a bilateral treaty on 'the

Demarcation of Spheres of Authority and Mutual Delegation of Powers' .27

Tatarstan served as a model member of the Federation and its treaty helped

as an example to other provinces desiring independence.

Through the late spring of 1995 and early summer, Yeltsin took up

the practice of signing more bilateral agreements with some other

republics. By early summer of 1995, several Oblast Governors insisted also

that Y eltsin allow them to hold regional elections. By August, Y eltsin

consented to thirteen gubernatorial elections in all to be completed by

December 1995. Although the incumbent winners were Yeltsin's

preferred candidates, their popular mandates actually served to make them

27

Otnosheniya Mezhdu Tsentrom i Regionami V Strategi Chescom Plane Seichas Gorajdo bole lnstitutsionali Zerovani, Chern Eshyo Sovsem ni dano, see Petrov (ESRC Seminar Paper Presented in LSE, 21 October 1998), p.25.

See Elizabeth Teague, "Russia and the Regions: The Uses of Ambiguity" in John Gibson, Philip Hanson, Transformation from Below, Local Power and the Political Economy of Post-( "ommunist Transactions (Chettenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 1996), p.24.

277

stronger in their dealings with Moscow as they now had the authority of

their respective electorates behind them.28

In addition to allowing gubernatorial elections to proceed thereby

opening the possibility of eroding central control over regional politics,

Y eltsin continued the practice of signing more bilateral agreements with

various oblasts, republics and autonomies. In an attempt to buy off

opponents or reward some supporters, many of these agreements were

signed in the spring 1996 in advance to June presidential elections.

Altogether twenty six agreements had been signed between Moscow

and various sub-national units by the end of November 1996 and more

were waiting for signature.29 This rather arbitrary policy of assigning extra

powers to some regions, but not others has created the potential for further

uneven economic and political development across the federation. This

poses one of the major challenges to Russia's state and institution building.

III STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERAL STRUCTURE

According to William Ricker, a federal state consists of two levels

of government ruling the same land and people, each having at least one

area of action in which it is guaranteed autonomy.30 He also draws an

important distinction between centralized and peripheralized federal

28

29

30

See Stoner -Weiss, n.2, p.245.

See ibid, p.246.

William Ricker, quoted in Steven L.Solnick, "The Political Eco11omy of Russian Federalism", Problems of Post-Commzmism, vol.43, no.6 (November-December 1996), p.I6.

278

systems. In a centralized federal state, most functions are performed by the

national institutions (authorities). In a peripheralized federal state, the

federal centre is sharply constrained. Ricker argues that centralized federal

systems are more likely to survive centrifugal pressures, but are more

likely to see regional authority trampled by expanding federal authority.

Peripheralized federal state, on the other hand, is more likely to succumb to

regional conflict or even civil war.

Although 'federalism' has been a significant feature of Russian

politics and federalism has become a reality in post-Soviet Russia with the

adoption of the constitution in 1993, it is difficult to fit Russia's

'federalism' in Ricker's framework of analysis. The 1993 constitution

contains a full chapter on Federalism favorable to institution-building and

clearly delineates the jurisdiction between federal and regional levels of

government. However, the recent problem of federal government with

Chechnya and the sending there of federal troops to suppress regional

awakening has given rise to few gray areas of federal provisions of 1993

constitution. In this section we will deal with the criticisms and strengths of

the constitution's federal provisions.

(i) Criticisms

a. Excessive Powers for the Federal Government

Because the constitution g1ves federal government excessive

powers, some critiques contend that Russia remams a unitary state in

279

everything but name. The specific powers given to the federal government

has been criticized as excessive. For example, Article 76.5, which asserts

the primacy of Russian law, has been interpreted to mean that regional

governments may not be 'sovereign' even with respect to those powers

assigned to them.31 Others argued that the constitution gives the federal

government too much of power to determine the structure of regional

governments. Article 77.1 states that the governments of the subjects will

be established on the basis of federal constitution and Jaw while Article

78.1 gives federal bodies of executive power the right to create their own

territorial agencies and staff those agencies.

31 See excerpts from the Constitution.

280

Table 1.5 Excerpts of the Constitution Relating to Federal Structure

Article 71

The jurisdiction of the Russian Federation shall include:

(a) the adoption and amendment of the Constitution of the Russian Federation and federal laws and supervision over compliance with them;

(b) the federal structure and territory of the Russian Federation;

(c) regulation and protection of the rights and liberties of the human being and citizen: citizenship of the Russian Federation; regulation and protection of the rights of national minorities;

(d) establishment of the system of federal bodies of legislative, executive, and judiciary power; procedures for the organisation and activities thereof; formation of federal bodies of state power;

(e) federal and state property and management thereof;

(f) determining the basic principles of federal policy and federal programs in the fields of state structure, economy, the environmental, social, cultural and national development of the Russian Federation;

(g) establishment of the legal framework for a single market; financial. monetary, credit. customs regulation. emission of money, guidelines for price policy; federal economic services, including federal banks;

(h) the federal budget; federal taxes and levies; federal funds of regional development;

(i) federal power grids, nuclear energy, fissionable materials; federal transport, railways, information. and communications; space activities;

(j) foreign policy and international relations of the Russian Federation, international treaties of the Russian Federation; questions of war and peace;

(k) foreign trade relations of the Russian Federation;

(I) defense and security; defense production; determining procedures for the sale and purchase of arms, ammunition, military hardware, and other equipment; production of fissionable materials, toxic substances, and narcotics, and procedures for the use thereof;

(m) defining the status and protection of the state border, territorial waters. the air space, the exclusive economic zone, and the continental shelf of the Russian Federation;

(n) law courts; Prosecutor's Office; criminal, criminal-procedural, and criminal-executive legislation; amnesty and pardon; civil, civil-procedural. and arbitration-procedural legislation; legal regulation of intellectual property;

( o) federal conflict of laws;

(p) meteorological service; standards, models, the metric system, and time measurement; geodesy and cartography; names of geographical objects; official statistics and accounting;

( q) state decorations and honorary titles of the Russian Federation;

(r) federal state service.

281

Article 72

I. The joint jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and the subjects of the Russian Federation shall include:

(a) ensuring compliance of the constitutions and laws of the republics, charters, laws, and other regulatory legal acts of the territories, regions, federal cities, autonomous regions, and autonomous areas with the Constitution of the Russian Federation and the federal laws;

(b) protection of the rights and freedoms of man and citizens, protection of the rights of ethnic minorities; ensuring legality; law and order, and public safety; border zone regime;

(c) issues of the possession, use, and management of the land, mineral resources, water, and other natural resources;

(d) delimitation of state property;

(e) management of natural resources, protection of the environment and ecological safety; specially protected natural reserves; protection of historical and cultural monuments;

(f) general questions of upbringing, education, science, culture, physical culture sports;

(g) coordination of health issues, protection of family, motherhood, fatherhood, and childhood; social protection including social security;

(h) implementing measures to combat catastrophes, natural disasters, epidemics, and eliminating consequences thereof;

(i) establishment of the general guidelines for taxation and levies in the Russian Federation;

U> administrative, administrative-procedural, labour, family, housing. land, water, and forestry legislation; legislation on the sub-surface and environmental protection;

(k) cardres of judie ill!): and law-enforcement agencies; the bar, notariate:

(I) protection of the original environmental and traditional way of life of small ethnic communities;

(m) establishment of general guidelines of the organization of the system of bodies of state power and local self-government:

(n) coordination of international and external economic relations of the subjects of the Russian Federation, compliance with the international treaties ofthc Russian Federation.

2. The provisions of this article shall equally apply to the republics, territories, regions, federal cities, the autonomous regions, and autonomous territories.

Article 75

I. The monetary unit of the Russian Federation shall be the ruble. The monetary emtsston shall be the exclusive responsibility of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation. No other currencies may be issued in the Russian Federation.

2. The protection and stability of the ruble is the main function of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, which it shall exercise independently from other bodies of state power.

3. The system of taxes levied to the federal budget and the general principles of taxation and levies in the Russian Federation shall be established by the federal law.

4. State loans shall be issued in accordance with the procedure established by the federal law and placed on a strictly voluntary basis.

282

Article 76

I. On issues within the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation federal constitutional laws and federal laws shall be adopted having direct effect throughout the territory of the Russian Federation.

2. On matters within the joint jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and the subjects of the Russian Federation federal laws shall be issued and in accordance with the laws, and other regulatory legal acts of the subjects of the Russian Federation shall be adopted.

3. Outside the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and the joint jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and the·subjects of the Russian Federation republics, territories, regions, federal cities, autonomous regions, and autonomous areas shall effect their own legal regulation, including the adoption of laws and other regulatory legal acts.

4. Federal laws may not contravene federal constitutional laws.

5. Laws and other regulatory legal acts of the subjects of the Russian Federation may not contravene federal laws adopted in accordance with parts I and 2 of this Article. In the event of a contradiction between a federal law and other act issued in the Russian Federation, the federal law shall apply.

6. In the event of a contradiction between the federal law and a regulatory legal act of a subject of the Russian Federation issued in accordance with part 4 of this Article, the regulatory legal act of the subject of the Russian Federation shall apply.

Article 77

I. The system of state power bodies of the republics, territories, regions. federal cities, autonomous regions, and autonomous areas shall be established by the subjects of the Russian Federation independently in accordance with the basic principles of the constitutional system of the Russian Federation and general principles of the organization of legislative and executive bodies of power as envisaged by the federal law.

2. Within the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and the powers of the Russian Federation on issues within the joint jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and the subjects of the Russian Federation the federal bodies of executive power and bodies of executive power of the subjects of the Russian Federation shall form the single system of executive power in the Russian Federation.

Article 78

I. To exercise their powers, the federal bodies of executive power may set up their own territorial structures and appoint respective officials.

2. By agreement with organs of executive power of the subjects of the Russian Federation, the federal organs of executive power may delegate to them part of their powers provided this does not contravene the Constitution of the Russian Federation or federal laws.

3. By agreement with the federal organs of executive power, organs of executive power of the subjects of the Russian Federation may delegate part of their powers to them.

4. The President of the Russian Federation and the government of the Russian Federation shall, under the Constitution of the Russian Federation, exercise the authority of federal state power throughout the territory of the Russian Federation.

283

b. Excessive Power for the Subjects

Critiques argue that the new constitution affords subjects not too

little but too much power. They focus on Article 11.3 which states that the

distribution of federal and regional power is governed by this constitution,

the federal treaty (of March 1992) and other treaties that delineate objects

of jurisdiction and powers. The right to enter into bilateral treaties with

individual subjects will allow the competitiveness of 1990-93 to continue

as regions will wrestle for distinct ad-hoc privileges from Moscow. The

resulting asymmetrical and unstable relationship between Moscow and

subjects will further undermine federal authority and stable institution­

building.

Two other provisiOns m the constitution also contribute to the

possible emergence of an asymmetrical federation. First, the jurisdiction

assigned exclusively to the federal government by Article 71 are rather

limited, while the joint jurisdiction listed in Article 72 are extensive.32

Secondly, Article 78.2 allows executive organs of the federal government

by mutual agreement to transfer a portion of their powers to the executive

ofthe regions and republics, while Article 78.3 allows the executive organs

of the regions and republics to transfer a part of their power to the federal

government. These provisions allow for the development of asymmetry in

32 See provisions relating to federal stnteture in Chapter 3 of the constitution.

284

relations between Moscow and the subjects which will further weaken the

federal government.

c. Indeterminacy and Internal Contradictions

Some argue that the division of powers between central and regional

governments is not clear. Article 72 identifies a host of issues that fall

under the joint jurisdiction of both federal government and sub units. These

include ensuring that local constitutions and charters are consistent with the

federal constitution, protecting civil liberties and human rights including

ethnic minorities, preservation of order, question of ownership of land and

natural resources, state property and general principles of taxation. etc.

Critics contend that these important tasks will, in practice, be difficult to

resolve jointly and the result will be another round of war of laws between

federal government and regional governments intending to assert their

respective authority.

Another example of indeterminacy pointed to by critics is the failure

of the constitution to resolve the most serious problem of inter­

governmental relations in taxation and revenue sharing. The provision of

the new constitution relating to exact word of "general principles of

taxation, collection and levying" is vague and gives rise to conflict between

the two levels.

285

d. Preservation of Russia's Internal Borders

Many Russian as well as western analysts have argued that the

drafters of the constitution should have redrawn Russia's internal borders

so that all constitutive units would be defined without regard to ethnicity. It

is argued that the combination of territorial recognition and preferential

treatment will entrench ethnic identity and make ethno-politics and

ethnicity (ethnic conflict) a constant feature of Russian politics. It would

have been better to have reconfigured the constituent parts of the new

federation into Zemli, Gubernias or some other unit without regard to

ethnicity thereby strengthening the federal structure.

(ii) Strengths of Constitution's Federal Provisions

In response to these criticisms, it is argued that no matter how well

designed, no constitution could decisively and promptly resolve Russia's

current inter-governmental conflicts. Secondly, no constitution, however

elaborate, can address every possible area of conflict as every constitution

includes a measure of vagueness and contradictory provisions. Finally, in

defense of federal provisions of Russia's constitution it can be said that

constitutions matter only to the extent their provisions are obeyed or

enforced. In this sense, Russia's constitution may lead to a sound

development of federal institutions only if its provisions are enforced.

286

As to the criticism relating to excessive powers for the federal

government it is argued that the new Russian constitution does not

establish a unitary state. Russia is one of the variants of federal state as

federations differ considerably in terms of the types of powers assigned to

the central and sub-federal authorities as well as other factors.

If the Russian constitution successfully constraints political

behaviour, the regime it establishes will certainly qualify as federal. Article

1 asserts that Russian Federation is a democratic and federal state based on

rule of law, with a republican form of government, Article 5.1 states that

the federation is "composed of republics, oblasts, krais, federal cities,

autonomous oblasts and autonomous okrugs" - the subjects of Russian

Federation and Article 5.3 states that the federal structure of Russia is

based on a division of competencies and powers between the organs of

state power of the Russian Federation and organs of state power of the

subjects of federation. Chapter 3 of the constitution goes on to define

different jurisdictions and powers of federal and regional governments.

Regarding the priority of the federal constitution, Article 4.1 states

that the "sovereignty of the Russian Federation extends to the entirety of

this territory". While Article 4.2 states that the federal constitution and

federal laws have supremacy throughout the territory of the Russian

Federation, regional autonomy and fiscal federalism have been the central

287

issues in the tug of war between the Kremlin and the regions. Y eltsin was

reluctant to accept the political autonomy of areas where his political

opponents were in power and continued to appoint local administrators

which violated letter and the spirit of the constitution. The constitution has

provided for a unified system of executive powers (Article 77 .2). Article 77

particularly states that the structure of government in the regions is

determined by the regions themselves, in accordance with the foundations

of constitution and general principles to be established by federal law. Thus

much depends on the enforcement of the constitution.

The excessive power granted to sub-units is also defended on the

ground that Russia's current circumstances make it wiser to leave open the

possibility of negotiated political solution to existing disagreements. The

attempt to arrive at a final and decisive legal solution through well-defined,

just and lasting general regime may not be possible in the short run.33

The loose division of powers between the central and the regional

governments is not necessarily a flaw. Vagueness contributes to flexibility.

Stephen Holmes and Cass Sunsten have argued persuasively that regimes

in transition are wise to build flexibility into their constitutions. 34 While

33

34

Yeltsin adviser Emil Day in has argued 'Anyone who today takes a position of legal dogmatism insisting on a tough line with respect to republics, is objectively promoting the rebirth of separatism'.

As stated in a paper on regional strategy written in late 1993 by three key Yeltsin advisers. "The Russian Federation must be reborn on a federal basis, but not all at once-rather it should be done in stages". The paper makes it clear that five fundamental bans (Zaprety) are the basis of federal relations (I) ban on secession (2) ban on unilateral changes in status of a

288

rule of law and democracy need to be entrenched , the rapidly changing

environment and high political stakes make it dangerous to establish rules

that are fixed too quickly.

Federalism has long been at the heart of Russia's institution building

and constitutional order. Since the earliest years of Soviet rule the union's

shape and character have been hotly debated and carefully constructed to

serve the regimes' political goals. Federal structure remains central for

modem Russia, too.

The 1993 constitution most significantly impacted on federalism

with its equalization of the status of the vanous constituent subjects.

Article 5 ( 4) declares that all subjects of the Russian Federation in relation

to the federal bodies of state power are legally equal among themselves. In

a significant break with the past practice, the ethnic republics no longer

enjoy a privileged status as regards taxation and natural resource control

vis-a-vis the non-ethnic regions. Unlike the regions, the republics have

retained the language rights under Article 68(2), but they have lost their

sovereign status as well as dual citizenship authority. More important in

contemporary Russia, the republics' autonomous control over taxation and

natural resources has been dramatically reduced.

subject (3) a ban on the transformation of administrative borders into state borders (4) ban on non-democratic fonn of government within federation and (5) a ban on local laws that violate the federal constitution or conditionally legitimate federal laws, see Edward W. Walker, "Federalism-Russian Style", Problems of Post -Communism, vol.42, no.4, p.l 0.

289

IV. CHALLENGES TO THE FEDERAL STRUCTURE IN

RUSSIA

The working of the federal relations over the last few years shows

that although the integrity of the Russian state is not really in jeopardy

even despite the Chechen war, the Federation still faces some challenges.

The first and the foremost pressing of these issues is to resolve the

complicated and unpredictable nature of fiscal relations between centre and

periphery.

(i) Troubled Fiscal Federal System

The confusing history of fiscal federal relations shows that regional

governments have become accustomed to withholding tax revenues from

Moscow when necessary. Even if the problem today is not as it was in

1992 -1993, still many regional governments are pursuing to implement

independent tax policies, often in direct contradiction to Moscow. Again,

the practice of establishing permanent delegations in Moscow to pressurize

revenue sharing demand and the practice of signing bilateral agreements

has led to new and independent regional tax regimes across Russia. Finally,

the twenty-one constituent republics of the Federation have come to expect

preferential treatment by Moscow in financial relations. This has served to

further exacerbate tensions between the oblast and republic levels as well

290

as to further undermine the foundation of federal, particularly fiscal federal

relations in Russia.

The various aspects of an effective fiscal federalism is one of the

highest priority for Russia today. As trade barriers are raised across the

country, the federal government may require to exercise its authority to

keep the nation economically united. This is critical to federation's

economic viability as well as that of the constituent parts.

(ii) Unequal Treatment of the Federation's Constituent Units

The most important challenge facing Russia today is the unequal

treatment of different levels of the federation's constituent units. As

mentioned in this chapter earlier, one of the most troubling aspects of the

legacy of Soviet system for the development of Russian federal system is

the continuing problem of balancing the claims of ethnic versus non-ethnic

republics. While the Russian Constitution declares 89 constituent units of

the federation 'equal', the Federative Agreements of 1992 establish an

unequal system and these agreements have still not been nullified. The

result of this persistently uneven treatment by central government has led

the regions to signing of bilateral power sharing agreements with Moscow.

This practice has succeeded in further eroding central powers over regional

291

governments and has reinforced the unpredictability m centre-periphery

relations. 35

(iii) Lack of Penetration of National Political Institutions into the Periphery

Lack of penetration of national political institutions like political

parties into provincial politics and the proper decentralization and

devolution of power presents a further challenge to the federal structure in

Russia. In Russia political parties which contested the national

parliamentary elections in 1993, 1995, 1999 were largely based in Moscow

and St. Petersburg. With the exception of Communist Party of Russia,

these parties are weakly organized and poorly represented at the

subnational level.36 In spite of its consistent decline in recent years, the

Communist Party is the only pan-Russian Party. Rest of the political parties

are restricted to specific regions only. As a result, local elections are

contested without the participation of national political parties and coherent

party platforms. Much depends on the personages of the Presidents of

ethnic republics and Governors of the regions and territories. This sort of

personality politics has further weakened the emergence of well-integrated

federal institutions and a strong federal state.

35

36

See Stoner- Weiss, n.2, p.249.

See ibid., p.250.

292

Devolution and decentralization of power is critical to emergence of

constitutionalism from below. The period of Perestroika from 1985 to 1988

reflects, Nina Belyaeva, was an initial era of system reconstruction

controlled by Gorbachev only after which lasting institutions began to

emerge from below.37 This shift was necessary if the people were ever to

understand and respect the law. In the new Russia, the evolution of

constitutionalism along with stable political institutions continues to

depend on solving grassroot political problems.38

Curtailment of regional rights and reliance on a vertical power

structure will only exacerbate secessionist tendencies in the Russian

Federation and deprive the federal government of the broad local support it

will need to implement market oriented economic reform successfully.

Some kind of viable decentralization is needed to encourage the regions

and republics to co-operate in implementing economic reform. One can not

proceed with market reforms and democratization without decentralizing

the whole country. 39

In conclusion, it can be said that on the basis of the present

constitution, notwithstanding few provisions with its long list of poorly

)7

1'1

Belyaeva on Russian Democracy, quoted in Robert B. Ahdieh, Russia "s Constitutional Revolution (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), p.l3 7.

Mishin, Interview of 14 August 1993, quoted in ibid.

See Tolz Vera, Meeting Reports (The Woodrow Wilson Center), vol.XI, no.4, p.l.

293

defined areas of joint jurisdiction (Article 72), federal structure can play a

constructive role in the development of constitutionalism and limited

government. Russia may now move on to create a true federation that will

encourage experimentation and diversity together with co-operation and

unity, the hallmarks of effective federal unions such as the United States.

The problem with the Russian Federation does not end with

whether Russia's institutional structures, procedures and conventions fulfill

the formal credentials of a federal democracy. As experience in successful

federal countries show, for a federation as a particular organizational form

of governance and its institutions to work successfully, it also requires a set

of socially held values and beliefs predicted on an understanding that unity

through diversity is best reflected in federation. This is what is often

referred to as a true federal state. For a federation to endure, it requires a

social commitment to the federal idea in which regional identities are held

to be simultaneously national and local in scope. Moreover, as Burgess

notes:

40

the genius of federation lies in its infinite capacity to accommodate and reconcile the competing and sometimes conflicting array of diversities having political salience within a state. Toleration, respect, compromise, bargaining and mutual recognition are its watchwords and 'union' combined simultaneously with autonomy its hallmark.40

M. Burgess, "Federalism and Federation: A Reappraisal" in M. Burgess and A. Gagman cds., Comparative Federalism and Federation, Competing Traditions and Future Directions (Harvester, 1993), p.7.

294

Federal idea based on 'checks and balances' will take some time to

take roots in post-Soviet Russia as pluralist democracy has little

opportunity to develop either at the centre or in the regions. A recent

presidential working paper on 'Russia's Regional Problems' noted that

Russia needs to create an environment capable of sustaining and

stimulating the democratic process. Hence the federal question in Russia is

directly related to the success of democracy and market economy.

In the final analysis, the best way for Russia to preserve its

territorial integrity would be to concentrate its energies on democracy,

building a structured party system at the federal level, establishing a strong

institutional base at political level and a sound currency and creating a

common economic sphere. On the other hand, if Russia's economy

continues to deteriorate and its new political institutions fail to consolidate

themselves or if the Russian State is unable to establish order and combat

crime, Russia would continue to face grave dangers.