exit venus: europe needs to be stronger about defense

8/13/2019 Exit Venus: Europe Needs to be Stronger about Defense

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FOREIGN POLICY PAPERS

EXIT VENUS: EUROPE NEEDS

TO BE STRONGER ABOUT DEFENSE

MERLE MAIGRE


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E V:E N S D

F P P

D

By Merle Maigre1

1 Merle Maigre is the security policy advisor to the president of Estonia. From 2010 to 2012, she was part of the NATOsecretary generals Policy Planning Unit at NATO. She previously worked as a researcher at the International Centre forDefence Studies in Tallinn, Estonia; as deputy head of the NATO Liaison Office in Kyiv, Ukraine; and at the EstonianMinistry of Defence. Maigre has a masters degree in war studies from Kings College London. She is grateful to DanielTwining (GMF) and Anthony Lawrence and Tomas Jermalavicius (International Centre for Defence Studies) for their valu-able comments and constructive criticism.

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9


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E V 1

E S

The economic crisis has had a significant anddetrimental impact on Europes defense

capability. Defense budgets in the Persian

Gulf, East and South Asia, and Russia are growing

enormously, often by double-digit margins, while

Europe is on the brink of falling into military

irrelevance. Only a small number of European

armed forces are available for deployment, and this

percentage falls below the usability target set by

NATO and accepted by the EU. NATOs main task

to reassure member states and to deter enemies

requires that allies have military forces of a

certain minimum quality and quantity. If the gapbetween NATOs ambitions and its available means

grows wide, the alliances credibility suffers and thesolidarity is undermined. NATO and EU, as well

as member nations individually, have a lot to bring

into the defense debate. The EU summit on security

and defense in December 2013 could help lay

groundwork for building a strong Europe, which

above all requires strong political will. Clearly, it

will take a lot to persuade European populations

of the continuing relevance of defense when

other challenges seem so much more immediate

and important. Nevertheless, the EU and NATO

politicians should make a better effort in building

a narrative that helps to assure people why strongerdefense is in their interest.


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E V 3

I

1

In the summer of 2011, then U.S. DefenseSecretary Robert Gates in his valedictory

speech in Brussels, alerted NATO allies to the

demilitarization of Europe.1Since 2008, Europe

has lost much of its motivation to project hard

military power due to a combination of financial

crisis and lack of political will. European countries

have been decreasing defense budgets without

co-ordination or consultation and without

consideration of how individual national cutbacks

taken together would affect European military

efficiency as a whole.2If this trend continues,

Europe is moving toward a combination of theunable and the unwilling.3

In March 2013, the last U.S. tank departed from

Germany.4This was a symbolic move: U.S. land

forces leave Europe and return home. The U.S.

1 Robert Gates, speech on The Future of NATO, Brussels, June10, 2011.

2 These tendencies are best captured by Nick Witney, WhereDoes CSDP Fit in EU Foreign Policy?, February 13, 2013 http://www.eng.notre-europe.eu/media/csdpeuforeignpolicy-witney-ne-jdi-feb13.pdf3 Camille Grand in Steven Erlanger, Shrinking Europe

Military Spending Stirs Concern, The New York Times,April 22, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/23/world/europe/europes-shrinking-military-spending-under-scrutiny.html?pagewanted=all&_r=04 John Vandiver, U.S. Armys Last Tank Departs fromGermany, Stars and Stripes, April 04, 2013, http://www.stripes.com/news/us-army-s-last-tanks-depart-from-germany-1.214977

footprint in Europe has become smaller, as theEuropean allies are shrinking their own militaries.

The NATO Secretary Generals 2012 Annual Report

cautioned that if the negative defense spending

trend of member countries continued, NATOs

military capacity and political credibility could be

put at risk.5

With two important security policy events in the

next ten months the EU Summit on defense and

security in December 2013 and the NATO Summit

in September 2014 it is time for a serious rethink

about European security policy. Where does theroad ahead lead and what can be done about it?

This paper describes the challenges that Europe

faces and analyses how this affects the transatlantic

security relationship. It then recommends ways to

maintain support for the transatlantic alliance in

the United States, outlines the European Unions

opportunity to reinvigorate the defense debate, and

suggests a broader and stronger strategic narrative

to explain why defense issues still matter.

5 NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen,Foreword The Secretary Generals Annual Report 2012, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_94220.htm
http://www.eng.notre-europe.eu/media/csdpeuforeignpolicy-witney-ne-jdi-feb13.pdfhttp://www.eng.notre-europe.eu/media/csdpeuforeignpolicy-witney-ne-jdi-feb13.pdfhttp://www.eng.notre-europe.eu/media/csdpeuforeignpolicy-witney-ne-jdi-feb13.pdfhttp://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/23/world/europe/europes-shrinking-military-spending-under-scrutiny.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/23/world/europe/europes-shrinking-military-spending-under-scrutiny.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/23/world/europe/europes-shrinking-military-spending-under-scrutiny.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0http://www.stripes.com/news/us-army-s-last-tanks-depart-from-germany-1.214977http://www.stripes.com/news/us-army-s-last-tanks-depart-from-germany-1.214977http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_94220.htmhttp://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_94220.htmhttp://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_94220.htmhttp://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_94220.htmhttp://www.stripes.com/news/us-army-s-last-tanks-depart-from-germany-1.214977http://www.stripes.com/news/us-army-s-last-tanks-depart-from-germany-1.214977http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/23/world/europe/europes-shrinking-military-spending-under-scrutiny.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/23/world/europe/europes-shrinking-military-spending-under-scrutiny.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/23/world/europe/europes-shrinking-military-spending-under-scrutiny.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0http://www.eng.notre-europe.eu/media/csdpeuforeignpolicy-witney-ne-jdi-feb13.pdfhttp://www.eng.notre-europe.eu/media/csdpeuforeignpolicy-witney-ne-jdi-feb13.pdfhttp://www.eng.notre-europe.eu/media/csdpeuforeignpolicy-witney-ne-jdi-feb13.pdf


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E V 5

While it is not out o

the ordinary to spe

less on defense wit

specific threats, th

challenge is to mai

the ability to quickly

regenerate militarycapabilities when

the funding sudden

becomes available

C

2Europe is not Investing Enough in Defense

Military capabilities in a number of

European countries have been significantly

affected by the economic crisis. Since

2008, EU countries combined have reduced their

defense spending from 200 to 170 billion. At the

same time, savings that are estimated to be 200

to 300 million remain modest.6The problem is

also not how much Europe spends, but how it

spends. Even though the EU-27 has half a million

more armed soldiers than the United States, only 4

percent of this personnel can be deployed at a time,

compared to 16 percent of U.S. forces.7A majorityof Europes ground forces are not deployable

because transport aircraft, communications,

surveillance drones, and helicopters remain in

chronically short supply in Europe. Also, European

armed forces have been largely personnel-heavy

and static as part of the Cold War legacy. At its peak

in 2006, the EU-27 had 3.7 percent of their active-

duty forces deployed on operations, but this fell to

2.9 percent in 2011.8A number of reasons account

for this. An acute sense of operational fatigue in

the general public and politicians is an important

cause. The defense sector also suffers from serious

underfunding.

Reductions in defense spending continue to shape

Europes military capabilities. In 2006, NATO

recommitted to a minimum of 2 percent of gross

domestic product (GDP) on defense. In 2012, only

four allies managed to reach that goal Estonia,

Greece, the United Kingdom, and the United

States.9In the last few years, all but three allies

6 Clara ODonnell, Time to Bite the Bullet on EuropeanDefence, Brookings, February 1, 20137 Tomas Valasek, Surviving Austerity: The Case for a NewApproach to EU Military Collaboration, Centre for EuropeanReform, April 2011, pp. 11-12.8 Bastian Giegerich and Alexander Nicoll, The Struggle forValue in European Defence, Survival Vol 54 No1, February-March 2012,pp.53-82.

9 NATO Secretary Generals Annual Report 2012.

out of 28 Norway, Poland, and Estonia havecut their defense budget, some by more than 20

percent. For example, Latvia reduced its military

spending by 21 percent in 2009, Lithuania cut 36

percent in 2010, Czech Republic and Ireland cut

10 percent in 2011 and 2010 respectively, Portugal

cut 11 percent in 2010, Greek military spending

dropped by 18 percent in 2010 and a further 19

percent in 2011, Romania cut 13 percent in 2010,

and Germany and U.K. cut about 8 percent between

2011 and 2015.10While it is not out of the ordinary

to spend less on defense without specific threats

or large scale engagements, the real challengeis to maintain the ability to quickly regenerate

military capabilities when the crunch time comes

and funding suddenly becomes available. This

requires keeping many residual defense capabilities,

maintaining certain military competences,

continuing with research and development work

and retaining some structures where the residual

competences would be parked until further notice.

All this is currently missing.

Defense Spending is Also in Decline in

the United States

The U.S. 2011 Budget Control Act required

sequestration cuts totaling $1 trillion over the

next 10 years.11Cumulatively, this will amount to

a 40 percent reduction of defense spending over

a decade. In some ways, the U.S. defense cuts are

normal as the country is coming out of wars in Iraq

and Afghanistan. However, the current situation

10 For a comprehensive overview, see Christian Mlling andSophie-Charlotte Brune, Report The Impact of the FinancialCrisis on European Defence for the European Parliament, April2011; See also Clara ODonnell (ed), The Implications of Military

Spending Cuts for NATOs Largest Members, Brookings AnalsyisPaper, July 2012; Clara ODonnell, Time to Bite the Bulleton European Defence, February 1, 2013. See also CSIS studyEuropean Defence Trends 2012: Budgets, Regulatory Frameworkand the Industrial Base, by David Berteau, Guy Ben-Ari, andJoachim Hofbauer, December 18, 2012.

11 Jacob Stokes and Nora Bensahel, NATO Matters. Ensuringthe Value of the Alliance for the U.S., CNAS Policy Brief,October 2013.


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T G M F U S6

European countries

with less military

capabilities mean less

possibilities to face

and oppose challenges

other than immediate

neighborhood. Thisnd of Europe is of less

interest for the United

States.

is special for two reasons. First, it costs muchmore to equip a soldier now compared to a decade

ago because the price of weapons has increased

and there are higher standard requirements for

basic equipment. Second, the current cuts are

more noteworthy because a significant part of the

defense budget is reserved for non-military fields,

such as retirement, healthcare, and other growing

benefit costs for the active military personnel. It is

politically sensitive to cut these budget lines; active

duty military would protest. In addition, Congress

is careful about base closures in the United States.

As a result of all these untouchable fields, cuttingmodernization and procurement accounts are

most realistic as this allows quick savings. Also,

the U.S. headquarters in Europe will be critically

scrutinized,12with a real operational impact on the

U.S. presence in Europe.

Transatlantic Security Relationship is at Risk

NATO has been the cornerstone of transatlantic

political and military cooperation for the past 65

years. In the decade since 2001, the U.S. share of

NATO defense expenditure has increased from 63

percent to 77 percent.13This weakens the political

support for Europe in the United States. The

imbalance of financial burden has rightly prompted

a new generation of U.S. politicians and voters to

wonder why they should continue to subsidize

Europes security if Europeans themselves appear

unwilling to make the necessary investment.14

To illustrate the point, the 2011 Libyan operation

highlighted some limits of Europes defense

capabilities: the United States provided roughly

75 percent of intelligence, surveillance, and

12 Jacob Stokes and Nora Bensahel.

13 Remarks by Ambassador Alexander Vershbow, NATO DeputySecretary General, NATO Defense Planning Symposium,Oberammergau, January 16, 2013.14 Anders Fogh Rasmussen, How to Keep NATO Strong,Foreign Policy, April 11, 2013, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/10/how_to_keep_nato_strong

reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, 75 percent ofaerial refueling, and 90 percent of targeting, despite

its willingness to take a back seat in the military

operations. European countries also proved

dependent on U.S. precision guided munitions.

Additionally, a number of European NATO

countries did not participate in the mission, simply

because they lacked the political will or capacity to

do so. Notably, Germany raised a lot of eyebrows

when it abstained from the UN Security Council

vote on intervention in Libya (together with Russia

and China). It has also set off a lively debate in

Berlin about how Germany should or should not bea free-rider on security.

European countries with less military capabilities

mean less possibilities to face and oppose

challenges other than immediate neighborhood.

European allies are less capable of reacting to risks

and acting globally. This kind of Europe is of less

interest for the United States and, therefore, there

will probably be less enthusiasm for common

military operations. The United States will grow

increasingly reluctant to provide support that they

do not see as vital for its interests. On the otherside, there is a growing reluctance to use force in

Europe. As a result, the Atlantic organization that

has been set up to maintain peace and use force

when necessary would have to take a strategic

pause.

There are increasing numbers of influential

lawmakers on Capitol Hill who lack the first-hand

experience of the Cold War times and who see

Europe as freeloading on the United States.15

The United States has made it very clear in public

statements, especially by former Secretary ofDefense Gates, reinforced by former Secretary Leon

Panetta and reiterated by President Barack Obama

at the NATO Chicago Summit in 2012, that Europe

must do more for its own security. If current

15 NATO Deputy Secretary General Alexander Vershbow.
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/10/how_to_keep_nato_stronghttp://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/10/how_to_keep_nato_stronghttp://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/10/how_to_keep_nato_stronghttp://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/10/how_to_keep_nato_strong


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E V 7

Both Russia and Ch

are investing very

heavily in conventio

power projection

capabilities.

defense spending trends continue, the practicalability of NATOs European nations to work

together with the United States would be seriously

limited. There is a risk that the United States may

lose interest in NATO.

The Defense Spending by New

and Emerging Powers

While the total defense budgets of NATO allies

are going down, Russia, Brazil, the wider Middle

East, and the Asia-Pacific region is spending more

on their militaries. According to the 2013Military

Balance, for the first time, nominal Asian defensespending overtook that of NATO European states

in 2012. This is not simply a result of Asia spending

more; it is as much a result of states in Europe

spending less.16

Even if one considered Russias and Chinas

military modernization efforts non-threatening

nature, basic prudence would assume that

European states should maintain a credible

ability to deter any potential aggression. Both

Russia and China are investing very heavily in

conventional power projection capabilities aswell as in their inter-continental ballistic missile

forces. Both China and Russia have undertaken a

set of joint military exercises. To the extent these

powers are cooperating rather than competing

against each other, this is a further danger to the

West. Beijings increasingly sophisticated and

asymmetric capabilities promise to challenge

U.S. military predominance in Asia, which risks

further diverting U.S. attention away from Europe.

Moscow is implementing a military reform to lead

to smaller, more professional, and more flexible

forces. The number of Russian military personnel

deployed near their western border has increased,

and Iskander ballistic missiles have been deployed

near its border with EU. Russia has also conducted

16 International Institute for Security Studies (IIISS) press state-ment for the launch of 2013 Military Balance, March 14, 2013.

several large exercises since 2009, most recentlyin October 2013 (Zapad 13) with a number of

provocative elements, including Russian military

aircraft flights in the Baltic and Nordic region (up

to 50 per year in 2012).17

European Low Threat Perception

The general downward trend of defense spending

in Europe is supported by the perceived absence

of threat. In a poll for Eurobarometer in 2011,

terrorism was the only external risk, named

by 7 percent of EU-27. Otherwise, economic

and financial concerns, immigration, andunemployment topped the list.18The 2013 GMF

Transatlantic Trendsrevealed that only 31 percent

of Europeans believed that war was sometimes

necessary to obtain justice, while in the United

States the number was 68 percent. Twenty-four

percent of U.S. respondents saw major military

threats endangering their country, while only 15

percent of Europeans agreed.19

Europeans feel safe, despite both novel and

enduring potential threats, such as Russias or

Chinas growing assertiveness, the unsettledsituation in the Western Balkans, and serious

tensions in Nagorno-Karabakh and Ossetia.20The

entire Arab world is in turmoil, with states coming

under massive pressure from Islamists with a

deeply anti-Western agenda. The Syrian civil war,

lacking effective Western intervention, is further

radicalizing and destabilizing a society at the very

heart of the Middle East. Along with the instability

in Egypt, this represents a significant degradation

of the security environment for all European

nations but especially those in southern Europe.

17 Interview with Kaarel Kaas, Researcher of InternationalCentre for Defence Studies (ICDS) in Tallinn, October 2013.18 Eurobarometer76, 2011.19 GMF Transatlantic Trends 2013Key Findings.20 Elvire Fabry, Chiara Rosselli EU Defence Capacity: Main-taining Credibility?, December 10, 2012, http://www.notre-europe.eu/media/csdp-synthesis-ne-jdi-dec12.pdf
http://www.notre-europe.eu/media/csdp-synthesis-ne-jdi-dec12.pdfhttp://www.notre-europe.eu/media/csdp-synthesis-ne-jdi-dec12.pdfhttp://www.notre-europe.eu/media/csdp-synthesis-ne-jdi-dec12.pdfhttp://www.notre-europe.eu/media/csdp-synthesis-ne-jdi-dec12.pdf


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T G M F U S8

Defense policy is

not very high on the

European political

agenda since most

voters do not think

it is more important

than the economy,the environment, or

migration.

One could assume that Southern Europeancountries such as Spain or Portugal should feel

more threatened and exposed as a result of the

changed international environment in Middle

East and Northern Africa. Yet, their decreasing

defense spending do not reflect any changes. Most

Europeans do not perceive direct military threats to

their territory, nor feel that their security is much

at risk. This, in turn, leads to a general rejection of

military force as a useful tool to resolve problems.

The eurozone crisis has captured the majority

of policymakers attention and decreased theirbudgetary capacity. Defense policy is not very

high on the European political agenda since most

voters do not think it is more important than the

economy, the environment, or migration. The

end of the Cold War provides a good intellectual

justification for defense cuts. People are also tired

of the Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns. In addition,

there is an increasing public perception that future

military operations will be less aggressive and will

require fewer resources. As Christian Mlling has

noted, at a time of significant financial hardship,the European publics are raising questions about

the legitimacy of the militaries and questioning the

merit of having armed forces at all.21All too often,

governments care about safeguarding employment

at home more than about preserving military

strength. Truth be told, they cannot be blamed

for that. The economy and the environment have

become risks and so as a consequence they are

given more priority.

21 Christian Mlling in Clara ODonnell (ed), The Implicationsof Military Spending Cuts for NATOs Largest Members,Brookings Analysis Paper, July 2012.


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E V 9

How to Bind NATO Together

As NATO plans to leave Afghanistan in

2014, the alliances future path is coming

into focus, especially with the upcoming

summit in view next September. With the Obama

administration pivoting toward Asia, speculation

about NATOs future has intensified. What could

hold the transatlantic Alliance together in times of

peace and growing gaps?

NATOs Strategic Concept offers some new

avenues for joint activities providing a tool of

training and interoperability. Holding militaryexercises tests NATOs command structure

and readiness of forces and logistics. This is

also underlined by the new Connected Forces

Initiative launched by the NATO secretary general.

Testing the tools and mechanisms and exercising

crisis management could be another useful way

of managing joint activities. Regular review of

NATOs crisis management mechanisms through

the management crisis exercises is an efficient and

a relatively cost-effective measure to strengthen

NATOs credibility in the eyes of those who doubt

its efficiency. Also, counterterrorism and specialforces could be a joint way to proceed. Finally,

NATO could raise its profile in cyber security,

stating this is something necessary for everybody in

the Alliance. The new Strategic Concept recognizes

that together these tasks fulfill the needs and

desires of all members old and new, northern

and southern even if not every member places

equal emphasis on all of these tasks.22

How to Maintain U.S. Support for NATOs

European Allies

NATOs value to the United States should not be

underestimated. Nowhere else in the world can

the United States find the like-minded and by-

22 Exit interview with Ivo Daalder on the Future of NATO withAdam Garfinkle, The American Interest, August 16, 2013. http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=1482

and-large reliable partners they have in Europe. Abig part of the U.S. power and prestige lies in its

ability to create and sustain alliance with European

partners. While the overall alliance cohesion

is regarded as the strength of the United States

personally, any cracks in the alliance are interpreted

by opposition forces as signs of the United States

weakness and cracks of the U.S. power.

In times of diminished resources for defense,

having reliable allies willing to share the burden of

collective defense becomes even more important

to U.S. interests.

23

A study just published by thecentrist Center for a New American Security

(CNAS) concludes that NATO alone continues

to provide the multinational interoperability,

command structure, and deployable capabilities

that make it the partner of first resort for the

United States.24The United States military power

stands as a deterrent, as no-one chooses to fight

it. NATO helps to build this deterrence value for

the United States and no soft power replaces the

needed military capabilities. NATOs great value

lies in its legitimacy as a political body.25It is a

forum of 28 democratic countries for discussingtransatlantic security questions and debating the

merits of possible military operations. As members,

the United States (and Canada) can have a direct

say in what happens in Europe.

In attempting to overcome the transatlantic gap,

Europe should highlight more positive impact and

its overall contributions. A positive example of the

narrative of European political will and capabilities

is its contribution in Afghanistan. Forty percent

23 http://warontherocks.com/2013/11/natos-value-things-big-and-small/



R

3

Nowhere else in the

world can the Unite

States find the like-

minded and by-and

large reliable partn

they have in Europe
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11/14

T G M F U S10

of troops after the surge are European. There are15,000 European troops in Iraq. There are 3,700

French troops in Mali. All this demonstrates that

Europeans are capable of defending their allies.

The International Security Assistance Force in

Afghanistan at its peak was composed of 67 percent

U.S. forces, 29 percent NATO forces, and 2 percent

non-European forces. Forty thousand European

forces in an international NATO operation means

that 40,000 U.S. men and women can stay home.

Also, when explaining Europe in the United States,

it is important to keep in mind that Europe is not asingle entity. Information about Europe presented

in Washington, DC, should be more differentiated

and nuanced. For example, the picture of defense

capabilities is not as bleak in the U.K. or France as

the rest of Europe. Libyan and Malian operations

show that some European military powers still have

the will to intervene.

Europeans should find a way of presenting

their military contribution by fitting it into the

U.S. strategic narrative and by demonstrating

a European added value. For example, Europe

should tap into the U.S. desire to avoid costly

entanglements by training, advising, and assisting

local or regional forces in various parts of the

world. Europeans are good at this too, and are

willing to bring other aspects to the table

development aid, institutions building, law and

justice. The comprehensive approach is stronger

and better developed in European thinking and

policy frameworks and this still does matter.

Serious defense and security conversation should

also take place as part of the Transatlantic Trade

and Investment Partnership negotiations. Reuniting

the West around the core NATO Alliance may be

an easier task if transatlantic economic integration

provides for greater cooperation as well as

producing greater resources for military spending.

In other words, NATO would be stronger and more

vigorous if a real transatlantic marketplace were tobe established.

How to Sustain the Momentum of CSDP

A stronger and more capable European defense is

what NATO, the United States, and Europe itself

all need. Europe has a good opportunity to focus

on defense at the EU summit dedicated to security

and defense. It could help lay the groundwork

for the two organizations to consult, coordinate,

and cooperate more effectively. In this regard, it

does not matter whether the defense efforts are

undertaken under a NATO or EU aegis. At the endof the day, what is important is that either NATO,

the EU, or individual European allies will be able to

respond effectively to internal and external defense

challenges. Naturally, a closer cooperation between

NATO and EU requires an agreement between

Greece and Turkey about Cyprus.

Given the political divisions, which currently

seem unbridgeable, what is most missing at the

EU level is not a new strategy document but an

inter-governmental strategic debate. The good

news is that EU heads-of-government may debatetheir strategic priorities as part of their planned

discussions on EU defense policy at the summit

in December their first such discussion in eight

years. EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton

has already outlined Europes changing strategic

environment in her recent preparatory report

on EU defense policy. And the president of the

European Council, Herman van Rompuy, has

indicated that he may include this subject in his

report on the state of defense in Europe for the 28

heads-of-government at the summit.

As Daniel Keohane proposes, Van Rompuys report

on defense in December could become a reference

point for the next president of the European

Council to hold an annual strategic debate with

EU heads-of-government. Having annual debates

Forty thousand

European forces in

an international NATO

operation means that

40,000 U.S. men and

women can stay home.
http://www.eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2013/131015_02_en.pdfhttp://www.eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2013/131015_02_en.pdfhttp://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/136394.pdfhttp://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/136394.pdfhttp://www.eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2013/131015_02_en.pdfhttp://www.eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2013/131015_02_en.pdf


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E V 11

The EU and NATO,

as well as Europea

countries individua

should pay greater

attention to creatin

a stronger strategic

narrative that makeclear why countries

need military

capabilities.

may not quickly lead to a new EU foreign policystrategy, but there is no hope of having a useful new

document without such discussions.26

How to Build a Stronger Narrative on Defense

Political will plays the most important part

in building defense capabilities. Generating

that will in Europe has become more difficult,

because military issues do not rate high among

peoples priorities, especially at times of economic

hardship. Without general publics and parliaments

understanding the importance of hard security

and military capabilities, defense investments inEurope cannot increase. This is where building the

narrative becomes important. The EU and NATO,

as well as European countries individually, should

pay greater attention to creating a stronger strategic

narrative that makes clear why countries need

military capabilities. The narrative could include

the following arguments.

At the highest theoretical level, the narrative could

evolve around the notion that the multi-lateral

and liberal world order we strive for does not

come for free. For the resource-poor and tradedependent nations in Europe, it is of existential

importance that the liberal world order survives.

The precondition for being able to provide modern

services democracy, strong economy, and

military ability is often overlooked.

Defense should be regarded as an insurance policy,

and, indeed, a pretty cheap insurance policy when

conducted through NATO. It is good value for

money. Hard security has a direct impact on the

European ability to conduct free flow of trade and

free movement. This requires Europe to be preparedto deploy naval and air power at critical moments

so to protect their interests. Europes interests could

26 Daniel Keohane, Does the EU Need a New Foreign PolicyStrategy?, October 21, 2013, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?lng=en&id=171319

be geographic (vulnerabilities in the neighborhood),functional (e.g. protecting energy supplies, keeping

sea lanes open), or existential (e.g. promotion of

international law, traditional defense, peace).27

Also, considering the low threat perception in

Europe, the narrative about the usefulness of

defense spending should shift from being purely

threats-based to explaining more generally why

defense matters. In doing so, additional arguments

should be considered that resonate more in the

economic crisis context. Efforts supporting the

continued need to invest in defense should includearguments such as defense is good economics

increasingly view defense spending as a means to

support employment, or regional, or industrial

policy. European governments could view defense

spending as a means to support employment, or

regional, or industrial policy.28

What are armed forces needed for in todays world?

This aspect is often a less understood side of the

defense debate. The diffuse nature of threats in an

uncertain world means that the role of the armed

forces has to be broader than merely defending

national territory. As Charles Moskos, who coined

the term postmodern military, has outlined, the

changing nature of the military in the 21stcentury

includes besides the defense of the national

territory overseas operations, peace-keeping

missions, humanitarian interventions, domestic

assistance to government at times of crisis or

natural disasters, and actors in defense diplomacy.29

Current-day military men have become soldier

statesmen and soldier scholars. The nature of a

27

Elvire Fabry and Chiara Rosselli EU Defence Capacity:Maintaining Credibility?, December 10, 2012, http://www.notre-europe.eu/media/csdp-synthesis-ne-jdi-dec12.pdf

28 Nick Witney, Where Does CSDP Fit in EU Foreign Policy?February 13, 2013 http://www.eng.notre-europe.eu/media/csdpeuforeignpolicy-witney-ne-jdi-feb13.pdf29 Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams, and David R. Segal(eds), The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War,Oxford University Press, 1999.
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?lng=en&id=171319http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?lng=en&id=171319http://www.notre-europe.eu/media/csdp-synthesis-ne-jdi-dec12.pdfhttp://www.notre-europe.eu/media/csdp-synthesis-ne-jdi-dec12.pdfhttp://www.eng.notre-europe.eu/media/csdpeuforeignpolicy-witney-ne-jdi-feb13.pdfhttp://www.eng.notre-europe.eu/media/csdpeuforeignpolicy-witney-ne-jdi-feb13.pdfhttp://www.eng.notre-europe.eu/media/csdpeuforeignpolicy-witney-ne-jdi-feb13.pdfhttp://www.eng.notre-europe.eu/media/csdpeuforeignpolicy-witney-ne-jdi-feb13.pdfhttp://www.notre-europe.eu/media/csdp-synthesis-ne-jdi-dec12.pdfhttp://www.notre-europe.eu/media/csdp-synthesis-ne-jdi-dec12.pdfhttp://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?lng=en&id=171319http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?lng=en&id=171319


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T G M F U S12

Building a strong

narrative on European

efense requires strong

adership from the top.

changed military is a reality that needs to be bettercommunicated to the wider public.

Defense in the 21stcentury is about proactive crisis

management. Those who prosper more than others

have a louder voice in determining how the world is

to be run. Certainly, not all problems have a military

solution, but maintaining strong military capabilities

and practicing engagement in crisis management can

contribute to avoiding problems for everyone. As the

former chief of the European Defence Agency, Nick

Whitney, claimed, The value of Europes armed

forces is less in countering specific threats than asnecessary instruments of power and influence in a

world where militaries still matter.30

The soft and hard side of power have to be in

balance. Soft power does not replace military

capability. As Joseph Nye, who has become

famous for the hard power-soft power distinction,

summarizes the military power in the 21stcentury

will not have the same utility for states that it had

on the 19th, but it will remain a crucial component

of power in world politics.31

Militarily, Europe is safer now than it has everbeen. At the same time, the economy has proven

its ability to destroy lives and to be a real security

threat. The narrative cannot just try to remind

people of geopolitical security threats that they

simply do not believe in. It has to be wider than

that. It will be hard to get it right, and perhaps some

research needs to be done about just what people

are likely to respond to.

For this reason, in a well-timed initiative, NATO

has asked think tanks from eight allies to assess

their national conversations on defense and toprovide recommendations on how to stimulate

30 Nick Witney, How to Stop the Demilitarisation of Europe,ECFR policy brief, November 2011.

31 Joseph Nye, Has Economic Power Replaced Military Might?,Project Syndicate, June 6, 2011.

this debate.32

As a result, it appeared that while thepolitical cultures and national views on defense

vary significantly across the alliance, there are

also some common aspects. Strategic debate about

contemporary security risks and NATOs role

are insufficient or limited to small professional

communities.33While the publics may understand

that a countrys freedom and prosperity depend

on its security, they lack knowledge about how

much the governments invest in defense, how the

investment is used, and what roles the military

forces actually fill. For example, many people

believe that countries spend far more on defensethan they actually do.34

This NATO-financed study is most valuable. All

the more, it is extremely important not to stop now

and declare the project finished, but to expand it

to more NATO countries. The resulting messages

should also be presented to EU heads and NATO

ministers so that allied politicians can use the

narrative in explaining the importance of defense

to their national constituencies. Building a strong

narrative on European defense requires strong

leadership from the top. EU countries presidentsand prime ministers need to get personally

involved, within national governments, during

NATO summits, and within European Council.

The heads of states and governments need to start

a real conversation about the strategic military and

security needs of Europe. No such conversation

currently exists at the pan-European level.

32 The contributing think tanks were the Atlantic Council ofCanada (Canada); Institut franais des relations internation-ales (France); Istituto Affari Internazionali (Italy); the HagueCenter for Strategic Studies (the Netherlands); DemosEurope(Poland); the International Institute for Strategic Studies (United

Kingdom); and the Center for a New American Security (UnitedStates). The reports are available at http://carnegieeurope.eu/2013/11/21/defense-matters/gub9

33 http://www.atlantic-community.org/-/how-defense-matters-in-nato-countriesas of November 26, 2013

34 NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen speech inCroatia, October 11, 2013, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_104038.htm
http://carnegieeurope.eu/2013/11/21/defense-matters/gub9http://carnegieeurope.eu/2013/11/21/defense-matters/gub9http://www.atlantic-community.org/-/how-defence-matters-in-nato-countrieshttp://www.atlantic-community.org/-/how-defence-matters-in-nato-countrieshttp://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_104038.htmhttp://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_104038.htmhttp://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_104038.htmhttp://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_104038.htmhttp://www.atlantic-community.org/-/how-defence-matters-in-nato-countrieshttp://www.atlantic-community.org/-/how-defence-matters-in-nato-countrieshttp://carnegieeurope.eu/2013/11/21/defense-matters/gub9http://carnegieeurope.eu/2013/11/21/defense-matters/gub9


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O F F I C E S

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