evolving security dilemma between the us and china

Evolving Security Dilemma between the US and China: Implications for Regional Strategic Stability on South Asia

Rizwana Abbasi

Abstract

The global distribution of power is shifting from Europe to Asia-Pacific and steady fluctuations between states within Asia are also being witnessed. The strategic quadrilateral relationship, described here as a growing systemic security dilemma, among states such as the US-China, China-India, and India-Pakistan is fairly complicated. Given the anarchic nature of the security dilemma, this study builds a debate on the question of how the systemic interaction of these states, their force structure, military modernizations, and future technological advancements lead to shape the regional security order of the broader southern Asian region. The study determines that the competitive power balancing system in Asia, leads to create an unresolvable uncertainty and security dilemma among these states, based on possibilities for miscalculations and accidental war. The security dilemma among these states can only be resolved through bilateral arrangements instead of multilateral mechanisms.

Keywords: Security dilemma, security competition, strategic stability, force modernization, new technologies, arms race.

Introduction

The global distribution of power1 has shifted to Asia as China’s economy is gradually growing, with its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) currently exceeding that of the United States at the rate of purchasing power parity. Similarly, many other countries in Asia are transitioning economically, thereby preserving moderately poised growth rates. Asia has become the epicentre of the global political economy. John Ikenberry suggests that the coming phase of the world order will be ‘the post-

1 Xenia Wickett, John Nilsson-Wright, and Tim Summers, ‘The Asia-Pacific

Power Balance Beyond the US-China Narrative’ in Chatham House (September 2015): https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/publications/ re search/20150924AsiaPacificWickettNilssonWrightSummersFinal.pdf

Rizwana Abbasi is Associate Professor in the School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Bahria University, Islamabad.

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Western and post-hegemonic order having China at the center.’2 Graham Allison maintains that as China gradually rises, the US has failed to recognize that Beijing has the potential to exert its own vision for a global order, with ability to challenge the American-led global system.3 Indeed, China’s growing influence and its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) have led to a transformation in Asia, making it more prominent in global political affairs. That having been said, the US has maintained its maritime supremacy in the region since the 1970s and it appears that it will continue playing a dominant role from a distance in order to safeguard its political, economic, diplomatic, and military interests. In this context, the US and India perceive a convergence of their interests in resisting the rise of China while Pakistan is legitimizing it through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, the fulcrum of China’s Belt and Road project.

When considering the security dilemma, it is imperative to acknowledge the pioneering contributions to and expansion of the concept of a security dilemma by leading scholars such as Herbert Butterfield,4 John H. Herz,5 and Robert Jarvis.6 For Jarvis, one state’s increased security often inadvertently threatens the security of another state.7 John H. Herz argues that in order to maximize security, states are compelled to accumulate ever more power to mitigate the impact of the might of others. This action-reaction cycle in turn creates greater insecurity in the other states, compelling them to prepare for disastrous outcomes.8 This growing systemic security dilemma has been defined by Charles Glaser as ‘a situation in which one state’s efforts to increase its own security reduces the security of others.’9 The complicated circumstances between these states in Asia provides an incentive to play out various combinations of strategies based on cooperation, competition, and

2 G. John Ikenberry, ‘The Rise of China and the Future of Liberal World Order’,

Lecture at Chatham House (May 7, 2014): https://www.chathamhouse.org/ sites/default/files/field/fielddocument/20140507RiseofChina.pdf

3 Graham Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides Trap? (Boston: New York, 2017).

4 Herbert Butterfield, History and Human Relations (London: Collins, 1951), pp. 19-20.

5 John H. Herz, ‘Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma,’ World Politics, Vol. 2, No. 2, January 1950, pp. 157-180.

6 Robert Jervis, ‘Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,’ World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2, January 1978, pp. 167-214, p. 169.

7 Ibid., p. 170. 8 John Herz, op.cit.,p.157. 9 Charles Glaser, ‘Will China’s Rise lead to War? Why Realism Does Not Mean

Pessimism’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 2, March/April 2011, p.82.

SECURITY DILEMMA BETWEEN US AND CHINA 57

containment that, in turn, raise the possibility of conflict amongst them which would be detrimental to the stability of the broader Asian region.

Clausewitz’s widely used concept that ‘war is the continuation of politics by other means’10 and that ‘states accrue power to fight wars’11 and that victory is the sole purpose of war was relevant in traditional times. However, innovative technologies such as nuclear weapons, changed this concept and states began to rationalize, realizing that victory cannot be achieved in war, as bigger wars have become socially and politically costly. This led Bernard Brodie to say that ‘the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on, its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no other useful purpose.’12 The probability of a full-scale war between rising and declining powers has diminished as Graham Allison rightly argues, stating that ‘war between US and China is not inevitable’.13 However, considering the emergence of smarter technologies, smart, short, and precise wars still remain relevant, in parallel with the deployment of other coercive means to achieve national goals.14 The presence of nuclear weapons may prevent the US and China or India and Pakistan from entering into a large-scale war but the probability of a security-driven arms race problem and the possibility of smart strikes and limited confrontation cannot be ruled out. Therefore, this article aims at assessing the end means of the power competition between the United States and China, raising the following questions: what are the reasons that led to the formation of competing trends between the US and China? How closely are the US and China evolving technologies linked to a vicious cycle of security and power competition between India and Pakistan? How can a chain reaction in these states lead to adverse or stable strategic effects? The study also aims to determine how systemic interaction between these states shapes the broader regional security environment.

10 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War (New York: E.P. Dutton and Co. Ltd., 1940). 11 Ibid. 12 Bernard Brodie (ed.), Absolute Weapons: Atomic Power and World Order (New

York: Harcourt, Brace, 1946), p.76. 13 Graham Allison, op. cit. 14 Vice Admiral Khan Hasham and Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, while speaking at an

international conference on ‘Strategic Coercion: Global Dynamics and South Asia’, at the Center for Peace, Security and Development Studies (Karachi, 12 March 2019).

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US power balance and military modernization in Asia

The emerging patterns of geopolitics outlined below have compelled the US to reinforce its footprint in the broader Asia-Pacific region. Firstly, the rapid economic growth of Asia has raised the geopolitical importance of this region. Therefore, the US has initiated its ‘rebalancing strategy’– a ‘Pivot to Asia’15 meaning that it has had to rebalance its economic, political, and security commitments in Asia.16 The Asia-Pacific region spans the area from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean, shaping global politics and thereby becoming the engine of a future global economy. Secondly, the US aims to safeguard the interests of its allies while managing regional conflicts, including: the territorial disputes between regional states, such as the Northern Territories or Southern Kuriles between Japan and Russia; the Senkakus between Japan, China, and Taiwan; Takeshima between Korea and Japan; Paracels between Vietnam and China; the Spratly’s which are claimed by China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, and the Philippines; and the Preah Vihear temple complex between Cambodia and Thailand. Besides these, China’s claim to the South and East China Seas and the unresolved issues between China and other Asian states are also driving features for US hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region. China’s construction of Gwadar in Pakistan, Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Sittwe in Myanmar, and Chittagong in Bangladesh are commercial ports but their development in turn creates security competition between the US and China.

Thirdly, the US dominated the blue waters and skies of the Asia-Pacific for nearly 70 years. It maintained its supremacy in the Indian Ocean Region during the Cold War in order to counter the expanding influence of the USSR (now Russia), maintaining a larger footprint in this region to safeguard the Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs) for oil and trade routes from the Middle East. The US aims to safeguard all the SLOCs that are pivotal to its economy from Asia-Pacific to the Indian Ocean region. Having noted that, the western border of the US stretches across the Pacific Ocean where the US and its allies have shared economic interests in East and Southeast Asia.17 Japan, South Korea, Australia, Singapore, Thailand, Philippines, India, Indonesia, and Vietnam are part of this alliance system. Moreover, the US aims to

15 Oliver Turner, ‘China, India and the US Rebalance to the Asia Pacific: The

Geopolitics of Rising Identities’, Geopolitics, Vol. 21, No. 4, 2016. 16 Phillip C. Saunders, ‘The Rebalance to Asia: U.S.-China Relations and

Regional Security’, National Defence University, INSS, August 2013. 17 Michael Berkley, ‘The Emerging Military Balance in East Asia’, International

Security, Vol.42, No. 2, Fall 2017, p. 78.


navigate all the waterways across choke points from Hormuz to the Malacca strait.

Fourthly, the US aspires to secure its own exports across the Pacific, while importing quality Asian goods at a sustainable level. The US has enjoyed political influence and economic hegemony in East and Southeast Asia for decades. China’s size, its continental power potential18 (a state that enjoys secure land borders in the absence of serious local enemies), and its growing wealth are gradually turning the geo-economic and geopolitical environment to its favour. China is not only building infrastructure but also regional economic connectivity while appearing as a major problem-solver for this region. Many lesser economies of East and Southeast Asia rely heavily on a rising China. The US in turn is pursuing a policy of selective/deep engagement19 to project its national interests20 in states in this region through a bilateral alliance system. The US also enhances its assertiveness through regional institutions,21 including the East Asia Summit (EAS), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN – the most powerful platform), and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. The multilateral institutions of Asia can strengthen the US alliance system in order to maximize their common political objectives. In this context, the former Defence Secretary, Ash Carter, highlighted the fact that the Asia-Pacific security set-up is a network of bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral linkages in which the US alliance system is decisively entangled.22 In 2009, the US joined the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), resulting in the US-ASEAN Summit held in November 2009. Although the unilateral withdrawal of the US from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) has weakened its alliance cohesion in Asia, it still closely works with the Philippines, South Korea, and Japan. Its resilience in the Asia-Pacific region depends on maintaining a consistent military force in the region, introducing military reforms and modernization plans, adopting new operational concepts and capabilities to adapt to the changing character

18 Evan Braden Montgomery, ‘Competitive Strategies against Continental Power:

The Geopolitics of Sino-Indian-American Relations’, Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol.36, No.1, 2013, p.81.

19 Charles Glaser, ‘A U.S.-China Grand Bargain,’ International Security, Vol. 39, No. 4, Spring 2015, p. 54.

20 Victor D. Cha, Powerplay: The Origins of the American Alliance System in Asia (Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2016).

21 ‘The Evolving US-Asia Alliance Network,’ Center on International Cooper- ation (26 October 2016): http://cic.nyu.edu/news_commentary/evolving-us-asia-alliance-network

22 Ibid.

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of warfare; this, in turn, creates a vicious cycle of arms competition among regional states.

US military modernization plans for Asia-Pacific

The US preserves a stockpile of 4,500 nuclear warheads, 1,930 of which are retained in deployed form (1,750 are strategic, whereas 180 are non-strategic warheads). Around 2,570 are reported to be held in reserve, while 2,570 warheads are said to be scheduled for disabling for a total record of 7,000 weapons.23 The US plans on spending 700 billion US dollars to improve its deterrent force over the next 25 years.24 It aims at capitalizing 350 billion US dollars25 on its deterrent force and modernization of platforms to face 21st century challenges.

Currently, the US possesses 18B2s and 88B-52Hs, out of which 16B2s and 44 B52Hs are thought to be specifically for a nuclear role.26 The US does not deploy more than 200-300 weapons at its bomber bases in peace time. The remaining 550-650 weapons are reported to be stored in the central storage at Kirtland and New Mexico.27 The US air force will continue to improve its bomber inventories with next-generation long range nuclear bombers28 (B21 bombers) between the 2030s and 2040s.29 Delivery of its new guided nuclear gravity bombs, such as the B61-12 to arm its existing B21 and the B2 at a cost of nearly 10 billion US dollars for an estimated 480 bombs,30 is scheduled for 2022. The production of modern cruise missiles with increased accuracy31 and range is underway. The latest Long-Range Standoff Missiles (LRSO), capable of integration in the B2, B52H, and B21, are being secured at a price of 25 billion US dollars for 1,000 missiles.

Of land-based ballistic missiles, the US retains 441 deployed operational Minuteman III ICBMs, whereas an additional 249 are kept in

23 Hans M. Kristensen, ‘US Nuclear Forces’, SIPRI Yearbook 2017: Armaments,

Disarmament and International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 616-618.

24 Brian Kalman, Edwin Watson, ‘The U.S. Nuclear Deterrent Triad: Can the U.S. Afford to Modernize it?’, Centre for Research on Globalization (16 March 2016): www.globalresearch.ca/the-u-s-nuclear-deterrent-triad-can-the-us-afford-to-modernize-it/5516253

25 Hans M. Kristensen, op.cit., p. 611. 26 Ibid., p.614. 27 Ibid. 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid. 31 Ibid.


storage.32 The US air force is building the latest class of ICBMs called Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD). Of ballistic missile submarines, the US navy has at least 14 SSBNs of Ohio class, of which eight are stationed in the Pacific, while the other six are in the Atlantic, all equipped with Trident II (D5) SLBMs. Nearly 12 new SSBNs will replace 14 Ohio-class SSBNs due to their better efficiency in refuelling. The US is also modernizing its Trident II D5 missiles.33 A total of 12 SSBNs are planned, worth 98-103 billion US dollars, including 10-15 billion US dollars dedicated to research and development.34 Moreover, the US possesses 500 tactical B61 bombs of all versions in its stockpile,35 180 of which are deployed at six different locations in the European Union; they will be replaced with the more modern and efficient B61-12 guided nuclear gravity bombs.

Deployment of US inventories in Asia-Pacific

Currently, the US aims to deploy a ready military force to contain China’s growing influence in the East and South China Seas and to counter the security threat to Japan. At present, 377,000 US civilian and military personnel are working across the Asia-Pacific.36 The US navy has stationed nuclear submarines at a secret location in the region and it has more than 5,000 troops deployed in Guam37along with the bombers stationed there, which include B-1s (carrying only conventional missiles), B-2s, and B-52s. The US missile defence comprises of land-based mid-course defence platforms stationed in Alaska and California, aimed at countering a limited ballistic missile attack originating from Iran or North Korea and to counter Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) technologies that have the capability to intercept medium-range ballistic batteries or the Aegis BMD systems, and the Patriot PAC-3 batteries that are meant to intercept and hit short to intermediate range ballistic missiles.

32 Ibid., p.615. 33 Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, ‘United States nuclear forces, 2017’,

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Volume 73, No. 1, 2017. 34 ‘The U.S. Nuclear Arsenal: A Dangerous Vestige of the Cold War’, Union of

Concerned Scientists, February 2014: https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/ legacy/assets/documents/nwgs/nuclear-arsenal-vestige-cold-war.pdf

35 Ibid., p. 3. 36 ‘The US has a massive military presence in the Asia Pacific. Here's what you

need to know about it,’ Agence France-Presse, (August 11, 2017), p. 2: https://www.pri.org/stories/2017-08-11/us-has-massive-military-presence-asia-pacific-heres-what-you-need-know-about-it

37 ‘Asia: 2016 Index of US Military Strength’, http://index.heritage.org/military/ 2015/chapter/op-environment/asia/

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It is worth noting that both Japan and Taiwan have acquired PAC-3 missile defence systems. The US and its ally, South Korea, are installing THAAD on South Korean territory against the North Koreans. The US at present has 28,500 air, land, and sea troops stationed on South Korean territory.38 Additionally, multiple squadrons of F-16 units and A-10 ground attack aircraft are stationed in South Korea.39 The US and South Korean militaries routinely conduct combined drills. Japan plans to buy THAAD systems and is aspiring to procure the Aegis Ashore BMD system to station in Japan. The US has about 50,000 troops deployed in Japan40 and the two countries control the seas near China.41 The US Conventional Prompt Global Strikes (CPGS) are capable of downing or disabling the anti-satellite capabilities or Area Access and Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities of adversaries. The US has deployed advanced space and anti-satellite capabilities in the region. The US and Japan are collectively developing Aegis BMD and SM-3 Block-IIA interceptors against incoming medium and intermediate range missiles. The US is also purchasing cyber weapons as deterrents as well as offensive cyber war capabilities. The platforms that are a part of general modernization efforts42 include fifth-generation F-35 fighters with increased survivable capacity, the latest stealth and long-range attack aircraft, and the KC-46A new-generation tankers and cargo jets to enable proficient and fast track long-range positioning.43

In the 2018 ‘US Nuclear Posture Review’ (NPR),44 President Trump presented his view that the US needed more nuclear capabilities to close the imagined credibility gap.45 His administration has clear plans to expand US nuclear-weapon capabilities.46 Thus, the US will continue to modernize its strategic nuclear triad while maintaining non-strategic nuclear weapons.

38 ‘The US has a massive military presence in the Asia Pacific. Here's what you

need to know about it’, op.cit., p. 2. 39 Ibid. 40 Steve Fetter and Jon Wolfsthal, 'No First Use and Credible Deterrence,'

Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2018, pp. 102-114. 41 Michael Berkley, ‘The Emerging Military Balance in East Asia’, p. 81. 42 Quadrennial Review, US Department of Defense (March 2014), p. 36: http://

archive.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf 43 Ibid., p.28. 44 Ibid. 45 Ashley Feinberg, ‘Exclusive: Here Is A Draft of Trump’s Nuclear Review’,

Huffington Post (January 11, 2018): https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/ trump-nuclear-posture-review 2018_us_5a4d4773e4b06d1621bce4c5

46 Kingston Reif, ‘Trump Budget Boosts Nuclear Efforts’, Arms Control Today, April 2019: https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-04/news/trump-budget-boost s-nuclear-efforts


The Trump administration has announced its withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty.47 The treaty was signed in 1987 to restrain both the US and Russia from developing nuclear and conventional ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles ranging between 500 and 5,500 kilometres. The evolving US-China security dilemma has compelled the former to abrogate the INF treaty as China is not a party to it. This treaty forbids the US from procuring and stationing more missiles and weapon systems in the Asia-Pacific region. The demise of this treaty has led to a new, accelerated arms race between the US and China, forcing China to adopt counter measures by increasing the number of its warheads and delivery means to safeguard its own security interests in the region. The consequence of this would be the creation of a vicious cycle of a security-driven arms race.

China’s rise and the regional security environment

China’s economic growth rate, its evolving military forces,48 and the maritime territorial conflicts between China and its neighbours make it a prominent player in the region. Since the 1990s, China and the US enjoyed smooth bilateral relations, aimed at promoting common economic and commercial interests such as trade, maintenance of the global financial system, and stability of the global economy. However, China’s growing assertiveness in the region has modified their view of each other on various political and security matters. China has achieved the status of the second largest global economy, thereby minimizing the power equation with the US. This power transition in turn creates tough competition between the two. China believes that the US military presence in Asia creates a great threat to Chinese security49 and that the US contributes to intensifying the tension between Taiwan and China.50

Moreover, China’s socio-economic growth is increasingly dependent on seaborne trade, especially for energy imports. Nearly ‘89 per cent of 47 ‘Trump says US will withdraw from nuclear arms treaty with Russia’, The

Guardian (October 21, 2018): https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/ 20/trump-us-nuclear-arms-treaty-russia

48 Ashley J. Tellis, Alison Szalwinski, and Michael Wills, Strategic Asia 2017-18: Power, Ideas and Military Strategy in the Asia-Pacific (Washington: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2017).

49 Zhao Tong, ‘China’s Strategic Environment and Doctrine’, in Robert Einhorn and W. P. S. Sidhu (eds.), The Strategic Chain: Linking Pakistan, India, China and US, Brookings Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Series, Paper No. 14, March 2017, p. 17.

50 Michael D. Swaine, Andrew N. D. Yang, and Evan S. Medeiros, Assessing the Threat: The Chinese Military and Taiwan’s Security (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2007).

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China’s hydrocarbons are shipped through waterways.’51 Maritime transport in the Indian Ocean is limited to the smaller chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca. Additionally, at stake for China is the first island chain which stretches from South Korea via Japan, the Philippines, and Malaysia to Indonesia. For the Chinese, the first island chain is used by the US along with its Asian allies as a tool to impede China’s legitimacy. China believes that the construction of its ports is purely defensive and commerce-based for its economic connectivity under its BRI project.52

The PLA has adopted a series of contingency plans in order to contain potential military intervention in the region by the US. China sees the ‘US military presence in Asia as a destabilizing factor’53 and its policy regarding the South China Sea as ‘Cold War mentality.’54 In turn, it is modernizing its technologies in order to safeguard its economic and security goals in the region.

China’s evolving technologies and countermeasures

China maintains a comprehensive though small arsenal, adhering to the policy of minimum deterrence and NFU,55 based on a defensive posture. However, currently, it is modernizing its deterrent forces in order to safeguard its vital interests in view of the developments highlighted above. The latest number of Chinese warheads is 260 which can be delivered via land-based ballistic missiles, aircraft, and nuclear-powered submarines. The land- and air-based platforms are reported to be operational with 190 warheads,56 while others are stored in a non-operational form. China retains its arsenals at a low level of alert in peacetime, de-mated and stored separately from warheads. It continues to ‘optimize its nuclear force structure,’ while improving ‘strategic early warning systems, command and control capabilities, missile preparation

51 Jan Hornat, ‘The power triangle in the Indian Ocean: China, India and the

United States’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 29, No. 2, 2016, p. 5.

52 Alek Chance, ‘The Belt and Road Initiative and the Future of Globalization’, The Diplomat (October 31, 2017): https://thediplomat.com/2017/10/the-belt-and-road-initiative-and-the-future-of-globalization/.

53 Kristien Bergerson, ‘China’s Efforts to Counter U.S. Forward Presence in the Asia Pacific’, p. 4.

54 Justyna Szczudlik, ‘China’s Response to United States’ Asia-Pacific Strategy’, PISM Policy Paper, No.41 (October 2012), p.5: https://www.scribd.com/document/165049932/China-Response-to-US-Strategy

55 Jeffrey Lewis, The Minimum Means of Reprisal: China's Search for Security in the Nuclear Age (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2007).

56 Kristensen and Norris, op. cit.


rapid reaction, and survivability and protection capability.’57 It possesses a small stockpile of HEU and plutonium among P5 countries.58 It ceased production of HEU between 1987 and1989 and the production of military plutonium in 1991.59 Therefore, instead of increasing them in size, China is modernizing its forces qualitatively.

For instance, China has stationed a range of its Dong Feng (DF) type ground-based ballistic missile systems, that are approximately two-thirds of its overall inventory. It possesses 150 missiles of seven types and is gradually modernizing its arsenal by replacing silo-based, liquid-fuelled missiles with more survivable mobile solid-fuelled models. It is improving its C2 systems for a large and dispersed mobile missile force. China reportedly has 50-60 ICBMs. Also, its longest-range operational ICBMs include its silo-based, liquid fuelled, and two-stage Dong Feng (DF 5A) and road-mobile, solid fuelled, three stage (SDF-31A). The short-range DF-31 ICBMs have replaced the aging two-staged DF-4 ballistic missiles. It is developing new versions of the DF31B missiles with improved range, accuracy, and payload capability. Its ICBMs the DF-4, DF-5 and DF-31 have ranges of 5,500 km.-1300 plus km. Its DF-3A missiles have a range of 3,000 km. China’s DF-15 and DF-21 ballistic missiles have ranges between 600 and 2,150 km. respectively. At least 44 of China’s long-range missiles are capable of carrying a total of 64 warheads that can engage targets on mainland US.

China is building the DF-41, the latest road-mobile ICBM, capable of carrying multiple warheads. It is swapping its ICBMs and the liquid fuelled-silos DF-5A systems for the latest-generation mobile, solid-fuelled systems, the DF-31A.60 It reportedly stations the latest road-mobile ICBMs and builds advanced road-mobile ICBMs with enhanced ranges. China is also working on Multiple Independently-Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs) technologies as it has recently stationed MIRVs silo-based ICBMs capable of penetrating the US missile defence system.

57 Shanon N.Kile and Hans M. Kristensen, ‘Chinese Nuclear Force’, SIPRI

Yearbook 2017, p. 637. 58 Ibid. 59 Ibid. 60 Eric Gomez, ‘Meet the DF-31AG and the DF-26: The Big Ballistic Missiles at

China’s Military Anniversary Parade’, The Diplomat (August 8, 2017): https://thediplomat.com/2017/08/meet-the-df-31ag-and-the-df-26-the-big-ballistic-missiles-at-chinas-military-anniversary-parade/.

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Aircraft carriers, destroyers, and nuclear-powered attack submarines61 and A2/AD systems are part of its maritime power projection. Due to a low level of threat to its land border,62 China’s main focus is on aerospace and naval modernization.63 The South China Sea now is a major point of confrontation. Nearly 5.3 trillion US dollars’ worth of maritime trade passes through this sea every year. China ‘has developed a modern fleet of its SSBN equipped with SLBMs.’64 It is reported that China’s 094 Jin Class SSBN has propelled it first patrol recently. China has acquired three Jin Class submarines, each with the potential to carry at least 12 SLBMs. Moreover, China possesses two categories of SLBMs: the JL-1 (with a range of 1,000 km.) and the JL-2 (with a range of 7,000 plus km.). China is working on its latest SSBN, that is the 096 Type. The latest long-range Tang-Class submarine is in progress which is likely to carry up to 24 SLBMs.

The PLAAF possesses a limited quantity of nuclear gravity bombs that can be launched by the Hongza-6 (h-6) medium-range bomber and also by short-range combat aircraft. China possesses two types of cruise missiles: the CJ-10 and the CJ-20. The CJ-10 is a ground-based cruise missile with an estimated range of 1,500 km and the CJ-20 is an air-launched cruise missile, currently under development. It is advancing its air defence capabilities for offensive and defensive operations by providing strategic warning of air attacks, anti-air missile defence, airborne operations, and strategic air lift.65 China is also pursuing missile defence capabilities.66 It has purchased four to six Russian S-400 systems in 2018. These interceptors are capable of engaging targets at a range of up to 400 km. There are no reports of whether China deploys its BMD systems, though it has the capability to trace and engage BMD systems. China has tested anti-satellite capabilities against sun-orbital objects; it has also tested a nuclear-capable hypersonic missile delivery vehicle and possesses extensive modern offensive cyber capabilities.

61 Ronald O’Rourke, ‘China’s Naval Modernization: Implications for US

Capabilities–Background and Issues for Congress’, Congressional Research Service, February 3, 2011, pp. 24-29.

62 Robert D. Kaplan, Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power (New York: Random House, 2011), p. 282.

63 Evan Braden Montgomery, ‘Competitive Strategies against Continental Power’, p. 84.

64 Robert Einhorn and W. P. S. Sidhu (eds.), op. cit., p. 4. 65 Oriana Skylar and Michael S Chase, ‘Long-Term Competition Between the

United States and China in Military Aviation’, SITC Research Briefs, Series 9, 2017, p. 2.

66 Doug Tsuruoka, ‘China Pursuing Missiles Defenses’, Asia Times, January 19, 2018.


China’s deployment of inventories in the Asia-Pacific

Against the backdrop of recent developments, China is trying to achieve nuclear efficiency and self sufficiency. The main focus is on the maximization of the power equation to raise its profile in global affairs and safeguard its interests in the maritime domain. In addition to its perceived kinetic A2/AD capabilities, Beijing also appears to be pursuing pre-emptive options well before a conflict, with the aim of eroding US’ hegemonic designs, while protecting mobility and operations in the Asia-Pacific region.

The contention is that to maintain its regional hegemony, China needs to improve its maritime potential and deterrent force on the coast around the East and South China Seas. For Michael Beckley, China is not even close to matching US military might in Asia.67 Today, it lacks the power potential to dominate the East Asia coast68 and the potential or military power to initiate a surprise attack, naval blockade, or strategic bombing of Taiwan due to the extremely sophisticated weapons systems, early warning systems, and platforms provided to Taiwan by the US. The geographical and technological indicators suggest that Japan has a lasting A2/AD capability. Thus, Japan can obstruct China’s sea and air domination in the East China Sea.69 Moreover, US dominance in the East Asian region, its potential military bases, and its military superiority, along with the military preparation of other regional states, can counter China’s sea and air domination, both in the western and southern parts of the South China Sea. China is faced with formidable constraints and is unable to command major portions of its seas nearby.70

Summing up, many of the measures adopted by the US are perceived by China as a threat to its own security, resulting in a vicious circle of security dilemmas. It goes without saying that China is gradually modernizing its defence forces and improving its maritime strength.

Analysis: classical systemic security dilemma becomes permanent

Both the US and China are behaving as defensive realist states, with neither aiming to harm the other. The two countries are effectively moderating the security dilemma as both are working together on a range of regional and global issues. For example, both work jointly on the

67 Ibid., p. 81. 68 Andrew J. Nathan and Andrew Scobell, ‘China’s Overstretched Military’,

Washington Quarterly, Vol. 35, No.4, Fall 2012. 69 Michael Berkley, ‘The Emerging Military Balance in East Asia’, p. 98. 70 Ibid., pp. 104-108.

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nuclear ambitions of North Korea and Iran, non-proliferation, climate change, global economic growth, and mitigation of the global financial crisis. Both share thoughts on global governance and promote military-to-military relations in an effort to mitigate mistrust and misperceptions. Despite this, the US-China relationship has evolved into one of the most complex and consequential, leading to intensified bilateral competition. This reflects the existence of the classical security dilemma between the US and China and the possibility of increased friction due to the deep-rooted divergences highlighted above. Security competition has driven the two states into a spiral of action-reaction that may force them into a situation that was conceptualized by Butterfield.71 Anarchy creates fear and fear, in turn, will generate uncertainty between the two. Both the states do not necessarily threaten each other, but they are not sure about their future moves, given the rising economic influence of China across Asia. To secure their economic gains, both are striving to accumulate greater power. This power competition US measures and China’s countermeasures will aggravate their fears and doubts about one another other, without institutionalizing any constructive mechanism to moderate the severity of the security dilemma. The power gap seems to persist, leading to an escalation of tensions between the two major rivals. Although experts have rejected the notion of a ‘Thucydides Trap’72 type of interaction between US and China,73 John Mearsheimer’s proposition that conflict is inevitable between a rising and established power74 may well prove true.

The power competition between the US and China creates an opportunity for India to bolster its economy and military power to attain a higher political profile. Due to its geopolitical location, India has become a critical actor in the US defence strategy of rebalancing towards Asia. India’s modernization plans – a chain reaction created by the US-China rivalry – becomes one of the crucial elements in the systemic security dilemma.

India’s capability-based modernization and the hedge against China

The historic rivalry between China and India dates back to the Sino-Indian war of 1962. Despite this rivalry, the volume of trade between the

71 Herbert Butterfield, op.cit., pp.19-22. 72 Graham Allison, ‘The Thucydides Trap’, Foreign Policy, June 9, 2017. 73 Face-to-face conversation of one of the authors with US officials in Washington,

July 2018. 74 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W.

Norton, 2001).


two is rising exponentially.75 Although China has resolved many of its border conflicts with its neighbouring countries, the strategic rivalry with India persists. Beijing claims the north-eastern Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh while India does not recognize Beijing’s jurisdiction over Aksai Chin in south-west China. Both also lay claim to a small part of Kashmir that was ceded to China by Pakistan in the early 1960s.76 These differences were suppressed for many years, but India’s look/act East policy has revived some of the issues. Currently, China exceeds India by four to five per cent in terms of its economy and defence capabilities,77 but India certainly is in serious competition with China in order to match its wealth and power in the region.

The US considers India as an anchor or a so-called stabilizer in the Asian order.78 India is cultivating its relationship with the US in order to strengthen its own position, advancing its broader strategic interests and, more specifically, creating a footprint in the global market by purchasing sensitive hi-tech systems and technologies to energize its wealth and power.79 To contain China’s rise, India has developed far-reaching relations with the US and its regional allies. The US is one of the world’s largest arms exporters to India at present. In recent times, India has conducted regular and extensive military exercises with the US,80 as the strategic interests of the two states converge in the Asia-Pacific region. The section below shows how India acts as a hedge against China through extensive modernization of its land and naval forces that, in turn, exert pressure on Pakistan’s national security and on the regional balance of power.

75 Rong Wang and Cuiping Zhu (eds.), Annual Report on the Development of

International Relations in the Indian Ocean Region (2016), (Berlin: Springer, 2016), pp. 53-77.

76 Francine R. Frankel, ‘The Breakout of China-India Strategic Rivalry and the Indian Ocean’, Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 64, No. 2, Spring/Summer 2011, pp. 1-17.

77 Mohan Malik, ‘Balancing Act: The China-India-US Triangle’, World Affairs Vol.179, No. 1, Spring 2016, p. 2.

78 Lisa Curtis, ‘The Triangle Dynamic in Asia: The US, India, and China’, The Heritage Foundation, Paper No. 1017, (Washington, 2007): https://www. heritage.org/asia/report/the-triangular-dynamic-asia-the-us-india-and-china.

79 Ibid., pp. 1-4. 80 Rajat Pandit, ‘U.S. Pips Russia as Top Arms Supplier to India’, The Times of

India (August 13, 2014): https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/US-pips-Russia-as-top-arms-supplier-to-India/articleshow/40142455.cms.

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Assessment of India’s force modernization

Global estimates suggest that India possesses 100-120 nuclear warheads of which 56 are housed in ground-based ballistic missiles. Nearly 48 of these warheads are grounded with gravity bombs, while another 14 are armed with sea-based ballistic missiles.81 India’s functioning ground-based ballistic missiles are of different ranges, including: Prithvi-II and Agni-I (shorter-range), Agni-II (medium range), and Agni-III (intermediate range). The nuclear or conventionally-armed Prithvi-II ranges between 250-350 km. Agni ballistic missiles possibly have Prithvi’s nuclear delivery role. Agni (700 km.), Agni II (1,000 km.), and Agni-III (3,000 km.) have had successful test launches. The nuclear-capable Agni-1 (road-mobile) has a range of 700 km. The short-range of Agni variants is deployed in western parts of India, mainly targeting Pakistan. Agni-II has a range of 2,000 km. The Agni-III nuclear-capable missile has a range of 3,200 km., capable of hitting Shanghai; it is probably deployed in the extreme north of India.

The Agni-IV underwent a launch in 2015 and will undergo further tests before entering service. Agni-II, redesigned as Agni-IV, incorporates advanced technological features, including composite rocket engines, improved stage separation, and a state-of-the-art navigation system. The Agni-VICBM was successfully launched in 2015; it allows India to target major Chinese cities, including Beijing. India is currently developing MIRVs and more manoeuverable warheads.

In the air domain, the Indian air force has the Mirage 2000H, a multi-role combat aircraft capable of carrying nuclear gravity bombs. India is busy advancing nuclear-capable sea- and air-based delivery means. Along with the Mirage 2000H, India’s Jaguar IS/IB fighter-bombers are the most significant elements of its nuclear strike force directed at both China and Pakistan.

On the sea,82 India is building SLBMs. Its SSBN, the Arihant, was first boarded for a sea trial in 2014 and 2016. A second Arihant-class nuclear submarine is under construction and the development of a third submarine is also underway. India is building another SSBN, the Aridhaman, and aims at including four SSBNs in its existing inventory by 2020. The Arihant will carry K-15 SLBMs with a range of 700 km. The

81 Shannon N. Kile and Hans M. Kristensen, ‘Indian nuclear forces’, SIPRI

Yearbook 2017, pp. 641-646. 82 Yogesh Johsi and Frank O’ Donnell, ‘India’s Evolving Nuclear Force and its

Implications for U.S. Strategy in the Asia-Pacific’, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, June 2016, pp.3-11.


K-15 combines aspects of both cruise and ballistic missiles. The second class of SLBMs is the K-4, with a range of up to 3,500 km. to hit targets in Pakistan, China, and the Indian Ocean. The K-4 will eventually replace the K-15 in arming the Arihant class submarines. India is also working on K-5, an SLBM with a 5,000 km. range. Moreover, the 350 km. Danush missile system also belongs on a naval-based Prithvi-II, giving India a rudimentary sea-based nuclear strike capability.

Cruise missiles/BMDs/air defences

India is also working on the Nirbhay subsonic land-based cruise missile that ranges between 700-1,000 km. and is designed for launch from land, air, and sea. India is furthering the sea-launched Nirbhay for its Arihant submarines. It may be working on an air-launched version for delivery by the Su-30MK1 combat aircraft.83 It is currently working on the indigenization of a BMD system, armed with Advanced Air Defence (AAD) and Prithvi Air Defence (PAD) respectively. India has procured the S-400 air defence system from Russia, capable of engaging short- and medium-range ballistic and cruise missiles. It is modernizing its Mirage and Jaguar fighters and aims to procure nearly 36 Rafale aircraft to gain air supremacy.

Hedging policy and deployment of new technologies

India’s Kiev-class and INS Vikramaditya aircraft carriers have entered examination in 2013. Reportedly, two of India’s Vikrant-class aircraft carriers are scheduled to enter service by 2018 and 2025 respectively.84 India believes that, in the backdrop of its confrontation with China, it can operationalize sea denial strategies, such as sea obstruction, to scuttle China’s energy corridor in the IOR.85 It has established two important bases, the Andaman and Nicobar Command in Port Blair, aimed at advancing its dominance in the Strait of Malacca to block China’s possible penetration of the IOR. This important command has the ability to rapidly deploy its military assets in the region to safeguard India’s interests.86 This raises questions for both Pakistan and China. The major portion of the 14 billion US dollars’ worth of weapons and technology that India has procured from the US in the last decade has led to enhancing its footprint in the broader IOR and on the Himalayan border against

83 Ibid. 84 Jan Hornat, op.cit., p. 8. 85 Shahank Joshi, ‘Why India is becoming warier of China’, Current History, 735,

pp. 156-161. 86 Jan Hornat, op.cit., p. 5.

72 PAKISTAN HORIZON

China.87 These technologies include: C-130 Js, C17s, light howitzer artillery, UAVs, P-8 maritime surveillance aircraft, jet engines, and aircraft carriers.

Peter Lavoy predicted some time ago that ‘India’s military modernization programme has led to a growing disparity between the Indian and Pakistani conventional military capabilities (resulting in) a regional arms race...and/or a lowering of the nuclear threshold...’88 Rodney Jones, a leading expert, argued more than a decade ago that the increasing conventional force imbalance between the two South Asian rivals ‘has destabilizing effects on their nuclear relationship.’89 For a long time, India has been investing substantially in satellites, advanced radars, signals intelligence, and reconnaissance to enhance its new military capabilities.90 It continues to modernize transformative military proficiencies. In 2018, India introduced the Land Warfare Doctrine, which focuses on achieving swift and intense limited war goals, training an agile force and reorganizing its strike formations into Integrated Battle Groups (IBGs) to initiate limited-scale infiltrations below the nuclear overhang.91 India has modernized its army by inducting 65,000 7.62 mm rifles for swift manoeuvres and close combat.92 Khattak argues that India is modernizing its infantry soldiers with Network Centric Warfare (NCW) capabilities and connecting the soldiers with field commanders and central command to enhance synergy, integration, and coordination, thus reinforcing its limited war capability.93 Khattak has given a detailed account of India’s conventional military modernization plans which have led to a widening of the conventional asymmetry with Pakistan.94 India’s growing conventional weapons modernization and

87 Mohan Malik, ‘Balancing Act: The China-India-US Triangle’, p. 3. 88 Peter R. Lavoy, ‘Islamabad’s Nuclear Posture: Its Premises and

Implementation’, in Henry D. Sokolski (ed.), Pakistan’s Nuclear Future: Worries Beyond War (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Jan. 2008), p.158.

89 Rodney W. Jones, ‘Conventional Military Imbalance and Strategic Stability in South Asia’ (University of Bradford: South Asian Strategic Stability Unit, March 2005), p. 5.

90 Walter C. Ludwig III, ‘Indian Military Modernization and Conventional Deterrence in South Asia’, The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 38, No. 5, 2015, pp. 733-737.

91 ‘Land Warfare Doctrine-2018,’ Indian Army, December 2018, 5: https://bit.ly/ 2ALwRSv

92 Abhishek Saksena, ‘Indian Army’s Future Infantry Soldiers to Get Lethal Weapons and Better Protection’, India Times, January 18, 2017, http://bit.ly/2rjl6uQ

93 Masood Ur Rehman Khattak, ‘Indian Military Modernisation: Implications for Pakistan’, ISSI Journal, Vol.39, No.1, April 2019.

94 Ibid.


asymmetry increases the danger of the deepening unresolvable security dilemma and the arms race in the region.

India plans on acquiring six Scorpene-class diesel-electric submarines from France and is building new destroyers, frigates, and corvettes.95 The Indo-US defence trade treaty initiative (DTTI) and the two states’ agreements on logistics support will lead to increased operational competence and interoperability for India, allowing US aircraft and ships to land and refuel at Indian bases. India deceptively claims that it perceives threats from China and Pakistan. Tasneem Aslam stated that, ‘India’s batteries are stationed towards Pakistan and China, but its projection is global. China is certainly a factor in Indian military’s calculations but it is more about prestige and power projection than maximization of security against China.’96 Accumulation of India’s material power and modernization of their deterrent forces and missile ranges ‘clearly suggest that their ambitions go beyond this region.’97

India does not face a substantial existential threat from China, given its growing trade volume with China, although India’s hedge against China in favour of the US seems to create the possibility of a future confrontation between the two states. A senior Pakistani former diplomat assesses that there is no possibility of war between India and China. He also says, ‘India is displaying brinkmanship to maximize its relevance, but clearly both the states do not want to go down the path of war or any confrontation as it would impact their economies.’98 Tasneem Aslam holds a similar view: ‘China has been accommodating India, as China does not want to be bogged down on its economy.’99 For Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, ‘There is a dim possibility of war between a larger China and emerging India.’ He confirms that, ‘India may not be a military threat to a rising China as both have their own reasons, although China will continue to maintain its strategic dominance.’100

95 Siddhart Srivastava, ‘India’s nuclear submarine plan surfaces’, Asia Times,

February 20, 2009. 96 Author’s interview with Pakistan’s ambassador, Tasneem Aslam, a career

diplomat who formerly served as the spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Islamabad, February 2019).

97 Author’s interview with a high-profile military officer who wished to remain anonymous (Rawalpindi, February 2019).

98 Author’s interview with Zamir Akram, former ambassador of Pakistan and currently adviser to the Strategic Plans Division (Islamabad, February 2019).

99 Author’s interview with Tasneem Aslam. 100 Author’s interview with Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, Professor at Quaid-i-Azam

University (Islamabad, February 2019).

74 PAKISTAN HORIZON

The possibility of war between China and India may seem less acute but the Indo-China power competition has created a grave security dilemma between India and Pakistan. The Indo-Pakistan rivalry is historically very complex and it has become more complicated than ever before against the backdrop of the Indo-US alliance. India’s forward military presence and its militarization of the Indian Ocean enhances its power projection capabilities which, in turn, deepens the mistrust between India and Pakistan. These trends determine Pakistan’s security environment (discussed in the subsequent section) when it comes to the systemic security dilemma affecting Pakistan’s geo-economic and security interests in the South Asian region.

Pakistan’s evolving technologies and security environment

India and Pakistan are historical arch-rivals. Pakistan perceives an existential threat from India. The triangular relationship between the US, China, and India has a direct impact on the South Asian security environment, compelling Pakistan to modernize its own technologies. Although western estimates suggest that Pakistan possesses 140-150 warheads,101 it has a limited number of nuclear-capable delivery platforms, some of which are assigned a dual role, both nuclear and conventional.

For ground operations

Pakistan possesses six land-based ballistic missiles. It has developed short-range missiles that are nuclear-capable and such as the Hatf-IX (Nasr, 60-70 km.). Nasr is designed to offset India’s Cold Start Doctrine (CSD), according to which India can launch limited conventional strikes against Pakistan under the nuclear overhang. The latest version of Nasr was test-fired in January this year in order to ensure its ‘extreme in-flight maneuverability.’102 The road-mobile Hatf-II (180 km.), Hatf-III (290 km.), and Hatf-IV (750 km.) are also short-range ballistic missiles. Pakistan also has a liquid-fuelled, road-mobile Hatf-V (Ghauri:1,250 km.) and the two-stage, road-mobile Hatf-VI (Shaheen-2:1,500 km.). It has developed the medium-range Shaheen-III ballistic missile variant, capable of carrying nuclear and conventional warheads against India’s

101 Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. Norris, and Julia Diamond, ‘Pakistani Nuclear

Force, 2018’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 74, No. 5, 2018, pp. 348-358, p. 348.

102 ‘Pakistan conducts another successful test launch of ballistic missile Nasr’, Dawn, January 31, 2019: https://www.dawn.com/news/1461016


Agni-V. This missile has a range of 2,750 km.,103 capable of reaching targets throughout India, including the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.

In the air, Pakistan possesses the F-16 A/B with a range of 1,600 km. The later Mirage-5 combat aircraft has also been assigned a nuclear role. The Mirage-3 has been developed for test flights of the nuclear-equipped Ra’ad, an air-launched cruise missile. ‘The Pakistani Air Force is adding aerial refuelling capability to the Mirage (in order to enhance) a nuclear strike mission.’104 Pakistan has developed JF-17 fighters to replace the aging Mirage 5 and Mirage 5S. It might integrate Ra’ad in the JF Thunder. On the sea, Pakistan has established Naval Strategic Forces Command to oversee its second-strike force. It is assumed that the sea-based force consists of nuclear-armed, submarine-launched cruise missiles, SLCMs-deployed on Agosta-class submarines or on surface ships.

Cruise missiles and MIRVs technologies

There are two types of cruise missiles in Pakistan’s inventory: the land-based Babur (Hatf-7),105 which also has a naval variant. The second is the air-launched Ra’ad (Hatf-8). Pakistan has recently developed Ababeel, a ballistic missile against the Indian BMD system and is currently working on improving its accuracy.

Intensity of the security dilemma between India and Pakistan

Pakistan’s evolving security posture is affected by a few plausible strategic changes occurring in the South Asian region. Firstly, the growing Indo-US strategic partnership has deepened Pakistan’s security concerns. Secondly, the suspension of communication between India and Pakistan and a lack of an arms restraint arrangement makes it more difficult for the two states to moderate the security dilemma as the likelihood and number of conflict scenarios have increased, while avenues for cooperation have decreased. Thirdly, the emergence of new technologies and weapons systems, such as BMD systems and MIRVs, sea-based systems, and short-range missiles have made deterrence stability in South Asia increasingly fragile. Fourthly, India’s recent procurement of S-400, a long-range multichannel air defence missile

103 ISPR press release, No PR-61/2015-ISPR, March 9, 2015: https://www.ispr.

gov.pk/press-release-detail.php?id=2804 104 Ibid., p. 349. 105 ISPR press release: No PR-10/2017-ISPR, Rawalpindi, January 9, 2017:

https://www.ispr.gov.pk/press-release-detail.php?id=3672

76 PAKISTAN HORIZON

system (ADMS) from Russia seems to have had a destabilizing impact on the region. India has readied five regiments, of which three will be deployed against Pakistan whereas two will be stationed on the border with China.106 For Pakistan, the supply of the ‘Russian S-400 missile system to India could destabilize the region.’107 General Mazhar commented, ‘We are cognizant of all developments and will ensure deterrence stability at all costs.’108 It seems this development may push Pakistan to produce more missiles systems in search of deterrence stability.

The demise of the INF treaty between the US and Russia will further fuel the arms race between US and China, pushing India and Pakistan into the equation.109 Thus, it is safe to argue that the systemic security dilemma due to the induction of sophisticated technology is currently shaping the strategic environment of the broader South Asian region. In South Asia, it is the consequence of India’s power projection ambitions and its strategic alliance with the US and its hedging policy against China that make the security dilemma relatively complex and difficult to resolve, thereby creating the risk of war and miscalculations.

Conclusion and findings

This study concludes that there is an intense evolving security dilemma in the Asia-Pacific, involving the US and China, China and India, and India and Pakistan. The study extrapolates the following findings: One, the evolving competition between the US and China will endure, due to their political, strategic, and economic differences in the Asia-Pacific region. Two, China’s conflicts with other Asian states and its claims to the South and East China Seas are not likely to be resolved in the near future. This, in turn, will aggravate the antagonistic relations between the two states, creating more space for confrontation and accidental war. Three, the US still remains the dominant sea power and maintains its ascendancy in Asian waters. China, in turn, will continue to modernize its own maritime power to preserve the balance and minimize emerging security threats. The US-China power balance could lead to an escalation 106 Pranab Dhal Samanta, ‘Russian S-400 Trump gives India an edge against

Pakistan, China’, The Economic Times, 13 July 2018: https://economictimes. indiatimes.com/news/defence/russian-s-400-gives-india-an-edge-against pakistan-china/articleshow/54893457.cms

107 ‘Russia’s sale of S-400 missiles to India may destabilize region’, Dawn, October 20, 2018.

108 Author’s interview with former Director General of Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division.

109 Rizwana Abbasi, ‘Arms Control in Crisis’, The Geopolitics, April 6, 2019: https://thegeopolitics.com/arms-control-in-crisis/


of tension and conflicts with serious implications for regional stability. This shifting distribution of power generates more worries, uncertainty, and renewed chances of accidents and miscalculations. The US and China may cooperate in certain areas, but building trust is difficult in the evolving competitive regional environment. For John Ikenberry, given the backdrop of this tense environment, realist-guided anarchy will continue to triumph.110 He further states that there are strong chances that the arms race engendered by the security dilemma may lead to dangerous risk-taking and the likelihood of war.111 Four, considering the volume of Sino-Indian trade, it appears that India is working not on a threat-centric scenario, but on capability-based defence modernization to secure its supremacy in Asia as one of the emerging players. India’s military modernization, in turn, increases Pakistan’s insecurities. This strategic chain could have destabilizing and irreversible effects. In the prevailing competitive environment, all the states will respond to each other’s capabilities, regardless of their intentions.

This vicious cycle of an arms race may intensify in the near future if it is not controlled amicably. Therefore, it is imperative that the US and China initiate bilateral confidence-building measures and institutionalize an inclusive bilateral arms control regime in order to promote a policy of accommodation, thereby avoiding the risk of miscalculations or confrontations in Asia. In parallel, India and Pakistan should resume their bilateral dialogue and create common ground to institutionalize restraint regimes in order to control the growing arms race and minimize the risk of accidental wars. It is vital that the two states implement an early restraint regime112 to achieve regional strategic stability and peace.

110 G. John Ikenberry, ‘From Hegemony to the Balance of Power: The Rise of

China and American Grand Strategy in East Asia’, International Journal of Korean Unification Studies, Vol. 23, No. 2, 2014, pp. 41-63, p. 53.

111 Ibid. 112 Pakistan did propose to India a nuclear restraint regime (NRR) in 1999 but

India refused to accept it.

evolving security dilemma between the us and china

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