11/1/2013

GROUP 4 CHANGING BUSINESS MODELS

Presented by:

Akshay Sabnis 2012PGPRAK008

Aneesh Pani 2012PGPRAK010

Aniket Harsh 2012PGPRAK011

Kumar Abhishek 2012PGPRAK025

Rohit Koul 2012PGPRAK035

Udit Dureja 2012PGPRAK038

Table of Contents

1. DELL: The Inception

2. Modus Operandi: DELL Direct vs the Hybrid Model

3. External Industry Analysis

4. Key Success factors

5. Key Processes and key resources

6. Competitive Profile matrix

7. Value loop

8. Dells Performance: Sustaining competitive advantage

9. Dell in Emerging markets: A comparative study of Dell in India vs China

10. Dell in 2013: New Business Model on the Anvil

DELL: The Inception

“The basic tasks of any business don't change: companies must manage their costs, grow their revenue

and profits, and keep customers happy. But how they accomplish these tasks, as encapsulated by the

business model, is changing dramatically” (KPMG, 2006)

“The model of what I call the Old Computer Industry as it used to exist before the personal computer

consisted of corporations like IBM, DEC, NCR, NEC and Wang, who would compete in vertical blocks

against each other. Each corporation would develop their own silicon components, build a computer

platform around that silicon implementation, develop their own system software, and then either

develop their applications running on their system software or have those applications developed by

third parties. They would then have their own wing-tipped sales people sell those computers to

corporate accounts.

Each of these vertical blocks then competed against the other vertical blocks. This is how the computer

industry and the business of the computer industry were pursued throughout its existence, until the

mid-80s. In the mid-80s, the Personal Computer drove a bulldozer across the scene and created a

horizontally structured industry. This New Computer Industry is largely based on a common silicon

platform, upon which various companies build a very standard computer platform, upon which you put

systems software that is largely common throughout the industry, upon which you sell packaged

applications, applications that you buy, like records or CDs, at a store. Whoever has a storefront,

telephone or warehouse can get into the distribution business” (Andrew Grove)

DELL Computer Corporation was officially established on May 3 1984. College freshman Michael Dell

who upgraded IBM PCs’ in his dorm room at University of Texas identified an opportunity to put his

talents to better use by assembling PCs using components bought from 3rd party vendors and selling it

directly to customers at 15% discount to established brands. Advertisements in trade magazines coupled

with word of mouth publicity brought a steady inflow of business to Michael Dell and transformed the

dorm room business to the Dell Computer Corporation.

DELL sought to differentiate itself through the customer centricity of its business model. It catered to

technology literate customers who were enamored by the idea of owning PCs that had been customized

for them. It targeted people who were seeking to buy their second or third PC and knew exactly what

they wanted. DELL was the pioneer of support services such as 24 hour Hotline, guaranteed shipment of

replacement parts and next day on site service. Coupled with its efficient low cost operations, it became

the preferred vendor for technology literate customer segment who looked for quality at reasonable

prices. The result: $6 million in the beginning of 1985 and $70 million by the year end. By 1990, the sales

crossed the half billion $ mark and the company went out for global footprints with a plant in Limerick

to serve the European, Middle Eastern and African markets.

The Slump (1990-94)

“Everyone is piggybacking Michael Dell’s distribution concept. He forged the trail and everyone else is

just following.” (Financial World, 1992).

Several low cost competitors copied Dell’s model and entered the market, undercutting Dell’s prices by

15%-30%. To protect itself from such competitors and eliminate the risk of over dependence on a single

channel, Dell entered the retail channel in 1991. It sought to capitalize on the growing segment of small

businesses and individual customers who preferred a “look and feel” of the product before going for a

purchase. Standard Dell products were offered through retailers like Business Depot, BestBuy, Sam’s

Club, Price Club/Costco, PC world, Staples and CompUSA. This resulted in sales growing by more than

100% to cross the 2 billion USD mark catapulting Dell to the ranks of world top 5 PC manufacturers.

However, this rapid growth led to severe cash crunch and in 1993, the company registered its first ever

operating loss.

The crux of the problem, however, was Dell’s entry to indirect channels. Dell’s cost sensitive frugal

culture did not gel well with the retail channels. The cost of selling started eating into the profits of Dell.

The biggest drawback of using retailers was inability to capitalize on its customization capabilities. It led

to tremendous sales growth, but Dell was not making money on these sales.

Explosive Growth (1994-2005)

With the return to Direct model, Dell experienced phenomenal growth with sales reaching over 25

billion in 1999 and a net income of 1.7 billion. Dell became the largest PC manufacturer in US and 2nd

largest world over. A large part of that growth could be attributed to launch of www.dell.com .

Customers could now order computers over the internet. It was perfect for Dell which only had a direct

selling channel. Dell could easily switch to the internet platform unlike its rivals who had to take

retaliation from their existing channels into consideration.

"The Internet offered a logical extension of our direct model we used Internet browsers to essentially

give the same information to our customers and suppliers -- bringing them literally inside our business.

This became the key to what I call a virtually integrated organization..."- Michael Dell

The Shrinking Pie (2007-2010)

The PC market had reached a mature stage with shrinking demand for personal computers.

“Dell still derives significant competitive advantage from customizing products and selling direct to

buyers. On the other hand, this market is shrinking and the beneficiaries are companies like HP that sell

through third-party channels such as retail chains. This shift has occurred because customer needs and

associated supply chain costs — elements that are aligned in a successful go-to-market strategy — have

changed in the mature PC business. A hybrid model that embraces both direct and reseller channels now

looks to be a better option for Dell” (Chopra, 2006)

In 2007, Dell ventured out to partner with indirect channel like retails.

Over the past decade, industry saw large scale consolidation with the merger of HP and Compaq and

exit of IBM. Dell has constantly maintained its leadership position in the industry. However, the

shrinking PC market received a further blow with the coming of the “smart” devices. In September 2013,

Dell has moved from being a public company to private when Michael Dell backed by Silver Lake went

for a leveraged buyout of Dell Computer Corporation at 25 billion USD

Modus Operandi: Dell Direct versus the Hybrid

The Dell Direct (pre 2007):

Since its inception, Dell had always followed the direct selling approach, eliminating need for retails and

intermediaries to take its products to customer. With the advent of internet, DELL took direct selling to a

whole new level with the DELL Direct. Now customers could order PCs, customized as per their

requirement. Dell would then assemble the PC and have it delivered to the customer. This was a perfect

logical evolution of their model and helped Dell in further re-inforcing its low cost structures through

better management of inventory as well as customer and supplier relationships. Following are the major

benefits arising out of Direct selling model:

Eliminate cost and risk associated with carrying large finished goods or component inventories.

Build to order capabilities

Just in time manufacturing

Low procurement costs as electronic components tend to get cheaper with time and so by

choosing not to store components, Dell benefitted from reduced cost of the component every

time they ordered it.

High availability of latest technology products.

Direct customer relationship

No channel costs and hence reduced cost of selling.

Use of IT to directly control its value chain to monitor flow of materials/components and

progress made on a customers’ order.

Segmentation: Helped Dell to better focus on customers and identify unique opportunities.

Component

Manufacturers

DELL Customers

Distributors

Order

Product

Component

s

Component

s

Customer segmentation was a direct result of the business model. 15% of revenue came from B2C while

rest 85% came from B2B.

Based on sales data gathered, Dell proactively offered the customers customized services like:

Premier Pages: Dedicated IT procurement and support sites for large clients, which allow hassle free

decision making and management of purchases from Dell. It serves as a customized sales channel.

Platinum Councils: These are periodic regional meetings of the largest clients of Dell, where different

stakeholders like executives, procurement staff and technicians describe their experience with Dell and

expectations in future.

Kiosks- Intended for B2C. Involved setting up kiosks in malls wherein consumers may check out the Dell

product and get a look and feel. They may then order it online or right at the kiosk.

These measures are meant to bring Dell closer to its customers and in effect create a hold-up through

making them increasingly dependent on Dell’s superior services.

B2C15%

B2B85%

Revenue

The Hybrid Model (Post 2007):

Post 2006, Dell was faced with an increasingly competitive market and declining market share. The

reasons attributed to this loss of market share to competitors were:

1. Speed of IC development has been more or less constant, doubling every 2 years (Moore’s law).

The incremental benefit arising out of ever more powerful microprocessors was on the wane.

For instance, a three year old processor (Pentium i3 or core 2 duo) is capable of handling most

common business applications.

2. Dell’s major portion of revenue (85%) came from corporate/commercial customers. There was a

substantial decrease in purchase made by commercial sector, from above 70% in 1994 down to

near 60% in 2004-05. Whereas, the consumer market increased share of the total market from

28% in 1994 to 38% in 2005.

3. Increased agility in new technology integration by PC manufacturers and given the low

incremental benefits with each subsequent new technology, customers no longer sought high

levels of customization as most of the models available in market managed to meet their

requirements satisfactorily. Hence very few people were willing to have PC customized and then

wait for it to be delivered by Dell, when they could have a “sufficiently good enough and

meeting all requirements” model belonging to HP/Lenovo etc instantly at the nearest retail.

4. The direct selling model was good when customers preferred customization. Surplus stock was

costly whereas assembly-to-order and centralized storage were profitable. With reduced PC

prices and customer satisfied with an off the shelf model, inventory of standardized model turns

quickly and is more profitable.

This forced Dell to go the retail way looking for indirect channel partners who had sufficient reach and

scope to take Dell to customers.

The world wide Retail Partners of Dell

Responding to changes in consumer requirements

Schematic of the Hybrid Model

Product

Commoditization

Less waiting time

Simpler Purchase

experience

Multi-channel

convenience

Both Direct &

Indirect Channels

Off the shelf

standardized models

Changing Markets Responses

Component

Manufacturers

DELL

Customers

Distributors

Component

s

Component

s

Retailers Customers

Order

The Challenges in Retail

Challenges:

- Lower margins

- Loss of customer connect

- Demand forecasting

- Trade promotions

- Channel Management

Strengths:

- Strong Brand

- Effective supply chain management

- Robust IT systems

- Greater outreach

External Industry Analysis

2008 and onwards:

“Worldwide PC shipments are now expected to fall by -9.7% in 2013, further deepening what is already

the longest market contraction on record, according to the International Data Corporation

(IDC) Worldwide Quarterly PC Tracker. The new forecast reflects not only a continued expansion of

mobile device options at the expense of PCs, but also marked the cessation of emerging market growth

that the industry had come to rely on in recent years. The market as a whole is expected to decline

through at least 2014, with only single-digit modest growth from 2015 onward, and never regain the

peak volumes last seen in 2011.” (International Data Corporation, 2013)

With the advent of smart/mobility devices, there has been a major shift in the way information is being

accessed. Consumers prefer hand held devices for a majority of their computing needs like social

networking, e-mails, reading and casual surfing of the internet. Demand for PC has taken a hit with

communication oriented computing devices gaining at their expense.

This has had severe implications for the PC manufacturers’ world over as their volumes are declining and

none of the major manufacturers, barring Apple, have been able to make substantial inroads into the

hand held device segment.

Most of the manufacturers have launched touch screen laptops that are supposed to chip away the

market share of Tablets. Microsoft, which is a major stakeholder along with PC manufacturers came up

with a new OS supposed to provide an interactive platform similar to Android and iOS to re-invigorate

the PC experience. However it seems to have done more harm than good.

“At this point, unfortunately, it seems clear that the Windows 8 launch not only didn’t provide a positive

boost to the PC market, but appears to have slowed the market, while some consumers appreciate the

new form factors and touch capabilities of Windows 8, the radical changes to the UI, removal of the

familiar Start button and the costs associated with touch PCs have made PCs a less attractive alternative

to dedicated tablets and other competitive devices. Microsoft is going to have to make some very tough

decisions moving forward if they want to help reinvigorate the PC market.” (Bob O’Donnell, IDC

Program Vice President, Clients and Displays)

(The Gaurdian, 2013)

Industry as in 2005-06

The US and other mature markets were being driven by PC replacement cycles. Markets in developing

regions like China and India were driven by new PC unit purchase. The markets in developed nations

continued to drive IT spending and business investment while the fast growing Asia Pacific market

continued the healthy spending cycle for PCs. The consumers in developing markets had long sought

value conscious portable PCs and that had led the industry to continue to drive down price points and so

bring in new customers.

The developing countries had been exposed to computers through desktops and proliferation of laptops

was a recent phenomena. A major trend in the developing countries (especially India and Brazil) had

been customers’ preference to buy components and have it assembled into a desktop computer. Hence

demand for branded desktop PCs was pretty low in these countries. The demand for branded PCs picked

up with the introduction of value for money portable computers (laptops) by the manufacturers like HP.

Another reason was large scale investment done by the manufacturers in increasing the reach of its

products through extensive channel partners. The manufacturers were expected to extend their product

line with low price variants.

In the developed countries, saturation was being kept at bay by incremental changes and promises of

superior performance and features. New versions of Microsoft Window’s designed for higher

specification PCs along with Intel’s new chips along with other technology up-gradations like Wifi, USB,

Bluetooth etc kept customers coming back for re-purchases.

Key Success Factors of DELL

DELL : A hero in the pre 2007 era.

SN Key Success Factors pertaining to Dell Direct (pre 2007)

1 Build to order resulting in low inventory and holding cost

2 Cheaper procurement of electronic components by not storing them and purchasing as and when

need arose at a cheaper price (price of electronic components usually go down with time)

3 Direct Selling to customer. Saves on cost of selling and increases net income.

4 Low component cost through procurement from Asian countries where labor is cheaper.

5 Customized systems allowing greater freedom to customers

6 Key CRM initiatives to engage high value customers like Premium page and Platinum council.

7 Next day on-site service guarantee

8 Low prices

9 Less number of partners

10 Robust IT system allowing Dell to be proactive and responsive.

11 Data mining to segment customers and anticipate their demands and identify opportunities for

cross selling.

12 Single point accountability by removing channels

13 Supply chain and synchronization with suppliers so that they there is no lag in passing of

information.

14 Suppliers’ units located near to Dell increasing co-ordination and ensuring quick response.

15 A culture of frugality

16 Pure assemblage with no manufacturing

SN Key Success Factors pertaining to Hybrid Model of Dell (post 2007)

1 Large retailers who can use their scale and scope to reach out to customers

2 Standardized products that allow economies of scale bringing down cost

3 Forecasting demand

4 Low cost higher volumes

5 Stock information from retails that would allow for pre-emptive or remedial action allowing for better inventory management

6 Supply chain and synchronization with suppliers so that they there is no lag in passing of

information.

7 Suppliers’ units located near to Dell increasing co-ordination and ensuring quick response.

8 A culture of frugality

9 Pure assemblage with no manufacturing

10 Next day on-site service guarantee

11 Low prices

The key reasons for these changes:

1. Dell’s major customer base comprised corporate and SME’s (85% of revenue). Their demand for

PC was on the wane and Dell had to go for luring individual consumers and for that having a

good reach was of paramount importance. The corporate customers highly valued customized

products and with their procurement on the decline, Dell was severely affected.

2. Price sensitive consumers in the developing markets necessitated standardized low cost

products employing of economies of scale.

3. Low penetration levels of PC in third world countries required use of channel partners with

extensive outreach.

4. Change in perception of customers in developed markets who did not see substantial benefit in

having customized computers. This was due to competitors’ high speed to market, which

enabled them to launch new technology models conveniently and with speed. Hence, there was

commoditization and customers perceived getting comparable products from a nearby store

much more convenient than waiting for it to be assembled and delivered by Dell.

THE INDUSTRY KEY SUCCESS FACTORS (1994-2006)

SN Key Success Factors Reasons

1 Product features With the customers becoming more knowledgeable,

there was a demand for high feature PCs

2 Market share For any PC company, it was absolutely important to

have substantial volumes

3 Established brand name Customer’s purchase decision was driven by brand

name association

4 Financial position Apart from volumes, profitability was also the

deciding factor for a company to be successful in the

industry

5 Price Competitiveness With the growth of transactional customers, the

sensitivity that they brought along with them also

increased.

6 Channel effectiveness An effective channel of selling ensures sales volume

and customer convenience.

7 Low distribution costs To maintain high profitability, ensuring low

distribution costs was necessary

8 Shorter delivery time For customers ordering online, shorter delivery time

was absolutely necessary

9 Breadth of products and services Customers demanded a larger assortment of

products

10 CRM Key CRM initiatives to engage high value customers

11 Global distribution network There were huge opportunities of growth in markets

outside US like Asia

12 Relationship with retailers Very necessary to cater to the growing transactional

consumer segment

13 Relationship with suppliers Information sharing with suppliers makes processes

efficient and helps in cutting costs.

14 Support and services Helped in building customer loyalty

The Industry (2007-2013)

Reasons for changes in the Industry key success factors:

SN Critical Success Factors

1 Innovation With the consumer becoming more tech savvy, introducing both component and

system innovation helps companies to capture market share

2 Product Features Most of the features offered by PC manufacturers are highly commoditized and

thus,

3 Market share For any PC company, it was absolutely important to capture substantial volumes

4 Established brand name

Customer’s purchase decision was driven by brand name association

5 Financial position Apart from volumes, profitability was also the deciding factor for a company to be

successful in the industry

6 Price Competitiveness With the growth of transactional customers, the sensitivity that they brought

along with them also increased.

7 High Mobility/smart devices

Presence in high mobility PC segment like portable PCs was crucial in maintaining

profits as there was a huge growth in this segment

8 Low distribution costs To maintain high profitability, ensuring low distribution costs was

9 Shorter delivery time For customers ordering online, shorter delivery time was absolutely necessary

10

Customer Loyalty With more and more people becoming brand conscious, there was more value of

customer loyalty as they became assets for the company(early adopters)

11 CRM Key CRM initiatives to engage high value customers

12 Global distribution network

There were huge opportunities of growth in markets outside US like Asia

13 Relationship with retailers

Very necessary to cater to the growing transactional consumer segment

1. Emergence of a disruptive technology. Touch screen devices with high processing power which

provided all benefits of laptops and usually fit into one’s pockets.

2. Consumer need for staying connected via social networking sites, meant greater proliferation

and acceptance for these devices.

3. Majority of companies were thinking of moving to IT service and consulting scape as it provided

greater returns and was a growing pie instead of shrinking like computer manufacturing.

4. Following Kano model, what is desirable today was a basic need tomorrow. This caused

immense pressure to keep making incremental changes while the margins kept going down.

5. Fast pace of technology change, didn’t allow for high pricing and also reduced the time for

which a product might enjoy premium status allowing companies to charge a premium on them.

6. Presence in multiple channels ensured visibility and included products in the consideration set

of consumers when considering a purchase.

7. Volume and market share were the most important factors for remaining profitable.

Key Processes and Resources

Customer Segmentation

In order to know the customer value proposition offered by dell, we need to understand the types of

customers dell catered to:

Large Customers were called Relationship Customers while the small customers were the transactional

ones.

For 1994-06

Dell, which catered predominantly to the commercial consumer markets (B2B) enjoyed market

dominance with it’s direct business model. It’s key value propositions were customizability and fast

delivery.

Customizability: With the market getting more educated, customers wanted a product that was catered

to their specific needs. This meant inclusion of features they wanted and exclusion of those that did not

benefit their needs/business.

Fast Delivery: With the direct sales model, customers can get their ordered PC/s quicker. This is due to

Cell Manufacturing with Groups(75% reduction in assembly time and 100% increase in productivity)

Lower Prices: With the absence of the middleman (retailer) the costs of distribution reduced drastically

thereby reflecting in lower costs and resultant lower prices. Besides, the increased efficiency also helped

in keeping costs down.

After Sales Service: Premier Pages for corporate accounts, On-site Service, On-site Support Customer

Forums, Online order Inquiries. These features offered customers best in class service.

Key Processes:

Direct Sales

Cell Manufacturing

Suppliers part of dell design team

Just in Time manufacturing

Simultaneous shipping of Monitors and PCs

Dedicated sales persons for Large accounts

On-site service and support

Information sharing with suppliers

Key Resources:

www.dell.com

Customer Relationship Management

Limited Suppliers

Brand Name(Legacy)

Profit Formula:

Customization

Direct selling

Low selling cost due to direct selling

Lower prices

On site next day support.

Effective and optimized operations

Customer Value Proposition:

Low priced customized Personal Computers with guaranteed next day on site service in case of

any issues sold directly through www.dell.com.

Customer Value Proposition

Low priced customized Personal Computers with guaranteed next day

on site service in case of any issues sold directly through www.dell.com

Profit Formula

Direct selling (+)

Customization (+)

Low selling cost due to

direct selling (+)

Lower prices (+)

On site next day

support. (+)

Effective and optimized

operations (+)

Key Processes:

Direct Sales (+)

Cell

Manufacturing

(+)

Suppliers part of

dell design team

(+)

Just in Time

manufacturing

(+)

Simultaneous

shipping of

Monitors and

PCs (+)

Dedicated sales

persons for

Large accounts

(+)

On-site service

and support (+)

Information

sharing with

suppliers

Key Resources:

www.dell.co

m

Customer

Relationship

Management

(+)

Limited

Suppliers (+)

Brand

Name(Legacy)

(+)

For 2007-13

With decreasing sales from corporate accounts and increasing consumer spending, Dell decided to

follow a hybrid model instead of the Direct model. Dell partnered with retailers all over the world and in

some instances even operated company run stores and franchises. This involved producing

standardized models that could be mass manufactured and making them available extensively.

Key Processes for Retail:

Mass manufacturing

Forecasting and demand assessment

Operational effectiveness

Inventory management

Relationship with retailers

Advertizing and Marketing

Trade and Consumer promotions

Key Resources for Retail:

Brand name

Large number of retail outlets on a global scale

Strong financial position to support marketing and communications

Support and Services

Profit Formula:

Large outreach and availability facilitating volume sales

Greater visibility in consumer market

Standardized products

Operational effectiveness

Customer Value Proposition

Low priced PCs easily and widely available with good service and support.

Customer Value Proposition

Low priced range of PCs easily and widely available with good service

and support.

Profit Formula

Large outreach and

availability facilitating

volume sales

Greater visibility in

consumer market

Standardized products

Operational

effectiveness

Key Processes:

Mass

manufacturing

Forecasting and

demand

assessment

Operational

effectiveness

Inventory

management

Relationship

with retailers

Advertizing and

Marketing

Trade and

Consumer

promotions

Key Resources:

Brand name

Large number

of retail

outlets on a

global scale

Strong

financial

position to

support

marketing and

communicatio

ns

Support and

Services

Why the changes?

With decreasing revenue from corporate and SME, Dell had to look at consumer markets which had

grown 10% points from 28% in 1994to 38% in 2004. However, Dell’s direct selling methodology was not

meant for supporting it in consumer markets. Herein the PC market was truly commoditized as most of

the competitors had long line of products offering a range of features to cater to different customer

requirements. The only differentiator was price. It was a volume game and larger volume sales, resulted

in larger market share leading to larger profits.

Prior to 2007, Dell’s profit formula had been low prices by selling direct and building to order which

substantially reduced its component as well as finished goods inventory. Its customer value proposition

had been based on customized product, low prices and support services. It had no indirect channels to

proliferate its products.

Post 2007, when Dell entered the indirect channels, its profit formula changed to creating greater

availability and reach. Instead of building to order (a tactic which had enabled Dell to bring down costs)

Dell would now have to build a range of standardized products catering to consumer demand and this

would reduce its operational effectiveness, closing the gap between competitors and Dell. With the

change in business model, customer value proposition changed to focus on availability, service, product

range and price.

Competitive Profile Matrix

Following gives details of a comparative study of the strengths and weaknesses of the top 3 players in

the PC industry for years 2005 and 2012 based on key success factors for the industry:

Rank 1 denotes best performer while Rank 3 denotes the worst among the top 3.

Weightage has been assigned to each key success factor and the score against each factor is the product

of the rank and weightage for each factor. The company with the lowest score is best performing

company of the three considered, while one with the highest is the worst of the three.

2005

Dell HP Lenovo

SN Critical Success Factors Weight age Ranking Score Ranking Score Ranking Score

1 Market share 0.02 1 0.02 2 0.04 3 0.06

2 Support and Services 0.08 1 0.08 3 0.24 2 0.16

3 Established brand name 0.01 1 0.01 2 0.02 3 0.03

4 Financial position 0.01 1 0.01 3 0.03 2 0.02

5 Price Competitiveness 0.12 1 0.12 3 0.36 2 0.24

6 Channel Effectiveness 0.1 1 0.1 2 0.2 3 0.3

7 Low distribution costs 0.15 1 0.15 3 0.45 2 0.3

8 Shorter delivery time 0.15 1 0.15 3 0.45 2 0.3

9 Breadth of products and services 0.1 3 0.3 1 0.1 2 0.2

10 CRM 0.06 1 0.06 2 0.12 3 0.18

11 Global distribution network 0.08 3 0.24 1 0.08 2 0.16

12 Relationship with retailers 0.06 3 0.18 1 0.06 2 0.12

13 Relationship with suppliers 0.06 1 0.06 2 0.12 3 0.18

Score 1

1.48

2.27

2.25

Hence, DELL was the best performing company in the year 2005 amongst the top 3.

2012

Dell HP Apple

SN Critical Success Factors Rating Ranking Score Ranking Score Ranking Score

1 Innovation/Product features 0.1 3 0.3 2 0.2 1 0.1

3 Market share 0.08 2 0.16 1 0.08 3 0.24

4 Established brand name 0.03 3 0.09 2 0.06 1 0.03

5 Financial position 0.01 3 0.03 2 0.02 1 0.01

6 Price Competitiveness 0.05 1 0.05 2 0.1 3 0.15

7 High Mobility/smart devices 0.15 3 0.45 2 0.3 1 0.15

8 Low distribution costs 0.13 1 0.13 2 0.26 3 0.39

9 Shorter delivery time 0.15 1 0.15 2 0.3 3 0.45

10 Customer Loyalty 0.1 3 0.3 2 0.2 1 0.1

11 CRM 0.06 3 0.18 2 0.12 1 0.06

12 Global distribution network 0.08 2 0.16 1 0.08 3 0.24

13 Relationship with retailers 0.06 3 0.18 2 0.12 1 0.06

Score 1

2.18

1.84

1.98

In the year 2012, amongst the top three performers, DELL was the worst performing.

DELL’s Initial Value Loop (Pre 2007)

Pay and Get only what you want

Large number of Options

Updated Technology based better products

Next Day online SupportCustomized

ProductsBulk OrderBy Enterprise

Customized Support and services

Direct Sales to Customers‘customary orders’

Built to order inOwn factories

Lower Inventories

Favorable Term with suppliers

Fresh components

Large number of buyers

Low Price

Large Volumes

Economies of Scale

Low Cost

Higher Profits

Choices

Consequences

This value loop of DELL worked well during the 1990s and early 2000s. This was the direct selling model

of DELL that set it apart from the other PC manufacturers and made Michael DELL famously say when

asked, “What he will do if Apple was given to him? – He replied, “I would close Apple down”. With Steve

Jobs out Apple’s innovation was also out of sync with times.

With HP-Compaq merger the economies of scale and channel integration gave HPQ a wider market

access and they displaced DELL from the NO.1 spot in 2001. But, DELL bounced back and enjoyed No.1

PC player till 2005.

DELL’s Value Loop (Post 2007)

Large number of buyers

Wider Reach

Large number of Options

Updated TechComponents

Next Day onsite Support

Bulk OrderBy Enterprise

Customized Support and services

Direct Sales to Customers‘customary orders’

Built to order inOwn factories

Favorable Term with suppliers

Low/Medium Cost

Economies of Scale

High VolumeFresh Stock

Comparable/ Low Price

Better products

Retail Selling

Pre Build forRetail in own factories

StandardProducts

Customized Products

Higher Profits

Choices

Consequences

As seen from the new value loop, the retail channel had been added in the business model of Dell. As

the key success factors in the industry during that time (around 2007) was centered on low distribution

cost, faster delivery cycles and relationship with retailers DELL thought that by adding Retail to its

portfolio, it will be able to challenge HP’s wide distribution after HP-Q merger.

As DELL expanded it came to emerging markets where the concept of only direct selling didn’t give

access to a vast hinterland in these countries, its growth was stunted. The new kid in the block was

Lenovo, with its cheap manufacturing base and great retail collaboration it did wonders in the emerging

markets (esp. China- the largest PC market in Asia Pacific). Also Apple i-pod had been released and a

shift towards innovation was happening. I-Pad (Apple’s tablet) had not been released yet so DELL didn’t

see Apple as a rival. Its focus was more on increasing market reach and for this it added retail selling , a

kind of anti-thesis to its Direct Selling model based on built to order (just in time approach).

Has DELL’s Business Model change sustained/improved performance?

AN ANALYSIS OVER (2008-13)

Large number of buyers

Wider Reach

Large number of Options

Updated TechComponents

Next Day onsite Support

Bulk OrderBy Enterprise

Customized Support and services

Direct Sales to Customers‘customary orders’

Built to order inOwn factories

Favorable Term with suppliers

Low/Medium Cost

Economies of Scale

High VolumeFresh Components

Comparable/ Low Price

Pre Build forRetail in own factories

StandardProducts

Customized Products

Higher Profits

As seen from the external industry analysis key success factors from 20010 (Launch of I-Pad by Apple on

April 3rd2010) onwards for the consumer computing industry has changed dramatically. Now, the

innovation, customer loyalty, relationship with retailers to cater to vast emerging hinterland has

emerged as the new key critical success factors in the industry. The earlier “Better Products” meaning

has changed.

DELL’s 2007 business model change in a way only gave it wider market access but at the cost of increase

in operations cost. This cost increase has cost it dearly when Lenovo emerged as the ultimate low cost

player with IBM Thinkpad’s technology and cheap manufacturing base. Its retail network based channel

distribution is also far better than DELL’s. Thus it has defeated DELL in emerging markets where cost

plays a major decisive role. HP’s scale has kept its PC division alive and its 2002 decision to focus into

services has given it some leeway in terms of financial performance. DELL is trying to bring change to its

business model to diversify into services and data centers, but these steps started late and as of 2012 its

major revenue is still from PCs sale and no major business model change since 2007 has occurred.

THE APPLE’s DISRUPTION of DELL

With the advent of tablets the PC industry has been hit. The old Window and Intel based updated PCs is

not a buzz word in the market. Today the PC industry is shrinking and consumers are not going for

product replacements with Laptops like before (with higher better Intel/Windows cycle – which earlier

used to be the definition of better products in the market), instead opting for other high mobility

devices. The PC industry of erstwhile has been superseded by the Consumer computing industry of

which PCs are just a part.

DELL thus has been hit hard by this change and Apple with its innovation centric model has fared much

better. A comparison of DELL’s model (on previous page) with Apple’s superior business model in this

innovation driven era is shown below.

Large number of buyers

Higher Prices

Medium/Low Cost

Large Volume

Higher Profits

Economies of Scale

Path Breaking Innovative Products

High investment In innovation/R&D

Apple Propriety software

OutsourcingProductManufacturing

Software Locked i-Phones/pads

Large no. ofQuality apps

Developer ecosystem

Higher Developermargin

Network Effects

Thus the DELL’s business model has been severely disrupted as of 2013 (hit by Lenovo, HP and Apple

mainly). All this can also be seen from the Financial Performance of DELL during the same period (2008-

13) which form the next section

DELL’s Performance: Sustaining Competitive Advantage

1. RETURN ON EQUITY (Verdict- POOR)

From the above graph one can clearly see that the DELL has not performed well on the return on equity

part since 2008. After the initial business model modification the ROE increased in 2007-08 period but

that was short lived. As the key success factors of the industry changes innovation driven companies like

Apple are achieving better return on equity. This can be seen from the chart below where one can see

that the ROE of Apple is on an upward trajectory and has overtaken DELL in 2012. Thus compared to its

peers DELL’s business model is weakened and the 2007 modification has not done much to strengthen

its business cycle. Moreover ROE increase if companies buy-back shares. Dell has been reducing its

shareholding over this period so actual ROE performance is still worse than the trend shown.

2. DU-PONT ANALYSIS (Verdict- ROE POOR DUE TO POOR ASSET TURNOVER)

Du-Pont analysis is a crucial measure to determine the reasons behind the change in the ROE. Du-Pont

analysis of DELL has been given in the diagram above that highlights the reason for the poor ROE

performance of the DELL Inc.

From this one can see that the ROE increased during the 2007-08 period due to increased Debt

and not on increased performance by DELL. Dell has reduced its debt since 2008 but off late

2011-12 it has been stable.

Asset turnover on the other hand has decreased since 2009, and is trending downwards. This

Asset turnover ratio is not very good DELL (which is mainly into sales of PCs and devices) and

manufacturing company looks more like a services company.

The drop means that sales have gone down or the newly acquired assets (Dell’s over 5 year) of

DELL are not producing enough returns.

The operating efficiency has shown no improvement. Thus overall, on account of diminishing

Asset turnover the ROE has gone down. This signifies that the current business model is not

faring well in the market space.

Du-Pont Analysis Operating efficiency: Profit Margin (NI/S)

Asset efficiency: Asset turnover (S/A) Financial leverage: Equity multiplier (A/E)

DELL’s Share outstanding has decreased by

20% over the 2008-12 periods.

Apple’s share outstanding has increased by

7% over the same period.

3. INVENTORY TURNOVER (Verdict- POOR)

Inventory turnover measure how quickly you have been able to turn inventory into sales. For a

Build to order, Direct Sales (with retail since 2007) model like DELL, with low inventory buildup -

its inventory turnover should be quite high. But the graph shows that the inventory turnover

has fallen during the period 2007-12.

Also one can see from the diagram that during the period 2007-12 the inventories of DELL is

increasing has fared poorer than the other Consumer computing makers.

4. OTHER FINANCIAL RATIOS (Verdict- POOR)

Current ratio: 1.19. As a rule of thumb it should be higher than 1.5 for companies

relying on operational efficiency. This tells that Dell doesn’t have a lot of buffer against

short term financing pressures, and may be vulnerable in a credit crunch.

Quick ratio: or the “acid test” is 1.13 at present. Generally should be higher than 0.75.

So Dell passes the acid test.

Current liabilities (Debts maturing within one year). DELL has sufficient cash of around

$12.5 B but the current liabilities have increased. This may be a sign that re-financing

will be needed in coming years.

0.00

2.00

2010 2011 2012 2013

Current ratio

Current ratio

0.00

2.00

2010 2011 2012 2013

Quick ratio

Quick ratio

0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

2010 2011 2012 2013

Total Current Liabilities

Total Current Liabilities

Receivables Turnover ratio: point to issues with making sales and collecting the cash. A

low ratio of 5.8 in 2013, points to the re-assessment of Dell’s credit policy which is not

earning interest for them.

Asset Turnover Ratio: reflects the use of assets by Dell to generate sales. With

increasing assets Dell is not able to generate much profits, having a decline Asset

turnover ratio which now stands at 1.2

Operating Profit Margin: With decreasing profit margin from 0.0681 in 2012 to 0.0498

in 2013) shows poor performance of Dell. It is not able generate profits on per dollar

sales which is due to its increasing expenses over a period of time.

5.50

6.00

6.50

2010 2011 2012 2013

Receivables Turnover Ratio

Receivables Turnover Ratio

0.00

2.00

2010 2011 2012 2013

Asset turnbover ratio

Asset turnbover ratio

0.0000

0.0200

0.0400

0.0600

0.0800

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Operating Profit margin

Operating Profit margin

5. DELL: SHARE PRICE PERFORMANCE (Verdict- POOR)

Finally all of this is generally reflected in the share price performance of the company. As expected,

DELL’s stock has not fared well during the 2007-2012 period. From the charts one can see the

comparative performance of DELL. During the same period the share price of Lenovo has seen a

phenomenal increase in its share prices. Apple with its innovative devices has been dominating the

consumer computing landscape. DELL has completely missed this ride.

APPLE Price Chart

LENOVO Price Chart

The Verdict: Dell has failed to maintain its competitive advantage

With the move towards creating standardized products that would be sold in retail outlets Dell has lost

its competitive advantage of supply chain and value chain efficiency. Dell has lost its distinctiveness and

comes across as a clone of HP. Disruption of it’s original direct selling model, weakened the reinforcing

structures like inventory management, cheaper procurement of electronic components and customer

relationship. The new model does not allow for as efficient management of inventory nor does it allow

for cheaper procurement and customer relationship building. Price wars are common and retailer

margin eats into Dell’s margins.

When it comes to services, Dell again is not faring well. IBM, whom Dell seems to be following has

created a large innovation driven ecosystem based on sound partnerships. How Dell’s foray into the

service sector will pan out is yet to be seen, but one thing which is certain is that Dell has lost its unique

identity.

DELL: Emerging Markets Performance (E.g. India & China)

DELL INDIA:

In 2001, the year it became the largest PC vendor in the United States, DELL came to India. Its initial

response was to utilize India’s low cost factor conditions and sell Enterprise computing to big firms and

govt. agencies. DELL opened its first Customer contact Center in Bangalore. Later it also established a

KPO, tech support, financial analytics and procurement service center for its global customers (B’lore,

Hyderabad, Chandigarh and Gurgaon). By 2005 India had become DELL’s largest base outside US.

In 2001, the PC market in India was at its nascent stage (PC penetration in India was 5.5M as compared

to China’s 20M). The PC Industry leader in India was Hewlett Packard (after merger with Compaq). Both

Hewlett Packard and Lenovo had manufacturing factories in India. Their products were available off the

shelf through a vast retail network. This retail model led to huge pilling up of inventories so discounts

were common in the PC market. DELL had no manufacturing facility and online order took one month of

delivery time from factory in Penang, Malaysia; so sales were limited. This market scenario persisted till

2007 and DELL’s sales in 2007 were just 79,244 Laptops vs. 1 Million Laptops of Hewlett Packard’s and

0.6M of Lenovo’s. In Commercial PC shipments HCL led the market in India in 2007.

DELL’s INDIA STRATEGY: 2007

In 2007 with Michael Dell at the helm, DELL changed its business model to include retail channels. DELL

devised a unique strategy attuned to the local Indian conditions. It took a set of steps to ensure its

success in the Indian PC market.

Manufacturing Base in India: DELL opened its manufacturing base in India in 2007 at Chennai. It

developed the suppliers’ ecosystem (at SEZ in Chennai) and applied Just in Time concept like the

seven other facilities across the globe. Manufacturing locally reduced delivery time to 50% and

improved margins. It also cut wait time to a maximum of eight days.

The Direct & Retail Strategy: In India internet penetration was low; e-commerce was not

prolific, credit cards were not popular and big retail chains were only opening up. So a field

presence was important for its success. In 2008, Dell established 38 exclusive stores across India

where customer requirements of getting “touch and feel” of the products before final purchase

decision could be met. With a strong field agent team it delivered orders to customer’s door. It

also started onsite customer service.

Focus on SBMs: On top of this, Dell partnered with 600 systems integrators in India who could

take orders on its behalf. These factors expanded reach of DELL to India’s Tier-II and Tier-III

cities. To encourage Dell among SMBs it introduced Dell 360 wherein they could educate

themselves about advantages of adding IT to their businesses. It also partnered with retailers

such as the Tata’s Croma and Future Group's e-Zone for shop-in-a-shop counter (DELL trained

staff and DELL’s invoice) for its products.

As a result as of these steps, DELL became the market leader in India in 2011. The new business

model modification of adding retail channels reaped initial success. But this position remained for a

short time and by 2013 things had deteriorated for DELL. As shown in the previous section’s

analysis, in a fast changing consumer computing industry with changing KSFs, the DELL’s overall

model had weakened. This also impacted its market share in India where the Smartphone

penetration was increasing by the day. Thus as of 2013, DELL is a distant 4th in the Indian Market

trailing Hewlett Packard by a huge margin.

PC Vendor

Q2 2013

shipments

%

Market

share

Q2 2012

shipments

%

Market

share

Growth/Loss

Q2’13/Q2’12

HP 1,204,340 25.40% 404,970 10.90% 197.40%

Lenovo 386,870 8.20% 362,670 9.70% 6.70%

Acer 378,030 8.00% 402,770 10.80% -6.10%

Dell 345,210 7.30% 406,690 10.90% -15.10%

Apple (MAC) 179,680 3.80% 153,790 4.10% 16.80%

Others 2,238,280 47.30% 1,990,900 53.50% 12.40%

Total 4,732,410 100.00% 3,721,790 100.00% 27.20%

Source: IDC Quarter 2, 2013 Data

DELL CHINA:

DELL first interacted with china by exporting PCs in 1995. By establishing company owned

manufacturing in China in 1998 DELL brought its focus to china. Its market share was just 1% in 1998. In

the start it targeted low end PCs and state enterprises. Seeing high competition in low end PCs from

local vendors, DELL changed its focus to high end products like servers and storage systems (supplying to

corporations). DELL’s build to order and direct sales model worked reasonably well for large enterprises

in China taking its market share to 7.40% by 2004.

The PC market in China grew rapidly at about 15% from 2002 to 2006 when the world PC market was

reaching saturation. As per IDC report in 2006, PC shipped to China's was 21.9M (a 15% Year on Year

increase). China had become the No.1 PC market in the Asia Pacific region. But, the PC market saw

intense competition from local players and low price emerged an important determining factor in PC

sales and for gaining market share. Lenovo with its low cost, wide distribution network (4200 outlets)

and better products from the IBM Think-pad stable ruled the roost.

DELL’s CHINA STRATEGY: 2007

With only Direct sales and little focus on low end PCs, Dell was late to the low-cost laptop party in China

(growing Low-end consumers’ esp. in vast Tier-II and III cities) and struggled to gain market share in

China till 2006. With the enterprise computer business stagnating, future growth was predicted to come

from these vast Chinese hinterlands. DELL had to react to make a mark in this PC segment.

Retail foray along with direct sales: As part of its 2007 strategy, DELL embraced retail selling in

China also. It tied up with Gome electronics chain to sell DELL PCs via its strong Retail network

across China. It now understood that consumers in emerging markets (Middle East, parts of

Europe and Asia Pacific-excluding Japan) valued relationships with retailers as reliability and

“touch and feel” was important.

By 2009, 70% of DELL’s PC sales happened through I-T malls and retail stores (to contrast- the

number was <30% in USA). Dell's unit shipments increased 28% in China from 2008. DELL’s unit

shipments to BRICs (a market that grew despite the global slowdown) saw an overall increase of

34%. As a consequence of this business model change, Dell's worldwide revenue hit $61 billion

in 2008, and its profit reached $3.6 billion.

DELL in 2013: New Business Model on the anvil

From the analysis one can see that DELL’s initial business model of direct sales and built to order based

on operational efficiency and low investment in R&D has been disrupted. Even its crucial change in

Business Model to add Retail channels (since 2007) to its portfolio for increasing PC sales has not borne

the desired results as Dell continues to lag behind HP in market share. DELL has had multiple quarters of

dwindling profits and lackluster tablet sales since 2008. A diversification effort to increase its presence in

services and mobility has not been very effective. As seen from the chart below even its Services

contribution has not increased over the 2009-12 period. All these have failed to stop its market share

from declining and have triggered an urgent need to transform its business model. This shows the

business model change at DELL is yet to bore fruit and more concentrated effort is needed. DELL (Revenue

Breakup in Million USDs)

Source: http://mobileopportunity.blogspot.in/2013/04/the-dell-buyout-storm-warning-for-tech.html

DELL GOES PRIVATE TO REINVENT BUSINESS MODEL (AWAY FROM PUBLIC GLARE)

As of November, 2013 DELL has been taken private (Leveraged Buy Out led by Michael Dell has been

completed on 28th October, 2013 and DELL has been de-listed from the stock exchange). The owners are

Michael Dell and Silver Lake Partners (investment firm). The deal has been valued at $24.9 Billion. Dell

stockholders are set to receive $13.75 (cash) per share of Dell common stock in their possession. An

additional one time special cash dividend of $0.13 per share is also agreed upon. Michael Dell wants the

company to be known for innovation driven and customer service. With new industry drivers, DELL

wants to focus on emerging markets, one stop solutions provider to enterprise; R&D based tablets and

other high mobility devices and virtual computing space apart from its PC business.

STEPS TOWARDS TRANSFORMATION (Apart from going private)

DELL GOING FOR ACQUSITIONS

DELL can’t become a services company overnight and that DELL. For transformation into a company i.e.

able to serve customers in different industries with expertise of an end to end provider takes time. By

acquisitions some of the expertise can be gained at a faster pace. Even before going Private DELL has

been acquiring diverse companies to expand its capabilities like:

Storage: EqualLogic, Compellent

Services: Perot Systems

Networking: Force10 and

Security: SonicWALL, SecureWorks.

In recent times DELL has spent $12bn on acquisitions mainly from the public money. With around $9.5B

in cash, the future acquisitions it makes can very well determine the direction DELL takes for

growth/survival.

ORGANISATION RESTRUCTURING

Dell has divided its global business into four groups. The rationale behind the formation of groups is to

offer complete solution to the customers. By aligning its competencies according to the client needs,

DELL plans to be a major player in the IT services domain. The groups are as follows:

Large enterprise group

Public group

Small and medium-sized business (SMB) group and

Consumer group.

The new DELL also plans to increase its workforce and hire people in the domains like: R&D, consulting,

and sales.

Post 2013: How the new Dell will look like?

As per Michael Dell, DELL wants to completely reform its business model away from the public

speculation and scrutiny. Moving DELL away from a PC and server company to a provider of IT solutions

with software and services capability is the transformation to happen inside DELL. This way it wants to

offer end-to-end solutions to its customers. At a solutions summit in China in September 2013, Michael

Dell told that DELL Inc. might increase presence into products and services for corporate clients.

The new business model is looking at a whole range of tasks to focus at:

New data centers (This market is growing)

Still a major player the PC and PC peripherals

Services (Especially to private enterprises and public institutions throughout the world to

transform their businesses and re-stimulate local economies).

Infrastructure solutions, software, cloud solutions,

Application development and modernization

Consulting and managed security services.

The shift from public to private would allow Dell to be free of market whims and affect on stock prices

would cease to be the drive behind decisions and policies. Dell needs to look inside to recognize and

leverage its strengths. Re-inventing a business model is never easy and will require constant pruning and

oversight before it pays off.

Dell’s is classic case of the fall of the giants. It showcases the struggle a company has to go through in

response to threats and changes in external environment. A decreasing revenue from commercial

clients and the threat from mobility/smart devices, forced Dell to re-invent its business model. Dell had

to re-organize itself, sacrificing some of its cherished strengths and capabilities to rise to a changing PC

market. It shows how a company should have its risks spread and ever be vigilant to changing market

trends.

Appendix

Financial Data

DELL Income Statement

Fiscal year is February-January. USD

millions 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Sales/Revenue 61100 53060 61600 62260 56980

Cost of Goods Sold (COGS) incl. D&A

50810 44030 50610 48750 45200

COGS excluding D&A 50040 43170 49640 47810 44060

Depreciation & Amortization Expense 769 852 970 936 1140

Depreciation 666 647 620 545 531

Amortization of Intangibles 103 205 350 391 613

Gross Income 10290 9030 10990 13510 11780

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

SG&A Expense 6820 6030 7250 8510 8360

Research & Development 663 617 653 856 1070

Other SG&A 6150 5410 6590 7660 7290

Other Operating Expense 0 0 0 0 0

Unusual Expense 290 835 248 566 404

EBIT after Unusual Expense -290 -835 -248 -566 -404

Non Operating Income/Expense 53 -45 10 7 -1

Non-Operating Interest Income 180 57 47 81 100

Equity in Affiliates (Pretax) 0 0 0 0 0

Interest Expense 93 160 199 279 270

Gross Interest Expense 93 160 199 279 270

Interest Capitalized 0 0 0 0 0

Income Before Tax 3320 2020 3350 4240 2840

Income Tax 846 591 715 748 469

Income Tax - Current Domestic 465 527 663 456 706

Income Tax - Current Foreign 295 116 97 273 191

Income Tax - Deferred Domestic 86 -12 -86 50 -320

Income Tax - Deferred Foreign 0 -40 41 -31 -108

Income Tax Credits 0 0 0 0 0

Equity in Affiliates 0 0 0 0 0

Other After Tax Income (Expense) 0 0 0 0 0

Consolidated Net Income 2400 1430 2640 3490 2370

Minority Interest Expense 0 0 0 0 0

Net Income 2480 1430 2640 3490 2370

Extraordinaries & Discontinued

Operations 0 0 0 0 0

Extra Items & Gain/Loss Sale Of

Assets 0 0 0 0 0

Cumulative Effect - Accounting Chg 0 0 0 0 0

Discontinued Operations 0 0 0 0 0

Net Income After Extraordinaries 2480 1430 2640 3490 2370

Preferred Dividends 0 0 0 0 0

Net Income Available to Common 2480 1430 2640 3490 2370

EPS (Basic) 1.25 0.73 1.36 1.9 1.36

Basic Shares Outstanding 1980 1950 1940 1840 1750

EPS (Diluted) 1.25 0.73 1.35 1.88 1.35

Diluted Shares Outstanding 1990 1960 1960 1850 1760

EBITDA 4240 3860 4710 5930 4560

DELL Financial Ratios Ratios Jul-13 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008

Earnings/Share 1.25 1.72 2.13 1.59 0.99 1.38 1.38

Profit Margin, % 2.36 4.17 5.63 4.28 2.71 4.06 4.82

Return on Equity, % 20.53 22.17 39.16 33.93 25.4 58.02 76.97

Return on Assets, % 4.74 4.99 7.84 6.83 4.26 9.35 10.69

Price/Sales 0.41 0.43 0.43 0.42 0.46 0.55 0 Price/Earnings 11.06 7.24 7 8.4 12.63 12.56 0

Price/Book 2.25 2.02 3 3.32 4.34 7.89 0

Debt/Equity 0.38 0.49 0.72 0.66 0.61 0.44 0.09

Interest Coverage 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Book Value, $ 6.14 6.16 4.96 4.02 2.88 2.2 1.71

Dividend Payout, % 41.68 11.72 0 0 0 0 0

Balance Sheet

In Millions of USD (Assets) 2013 2012 2011 2010

Cash & Equivalents 12569 13852 13913 10635

Short Term Investments 208 966 452 373

Cash and Short Term Investments 12777 14818 14365 11008

Accounts Receivable - Trade, Net 6629 6476 6493 5837

Receivables - Other - - - -

Total Receivables, Net 9842 9803 10136 8543

Total Inventory 1382 1404 1301 1051

Prepaid Expenses - - 374 539

Other Current Assets, Total 3967 3423 2845 3104

Total Current Assets 27968 29448 29021 24245

Property/Plant/Equipment, Total - Gross 5300 4934 4729 4652

Accumulated Depreciation, Total -3174 -2810 -2776 -2471

Goodwill, Net 9304 5838 4365 4074

Intangibles, Net 3374 1857 1495 1694

Long Term Investments 2565 3404 704 781

Other Long Term Assets, Total 854 490 262 345

Total Assets 47540 44533 38599 33652

In Millions of USD (Liabilities) 2013 2012 2011 2010

Accounts Payable 11579 11656 11293 11373

Accrued Expenses 1674 2176 3652 3458

Notes Payable/Short Term Debt 3843 2867 851 663

Current Port. of LT Debt/Capital Leases - - - -

Other Current liabilities, Total 6343 5302 3687 3466

Total Current Liabilities 23439 22001 19483 18960

Long Term Debt 5242 6387 5146 3417

Capital Lease Obligations - - - -

Total Long Term Debt 5242 6387 5146 3417

Total Debt 9085 9254 5997 4080

Deferred Income Tax 918 405 0 -

Minority Interest 21 0 - -

Other Liabilities, Total 7240 6823 6204 5634

Total Liabilities 36860 35616 30833 28011

Redeemable Preferred Stock, Total - - - -

Preferred Stock - Non Redeemable, Net - - - -

Common Stock, Total 12554 12187 11797 11472

Additional Paid-In Capital - - - -

Retained Earnings (Accumulated

Deficit) 30330 28236 24744 22110

Treasury Stock - Common -32145 -31445 -28704 -27904

Other Equity, Total -59 -61 -71 -37

Total Equity 10680 8917 7766 5641

Total Liabilities & Shareholders' Equity 47540 44533 38599 33652

Total Common Shares Outstanding 1738 1761 1918 1957

PC Industry Global PC Market Share by Units, Percent (1996-2000)

Rank 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

1 Compaq 10 Compaq 13.

1 Compaq 13.

8 Compaq 13.

2 Compaq

12.8

2 IBM 8.6 IBM 8.6 IBM 8.2 Dell 9.8 Dell

10.8

3 Packard Bell NEC 6 Dell 5.5 Dell 7.9 IBM 7.9 HP 7.6

4 Apple 5.9 HP 5.3 HP 5.8 HP 6.4 IBM 6.8

5 HP Packard Bell NEC 5.1

Packard Bell NEC 4.3

Packard Bell NEC 5.2 NEC 4.3

6 Others 62.

2 60.

1 57.

5 57.

7

Global PC Market Share by Units, Percent (2001-2005)

Rank 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

1 Dell 13 HPQ 16.2 Dell 15 Dell 16.4 Dell 16.8

2 Compaq 11 Dell 15.2 HP 14.3 HP 14.6 HP 14.5

3 HP 7.2 IBM 6 IBM 5.1 IBM 5.5 Lenovo 6.9

4 IBM 6.4 NEC 3.4 Fujitsu* 3.8 Fujitsu* 3.8 Acer 4.6

5 NEC 3.8 Toshiba 3.2 Toshiba 2.9 Acer 3.4 Fujitsu* 3.8

6 Others 58 56 58.9 56.4 53.3

Global PC Market Share by Units, Percent (2006-2012)

Rank 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

1 Dell 16 HP 19.2 HP 18.4 HP 19.3 HP 17.9 HP 17 HP 16

2 HP 16 Dell 14.3 Dell 14.3 Acer 13 Dell 12.9 Lenovo 13 Lenovo 15

3 Lenovo 7 Acer 8.9 Acer 11.1 Dell 12.2 Acer 12 Dell 12 Dell 11

4 Acer 5.8 Lenovo 7.4 Lenovo 7.2 Lenovo 8.1 Lenovo 9.7 Acer 11 Acer 10

5 Toshiba 3.8 Toshiba 4 Toshiba 4.5 Toshiba 5.1 Toshiba 5.4 Asus 5.9 Asus 6.9

Others 52 47.1 44.5 42.3 42.1 41 41

For These years Dell was number 1

in PC shipments

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