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S E R t ~

xecutive Summary

U//f QU Q) On 12 January 2016, two Riverine Co mmand Boa ts (R CBs) left Kuwait on a 259

nautica l mile (nm) transit to Bahrain. It was the lon gest transit the crews had eve r attempted.

Their task ing was to proceed directly from Kuwait to Ba hr ain via a stan dard Plan of l ntended

Move ment (PIM) track , wit h a brief stop for refue ling half-way throu gh the transit. From the

moment they left port , the two boats deviated fro m the PIM. W hil e t he o riginal PIM would have

kept the RCBs out of any territorial seas, the crews unplanned and unauthorized dev iation

ca used th em to tran sit unknowingly through Sa udi Arabian territorial seas a nd then through

Irani an territorial seas off the coas t of Farsi Island . When the RCBs were abo ut 1.5 nm from

Farsi Island , one of the two boats suffere d an engine casualty. T he boat we nt dead in the wa ter

to co nduct engine repairs , wh ile the seco nd RC B stoppe d and waited. S hort ly t hereafte r, IranianRevolutionary Guard Cor ps Navy (IRGCN) patrol craft approached the RCBs in a t hreatening

posture (with weapo ns uncovered) . As t he c rews briefly attempted to evade and then

communicate with the lranians, two more IR GCN vesse ls arriv ed. Th e RCBs, be ing

ove rmat ched, were then fo rced to reposition to Farsi Island where the crews were held o vern ight

and interrogated. Afte r lea rnin g the crews we re deta ined,

Comma nd er , Fifth Fleet (C5F) dir ected a military response whil e liaisi ng w ith CNO and

CENTCOM/Depart ment of State. As a result of the se efforts and d ip lomatic negot iati ons , the

crews we re released the next morn ing.

(U/ /F.OUO ) On 13 January 20 16 (C5F ) directed to

co nduct an investigation into the facts and r u~ s t n c e ssurroundin g the incident. l n d his team comp leted a Command Investigation and presented it to

on 28 February 2016. After a numb er of endor sements provided amplifying infonn ation

clar ifying the finding s of the Co mmand Invest igation , the Vice Ch ief of Naval Operat ions

(VCNO) di rected , Deputy Commander , U.S. F leet Fo rces

Co mmand , to conduct a s upplemental inquiry to provide a more comprehensive revi ew of thi s

incident, to include a discussion of the consequences of force disaggregation. This suppleme nta l

inqu iry focused on four a reas:

.J l 1 0Rl \


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RL I I f\OI ORf\

I. (U/ / FOUO) Pre-deployment Readiness. The investigation reviewed the pre-deployment

command organization, mann ing, and training to determine whether t here were

deficiencies in those areas and if so whether those deficiencies contrib uted to the

inc ident.

2. (U//FOUO) Deployment Tasking and Readiness. By the time the detention incident

occ urr ed, the R S crews were in the fifth month o f a six month deployment, three

months o f which were disaggregat ed from their hom e port in Bahrain. T he invest igation

reviewed the first five months o f the deployment, focusing on the period of disaggregated

employment to determine the effects of in-theater maintenance, sustainment training ,

command oversight, and disaggregated force emp loyment on the transit.

3. ( C) Operationa l Task ing and Tactical Execution. The RCBs were tasked to conduct the

259 nm transit w ith less than 24 hours notice. The investigation reviewed the

operationa l chain o f com mand s planning and task ing procedures. It also reviewed the

tactical execution o f he transit and operational planning and overs ight as co nduct ed by

the Maritime and Tactical Operations Cente rs.

4. (U//FO UO) International Law. The tasking letter to also

directed the Judge Advocate Ge neral o f ttle Navy to provide the inve stigation team with

an analysis o f U.S. and Iranian compliance with international law during the incident.

VADM Breckenridge s comments on that mem o are inc luded as part o f this report.

indings

U // FOUO ) The findings o f the inve stigation are as follows:

I. U //F OOO Tactical and On-Scene Failures. The RCB Boat Capta ins and crews were

derelict in performing their duties to expected norms and standards. They did not

conduct mission planning or produce a Concept o f Ope rations (CON OPS) brief; they did

not review the PIM; they deviated fro m the PIM without authority;

hey failed to report the engine cas ual ty to the Tactical

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Operations Center (TOC); they failed to report the sighting of unpredicted land; and they

failed to maintain maneuver while repairing one o f he RCB engines.

2 (U//F Q.00 ) Supervisory Leadership Failures Commander,Task Force 56 (CTF 56) a n d ask Group 56.7 (CTG 56.7)

inappropriately tasked their subordinates beyond the capabilities and limitati .ons o f heir

training and craft. They did not ensure adequate planning and preparation, and failed to

conduct adequate risk management. CTF 56's ca n do/will do culture, especially in the

face of short -notice tasking, frequently compromised appropriate risk management and

procedural compliance.

3. (U//F OtJO ) Operational Planning Failures. CTF 56) and _ _(CTG 56. 7) failed to ensure that the transit was properly planned. The transit had lackedsufficient go/no -go criteria, did not have a fully-developed communications plan , did

not anticipate the potential for interactions with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps

Navy (IRGCN) and Iranian Navy (fRfN), failed to provide Pre-Planned Responses

(PPRs) for Iranian interactions. Contraryto (C5F) i n t e n t

and the C5F staff fai led to ensure the RCBs had surface or air

overwatch during the transit.

4. ( G) Inadequate TOC/MOC Oversight. An atypical transit such as this should have been

overseen at the CTF 56 Maritime OperatiOns Center (MOC) leve l, b u t

failed to take ownership of the transit and delegated oversight to CTG 56.7. CTG 56.7

then failed to plan for accountab le and engaged Tactical Operations Center (TOC)

oversight during the transit. As a result, junior watchstanders coordinated the transit;

oversight was disjointed and ineffective, and incident response was passive and

reactionary as events unfolded.

5 (U//F OU O ) Comp liance with International Law. It was reasonable for Iran to investigate

the unusual appearance of armed U.S. Naval vessels within territorial waters so close to

its shores. However, the IRGCN's obstruction, at gunpoint, of the RCBs' transit


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infringed upon their right o f innocent passage under international law and was

disproportionate under the circumstances. Iran s boarding and seizure o f the RCBs

followed by the interrogation and video recording o f the crew clearly vio lat ed established

normso f

sovereign immunity. The RCB crews, although not operating in accordancewith established U.S. Navy procedures, did act consistently with international Jaw.

6. (U/ /FOUQ ) Pre-Deployme nt Training. The RCB crews received adequate pre

deployment training in accordance with established Fleet training requirements. Pre

deployment training and manning were not contributing factors to this incident.

Causal, Contributin2, and Other Significant Factors

(U// J1 0UQ ) The factors that led to this incident are comp lex, but can be divi.ded into one of three

categories .

(U//F.Q.00 ) Category A: Causa l factors that, if corrected, would hav e interrupted the chain o f

events and prevented the incident from occurring.

l (GI CTF 56) demonstrated poor leadership by ordering the transit on shortnotice without due regard to mission planning and risk assessment. He severely

underestimated the complexity and hazards associated with the transit. He lack ed a

questioning attitude, failed to promote a culture o f safety, and disregarded appropriate

backup from his staff and subordinate commands.

2. S/IRElll)The TG 56.7 Commanding Officer,, exercised poor leadership in that he failed to set the conditions for

success prior to the transit. Whe n tasked with extending the RCBs in the Nort hern

Arabian Gulf (NAG) , he failed to adapt support and oversight o f his disaggregated forces,

resulting in degraded RCB maintenance, declining standards, and poor morale. - l f i l e d to provide appropriate oversight o f CTG 56. 7 leadership to ensure the crews

conducted proper voyage planning for the transit, and was derelict in his responsibility to

review and approve the navigation track. He also fai led to properly train his TOCs and


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